


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
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A SHORT HISTORY OF THE
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A SHORT HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES

1492—1920

BY

JOHN SPENCER BASSETT, PH.D.


PROFESSOR OF AMERICAN HISTORY IN
SMITH COLLEGE

New York

THE MACMILLAN COMPANY

1921

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Set up and electrotyped. Published September, 1913.
With new chapters, February, 1921.

PREFACE

IN this book I have sought to tell clearly and impartially the story of human achievement in what is now the United States, from the earliest traces of man's existence to the present time. Out of the multitude of facts which may be considered within the domain of American history, those have been recounted which seem best suited to explain the progress of the people as a nation. The influence of physical environment has been discussed in the opening chapter, which also deals with the primitive inhabitants. An attempt has been made to give the colonial period its proper unity and show in what manner the colonies were a part of the general British scheme of imperial government. At the same time one must remember that it is American and not British history which concerns us, and for that reason the narrative must not neglect the individual colonies. From the end of the colonial period the dominant interest is the progress of events which have to do with the common cause of independence, and after that with national development.

Much thought has been given to the proper distribution of emphasis between the various historical factors. Political institutions are the most conscious expression of the national will. They determine the form of the story which the historian has to tell. But social and economic conditions and the actions of leading men give color and contour to the figure and decide whether it be attractive or unattractive, vivid or unimpressive. This volume contains at intervals summaries of the habits and social progress of the people, while throughout it seeks to present the decisions of congress and administrations in the matters which relate to the most important phases of popular welfare. It is believed that, if well done, it thus becomes in the most vital sense a social history. My aim has been to lay the necessary foundation for those who wish to pursue further the subject of American history in whatever phase they may be interested.

In a work like this it is impossible to discuss new historical evidence. I have had to content myself with what has already been done by patient and faithful investigators. I have drawn from the results of their labors freely and gratefully. It has also been necessary to omit many things which I should have desired to include had greater space been allowed by the plan to which the book must conform. It seemed best to deal only with the main currents of history, and to follow these with considerable fullness rather than encumber the narrative with many details. If some of my readers are disappointed

through the omission of something they expected to find, I hope they will be consoled by finding that what has been attempted has gained in amplitude of treatment.

The bibliographies at the ends of chapters are intended as an aid to those who wish to read further than this book can carry them. They are classified with respect to subjects, and while they are not critical, no book has been mentioned which does not contain useful information, although some of them must be perused with discrimination. It is suggested that the investigator supplement the information herein offered by consulting Larned, *The Literature of American History* (1902), Hart, editor, *The American Nation*, 27 vols. (1904-1908), as well as special bibliographies. The books mentioned under the caption, *For Independent Reading*, are popular rather than scientific, but they generally contain reliable information. It is hoped that they may be of value to students who wish to read American history during vacations and to others who read through their own initiative.

Finally, the author's thanks are due to Professor Marshall S. Brown of New York University, who kindly read and criticised the completed manuscript, but who is in no way responsible for the errors herein contained.

J. S. B.

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
1913.

PREFACE TO THE ENLARGED EDITION

THE progress of time makes it necessary to add to this book an account of the events that have occurred since the work was published in 1913. At that time a new administration was coming into office: at the present it is going out. To treat in proper perspective a period so close at hand and to interpret rightly its many disputed points may well tax the resources of the wisest historian. I hope for the same consideration from the public in this respect that has been so generously extended to the book in other respects. I have given my serious attention to determining what to omit as comparatively unimportant, and how to combine and emphasize the facts that are presented. If I have made mistakes in doing so, I have at least avoided some I might have made by following another course.

J. S. B.

March 3, 1921.





tion they furnish the basis of great industrial activity. They represent enormous values in themselves, they support a large body of laborers, and they enter so extensively into modern production that many manufactories are sure to spring up in the neighborhood. The result is rich and densely settled areas, numerous cities, and the various important influences which naturally accompany them. Most parts of the United States are near coal deposits, but the richest coal-bearing area is that lying chiefly on the western slope of the Alleghanies extending from northern Alabama in the southwest to southern New York in the North. This belt at the southern part is about thirty miles broad, but near the northern end it spreads out in a great bulb reaching from Cumberland, Maryland, to Newark, Ohio. The deposit in most of the region is bituminous, but in the northeastern part, near Scranton, Pennsylvania, is a rich anthracite field, an area of four hundred and seventy-two square miles, which surpasses in mineral wealth any other region of the same size in the world.

The anthracite coal fields were discovered in 1790 by a hunter whose strange stories of stones that burned in his campfire attracted attention. Investigation revealed on the Mauch Chunk a hill of excellent coal fifty feet high with a surface of forty acres. It was long before the people came to understand the use of anthracite, or **Discovery of "stone coal."** Tradition relates that when it was first **Anthracite.** offered for sale in Philadelphia in 1812 purchasers were unable to burn it and drove the seller out of town for a swindler. Another story is that an iron manufacturer not long after this tried to use it in his furnace. All the forenoon he poked at the fire to make it burn, but had no success. Finally he closed the furnace door in disgust and went to his dinner. On his return the coal was burning brightly; he had left the drafts open, and the accident is supposed to have revealed the secret of the use of anthracite coal. At any rate, this fuel has been widely used in America from about 1825.

Most of the Alleghany coal fields are bituminous. The best portion of them is around Pittsburg, where there are, also, good deposits of iron ore and limestone necessary for iron smelting. Other rich portions of the general field are in eastern Ohio, West Virginia, Kentucky, Tennessee, northern Georgia, and Alabama. Another considerable bituminous coal field is the Central. It lies in Indiana, Illinois, and western Kentucky, with sporadic deposits in some of the neighboring states. Its total area is fifty thousand square miles, and the block coal which it yields is very satisfactory for furnaces. In the Rocky Mountains are much lignite and some bituminous coal. On the Pacific coast are moderate deposits in California, Oregon, and Washington; and recent investigation has shown valuable deposits in Alaska.

**Distribution
of Coal
Deposits.**

The coal supply of the United States is greater in proportion to the national area and more accessible than that of Europe. We have one

square mile of coal for every ten square miles of surface: Europe has one for one hundred and eighty-eight. Besides this, our seams are thicker and nearer the surface. In industrial endurance we are, therefore, likely to surpass any other continent, except Asia, where China has immense beds. These coal beds bring the Orient into the range of world politics, and are apt to bring our own Pacific coast into close relations with that part of the world in the future.

Iron ore was worked in most of the colonies before the revolution. At that time furnaces were fired with charcoal, which was plentifully

Iron Works. obtained from the forests. Most of the enterprises were small. There were smelting furnaces, bloomeries for the production of wrought iron, and hammers for making bars; and the total output gave the colonists a large part of their iron implements, and iron in some forms was sent abroad.

Roebuck's invention in 1760, by which coal was used in blast furnaces, and the introduction in 1790 of the steam engine to operate the blast caused a revolution in iron mining. Charcoal furnaces were discarded, and the iron industry in the United States was confined to the regions which yielded mineral coal. Western Pennsylvania became a very important center of the industry, and northern Ohio in the Cleveland region, where the rich ores from Lake Superior could meet by water transportation the coal from the Alleghany coal region, became not only noted for the earlier forms of iron working, but it became the home of many factories established to produce the articles in which iron is the chief material. The same thing may be said of other regions, as West Virginia, eastern Tennessee, and northern Alabama. The Alleghany and Central coal fields, and the regions contiguous to them, seem, therefore, to be one of the most important underlying physical factors of our history, and one which will probably gain influence in the future.

Coal oils are abundant in the upper Ohio valley and are found in paying quantities in other regions, as Kansas, Nebraska, and Texas.

Mineral Oil. In regions where there has been little geological disturbance they accumulate beneath the surface in great lakes. There is, also, in the Ohio valley and extending eastward into Virginia, an area of oil-bearing shale as large as the states of New York and Pennsylvania combined. It is one hundred and fifty feet deep and ten per cent of it is oil. If satisfactory means can be found to extract this product, it will become a vast resource when the oil deposits proper are exhausted.

Gold in lodes is found on the Atlantic coast from Newfoundland to central Alabama. Before its discovery in California in 1849 it was

Gold. mined profitably in the southern part of this eastern belt, but the greater productiveness of the western fields has made it nearly unprofitable to work the eastern mines. All the Cordilleran region contains gold, and its discovery in California led to great results.

Very rich mines have been opened in Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Utah, and other neighboring states. The last notable gold area discovered in America is the Klondike fields, opened in 1897. Although they are in Canadian territory access to them is through Alaska, and the historical results in that territory have been important. In 1859 two prospectors, Comstock and Jenrode, found a rich silver region on Mount Davidson, at what is now Virginia City, Nevada. Rapid developments followed, other regions were discovered, and it was at length seen that in Nevada, Colorado, Arizona, New Mexico, Utah, Montana, and Wyoming were vast deposits. This development, with the progress of gold mining, gave a strong stimulus to the settlement of the mountain region. Railroads were built, the Indians were pressed back, states were created, and important industrial and political consequences followed.

Silver.

The natural conditions in the United States which most affect manufactures are factory power and labor supply. In the earliest times the most important form of the former was water-power. In New England the coastal plain is narrow and comparatively precipitous. Here water-power is excellent, and it was utilized long before the revolution. The coming of steam power lessened New England's advantage in this respect, but did not remove it entirely. As the coal supplies are reduced, water-power, whose force is constant, must tend to recover something of its former superiority. South of New England the coast plain becomes wider and the rivers have less fall. In the Carolinas the plain is so level and the evaporation through the long summers so great that water-powers are not very important, and only on the largest rivers is there a constant supply throughout the year. Generally speaking, the region between the Appalachians and the Rockies is level, and good water-power is scarce; but there are exceptions, the most notable being Niagara Falls, where there is great possibility for service. That part of the Pacific coast which lies between the Coast Range and the Sierra Nevada Mountains has good water-power. The Willamette near Portland has a fall of forty feet which produces energy equal to a million horsepower.

Water-power.

EARLY INHABITANTS

The most recent investigations have tended to show that man existed in England, Germany, and Java either within or before the glacial period, the basis of the contention being the discovery of very early skulls. His earliest authentic traces in America do not point to so remote a period. We have, however, a disputed claim, which, if conceded, would give the American man a very early origin. In 1866 workmen digging a mine-shaft in Calaveras county, California, reported the discovery of a human skull in gold-bearing gravel of what is generally held to be the pliocene age, although

The Calaveras Skull.

some geologists have made it as late as pleistocene. The existence of human life at so early a time was so improbable that a dispute at once arose as to the genuineness of the discovery, with the result that most authorities rejected the claim because the skull was found by untrained persons, or concluded that it was either intruded into strata artificially or that the strata themselves were irregular. The reported discovery in 1913 of a skull in pliocene strata in Sussex county, England, would, however, if confirmed by experts, give some support to those who defend the Calaveras skull.

Another claim is that the presence of man in the glacial period, or immediately afterwards, is shown by finding stone implements fashioned by man in river drift along the Delaware river and in Ohio and Minnesota. This claim is also disputed, the supposition being that the implements found were intruded from the surface at a much later period. The controversy over this matter has been long and warm, but the defenders have found a valuable ally in Volk, whose recent investigations have enabled him to say that the existence of man on the Delaware in the glacial period cannot be doubted.

A surer basis of reasoning is the skulls found in 1902 at Lansing, Kansas, in a silt stratum on the banks of the Missouri. Two opinions arose as to their antiquity. One held that they were deposited in the glacial or post-glacial period and were covered by *débris* which the river brought down from the melting glaciers. Others held that they were deposited much later and were covered with silt by the shifting currents of the Missouri. The second view is more conservative, and has been generally accepted. By it the Lansing skulls have been in position not less than one thousand, and possibly thirty thousand, years. Investigation shows that the skulls are those of American Indians. Eliminating the claims not universally received, they seem to be the earliest evidence of man in America.

In various parts of the United States are earth mounds of great antiquity. Some are conical, others elongated, others pyramidal, and others are irregularly shaped. The first class are usually burial mounds: the uses of the others are not known. Some persons have been able to discern in the irregular ones a resemblance to certain animals, as the Serpent Mound in Adams county, Ohio. They are so far superior in construction to the works of the Indians whom the whites found in North America, that it was thought that they were made by a distinct race. This conclusion is now generally discredited. It is agreed that they are of Indian origin, although they probably were created by a superior and now forgotten branch of that race.

Of similar interest are the "Cliff Dwellers," so called from the nature of their dwellings, placed on inaccessible ledges on the steep sides of

cañons in the southwest. They lived chiefly in the Mesa Verde region of Colorado, where their houses vary in size from one room to more than a hundred. The buildings were evidently made in secure places to protect the occupants from the attacks of stronger, though less civilized, enemies who roamed the plains. Their walls were of stone, and in the ruins are found evidences of a culture more advanced than that of most of the Indians. It was formerly assumed that the "Cliff Dwellers" were a distinct race, but it is now believed that with the Pueblo Indians, the ancient Mexicans, the Mayas of Yucatan, and the early Peruvians, they were only more highly cultivated branches of the one original American race which survives in the Indians.

"Cliff
Dwellers."

THE INDIANS

There has been much speculation about the origin of this race, but no theory advanced has been free from serious difficulties. The only point definitely received is that at one time northeastern Asia and northwestern America "formed one culture area"; but it cannot be asserted that the Americans came from Asia or that the Asians came from America. Future investigation may give more satisfactory results, but in a field where so much is doubtful we are for the present forced to suspend judgment.

Origin of
Indians.

Although there is unity of general characteristics, there are striking variations in the Indians, and it has become the rule to group the tribes by these variations, the most notable of which are in culture, physical characteristics, and language. Linguistic differences are most easily observed, and language is taken as the basis of the groups, or families, as they are called. But this kind of variation does not always coincide with the others, and sometimes we find a small number of Indians remotely settled from those to whom by language they seem to be closely related. On this basis the United States Bureau of Ethnology divides the Indians north of Mexico into fifty-nine families, the most important of which are:

Classifica-
tion of
Indians.

1. *The Algonquian Family*, inhabiting Canada from Hudson's Bay southward and extending west as far as British Columbia, and in the United States covering all New England, New Jersey, Delaware, eastern Pennsylvania, most of Maryland and Virginia, and practically all of the Ohio valley, with the Northwest as far as the upper waters of the Mississippi. Among them were the Algonkins proper, Pequots, Narragansetts, Mohegans, Powhatans, Pamlicos, Delawares, Shawnees, Miamis, Kickapoos, Illinois, Fox, Cheyennes, and Arapahoes. Here one sees the irregularity of the geographical distribution of tribes linguistically related. The Algonquian group on the north Atlantic coast was divided from the central body by the Iroquoian family, which persistently held the country between Lake Erie and the Hudson, and

far south were the Pamlicos in North Carolina, while much farther west, beyond a vast country occupied by a Siouan stock, were the Cheyennes and Arapahoes. By what means the sporadic tribes became isolated from the great mass of the family is not known.

2. *The Iroquoian Family*, whose chief group lived in New York and western Pennsylvania, on both shores of Lake Erie and Lake Ontario, and on the St. Lawrence as far as Quebec. There were two southern groups, not connected with one another or with the northern group: one was the Cherokees in the southern extremity of the Appalachian Mountain chain, and the other comprised the Tuscaroras and Nottoways in eastern North Carolina. Of the northern group the tribes of greatest historical significance were: the Mohawks, Oneidas, Senecas, Onondagas, and Cayugas, — generally called "The Five Nations," — and the Conestogas, Eries, and Wyandots or Hurons.

3. *The Muskogean Family*, who occupied most of Georgia, the upper strip of Florida, Alabama, Mississippi, and that part of Tennessee lying south and west of the Cumberland. The chief tribes were the Creeks, Choctaws, Chickasaws, Seminoles, Alabamas, and Apalachis.

4. *The Siouan Family*, the chief group of which lived west of the upper Mississippi and throughout most of the Missouri valley. It included the Dakotas, Omahas, Winnebagos, Crows, Iowas, Missouris, and the Osage Indians. An eastern group lived in the western Carolinas, where their principal tribe was the Catawbas. A small sporadic tribe, the Biloxis, lived on the Gulf coast east of the mouth of the Pearl river.

5. *The Caddoan Family*, whose home on the Gulf west of the mouth of the Mississippi extended northward so as to cover most of Louisiana, the eastern half of Texas, and the southern parts of Arkansas and Indian Territory. The historically important tribes were the Caddos, Pawnees, and Wichitas.

6. *The Shoshonean Family*, living in western Texas, New Mexico, Colorado, northern Arizona, Nevada, Utah, Idaho, Oregon, and parts of Wyoming and Montana. Its notable tribes were the Shoshones, Comanches, Paiutes, and Utes.

7. *The Shahaptian Family*, living chiefly in southern Washington. Their important tribes were the Nez Percé, Umatillas, and Walla Wallas.

8. *The Salishan Family*, whose home was in northern Washington and British Columbia, and whose chief tribe was the Spokanes.

9. *The Athapascan Family*, who lived chiefly on the northern Pacific coast from British Columbia to Alaska, and extended into the interior so as to fill up the McKenzie valley. But there was a detached group in western Oregon, another in California, and still another in New Mexico and parts of Arizona and Texas, where lived the long remembered Apaches and Navajos.

10. *The Eskimauan Family*, living in Arctic regions from Greenland

and Labrador on the east to the region beyond the Aleutian Islands on the west. They are divided by localities into Greenland, Labrador, Central, Alaskan, Aleutian, and Asiatic.

The classification includes, also, a large number of very small families, more than thirty of which are upon the Pacific slope. It represents with reasonable accuracy the distribution of the more important historic families at the time they came within the knowledge of Europeans. The distance at which some detached tribe is located from the mass of the family indicates how far the Indians must have wandered, searching for good hunting grounds or impelled by struggles with other tribes. The dialectic differences between separated portions of the same family seem to indicate the lapse of long periods since separation.

The Indians had little capacity to subdue nature. Hunting and fishing were ever the chief means of subsistence of most of the tribes, and, except in a few quiet groups of the warm Southwest, agriculture was subsidiary to these natural supplies. Where so much depended on outside resources habits varied widely with environment. Not only means of support, but the character of the houses, and to some extent social and religious ideals, were modified by external conditions. Thus it happened that in the area occupied by one of the large families there were apt to be wide variations of culture, and classification by culture would give different groups from the linguistic divisions. It is only through recent investigations, largely by the United States Bureau of Ethnology, that enough has been learned about the languages of the various tribes to make a trustworthy classification on that basis, which is accepted as most fundamental.

Irregularities of Classification.

INDIAN CULTURE

The Indians lived in tribes, and most tribes were divided into clans. The basis of clan unity was kinship, although some members came in by adoption. Each clan had a totem, some animal or plant to which the members stood in special relation, and by whose name it was known, as "Wolf," "Bear," or "Turtle." Some believed themselves descended from the totem, others had no such idea. Marriage within the clan was strictly forbidden, usually under penalty of death. The wife retained membership in her own clan, and as her children took her clan, they had no clan-relation with their father's clan. This was the only kinship the aborigines knew anything about. They did not inherit the father's movable property, but took that of the mother. His possessions, if he left any, went to his own clan kindred. They could not go to his brothers' children, since they would follow the clan of their mothers, but passed to his sisters' children, who alone of his mother's children could be kin to him. If a man were killed, his clan held the murderer's clan responsible, either taking

Clans.

"blood revenge," or demanding money instead. For one member to kill another member of the same clan was exceedingly shocking to the Indian's feelings, and they were loath to punish him with death, since that involved the shedding of a fellow member's blood. In some tribes the difficulty was obviated by first outlawing the murderer, after which he could be dealt with. The clan was the strongest knit of the social units, and its position was fundamental in Indian society. It had a kind of sanctity through blood, as is illustrated by the fact that some clans had the privilege of furnishing chiefs to the tribes.

The clan had two kinds of leaders, a sachem and a chief. The former had civil function in times of peace, being judge and administrator of the ancient customs. He was elected by consent of the clan members and might be deposed by the same authority.

The Sachem. The office was permanent, and must be filled from the men of the clan as soon as there was a vacancy. Adults, men and women, had the right to vote for a sachem, and the choice usually fell on a brother of the deceased, or the son of a sister, never on a son of the former incumbent. The other clans in the tribe must approve of the chosen candidate, and he must be inducted into office with appropriate ceremonies in which the entire nation was represented. As head of his clan he sat in the council of the nation. As there was one sachem for each clan, and as the clans were long established divisions of a tribe, the number of sachems was limited. For example, there were eight clans in the Tuscarora tribe of the Iroquoian family; they were called from their totems the "Grey Wolf," "Bear," "Great Turtle," "Beaver," "Yellow Wolf," "Snipe," "Eel," and "Little Turtle." Each had its sachem, and together they were the most distinguished men of the tribe.

The chiefs were chosen for military purposes, and on account of some special quality or work. The office was not necessarily continuous, and the existence of a vacancy did not demand a new election. The number of chiefs varied with the size of the clan, in some modern tribes being one for each fifty persons, although this proportion is believed too high for ancient society. The chief was elected by the clan, which could depose him for unworthy conduct. The sachem was the exponent of clan kinship, the chief represented individual prowess. In some tribes there was a head chief, one of the sachems whose ability pleased the tribe. His functions were confined to the intervals between the meetings of the tribal council, and were not important.

The clan and the tribe each had a council. Of the former all the free adult members of the clan, men and women, were considered members. It elected and deposed sachems and chiefs, decided what should be done to avenge or condone the murder of a clan member, adopted new members, and regulated other

The Council.

matters pertaining essentially to the group. It was extremely democratic, and as the lowest unit of government gave tone to the deliberations on affairs too large for its jurisdiction. There was also a tribal council, composed of all the sachems and chiefs within the tribe. It decided upon matters touching the entire tribe, as relations with other tribes or with the whites. Any freeman might attend its meetings and speak his sentiments there: even the women might be heard through an orator whom they chose to speak for them; but the decision was left to the council. The Iroquois, and possibly some other tribes, required that a vote of the council be unanimous.

In some of the large organizations there was a brotherhood, or phratry, a third group which was between the clan and the tribe. It was composed of clans, usually three or four. Its function was social and religious. In the celebrated ball games the two sides would represent two brotherhoods. Disputes between two clans could be appealed to a council of sachems and chiefs from all the clans in the brotherhood. In the funerals of prominent men the brotherhood took conspicuous part, but its governmental functions were never well developed.

**The Brother-
hood.**

Naming children was strictly regulated because it bore directly on clan organization. Each individual had two names within his life, one received at birth, the other at maturity; that is, at sixteen at eighteen years of age. Certain names were peculiar to certain clans, and were not given to children of other clans. In some tribes a youth was required to go on the war-path and earn his new name by an act of courage or prowess. This new name must be approved by the tribal council. An adult might change his name if he could get a chief to announce it in council. When a man was elected sachem or chief he took a new name selected for him by the council.

**Names of
Persons.**

In conferring names, and in many other affairs, the authority of the clan or tribe was very great; but in beginning war much was left to the individual. Perhaps it is wrong to speak of the beginning of war. Strictly speaking, wars between the tribes never ended, except those which resulted in alliances. An interval of several years might elapse between outbreaks of hostilities, but within that time each side considered itself in a state of conflict with its enemies. The old men, remembering former trials, might prefer peace, but the young men were apt to desire to fight. Under such circumstances the latter would form a war party under some chieftain of known ability, there would be a war dance, and immediately the party would march against the enemy. Each member would take a pouch filled with Rockahominy, which was parched corn pounded into flour. Between Indian tribes there were usually broad, uninhabited zones, and the hostiles might, therefore, be many miles away. The Catawbias in upper South Carolina had for hereditary

**Making
War.**

enemy the Delawares, in the Delaware valley. The war party, painted so their mission might be known, marched through this neutral zone supporting themselves on game and fish until they were in the enemy's country, where no fires must be made lest the smoke reveal the approach of the warriors. Now they relied on the Rockahominy. So accustomed were they to fasting that two spoonfuls of it moistened with water and swallowed in haste was sufficient for several hours' nourishment. If they could surprise the foe, they struck quickly and returned with scalps and captives to their home to await some retaliating blow from the injured tribe. While such a war party was out, the rest of the tribe might remain at their peaceful occupations. But when the war was general and all the fighting men were out, they were formed into war bands in the same way, each led by some noted brave under whom the warriors desired to serve.

The most distinguished group of North American Indians was the Six Nations of the Iroquoian family, five of whom lived through most of our colonial period in western New York, and the other, the Tuscaroras, in North Carolina. After suffering much from their enemies they established early in the fifteenth century a well-knit confederacy, with a common council and a strongly aggressive policy. They proved themselves the scourge of surrounding tribes. Their ancient enemies were the Algonkins of Canada and New England. They became friends of the white men in New York, and played an important part in the operations against the French of Canada, who early incurred their resentment by helping the Algonkins. A kindred southern branch, the Cherokees, played an important part

**Other
Tribes.**

in the early history of Tennessee and the region south of it. Further southward were the Creeks and other members of the Muskogean family, very numerous, and for a long time they held back whites in the Gulf region. A large number of tribes classified as the Siouan family lived in the northern Mississippi basin and were represented by some branches on the upper Potomac and in the Piedmont region of the East. They were especially dependent on the buffalo, and followed it westward before the advance of the whites. At the middle of the nineteenth century they were in the vast Missouri valley, and their representatives, Cheyennes, Arapahoes, and the Sioux, offered fierce resistance to the whites in the period immediately following the Civil War.

The white settler's contest with the savage for territory divides itself into well-marked stages. The first colonies, weak and isolated, soon came into conflict with some neighboring small tribes who feared the loss of their land. The Pequot war in New England and the Virginia outbreak of 1622 are illustrations.

**Stages of
Indian Re-
sistance.**

The victory of the whites in these earliest struggles gave a respite; but as their settlements extended inland a larger number of Indians became alarmed, a stronger combination was formed, and a

sterner struggle ensued. For example, see King Phillip's war in New England, the Tuscarora war in North Carolina, and the Yemassee struggle in South Carolina. Another defeat convinced the savages of their weakness, and there followed another period of peace until the Indians found external allies. On the north it was the French who helped them, and several bloody wars were fought before this combination was broken. On the south outside aid came from Spain, though not openly, and the Indians themselves were numerous enough to be formidable. But the whites were now so well planted that the result was beyond question. From this time Indian wars were frontier struggles, the savages resisting their inevitable fate, sometimes stimulated to it by the designed oppression of white men and mixed breeds who wished an opportunity to seize Indian lands. In this way war has run over the land from ocean to ocean, extinguishing some tribes, greatly depleting others, and forcibly converting the remainder from nomads to agriculturalists.

In the Indian's character were some of the best and some of the worst qualities. In warfare he was stoically indifferent to his own suffering and also to that of his enemies; he was true to friends and truculent to foes; he was brave in battle, but he stalked his enemies as he hunted wild game, and murdered them by stealth if he could. When it was necessary he was abstemious, at other times he was gluttonous: his virtues and vices were those of the savage. His pathetic passage across the page of history has appealed to the idealist, but his cruelty and vindictiveness awakened horror in most of those who encountered him.

**Indian
Character.**

His intellectual development was slight. The most advanced tribes had no system of written language higher than picture writing, which reached the stage of symbolism in Algonquian tribes, and was rudely hieroglyphical in Mexico and Yucatan. His body of tradition, preserved orally, was limited; and his music, chiefly religious, was lacking in harmony, a rhythmic chant with complex structure, designed to fire the will rather than please the ear. In decorative art he was most successful; for although he knew nothing of higher forms, his designs for ornamental pottery, basketry, and weaving had a quiet beauty which appeals to the best modern taste. The same quality appears in the simple beauty of many of his myths.

**The Indian
Mind.**

His religion was animism, a belief in the existence of numerous spirits. He was apt to stress most the importance of the spirit he attributed to the thing most influential in his life, as the sun, the rain, or the moon. The tribes of the plains gave high place to the spirit of the buffalo. The name manitou, or mystery, was used by the Algonquian tribes for spirits, and it has become a general term. The early travelers and missionaries spoke of the belief in a "Great Spirit," single and invisible, but ethnologists have found no evidence that the Indian had such an elevated ideal. He believed,

Religion.

however, that man had a soul — some tribes thought he had several — and that he lived after death in a “happy hunting ground.” Some Indians buried their dead, others cremated them, and others preserved them as mummies. A man might make a manitou his friend, and if so he became a shaman, or medicine-man. He could now, through the aid of his manitou, drive away the evil spirit which was thought to inhabit a sick person. He accomplished the work by singing, dancing, and physical manipulations. Frequently the patient recovered: if he died, it was said that he was possessed by a manitou stronger than that of the shaman who treated him. In the more advanced tribes of the Southwest there were associations of shamans to preserve the secrets of their cult, among which were religious ceremonies.

Recent comparative studies have thrown much light on Indian mythology. It reveals no well-defined idea of creation. Most of the stories say that the earth once differed from its present condition, and that men and animals then lived and talked together and were the prey of great monsters. There was no daylight or fire, and poverty and misery ruled the world. Finally came a beneficent person who reformed tribes, taught man to improve his habits, and gave him certain inventions. His work of betterment done, he departed to come again. The Messianic quality of this personage probably suggested the idea that the Indians had a belief in a “Great Spirit”; but he was only a culture hero, and not altogether an admirable one; for although he worked for others and had superior intelligence he was sometimes a sharp trickster and was frequently made ridiculous by his opponents.

The houses of the Indians were sometimes communal and sometimes designed for single families. Of the former the best type is the long house of the Iroquian tribes. It was made of bark and poles, and inner partitions divided it into several compartments. A door at each end and openings in the partitions gave an open passageway from one end to the other. In each alternate opening in the partitions was a fire pit with a hole in the roof above. One family occupied one compartment, and one fire thus served two families. Around the walls of the room were hurdles made of small poles, covered with mats and skins. By day they were benches and by night beds. Sometimes the houses were large and round, with one great fire pit in the center, at which the partitions converged, making triangular compartments.

In a part of our Southwest, Mexico, and Central America the Indians lived in pueblos, the Spanish word for villages. These were great communal houses several stories high, the front wall of each story dropping back so as to make a terrace. In the modern pueblos doors are made in the walls, but formerly the interior was reached through holes in the flat roofs, or floors, of the terraces by means of ladders which were taken up at night or when

there was danger of intruders. The building material was either adobe or rough stones laid in clay mortar. When the whites entered the Southwest there were about sixty-five of these houses there. They were the usual type of Mexican dwelling, and the imaginative Spaniards who first saw them described them as palaces. In Yucatan they achieved a degree of massiveness and ornamentation which indicates, perhaps, the highest point of development in Indian architecture. Tribes of different linguistic stock adopted this kind of house, and the term Pueblo Indians has been used for all of them. It ought to be remembered that it has no family significance.

Contact with the white man made it necessary for the Indian to adopt civilized habits or perish. In ordinary social evolution this change would have required many centuries. Stimulated by the liberal government of the United States the more advanced tribes have made progress, the less advanced have caused disappointment to their well wishers. The Cherokee and Muskogean tribes have shown greatest power of assimilation, both in their eastern homes and in the now obliterated Indian Territory, where they resided for seventy-five years. They show, also, a slight gain in population, which cannot be said of most of the Indians who formerly lived on the western plains and who have been gathered into reservations under government supervision. In contact with civilization the Indian is abnormally susceptible to diseases, particularly smallpox, measles, and tuberculosis. The use of spirituous liquors is also especially harmful. The males generally are averse to manual labor, and agricultural progress has often meant more idleness for the men and more work for the women. Idleness breeds bad habits, which retard racial progress.

The Indians
and the
Whites.

In 1500 there were about half a million Indians in North America, the great majority being in what is now the United States, where, by the best estimates, there are now, 1911, only 322,715. In the latter number are included 101,287 in the five civilized tribes, including freedmen and intermarried whites. During the last half century the Indian population seems to have been about stationary. The Cherokees, Creeks, Choctaws, Chickasaws, and Seminoles now included in Oklahoma are the five civilized tribes. They are self-supporting and prosperous. In 1911 the total federal appropriation for Indians was \$10,452,911. In this year \$9,381,232 was spent on Indian education.

Present
conditions.

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CHAPTER II

THE DISCOVERY AND EXPLORATION OF AMERICA

EVENTS AND IDEAS LEADING TO THE DISCOVERY

THE first recorded contact of Europe and America was by way of the north. In 874 a Norse colony settled in Iceland and made it a center of culture and prosperity. Two years later a ship blown out of her way returned to Iceland with the story of a great body of land to the westward. For a hundred years no efforts seem to have been made to investigate the report, but in 983 Eric the Red, exiled from the island for manslaughter, solved the mystery, and named the newly discovered country Greenland, because he thought a good name would attract settlers. A colony was planted, the remains of which are still visible, and in the year 1000 his son, Leif Ericsson, arrived from Norway with missionaries to convert the country to Christianity. Vague reports were in circulation of a great land to the west, and he set out to explore it, coming after a time to a slaty shore, which he skirted southward for days, until he came at last to a pleasant place where a river ran out of a lake into the sea. He brought his ship into the haven and explored the country. It abounded in timber and "wild wheat," probably oats; and one of the crew, who came from the vine-growing portion of Europe, discovered grapes still hanging in the autumn sunlight. Leif, thinking, no doubt, that a good name would benefit this land as much as that of his father, called the place Vinland. An attempt to colonize Vinland now followed, and several voyages were made thither within the next twelve years. All ended disastrously. The place was too remote for successful exploitation, and the deeds of the adventurers survived only in the sagas, a part of the heroic achievement of the Norse past. To the people of the time and to those who succeeded them the newly discovered land was not part of a great continent, but only an indefinite No Man's Land beyond the mysterious seas. It was probably what we now know as the shores of Nova Scotia, although some students identify it with the New England coast and point out Martha's Vineyard as the particular spot.

About 1390 two Venetian brothers named Zeno were employed by the Earl of the Orkneys and Caithness in directing his navy. They were skillful sailors, helping to conquer the Shetland Islands, and about 1394 they made a voyage to

By the
Norse.

Vinland.

The Zeno
Brothers.

Greenland. Stories of a great land to the west were brought in by fishermen, and a few years later the younger brother, with the earl himself, sailed to discover it. The story goes that they found land some days' sail beyond Ireland, and that the earl remained to explore it. Zeno wrote an account of his adventures, which, with some letters and a map, were preserved in the family palace in Venice. In 1558 all that remained of them was published by a descendant, the map confessedly improved by the editor. The text, much of which is lost through neglect, was probably altered to suit the then recently acquired knowledge of the New World. It is impossible to say what Zeno discovered, but he may well have fallen upon some part of the North Atlantic coast, to encounter which was easy if one only sailed long enough west of Ireland.

Neither of these explorations served to bring the American continent within the knowledge of Europe, because (1) the lands discovered were not believed to be parts of a vast mainland, (2) the discoverers were not strong enough economically to develop the new lands, and (3) it was, after all, not a new continent that the Old World was looking for, but a new way to an old one. The voyage of Columbus really discovered America, but before it was made several things prepared the way.

The most important was the disaster which overtook the trade between Europe and the East in the second half of the fifteenth century.

Interruption of Oriental Trade. Spices, silk, perfumes, dyes, precious stones, and other oriental goods were brought west by three principal routes. One was by water along the southern shore of Asia to the

Red Sea, thence by caravan to the Nile, and finally to Alexandria. Another was a middle journey by caravan and rivers through Persia and Syria to Acre, Antioch, and other Syrian ports. A third was by river, caravan, and interior seas to the Euxine, where Constantinople was the chief terminus of the trade. To these cities came merchants from Italy, France, and Spain, purchasing the eastern goods and passing them on to the interior and northern towns of Europe. Most aggressive were the traders from Venice and Genoa. From each eastern town they secured privileges of trade with permanent quarters in which they were ruled by their own laws and protected by their own home governments. These quarters, with their inhabitants, became the outposts of a valuable industrial life. Both towns also owned many colonies on the Ægean Islands. In 1453 the Turks seized Constantinople and began to take all the ports of the East, until in 1517 Cairo was taken and Egypt became a Turkish province. Each step in the conquest was followed by trade restrictions. High tariffs were levied, privileges were curtailed, and the island possessions of Venice and Genoa were seized by the conquerors. These disasters were felt by all the Mediterranean merchants, and stimulated a general desire for another way to the East.

Such a route, if discovered, must be by sea, and it must begin at the Straits of Gibraltar. For centuries the ocean beyond this point was a sea of terror on which sailors dreaded to venture. North of the straits the coast was known as far as Scotland and Scandinavia: south of it men sailed as far as Cape Non, about seven hundred miles. The compass and the astrolabe slowly came into use on the Mediterranean during the fifteenth century and enabled the mariner to sail confidently when either land or stars were not in sight. The renaissance of science by the middle of the fifteenth century dominated the minds of learned men and was beginning to reach the more independent spirits in navigation and other practical arts. Before such a process the sea of terror became merely a part of the unknown, and as such invited discovery.

Effects of
the Spread
of Knowl-
edge.

The first attempts to penetrate its mysteries were made by Portuguese. On the east coast of Africa, south of Egypt, tradition then located the native Christian kingdom of "Prester John," whose power and wealth were much exaggerated in the popular imagination. African traders in Morocco told about interior towns from which roads ran southward to a southern sea into which flowed a river great enough to be compared to the Nile. To pass from Cape Non to the region of Abyssinia seemed possible, and, since it would open a water communication to India, it would be profitable. It was Portugal's fortune to have the man who could lead in this work.

"Prester
John."

Prince Henry the Navigator was a younger son of John I. Without family responsibilities or hope of the crown he could follow the promptings of a scientific and adventurous disposition. In 1419 at Sagres, on Cape St. Vincent, he established a home and drew around him a group of intelligent mariners, geographers, and map makers. His father, brother, nephew, and great-nephew, four generations of kings, supported his work and carried it on after his death in 1460. The first results were unimportant. The Madeiras and Azores were rediscovered, explored, and colonized, but the timid captains were afraid to get far away from the shore, and Cape Boyador, under the Tropic of Cancer, was so dangerous that for a long time none dared pass it. But in 1434 Gil Eannes, bolder than his colleagues, sailed far out to sea, doubled the perilous point, and proved that the "Sea of Darkness" was safe.

Prince
Henry.

Progress was now more rapid. Year after year an additional portion of the desert coast was observed, until finally, in 1445, Dinis Fernandez passing at last the glinting sands, came to a green point which he called Cape Verd. A fertile country now appeared, peopled by "Moors," or negroes, some of whom were taken to Portugal, where slaves were in demand. It was the beginning of a trade which threatened for a time to defeat the further exploration of the coast. One expedition after another sent to make

West Africa
Explored.

discoveries came back with nothing but slaves. In 1455 Cadamosto, passing the Cape Verd Islands, sailed so far into the Gulf of Guinea that it was believed the southern extremity of Africa was turned. His mistake was soon known, and the explorations were pushed on, more slowly after the death of Prince Henry, 1460, until at last in 1487 Bartholomew Diaz sailed past the Cape of Good Hope. The mutiny of his crew forced him to return to Portugal, but the world now knew that Africa could be circumnavigated. The Portuguese discoveries were important because they made explorations popular, created a school of bold navigators willing to attempt any seas, and at last brought men to the fabled East, tales of whose wealth up to that time fascinated the European imagination like a fairy dream. They enlarged the world's knowledge of geography, but threw little light upon the question of the earth's shape.

The theory of the sphericity of the earth was held by Aristotle, who died in 322 B.C. He drew his conclusion from the circular shadow of

the earth on the moon in eclipse and from the varying altitude of stars, and he announced that one common ocean probably united Spain and India. A century later Eratosthenes in Alexandria applied mathematics to this idea and calculated the circumference of the earth, making it fourteen per cent. too large. Other Greeks, probably very many, accepted sphericity, but it was rejected by the early Christian church, which had its own idea of the cosmos. Arabian scientists kept the spark of knowledge alive through many centuries, and Roger Bacon in the thirteenth century incorporated it in his *Opus Majus*, whence it was abstracted by Pierre d'Ailly for his *Imago Mundi* (1410). The last was a widely read work in the day when explorations and all kinds of new knowledge were exceedingly popular. Astronomers and many others at the end of the fifteenth century were ready to accept the theory independently of the voyage of Columbus. Martin Behaim, a German geographer, in the very year Columbus made his memorable voyage, and without the discoverer's knowledge, made a copper globe with the known lands described on it. In calculating the circumference of the earth the astronomers made a mistake, estimating it at three fourths of its real magnitude. The result was to make China seem six thousand miles nearer Europe than it really is, a fortunate error.

A better knowledge of the East also helped to prepare the way for the discoveries of Columbus. In the later thirteenth century three Venetian merchants named Polo went to Cathay, or China, for trade. One of them, Marco Polo, became a favorite of the ruler, or Grand Khan, and remained many years at the court, where he had opportunity to learn about the extent, geography, and wealth of the country. In 1295 the three returned to Venice with great quantities of gems. In 1298 Marco wrote an

Revived Belief in the Sphericity of the Earth.

The Story of Marco Polo.

account of his adventures, calling it *The Book of Ser Marco Polo*. Before this time China was believed to be bordered by immense marshes, but he declared that it was washed by a vast ocean and that within this ocean lay Cipango, or Japan, a great island rich in gold and cities. The book fired the imagination of Europe, heightened the charm of the East, and stimulated the hope of reaching the East by sea. If the earth were a globe, why might not the ocean west of the Straits of Gibraltar be the same as that east of Cipango?

Thus through the merchants' desire for a western way to the East, through improvements in navigation, through the slowly evolved conviction that the world was round, and through the better acquaintance with the geography of China, the time was come when some adventurous man would compass the unknown by making a path from the Straits of Gibraltar to fabled Cipango. The scholars believed this possible but had not the courage to attempt it. Navigators had courage to accomplish it but had not the mind to believe in it. Christopher Columbus had the requisite skill and faith. He had also the persistence and endurance necessary to carry him successfully through the initial stages of an enterprise which the world could not understand.

THE ACHIEVEMENT OF COLUMBUS

Columbus's father was a wool-worker, but the boy early became a navigator. An age which knows as ours how poor boys of mind become prominent will understand how he turned to the most progressive vocation then open to him. He learned Latin and read diligently the geographical books of the day. He was attracted to Portugal, where he married into the family of a prominent navigator. He sailed as far north as England, possibly to Iceland; and he lived for a time on the island of Porto Santo, north of Madeira. We do not know how he came to believe he could reach China by the west, but we know he mastered all available knowledge on the subject. When he read in a book that the frigid and torrid zones were uninhabitable, he confuted it in the margin on the ground that the Portuguese sailed through the torrid zone and found it inhabited, while the English and the Norse visited the frigid zone. It was sound reasoning to set observation against tradition. But when tradition favored him he accepted it. He saw in the apocryphal book of Esdras that only one seventh of the surface of the earth was water: had he been an equally sound reasoner he would have withheld judgment until some one observed the quantity of earth and water. But Esdras suited his theory, and he accepted the statement without question. The error tended to make him think it was but a short distance from Europe to his goal.

The Educa-
tion of
Columbus.

While in Portugal, about ten years before his famous voyage, Columbus learned that Toscanelli, a noted Florentine astronomer, had

announced the possibility of sailing from the west to the east. He wrote to the Italian, asking for instructions, and received in reply a copy of a former letter by the astronomer in which the possibility of the fact in question was asserted, but no directions for making the journey were given. In fact, they could not have been given in the existing state of information about the western seas, for these seas were not explored. Toscanelli perhaps gave Columbus confidence in his ideas, but all the information in his letter was to be found elsewhere.

Whatever the source, Columbus, when in Portugal, had the conviction that his project was feasible. He talked so much about it that he got the reputation of a boaster, and when he applied to King John II for a ship to test his idea, he was turned aside as a dreamer. It was then 1484, and he betook himself to Spain, where for seven years he urged his plans with little prospect of success. In the interval he sent his brother, Bartholomew, to London to see if help could be secured there. It has been said that Bartholomew gained a promise from Henry VII, but it was given after the king and queen of Spain relented. It was really the queen who gave the assistance. She was induced to do so by her former confessor, Juan Perez, and by the treasurer of Aragon, Luis de Santangel.

To make his voyage, Columbus had three ships fully manned. The expense was assumed by Isabella, who in her own right was sovereign of Castile. The money, 1,000,000 maravedis, \$59,000, seems to have been borrowed on the queen's security. The old story that she pledged her jewels is now generally discredited. Columbus was made an hereditary grandee and admiral of Castile, with the right to govern the new lands he should discover. He and his heirs were to have one tenth of all the gold and silver he should find, and they might pay one eighth of the expenses of fitting out any expedition and take a similar portion of the profits thus secured. Letters of introduction to the rulers of the East were also furnished, and with these in his pocket the stern discoverer, raised from the rank of adventurer to that of great lord and friend of sovereign princes, embarked his unwilling crew of less than one hundred men. August 3, 1492, in the early morning, the three ships, the *Santa Maria*, *Pinta*, and the *Niña*, stood out to sea from the port of Palos, sailing first to the Canaries. The first was the largest, and alone, of the three, had a deck. Her tonnage is estimated at one hundred to two hundred and eighty, and that of her companions at one hundred and forty and one hundred respectively. A great event never depended on frailer agencies.

Stopping at the Canaries to refit, the fleet sailed again on September 6. Fear seized the hearts of the crew as they saw the land disappear on the eastern horizon. They were steering into seas hitherto unexplored, under the orders of a visionary, and

**Columbus
and Tos-
canelli.**

**Efforts to
get Assist-
ance.**

**Columbus's
Ships.**

**The De-
parture.**

The Voyage.

were full of dismay. Columbus kept a diary of all that happened, reporting it to the queen; but for the sailors he kept another log in which he shortened the distance sailed. No storms were encountered, and the trade winds blew him steadily westward. Scowling at first, the crew at length became sullen, and finally, October 10, threatened to throw the admiral overboard. To none of these difficulties would he yield: "He had come to go to the Indies," he said, "and he would keep on till he had found them with the aid of our Lord." It is well to remember that Columbus's greatness consisted, not so much in his original idea, as in the determined spirit in which he risked his life to execute it.

On the evening of October 11 lights were seen in the darkness and soon the roar of the surf was heard. At dawn a low green shore was before them, an island which the natives called Guanahani, and which the pious Columbus renamed San Salvador. **The Discovery.** Its identity is lost, but the best guess is that it was Watling's Island, one of the Bahamas. It was inhabited by naked savages with whom the admiral conversed by signs. They reported a great kingdom to the south, and he turned in that direction, discovering Cuba, which he thought the mainland of India. The natives he called Indians, and the term has persisted to this day. He was impressed by seeing them drawing smoke through tubes made from the leaves of a certain plant, and noted that the natives called these tubes *tobaccos*. Sailing along the eastern half of the north coast of Cuba he came at length to Hayti, which he called La Isla Española, whence Hispaniola. It proved an ill-fated country, for on its shores he lost his best ship, the *Santa Maria*.

Columbus's thoughts now turned to Spain, and leaving forty-four men to establish a Spanish post, learn the language of the natives, and plant food crops, he departed early in 1493. Storms harassed his return, but March 15 he cast anchor at Palos. **Return to Spain.** All Spain echoed with his praise, and news of the discovery quickly ran throughout Europe. Many people doubted if the new lands were really India — among them the king of Portugal, who said plainly they were only a part of Guinea, discovered by the Portuguese and confirmed to his crown by papal bulls and by a treaty with Spain in 1480. A serious quarrel might have followed, but Spain appealed to the Pope, Alexander VI, a Spaniard, and May 3 and 4 he issued two bulls dividing the new lands between the two countries. An imaginary line was authorized one hundred leagues west of the Azores and Cape Verde Islands, all the lands discovered east of it being given to Portugal and all west and south of it going to Spain. **The Papal Bull.** The arrangement was not satisfactory, and it was modified by another bull, September, 1493, and by a treaty between Spain and Portugal, 1494, by which the line of demarcation was fixed at three hundred and seventy leagues west of Cape Verde Islands.

Columbus's reports occasioned great enthusiasm in Spain, and many expeditions were planned. Most of them ended in disappointment, but the work of exploration was forwarded. The

Second Expedition. king and queen were delighted with their admiral and sent him forth in September, 1493, with seventeen ships and

thirteen hundred persons, gentlemen adventurers, laborers, soldiers, and missionaries, to plant a Spanish colony. The settlement was to be under the admiral's absolute authority. A town was laid out in Hayti and called Isabella. Gold mines were found in the interior, and the neighboring natives, always submissive, were ordered to work them and bring in a certain amount of gold each month. A native chieftain, despairing of complying with the order, offered instead to cultivate a large tract of land for the benefit of the whites; but Columbus rejected the plan because he knew that gold alone would be valued in


Treatment of the Natives. Spain. He saw that if he could not satisfy this desire he would have no support at home. The harsh measures he took with the Indians reduced the native population of the island by two-thirds in three years. When he went to

Spain in 1496 many of his returned companions declared that there was no gold in Columbus's Indies; but the admiral managed to produce enough of the precious stuff to satisfy the sovereigns that explorations should continue. A portion of the natives were cannibals, and Columbus suggested that permission be granted to take these to Spain for slaves. He probably hoped by this means to support the explorations, as the negroes from Guinea supported the Portuguese enterprise; but Ferdinand the Catholic was not willing to authorize the enslavement of the natives. Nevertheless Columbus and others sent Indian slaves to Spain, where they were generally liberated. Spite of the efforts of the government, enslavement was practiced in the colonies, until most of the natives of the West Indies disappeared.

After 1496 Columbus made two voyages, one in 1498 and another in 1502. On the former he steered far southward, hoping to pass all

Third and Fourth Voyages. obstructions, reach the Indian ocean, and circumnavigate the globe. To his surprise he encountered a great body of land, about which Marco Polo said nothing, sailing past it

for days in a westward direction. A sailor let down a bucket at one point and found the water fresh. It was from the mouths of the Orinoco river, and Columbus rightly concluded that so great a river must flow out of a vast continent. He spoke of it as another world, never doubting, however, that the land discovered to the northward was part of India. His fourth voyage was made to find a passage between this new continent and the old. The journey was delayed by great storms, but steering a more northerly course, he came at length to the coast of Honduras. He sailed south about twelve hundred miles past the Isthmus of Panama, whose narrowness he did



not suspect, and returned to Spain in 1504 after many hardships. He died two years later, May 20, 1506.

Columbus was most successful as an explorer. Here one needed courage, persistence, intelligence, and faith in a mission; and he had them all. As an administrator he was not successful. He was sensitive, arbitrary, unyielding, and severe. Low-born and a foreigner, he could not govern Spanish noblemen without friction. His appointment to command colonies was unwise and brought him much sorrow. Numerous bitter enemies sprang up among those whom he tried to rule, and their denunciations cut his sensitive spirit deeply. The greatest indignity he suffered was when in 1500 he was sent back to Spain in irons, charged with malfeasance. The spectacle aroused the sympathy of Spain, and the king and queen ordered his release. But his political authority in the New World was annulled, and his monopoly in discovery was limited.

Unhappi-
ness of
Columbus.

EXPLORING THE COASTS OF THE NEW WORLD

Spain, Portugal, France, and England shared the labor of exploring the world Columbus discovered. Stopped by its position across the pathway to India, their mariners turned northward and southward in search of a way to the Orient. Thus every gulf and bay of importance was explored until at last Cape Horn was passed and the spice islands reached across the vast Pacific. Then they took up the task of exploring the interior, led on by a consuming hunger for precious metal. The rest of this chapter deals with explorations by sea and land.

Two Phases
of Explora-
tion.

In this work Spain took the lead. Hayti, colonized by Columbus, furnished a base for expeditions to the shores of the Gulf of Mexico and the Caribbean Sea. Cuba, first circumnavigated in 1508, was immediately thereafter conquered and colonized by Velasquez, and furnished a new and more westerly base. Columbus's third voyage, 1498, developed the coast line for nearly three hundred miles west of Trinidad, and his fourth, 1502, revealed the shore from near the Cape of Honduras past the isthmus to the Gulf of Uraba. In 1499 Hojeda, accompanied by Amerigo Vespucci, sailed for America on an important voyage. He reached the coast near Paramaribo, in Surinam, and sailed west to a point near the terminus of the third voyage of Columbus. North of Honduras, around to the south of Florida, explorations were made by various persons from 1508 to 1522, and during the same period other Spaniards explored the Atlantic coast as far north as Cape Lookout, in North Carolina. This hollow coast line from Trinidad northward to North Carolina, with the islands between, was looked upon by Spain as hers by right of discovery, and the claim was generally allowed.

From Trini-
dad to Cape
Lookout.

To her also belongs the honor of discovering Brazil and the region south of it. In 1499 Vicente Yañez Pinzon sailed for America.

Brazil. Driven out of his course by a great storm he crossed the equator and made land some distance south of it. Then turning north he followed the coast for two thousand miles, past the mouth of the Amazon, until he set out for home with the wonderful news of a vast continent not hitherto mentioned in any then known account of the East. Before he could reach Spain another adventurer, Diego de Lepe, setting out later than Pinzon and returning earlier, reported a similar discovery in the same region. He reached a point as far south as Cape St. Augustine, in Brazil. Amerigo Vespucci is believed to have accompanied de Lepe. Spain had no advantage from these two important voyages; for Brazil was east of the famous papal dividing line.

The appearance of Vespucci in this narrative is interesting because his name was given to the New World. This came, as we shall see, from a piece of fraud committed, not to get the honor of **Vespucci.** naming the continent, but to create the impression that he first discovered it. He was born in Florence, became a man of business, and in 1492 went to Seville as an agent for the commercial house of the Medici. He became connected with the navigators, whose ships he fitted out, and finally decided to accompany them on some of their voyages. He made four journeys across the ocean, but was the leader of none of them. His fame rests on his faculty of writing and on his willingness to exaggerate his importance in the affairs he describes. He later wrote two letters, in one of which he described his first voyage and in the other all of the four. These letters were widely published and created the impression that the writer deserved to have South America bear his given name.

Vespucci says that he made the first voyage in 1497, that he sailed along the northern coast of South America, and by mentioning no other person as commander of the expedition he gives the **His Unre-** impression that the leadership was his. After much **liability.** investigation and reasonable deduction it is generally conceded that he antedated the expedition by two years in order to place it before that of Columbus in 1498, that he really made it in 1499 in company with Hojeda, who was sole commander, and that his descriptions of the places discovered are almost exactly those of this later voyage. His second journey was made in 1500. Again he omits the name of the commander but says that he himself commanded one of the ships. The latter statement is doubted because it is not supported by the fairly complete naval records of the time. His third and fourth voyages are not important, being made to places admittedly already discovered.

Vespucci's letter describing his third voyage was published in Latin in 1503 with the title *Mundus Novus*. It is the first published Latin

account of the new continent south of what was still supposed to be India. Columbus's letter describing his discovery of 1497 was not published in Latin until 1508, whereas Vespucci's second letter, in which all his alleged discoveries were described, was published in Latin in 1507. The story of the Florentine, therefore, first published in the language of learned men, alleged to belong to the year 1497, and told in an attractive style, created the false impression that he and not Columbus discovered the great unknown mainland, and in his honor the name "America," from the Latin form of his Christian name, was given to that region — but not at first to the region north of the Isthmus of Panama.¹ The order of development is something like this: first we have "America" south of the isthmus and "India" north of it; next, "America" south of the isthmus and "North America" north of it finally; "South America" in the south and "North America" in the north. The first person to use the name "America" — although others earlier used "Mundus Novus" for South America — was Martin Waldseemüller, a professor of geography at St. Dié, who in a book of his own published Columbus's second letter in 1507. Thoroughly under the influence of Vespucci's narrative he described this newly discovered land and added, since "Americus discovered it, it may be called Amerige; in other words, the land of Americus, or America." He said further that he preferred the form "America," since both Europe and Asia were named for women. A map which accompanied his book used the name, which was soon in general popular use in most of Europe outside of Spain, where the term "Indies" was used long after its absurdity was recognized. Waldseemüller later changed his mind about the name, and in a map which he made in 1513 substituted the term "Terra Incognita"; but it was too late to overtake the error of 1507.

The Name
"America."

Waldsee-
müller.

But one more discovery was now needed to make the New World stand in clear relief before the eye of the old — and that was made by Magellan in 1519–1522. Although a Portuguese, he sailed under Spanish authority with five ships manned by unwilling and mutinous crews. He spent the first winter on the eastern shore of South America, forty-nine degrees south, where the climate was like that of Newfoundland. Here he put down a mutiny by his individual courage, and in the spring resumed his journey. October 21, in the Antarctic spring, he entered the straits which now bear his name — a channel from two to five miles wide and three hundred and twenty-five miles long. Its last half passes between high rocky banks with impressive mountains on each side. The little fleet passed through fearsomely, not knowing what mysterious terror the next league ahead might present. At length the cliffs receded and

Magellan's
Discovery.

¹ The arguments in this connection are admirably given in Bourne, *Spain in America*, ch. vii.

the straits opened to a broad ocean which Magellan called "Mare Pacificum." He struck out boldly to the northwest, and after much suffering came at last to the rich islands of the East. He was killed in battle with the natives in the island of Matau, one of the Philippines. A single ship survived the perils of the sea and reached Spain, having proved the truth of Columbus's dream.

Next to Spain, Portugal took prominent part in American explorations. Her West African voyages throughout the fifteenth century gave her a prestige which the immense activity of Spain at the close of the century threatened to discredit. Spurred by this thought she sent out Vasco da Gama in 1497. He went first to the Cape Verde Islands, then striking into the great South Atlantic, sailed without signs of land till he came to thirty degrees south latitude, when he turned to the southeast, and after a long time reached the coast at a point one hundred miles north of Cape of Good Hope. His course represented two sides of a triangle, to cover which he took ninety-three days, out of sight of land; whereas Columbus on his first voyage took only thirty-five days from the Canaries to Guanahani. Passing then around the cape, which had been unvisited since Bartholomew Diaz was blown past it in 1487, he sailed on to India, where, indeed, the lands of spices and gems lay before him. His return to Lisbon brought the glow of old-time pride to the hearts of his compatriots. It shows in a letter the king sent to Ferdinand and Isabella, announcing that a Portuguese captain had reached the real India where there were real pepper and real rubies.

In 1500 another Portuguese navigator sailed into the unknown seas, going as boldly into the north as da Gama went into the south. This was Gaspar Corte-Real, who sailed many days and found "a land which was very cool and with great woods," but not otherwise described. In 1501, with three ships he sailed for the same coasts. One of the vessels was lost with the commander aboard, but the others returned with fifty captive Eskimos. Surviving stories and contemporary maps show that he visited Labrador and explored Newfoundland. In 1502 his brother, Miguel Corte-Real, went out to find the lost Gaspar and was himself cast away. A year later the king sent out an expedition to find the two brothers, but it was futile. These northern explorations are only geographically important: Portugal founded no territorial claims on them.

More important were her attempts on the Brazilian coast. In 1500, a few months before Gaspar Corte-Real sailed, one of her captains, Cabral, with thirteen ships dropped down to the Cape Verde Islands, and, like da Gama, stood thence out into the ocean. But he turned farther west, where the ocean is narrowest, and reached land in eighteen degrees south latitude and took possession in the name of Portugal. He sent one ship to report his discovery and

with the others sought to pass beyond this land to India. Storms impeded his progress and he was forced to turn back.

While Spain and Portugal explored and acquired portions of the New World, England, through no inclination of her own rulers, explored and secured title to the portion she was later to colonize. John Cabot, born in Genoa, but a naturalized citizen of Venice, after unsuccessful attempts in Spain and Portugal, came to England, where the king, Henry VII, in

English Ex-
plorations.

John Cabot.

1496 gave him such lands as he might discover beyond the sea to hold the same in the English name. In a ship no larger than Columbus's *Niña*, with a crew of eighteen, he sailed in May, 1497, and four hundred leagues west of Ireland came to land, probably Newfoundland. He skirted the coast southward for three hundred leagues and returned to England, where the thrifty king rewarded him with a gift of ten, and an annual pension of twenty, pounds. A year later he sailed on a second voyage the detailed results of which we do not know; but from various sources it seems probable that on this expedition he explored the Atlantic coast from Long Island to South Carolina. With this voyage he disappears completely; probably he perished on it. He was not an educated man, like Columbus, and the English were not interested in discoveries. Accordingly we have in England only the barest documentary evidence in regard to the voyages. Both this meager record and the fact that English explorations were not notably continued show how little interest our mother country had in the lands beyond the sea. But the agents of the Spanish and Italian governments then in England felt a lively interest. They reported to their superiors all they heard about Cabot's achievements, and from this source we get most of our scanty information.

John Cabot had a son, Sebastian, for thirty-six years Chief Hydrographer of Spain and after that adviser in matters of navigation to the English admiralty. He was highly esteemed by his contemporaries and posterity. An inscription on his picture and another on a map which he made in 1544 assert that he was with his father when, in 1497, land was discovered in the north. Sebastian talked freely in Spain to persons who have reported his words. From these three sources grew the impression that Sebastian was a great discoverer. Some of the statements in the story are contradicted by the scant contemporary records which refer to John Cabot, and the result is a lowering in later years of the fame of the son; but it is impossible to come to a satisfactory conclusion in the matter. England forgot the Cabots for a century. But in the days of Raleigh and Hakluyt she recalled them to mind, and these voyages became the basis of her claim to the North Atlantic coast.

Sebastian
Cabot.

France, through the efforts of two men, took part in American exploration. In 1524 Giovanni da Verrazano tried to find a passage to India by the northwest. It is difficult to determine from his narra-

tive how much of the Atlantic coast he explored; but it seems that he entered New York harbor and the Hudson river and penetrated

French Explorations.

Verrazano.

Narragansett Bay, after which he sailed north as far as Newfoundland. In 1534 Jacques Cartier, a Breton, sailed with two ships on what proved a more important voyage. He explored the Gulf of St. Lawrence and was forced home by stormy weather. Next year he came again to the same place, took up his labors where he suspended them in 1534, and went up the St. Lawrence as far as what is now Quebec. Then

Cartier.

he took rowboats, with which he reached the Indian village of Hochelaga at the site of Montreal. The rapids which here stopped his search for a passage through the continent were later called "La Chine" in ridicule, it is said, of his attempt to find China through this river. Cartier's exploration was the basis of French title to Canada. It was followed in 1541 by an attempt to plant a colony, Roberval having the command and Cartier showing the way. A fort was built near Quebec, but the Indians drove off the garrison, and killed or discouraged the colonists so that they gladly escaped to France.

The earliest maps after the discovery of America show us how Europe gradually came to realize the shape of the new continent. The

Early Maps.

first preserved was by Juan de la Cosa (1500). He was with Columbus in 1492 and 1493, and with Hojeda in 1499. He was informed about the other discoveries and accounted for them on his map. He shows the coast line of North and South America in the shape of a great letter U which lies on one side. The discoveries of Cabot represent the upper leg and the Spanish discoveries in the northern part of South America represent the lower leg. The curved interior takes the place of the shores of the Gulf of Mexico and the Caribbean Sea, within which the Antilles are correctly placed. North and south of the terminus of each leg the shores go off at right angles. Opposite the upper one and well out in the ocean he places the land discovered for Portugal by Corte-Real, not knowing it was nearly identical with Cabot's discovery. These Spanish, English, and Portuguese lands are located with approximate correctness, but the lines which connect them, the inner curved part of the figure, were drawn without experimental knowledge, probably by guess.

A map made for Cantino, an Italian envoy in Portugal, about 1502, adheres more closely to known facts. Unknown parts of the coast are entirely blank, the northern part takes a vertical position, Florida and the shore north of it comes into a semblance of itself, and the same is true of South America from the Gulf of Uraba to the Tropic of Capricorn. A map by Stobnicza, 1512, has the parts of coast line omitted from the Cantino map, and one by Waldseemüller, 1513, gives an outline of the two continents with a suggestion of accuracy. A French globe, about 1527, shows Asia connected with South America.

EXPLORING THE INTERIOR

The second stage of exploration was directed into the interior and it went hand in hand with colonization, Spain taking the lead. First Hayti (1494) and then Cuba (1508) were settled. These two islands soon developed a number of vigorous Spanish-born grandees who were willing to attempt adventures on the unexplored mainland. Such a one was Hernando Cortez, who in 1519 sailed to conquer Mexico, the wealth and advanced culture of which was previously reported to the whites. He took with him five hundred and fifty Spaniards, two hundred and three Indians, one negro, and sixteen horses. He destroyed his ships when he landed at Vera Cruz, and announced to his men his determination to conquer Mexico or die. At that time the Mexicans expected the return of a culture hero, Quetzalcoatl, who, tradition said, would come back to bless the people. Some of them considered the arrival of the Spaniards the fulfillment of the prophecy. Cortez was quick enough to use this opportunity, but his main reliance was his sword. His firearms, armor, and horses gave him an advantage, but the vast numbers of his enemies would have outweighed it had he been less capable or his enemies been well united. He forced his way to the Aztec city of Mexico, where the superstitious natives received him darkly. Fearing an outbreak he seized Montezuma, the Mexican ruler, and when the capital flew to arms withdrew for the time and established a siege which was finally successful. After two and a half years of severe struggle he and his little army were masters of Mexico.

Spanish Explorations in the Interior.
Cortez.

Another explorer of the interior was Balboa. He was a bankrupt planter who left Santo Domingo secretly to escape his creditors, and joined an expedition which was trying to plant a colony near the Isthmus of Panama. Small, ugly, and poor, he

Balboa.

nevertheless was born to command and was soon the leading spirit in an otherwise failing enterprise. By his resolution he resisted all attempts to supplant him and finally performed a feat which made him famous. When some Spaniards were disputing over a bit of gold, an Indian told them he could show them a great water over which came quantities of the yellow metal. Balboa remembered the words, and with about two hundred Spaniards set out to find this sea. His march of forty-five miles was through a tropical tangle of jungle to penetrate which required the labor of eighteen days. At length he neared the sea. Halting his men he climbed the last impeding ridge so that he alone might first see the object of his search. Then this bankrupt adventurer, stern ruler of men, heartless betrayer of benefactors, and relentless victor over his personal enemies, knelt and thanked "God and all the Heavenly Host who had reserved the prize of so great a thing unto him, being a man but of small wit and

knowledge, of little experience, and lowly parentage." Thus it was that Balboa discovered the Pacific Ocean in 1513.

More interesting but less significant historically were the explorations of Ponce de Leon in 1513. Twenty years of adventure in the West Indies had developed him into a great captain. He finally set out to find Bimini, a land in which the Indians said there was much gold and a fountain of perpetual youth. On Easter Sunday he discovered the mainland, which he called Florida, from *Pascua Florida*, the Easter season. He landed at St. Augustine harbor, and thence explored the coast southward until he passed the extremity of the peninsula. The name "Florida" was later used by Spain for the coast as far north as the Chesapeake Bay.

Another explorer was de Narvaez. In 1527 he sailed from Spain for Florida with a colony of six hundred persons. Desertion and shipwreck reduced these to four hundred, most of whom landed in the western part of what is now Florida somewhere north of Tampa Bay. Indian reports of a great town lured them into the interior, where they were surrounded by vast numbers of savages and forced back starving to the coast at Pensacola Bay. They built boats, converted their horses into food, made sails from horsehides and from their own clothes, and sailed — not for Cuba, but westward, where they hoped to join their fleet. In this they were disappointed: one by one their rude boats were destroyed: de Narvaez was drowned; and the remnant, now fifteen, took refuge with the Indians, who first beat them and then discovered that they were medicine-men. For five years they managed to keep in favor with the savages, passing from tribe to tribe in great honor. Finally four men, all who were left of the six hundred whom de Narvaez brought out nine years earlier, reached the city of Mexico. One of them was Cabeça de Vaca, historian of the expedition, whose journal makes a thrilling narrative. He described the interior of the continent in glowing terms and gave a stimulus to later disastrous attempts at exploration.

One of the victims of this exaggeration was Hernando de Soto, who having gained a fortune in Peru with Pizarro was made governor of Cuba and ruler of Florida, which he was to explore and colonize at his own expense. May 30, 1539, he landed at Tampa Bay with over six hundred and twenty men. He spent the summer and winter near the coast, and in the spring marched northward, across Georgia, South Carolina, and part of North Carolina. He crossed the Blue Ridge Mountains in the last-named state near the point where rise the highest peaks of the Appalachian system, then turning south again reached southern Alabama in October, 1540, always looking for "some rich country," fighting several battles with the Indians, and suffering much from hunger and sickness. De Soto learned that a fleet awaited him on the coast, but concealed

the fact from his men and marched again for the interior. He wintered in northern Mississippi, and moving on in the spring came on May 8, 1541, to the Mississippi near Memphis. He crossed and spent the summer exploring what is now Arkansas. He encamped, and in the spring would have gone farther into the west if his men and horses had not failed him. Broken spirited, he fell sick, and May 21, 1542, he was buried in the river he had discovered. His adventures took three years. His followers built boats and escaped down the river and along the coast to Mexico. De Soto gave his fortune and his life to this enterprise and the result was expressed in the extension of geographical knowledge for the benefit of the world at large.

In Mexico at this time a story was circulated of seven cities which an Indian had visited, each as great as Mexico City. The narrative of Cabeça de Vaca seemed to confirm it; and the excitable imagination of the adventurers seized it with avidity. **Coronado.**

A friar sent to investigate returned, saying he came in sight of one of the cities, probably the pueblo of Zuñi, and preparations were made for a conquest of this wonderful region, believed to be as rich as Mexico. Francisco de Coronado was appointed to lead the colony. He set out in 1540 with eleven hundred men, Spaniards and Indians; but he left the main body on the north shore of the Gulf of California and went into the interior with fifty horsemen. He took Cibola, which proved to be a pueblo without treasure. Not discouraged, he ordered up the main body and struck into New Mexico. He went as far as the border of Oklahoma, and with an advance guard arrived at the center of Kansas within nine days' march of the point to which De Soto at that very time had penetrated in Arkansas. He found pueblos and Indian villages, but no treasure, and returned to Mexico in 1542 with the loss of only a few of his followers. Thus from 1513 to 1542 Spain explored Florida, Mexico, and the region north of the Rio Grande, discovering their real character and opening the way for colonization.

Such was the work of Cortez, Balboa, Ponce de Leon, Narvaez, de Soto, and Coronado. They were strenuous men, sparing neither themselves, their followers, nor the natives, whom they plundered, enslaved, and slew with great cruelty. Through their efforts Spain in fifty years, from 1492 to 1542, explored and held a vast region. Nor was gold-seeking their only interest: agricultural colonies quickly followed the adventurers; and their strength is shown by the part they contributed to further explorations. No other colonizing nation in America did so much in so short a time. Had not the wars of Phillip II, soon to begin, paralyzed Spanish industry and checked emigration to the colonies, it seems likely that a very strong Spanish empire would have been established from Florida to the mouth of the Orinoco. **Spanish Colonial Power.**

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CHAPTER III

THE FIRST ENGLISH SETTLEMENTS IN THE SOUTH

THE GENTLEMEN ADVENTURERS

NOTHING shows better the rapid progress of Spanish colonies than the fact that England became interested in colonization through depredations on them. Captain John Hawkins, of Plymouth, Devonshire, did much to open this phase of English history. Negro slaves were in demand in Spanish colonies, and although foreigners were forbidden to trade there, he determined to get access to the market. In 1563 he arrived in Hayti with three hundred negroes, whom the planters, not knowing the king's law, or disregarding it, gladly purchased. He loaded his ships with produce, and sailed for Europe, sending two of them to Spain, where they were promptly seized by the authorities. His courage rose with opposition, and he soon reappeared with another cargo. When the timid colonists hesitated to purchase, he landed an armed force, and frightened off the officials, whereupon the slaves were sold. The king — it was Philip II — now sent a fleet to enforce the laws. It found Hawkins, recently returned from a third voyage, safe in the harbor of Vera Cruz, whose defenses he had seized. He hesitated to appeal to force and agreed to admit the Spanish commander to the harbor on the promise of immunity from attack. The pledge was broken, the English being cut to pieces by the superior number of their opponents. Two ships escaped, one commanded by Hawkins, the other by his nephew, Francis Drake.

**The English
Seamen.
Hawkins.**

Both men were henceforth implacable enemies to the Spaniards. They became the center of a group of hardy captains who dealt Spanish ships many a blow, and who at last united to overthrow in 1588 *The Invincible Armada* which Philip sent against England. Their most notable single adventure was when Drake in 1578 in *The Pelican* sailed around South America, took great quantities of gold from unwary Spaniards, explored the west coast to the forty-eighth parallel, and circumnavigating the globe returned to England to be knighted for his success. These adventures revived English interest in America and promoted colonization.

Drake.

Hawkins and Drake had many imitators. One of them, Sir Humphrey Gilbert, in 1578 received from Queen Elizabeth a patent grant-

ing him power, civil and proprietary, over all lands which he might colonize not held by a Christian prince. He wished to discover a northwest passage to China, and believed that a colony in America would be a useful base for his explorations. In the same year he went out with seven ships, one commanded by his half-brother, Walter Raleigh, then twenty-six years old. The expedition encountered the Spaniards, and soon returned to England. In 1583 Gilbert sailed to Newfoundland to plant a colony there, but he was lost in a storm and his expedition failed. He was a model knight and Christian, and his last known words shouted from the deck of his little ship, then battling for life in the waves, — "The way to heaven is as near by sea as by land," — have often been repeated by Englishmen.

Walter Raleigh took up his dead brother's work, the queen issuing a new charter, and in 1584 he sent two ships under Philip Amadas and Arthur Barlowe to explore the Atlantic coast before attempting to plant a colony. With an eye on the rich Spanish galleons, which English captains were accustomed to plunder on sight, they first sailed to the West Indies, then turning northward came to the coast near Cape Lookout, North Carolina, and skirting the shore found an inlet which does not now exist, and so came in July through Pamlico Sound to Roanoke Island. The rich vegetation, the abundance of fish, and the friendliness of the natives delighted them, and they returned with wonderful stories of what they saw. They reported an abundance of grapes, which abound in that locality to this day; and they found something — probably the persimmon — which they took for the date. Their written description of the place was designed to enlist the efforts of future adventurers, please the queen, and increase the glory of their employer. Elizabeth was enough gratified to confer knighthood on Raleigh, and to call the country Virginia in token of her unmarried state.

In 1585 Raleigh sent Ralph Lane, a brave, tactless captain of infantry, with a hundred men to land at Roanoke Island, make a better investigation of the interior, and select a site for a permanent settlement. He explored Albemarle Sound, went up the Roanoke river until he realized that it was not a northwest passage, and heard from the Indians of Chesapeake Bay, which he properly concluded was better suited than Roanoke Island for the proposed colony. His abrupt manner brought him the hostility of the Indians, his supplies were soon gone, and when in 1586 Sir Francis Drake came to the coast, after a profitable cruise in the West Indies, Lane was glad to embark for England. A few days later Sir Richard Grenville touched at the place with supplies and recruits. He left fifteen men with food to hold the country in the name of the English and sailed off to the West Indies to capture Spanish treasure.

Raleigh now prepared to plant a permanent colony. May 8, 1587, he sent out three ships with one hundred and fifty colonists, twenty-five of whom were women and children. The commander was John White, who was with Lane in 1585 and who showed his confidence in the enterprise by bringing with him his own daughter, Eleanor, and her husband, Annanias Dare. White was to pick up the garrison left by Grenville and plant the "Citie of Raleigh in Virginia" on the Chesapeake. But arrived at Roanoke the hired captain refused to go farther, and when White and the men of the colony were on shore, put their effects on land and sailed away with two of the ships. A more resolute explorer than White, as Cortez or De Soto, would have gone on board, overpowered the captain, and taken the ships to their proper destination.

Third Expedition.

The island was inaccessible from the sea and its soil was poor. The colonists soon became discouraged and urged White to return to England for supplies. Late in August he set sail in the one ship at the disposal of the settlers, leaving behind him a granddaughter, Virginia Dare, born August 18, the first offspring of the English race in what is now the United States. England at that moment was expecting the arrival of the Spanish Armada, and a strict embargo was laid on shipping. White was forced to remain in the country, and it was not until 1591 that he came, in a hired ship, to ascertain the fate of the colony. The island was deserted, the fort was in ruins, and the only evidence of the fate of the colonists was the word "Croatoan" carved on a tree. It was the name of a friendly tribe of Indians dwelling near Cape Hatteras. Before his departure it was agreed that if the colonists removed they would carve the name of their place of refuge on a tree, and if they went in distress a cross was to be added. As no cross appeared, White took courage. He would have gone to Croatoan, but the captain of the fleet, fearful of storms, would not delay, and spite of later efforts of Raleigh to find them, the colonists were never seen again by white men. The settlers at Jamestown, planted twenty years later, learned from the Indians that the people of Roanoke went to the Indians, but were later massacred through the agency of Powhatan. The Indians added that four men, two boys, and one maid were saved by a friendly chief. If so, they were probably adopted into the tribe according to the Indian custom.¹

The "Lost Colony."

The enterprise at Roanoke Island wasted Raleigh's fortune, and the colony itself was a failure, but he kept up his interest in Virginia, saying in 1602 when about to be sent to the Tower, "I shall yet live to see it an English nation." He did, indeed, at Roanoke Island plant the seed which

Significance of Roanoke Island.

¹ The claim that the mixed breeds of Robeson county, N. C., formerly known as Scuffle-tonians, recently called "Croatans," are descended from the "Lost Colony" is unsupported by evidence and highly improbable.

produced fruit at Jamestown. His failure contained a lesson and showed the place at which success would be found. His faith in the expansion of English power was communicated to others, the pathetic fate of his colony hung over the imagination of his countrymen, and the cause of colonization was not forgotten.

Raleigh's misfortunes showed that planting a colony was a large work and that it demanded the support of many people. He, indeed, realized this, and in 1589 assigned to a group of "Associates" the right to establish a colony in Virginia. Among them were ten men who were later connected with the Virginia Company. One of them was Richard Hakluyt, who in 1584 presented the queen with *A Discourse of Western Planting*, a little book of arguments to show why Elizabeth ought to encourage colonies. The appeal failed completely. English sovereigns never expended money in founding or nourishing colonies in America. Among Raleigh's "associates" was Thomas Smythe, a prominent merchant, and either he or his son by the same name was treasurer of the Virginia Company. In 1603 Raleigh was convicted of treason and the assignment of 1589 became null.

The English opinion of Virginia at this time came from the reports of Raleigh's captains and was influenced by the Spanish experience in Mexico and Peru. The popular imagination added much to these already exaggerated impressions. A favorite comedy of the day, "Eastward Ho," gives the following exposition of Virginia in 1605:

**Exaggerated
Opinion of
Virginia.**

"*Seagull*. A whole country of English is there, bred of those that were left there in '79 [1587]; they have married with the Indians . . . who are so in love with them that all the treasures they have they lay at their feet.

"*Scapethrift*. But is there such treasure there, Captain, as I have heard?

"*Seagull*. I tell thee gold is more plentiful there than copper is with us; and for as much red copper as I can bring I'll have thrice the weight in gold. Why man, all their dripping pans . . . are pure gold; and all the chains with which they chain up their streets are massy gold, all the prisoners they take are fettered in gold; and for rubies and diamonds they go forth on holidays and gather 'em by the seashore to hang on their children's coats, and stick in their children's caps, as commonly as our children wear saffron-gilt brooches and groats with holes in 'em.

"*Scapethrift*. And is it a pleasant country withal?

"*Seagull*. As ever the sun shined on: temperate, and full of all sorts of excellent viands; wild boar is as common there as our tamest bacon is here; and venison as mutton. And then you shall live freely there, without sergeants, or courtiers, or lawyers . . . Then for your means of advancement, there it is simple and not preposterously mixed. You may be an alderman there and never be scavenger; you may be any other officer and never be a slave. You may come to preferment enough, . . . to riches and fortune enough, and have never the more villany nor the less wit. Besides, there we shall have no more law than conscience, and not too much of either; serve God enough, eat and drink enough, and enough is as good as a feast."

THE BEGINNING OF VIRGINIA

Various adventurous sea captains were on the American coasts early in the seventeenth century, and they probably gave the impulse which resulted in renewed efforts to people the country. Two whose names stand out are George Weymouth and Bartholomew Gosnold. They offered their ships and their services and tried to get others to raise funds to send out colonies. They succeeded in enlisting the support of a number of gentlemen and merchants, and applied to the king for permission to plant two colonies, — one in the south, where Raleigh's efforts were spent, and one in the north, in a region whose resources of fur, timber, and fisheries had attracted the attention of Weymouth and others. The request was granted, and April 10, 1606, two groups of "adventurers," one resident in London and the other in Plymouth, Bristol, and other towns, were authorized to plant the "First Colony" and the "Second Colony" respectively. The London Company, as the first group came to be called, was to plant between the thirty-fourth and forty-first degrees of north latitude, and the Plymouth Company between the thirty-eighth and forty-fifth degrees; but it was provided that when one colony was established the other should not be placed within a hundred miles of it. Each was to have jurisdiction over a region one hundred miles square, fifty on each side, north and south, of its first settlement, and one hundred into the interior. Various privileges were granted to each, among them authority to open mines, grant lands, coin money, defend themselves against intruders, and import certain articles for seven years without duty.

**London
Company
and Plym-
outh Com-
pany.**

Raleigh's grant said little about the government of the colony he should plant, the inference being that this was a matter left largely in the hands of the proprietor. The grants of 1606 show a better developed idea of a colonial system. The colony was to be a national undertaking, dependent, not on parliament, but on the king. He created the charter and reserved for himself the ultimate jurisdiction over the colonial government. He also issued "instructions," in which was established or modified the internal constitution of the proposed colony. His direct representative was the superior council of Virginia, consisting of thirteen members appointed by the king. Virginia, as then conceived, was an immense domain in which could be established eight seacoast colonies, each one hundred miles square. The government now devised was to apply to the First and Second Colonies, and probably to all others to be set up in Virginia.

**The King's
Idea of
Colonial
Govern-
ment.**

Within the colony was to be a resident council of not more than thirteen members, appointed temporarily by the superior council

in London. It was to choose its president annually, and its functions were four: (1) to make ordinances in matters not touching life and members, such ordinances to be in keeping with the "instructions" and with English law, and to be in force until repealed by the king; (2) to sit as a court of justice; (3) to appoint minor officials; and (4) to exercise the functions of local administration. The "instructions" also established the Church of England and prescribed exile for persons preaching against it. There was to be a Cape Merchant, or treasurer, to receive the goods sent to the colony and to sell those sent home. He was to administer the common store, to which every man's produce should go for five years. The inhabitants were to have the personal and property rights of British subjects, and trial by jury was not to be denied.

**Government
within the
Colony.**

The Second Colony, sent out by the Plymouth Company, sailed August 12, 1606. It was a small expedition and was taken by the Spaniards. The failure did not discourage the Company, who next year sent one hundred and twenty settlers to the mouth of the Kennebec. A bitter winter and other hardships discouraged them, and they returned to England in 1608.

**Colony on
the Kenne-
bec.**

The London Company, moving more slowly, sent forth a larger number of adventurers. December 20, 1606, they sailed from London, one hundred and twenty men, without women and children, in three ships, *The Sarah* [Susan] *Constant*, *The Goodspeed*, and *The Discovery*. Captain Christopher Newport, a seaman experienced in the war against the Spaniards, commanded the expedition on the sea and was instructed to remain two months in Virginia making explorations. He carried a mysterious sealed packet, to be opened twenty-four hours after he made land, containing the names of the all-powerful seven who should make the governing council. Several men of high birth and pretensions were on board, and during the four months the little fleet took to pass first the Canaries, then to the West Indies, and thence northward to the Chesapeake, there was much speculation and some heart-burning in anticipation of the assignment of the coming honors. One man aboard was Captain John Smith, a veritable soldier of fortune, without family connections to speak of. He had real ability, but was probably aggressive and boastful. He drew to himself a group of supporters, which displeased Edward Maria Wingfield, a proud man of high birth, who charged Smith with plotting mutiny, and got him put in irons for the rest of the voyage. April 26, Old Style, they sighted the Virginia capes and named them Henry and Charles after the two sons of their king. Before them was Hampton Roads, and beyond that a great river which they called the James. Seeking to reach it they were impeded by shallows, till at last they found the channel close to a spit of land,

**The First
Settlers.**

which in gratitude they called Point Comfort. At last the sealed packet was opened. The three captains of the ships, Newport, Gosnold, and Ratcliffe, with Wingfield, Smith, and two others were to be the council. Wingfield's ascendancy was complete; he was elected president, but Smith, though given his liberty, was not allowed to sit in the council.

The colonists now divided into two parts; one explored the river and bay and the other proceeded to lay out a town. The site was a peninsula thirty-two miles from the mouth of the James, large enough for a town and some fields. It was connected with the mainland by a narrow neck and was easily defensible. Though lying low, it was as high as most of the bank up to that point. The channel cut the southwest end and made a low bluff so that the ships could be tied up to the shore. Here a fort was constructed, with a church and a storehouse. In the rear of these was laid out a little street along which huts were built. The town was named Jamestown. June 15 the fort was completed, and the colonists felt safe against the Indians. A week later Captain Newport returned to England. He carried a quantity of pyrites which he took for gold. He valued it so highly, that arriving on the English shore he dared not leave his ship and proceed to London, lest the precious stuff be stolen.

Virginia presented a fair appearance to the colonists. The great oaks, pines, and cypresses, with grapevines as large as a man's leg, showed the fertility of the soil. The great sturgeons in the river, the luscious oysters on the rocks, mussels with pearls in them, flowers in the woods, strawberries twice as large as those of England, and many other things filled with admiration the imaginative gentlemen adventurers. They roamed through the woods in ecstasy. Every new bird, every shady nook carpeted with flowers, every fine view of river or grassy marsh, brought forth expressions of delight, as we may see from the writings of several of the more bookish members of the colony. It would be interesting to know what the laborers thought, who came to convert all this forest beauty into patient, corn-growing fields. The Indians at this time no longer looked on the whites with wonder. Spanish and English ships had inflicted enough cruelty to place war in their hearts. The Paspaheghs controlled the region and resented the intrusion at Jamestown. No treaty was offered them, and they would have destroyed the intruders had they found an opportunity.

The sultry August days brought disaster. Gentle George Percy describes the situation with pathetic briefness. "The sixth day of August," he says, "there died John Asbie, of the bloudie Flixe. The ninth day, died George Flowre, of the swelling, the tenth day, died William Bruster Gentleman, of a wound given by the Savages, and was buried the eleventh day. The

Jamestown.

Natural
Charms.The Work
of Disease.

fourteenth day, Jerome Olikock, Ancient [*i.e.* Ensign], died of a wound. The same day, Francis Midwinter, and Edward Moris Corporall died suddenly." Thus runs the account throughout August, closing with this, "Our men were destroyed with cruell diseases, such as Swellings, Flixes, Burning Fevers, and by warres; and some departed suddenly; but for the most part, they died of meere famine. . . . It pleased God, after a while, to sende those people which were our mortall enemies, [the Indians] to relieve us with victuals, as Bread, Corne, Fish, and Flesh in great plentie; which was the setting up of our feeble men: otherwise we had all perished." This fortunate succor came from Powhatan, who lived on the York river, and from Indians south of the James, who were pleased to give food for trinkets, Captain John Smith going to them for trade.

The starving settlers turned against Wingfield, who could think of no better means of meeting the difficulties than to husband the small store of food until help arrived from England. The resourcefulness of Smith now attracted attention, and he was admitted to the council. Soon afterwards this body deposed the president and placed Ratcliffe in his place. Smith then became the most active man in the colony. He was sent out to trade with the natives, and besides securing food won their respect, so that even the Paspaheghs became friendly. January 8, 1608, Newport, returning with supplies and 110 recruits, found the colony safe, although the numbers were reduced to 40. He was ordered by the Company to bring back a valuable cargo, and three months were spent in getting lumber to fill his ships. The time should have been given to clearing the forest for grain. As it was, when planting time came only four acres could be put into cultivation. A hundred would not have been too much. In August disease and famine reappeared and the population was reduced to 50. Then Newport reappeared, and precious time and strength must be given to the preparation of his cargo. Under such circumstances the arrival of a "supply" was a questionable benefit. In 1608 Smith became president, and when all the other councillors died he would not appoint successors, but ruled alone. The people accepted him, and in the spring of 1609 he got 40 acres into cultivation. He also erected better houses and dug a well, at that place a work of a few hours. Although a physician was among the colonists, the brackish river had for two years furnished the drinking water.

In the autumn of 1609 Smith returned to England, and the winter which followed was termed "the starving time." The population, largely increased by recent arrivals, was reduced from 500 to 60. Some of the sufferers were tempted to cannibalism, and one desperate man threw his Bible into the fire, crying, "There is no God in heaven!" When Sir Thomas Gates, a new governor, arrived in the spring he decided the experiment

Services of
Captain
John Smith.

was a failure and embarked the whole company for England. Before he left the river he encountered still another governor, Delaware, with supplies and recruits. All returned to Jamestown, where the situation became a little better.

In 1609 the government by council was abandoned and a governor appointed with practically the authority of military law. Such a man was Delaware, who was too mild to be a despot. In 1611 he returned to England, remaining governor till his death in 1618, and ruling Virginia through a deputy governor. In this capacity came Sir Thomas Dale, 1611-1616, as bitter a tyrant as ever held office in America. There was much to excuse his harshness. He found on his arrival that no crops were planted, although the planting season was past. The men's chief occupation was bowling in the streets, the houses were falling in pieces, and the Indians were defiant. He turned on Newport, who had continually deceived England about the state of the colony, pulled his beard in public, threatened to hang him, and asked "wheather it ware meant that the people heere in Virginia shoulde feede upon trees." He set the colonists to digging sassafras roots and hewing cedar for the profit of the Company. The spiritless inhabitants did not resist, but fled to the woods: when he took them he burned them at the stake. For stealing food some were hanged, and one was tied to a tree to starve.

**Council's
Powers
Abolished.**

**Dale as
Governor.**

The food was bad, either because the contractors cheated the Company, or because provisions spoiled in transit. There was much complaint, and Dale devised a scheme of relief. He distributed small lots of land to the people, and all who had come as laborers were given one month of the year to raise food for themselves. Another group, probably all who were not laborers, were called farmers and given three acres of land each, for which they paid to the company each year seven and a half barrels of corn and one month's labor. It was exorbitant rent, but when men directed their own labor they worked as much in one day as formerly in a week.

**Distribution
of Land.**

The large number of gentlemen adventurers who came to the colony had a bad effect. They came hoping to find gold as Spanish gentlemen had found it in Central America, but they were nevertheless honestly desirous of building up the enterprise. Unaccustomed to labor they did not readily take up the hard work of clearing the fields, and despair, disease, and death found them an easy prey. Not used to superior authority they turned to intrigue. On this group fell Dale like a thunderbolt. He had no troops to enforce his orders, but his iron will served instead. Hardened soldier that he was, he found it the most difficult task of his life. When he left Virginia in 1616 the days of illusion were passed and the colonists realized that the chief thing was to develop the agri-

**Dale's Serv-
ices.**

cultural resources of a fertile country. They then numbered 350 and were well supplied with cattle and hogs. It was within this period that the possibilities of tobacco were discovered. Virginia now had a profitable money crop, great estates became possible, and the early aristocratic impulses of the settlers might reassert themselves.

BETTER TIMES IN THE COLONY

Meanwhile the London Company cast off its early enthusiasm. The public-spirited gentlemen who founded it soon ceased to contribute to its support. Threatened with failure, its friends attempted to make it a national trading company. The clergy lent their influence on missionary grounds, with the result that the membership grew to 765, only 225 of whom were of the gentry. A share cost twelve pounds and ten shillings, and in 1612 the king permitted all important business to be transacted by a majority of the stockholders. Now appeared at the quarterly meetings a group in support of the king's ideas and a popular party who declared that prosperity would not come to the colony until self-government was granted. Such a suggestion was abhorrent to James I, but the misery under the king's plan was evident and the liberals triumphed in 1618. They were ably led by Sir Edwin Sandys, ever the friend of liberal ideas.

Sir George Yardley, governor, arrived at Jamestown April 19, 1619, announcing the permanent end of common property and the beginning of self-government. Each colonist was to have an assignment of land—one hundred acres for those who came before 1616 and fifty for those who came afterwards. The laws were to be made by an assembly composed of a governor and six councillors appointed by the company and two representatives elected by each town, hundred, or plantation. The governor and council had executive functions, assigned land, sat as a high court of justice, and composed the upper house of the assembly. The most honorable position in Virginia next to the governor was the councillor. The representatives made the House of Burgesses, or lower house. The assembly was to make laws not contrary to English laws and subject to veto in England. In the main, this was the frame of government for Virginia and the other royal colonies until the revolution.

Tobacco was now worth five shillings a pound in London, but the price fell rapidly. One man on cleared ground could raise, in 1649, about 2000 pounds. Fifty acres of land, known as a head right, was given to each adult immigrant who settled in the colony, and fifty to a master for each servant. Sir Edwin Sandys, the Company's treasurer, worked indefatigably to bring people to a country where wealth and liberty were

**Changes in
the Com-
pany.**

**Self-
Government**

**Charter
Annulled.**

promised, and his success was marked. But the court party intrigued against him. They convinced the king that Virginia was a nest of sedition, and he set himself to defeat the reelection of the treasurer. "Choose the devil if you will," he said to the stockholders, "but not Sir Edwin Sandys." This warning was too plain to be mistaken, and the liberal faction elected the Earl of Southampton, as progressive as his predecessor. James's suspicions were not allayed, and many advisers incited his anger, among them the Spanish minister, Gondomar, who resented the intrusion of the settlement into what he considered Spanish territory. In 1623 one of his tools published a paper called "The Unmasking of Virginia," bitterly attacking the company and the colony. James sent a biased commission to Virginia to investigate, and on its report brought suit to annul the charter. All the past misfortunes were laid at the door of the London Company, and June 16, 1624, the Company fell, Virginia passing into the hands of the king. He probably intended to undo the liberal reforms, but he died within a year, and Charles I, more friendly than his father, allowed them to continue. Thus the first law-making assembly established in America remained as a model for the colonies not yet created, and liberal government under royal supervision became firmly rooted in our life.

The governors sent by Charles were no worse than those sent by the Company. They had frequent quarrels with the assembly, which became the defender of colonial rights against the royal prerogative. Sometimes the council sided with them, and in 1635 it even deposed Governor Harvey, who tried to lay taxes without an act of assembly and to remove officials by his mere word. He was promptly restored by King Charles, who resented the unmaking of a governor. But the king was greatly beset by his own enemies, and vacillated from party to party. He soon sent a liberal governor, and then changing again, sent in 1642 a supporter of the royal prerogative, Sir William Berkeley, destined to rule long in Virginia. Berkeley was a stout aristocrat and a supporter of the king's prerogative, but he was honest, and his administration was a period of economic prosperity.

Royal
Governors.

Planting the first permanent colony cost the English stock dearly. When it ceased to exist in 1624 the London Company had expended 200,000 pounds, equal to \$5,000,000 in American values of to-day, and from this large expenditure the return was very slight. In the same period it sent to Virginia over 14,000 persons, nearly 13,000 of whom died from exposure and disease. But in spite of this waste of money and life the first lessons of colonization were learned for the benefit of colonies to be established in the future, and Virginia remained a permanent home of white men.

Two Indian wars fell heavily on the colony within the early period of its existence, one in 1622 and another in 1644. Each marked an

attempt of the natives to save their land from the occupation of the strangers. Before the first of these attacks relations with the savages were peaceful, owing in the first instance to the exertions of Captain Smith and after that to the good will of Powhatan, head chief of a confederacy which included at least thirty-four tribes. His good will was much influenced by his daughter Pocohontas, who probably saved the life of Smith, made many visits to Jamestown, and finally married Rolfe, one of the colonists. In 1618 Powhatan died, and his able brother, Opechancanough, who disliked the English and wished to expel them before it was too late, began to plot war. In March, 1622, the tribes generally went on the warpath, and swept through the outlying plantations with a trail of blood. Nearly 400 persons perished, and the planters who survived the first attack fled to the older settlements. They were compelled to leave their cattle behind, which, with their homes, were destroyed. As soon as the spring crops were planted the whites divided in bands and took a terrible vengeance. For twenty-two years there was peace. But Opechancanough, at last the head chief, only waited an opportunity. In 1644 there was civil war in England, and he thought the expected moment was at hand. Old and blind as he was he acted with energy, and in two days over 300 settlers were slain. Again the whites took up arms, and in 1646 the aged head chief himself was taken and killed. In this struggle the savages lost heavily and were forced to make a treaty by which they retired from the region between the James and the York rivers. Thenceforth tidewater Virginia had peace.

THE SETTLEMENT OF MARYLAND

In 1609 the London Company's jurisdiction was fixed at 200 miles north and south of Old Point Comfort, and it was to extend westward through this region to the Mississippi. The Jamestown settlement was not thought to have jurisdiction over all this area; for in 1619 the Company granted privileges to the Pilgrims from Leyden, which, but for the unfavorable voyage of the *Mayflower*, would have resulted in a coördinate colony near the Delaware. With the fall of the Company, 1624, all Virginia again became the king's, and soon afterwards he cut off from it two great proprietary provinces. One, lying on the south of Virginia proper, he gave to Sir Robert Heath, 1629, who did not improve it, and the other was given to George Calvert, Lord Baltimore, who thus became the founder of Maryland.

Virginia Divided. Calvert was a member of the London Company and a favorite with the king. In 1625 he announced himself a Catholic, resigned the principal secretaryship of state, and gave himself up to colonization. His first attempt was in Newfoundland, but it failed through the cold climate, and he

turned to Virginia, asking in the first instance for a grant of the lands between the James river and Albemarle Sound. To this request the friends of Virginia objected, and he was satisfied with a grant north of the Potomac, extending as far as the fortieth degree of latitude. To the colony, the charter of which was signed June 20, 1632, the king gave the name Maryland, in honor of his queen, Henrietta Maria.

By the Maryland charter a government was created less liberal than that of the London Company. The model on which it was formed was the County Palatine of Durham, in northern England. The proprietor, Baltimore, was to have in the colony the same authority as the Bishop of Durham had in the county, of whom the old motto of law ran, *Quicquid Rex habet extra, Episcopus habet intra*. Thus the proprietor, besides having possession of the land, was the head of the administrative, judicial, and military functions. The legislative function had no place in the system in force in Durham, and in this respect the Maryland system was more liberal; for it provided that the proprietor might make laws in keeping with those of England "with the advice, assent, and approbation of the freemen or the major part of them or their representatives." The inhabitants were thus to have a share in law making, but the proprietor could have the initiative and might exercise a veto. By the charter the church of Maryland was to conform to the laws of England, and the right to nominate clergymen was reserved to the proprietor. He was to hold his estate at only a nominal rent, and without taxes to the royal treasury.

The Government in Maryland.

George Calvert, first Lord Baltimore, died as his charter was about to be signed, and Maryland passed to his son, Cecilius, a wise and liberal-minded man. He proceeded with the work of colonization, and in October, 1633, sent two ships with twenty gentlemen and about two hundred laborers to make the first settlement. With them went his brother, Leonard, as governor. He and most of the gentlemen were Catholics, and most of the laborers Protestants. In a country as strongly anti-Catholic as England it behooved the Calverts to be tolerant, but there is no reason to think that the liberty of conscience which they granted in Maryland did not arise from their sense of justice and liberality. At any rate, at a time when Virginia drove out non-conformists and Massachusetts persecuted Roger Williams, Maryland was the home of religious freedom. Toleration attracted to Maryland people of varying religious belief. Unfortunately, they were not so liberal as the proprietor, and when strong enough began to persecute one another, until civil war at last appeared in the colony.

Religious Toleration.

English Catholics suffered much from the laws against their faith, and it was thought that they would gladly seek an asylum in America. They were fined for not attending the established church, keeping

arms in their houses, educating their children abroad, maintaining Catholic schoolmasters, and converting Protestants to Catholicism.

Would the Catholics Migrate? They might not be legally married by their own clergy, serve as executors, or be buried in their own churchyards. Fines were collected from them persistently: even James I, who had sympathy for their faith, took thirty-six thousand pounds a year in this way. For these reasons Catholics were deeply discouraged. But when Baltimore's charter was at length signed, King James was dead, and the English church seemed tending toward Catholicism. Laud was establishing high church practices and harrowing the Puritans, and the new king was giving willing approval. So hopeful were the Catholics of better times in England that the expected emigration did not occur, and Baltimore, who wished to see the colony grow, was the more willing to receive settlers of other faiths.

The settlement at St. Mary's. The first colony entered Chesapeake Bay late in February, 1634, giving thanks to Providence for bringing them through many storms. They were struck with admiration for the Potomac, "in comparison with which the Thames seemed a rivulet." Near its mouth was a tributary which they called St. George: nine miles up its course they laid out a town and called it St. Mary's. The site was occupied by the Indians. Mindful of Captain Smith's experience in Virginia the Marylanders resorted to trade, and for some axes, knives, cloth, and hoes purchased the village. The neighboring savages were weak, and, suffering much from the Susquehannas, who lived near the mouth of the river which now bears their name, received the whites gladly, and were converted to Christianity by the Jesuits. Leonard Calvert took up the work of establishing his colony in an orderly manner, profiting by Virginia's experience. The Indian fields were put in corn and tobacco and other land was cleared, the location selected was dry and healthy, and land was assigned individually from the first. The delusion of gold-hunting never troubled the colony. The result was that the first year a shipload of corn could be sent to New England to exchange for salt fish. Maryland was planted without a "starving time."

Independence of the Assembly. February 26, 1635, the colonists held an assembly. They were not authorized to do it by the proprietor, but thought the charter gave them permission. They sent a number of laws to England, where Baltimore disallowed them because he intended to have the initiative in law making. Three years later he sent a body of laws which were submitted to a second assembly. He now learned how little the right of initiating law is worth when the representatives are in a bad humor; for the assembly was overwhelmingly against his code. Baltimore was a wise ruler and would not press his point. He authorized his brother, Governor Calvert, to allow the assembly to make laws as they desired,

to be in force till he should pass on them in England. The proprietor tried again in 1649 to introduce a system of law favorable to his predominance, and failed again. In 1650 Maryland was given a legislature with two houses, one composed of representatives and the other of the councillors and persons specially summoned by the governor.

Baltimore learned in another way that the feudal ideas of the Stuarts could not be grafted on society in America. In pursuance of his grant he created manors consisting of one thousand or more acres. The lord of the manor was authorized to hold manor courts, to which his tenants might come and vote under his direction. The tenants consisted of English laborers who might soon become farm owners. They felt the impulse to freedom which inhered in a society the natural basis of which was the ability to work. They took control of the lord's courts, held local popular meetings, and in a short time the Maryland manors disappeared.

**Short-Lived
Manorial
System.**

The Jesuits themselves felt the force of democracy. They were much interested in the experiment and used the opportunity to acquire large tracts of land,—some from the proprietor and some from the Indians, who trusted them. They began to talk of the supremacy of the church law over the proprietor and assembly. Lord Baltimore was a true Catholic, but he was not intolerant, and he realized that if the Jesuits obtained control, public opinion in England would demand the destruction of this cherished asylum for his fellow-believers. He sent an agent to Maryland to check the extreme Catholics there. The Jesuits resented this and talked of excommunication. The proprietor then took decisive action. In 1641 he issued new regulations to control the granting of land, and one provision was that lands should not be granted in mortmain; that is, to religious societies. In the same sagacious spirit he sought to restrain religious disputation between the two religious groups, and in 1643 he went so far as to send notice to New England that all creeds would be protected in Maryland. All these efforts brought slight increase of population. Protestants preferred to settle in one of the Protestant colonies and Catholics were not going to America in large numbers. The most notable accession was the removal of more than one thousand Puritans from southern Virginia to escape Berkeley's strict regulations.

**The Jesuits
Checked.**

Virginia did not relish the loss of what she considered her territory north of the Potomac. In 1630 she sent one of her chief citizens, William Claiborne, to England to try to defeat Baltimore's plans. He did not succeed, and returned to Virginia in a mood to make trouble. He lived at what is now Hampton, Virginia, but was engaged in the fur trade on the northern shores of the Chesapeake, and had a trading station with a fort and a small garrison on Kent's Island, within Baltimore's

**Controversy
over Kent's
Island.**

grant. Governor Leonard Calvert held that it ought to fall under Maryland jurisdiction, and the terms of the charter supported him. But Claiborne held that as it was settled under Virginia authority before the charter was issued it ought to remain under that jurisdiction. When, therefore, Calvert called on Claiborne to submit to Maryland, the latter refused and Virginia supported him. Rival fur traders stirred up feeling at St. Mary's, and August 5, 1635, they seized one of Claiborne's pinnaces. The Virginian was a high-spirited man and retaliated, blood being shed on both sides. Neither party cared to go further, and for nearly three years there was no more trouble, Claiborne continuing most of the time to trade in Maryland in defiance of Calvert. He was confident of his position, and in 1637 went to England on business. Governor Calvert then sent a force which surprised Kent's Island by night and forced its inhabitants to submit to his government. The following year Claiborne was attainted of treason by the Maryland assembly, and one of his followers was hanged for having committed manslaughter in one of the recent encounters. At the same time royal commissioners decided that the disputed island belonged to Lord Baltimore. Claiborne submitted unwillingly and bided his time. He had lost his island, but he found a means of annoying Maryland.

From 1630 to 1650 Englishmen were divided into a king's party and a parliamentary party. The old court party of the London Company, still intriguing for the restoration of their charter, favored the king, who in 1630 sent John Harvey to rule Virginia in the interest of the royal prerogative. The former supporters of Sandys and Southampton were still active and were very strong in Virginia, where Claiborne was one of their leaders. In 1635 they deposed the governor and sent him to England with charges of misconduct. Lord Baltimore was a supporter of the king and a friend of John Harvey. He used his influence with Charles and got the deposed governor restored; but in 1639 the king felt the need of the liberal party and replaced Harvey by Wyatt, whom he removed in 1641 to make room for Sir William Berkeley, a thorough royalist. The popular party in Virginia followed these movements closely and identified Baltimore with their enemies. When, therefore, the king and parliament were at last at war, 1642, they thought the time had come to strike Baltimore in Maryland. Although they were not willing to oppose Charles in Virginia, they were willing to urge the Puritans of Maryland to strike at his friend, the proprietor of that province. Claiborne saw in it an opportunity to recover his property, and in 1645 landed on Kent's Island and tried to get the inhabitants to join him in an attack on the proprietary government. They would not follow him, not because there was no discontent in Maryland, but because they did not want to take up Claiborne's quarrel.

**Maryland
Drawn into
Politics by
Virginians.**

This discontent came to the surface in 1644 when Edward Hill, member of the popular Virginia party, appeared in Maryland to persuade the Puritans to return to their old homes south of the James. They did not heed him, but persuaded him to espouse their cause against the Catholics. They organized a Protestant assembly, and elected Hill governor, in the absence of Governor Calvert in England. But at this juncture Calvert returned, and finding his province in revolt got a body of soldiers from his brother royalist, Governor Berkeley, and made prisoners of Hill and his assembly. Six months later Governor Calvert died. He tried to pass the governorship to a Catholic and royalist, but affairs in England were ordered otherwise.

**Civil War in
Maryland,
1644.**

In England the king's cause was now desperate, and astute Cecilius Calvert was looking for means of appeasing Parliament. The vacant governorship was just the opportunity; he gave it to William Stone, a Virginia liberal and a Protestant, and began to think of laws for religious liberty. Stone's first assembly passed the famous Toleration Act of 1649, protecting all who professed faith in Jesus Christ. It was honestly meant by the proprietor, but it was needed in order to protect the Catholics under a government thoroughly Protestant. Baltimore's reversal of policy created disgust among his old English friends, and Charles II in exile ordered that he surrender his government because he adhered to the Parliamentarians. This was an impotent thrust, and he used it as a good argument when his enemies tried to get Parliament to seize the province on the ground that it was a nest of Romanism.

**Shrewd
Policy of
Baltimore.**

In 1651 Parliament, now completely under Cromwell, sent commissioners — one of them being the ubiquitous Claiborne — to reduce to obedience Virginia, Maryland, Barbados, Antigua, and Bermuda. The islands submitted at once, Virginia made no resistance, and in 1652 Maryland also submitted. Baltimore's property rights were maintained, but he lost the government, though Stone remained in office under the parliamentary government. He was friendly to the proprietor, and in 1654 tried to get him recognized as head of the government under Parliament. This aroused the resentment of the commissioners, and Claiborne appeared with a Virginia army, deposed Stone, appointed commissioners in his stead, and disfranchised the Catholics. A new assembly was strongly Puritan and toleration was cast to the winds.

**Triumph of
the Protes-
tants.**

The deposed governor appealed to force, the Catholics and some Protestants fighting under him for the proprietor and liberty of conscience. He marched against the Puritans in 1655 and sustained a complete defeat at Providence. The Virginians now felt that they might reunite Maryland to their own colony. They sent a petition to England urging that the proprietary government be abolished and that the two colonies be

**Peace at
Last, 1657.**

made one. Baltimore's wise concessions to Puritans now bore fruit. He completely defeated his enemies; and the government forced a settlement which left him in control of Maryland according to his charter and placed the Act of Toleration beyond question. With this settlement ended Virginia's interference with Maryland affairs and her hopes of recovering that province. At this time Baltimore's colony contained 8000 inhabitants on both sides of the Chesapeake as far north as the mouth of the Susquehanna.

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CHAPTER IV

THE SETTLEMENT OF NEW ENGLAND

THE PLYMOUTH COLONY

WHEN James I was driving non-conformist ministers from their livings, two of the victims, Richard Clifton and John Robinson, were received at Scrooby, in Nottinghamshire, by William Brewster, living in a manor house of the brother of Sir Edwin Sandys. The region is the cradle of religious reform; for not only did the New England Pilgrims originate here, but ten miles northeast of Scrooby is Epworth, whence issued a century later the founder of the great Wesleyan movement. Brewster, a man of stout heart, a retired diplomat, and a strong Puritan, gathered his neighbors under his roof to hear the words of Clifton and Robinson; and in 1606 was organized a separatist congregation, with Robinson for pastor. Self-control, plainness in dress, honesty of speech, and absolute faith in the Bible were some of the features of its faith. The pastor was a fellow of Cambridge, wise in business matters, and capable of ruling others by his sweetness and strength of character. An antagonist called him "the most learned, polished, and modest spirit that ever separated from the Church of England."

Origin of
the Pilgrims.

The congregation encountered persecutions immediately. The members were watched day and night and, as Bradford later wrote, "some were taken and clapt up in prison . . . and y^e most were faine to flie and leave their howses and habi- tations, and the means of their livlihood. Yet these and many other sharper things which afterwards befell them, were no other than they looked for, and therefore were y^e better prepared to bear them by y^e assistance of Gods grace and spirite." Fleeing one by one, the members at length arrived in Amsterdam and then went to Leyden, where they found employment and set up their church, their pastor going with them and sharing their sorrows. At the end of ten years their industrial condition was not improved, and their children were becoming Dutch in speech and ideas. They longed for a home in an English land and applied for a grant in Virginia. February 2, 1620, a patent issued from the London Company per- mitting them to settle a plantation and to govern it by laws of their own in keeping with the laws of England. Sandys got his friends to

In Leyden.

The Charter.

urge the king to promise that the settlement should not be molested; but James would only wink at the enterprise. This satisfied the Pilgrims, as we may now call them; for they reflected that "a seale as broad as the house floor" would not keep James to his promise.

Not all the congregation could leave Leyden. Some were held back by family bonds, others were too old or too young, and others could not sell their property for money. Thus it happened that the majority remained in Leyden and the pastor stayed with them. By request, William Brewster went as leader. Robinson's preaching in Leyden had drawn to his congregation fugitives from many parts of England, and the result was that many of the emigrants were not of those who fled from Scrooby, and some were not members of the congregation. Seventy London merchants advanced 7000 pounds to fit out the expedition; and it was agreed that the net earnings should go into a common fund for seven years and then be divided among the shareholders. Ten pounds was the value of a share and each immigrant was allowed one share for services.

September 6, 1620, after many delays, the Pilgrims, 102 in number, set sail from Plymouth for Virginia, as they thought, in a hired ship, the *Mayflower*. November 11 they sighted land at Cape Cod. Bearing southward to pass it and come to the Delaware river, where they designed to settle, they encountered shoals and drew back, coming to anchor in the harbor of Provincetown. The captain of the ship refused to continue his journey southward, alleging the dangers of the sea. After five weeks of exploration they took the ship to Plymouth, a place marked and named on Captain John Smith's map. The place had deep water for the ships, a stream of fresh water for drinking, and some cleared fields where Indians had once grown corn. December 16 (26, New Style) they brought the *Mayflower* to the place and began to build huts for the passengers.

A hard winter and much suffering now followed. Hunger, cold, and illness played their parts relentlessly, and by the arrival of spring hardly fifty of the colonists were alive. Of the eighteen wives who came in the ship only four survived. The seasoning process was as cruel here as in Virginia. But the spirit of the survivors did not flag. By hard work they raised a small amount of corn in 1621 and came to the autumn with hopefulness. But the arrival of thirty-five colonists without food necessitated a régime of half-rations. In the spring of 1622 came sixty-five more, and the whole settlement was in dire want until the corn ripened. During these distressing months the fish and game were abundant, but the colonists were agriculturalists and had not learned to take them. Here, as in Virginia, it took time to develop the keen resourcefulness of the American frontiersman.

The Project.

Voyage of the Mayflower.

The Seasoning Time.

Plymouth, outside the bounds of the London Company, could not profit by the original patent. But in 1621 it received a grant from the council for New England, which was created by the king in 1620 with authority to settle the coast from the fortieth to the forty-eighth degree of latitude. The terms were not satisfactory, and in 1630 a more valid grant was secured. The colonists desired a charter like that of Massachusetts Bay, but the gift was denied them. Without a frame of government from the crown they were therefore thrown on their own initiative. The result was the "Mayflower Compact," signed November 21, 1620, by each male adult except the servants and two hired seamen. It created "a civil body politic" on democratic lines but fully subservient to the royal authority. In the absence of a charter it was the basis of civil government in Plymouth until the colony was united with Massachusetts in 1691. The first governor, John Carver, died in 1621, and his successor, William Bradford, was annually reelected, until his death in 1657, with the exception of five years, when he refused to serve.

**Civil Gov-
ernment.**

The relations of the colonists to the Indians proved fortunate. Pestilence had swept away those in the immediate neighborhood. In the spring of 1621 Samoset, from the island of Monhegan, arrived at the town crying "Welcome!" He had lived for some time with English traders and proved useful to the colonists. He brought to them Squanto, another Indian, who taught the whites to raise Indian corn and to fertilize their fields with fish. In 1621 a treaty was made with Massasoit, chief of the Wampanoags, and it resulted in fifty years of peace with the Indians south and east of Plymouth. To the west were the Narragansetts, who sent a war challenge, a bundle of arrows tied in a rattle-snake's skin. Bradford promptly returned the skin stuffed with bullets, and the threatened danger vanished. In 1623 the Indians to the northward planned to exterminate the whites whom the adventurer Weston had settled at Weymouth. The whites asked Plymouth for aid, and Captain Miles Standish, with the fighting men of that colony, marched against the savages and taught them to respect the white man's arms. After that Plymouth had peaceful relations with all the Indians.

**Relations
with the
Indians.**

Another difficulty overcome by Bradford's good sense was the communal form of labor, adopted for seven years at the instance of the merchants who promoted the colony. Lack of interest marked the system, and the colony seemed on the verge of destruction when in 1623 Bradford assigned a parcel of land to each family for use. The result was good, and individual effort returned with the prospect of individual gain. The fur trade, well managed, proved profitable, and from the proceeds the debt to the company in England was paid off.

**Common
Stock
Abandoned.**

In church government the Pilgrims were thoroughgoing Separatists. Pastor and elders were elected by the adult males of the congregation. Religious ceremonies were rigorously eschewed, and for a time even marriages and funerals were conducted without religious forms. Attendance at meeting was compulsory on members and non-members. Theology ruled the minds of the people and the orthodox believed they saw on every hand revelations of the divine will. In 1623 drought threatened to destroy the crop and a day of humiliation and prayer was observed; after which came a copious rain which saved the harvest. In gratitude a Thanksgiving Day was set apart for the autumn. There had been, however, a day of thanksgiving in 1621.

The growth of Plymouth was slow, for the soil was not fertile and but little remained from the annual product after the food of the colony was set aside. There was no staple crop, as tobacco in Virginia, from which a large money return could be expected. Immigration was naturally from the Separatists, who came slowly. Thus it happened that in 1624 the population was 180, and in 1626 it was 300. By this time a desire to disperse and settle on the better lands to the northward could not be restrained, though Bradford did his best. Men abandoned their house lots as they went, and Duxbury and Scituate sprang into thriving existence. Each had its own civil and ecclesiastical government like that of Plymouth; and for common affairs of each kind there were representative assemblies. To be admitted to citizenship in a town or membership in a congregation required a vote of the existing citizens or members, as the case might be.

Meanwhile, much attention was given to colonizing other parts of New England. The Plymouth Company of 1606 was reorganized in the Council for New England, 1620, and received a valuable fishing monopoly. Sir Ferdinando Gorges and Captain John Mason, king's men and churchmen, were the most active members. They made large plans which they had not the means of executing. In 1623 a settlement was made at Rye, in New Hampshire, only to fail in 1626. In 1627 an attempt was made at Dover and another at York, while fishing stations were established at Pemaquid Point and on Monhegan Island. Saco and Biddeford soon followed. Other small settlements were Cape Anne, 1623, Hull, 1625, Salem, 1625, "Merry Mount," near Quincy, 1625, and Buzzard's Bay, 1627. Most of them were mere fishing stations, and none gave evidence of prosperity. The Council of New England could offer them little aid. After granting most of what is now New Hampshire and Maine to Mason and Gorges and smaller tracts to other persons, it asked the king in 1635 to annul its charter, saying, "what remains is only a breathless carcass." From this time we hear little more of the council. Most of the lands over which it had juris-

**Religious
Ideas.**

**Expansion
of Plymouth.**

**Other New
England
Settlements.**

diction had been granted to former members and the council, who now held of the king directly.

THE MASSACHUSETTS BAY COLONY

The Pilgrims were Separatists, but the Puritans, who founded Massachusetts, wished to remain in the established church, although they thought to reform its doctrines. They were especially earnest against bishops, whom they considered a relic of popery; and they resented the wearing of surplices. They were very numerous, and Laud, Bishop of London and supporter of Charles I in his arbitrary government, began to harry the Puritan clergy out of their offices. Thus arose the impulse of the Puritan migration to New England, a place where prelates would not distress and religion would be preserved in Puritan integrity. Yet other motives were present. The New World offered wide industrial opportunity, and it seemed to be possible to found a government there free from the taint of absolutism which then alarmed many Englishmen. The Puritans were generally thrifty and practical business men and liberals in their political ideas. Among them, also, were many thoughtful and well-educated men who could give reasons for the doctrines they held. Of this class was John Winthrop, a well-to-do landowner, a former student but not a graduate of Cambridge, a lawyer, and a wise man of affairs. He would have been a leader of any community in which he lived.

**Origin of the
Puritan
Migration.**

In 1628, before the Puritan migration was planned, six Englishmen, among them John Endicott, secured from the Council of New England a grant of land bounded on the north by the headwaters of the Merrimac and on the south by the source of the Charles and stretching westward to the Pacific. They were authorized to establish fisheries, trading stations, and agricultural settlements, and were named the Massachusetts Bay Company. In 1629 the king confirmed the grant and gave the grantees civil jurisdiction within the limits of the grant. Endicott with about forty others arrived at Naumkeag in September, 1628, to plant the first town. He found there the remnant of the Cape Anne settlement and the two parties settled together amicably, changing the name of the place to Salem. Endicott and his associates were Puritans, but up to this time their enterprise had no religious significance. In 1629, however, the number of associates was enlarged, and among the new members was Winthrop. The struggle between parliament and crown was already begun, and many on the former side felt that tyranny would certainly triumph and were willing to escape betimes from its grasp. In August, 1629, twelve leaders of this group made the Cambridge Agreement, pledging themselves to emigrate to Massachusetts if the company would transfer the government entirely to the settlers.

**Massa-
chusetts
Bay Charter.**

The company accepted the proposal, and the transfer made, John Winthrop was elected governor by those who proposed to go with him. June 12, 1630, he arrived at Salem with eleven ships and 900 settlers. Here, he found, was much discouragement and some suffering, and he decided to make his chief settlement elsewhere. He selected a site at the mouth of the Charles and called the place Boston. But it was too small for such a large number of settlers, and the colonists dividing into bands settled seven other towns from Salem to Dorchester. They did not escape sickness and hunger, and by the end of the first winter 200 had died. But the governor strove hard to provide food and was able to bring the colony through the winter without serious discouragement. After that the growth was rapid, and in 1643 the total population was over 16,000. But the outbreak of war between parliament and king made it necessary for every Puritan to remain in England, and from that time the migration to New England was slow.

Soon after the colony was settled there arose serious difficulty in regard to its government. The charter intrusted authority to the governor, the assistants of whom there were to be not more than eighteen, and the freemen, but it did not define the power of each. The same difficulty appeared in other colonies, and in them, as in Massachusetts, it had to be worked out gradually into a practical solution. Trouble arose when Winthrop, a man of strong personality, began to act in important affairs on his own initiative. He lent powder to Plymouth, established trading stations, and erected fortifications at Boston. Finally, acting with the assistants, he levied a tax to pay for fortifications at New-town. Watertown refused to pay, claiming that only the freemen might lay a tax. Here was defiance in the infant state, and Winthrop was not the man to tolerate it. The townsmen were called before him and withdrew their protest. But their cause was good and their action led to reform. Next year, 1632, the general court, the assembly of all the freemen, enacted that each town should elect two delegates to advise with the governor about taxation. This hardly restrained the stout will of the governor, and in 1634 three delegates appeared at the general court from each of the eight towns and secured the adoption by that body of a fundamental reform. Henceforth, of the four courts held each year according to the charter, one, attended by all the freemen, was to elect governor, deputy governor, and assistants, and the others, composed of delegates from each town, was to make laws, grant land, and transact other important public business. At first both assistants and delegates sat together, but this was changed in 1644, when a bicameral system was adopted and the assistants became in reality an upper house. Winthrop and many others regretted these changes, for they believed government should

**The Charter
Transferred.**

**Boston
Settled.**

**A Constitu-
tional Sys-
tem Evolved.**

rest with the upper class. But the popular party was strong and did not cease its efforts until in 1644 it defeated Winthrop's reelection. But in 1646 he was again successful, and retained the governorship until he died in 1649. We shall not understand Massachusetts history if we do not remember that the colony was long ruled by the ideal of an aristocracy of virtue.

To insure the supremacy of the virtuous it was enacted in 1631 that none but members of a church should be freemen. By this means the individual congregations, under the influence of their ministers, regulated the suffrage. Joining the church thus became the means of enfranchisement. Although this practice must have secured the disfranchisement of the most worthless characters, it also excluded those who for conscience sake would not join a church, and those who held other than the Puritan faith. But such people were not desired in the colony. The settlement was planned as a Puritan commonwealth, and if non-Puritans came they might remain as long as they were quiet, but without the suffrage. If they sought to spread another faith, they must be sent away. A word must be said for the men who made such laws. The fathers of many of them remembered the days when "Bloody Mary" burned Protestants at Smithfield, and the religious wars of France were only recently extinguished, while a similar struggle in Germany was then in its worst stage of horror. Believing in the doctrines for which so many lives had been surrendered, they felt justified in safeguarding it in the New World. Massachusetts was not established as a home for toleration, but as a well-defended fortress of the Puritan faith.

The Franchise.

There was frequent necessity for enforcing uniformity in the early years of the colony. European Protestantism at the time was beset with schism, and it was natural for the same symptoms to appear in America. They were repressed sternly, and the victims went back to England with loud complaints of intolerance. But one of the dissenting ones would not return. Roger Williams, destined to found Rhode Island as a genuine home of tolerance, was a protégé of Sir Edward Coke, the famous jurist. He had a brilliant career at Cambridge, but refused to take orders because he would not support the Establishment. In 1631 he became minister at Salem, then preached at Plymouth, and at length returned to Salem. He preached the separation of church and state, declared that an oath was only to be enforced morally, and said that it was a sin to worship according to the forms of the established church. His rigid literalness led him to assert that the soil belonged to the Indians, from whom alone the whites could acquire title.

Roger Williams and his Views.

All this would have aroused the authorities at any time, but in 1635 it occasioned especial alarm. Excluded schismatics returning to England had pronounced the colony a nest of separatism,

and the Privy Council had in 1634 stopped ten ships about to sail until their passengers agreed to conform with the Prayer Book.

**The Colony
under Sus-
picion.**

Meanwhile, a commission headed by Laud was appointed to supervise the colonies in America. The general court of Massachusetts, much alarmed, took steps to fortify the harbors, but in a short time the tide turned. Good diplomacy had thrust the danger aside, but no one knew when it would return. It was not a time for preaching such radicalism as Williams's in the colony. The Puritans, claiming that they held the true English faith, were accustomed at this time to assert rather stoutly their accord with the English Church, although, as a matter of fact, they had no bishop and paid not the slightest attention to the British hierarchy.

Williams's views inevitably elicited a response, and one of those polemic conflicts ensued for which the age was noted. The defender

**Roger Wil-
liams Ban-
ished.**

of orthodoxy was John Cotton, of Boston, and under his proddings Williams took a still more radical position. He began to criticize other ministers; he advised his own flock not to affiliate with other churches, and when some of them ignored him he excommunicated them. This was too much, even for Salem, and it turned against the minister, who felt impelled to resign. He was now summoned before the general court, and refusing to recant he was ordered into exile in October, 1635. As winter was approaching, he was permitted to remain until spring on condition that he did not preach his tenets. He seems to have made no promise in the matter, but when it was known in January that he was instructing a group of twenty persons, preparations were made to send him to England. Learning of this he escaped across the snows to the Narragansett Indians, who received him kindly. Here, outside of Massachusetts, he planted the settlement of Providence. He was followed by a small number of friends.

A more important division was occasioned by Mrs. Anne Hutchinson. Of the best social rank in Boston, she had her following among the influential class. She was distinguished for

**Mrs. Anne
Hutchinson.**

mental acumen and piety and showed much ability in discussion. Her first achievement was to gather a number of women to whom she explained sermons. From that she advanced to the teaching of her own doctrines, and soon she had a large following, among whom were many men of importance. Then the orthodox became alarmed and began to warn the faithful against what they declared were her errors. Attack and counter-attack led to recrimination and intrigues, in which religion and politics were intermingled. At length a council of ministers assembled but did not openly condemn her doctrines. In 1635 young Sir Harry Vane arrived in Boston and became an adherent of her faith. He was exceedingly popular, and in 1636 was elected governor. Thus strength-

ened, Mrs. Hutchinson's party had probably a majority in Boston, but in the other towns the orthodox side was stronger. In 1637, when the echoes of the controversy reached all parts of the colony, a synod of ministers convened and laid down eighty-nine points of orthodoxy, all in repudiation of the teachings of Mrs. Hutchinson, which were clearly Antinomian. Against an utterance by the ministers the politicians dared not act, and now the weaker of the new sect began to desert it, among them Rev. John Cotton, of Boston, who had once been friendly to the new ideas. In the same year Governor Vane was defeated for reelection by Winthrop, who took a conservative attitude in the dispute, and a short time afterwards the rejected candidate left Boston for England. In November, 1637, the situation came before the general court, which decided that only one form of religion should exist in the colony, and declared that the newer should go.

The affair ended with a trial which seems to moderns a judicial horror; but it was held in conformity with the usage of the English parliament when it sat to investigate a great and dangerous matter of state. Mrs. Hutchinson was summoned before the court to explain her doctrines. Had she been cautious she might have baffled her opponents; but having a sharp tongue she compromised herself by her replies. Being asked, "How do you know that it is God that did reveal these things to you and not Satan?" she replied, "How did Abraham know that it was God that bid him offer his son?" "By an immediate voice," said one of the court. "So to me by an immediate revelation," was the rejoinder. This was enough. The Puritan held the words of the Bible for the highest authority and had no tolerance for those who claimed special revelations. Winthrop, presiding over the court, put the question: Shall Mrs. Hutchinson be banished from Massachusetts? and only two votes were in the negative. When she asked why she was banished, the governor replied: "Say no more. The court knows wherefore and is satisfied." Her leading followers were fined or disfranchised. In the following spring she was brought before her own church to be dealt with as a church member. Broken in spirit by imprisonment and isolation, she recanted the most extreme of her doctrines, saying they arose from "the height and pride of her spirit." But this availed nothing. Several of the most pious ministers present denounced her as a liar and she was formally excommunicated. With her family she went southward to Narragansett Bay, and when, four years later, she and her family were massacred by the Indians the saints of Massachusetts took it as a judgment from heaven.

**Trial of Mrs.
Hutchinson.**

The next important protest against dogmatic uniformity in Massachusetts came from the Quakers, and it was sternly repressed. The death of Winthrop in 1649 and Rev. John Cotton in 1652 left Endicott, a narrower-minded man, in control. In 1656 came to Boston

two Quakers, women, who felt it their duty to "bear witness" in that town. They were sent away, but eight others immediately appeared only to be driven back, also. This caused much anxiety

**The
Quakers in
Boston.**

among the ruling class, who considered Quakerism especially dangerous. Accordingly, letters were sent to the other New England colonies urging that laws be passed for the exclusion of the pestiferous heresy. Connecticut, New Haven, and Plymouth gave favorable replies, and laws were passed to keep the new sect out of their bounds. Massachusetts passed similar acts, but as they were continuously violated she finally enacted that if any banished Quakers returned to the colony they should suffer death. Immediately William Robinson, Marmaduke Stevenson, and Mrs. Dyer, wife of the secretary of Rhode Island, appeared in Boston. They were ordered to depart, but at once came back and were sentenced to be hanged. The two men were executed, 1659; but Mrs. Dyer was reprieved at the last moment when her son offered to take her to her home. In 1660 she returned and suffered martyrdom. Other colonies forbade the Quakers to preach, as Virginia and New Netherland, but it was only Massachusetts that put them to death. In striking contrast was the course of Rhode Island, which made no restriction on liberty of speech.

THE SETTLEMENT OF OTHER NEW ENGLAND COLONIES

Four settlements, at Providence, Portsmouth, Newport, and Warwick, each made by religious refugees from Massachusetts, make up the early colony of Rhode Island. The first was est-

**Rhode
Island
Founded.**

ablished by Roger Williams and a small group of followers in 1636 on lands granted by the Indians. The second was made by Mrs. Hutchinson and her followers in 1638, the third by a portion of her followers who left Portsmouth in 1639 and settled along the shore of the excellent harbor of Newport, and the fourth was planted in 1638 by Samuel Gorton, an insurgent from Massachusetts who could not stand the turbulent régime of Providence. There was much discussion among the settlers, as was to be expected from men whose very existence was religious dissent; but out of it came a spirit of democracy which left a lasting impress on the settlements. They began without charters and had no other form of government than what they established by their own agreement. In 1643 Roger Williams, on a visit to England, got an act of incorporation under the government of the Long Parliament, confirming to the people of the four settlements their lands with the right to govern themselves in their own way. Under this act a common system was organized, and it remained the authority for Rhode Island and Providence until in 1663 a more regular charter was issued by the king.

Meanwhile, the lands south of Massachusetts and west of Rhode Island had attracted settlers. On the Connecticut, Dutch trading forts had already been planted where Hartford and Wethersfield later stood, and one object of the English was probably to save this rich valley from the control of New Amsterdam. The migration was begun in 1636 when Rev. Thomas Hooker and a large part of his congregation at Cambridge sold their lands and moved in a body to the upper Connecticut valley. Other groups from Dorchester, Watertown, and Roxbury soon followed, those from the last-named town settling at Springfield, which proved to be within the bounds of Massachusetts. Out of this movement sprang English settlements at Hartford, Windsor, and Wethersfield, and later at other places in Connecticut. The newcomers did not drive out the Dutch, but in many ways made life uncomfortable for them. The river towns of Connecticut in 1639 adopted a written form of government with a governor, assistants, and a law-making general court composed of deputies from the towns. The suffrage was to be regulated by the towns. This, it will be seen, was but a copy of the Massachusetts system.

**The River
Towns of
Connecticut.**

The upper river towns were not planted before still another enterprise was launched at the mouth of the Connecticut. In this region the Earl of Warwick held a large tract of land from the Council of New England. In 1631 he transferred it to Lord Saye and Sele, Lord Brooke, and others, who sent out a colony under John Winthrop, Jr. At the mouth of the river it settled the town of Saybrook, and its territory was known as the colony of Connecticut. For many years it languished through lack of funds.

A third enterprise was the colony of New Haven, planted in 1638 by Theophilus Eaton and Rev. John Davenport. It was a strong band of immigrants, and they came with great hopes of making their port the commercial metropolis of the region. But various disasters intervened, and for a time prosperity came slowly. In 1646 they built a ship and sent her away with a cargo worth 5000 pounds, but nothing further was heard of her. Tradition says that once afterwards she appeared as a phantom ship and suddenly disappeared as she seemed about to enter the harbor.

**New Haven
Established.**

The settlement was founded without charter or land grant, and the inhabitants proceeded to constitution-making of their own will. Taking the Bible as guide and law book they transformed the congregation into a body politic to rule in civil as in ecclesiastical affairs. Thus none but church members should vote, and a committee of seven members was provided with authority to determine who should be admitted to church membership and consequently to the franchise. This oligarchical government remained in force until in 1662 New Haven was merged into the Connecticut Colony, when that enterprise got a charter from

**The New
Haven Gov-
ernment.**

Charles II. But we must not forget that narrow as the basis of government was in New Haven, as in other New England colonies, it was an honest and beneficent government in most of the affairs of life. Its sole severity was in requiring a rigid observance of Puritan practices, and to most of the inhabitants this was not a hardship.

The advance of the whites along the coast alarmed the Pequot Indians, who lived in the central part of the present state of Connecticut. The origin of the trouble does not clearly appear, but the settlers were convinced that the times demanded a most signal chastisement. Massachusetts lent a hand, and in 1637 a combined force of whites from Massachusetts and Connecticut, with 280 Indian allies, ancient foes of the Pequots, surprised the enemy in a fort near the Rhode Island boundary line and of the 400 men, women, and children within it not more than five escaped alive. The Pequots were then pursued vigorously. Overtaken in a swamp near New Haven, another great slaughter occurred, and the result of the two engagements was the complete extinction of the Pequot tribe as such. It was grim dealing, but it gave the whites peace from the Indians for many years.

Meanwhile the coasts of New Hampshire and Maine had been dotted with fishing and trading villages which gradually grew into agricultural towns. In some cases they received fugitives from the religious persecutions in Massachusetts. These settlements were usually made under the protection of Sir Ferdinando Gorges and Captain John Mason, who held grants for nearly the whole region, although some were direct from the Council of New England. In 1635 Mason obtained confirmation of a grant for the region between Salem and the Piscataqua as his own property, and called it New Hampshire. The region between the Piscataqua and the Kennebec was confirmed to Gorges and called Maine. Massachusetts had a claim to most of the former, for her charter fixed her north boundary at an east and west line running three miles north of the source of the Merrimac. She did not act violently, but when Mason died (1635) and his heirs left the New Hampshire towns to shift for themselves, she absorbed them one by one, giving protection in exchange for allegiance. In 1647 Gorges died and Maine was left without a head. The towns tried for a while to maintain a general government of their own, but they were very weak, and much disorder appeared. Now Massachusetts realized that her hour was come. Assuming the aggressive, in 1652 she ran her northern boundary in keeping with her own claim, and extending the line eastward to the ocean, secured the coast towns as far north as Saco Bay. The weak settlements to the north of the line remained independent for six years, when they also submitted to Massachusetts. In all these towns the government was organized on the regular New England plan; but not all of them were of the congregational faith.

The Pequot War, 1637.

New Hampshire and Maine.

The Pequot war seems to have been the first occasion of a desire for union among the Puritan colonies. Connecticut made such a suggestion in 1637, but Massachusetts raised the question of boundaries, and it was impossible to find a satisfactory basis of coöperation. In a year or two alarm was felt lest the Dutch seize the Connecticut settlements, and the suggestion was repeated, but with the same results. In 1642 Connecticut renewed the request, alleging a general Indian league to crush the whites. Then Massachusetts began to relent, and in 1643 the desired league was formed without reference to boundaries. To it were admitted the colonies of Massachusetts, Plymouth, Connecticut, and New Haven. New Hampshire and Maine were not taken in because they were unlike the leagued colonies "in their ministry and administration," and Rhode Island was left out because the inhabitants were "tumultuous" and "schismatic."

**New Eng-
land Con-
federation.**

The Constitution of the Confederacy provided for a firm and permanent offensive and defensive league, the management of which was placed in the hands of two commissioners from each of the four colonies. These commissioners by a majority vote of six were to settle questions of war or peace, quotas of men and arms, contributions for the general fund, and division of the spoils gained in war. Contributions were to be paid by the individual colonies in proportion to population, and the confederacy was not to interfere in the local affairs of a colony.

**Its Con-
stitution.**

The confederation was in operation for forty years. It did not remove all the causes of conflict between the colonies, but it lessened them. It stood the test of the terrible war with King Philip, and only fell to pieces when the early dangers it was formed to meet were passed. Although phrases in the constitution seem to indicate that the framers hoped to build up a permanent federal state, the confederacy was, in fact, only a league for self-protection. Between the large colony of Massachusetts and her small neighbors there was too much latent jealousy for permanent coöperation. The latter were vigilant lest they lose some of their power, and the requirement that six of the eight commissioners should assent to business was an expression of this feeling. On the other hand, Massachusetts resented the checks the constitution put upon her. She declared that she was forced to assume a disproportionate part of the common burden. In 1653 the commissioners decided to raise troops for an expected war against the Dutch, and apportioned the levies of troops so that Massachusetts should furnish two-thirds of them. The Bay Colony did not relish fighting a war to protect the people of Connecticut, and persuaded itself that the war was not necessary. The requisition was accordingly ignored in words which strongly remind us of the language in which South Carolina justified nullification many years later. There were cases of friction which made it clear that it was futile to expect the one strong government to yield itself to the direction of three weak ones.

NEW YORK UNDER THE DUTCH

The history of New Amsterdam, as the Dutch called New York, begins with the exploration of Henry Hudson, an Englishman in Dutch employ, in 1609. In the *Half Moon*, a "fly-boat" manned by eighteen or twenty men, he skirted the coast from Newfoundland to Virginia, searching for a northwest passage. He entered Delaware Bay, but turned back when he observed shoals. Northward 125 miles he came to a broad harbor which he entered safely. The water was very salt, and he thought it might indicate the long-sought passage to other seas. Following its course he sailed onward, past beautiful hills and rich plains, until at last he was halted by shallows at what is now Albany. From that point a small boat proceeded eight leagues, but only proved that no open sea lay beyond.

This exploration revealed to the Dutch the value of the Hudson river. With an excellent harbor at its mouth and long water communication to the interior of the country, it was apparent that it possessed great advantages in the Indian trade. From 1610 their traders began to frequent the river, among them Adriaen Block, a man of much enterprise. In 1613 his ship was burned, but he built another in which he began to explore the New England waters. He visited Long Island Sound, the Connecticut river, Block Island, which bears his name, and the coast as far as Nahant. For his services he received for three years the monopoly of the fur trade between parallels 40° and 45° north latitude. For trading purposes Manhattan Island was of supreme importance, and by 1620 it was the center of a fair trade.

In 1621 the government of Holland established the Dutch West India Company, a trading enterprise, and authorized it to spoil the Spaniards and to settle colonies in Africa and the New World. It had no special reference to the Hudson river region, but that section naturally attracted attention, and in 1623 a small settlement was made on Manhattan Island. The enterprise was confided by the company to Peter Minuit (pronounced Minnewit), the governor, who with five councillors was the sole governing body. They were supplemented, however, by a *schout-fiscal*, who arrested and prosecuted delinquents, and a secretary who represented the company's financial interests, and between these and the governor and council much friction occurred. All these officers were appointed by the company, and popular suffrage was not granted. The settlement was called New Netherland, and the town on Manhattan Island was New Amsterdam. The boundaries of the province were indefinite. Soon after his arrival Peter Minuit purchased Manhattan Island from the Indians for goods worth \$24,

and began to erect a fort with a mill and large houses for the company's business.

New Amsterdam grew slowly, for its chief business was the fur trade, and agriculturalists were not attracted. In 1629 the company tried to promote the settlement of the interior by adopting a system of large landed estates. It was provided that any member of the company who in four years should carry to the colony fifty families at his own expense should have a large tract of land over which he should have extensive civil and criminal authority under the title of Patroon. He should also have on his estate the monopoly of weaving and some exclusive trading privileges. It was thus definitely proposed to establish a feudal system of landholding like that of Holland. To encourage the patroons the company agreed to furnish them with as many negroes slaves as were desired. Under this system the valuable lands around New Amsterdam and on the Hudson were quickly absorbed by the most influential members of the company.

The Patroon System.

Peter Minuit's administration ended in 1632, and he was succeeded by Wouter van Twiller, who had married a niece of the great patroon, Kiliaen van Rensselaer. He received much opposition within the colony, and his peace was also disturbed by the encroachments of the New England men in Connecticut and the threats of Virginians who resented the presence of the Dutch in the Delaware. He was glad to retire from his unhappy position, and regarded with complacency the troubles of William Kieft, his successor, who arrived in 1638. Under him occurred a war with the Indians, who fought to save their hunting ground from the advance of the whites. The easy-going Dutch were slow to fight, and only Kieft's insistence brought the council to a declaration of war. In battle the settlers were not efficient, and at last Kieft called in Captain John Underhill, a soldier of fortune from New England, who took prominent part against the Pequots. He collected 150 soldiers, surprised and destroyed an Indian village at Strickland's Plains, and of the 500 inhabitants only eight are said to have escaped. In this war the settlers built a

Confusion under Van Twiller and Kieft.

Indian War.

wall across the lower end of Manhattan Island to protect their fields and houses. Its memory is perpetuated in the name of Wall Street. In 1646 peace was made with the savages, but already the colony was in dire distress. The inhabitants of New Amsterdam were about 400, and among them a visitor heard eighteen languages. They were discontented, and assailed Kieft bitterly. As sole ruler with the Council he was held responsible for all the evils that came, and the truth is, he was not a man to exercise despotism benevolently. In 1647 he was succeeded by Peter Stuyvesant.

The new governor began by declaring that he would rule as a father over his children. He promulgated many ordinances against intem-

perance, but they were not enforced, and it was charged that he himself received money to wink at their infraction. He required the

Governor Indian traders to have licenses from the governor, which
Stuyvesant. proved an advantage to his private purse. But he dared not

of his own power levy taxes, and out of this feeling came a step in constitutional development. He asked the people to elect eighteen men from whom he and the Council selected nine to advise with them in the government, their successors to be chosen by themselves and the governor and council. Thus was created the Nine Men, destined to be a thorn in his side. But the desire for self-government was not satisfied, and at length a leader of the liberals appeared in Adrian van der Donck, president of the Nine. In 1649 he went to Holland with a petition, asking the government to take the colony out of the hands of the Company and give it just laws. He also carried

Demand for a severe arraignment of Stuyvesant, whose irritable tem-
Liberal per and covetousness gave ample grounds of complaint.
Government. In 1652 his efforts succeeded so far that municipal privileges were granted to New Amsterdam, but the governor was allowed to appoint the officials. His despotism was nowise lessened by the creation of this body of subordinates. The next year an attack by the English seemed imminent, and Stuyvesant permitted delegates from the towns and villages to meet to provide means of defense. But the assembly took up the state of the colony instead, and sent a memorial to the governor, severely arraigning the existing system. An exchange of arguments followed, in which the governor's aversion to popular government was made very plain, and the result of the agitation was nothing. The existing despotism continued until the end of Dutch control, 1664.

Religious bigotry was added to the stout old governor's love of power. He hated the Lutherans, Independents, and Baptists, and

Religious issued a proclamation that no public religious meetings
Persecu- should be held except those in accordance with the Dutch
tions. Reform Church. The ordinance was often evaded, and

there were some notable cases in which its violation was severely punished. The worst was that of Robert Hodshone, a Quaker, who, for preaching at Hemstead, Long Island, was sentenced by the governor to two years of hard labor. When he refused to work he was beaten on three successive days until he fell to his feet. Then taken before the governor he would speak when told to hold his tongue, for which he was hung up by his hands and beaten until his back was raw. This also was repeated until the popular mind sickened of it. At last the governor's sister interceded, and Hodshone was allowed to go out of the province. Spite of such severities the dissenting churches in New Netherland grew stronger.

From conflicts with the settlements around New Amsterdam the efforts of Stuyvesant were drawn to the protection of his boundaries

north and east. The Delaware Bay, as well as the Connecticut river, were both within the charter limits of New Netherland, though neither was settled by an agricultural colony. To the former came in 1638 fifty Swedish settlers under Peter Minuit, formerly governor of New Amsterdam, planting near the site of Wilmington the town of Christina. At that time Sweden was a leading factor in the Thirty Years' War, and her colony was not disturbed. But the war ended in 1648, and the Dutch within a few years made plans to seize the intruding settlements. In 1655 Governor Stuyvesant went against them with a largely superior force and easily compelled their submission. Sweden was in no position to retake what was lost, and the incipient colonial establishment came to an end.

The
Swedish
Settlements.

With the English on the Connecticut Stuyvesant had less success. The Dutch trading fort at Hartford, Fort Good Hope, was completely isolated by planting the English settlements on the river; but it remained undisturbed, flying the Dutch flag and taking what share it could of the Indian trade until 1654. In that year, war between Holland and England being in progress, the colonists seized Fort Good Hope, and with that Dutch possessions in New England passed out of existence. Governor Stuyvesant's patriotism suffered a severe shock in this calamity. For several years the English settlements had been moving westward along the shores of Long Island Sound as far as Greenwich and throughout the eastern half of Long Island,—additional evidence of the humiliation of Dutch power. Into the New Netherland settlements themselves Englishmen penetrated and became a large part of the element in opposition to Stuyvesant's despotic rule.

Dutch ex-
cluded from
Connecticut.

The English
on Long
Island.

The situation in the colony invited an attempt at conquest by the English, and the Connecticut colonies were anxious to have it made by the New England Confederacy; but Massachusetts held back. Then appeal was made to England, and in 1654 the government was induced to undertake an expedition, but peace with Holland was made before it could arrive. Now followed ten years of quiet, during which New Netherland continued to offend against the British navigation laws. The English had never given up their claim to the whole coast and the Dutch colony was within the formal bounds of both New England and Virginia. Why should it continue to defy British power? The answer came in 1664 when the king, Charles II, granted it to his brother, the Duke of York, together with jurisdiction over New England itself.

British Plan
to Seize
New
Netherland.

The Duke acted vigorously. Colonel Richard Nicolls was appointed his deputy-governor, and August 18, 1664, arrived before New Amsterdam with three vessels of war and an adequate body of soldiers. He

was joined by men from Connecticut, and word came that Massachusetts would also send aid. At the same time the Englishmen on Long Island were arming, and throughout the Dutch villages themselves was apparent a determination to help the English in wiping out the rule of the Dutch West India Company. Stuyvesant was in a rage. He ordered all the citizens to work on the fortifications, and was determined to fight to the last. But the burgomasters of the town realized the impossibility of defense, and when Nicolls by letter offered the Dutch all the liberties of Englishmen, with intercourse with Holland, they asked to see the letter. Stuyvesant tore it into bits and said he would rather "be carried out dead" than yield to the men around him. He ordered the guns of the fort to open fire, but he was led away from the ramparts before they could be discharged, and August 29 the town was surrendered. A short time later the forts on the Delaware capitulated, and the English flag floated from Florida to Maine.

EARLY RELATIONS OF THE COLONIES WITH ENGLAND

By an old principle of English law all land in the kingdom not otherwise granted belonged to the crown. Under it the king created fiefs at will and gave the grantees authority to establish local governments. When the American continent was added to the English domain it fell under this rule. Its lands became king's lands, and were subject to his disposal. It was, therefore, the crown and not parliament which created the American colonies and gave them their forms of government. Having created the colonies, the crown, acting through the Privy Council, provided the rules under which they continued to exist, and supervised them in such ways as were compatible with the charters. Matters of trade, however, were ever near to the British heart and were jealously maintained by parliament, so that in regard to colonial trade parliament was supreme. In most other things the colonies must look to the crown.

The king contributed little to the support of the colonies. Virginia was planted by a company of private individuals, actuated partly by philanthropic and partly by commercial purposes. Maryland was the enterprise of the Calverts, who wished to found a home for Catholics and incidentally to establish a great and permanent landed estate. New England was settled by groups of Puritans who wished to have happy and prosperous homes in which they might worship in their own faith. To each enterprise the king gave his sanction and his blessing, but nothing more. American colonization in its earliest days was not an enterprise of the crown.

When the colonies were safely established and it was seen that

another England was growing up beyond the sea, the king began to take a larger interest in them. Virginia fell into his hands when the charter was annulled in 1624, not so much because James I had a definite desire to direct the colony as because he hated the liberal government established by the company. His successor, Charles I, came to see that some kind of colonial supervision ought to be provided, and appointed a commission, with Laud at its head, to make laws for all the colonies, regulate their religion, appoint their judges, and remove their governors when advisable. In the turbulent times then existing the commission did nothing. In 1643 the Long Parliament took up the subject and appointed the Earl of Warwick governor over all the colonies. He was to be assisted by seventeen commissioners with wide governing powers. Much occupied with other things Warwick seems

Colonies to
be brought
under Royal
Oversight.

Inoperative
Commis-
sions.

to have done little in regard to colonial affairs, which after the restoration were placed in the hands of a Council for Foreign Plantations, an advisory body reporting to the Privy Council. It showed little capacity, and in 1675 was superseded by a standing committee of the council, known as the Lords of Trade, which proved far more industrious. Most of the colonies, it must be remembered, existed under charters, which might be forfeited if certain conditions were violated. It was the duty of Lords of Trade to inform themselves of colonial affairs and report to the king a violation of a charter. Over a royal colony the Lords had a larger jurisdiction. They prepared, or saw, the instructions to a royal governor, passed on the laws of an assembly in a royal province, advised the king whether or not such laws should be allowed, and had a large influence in the appointment of officials. Over the colonies generally they had a broad supervision, informing themselves about the conditions of trade, making suggestions for the better execution of the navigation acts, interfering in disputes between colonies, and, in short, seeking to evolve a system of colonial administration which should embody the best results for both the colonies and the British nation. In 1696 the Lords of Trade were reorganized into the Commissioners of Trade and Plantations, a board independent of the Privy Council. As the English cabinet developed, the functions of commissioners decreased. Finally in 1768 a colonial secretary of state became the head of colonial affairs.

The Lords
of Trade.

The Puritan revolution in England, by overthrowing Laud's power, probably saved the colonies from an attempt to bring them under an active dependence on the crown. It left New England undisturbed, and dealt gently with Virginia, where Charles II had been proclaimed king, and with Maryland, whose Catholic proprietor was after a while confirmed in his rights. The parliamentary party, in fact,

The
Colonies
and the
Puritan
Revolution.

was too busy with its troubles in England to interfere with government in the colonies. But it adopted the navigation ordinances of 1651, which had, if enforced, a decided influence on their commerce.

In a struggle against a king who laid taxes arbitrarily the English merchants took a leading part, and they had a corresponding influence in the revolutionary government. It was to please them that parliament undertook to make the colonial trade inure to the benefit of English traders. Sporadic laws of the same import had existed for years; but the recent wide growth of the colonies gave them a new significance, and a new law was made. It provided: (1) that no goods produced in Asia, Africa, or America, including the colonies, should be brought into any British port in any but English owned and manned ships; (2) that no European goods should be taken to England or the British possessions in any but English ships or in the ships of the country in which the goods were produced; (3) the coasting trade in British dominions should be limited to British ships; and (4) no salted fish, oil, or whale products should be brought into the British dominions that were not taken in English ships — nor should they be exported in any but English ships. The plain purport of this law was to limit the English and colonial trade to English channels for the profit of English merchants. The restriction, however, was not enforced. Foreign vessels could not be excluded from colonial ports without efficient police service, and so lax was the execution of the law that we may wonder if it was intended to apply to the colonies.

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For Independent Reading

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CHAPTER V

COLONIAL PROGRESS UNDER THE LATER STUARTS, 1660-1689

CHARLES II AND THE COLONIES

WHEN called to the throne Charles II was in no position to continue his father's strong policy either at home or in the colonies. He accordingly left the government of the latter *in statu quo*, and was content to increase the means of making them yield to him a revenue. To Connecticut and Rhode Island he gave charters confirming their former liberal institutions, and they were so satisfactory that they served as state constitutions until 1818 and 1842 respectively. The former was also notable in that it united Connecticut and New Haven in one government. For a time the Massachusetts charter seemed in danger of annulment because members of the Anglican church could not vote, but negotiation led to a compromise by which the general court enacted that all persons of property and good character should have the right to vote. But since a regular minister must vouch for an applicant's good character it is likely that the spirit of the law was nearly as restrictive as ever.

Virginia and Maryland, loyal enough, had nothing to fear in the nature of constitutional change, but they were powerfully affected by the king's desire for money. Heavy British taxes were levied on tobacco, already selling at ruinously low prices. That which was used in England paid a tax of one shilling, ten pence a pound, and that which was reexported paid ten and a half pence. At this time a large recent immigration to Virginia and Maryland had raised the supply of tobacco beyond ordinary demands, and this tended to increase the distress of the planters. To discharge his obligations to his courtiers, Charles granted the quitrents and escheats of all Virginia to Lord Arlington and Lord Culpeper for thirty-one years. These hard measures were received with dismay by people to whom Stuart loyalty had been little less than a religion. They became discontented, and violated the navigation acts as freely as the traders of New England.

The influence of the merchants was enough to secure the continuation of the navigation policy of Cromwell. The ordinance of 1651 was reenacted, for the legality of recent parliamentary action was

not granted, and to it was added the important amendment that tobacco, sugar, and other enumerated colonial products destined for a foreign port must first be landed in England, Ireland, or some colony other than that in which they were produced. The significance of this amendment was that no enumerated product could be carried to foreign countries in foreign ships, which meant that foreign ships would not bring their own products to the colonies because they could not get return cargoes. It also meant that colony ships could take enumerated products to British ports alone. The fact that goods from the continent could go to the colonies in British vessels and that colony ships could take goods from the continent to the colonies, led to violation of the law: ships could hardly be expected to make the return voyage in ballast when opportunity of evasion was so easy. To meet the difficulty a new law in 1663 provided that European goods with a few exceptions should only go to the colonies from England in English and colonial ships. The act of 1660 meant that enumerated products should be sold in England, and that of 1663 meant that all colony importations should come from England. The evasions of these laws in the colonies led to a third act, passed in 1673. It required every ship captain loading tobacco, sugar, or other enumerated colonial products either to give bond for landing them in England or to pay stipulated duties on the spot. In this way it was intended to make colonial trade yield profit to the British importers, exporters, and ship owners, as well as to the king's revenues. It was a theory of the time that a colony planted by the mother country and protected by it should in return yield advantages of trade. This policy, in connection with the new system of import duties, was expected to add largely to the king's revenues. It should be remembered, however, that tobacco was the only enumerated article produced in the mainland colonies. The navigation acts did not apply to fish, timber, fur, wheat, pork, beef, and many other exported articles.

The Navigation Acts
of 1660,
1663,
1672.

When Charles came to the throne his colonies in America were Virginia, Maryland, Massachusetts, Plymouth, New Haven, Connecticut, and Rhode Island, and to these New York, as we have seen, was soon to be added. But there were still vast regions on the coast in which Englishmen had not settled. Out of these unsettled parts Charles created three new colonies, Carolina, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania, all proprietary colonies granted to some of the leading noblemen of the court. It was not so much to promote colonization as to advance the interests of the grantees that these colonies were chartered.

New
Colonies.

The model of the proprietary colony was the county Palatine of Durham, in England, over which the Bishop of Durham ruled under the king. Whatever the king might do in England, ran the motto of the law, the bishop might do in Durham. But in the proprietary

charters the right of the proprietor was limited by the provision that he must make laws "by and with the consent of the freemen."

The Proprietary Colony.

By this provision these colonies, as well as the others, were able to secure the right to make laws in their own assemblies subject to the veto of the proprietors. Besides the colonies mentioned, New York, after its conquest from the Dutch, and Maryland, from the beginning, were proprietary. This kind of colony was thought to have the advantage of powerful aid from its owners in its early stages; but experience showed that the proprietors were more concerned to make money out of their colonies than to spend it on them. They were, also, not successful in keeping order, having no other military force than they could summon from among the inhabitants themselves. In Carolina this was especially true, and the end of proprietary rule there was a blessing.

In 1629 the king granted Carolana, as he named it, to Sir Robert Heath, but the grant lapsed for want of efforts to people the region granted. In 1663 Charles II regranting it to eight nobles, Ashley, Albemarle, Clarendon, John Berkeley, William Berkeley, Carteret, Craven, and Colleton. The bounds were latitude 36° on the north and 31° on the south, and it extended to the Pacific. It was seen on examination that the southern limits of Virginia was latitude $36^{\circ} 30'$, and a new charter issued in 1665 with that line for the northern boundary of Carolina, as it was now called. Thus the region between Virginia and Florida was opened to settlement.

The proprietors had dreams of building a feudal state. Under the guidance of Ashley, now the Earl of Shaftesbury, the fundamental constitutions were prepared by John Locke, then in the early stage of his brilliant career. They provided for a feudal hierarchy, at the bottom of which should be the freemen and at the top three ranks of high landed lords with overwhelming power in political affairs. The system was highly theoretical, and the proprietors did not expect it to be in force at once. It was sent out to their agents with instructions to put into force as much of it as possible. The agents published it and the Carolina assemblies possibly gave it formal recognition, but the system was never in actual use, and very few of the land-gravers and caciques, the higher ranks of nobility provided for, were appointed in Carolina.

The Fundamental Constitutions.

The Albemarle Settlement.

Meanwhile, the ordinary forces of frontier life were carrying population to Carolina. As early as 1654 men from Virginia had taken land on the northern shore of Albemarle Sound, first securing grants from the Indians. In 1665 the proprietors sent them a government and authorized an assembly for the "County of Albemarle." From that time a

steady but slow stream of population arrived from Virginia, mostly poor persons who found the frontier more congenial than the aristocratic life on the James. The harbors were bad, and communication with Europe was chiefly through Virginia. The people were mostly dissenters or members of no church. They were intolerant of the attempts of the proprietors to rule them, and there was much commotion throughout the sixty-six years of proprietary rule. It was as democratic a society as was planted on the coast. About 1690 the Albemarle settlements, now expanded to the southward of the Sound, began to be called North Carolina, and at a later period Cape Romaine was fixed as the dividing point between the two Carolinas. Thus the Cape Fear river, its only good means of access to the sea, went to the northern province. It had been the scene of a futile attempt at colonization as early as 1664, and from that time remained unsettled until 1725. It had water communication with the interior of the colony, and had the first settlements been placed here, and not in the isolated north-eastern corner, it seems certain that the early history of North Carolina would have been different.

North
Carolina.

In 1670 Charleston was settled by an expedition under William Sayle. It grew steadily from the beginning, although it received little aid from the proprietors beyond the first cost of transportation to America. In 1680 French Huguenots began to arrive, settling chiefly on the Santee river. The fertile soil and mild climate of the two Carolinas proved very advantageous to the settlers, who, following the custom in other colonies, placed themselves along the navigable streams, where the bottom lands were richest. The people enjoyed abundance, and in South Carolina men of business ability among the colonists made fortunes easily. Their emergence out of the mass of "adventurers" was facilitated by the easy access to markets and the early introduction of slaves as a cheap and permanent labor supply. About 1693 rice began to be raised with profit. It was a staple product, commanding a ready market in all parts of Europe, and it played the part in South Carolina that tobacco played in Virginia and Maryland. The Albemarle settlers did not raise either rice or tobacco in considerable quantities.

South
Carolina
Settled.

The English conquest of New Netherland did not bring with it as much liberal government as the English living under the Dutch régime had expected. The Duke of York by his patent from the king was constituted lord proprietor with power almost absolute. He, however, dared not lay taxes and give orders arbitrarily, lest his subjects be forced into rebellion. His representative in the colony was Colonel Richard Nicolls, the governor, an astute man whose tact did much to make the rule of the proprietor bearable. He had promised the

The
"Duke's
Laws."

people of Long Island self-government, and to redeem his promise in form published the "Duke's Laws," as they were called. They allowed the popular election of local constables and overseers, but made them accountable to the governor, and they provided for trial by jury. More important still, the judges were to be appointed by the governor, and to them, sitting in one body, or assize, was intrusted the law-making function, subject to the approval of the governor. This system, which fell far short of representative government, was soon extended to the entire colony. It did not satisfy the people, but it was better than the Dutch rule, and the tact of Governor Nicolls did much to lull the popular discontent. He returned to England in 1668.

In 1672 England began a war with Holland, and the next year the Dutch appeared before New York with 23 ships and 1200 men.

**New York
conquered
by the
Dutch but
restored to
England.**

The governor was absent in New England, and his representative, without an adequate force to defend the place, surrendered after a feeble resistance in which one Englishman was killed. The old Dutch system of government was reëstablished, and the name of the town of New York was changed to New Orange. But when peace was made in 1674 New York was restored to England, and the king issued a new charter granting it to the Duke of York, who in turn reissued "the Duke's Laws." At this time Edmund Andros became governor, and ruled until he was succeeded in 1681 by Thomas Dongan. Both men were loyal servants of the proprietor and administered the government successfully. But the people continued to ask for an elective assembly. To their request the duke turned a deaf ear, saying that assemblies were dangerous things and often disturbing to good government. Under his direction the seat of power was the governor and council, who made the appointments and constituted a narrow and powerful aristocracy.

The advocates of liberal government gained steadily in power, and in 1681 their opportunity came. While Governor Andros was in England to answer charges against his official conduct, the merchants,

**Struggle
for an
Assembly.**

seizing on a technicality, refused to pay the duties he had imposed as the representative of the Duke. A strong petition was sent to England praying that New York might be governed as other colonies by a governor, council, and assembly, and urging that no duties ought to be taken without the consent of the representatives of the people. The proprietor was sensibly touched by the failure of revenue, and 1682 granted the petition but with notable restrictions. The assembly was to meet and be dissolved at the order of the governor, the revenue raised should be at the disposal of the proprietor, and all laws must be approved by governor and proprietor. Under this system, the first assembly of New York met in 1683. Fifteen of its acts are preserved. One of

them, known as the "Charter of Liberties," established the authority of the assembly, guaranteed triennial sessions, and provided for freedom of conscience and the popular assent to taxes. The whole fifteen seem to have been approved at first by the Duke of York, but before they were registered he became James II, and New York became a royal province. The laws now went before the Committee of Trade, which found that the "Charter of Liberties" asserted too definitely the right of the assembly to govern the colony. In fact, at that time there was in England a tendency to reduce the powers of colonial assemblies; and since James II. as king did not need his colonial revenue, the "charter" was disallowed. When Governor Dongan in 1686 received a new commission, being now a royal governor, he was authorized to make the laws for the colony. Thus ended for the Stuart period the progress of liberal government in New York.

In 1664, the year New York was granted to the Duke, that part of it which now comprises New Jersey was by the grantee transferred to Lord John Berkeley and Sir George Carteret and called New Jersey, from the Island of Jersey, which Carteret had bravely defended during the Puritan wars. The

Settlement
of New
Jersey.

governor of New York protested in the name of his superior that the grant only passed title to the land, but Berkeley and Carteret insisted that it conferred on them the rights of government as well, and they proceeded to organize the government of New Jersey, with a governor, council, assembly, and local officers. The dispute was finally settled in their favor. Some settlers were already within the colony, Dutch and English, and more came. Among them were many New England men who brought in the democratic spirit of their former homes. At length the two proprietors divided their holding. Then Berkeley sold his share, the western part, to four prominent Quakers, among them William Penn. In 1682 East Jersey was purchased by Quakers from the Carteret heirs, and soon after a small remnant was acquired from Fenwick, who held by a previous grant from Berkeley. Thus the two Jerseys became Quaker colonies. In the eastern part the settlers were chiefly New Englanders, in the western part they were Quakers. Both sections enjoyed religious liberty and prospered under a liberal form of government.

East and
West
Jersey.

But William Penn was not satisfied with a colony depending so largely on charters badly defined, and in 1681 he secured from King Charles a patent for Pennsylvania, west of the Delaware, and made plans to build a commonwealth on Quaker principles. The name was given by the king himself, much to the chagrin of Penn, who wished to avoid a semblance of vanity. The grant was evidently to satisfy the king's debt to Penn's father, who had been a British admiral. It gave Penn, the sole proprietor, ample power to devise a government. But recent

Penn's
Charter.

experiences had taught the king that a colony was capable of becoming quite an independent affair, and it was provided that the Pennsylvania laws be submitted to the king, that the navigation acts be enforced, and that the supremacy of Parliament be recognized.

Penn's terms to attract colonists were liberal. To those Englishmen, Swedes, and Dutchmen who were already in the region ceded he offered assurances of protection, and in 1681 he sent them a governor. In England he himself was ceaselessly active in measures to attract

**Proposals
to Settlers.**

immigrants. His position among the Quakers was such that his invitation must be heard. It was sent forth with persuasive charms. Let all thrifty men, he said, who wished to establish prosperous homes in a new land and all who would live in just equality with their neighbors come to Pennsylvania. No religious discrimination should be made against any man who acknowledged the existence of God, but only Christians could take part in government. His ideas of good government were embodied in a published "Frame of Government." "Any government," he said, "is free to the people under it, whatever be the frame, where the laws rule and the people are a party to those laws, and more than this is tyranny, oligarchy, or confusion." To an age keenly alive to the dangers of the doctrine of divine right of kings this must have been a voice of comfort.

**Arrival of
Penn.**

In 1682 Penn himself arrived in Pennsylvania, accompanied by about one hundred colonists. In 1682 he had acquired what is now Delaware from the Duke of York, in order that his colony might have sea front; and he first visited the settlements already planted about New Castle. Having confirmed the government of the three "Lower Counties," *i.e.* Delaware, he went on to Philadelphia, the site of which had already been selected under his directions at the confluence of the Schuylkill and Delaware rivers. Its broad streets, at right angles with one another, gave the place an air of dignity which long impressed visitors. It was Penn's desire that each dwelling should be in the center of a garden in order that Philadelphia might be "a green country town, which will never be burned and always be wholesome." He gave careful supervision to all that pertained to the colony, and said in seven years, "with the help of God," Pennsylvania would equal her neighbors in population. The boast was not too large, for immigrants came in large numbers, and in three years the population exceeded eight thousand.

Penn's benevolence was seen in his policy toward the natives. He took no land without making treaties in which he gave articles of value to the savages. One treaty, in June, 1683, probably at Shackamaxon, now Kensington, became famous, and tradition long referred to the "Treaty Elm" under which it was made. The result of this policy was uninterrupted peace

**Penn and
the Indians.**

with the Indians of eastern Pennsylvania. It was supported by the sobriety of the inhabitants and by the absence of frontier land squatters who occasioned most of the Indian wars in other colonies.

Penn's "Frame of Government" provided for a council of 72 members and an assembly of 200, all elected by the freeholders. Like the Fundamental Constitutions of Carolina, it was drawn for a large colony and without reference to actual conditions in a new country. Penn did not attempt to put it into operation. His first assembly, which met in December, 1682, consisted of a council of eighteen members and a lower house of 54, all elected by the settlers. To this body he gave the privilege of preparing the government of the colony, with the result that a "Great Charter" was enacted by the assembly, April 8, 1683, in which all the functions of government were provided for by the representatives of the people. Penn accepted it, for he wished for nothing more than that men should govern themselves in their own way, but in a spirit of enlightened benevolence. However, his personal influence had much to do with the form of government adopted. Another measure of this first assembly was to incorporate the Lower Counties with Pennsylvania. It was action very objectionable to the people of the Counties themselves, and they soon began an agitation which resulted, early in the next century, in their separation as a distinct colony though still under the governor appointed by Penn for Pennsylvania.

Self-Government in Pennsylvania.

Delaware.

Meanwhile, Penn was called to England, partly to relieve his distressed brethren through his personal influence with the Duke of York and partly to arrange a boundary dispute with Lord Baltimore. In the first instance he was easily successful; for 1200 Quakers were released from prison through his intercessions. In the second he was also successful, but it was many years before the victory was secured. The controversy with Lord Baltimore goes back to the grant of 1681, which undoubtedly included within Pennsylvania lands Charles I had granted to Maryland. The fortieth parallel of latitude marked Maryland's northern boundary by the charter of 1632; but Penn's charter provided that his southern line should begin with a semicircle with a radius of twelve miles from New Castle and proceed westward on the fortieth parallel from the point at which the semicircle cut that parallel. On investigation it was found that New Castle was 20 miles south of the fortieth parallel, and if the semicircle were drawn as described, it would leave a broad strip of Maryland in the new colony. Penn argued his rights against Baltimore, but could not settle the dispute. The latter naturally held to his rights under a grant previous to 1681; but Penn, who was bent on having an outlet to the sea, would not relent, and the dispute

Penn Returns to England.

The Penn-Baltimore Boundary Controversy.

was continued by the two men and their heirs until 1760. In that year the present boundary was agreed upon, and in 1767 it was run by Mason and Dixon.

Even more annoying was the controversy for the possession of Delaware. All the colony was within the bounds of the Maryland patent, but the Duke of York claimed it by the conquest of the Dutch, and Baltimore did not dispute the claim. When, however, the Duke transferred Delaware to Penn the Maryland proprietor asserted his rights and seemed about to prevent the confirmation of the Duke's grant when Penn returned to England, 1684. The influence of the Quaker proved sufficient for his cause, and in 1685 his right to Delaware was recognized by the Lords of Trade. His wonderful influence with James, now become king, was the despair of his enemies, who started the report, widely believed at the time, that Penn was in reality a Jesuit. He came under suspicion when James was driven out, was arrested, and for a time, 1692-1694, his colony was taken from him. He easily cleared himself of the charges and was restored to his rights. In England many misfortunes beset him. Chief among them was the news that the colonists were wrangling over the powers of government. After many gentle remonstrances he himself came back in 1699, and for five years modified by his presence the strife which is, perhaps, inherent in a democracy such as he had created. Spite of the divisions the colony grew rapidly in numbers and wealth.

**Penn gets
Clear Title
to Delaware.**

**His Second
Visit to
Pennsyl-
vania.**

THE STUART REACTION

The Cromwellian period in Maryland history, so full of political and military combat, was succeeded by an interval of quiet. Each side had learned something in the conflict. The proprietor, who easily secured the recognition of his rights from Charles II, knew well that turmoil interfered with industry and consequently lessened his income. The people longed for peace. The toleration act of 1649, made to meet an exigency of the time, remained a permanent result of the late conflict, and for a time Catholics and Protestants lived together amicably.

Cecil Calvert, the second Lord Baltimore, died in 1675. Under him the colony was founded, and his tactfulness had brought it through many dangers. His son and successor, Charles, governor from 1661-1675, was a man of downright convictions, and knew not his father's art of compromising. Like other English noblemen of the day he wished to use political power for the benefit of his family and dependents. What Charles II did in England, what the Duke of York did in New York, and what Berkeley did in Virginia, Charles Calvert, as governor and as pro-

**Maryland
at Peace.**

**Ideals of
Charles
Calvert.**

prietor, sought to do in Maryland. Through him the offices were filled with kinsmen, the suffrage was limited to freeholders, and only half of the members-elect were summoned to the assembly. This policy awakened the old spirit of resistance, and in 1676, while Lord Baltimore was absent, a band of sixty, incited by Bacon's example in Virginia, gathered to overthrow the proprietary government. The governor seized and hanged the popular leaders, Davis and Pate, and the rebellion collapsed.

But the spirit of discontent did not disappear. The absence of Baltimore in order to oppose Penn's efforts in England gave opportunity to its growth. Eventually he fell into a dispute with the collectors of the royal revenues in Maryland and the king took the side of his own officers. Most important of all, the struggle was given a religious cast. The accession of James II, a Catholic sovereign, in 1685 accentuated this phase of the controversy. When the royal prince, called the "Old Pretender" by most Protestants, was born, he was proclaimed in Maryland by the proprietary governor with impolitic fervor. The Protestants, through the progress of immigration many times as numerous as the Catholics, were ready for revolt. Then came news that William of Orange had landed in England. No longer restrained, they formed under the lead of John Corde and others an Association for the Defense of the Protestant Religion. They seized St. Mary's, the seat of government, dispersed the Catholic bands who met to resist them, sent a loyal address to William and Mary, and held an assembly in which representation was on a popular basis. The new sovereign of England accepted the revolution in Maryland, which then became a royal province. In 1715 a Protestant succeeded to the Baltimore title and was restored to his full rights in Maryland, which from that time until the revolution was a proprietary colony.

Revolution
in Maryland.

For sixteen years after the Restoration political authority in Virginia was the will of Governor William Berkeley. As Charles II prolonged his own supremacy by maintaining the "Cavalier Parliament" for seventeen years, so Berkeley in Virginia kept alive for fourteen years the assembly chosen in 1661 in the height of enthusiasm for the Stuarts. By this means, by nominating his own councillors, and by making other appointments judiciously, he concentrated the authority in the hands of a small group of wealthy planters who depended on his own favor. Meanwhile, the price of tobacco had steadily fallen, due partly to the navigation acts and partly to over-production. Virginia had no other money crop, and naturally exploited that to the limit of her capacity. Proposals to limit production had little effect, and there was much suffering. Throughout this period prices of imported merchandise grew higher, the planters fell into debt to the London merchants, and the spirit of hopelessness easily ran into defiance. Berkeley's

Berkeley's
Despotism.

system of despotism was the most visible of political evils, and they turned against it as the cause of all their distress.

The occasion of the outbreak was an Indian war. Within recent years the march of settlement had reached the Potomac valley, which alarmed the Indians in that region. They foresaw the end of their hunting grounds, and their murmuring created apprehension in the minds of the settlers. In 1675 the savages killed two planters on the Potomac, and the whites replied by killing the murderers and several other Indians. Reprisals were made by the red men, and soon the frontier was harrowed from end to end. Then the Susquehannocks rose in January, 1676, and killed thirty-six whites. The settlers fled from the border, and called on the governor for protection. He ordered a body of militia to the scene of danger, but recalled it before it had well started. His opponents claimed that he derived profits from the Indian trade, and on that account wished to avoid a war.

The assembly met in March, 1676, and proposed to build forts in the Indian country. The people objected that this only meant higher taxes. What they wished was a vigorous campaign to break the power of the Indians effectively. To their petitions of this purport Berkeley returned an angry reproof and the people began to raise troops on their own account. They found an excellent leader in Nathaniel Bacon. His fervid speeches had ample foundation in the condition of the colony, and he was shortly at the head of three hundred men, with his face set toward the frontier. To Berkeley this was treason, and he promptly said so in a proclamation. Two hundred and forty of Bacon's men then went home, but he marched on with the rest, and in a bloody action killed one hundred and fifty Indians.

Meanwhile, the movement took on the form of open resistance to the existing régime. People were gathering with arms in their hands, and demanding a new assembly chosen by the freemen. In panic Berkeley promised all that was asked, and even pardoned Bacon and restored him to the Council. In the new assembly a number of reforms were adopted which must have been as gall to the power-loving governor. The reformers did not trust the governor, and wished their leader to be commander-in-chief of the militia, probably as a guarantee that the governor would not repudiate his promises. They claimed that the command had been promised, and when it was not given a violent quarrel arose. Bacon was impetuous, and ended by collecting five hundred armed men, with whom he overawed Berkeley and forced him to issue a commission to operate against the Indians. Then the army marched away to the scene of war. As soon as they were gone, the governor repudiated what he had done and called on the people to aid him in suppressing the "rebels." There was

**Bacon's
Rebellion.**

**Bacon as-
sumes
Leadership.**

**Movement
becomes
Political.**

no response to his call, and he fled to Accomac County beyond Chesapeake Bay.

The struggle thus became a real attempt at revolution. Bacon had begun as a reformer. If he now yielded, all his work was for naught. Being an aggressive man, he determined to accept the challenge and fight it out with the governor. His influence over his followers was great enough to carry many of them with him, but many others fell away and chose to follow Berkeley, who was able to return to Jamestown with six hundred men. Bacon was soon upon him, besieged the town, and forced the governor to take flight. The struggle was now a social one, the mass of poor and moderately well-to-do people supported the revolt, and the great planters generally were for the old order. While he constructed his lines before the capital, Bacon forced the wives and daughters of many of his enemies to stand before his works to avert the fire of the governor's soldiers. When Jamestown fell he burned it lest it should again offer asylum to his enemies. All this happened during the summer and early autumn of 1676. What else would have come is only to be guessed; for Bacon died October 26 of a fever contracted through exposure, and his cause collapsed. Berkeley came back to Jamestown, harried out the remnant of the rebels who had taken refuge in the swamps, and although the king had promised amnesty to those who submitted, hanged thirteen as a warning to those who defied his authority. To the captured William Drummond, who, before he joined Bacon, had been governor of Albemarle, probably through Berkeley's selection, the governor said in greeting him: "Mr. Drummond, you are welcome. I am more glad to see you than any man in Virginia. Mr. Drummond, you shall be hanged in half an hour." To which the prisoner replied: "As your honor pleases," and he was led away to the scaffold.

**Rebellion
Full-
Fledged.**

**Death of
Bacon.**

News of these commotions had ere this reached England, and the king had already dispatched a force of one thousand men under three commissioners to pacify Virginia. Berkeley's high proceedings were well known in England, and the knowledge was reflected in the instructions of the commissioners. Amnesty was offered to all rebels who would submit, and Jeffreys, one of the three, was to succeed Berkeley as governor. They found Berkeley supreme and defiant. His powerful family influence in England made it unwise to arrest him, and there was a period of angry wrangling, at the end of which the irritable old man embarked of his own motion. Arrived at London, he learned that the king would not see him. It was the last straw for a body and mind already tottering under the weight of years, and he died in a few months, July, 1677. He had in his day been a stout-hearted defender of the royal authority, a friend of the Established Church, and a worthy leader of the

**Settlement
of Difficul-
ties.**

well-born Virginia gentry. His ideals were of great account in a day when democracy was in its cruder stages of development. His often quoted words on education in Virginia express the ideals of his class. "I thank God," he said, "there are no free schools nor printing, and I hope we shall not have any these hundred years, for learning has brought disobedience and heresy and sects into the world and printing has divulged [them] and libels against the best government. God keep us from both."

Bacon's Rebellion shows that Virginia society had gone beyond this ideal, and the royal commissioners recognized the fact. They called for free expressions of grievances with the result that a "charter" of privileges was granted by the king in which important reforms in local government were included. In 1679 Lord Culpeper arrived as governor. He was in need of money, and proceeded to get it by increasing the fees, requiring "presents" in money from outgoing ship captains, and other similar measures. It was at this time that lawless bands of tobacco planters began to destroy the growing crops to relieve the over-production which produced low prices. In 1684 Culpeper was succeeded as governor by Lord Howard of Effingham, who was in no sense a better ruler than Culpeper. Thus passed the years until the end of the Stuart dynasty, years full of commotion, in which the Virginia spirit of self-government slowly rose against the power of a governor appointed by the king but bent on nothing so much as his own advantage. It took many years of such experience to change the most royal of the colonies into an out-and-out home of revolution; but the process went steadily on.

THE COLONIES UNDER THE LATER STUARTS, 1660-1689

Charles II did not like the Puritan colonies, but he did not wish the trouble of abolishing them. It was easier to give charters to Connecticut and Rhode Island, to wink at the compromise by which Massachusetts seemed to give the suffrage to members of the English Church, and to take what revenue came from the New England trade, than to risk war with the colonists as a result of suppressing the charter. Thus the years passed, for a time in safety for the New Englanders, while their fellow dissenters in England suffered from a high church reaction. When trouble at last came it was through the initiation of his over-zealous officers rather than through the will of the good-natured king.

A more serious peril was the attitude of the Indians. The steady extension of the settlements from the seashore inward showed them that their hunting grounds were in danger, and they came together in common defense under Philip, son of Massasoit, the Wampanoag, long the friend and stay of Plymouth colony. The war began in the summer of 1675

**Berkeley's
Ideals.**

**Culpeper's
Rapacity.**

**New
England.**

**King
Philip's War.**

with the usual outrages on the frontier, in which retaliation and pitiless slaughter played their parts. Knowing the habits of the whites, the Indians fell on them suddenly with bloody results. The Nipmucks, in western Connecticut and Massachusetts, joined in the struggle, and the river towns were ravaged. Then the Narragansetts appeared about to join the belligerents; and the whites, without waiting for open hostilities, fell on them in a fort in what is now Kingston, Rhode Island, and crushed effectually their military power. But the struggle went on more bitterly than ever, the whites fighting for life persistently and steadily. After some months their superior organization began to tell. Canonchet, king of the Narragansetts, was run down and slain in April, 1676. A month later one hundred and twenty warriors were killed in a battle on the Connecticut, and August 12, 1676, Philip himself fell at the hands of Colonel Church, a noted Indian fighter. Through nearly two years' fighting the colonists lost severely in life and property. Their homes were ruined, their crops destroyed, and famine was avoided only by importing grain from Virginia. But the power of the Indians was broken, and thenceforth the settlers might plant in safety in the interior. The most permanent effect of the struggle was the damage inflicted on the beaver trade. Driving back the Indians inevitably limited the area of its operation. In this struggle all the New England colonies suffered indiscriminately, and all united in the measures of defense.

The wounds of war were not healed before Massachusetts realized that serious efforts were to be made to annul the liberal charter under which she enjoyed self-government. The attack would doubtless be of a legal nature, the charge being made that the charter should be forfeited because the colony had, among other things, harbored some of the regicides, evaded the king's orders in regard to a broader suffrage, denied the right of appeal to England, shown a spirit of indifference to the royal authorities in regard to the appointment of agents in England, and continually evaded the navigation acts. In 1676 Edward Randolph visited Boston as a "messenger" with a letter from the king to the authorities. He was privately instructed to ascertain in what respect the colony laws were against those of England and to report on religious conditions, the execution of the navigation acts, and the numbers and strength of the colonists. He was a shrewd observer, and was prejudiced against the Puritans. His report was very unfavorable to the colony, but for a time nothing was done.

Massachusetts
Charter
Threatened.

In 1678, however, Randolph was appointed collector of the customs for New England and took up his residence in Boston with the design of breaking up smuggling, which was widespread. His numerous complaints sent to England all proceeded from the conclusion that the only way to enforce the acts of trade was for the king to take the charter colonies into his own hands and appoint officers who

would support the collector. Charles II wanted little urging on this point; for just at this time he was proceeding against the municipal charters of England. June 12, 1683, he secured from a partial court a verdict against the charter of London, and next day the attorney-general was ordered to take out a writ of *quo warranto* against the Massachusetts Company. Randolph, then in England, was sent back to Boston to serve the writ, a task congenial to his feelings. The Massachusetts authorities retained counsel and determined to contest the suit. Storms intervened, and Randolph could not return the writ within the time set, so that it failed. Rather than go through the process of sending another writ to Boston the attorney-general now sued out in the court of chancery a writ of *scire facias*, which had the virtue of not requiring service in the colony. Under this writ the case came to a speedy hearing, and October 23, 1684, the charter was declared forfeited.

**Massachusetts
Charter
Annulled.**

Pleased with his victory, Randolph now marched against the other colonial charters. Pennsylvania alone was saved through the influence of her proprietor; but writs were issued against the charters of Connecticut, Rhode Island, the two Jerseys, and Delaware. Randolph's pockets fairly bulged with *quo warrantos*. But the times were turbulent in England, and murmuring was heard against the king's wholesale destruction of charters. For this, and for other reasons, the writs were not pressed to an issue, and thus the other charter colonies safely outran the Stuart peril.

**Other
Charters in
Danger.**

But they came near shipwreck on a scheme for a general consolidation of the colonies north of Delaware Bay. This scheme was devised much earlier than 1684, and only awaited the forfeiture of charters to be put into operation. The result in the Massachusetts case encouraged its promoters to proceed. Without waiting for the results of the processes against the charters of Connecticut and Rhode Island, they were treated as already annulled, and a governor was appointed to rule over all New England. The man selected for the position by Charles II was the stern Colonel Percy Kirke, who could hardly have failed to create rebellion had he come to rule New England without the aid of an assembly, as his instructions ran. When James II came to the throne the appointment was not completed, and he sent Kirke to deal with the rebels at Taunton and made Edmund Andros governor of New England. Andros's authority extended over Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Maine, and Plymouth. He was to rule without an assembly and with the aid of an appointed council. Rhode Island and Connecticut were frightened into releasing their independence, although the latter concealed its charter and brought it forth in happier days. In 1688 a new commission constituted Andros governor of all the colonies north of Pennsylvania, and to this consolidated

**The Dominion of
New England.**

territory was given the name of the Dominion of New England. Each constituent colony was to become a district in the larger organization and to lose its assembly, but from it were appointed members of the governor's grand council which ruled the Dominion. Over New York Francis Nicholson ruled as deputy governor, but Andros himself supervised the rest of his "dominion." This system, so soon to be overthrown, expressed James II's ideal of colonial government.

During the short time between the fall of the charter and the arrival of Andros, Joseph Dudley was governor of Massachusetts. He was born in the colony, but was now zealous for the royal prerogative. He wished to make the transition in government as easy as possible, but the task was difficult from its very nature. The people were not prepared to resist: they submitted with sullen reluctance. Now came a clergyman of the English Church, for whom Dudley demanded the use of one of the Boston meetinghouses. The demand was steadily refused. After a while it was agreed that the clergyman, Mr. Ratcliffe, should use Mr. Willard's meetinghouse each Sunday, one minister preaching after the other finished and alternately taking the first sermon. But trouble arose because neither would stop at the proper time, and at length Andros seized a lot belonging to the town, and on it was erected King's Chapel. The new régime also gave offense by celebrating Christmas, by requiring persons taking an oath to kiss the Bible instead of holding up the hand, by ordering that school teachers should have licenses from the governor, and by requiring the shops to close on the anniversary of the death of Charles I. All these offenses, however, were surpassed by the extreme zeal with which the governor ordered and celebrated public thanksgivings for the birth of a son to their Catholic majesties in 1688.

**Dudley
Governor of
Massachu-
setts.**

Within its short duration Andros's government showed itself a despotism. He was given the right to make laws, levy taxes, and administer justice. The Council was expected to offer advice, but he so filled it with his instruments that it but reflected his will. When he ordered the collection of the old taxes, no longer legal since the assembly did not exist, some towns refused to pay on the ground that they were assessed illegally. The leading men of Ipswich were arrested, tried before a "special commission," and fined for their resistance. To this practical proof that their liberties were abridged was added the conviction that their property was in danger. By law all the ungranted land in the colonies belonged to the king, and Andros was to dispose of it in his "Dominion," subject to quitrent. He declared that most of the old land grants were worthless, and seemed about to take possession of farms and even village lots. But he at last showed his favor by saying that he would issue regular grants to all whose titles were in question. As he and his officers must have fees for these

**Andros's
Strong
Measures.**

grants, the offer was not a disinterested one. Moreover, many choice bits of land were by influential officials declared to be subject to new grants, which showed the people that the new régime was rapacious as well as arbitrary.

But the day of James II was run. November 5, 1688, William of Orange landed in England. December 22 James fled the kingdom, and in February, 1689, Parliament offered the crown to William and Mary. It was a bloodless but complete revolution, not only in dynasty but also in the fundamental theory of government. For the Stuart ideal of divine right was now substituted the supremacy of the people in Parliament. This system could hardly exist in England without having its echo in the colonies. Not only did they seize the opportunity to wipe out, as in New England, all traces of James's recent innovations, but from that time every colonial assembly felt more strongly than ever its right to lay taxes and make laws within its own province. This conviction, slowly developing, precipitated at the close of three-quarters of a century a struggle between mother country and colonies, the real import of which was, Should the colonial assemblies or Parliament govern the colonies?

The news of William's success in England created a profound impression in Massachusetts, where the people were ripe for revolt. In the "Declaration" he issued on landing he said that magistrates unjustly turned out of office should resume their functions. He had in mind the municipalities of England, but the New Englanders took it as referring to the colonies. This "Declaration" was brought to Boston by John Winslow, whom Andros at once arrested. But the news was out, and on April 18, 1689, the people rose in arms, seized and imprisoned Andros, Randolph, and other officials, and proclaimed the restitution of the old government under Bradstreet, the last governor under the charter. They sent a report of their action to their agent in England and asked that they be allowed the old charter. Andros remained a prisoner in Castle William nearly a year, and was then sent to England.

In New York, where Francis Nicholson ruled as Andros's deputy, affairs were also ripe for revolt. James had placed many Catholics in office in the colony, and this seemed to support the rumor, widely circulated in Massachusetts as well, that he would introduce the Catholic religion in the colonies. Against Nicholson all the Protestant population was ready to act.

Disappointment because the colony had not been given an effective assembly also had much to do with the popular discontent. The people found a leader in Jacob Leisler, German by birth, now a prosperous merchant in New York. Nicholson hesitated to proclaim William and Mary, which aroused severe criticism by opponents of

the Stuarts. In May, 1689, a careless remark was twisted by rumor until it was reported that he threatened to burn the town with his own hand. Violent demonstrations followed, and the deputy governor fled to England, leaving the government to three councillors, Phillips, Cortlandt, and Bayard. Leisler now came to the front. At the head of the popular party, he disregarded the councillors, and called a convention of delegates from the counties. This body met and appointed Leisler commander-in-chief of the province, with large powers of government. For two turbulent years he was in control of the province.

In Maryland, as we have seen (page 91), the expulsion of the Stuarts from England was followed by Corde's Rebellion, thus making it the third colony in which force was used to bring about the recognition of William and Mary. In the other colonies the transition occurred peaceably. Rhode Island and Connecticut resumed their charters and were allowed the privilege on the ground that the charters had never been repealed or surrendered. Massachusetts was allowed to retain Maine, but New Hampshire, recognized as a royal colony in 1679 but made a part of the Dominion of New England in 1686, now became a royal province once more. Commotions at once appeared, and in 1699 the province was placed under the supervision of the governor of Massachusetts. It was not until 1741 that it again had a distinct governor, although a lieutenant governor generally ruled during the interval. New Jersey was allowed to return to her proprietors until 1702, when she also became a royal province. In the rearrangement Plymouth became a part of Massachusetts. Thus was distributed all the territory which had been placed under the authority of Andros. Virginia and the Carolinas were not materially affected by the revolution, and Pennsylvania, including Delaware, while inwardly tranquil, was taken from the hands of the proprietor in 1692 on the charge that he was a Jacobite, but restored in 1694, when his innocence had been made apparent.

The Revolution in Other Colonies.

In Massachusetts the renewal of the old charter was desired by a portion of the people, while others thought it a good opportunity to get a self-governing system like that of Connecticut. Each side had its representatives in England, but neither won. The charter of 1691 was largely due to the influence of Edward Randolph, just arrived in London out of captivity in Boston. By it Massachusetts became a royal province with a governor appointed by the king, an assembly elected by property-holders, and a council, not appointed by the king as elsewhere, but nominated by the assembly and approved by the governor. In ordinary matters the approval of laws was left to the governor, though the king reserved the right of sanction to certain special affairs. The Puritan party was dealt a severe but expected blow in the provision for liberty of conscience for all Protestants.

New Massachusetts charter.

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CHAPTER VI

COLONIAL DEVELOPMENT, 1690-1763

DEVELOPMENT OF THE COLONIAL CONFLICT

OUR colonial history proceeds in two currents, one English and one American. The beginning of each is somewhat confused because each began without plan and according to special conditions. But by 1690 each current has become more distinct. We can now see what England is doing for the colonies and how the latter, though widely differing in surroundings, begin to have common experiences and interests.

The English colonial policy under the later Stuarts looked to absolute government, through a governor and council and without the aid of an assembly. The revolution of 1689 checked this plan and the colonial system henceforth contained the following general features: 1. A desire to make the royal provinces uniform in the colonies; 2. An absence of parliamentary control, the colonies being under supreme authority of the king, who established the charters, appointed the high officers, and passed on colonial laws; 3. The navigation acts, designed to benefit English merchants and ship owners, who made up a strong part of the support of government. These acts were enforced by collectors and admiralty courts created by the king and distinct from the ordinary colonial officials, with whom they were sometimes in violent quarrel. 4. The maintenance of effective imperial control through the royal officials. The governor of a province was expected to guard the interests of the crown, resist encroachments of authority by the colonial assembly, and by influence over the colonial gentry to create, if possible, a party of king's friends among the inhabitants. Some of the governors performed the last of these tasks successfully, notably William Tryon, but others, like Andros, Nicholson, and Bellomont, were tactless and irascible and were continually at variance with the colonists. 5. The growing interference of Parliament in colonial affairs. This began with the passage of the acts of trade, many times amended or defined, but it extended to the regulation of money, the protection of British creditors against loss in the colonies, the establishment of post offices, and other matters related to trade. From this position it was not far for Parliament to advance when it later decided to tax the colonists directly.

**Principles
of the Eng-
lish Colonial
Policy.**

This system grew up under men of experience who believed it gave the best results to all concerned. To the colonies England gave protection against other powers, and even against the Indians in extreme cases. From her they received their lands, their laws, and their very existence. Was it too much to expect they should contribute something in return to support the trade and maintain the glory of England? And if this be granted, was it not reasonable that such a system of administration be preserved that the colonies should not forget filial duty or question parental authority? To all of which the colonies had the plain answer that they acted in their own interests, as was the right of Englishmen.

The English Ideal.

In 1690 the population of the colonies was about 220,000, most of them agriculturists. Wherever they lived they had the same interests in relation to England. Every colony had a legislature, New York having won that long demanded favor with the triumph of William and Mary. This body became instinctively the guardian of the interests of the colony, and it was in continual opposition to the royal officials. As it became more inclined to assert colonial rights of self-government, the crown became more willing to resist. To each side the action of the other seemed aggressive, and it was resisted by all the arts known to able politicians. In this long struggle, from which no colony was exempt, the causes of dispute vary. Sometimes it is the payment of salaries to the governor, at other times quitrents, or land sales, or the issue of paper money; but the struggle is always fundamentally the same, and it leads to the same end. This struggle was also an important training school for colonial leaders. It not only formed parties, ready at the proper time for the work of revolution, but it developed the men who led them.

The Colonies' Side.

During the period now under consideration three wars between England and France had their reactions in America. They brought the Canadian Indians down on the English frontiers, forced the colonists to fight in defense of their homes, and even led them to make expeditions for the conquest of parts of Canada. All this gave the people confidence in their ability to defend their country, trained men and officers to military duty, and developed the spirit of union in a common cause. Hardly a colonial assembly but shows a firmer grip on the political life of its colony through having raised its contingents for the wars; for here, as in England, before money was voted grievances must be redressed. A governor who wished to get his colonial assembly to raise troops for the Canadian frontier could not afford to quarrel with that assembly.

Influence of the French and Indian Wars.

But it must not be supposed that the party strife in the colonies measured the state of their happiness. It was an era of great industrial development. In 1689 the frontier line from Maine to the

Savannah river followed the coast generally at not more than fifty miles distance. In 1760 settlers had penetrated into all parts of New England, and all of the South from Florida to New York westward as far as the Alleghanies — which barrier, indeed, had been crossed by the most daring ones. In New York alone the frontier had not been moved westward; and here it was the presence of the Iroquois in the Mohawk valley, allies of the English and useful in operations against the French and Algonquins, that kept the whites from some of the richest land on the continent. Throughout the settlements plenty prevailed, land was cheap, and no man who worked need fear want; large families were the rule, and no parent was anxious lest there should be no opportunity for his children. Under such conditions population increased rapidly, by birth and through immigration. In 1690 it was about 220,000, and in 1760 it reached 1,500,000.

Progress of
Settlements,
1690-1760.

TYPICAL COLONIAL CONTROVERSIES

This narrative cannot deal with the political struggles of all the colonies. Interesting as the stories would be they lead to one end, the evolution of a colonial party; and in the royal provinces the common keynote of the contests is opposition to royal prerogative. In the proprietary colonies it is resistance to the will of the proprietor, and in the liberally chartered colonies of Connecticut and Rhode Island its traces are found in the common opposition to the British laws relating to trade. Everywhere the spirit of self-government is apparent. What the parliament was to England the assembly under the restrictions of its charter aspired to be to the colony. If we consider some of the more notable controversies, we shall see in what manner they looked forward to the ultimate assertion of independence.

Develop-
ment of
Colonial
Parties.

Governor Phips, the first royal governor of Massachusetts, opened a long quarrel with the assembly when he published his instructions from the king directing him to get the assembly to vote a permanent appropriation for the salaries of the governor and other officials appointed by the crown. For the assembly to comply was to relinquish its best source of power, and the request was ignored. On the contrary, bills assertive of fundamental rights and laws establishing courts were passed, all of which were vetoed in England. This only confirmed the assembly in its determination to keep a firm hand on the purse-strings. Phips urged the lawmakers to vote a regular salary, but they would only give 500 pounds for services already rendered. To Bellomont, his successor by royal appointment, they gave 1000 pounds for two years' service. This way of granting money after the completion of a given

Colonial
Controversies.

The
Governor's
Salary in
Massachu-
setts.

time was thought to be useful in keeping the governor friendly to the colony. In 1702 Joseph Dudley became governor, and ruled fourteen years. He tried in vain to relieve himself from the necessity of taking his remuneration at the discretion of the assembly. At the end of his term of office they had voted him 6950 pounds. In asserting his right to veto acts of assembly he disallowed the election, as speaker, of Thomas Oakes, one of the most astute leaders of the opposition. He claimed that such an election was in the nature of an act of the legislature. A bitter controversy arose, and continued until, in 1725, in a so-called explanatory charter, the king ordered that the election of speaker should be subject to the governor's approval. The assembly thought it expedient to accept the restriction. The salary controversy, continued under Shute (1716-1728), came to a climax under Burnet (1728-1729). He was instructed to insist on a regular salary of at least 1000 pounds, and the assembly was told that if it were not granted the charter would be in danger. The reply of the colony was to offer the governor 1700 pounds as a gift, but he was forced to decline it, even when the sum was raised to 3000 pounds. The controversy now became warm, but in the midst of it Burnet came to his death from the oversetting of his carriage in the water, and the assembly showed its favor by voting 2000 pounds to his children. Under Governor Belcher, his successor, the dispute was compromised, 1731, when the assembly came to vote the governor's salary annually, but at the beginning and not at the end of each year. New York and South Carolina in the eighteenth century began to grant the governor's salary year by year, and spite of the protests of the Board of Trade the custom was maintained. In Virginia and the Carolinas the salaries were provided for in general taxes, which did not depend on the annual votes of the assemblies.

Closely connected with this controversy was the claim made by most of the assemblies that they, like the English House of Commons, had the sole right to initiate money bills. The Council, usually appointed by the king, had the right to approve all bills, and this made it an upper chamber of the legislature. It usually supported the governor and warred against the assembly. The latter body, by insisting on its control over money bills, assumed a position of superiority, and its good will was so necessary to the success of any governor's administration that it finally won the recognition of its claim.

In New York the legislative controversy was also prominent, and here it was concerned with money bills in general. The failure of the legislature of 1683 was resented by the people, and Leisler recognized the fact by calling an assembly. It authorized him to act in the emergency, and the flight of Nicholson left him in supreme power. The council resented his assumption of authority, and he drove them from his presence as persons "Popishly

**The As-
sembly and
Money Bills.**

**Leisler in
New York.**

affected, Dogs and Rogues." For him, a man of the people, the aristocratic councillors had no tolerance; and he returned their contempt with interest. But he was a popular leader and kept a semblance of order in the turbulent population of Manhattan. Having proclaimed William and Mary he expected some recognition of his services; but his sovereigns ignored him and appointed Henry Sloughter governor. They also sent to New York a body of troops under Ingoldesby with instructions to restore order. Ingoldesby arrived before the new governor landed and demanded the surrender of the fort. He showed no written orders, and Leisler refused to yield. Then Sloughter came and demanded the delivery of the fort, also without showing his authority. After some hesitation Leisler retired. He was arrested for treason, tried by a special court over which Joseph Dudley presided, sentenced to death, and executed. Tradition has it that Sloughter signed the death warrant while drunk. Be that as it may, Sloughter died a few weeks afterwards, a victim of inebriety. Leisler had his faults, but he did not deserve death, and leaving him a victim to hatred of his enemies is a blot on the reputation of the British government.

Sloughter was instructed to summon an assembly "according to the usage" of the other colonies. He and his successors took this to mean that they might at will summon, prorogue, dissolve, and apportion the membership of the lawmaking body. An obedient assembly was thus kept long in power, in one case for eleven years. But not many assemblies were obedient, and one of their most common protests was to demand frequent elections. Their persistence won a measure of success in 1743, when a colonial law was approved by the king, making it necessary to have a new election once in seven years.

**Struggle for
an Assembly
in New
York.**

In 1692 the New York assembly began a long controversy over the right to vote money. A committee was appointed to investigate the expenditure of money in support of frontier defense. Its real business was to see if the governor, whose salary the assembly would not vote in a regular way, was not making up the deficiency by diverting to his own use some of the funds appropriated to support the garrison. The committee could do nothing because the governor did not allow them to see the muster-rolls and accounts. The next assembly (1694) was determined to have its way, and resolved that it would do no business until it had inspected the accounts. Governor Fletcher demurred for a while, but at last sent them the books of the receiver-general. From this time forward the assembly regularly inspected the accounts and might know how the money it had appropriated was spent.

**The Control
of Money
Votes in
New York.**

In 1702-1708 Edward Hyde, Lord Cornbury, was New York's governor. Without public or private morals, he left a stain on the governorship blacker than was left by any predecessor or successor. He

was cousin-german of Queen Anne, whom he resembled, and was said to have appeared in woman's clothes to show colonial society what the queen looked like. The assembly voted money to fortify the harbor of New York, but at the next session it appeared that he had diverted most of it to his own use, although he had been voted a present of 2000 pounds to pay the expenses of coming to his post. The deed was possible because all money hitherto voted was to the king to be used for the province, and once it was in the hands of a royal official it might be taken for governor's salary or any other purpose authorized by the king. Preceding governors had followed this practice, but not so flagrantly, and

Cornbury in New York.

A Colonial Treasurer.

the assembly seized the opportunity to check it. A resolution passed to vote no more money except such as was paid out by a treasurer appointed by the assembly and responsible to it. The position was so reasonable that the authorities in England approved it so far as extraordinary grants went. After that the assembly assumed that most appropriations were extraordinary.

Nor was the Quaker Commonwealth free from controversy. Penn's humane ideals never failed him, but they were better suited for an infant community than for the large province he soon had on his hands. So many reports of dissension reached him that in 1699 he returned to Philadelphia, hoping, he said, to end his days there. He found the people divided.

Political Change in Pennsylvania.

Quary, surveyor-general of the royal revenue, complained that the navigation laws were not enforced, the people complained that the proprietor did not develop the colony or keep his promises in granting lands, while the proprietor could reply that the people did not pay quit-rents and that the colony itself had impoverished its owner. More than all, the three counties which became Delaware were in dispute over their rights in the colonial assembly. To all the malcontents Penn made earnest pleas for moderation. The upshot was "The Charter of Privileges," passed by the assembly and council and approved by Penn in 1701 on the eve of his departure for England, whither he was called by the news that Parliament was about to abolish all the proprietary colonies. This "charter" represents the experience of Americans as it was worked out at that time in the problems of self-government in the New World. If any other colony had been allowed to revise its constitution on the basis of what it had discovered through its own struggles the result would probably have been much like that in Pennsylvania, where the mild proprietor was not much of a weight on the constitution-makers.

Penn's "Charter" provided for four representatives elected by the freemen of each county to make up an assembly, which when it met was to elect its own officers, pass on the qualification of its members, prepare bills, and have all rights of an assembly chosen by "free-born subjects of England." The

Penn's New Charter.

appointment of governor and councillors remained with the proprietor, all who believed in God were to have freedom of conscience, and all Christians could hold office. In 1705 a supplementary act provided that only Protestants could be members of the assembly. The dispute with Delaware was settled by allowing it to have a separate assembly from Pennsylvania; but each colony remained under Penn's jurisdiction, and the "Charter" embodied the government of each until the revolution. It was the habit, also, for the same governor to rule over each colony.

Delaware to
have a
Separate
Assembly.

Probably from an early date the Quakers were less than a majority of the population of Pennsylvania, but they were the most influential portion; and their peculiar belief brought some annoying situations into existence. For example, they refused to take oaths, and sometimes even to administer them. They passed laws to allow witnesses in court to affirm, but these were disallowed by the king, who, by the original charter, reserved to himself the approval of laws. Then the assembly renewed their enactment, incorporating it in the law creating courts so that its veto, which followed, left the colony without judicial tribunals. This was no great inconvenience to the Quakers, for they usually settled their disputes among themselves; but it worked hardship on others. In 1718 the contest ended with a compromise: the assembly adopted the severe English penal code and in the same bill allowed affirmations; and the king approved their action.

Position
of the
Quakers.

As to Oaths.

From the beginning of their history the Quakers opposed war; from which it followed that the colony not only had no militia system, but it refused to vote money to erect forts on the frontier.

Its pacific relations with the Indians warranted this course so far as internal problems were concerned; but when French influence in the Ohio valley created external problems, over which Quaker good will could exert no direction, the non-resistance principles of Pennsylvania became a serious danger. At this time Benjamin Franklin had become a force in the colony, and when in 1739 the assembly refused to raise a militia at the request of the king, he started an association to establish a volunteer organization. From a lottery he got funds to build fortifications. His action was approved by practical men, and weakened the opposition of the Quaker party. In 1745 the assembly appropriated 4000 pounds for "bread, beef, pork, flour, wheat or other grain" in support of the garrison in newly captured Louisburg. The governor used part of it to buy gunpowder on the ground that it was "other grain," and his action caused so little scandal that in 1746 the assembly voted the king 5000 pounds without stipulating the purpose for which it was to be used, although it was well known that it would be used for military defense.

As to
Military
Service.

From this time we may consider the religious motive in the matter a subordinate one; but it was replaced by a political motive. In 1754 the Indians and French were raiding on the western frontier and it was necessary for the militia system to be taken under public control. The assembly would do nothing unless the estates of the proprietor were taxed. They referred to the large amount of his unsold land from which he had no revenue, and through his influence the law failed. Then came the defeat of Braddock, followed by frontier outrages. So strong a cry went up from the non-Quaker inhabitants that the ministry in London heard it and brought a bill into Parliament to require members of the Pennsylvania assembly to take the oath of allegiance. This would effectually exclude Quakers from that body. Alarmed at the prospect of a permanent discrimination, they now decided to yield temporarily. Through the intervention of friends the bill was withdrawn from Parliament and the Quakers in the colony agreed not to stand for election to the next assembly. In a legislature thus purged of old ideas it was easy to pass laws for a militia and for fortifications.

Penn's last days were full of financial troubles, to which were added mental infirmities. He died in 1718, leaving his colony to his four sons, for whom his widow acted until her death in 1726. Two of the sons, John and Thomas, resided in Philadelphia, the former for one and the latter for fifteen years. The development of the province made the proprietors very rich, and the demand that they should pay taxes on their lands became strong. They resisted successfully, since they controlled the governorship. In 1763 John Penn, grandson of the founder, became governor, and continued in office until the Revolution. The later Penns returned to the Church of England, which tended to widen the breach between the family and the colonists. In 1778 the state of Pennsylvania annulled the charter and allowed the proprietors 130,000 pounds in lieu of their rights. Later, 1786, a supplementary grant was made to them, and the king himself gave an annuity of 4000 pounds.

The history of Pennsylvania shows the proprietary colony at its best: that of Carolina shows it at its worst. The eight proprietors knew nothing of their colony, which they did not visit. They had no other interest in it than to get money, and when that failed they ceased to pay attention to its needs. They had no military force with which to preserve order or to enforce their own rights. By 1690 the shares had passed for the most part into the hands of a group of merchants who were as much disappointed as their predecessors with the enterprise. Meanwhile the people of the colony grew in numbers and prosperity. About 1690 the northern settlements began to be called North Carolina. In that year a governor was appointed for the first time for all Carolina,

**A Militia
System
Established.**

**Later His-
tory of the
Penn
Family.**

**Proprietary
Misrule in
Carolina.**

with authority to appoint a deputy governor for the northern settlements. In 1714 Charles Eden was made governor of North Carolina without reference to the governor of South Carolina. At this time North Carolina was in serious commotion. Its population was strongly dissenting, among them many Quakers. The official class were of the Church of England, and by tendering the oaths of supremacy to the Quakers elected to the assembly they could rule the colony. The result was a social revolt, the mass of poor men arrayed against the aristocrats and conservatives. After seven years of commotion the former had a leader in Thomas Cary, who, in 1711, took up arms, but was defeated and captured with the aid of troops from Virginia. Immediately afterwards came an Indian war in which only aid sent from Charleston enabled the whites to triumph. In 1715 South Carolina had a fierce struggle of her own and received valuable aid from her northern sister. Thus the Carolinas passed safely through that stern Indian struggle which came to most colonies when the savages realized the significance of the white man's advance into the interior.

**North
Carolina.**

**The Cary
Rebellion.**

**Indian Wars
in the Two
Carolinas.**

In 1729 seven of the proprietors sold their rights to the crown. The one remaining was Carteret, later Earl of Grenville. In 1743 he received in lieu of his rights as proprietor a broad belt of land in the northern part of North Carolina, to have in fee the ungranted parts and to collect the quitrents on the granted portion. This vast estate was not to be managed without serious trouble in a community in which the rights of feudal proprietors were not tenderly regarded. But the conversion of the two colonies into royal provinces was beneficial to their development.

Five royal governors ruled in North Carolina, and the pathway of each was strewn with thorns. The most continual quarrel was in regard to the payment of quitrents. These were a perpetual obligation imposed on land when first granted and to be paid by whomever owned the land. They do not mean that the grantee did not have fee-simple title, as has sometimes been assumed, but were in the nature of a permanent land tax. To pay them was irksome to the settlers, who found many ways of evasion. One difficulty was that they were payable in tobacco or other produce, and that the expense of collecting from small farmers ate up the value of the proceeds. To obviate this the governor ordered that quitrents be paid at certain specified places. The inhabitants protested, and a law passed the assembly to authorize payment at the home of the landowner, where most other rents were paid. The governor vetoed the bill, and a deadlock resulted. For many years the revenue from quitrents was very slender.

**The Quit-
rent Con-
troversy in
North
Carolina.**

Meanwhile, South Carolina grew in wealth through the cultivation of rice and indigo. Great numbers of negro slaves were imported, so that in 1719 there were 12,000 to a white population of 9000. The accumulation of wealth gave society an aristocratic tone, and Charleston became a seat of elegance and luxury. One result was to lessen respect for the weak authority of the proprietors, and about 1716 a series of reforms began. Hitherto all the elections were held in Charleston and all freemen were allowed to vote. It was claimed that persons in the interests of the proprietors thus controlled the elections, going so far as to allow Indians and non-resident sailors to vote in order to carry their cause. In 1716 the Indian war was just over. The proprietors had contributed nothing to the defense of the colony, and their influence in the assembly was low. The moment was favorable for election reforms, and a law passed directing that future elections be held in the parishes with a small property restriction for voters, thus shifting the center of power from the Charlestonians to the planter class. The same assembly decided to appoint its own receiver for taxes paid by the Indian traders. Both laws were promptly vetoed by the proprietors, together with a previous law levying duties. The people were in a rebellious mood, when news circulated of an expected attack from the Spanish in Florida. The governor called out the militia, who at once constituted themselves an army of revolt against the proprietary régime. New elections of the assembly had been held, and the members met, resolved themselves into a convention, after the example of the convention parliament of 1689, repudiated the authority of the proprietors, and asked the king to rule the colony as a royal province. The quickness with which the Board of Trade acceded to this request gives some strength to the suspicion that it connived at the revolution in the first instance. The proprietors, however, retained their rights to the land until the two colonies were sold to the king in 1729.

**Progress in
South
Carolina.**

**Overthrow
of Proprietary
Rule.**

**The Two
Carolinas
Compared.**

In its new capacity, South Carolina had peace, and developed in wealth. Great slave plantations became the rule, whereas in North Carolina small farms were prevalent. In 1717 the population of the two colonies was about 19,000 and 9000 respectively, in 1760 it was 100,000 and 93,000. Within this period the slave population grew from 12,000 to 70,000 in South Carolina and from an inconsiderable number, probably 1500, to 16,000 in North Carolina. The latter colony was ever noted for its democratic conditions. It had no good harbors and no staple products out of which riches could be gathered. It was a land of simple abundance and the refuge of those who wished to avoid the aristocratic conditions of the neighboring colonies.

GEORGIA FOUNDED

What Penn was to the Quaker colony General James Oglethorpe was to Georgia. As a member of parliament, philanthropist, and colony planter, few men of his day deserve more our respect. His sympathy was drawn to the inmates of the debtors' prisons, and he wished to plant a colony in which they might begin life anew. Many noblemen, clergymen, and others supported the plan, and in 1732 the king by charter created the Georgia "Trustees," a company to plant a colony between the Savannah river and Florida. The king and his advisers were opposed to proprietary governments in general, but they relaxed their opposition in this case because the new colony would make a "buffer" between South Carolina and the Spanish possessions. But as a matter of simple precaution it was provided that the charter should expire in twenty-one years, after which Georgia would become a royal province.

Oglethorpe.

The Colony of Georgia Projected.

The trustees lost no time in announcing their plans of settlement. Recent affairs in South Carolina showed that when slaves far exceeded the white population the capacity of defense was lessened, and it was determined to exclude slavery from Georgia. With an eye, also, to the character of the expected debtor immigrants it was provided that one person should own no more than 500 acres of land and that grants should be strictly entailed to male heirs, in default of which they should revert to the trustees. While these regulations may have been warranted by the conditions they were devised to meet, they could only discourage the immigration of normally competent persons. Every colony in America had an abundance of land for those who would take it, and a new colony in an exposed position could not expect to have settlers unless it offered liberal terms. The prohibition of slavery was well intended by the trustees, but it displeased the actual settlers, who sent to England urgent pleas for the repeal of the regulation. They saw how men prospered in South Carolina through slave labor and resented the arbitrary power which kept them from the same fortune.

In January, 1733, Oglethorpe, who was appointed governor, arrived in Charleston with the first Georgia colony, about one hundred men, women, and children. Indian treaties were made by which the Creeks, inhabiting the Georgia coast, ceded the site of Savannah and took the settlers for allies.

Georgia Settled.

Other English settlers came slowly; the trustees, like other proprietors of colonies, spent little money on the enterprise after the enthusiasm of launching it was gone. Only a small proportion of those who went over were debtors. In 1734 a company of Protestants from Salzburg arrived, and later on other Germans landed. Another source of popu-

lation was the Scotch Highlanders, who settled along the Altamaha. In 1760 the population was only 9000, of whom 3000 were slaves.

The colony was planted in defiance of Spain's claim to all the coast as far north as Charleston. Oglethorpe ignored her protests and challenged the Spaniards by erecting a fort at Frederica, the southern extremity of his charter limits. He even went so far as to found small posts as far as the St. John's river, within the bounds of Florida. So threatening became the situation that he went to England for assistance. He was authorized to raise a regiment, and returned to Georgia, 1738, with instructions not to fight until attacked. In 1739 began a war with Spain. Oglethorpe now marched against St. Augustine, but withdrew after a short siege. In 1742 the Spaniards retaliated by sending a strong expedition against Frederica. Oglethorpe had a force much inferior, but by utilizing favorable natural defenses drove off the invaders. The end of the war, 1748, found Georgia undisturbed by Spain, and thenceforth disappeared any doubts of the success of the new colony.

Now comes into greater prominence the protests of the settlers against the paternal restrictions of the well-intentioned trustees. George Whitfield, the missionary, who had founded an orphanage in Georgia, was one of those who urged the free admission of slaves. So strong was the cry of the objectors that one by one the restrictions were removed. In 1749 the importation of slaves was allowed, with certain safeguards as to the proportions of slave and free population. In 1750 the objectionable restrictions on land owning were removed, and at the same time the importation of rum, hitherto forbidden, was allowed. These relaxations gave greater freedom to individual enterprise, and the result was favorable.

The early government of Georgia was very paternal, as became a colony founded for the inmates of debtors' prisons. There was no assembly, laws were made by the trustees, resident in England, and the governor had extensive powers. When Oglethorpe at last went to England, 1743, a president and four assistants were left in charge. In 1751 an assembly was summoned. It was not to make laws, however, but to suggest them to the trustees. At this time Oglethorpe and his associates were discouraged with their attempts to govern men more wisely than they could govern themselves. In view of the approaching termination of their charter, 1753, they thought it well to surrender their authority over the colony. Thus Georgia became a royal province and prospered under a governor, council, and assembly.

Oglethorpe
and the
Spaniards.

Restrictions
Removed.

Government
in Georgia.

X

X

GROWTH OF NEW FRANCE

While the English gradually extended their agricultural settlements from the coast to the Alleghanies, France was establishing a less solid occupation in the Mississippi Basin. Her flag was carried forward by traders, who at wide intervals built forts occupied by small garrisons. Such occupancy did not alarm the natives. In fact, it pleased them; for the game was not driven away, and an abundance of manufactured goods and a convenient market for furs were assured. To maintain the forts was expensive, and if war should come, the defense of the vast region must be made by troops sent from Canada or France. The French power, therefore, was not so well rooted in the soil as that of England on the coast.

English and
French Colo-
nization.

The beginning of French colonization in America was in the sixteenth century, when Coligny, the Huguenot leader, made an unsuccessful attempt to establish in "Florida" a refuge for his coreligionists. In 1562 he sent out Ribaut, a bold mariner, to explore the coast and select a place for settlement. Ribaut was delighted with the country, and left thirty men at Port Royal harbor in a rude palisade, called "Charlefort" for Charles IX. Idleness and want soon brought them to mutiny, and they escaped to Europe in a boat of their own construction. Starving and reduced to cannibalism, they at last sighted the French shore, only to be made captives by an English vessel which happened to be near.

Coligny's
Colony in
"Florida."

Coligny was not discouraged, and in 1564 sent out a colony under Laudonnière. It settled at the mouth of St. John's river and built Fort Caroline, named, like its predecessor, in honor of the king. Hunger and discontent soon appeared, and the colony was on the verge of ruin when a second expedition brought supplies and restored the spirits of the people. What would have followed does not appear; for a greater danger than any hitherto encountered was at hand. The Spaniards of Cuba had heard of the settlement, and September 19, 1565, Pedro Menendez, with a strong Spanish force, surprised the fort and slew the Frenchmen who did not escape to the forest or declare themselves Catholics. Leaving a garrison on the site, he founded St. Augustine, fifty miles southward. The Florida coast commanded the route by which Spanish treasure ships returned from the Gulf of Mexico, and it was not to be left in the hands of a foreign power. News of Menendez's atrocities caused great commotion in France, and in the spring of 1568 Dominique de Gourgues appeared at Fort Caroline. He surprised the garrison, slew those who resisted, and hanged the prisoners. Over the slain Huguenots

Second
Colony, Fort
Caroline,
1564.

Menendez had put up this notice: "I do this not as to Frenchmen but as to Lutherans." De Gourgues left over the dangling bodies of the Spaniards this inscription: "I do this not as to Spaniards, nor as to Marranos, but as to traitors, robbers, and to murderers." But for all this St. Augustine continued to exist and Florida remained a Spanish colony.

In Canada, where Cartier's explorations, 1534, 1535, and 1541, had given France a claim by right of prior discovery, French colonization fared better. Fur traders continued to visit the St. Lawrence, but no other impetus toward planting settlements was seen until the region came under the eyes of Champlain, who arrived as the guest of a trader in 1603. From that time his interest was keenly aroused.

The next year he returned with De Monts, who had a charter to plant a colony in La Cadie, or Acadia, as the French had called the region from northern Nova Scotia to Philadelphia. A settlement made at Douchet Island proved unsatisfactory, and the colonists moved

to the neighborhood of Annapolis, where they managed to withstand the cold and perils of the forest for many years. De Monts, however, was discouraged, and withdrew from the undertaking. But Champlain's zeal was unabated. What he had seen only made him love the long stretches of shore and forest along which he sailed for many a day. In 1608 he returned to

plant a trading colony at Quebec, which his discerning eye selected as the key to the St. Lawrence valley. Fur trading supported his colony, but his adventurous spirit

sought other fields. The Indians around him, Algonquins, were at feud with the Iroquois, and Champlain was induced to aid them. Early in 1609 he, with two other whites, joined a war party going southward. He eventually reached the lake which now has his name, and on its shore a battle was fought. As the Iroquois advanced across a plain, Champlain in full armor showed himself, shot two Indians dead, and wounded another. A third was killed by one of the other whites, and the savages fled. From that time the French

settlements in Canada had the hostility of the powerful Iroquois Confederacy. Champlain had naturally thought best to make friends with the Indians among whom he had settled, and for many years his action produced no bad results; but there came a time when the French wished to extend their influence into the region now known as western New York, and were prevented by Iroquoian hostility. By this small occurrence in 1609 the eastern and southern shores of Lakes Ontario and Erie were kept out of French hands and made accessible at the proper time to the English-speaking people.

New France, as the St. Lawrence region was now called, grew slowly. It was only a series of trading posts, and so little concerned

with agriculture that in 1628, when war interrupted communication with Europe, only one family in Quebec had raised enough food to support it through the winter. In 1660 there were 3000 white settlers, including the fishing posts in Acadia. In 1629 Quebec was taken by the English, but Charles I restored it to France. Champlain died at Quebec in 1635.

Slow
Growth of
New France.

It was about this time that the Jesuits turned their attention to Canada. They proposed to convert and civilize the Indians, and thus establish French power in the Lake region while they delivered into French hands an immense fur trade. With the Algonquins on the St. Lawrence they were easily successful: then they sent missions to the Hurons, on the shores of the lake which now bears their name, and here, after some delays, they also succeeded. With the Iroquois they could, for a long time, make no headway. It is not probable that an Indian nation under French influence, however civilized, could have kept the English permanently out of the region south of Lake Erie; and it is certain that the Iroquois, through their hostility to everything French, defeated the hopes of the Jesuits and made easier the progress of the English. But the work of the priests commands our esteem. They went without hesitation into the most dangerous places, giving up their lives as readily to torture as to disease. Their "Relations," reports of their experiences, were published contemporaneously in France and stimulated popular interest in Canada, while for posterity they are a valuable source of knowledge of Indian life. On the savages themselves the missionaries exerted a good influence. The tendency to make war continually was lessened, the most barbarous forms of torturing captives disappeared, and their general antipathy toward the whites was softened. On the other hand, the power of the Jesuits was used to promote French dominion, and some of the most cruel raids against the New England frontier were instigated by priests.

Plans of
the Jesuits.

Let us now turn to the Iroquois, for many years the foes of the Jesuits. Five nations, the Mohawks on the east, and next in order, the Oneidas, Onondagas, Cayugas, and Senecas made up the Confederacy. A sixth nation, the Tuscaroras, of North Carolina, did not join the Confederacy until 1713. In the time of Champlain the strength of the Iroquois was about 2500 warriors; but superior central organization, with the courage of the men, made it the most powerful Indian organization of the North Atlantic coast. The wars against the French and the Algonquins were usually led by the Mohawks, those against the Hurons by the Senecas. By 1650 the Hurons were broken and dispersed, and by 1750 the Iroquoian authority through a series of wars was imposed in a loose way over all the western tribes as far as Lake Michigan, the Illinois, and the Mississippi, and southward to the northern

Power of
the Iroquois.

limits of the present states of Mississippi and Alabama. Armed by the Dutch, the Mohawks and neighboring nations made life wretched for the French and Algonquins on the St. Lawrence. In 1665 Louis XIV sent a fine regiment to America to chastise this fierce enemy. In two fruitless expeditions it destroyed some villages which the inhabitants had abandoned, and only succeeded in stimulating the Mohawks' hatred of France. At this time (1664) New York passed into English hands. Its new masters early appreciated the importance of Iroquoian friendship, and in 1684, in a memorable treaty at Albany, induced them to acknowledge themselves English subjects.

Iroquois and the English.

Governor Dongan, of New York, thereupon informed the governor of Canada that the province of New York included the Iroquois lands, and caused the arms of the Duke of York to be affixed to walls of the Iroquois towns. The reply was a French invasion which accomplished nothing. For the time it was believed that the French would make a determined attempt against New York, which was not able to offer serious resistance. It was partly to have a consolidated force strong enough to meet this danger that James II created the short-lived Dominion of New England. France and England were now keenly alive to the importance of their American possessions, and their wars for the next seventy years always kindled the conflict on the American frontier. But that part of our story must be deferred while we consider the extension of French authority in the Mississippi valley.

The missionaries to the Hurons were the first Frenchmen to have knowledge of the rich country beyond Lake Erie. Though driven out of it by the dispersion of the Indians, they kept alive the knowledge of its wonders. In 1673 Father Marquette, member of the indomitable society, and Joliet, a trader, going through this country, came to the Wisconsin river, down which they took their canoes until they came to the Mississippi, which they followed to the mouth of the Arkansas. They desired to reach the salt sea, but prudently turned back lest they fall into Spanish hands and knowledge of their discovery perish with them.

Marquette and Joliet.

What they failed to do was achieved by La Salle, one of the most intrepid of the French explorers. He wished to organize the fur trade on the lakes, and from the profits carry on extensive discoveries in the region beyond. A license was obtained from the king, and money was subscribed by friends, but the opposition of Quebec merchants and the Jesuits was a severe impediment. Before complete ruin overtook his scheme he set out in December, 1681, to follow the "Great River" of Marquette and Joliet to the sea. With him were Tonti, a faithful friend, and fifty-three others, Frenchmen and Indians. From Lake Michigan they ascended the Chicago to its source and thence by portage to the Illinois, down which they reached the Mississippi, and April 6 they passed out one of its sluggish

La Salle.

mouths to the Gulf of Mexico. The Indians were friendly and assured La Salle that he was the first white man to explore the river ; he took possession of its banks in the name of the king of France. News of his achievement aroused enthusiasm in France, and in 1684 he set out with a colony and four ships, fitted out by the king, to settle at the mouth of the Mississippi. After many hardships he landed on the Texas coast, whence he started overland to find the river he had traversed and to communicate with Tonti, whom he expected to arrive from Canada. In the interior he was murdered by his own men, 1687, and of his followers only a few survived starvation on the great plains or escaped the hands of the Spaniards.

His Death.

La Salle's unfinished work was taken up in 1698 by d'Iberville and his brother, Bienville, both notable men in New France. In January, 1699, they arrived by sea and planted a trading post at Biloxi, on the mainland near the mouth of the river. Bienville was governor, and the country was called Louisiana, for Louis XIV. For many years the fate of the place seemed doubtful. The Indian trade was engrossed by the English and Spaniards, and the colonists were not inclined to become agriculturists. In 1712 the monopoly of the Louisiana trade was granted for fifteen years to Crozat, but he managed it so badly that it yielded small returns. Five years later the colony, including trade privileges and the ownership of ungranted lands, passed into the hands of Law's Mississippi Company. Its immense possibilities, which were carefully exploited by the adventurers, gave a basis of confidence to the company ; but the final collapse was certain. Before it came, however, New Orleans was founded, 1718, and became the seat of government of Louisiana. In 1731 the company gave up its rights, and the colony was thenceforth governed by the crown. It had no popular assembly, but the authority was in the hands of a governor with local courts, from the decisions of which appeal lay to the king. The population grew slowly, and by the middle of the century it was not more than six thousand, one third being slaves. At this time St. Louis, Natchez, and several other interior posts had been established.

Louisiana
Settled,
1699.

THE FRENCH AND INDIAN WARS

Three great Frenchmen influenced the history of New France late in the seventeenth century, — Louis XIV, Colbert, his minister, and Frontenac, twice governor of Canada, 1672 to 1682 and 1689 until his death in 1698. The first and second acted together, creating in 1664 a consolidated company with trade monopoly for all the French colonies. To it the king offered bounties for all goods exported or imported and generous assistance in the

Colonial
Policy.

early years of the enterprise. To encourage infant industries liberal grants were made, immigration was stimulated, marriage was encouraged, and large families were rewarded in many ways. Louis XIV watched eagerly the reports of Canadian population. They could have given him little comfort for all he had spent, since in 1679 the colony contained but 9400 whites, and there were only 6983 horned cattle, 719 sheep, and 145 horses. Colbert died in 1683, but his policy in Canada was continued.

Frontenac was chiefly notable for his ability in dealing with the Iroquois. In 1673 he made a treaty with them and built a fort where Kingston now stands. He said that with a vessel on Lake Erie and a fort on the Niagara he could now control the upper lakes. The ship, the *Griffon*, was built by La Salle, but was wrecked on her first voyage. Frontenac supported La Salle's trading enterprise and thus incurred the opposition of the Quebec traders, whose profits were affected. He also incurred the hostility of the Jesuits, whose power by this time was overwhelming. Combining their efforts, his enemies secured his removal in 1682. His successors renewed the war with the Iroquois, who were thus thrown back on the English for support.

By this time the French were aware of the vast possibilities of the interior parts of North America. Of the three river valleys that conduct thither they held two, the St. Lawrence and the Mississippi, and it seemed necessary to seize the other, the Hudson, ere it was able to defy them. To do so would cut the English settlements in twain and go far toward expelling English authority from the continent. Moreover, the opportunity to realize these plans seemed to come when in 1689 France began war with England on account of the overthrow of James II by William of Orange.

Her first care was to send Frontenac back to Canada as governor, and he immediately turned his attention to winning over the Iroquois.

In order to impress them with French prowess he sent three expeditions against the English frontier. February 9, 1690, a force of Frenchmen and Indians surprised Schenectady, near Albany, slew 60 whites and led away 27 captives. The second force attacked and destroyed the village of Salmon Falls, New Hampshire, and the third took Fort Loyal, where Portland, Maine, now stands. Each of these affairs was conducted with much cruelty, and cries for vengeance arose from all the northern colonies. A congress of delegates from Massachusetts, Connecticut, Plymouth, and New York convened in May, 1690, and planned a retaliatory expedition to take Quebec. It was agreed that New York and Connecticut should raise an army and attack Montreal by way of Lake

**Louis XIV
and Colbert.**

**Frontenac's
Plans.**

**France
Desires the
Hudson.**

**King Wil-
liam's War,
1690-1697.**

**Frontenac's
Raids.**

Champlain. Massachusetts was asked to coöperate by sending a naval force against Quebec. To this request her delegates would not positively agree. At that moment a fleet of her armed merchantmen, under the command of Sir William Phips, was engaged in an expedition against Port Royal, in Acadia, a nest from which had gone forth many privateers. Soon Phips appeared in Boston laden with booty and reporting that Port Royal had been subdued and its inhabitants forced to take oaths of loyalty to William and Mary. So great was the enthusiasm that the colony decided to send a strong force against Quebec, believing that a bold stroke would end the French peril in that quarter once for all.

A Counter-stroke Planned.

Capture of Port Royal.

While Massachusetts made ready her attack, the army of the other colonies had assembled and set out for Montreal. Dissension appeared, smallpox was discovered, the Iroquois allies did not keep their promises, and the expedition was abandoned at Lake Champlain. After many delays Phips started for Quebec August 9, 1690. He had no pilot who knew the St. Lawrence, and as he groped his way through its course news of his movements was carried to Frontenac, who barely had time to collect his forces at Quebec, most of them having been drawn off to Montreal to meet the expected attack there. The Massachusetts men landed 1200 strong and laid siege to the town. Their commander lacked the ability of his opponent, and soon disease and discouragement reigned in the army. Cold weather now approached, and it was decided to return to Boston. Had Phips acted vigorously at first, it is probable that the town would have been taken. The expedition cost the colony dearly both in money and in the men who died from disease.

Failure of the Counter-stroke.

The war now waged was called in the colonies "King William's War." It lasted until 1697, when peace came with the Treaty of Ryswick between France and England. No large expedition marked the further course of the struggle on either side in America, but Indian forays were continuous.

Indian Raids.

The New England borders, from Northampton to Pemaquid, suffered severely. In 1697 Haverhill was captured with scenes of bloodshed. One of the captives was Hannah Dustin. Led away toward Canada, she watched her opportunity, slew her captors, and escaped to her friends. Her achievement was long a source of inspiration to the frontier women of America. During this war the Iroquois suffered severely at the hands of the French. Two strong expeditions were sent against them by Frontenac, and it was reported by the French that their fighting men were reduced to half their former number. In 1694 they were willing to make peace with France, but Frontenac refused unless the Indian allies of the French were included,—terms the Iroquois would not accept. In maintaining the good will of these savages the services of Peter

Results of the War.

Schuyler, of Albany, were most valuable to the English. The treaty of peace left affairs as they were at the beginning of the war.

In 1701 began the War of the Spanish Succession, whose American phase was called "Queen Anne's War." During the interval of peace the French had made a treaty with the Iroquois. A further peaceful influence was the conversion of a large portion of the Mohawks and their removal to the vicinity of Montreal. Thus Vaudreuil, governor of Canada, was able for several years to preserve friendship with this powerful confederacy, and in consequence the New York border did not suffer in Queen Anne's War as formerly. It was otherwise with New England. The Abenakis, who lived on this frontier, were under the influence of the missionaries, and faithful to France. The governor used them to harass the settlements, and their captives were turned over to the missionaries for conversion to Catholicism.

Every portion of this frontier suffered, but the severest blow was at Deerfield, February, 1704. Fifty Canadians and two hundred Indians fell on the place on a bitterly cold night, scaled the palisade before they could be discovered, and killed the inhabitants from house to house. Fifty-three whites perished during the night and one hundred and eleven were carried away through the frozen forests, among them Rev. John Williams and his family. Seventeen of the prisoners were killed on the march because they could not keep up with their captors, and others died of hunger. Mrs. Williams died in the former way, but the husband and children reached Canada safely. After futile efforts to force him to conversion he was purchased by the governor from his Indian master, and in later years he and the survivors were ransomed by their friends in New England. Many "New England Captives" refused to return when the opportunity offered. Of this class was Eunice Williams, daughter of the Deerfield minister. Converted to Catholicism and married to an Indian husband, she clung to her new home and religion.

England was by this time convinced of the importance of taking Canada, and made plans for a joint English and colonial expedition for that purpose. In 1710 a fleet appeared in Boston, where it was joined by a body of colonial troops and succeeded in taking Port Royal, whose name was changed to Annapolis. From that time Acadia was a British possession. In 1711 a still larger fleet appeared, commanded by Admiral Sir Hovenden Walker. On board was an army under John Hill, brother of Queen Anne's favorite, Mrs. Masham. This force, after receiving recruits in Boston, numbered 12,000 men, and should have taken Quebec with ease. But the admiral would not trust his French pilots, and ran on the rocks near the mouth of the St. Lawrence, with a loss of ten

**Queen
Anne's War,
1701-1713.**

**Deerfield
Raided.**

**Port Royal
Taken.**

**Failure of
Sir Hoven-
den Walker.**

ships and 900 men. With this he lost heart and abandoned the expedition.

In this war Spain was allied with France, and for that reason war began between her colonies and South Carolina. The initiative was with the Spaniards of Florida, who in 1702 armed a large number of Indians for a hostile movement. Before they could attack they were severely defeated by a body of Indians raised by the South Carolinians, who then attacked St. Augustine, burned the town, but failed to capture the fort held by a Spanish garrison. Next year they raided the Florida plantations, doing much damage. In 1706 the Spaniards retaliated with a large French and Spanish fleet and a strong landing party sent out from Havana to take Charleston. It met a stout resistance from Governor Nathaniel Johnson and the colonial army. An attempt to land was beaten back and the invading fleet was attacked so vigorously by a flotilla of Carolina craft that it departed. A French man-of-war which anchored in a neighboring bay was surrounded and taken. In this spirited defense of their chief city the South Carolinians showed great courage, and it is likely that with the aid of a small English force they could have destroyed Spanish power in Florida.

South
Carolina
and Florida.

By this time England and France, with their allies, were tired of the war, and peace was made at Utrecht, 1713. As to America, the terms were: (1) England was to have Acadia, whose boundaries, however, were not defined; (2) the Iroquois were acknowledged as English subjects, but their boundaries also were not defined; (3) Newfoundland was ceded to England, but the French might dry fish on a part of the coast; and (4) the Hudson Bay region was to be English territory. This was the first important treaty in which the affairs of English America figured, and Professor Channing well says it may be regarded as the beginning of the diplomatic history of the United States.

The Treaty
of Utrecht,
1713.

Acadia now became the royal province of Nova Scotia. Its possession by the British meant much for the New England fisheries. The Hudson Bay clause, also, had special significance. Fifty years earlier Groseillier and Radisson, two Frenchmen excluded from the fur trade by the system of monopolies in existence in Canada, learned that the Canadian north-west could be approached from the great bay of the north. After futile efforts to get financial support in Boston and Paris, they got help from a group of English nobles, among them Prince Rupert, cousin of the king. The result was a charter for the Hudson Bay Company, 1670. Thus was founded the great commercial organization which has worked so mightily to extend British influence in the northern parts of the continent. It received its guarantee of

The Hud-
son Bay
Company.

territorial development in the Treaty of Utrecht. Still another feature of this treaty which was important to the colonies was the clause known as the "Assiento," by which English merchants had for thirty years the monopoly of the slave trade in Spanish America. Out of the firm development of this trade English colonial slavery as well as colonial trade was to get an added impetus.

To make good the loss of Port Royal, France now built a strong fortress on Cape Breton Island, calling it Louisburg. This evident determination to perpetuate her influence in that region convinced the English authorities that further trouble was to be expected on the frontier. The expectation was realized when the War of the Austrian Succession began in 1744. In this struggle England and France were again on opposite sides, and hostilities at once began in America, where the conflict is known as "King George's War." It was hardly begun before Governor Shirley, of Massachusetts, and his associates were laying plans to take Louisburg. Indeed, they could hardly do otherwise; for the place harbored so many privateers that New England fishermen and traders were reduced to dire distress.

For this expedition New England raised 4000 men who sailed from Boston on March 24, 1745, under the command of William Pepperell, a rich merchant of Kittery, Maine. He found Louisburg insufficiently garrisoned and supplied, and a British fleet arriving at that time in the Gulf of Newfoundland served to keep French reinforcements from the beleaguered fort. After forty days of siege Pepperell received the surrender of the stronghold. The news of this colonial achievement caused an outbreak of surprise and joy in England, and for his part in it the commander was made a baronet. In France it caused bewilderment and dismay. Two expeditions were sent to retake Louisburg, but the first, 1746, returned on account of storms and the death of the commander, and the second, 1747, was driven back by a British fleet. In 1746 Shirley organized a strong land expedition against Canada, but it was disbanded by the English authorities, who needed elsewhere the regulars Shirley expected to use. In 1748 the war ended in the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle. Louisburg was unwisely restored to France, and an attempt was made to soothe New England's disappointment by a donation of money which partly repaid her expenses in the war.

The

"Assiento."

King

George's

War. 1745-

1748.

Louisburg.

Louisburg

Taken.

Results of

the War.

THE LAST CONFLICT BETWEEN THE ENGLISH AND THE FRENCH IN
NORTH AMERICA

No one who knew the conditions in America believed that the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle settled the differences between England and France. In fact, every year brought the settlements of the two powers closer together, and in doing so increased the probability of war. A series of posts from the upper Mississippi to the lakes through the Wabash valley marked a continuous line of travel; and in 1749, the year after the treaty was signed, the governor of Canada sent C  loron de Bienville with 214 white men and a force of Indians to take possession of the Ohio valley. In token of their pretensions they planted leaden plates from Lake Chautauqua down the Alleghany and the Ohio and up the Great Miami, including a portion of the undisputed territory of the Iroquois. On the journey they met several bands of English traders, whom they ordered out of the country. In the same year several Virginians, among them Lawrence and Augustine Washington, brothers of the future president of the republic, secured a royal grant for 200,000 acres of land south of the Ohio and between the Monongahela and Kanawha. About the same time a still larger tract was secured by the Loyal Land Company to be located beyond the mountains, probably in Tennessee or Kentucky. These two movements, French and English, brought the two rival nations into close proximity in a region which each regarded as the key to the control of the interior. A clash could hardly be avoided.

French and
English in
the Ohio
Valley.

If additional motive was necessary, it was to be found in Indian relations in the lower part of the great valley. In the southern Appalachians lived the Cherokees, a strong and progressive nation. From the seventeenth century the Virginia traders visited it, but with the settlement of Carolina its rich trade was absorbed by the merchants of Charleston.

Conflicting
Interests in
the South.

When Georgia was settled Augusta became a strong rival of Charleston. This shifting of the Cherokee trade from place to place has nothing to do with the conflict for the Mississippi valley, but it well shows the progress of industrial distribution. In 1730 the English made a treaty with the Cherokees, taking them under British protection. South of them were the Creeks, another powerful nation, and westward on the Mississippi the Chickasaws and Choctaws. With these latter tribes the English had traded also, but the Spaniards disputed with them the trade of the Creeks, and after the settlement of Biloxi, New Orleans, and Mobile (1710) the French became competitors for it. They made treaties with the three last-mentioned nations, and what was the horror of the Englishmen to learn that active efforts were being made to win the Cherokees. If France

could establish a firm influence over these western tribes, it was clear she would be in a strong position to exclude any rival power not only from the western trade but from pretensions at sovereignty as well.

But let us return to events in the Ohio valley. Four years after Bienville's journey, *i.e.* in 1753, Duquesne, the governor of Canada, sent 1000 men to the same region. They constructed **The Forks of the Ohio.** a road thirteen miles long from Presque Isle, now Erie, to the Rivière aux Bœufs, tributary of the Allegheny, where they built Fort Le Bœuf, and about forty miles southward they built Fort Machault on the Allegheny. Whither this tended was easy to see, and Governor Dinwiddie, of Virginia, sent a protest by the hands of George Washington, a young man of twenty-one years whose character had already won the confidence of all who knew him. The region occupied, so said the protest, was in Virginia, and the governor of Canada was told to vacate it. The commandant at Fort de Bœuf forwarded the letter to Governor Duquesne, and Washington returned by a most difficult journey to Virginia. On the way he met a party going into the wilderness to build a trading fort at the junction of the Allegheny and Monongahela rivers, a critical point which the French advance had not yet reached. They had hardly accomplished their purpose when a large French force descended the Allegheny in canoes, took the fort, and enlarged and strengthened it, changing the name to Fort Duquesne. This happened in April, 1754.

At Will's Creek (Cumberland, Md.) the expelled English garrison met Washington, now lieutenant colonel, whom Governor Dinwiddie had sent forward with 300 men to strengthen the garrison **The French Successful.** at the forks of the Ohio. The task assigned was beyond his present strength, but Washington determined to go forward and open and hold a road by which a larger party could drive out the French. With great difficulty he cut a road across the mountains, and came late in May to Great Meadows, fifty miles from Will's Creek. Learning from friendly Indians that a French detachment had marched to meet him, he surprised and defeated it, May 28. The French explained afterwards that the detachment, whose leader, Jumonville, was killed, merely came to warn the English out of the country. The affair was followed by a movement in force against the colonial army. Washington built a rude work, Fort Necessity, and met the attack as well as he could, hoping to hold out until reinforcements arrived. His efforts were futile, and July 4 he surrendered the place, marching out with the honors of war.

The war which was thus begun had been foreseen by the British government, who in 1753 ordered the governors of certain colonies to hold a conference with the Iroquois and devise a plan of common defense. Accordingly the Albany congress met June 19, 1754,

with delegates present from New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut, New York, Pennsylvania, and Maryland. Washington was then facing defeat beyond the Alleghanies, and the congress took up the large phases of the situation. To meet the crisis, united action was demanded, and the meeting adopted a plan of union furnished by Benjamin Franklin, one of the delegates, who, however, acted for a committee appointed to consider the subject. It provided for a federal council of delegates from each colony, to meet annually, and to have among other federal powers the right to lay taxes, enact laws, raise armies, appoint officials, and manage Indian affairs. In the general state of colonial jealousy then existing it was impossible that the colonies should accept a scheme which took from them so much of their own authority. The plan was rejected by the assemblies, to which it was referred, and it found little favor in England. Franklin justly said it had too much self-government to please the king and too much prerogative to please the assemblies.

The Albany Congress, 1754.

Meanwhile, an elaborate attack on Canada was prepared in England, although war with France was not yet declared. While a fleet under Boscawen lurked around the mouth of the St. Lawrence to intercept ships taking troops to Quebec, colonial expeditions were to seize the frontier posts. Boscawen allowed the prize to slip through his fingers, and of the other attempts only that of Braddock demands our attention. This brave but headstrong officer, with two

The French and Indian War begun, Boscawen's Orders.

British regiments, arrived in the Potomac in March, 1755, and prepared to move from Will's Creek on Fort Duquesne. He was joined by 450 Virginia militia under Washington, the entire army being thus about 2000 strong. Widening and extending Washington's road, his advance reached Turtle Creek, eight miles from Duquesne, on July 9. As the troops marched through an opening in the forest they encountered a heavy fire from each side of the road. The Virginians leaped into the bushes and fired from behind whatever cover they found. Braddock, coming up, swore at them loudly, and when some of his regulars sought to fight like the Virginians, he beat them back into the ranks. In close formation in the middle of a glade they fired into the forest whence came the enemy's fire, and in doing so killed some of the militia. On the other hand, they made an excellent target for the foe, and fell rapidly. Braddock rode everywhere with the greatest coolness, but his efforts were unavailing, and when he finally received a mortal wound he had just given the order to retreat. Washington, who had been in the thickest of the fight, took command and led the men to the rear. Of the 1200 men in the advance body 877 were killed or wounded. The attacking party, led by Beaujeu, who was killed in the fight, contained no more than 254 whites and 600 Indians,

Braddock's Expedition.

and the latter went home with their booty after the battle. At Duquesne all was confusion, and the 1100 men still left in the English army might have taken the place. But Dunbar, who now took command, fled to Philadelphia, burning his wagons and destroying a large quantity of powder. This disaster was followed by Indian outrages, Braddock's road making such operations easy to the savages.

While Braddock played his part in western Pennsylvania, fighting also occurred in New York. William Johnson marched with about 3000 men to take the position at Crown Point, commanding the road from Lake George to Lake Champlain.

The French sent Dieskau with an equal force to oppose him. At Lake George, September 8, the French advance attacked a part of Johnson's force and was beaten off after a hot engagement. Johnson gained much credit and was made a baronet for his part in the battle, although he was wounded early in the day and the command was taken by Phineas Lyman, of Connecticut, a better soldier. But Johnson's victory was the only success of the year, and the government felt constrained to give it prominence. An expedition by which Governor Shirley attempted to take Fort Niagara failed completely, partly because Braddock's defeat prevented an expected coöperation, and partly because it was impossible to bring up supplies to support a large army on the western border of New York.

In the same year occurred the removal of the Acadians. The governor of Nova Scotia was alarmed at their attitude, since they insisted on being "neutrals" in the impending war and refused to take an unconditional oath of allegiance to England. He called on Governor Shirley, of Massachusetts, who sent 2000 volunteers, with whose aid Fort Beausejour was taken. Then it was decided to remove the French Acadians forcibly and distribute them among the colonies to the southward. The decision was carried out with great suffering. Many of the exiles escaped from their new homes, some going to Louisiana, others to Canada, and others returning to Nova Scotia. The sad tragedy has received its most popular rendering in Longfellow's "Evangeline." The attitude of the Acadians toward the British government was reprehensible, but not enough so to justify the punishment they received.

In 1756 began the Seven Years' War in Europe, England joining Prussia against France and Austria. This was two years after fighting had begun in America, where the struggle is known as the French and Indian War. The British ministry was led at first by Newcastle, who thought only of patronage and speculation, and their conduct of the war was weak. A new ministry created in 1756 could do little more, although Pitt was in it in a secondary position. Finally there was such a popular demand for this firm and patriotic leader that in 1757 he was

**Fighting in
New York.**

**Removal
of the
Acadians.**

**Beginning
of the Seven
Years' War.**

given full control of the war policy, while Newcastle, one of the Pelhams, maintained the control of home affairs. Frederick the Great said, when he heard of the appointment: "England has long been in labor, and at last she has brought forth a man."

Meanwhile, the years 1756 and 1757 were full of misfortunes in America. where Loudon, a weak product of the Pelham régime, commanded. In 1756 Oswego was taken, and in 1757 an expedition against Louisburg failed, while a French army under Montcalm took Fort William Henry at the southern end of Lake George, and perhaps only the withdrawal of his Indian allies saved from capture Fort Edward, on the upper Hudson. Out of the discouragement consequent on these events the colonies were raised by the news that Pitt was in full power, and that arms, ammunition, and provisions would be furnished by the king for any troops the colonies would raise. The response was excellent, and soon every colony north of the Potomac was filled with busy preparations for war.

Disasters of
1756 and
1757.

Four principal campaigns came out of this activity in America. The first was against Louisburg, now greatly strengthened and defended by 3000 regulars with twelve warships anchored in the harbor. Before the place appeared in the summer of 1758 forty-one British men-of-war and 11,000 regulars with a small force of provincials. Jeffrey Amherst was in command, and one of his brigadiers was James Wolfe. In a severe bombardment the French fleet was burned, the walls of the fort were pierced, and the garrison was forced to surrender. In 1749 Halifax had been founded as a seat of English power on the northern coast, and in view of its development Louisburg ceased to be important. Lest it again fall into enemy hands it was demolished in 1760.

Louisburg
Captured.

The second campaign was made to take Fort Duquesne and relieve Pennsylvania, Maryland, and Virginia from Indian raids. The task was assigned to General Forbes with 1200 Highlanders and nearly 5000 militia from Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia, and North Carolina. The advance was slow, partly because the commander was ill and partly because he believed that the French Indians would become impatient and desert the force at Duquesne. As winter approached he heard that just this had happened. Hurrying forward with an advance guard of 2500 he found the fort deserted and its works blown up, November 25, 1758. The French had fled. Three months earlier Colonel Bradstreet had destroyed Fort Frontenac, commanding Lake Ontario. The fugitives from Forbes' vengeance were thus cut off from Canada and dispersed into the wilderness. From these two blows collapsed all that network of posts France established in the Ohio valley, and those which were on or south of the western lakes were left mostly to their own resources. The fort at the forks of the

Fort
Duquesne
Taken.

Ohio was now named Fort Pitt, in honor of the minister who made its capture possible.

The year 1758 thus saw the Canadian frontier defenses carried at the two extremes, Louisburg and Duquesne. An attack made on its center, along the Hudson-Lake-Champlain line of approach, was a failure. For the command Abercromby, a political favorite, was selected against the wishes of Pitt; but it was hoped that his inefficiency would be overbalanced by his second in command, George Howe, as capable and popular a soldier as then served the king. Abercromby gathered his forces, 15,000 strong, at Lake George, and July 4, 1758, advanced against Ticonderoga. Next day an attempted ambushade was beaten off, but with the loss of Howe's life. From this time things went badly. July 8, the British general fought a long and hard battle under the walls of the fort, and at the end withdrew with a loss of 1944. He had been repulsed by a force one fourth as large as his own, and yet he fled rapidly to his boats. The demoralization of his army was only relieved by Bradstreet's capture of Frontenac a few weeks later.

At this point let us consider affairs in Canada, where three men were to mar or make the country's fortune. In 1756 the Marquis de Montcalm, an excellent soldier and a cultured gentleman, arrived in Quebec with a commission to command all the forces in Canada. His coming disappointed Vaudreuil, the governor, who did not relish a diminution of his own authority. Over his head scowled the dark face of Bigot, intendant and head of finances. Convinced that neither the irresolute governor nor the brave general could save Canada from the British, he hastened the course of his peculations in the conviction that the approaching cataclysm would destroy the evidences of guilt. He seems to have induced the governor to share the spoils, and the consequent corruption in civil affairs was a source of embarrassment to the honest and patriotic Montcalm. It cut off the supplies needed for the army, increased the expenses of the war, and made it difficult to get recruits. All the while the jealous governor did not cease to try to discredit the general with the authorities at home. Montcalm, disgusted with the situation, was on the point of resigning when Forts Duquesne and Frontenac were lost and he then felt that honor demanded that he stay in Canada. His army at the time it was largest consisted of 4000 French and 2500 Canadian regulars, with 5000 colonial militia. Besides these, all able-bodied men in New France might be called into service when needed. The Indian allies rarely mustered more than 1000.

In 1759 Pitt sent out two strong expeditions. Wolfe, with 9000 men and a powerful fleet was to attack Quebec by the St. Lawrence, and Amherst, with 11,000, was to move on the same place by way of Lake Champlain. Supporting Amherst, 5000 men under Colonel Prideaux were sent

**Operations
Planned for
1759.**

against Fort Niagara. This post was easily taken, and Oswego was rebuilt, reëstablishing complete English control of Lake Ontario. Amherst's expedition reached Lake George in June, whereupon the French abandoned Ticonderoga and Crown Point. Following their retreat northward he found them strongly placed at Isle aux Noix, commanding the entrance of the Richelieu, and was not able to take the position on account of the approach of winter. On Wolfe, therefore, fell the burden of the attack on Quebec. For that work his army was designed to be strong enough for complete success even if it acted independently. France, now engaged on every side in Europe, had no troops available for Canada. Montcalm, harassed by enemies at his own side, was forced to prepare for the impending conflict with no other outside assistance than 500 fresh troops and a small supply of provisions. Advised of the coming of Wolfe, he gathered at Quebec all the men available, 15,000 white men and 1000 Indians, and held himself ready for the onslaught.

The British expedition was before Quebec by June 26. Before him Wolfe saw a rocky peninsula, at the end of which was the town. The crest of the bluff was well fortified, and across the neck of land above the town a strong line of intrenchments was drawn. To assault the place from the water front or in the rear seemed futile. In fact, it was a prevalent opinion that Quebec was impregnable, and to starve it into submission was difficult, because winter operations were impossible. Wolfe realized these disadvantages, but landed his many cannon on points of vantage and opened a bombardment. At the end of two months the buildings in the town had been badly damaged, but the French hold was not relaxed. The delay, however, discouraged the provincial troops, many of whom went home. The approach of winter warned the British that they must complete their work or withdraw, and Wolfe decided to attack the town from the high ground behind it. On the night of September 12, he managed to find a way to the Plains of Abraham, a mile and a half from Quebec, and by the morning of the 13th 4500 troops were drawn up ready to assault the defenses. Montcalm hurried forward with a force of about equal size. Thinking only a small portion of Wolfe's men confronted him, he drew up his troops in line of battle in order to drive the British into the river. Had he retired into his own lines he might have held out until the November frosts forced the British to withdraw. The battle that followed was hard volley against hard volley, and lasted only a few minutes. Some of the Frenchmen were recruits whose wavering threw the rest into confusion, and then the whole line broke for the cover of the fortifications, followed by the English, whose energy made the pursuit a complete victory. At the moment the flight began, both Wolfe and Montcalm fell, mortally wounded. Governor Vaudreuil, in consternation, withdrew hastily to Montreal, and four

The
Strength of
Quebec. ✓

The Plains
of Abraham.

days later, September 17, the garrison he left behind surrendered to the British.

When winter began, Quebec was occupied by 7000 British troops under General Murray, illy prepared to face the bitter cold. Hardship and illness reduced this force by the end of April to 3000 effective. Down on them now came Lévis, the successor of Montcalm, who had collected the fragments of French military power to the number of 12,000. April 28 Murray gave battle on the Plains of Abraham and was forced back into his lines with a loss of a third of his force engaged. His position seemed desperate when the arrival of British frigates with supplies restored hope and enabled him to drive off Lévis, who now gave his attention to the defense of Montreal, the last French stronghold in Canada.

His utmost efforts in this respect were soon demanded, for three expeditions were being prepared to overwhelm him. One under Amherst was to assemble at Oswego and proceed down Lake Ontario and the St. Lawrence, another under Haviland was to advance by way of Lake Champlain, and a third was to be led by Murray up the St. Lawrence from Quebec. The three expeditions were to arrive at Montreal at the same time, and if the plans did not miscarry could be expected to put an end to French rule in New France. The story of American operations against Canada is full of the failure of coöperation where supporting movements had been proposed, but for once we come to the exception. August 24, 1760, Murray was eighteen miles below Montreal, and took such a strong position that he was safe against an attack in detail. September 6 both Haviland and Amherst arrived before the town, and with the aid of Murray's ships the investment was completed. The defenses, good enough against the Indians, were not proof against British cannon; the garrison was only 2500 men, for many of the Canadians had gone home on being promised immunity by the British; and the provisions would suffice for only fifteen days. Under these conditions the French hastened the inevitable by surrendering the place and giving parole not to fight again during the war. Thus was lowered the French flag in Canada September 8, 1760. It is gratifying to add that in Paris, whither they were allowed to go, Vaudreuil, Bigot, and their chief tools were arrested and tried for malfeasance in office. The governor was acquitted for lack of proof, but the false intendant was fined 1,500,000 francs, his ill-gotten pelf confiscated, and he himself exiled for life.

**Spain In-
volved in
the War.**

The struggle thus far had not affected Louisiana, but it now remains to be seen how that too was drawn into the vortex of ruin which affected all French colonies. Spain saw with alarm the progress of British power in America and on the sea, and in 1761 pledged herself in the celebrated Family Compact to treat French enemies as her own enemies. As a consequence,

England declared war on her January 4, 1762, and sent a strong expedition against Cuba. August 13 Havana was taken with booty worth \$15,000,000; a sum which, however, did not repay the frightful loss of lives from disease in the British army. September 1 of this year a British force took the Philippine Islands, but gave them up when promised a ransom. Impressed by these experiences, Spain was soon willing to make peace. France, utterly exhausted, was equally ready, and the result was the Treaty of Paris, February 10, 1763.

Before it was signed there was much discussion of terms. England boldly demanded Florida, much to the dismay of Spain, who wished to keep the entrance of the Gulf. Then France, out of consideration for Spain, whom she had persuaded to enter the war, offered England all of Louisiana west of the Mississippi if she would forego the demand for Florida. But England was obdurate; and France gave Louisiana to Spain to recoup her for the loss of the peninsular province. The arrangement was made secretly between the two powers concerned, and was not generally known until long after the Treaty of Paris was signed. France had been spending on Louisiana 300,000 livres a year without a sou in return, and her apparent generosity accorded well with her financial necessities. With Canada and India gone, and her fleet destroyed, Louisiana could not be of value to her.

**Treaty of
Paris,
1763.**

The terms of the general treaty were as follows: Canada, Nova Scotia, Cape Breton, and all the interior east of the Mississippi, except the so-called Isle d'Orleans near its mouth, were ceded to the British; the West Indian islands of Tobago, Dominica, Granada, and St. Vincent also were ceded to the English, but Martinique and Guadeloupe, which had been conquered, were left to France. England received Florida and gave up Cuba; France lost all her East Indian colonies but Pondicherry and Chandernagore; and France was to retain the right to dry fish on the north and west coasts of Newfoundland, with two small islands off the shore as a shelter for her fishermen.

**Terms of
the Treaty.**

Thus France made her exit from North America, where she had lost her day as a colonizing power. One cannot but admire the bravery with which she attempted large tasks and the generosity with which she succored infant settlements. Her failure was inherent in her own life. Without a large manufacturing interest she was not able to build up a colonial market for her merchandise; and without a surplus population there was little demand for colonies to improve the condition of her farming class. As Spain tried to support colonial development on the mining industry so France wished to make it depend on the fur trade, whose very existence demanded that agriculture should not advance into the continent. Between the farmsteads of the English and the hunting ranges of the interior the clash was inevitable and the issue certain. If Pitt had

**The Failure
of France.**

not, by his foresight and energy, completed the French expulsion in 1760, the colonies themselves must have done it at no very distant date.

It is said, but on doubtful authority, that Choiseul, the French minister who made the Treaty of Paris, remarked that England would do well to leave Canada to France in order that the danger of a French and Indian attack might keep the English colonies dependent on the mother country. It is certain that the idea was often mentioned in 1762. It was so strongly urged by the English interests in the West Indies in order to induce the government to retain all the French islands there, that Franklin wrote a pamphlet to show that it was badly founded. The colonies, he said, were so divided by mutual distrust and varying interests that they would never unite against England. Such might have been the case for many years had not a headstrong king forced them to a union in defense of rights they held dearer than any of the interests which had caused their dissensions.

Two Indian wars came as an aftermath of the struggle against France. After the outbreaks of 1711-1716, the Cherokees remained at peace with the English; but the efforts of the French had due influence in arousing their suspicions. A party went rather unwillingly with Forbes against Fort Duquesne, 1759, and some of them deserted. A group of the deserters on their return killed twenty-two whites in North Carolina, and another band stole a number of horses. The whites retaliated by killing the Indians, whereupon the Indians fell on the settlements and slew whom they found. Governor Lyttleton of South Carolina now called out troops and marched to the Indian country with 1500 poorly equipped soldiers. Before he started he was joined by thirty Cherokee chiefs who said they were come to make peace. They had been promised personal immunity, but Lyttleton forced them to go with him to the frontier, and when the murderers of the whites were not delivered up by the tribes, he detained as hostages these envoys of peace, who had trusted his promise. Although he made a new treaty, he was hardly back in Charleston before depredations were resumed. The commandant of the frontier fort in which the hostages were detained was lured out of the gate on pretense of a parley and murdered, and the garrison, angered by this cruelty, slew the hostages.

The war now became general. Lyttleton was no longer governor, but Bull, acting in his place, sent forward, 1760, Colonel Montgomery with 1650 men, three-fourths of whom were regulars who had opportunely arrived at Charleston. They burned the lower Cherokee towns and killed or captured more than a hundred persons, but were fiercely engaged in an attempt to cross the mountains and fall back to the seaboard, whence the regulars returned to New York to take part in the campaign against Montreal. Their departure encouraged the Indians and sealed

Was the
English
Course
Wise?

The Chero-
kees Begin
Hostilities.

The Cam-
paigns of
1760 and
1761.

the fate of Fort London. The post had been unwisely built in an exposed position beyond the Alleghanies, and its garrison of 200 men could not be relieved. Hunger at last overcame them and they surrendered on condition that they should return home in safety. But the Indians pursued them, slew twenty-six, and took the others prisoners. By 1761 troops could be spared from the north, and General Amherst sent Colonel Grant with 1200 Highlanders to complete the pacification of the Indian country. Grant, joined by militia and friendly Indians until his army numbered 2600, won a costly victory over the Cherokees in June, and then proceeded to destroy their towns and the growing crops. This was a heavy blow, and the chiefs sued for peace. The treaty that followed did not remove Cherokee resentment, as their support of the British showed in the war of the Revolution. In the war of 1760 and 1761 both North Carolina and Virginia raised troops to protect their borders; but the work of vengeance which forced the Cherokees to make peace was done by the regulars, marching from Charleston and aided by the South Carolina militia.

The second conflict with the Indians was the Pontiac War. The Indians of the Northwest recognized their doom when the British seized and held the French posts, and to save themselves formed a confederacy under Pontiac, a capable and ambitious warrior of the Ottowas. Emissaries of France told them that the French would return and subdue the British garrisons, and this gave the red men courage to strike while the new lords of the country were weak. The confederacy was well organized, each tribe promising to fall on and destroy the post nearest to it. The attack was made in May, 1763, and the result was that ten posts from Bedford, Pennsylvania, to Michilimackinac, at the entrance of Lake Michigan, fell to the savages, most of them being entered through treachery, and the garrisons murdered. Detroit and Fort Pitt, however, were warned and held out. The former received supplies

**Pontiac
War, 1763-
1764.**

by water and defied its foe, though Pontiac himself led the force which invested its land approaches. The latter was saved by Colonel Bouquet. This officer had seen seven years' service against the Indians and knew well how to fight them. He was in Philadelphia when the trouble began, and was ordered to relieve Fort Pitt with 500 Highlanders. Moving rapidly, he approached the scene of Braddock's defeat on August 5. Here he was surrounded by Indians at Busby Run, and fought fiercely until nightfall. Next morning the Indians resumed the battle, when by a feigned retreat Bouquet drew them into a heedless charge on his baggage train, and turning at the proper moment drove them off in great disorder. Four days later Fort Pitt was reached and relieved, but Bouquet must wait for reinforcements before he could march into the Indian country beyond it. In the following year, with 1500 men, he marched without opposition into

**Detroit and
Fort Pitt.**

**The End of
the War.**

what is now southeastern Ohio as far as the upper Muskingum and made treaties of peace with the Indians of that region, rescuing 200 captured settlers. In a great council at Fort Niagara the Indians of the lake also made a treaty of peace in which they ceded to the English a strip four miles wide on each side of the Niagara river. Pontiac remained hostile until convinced that there was no hope of aid from the French, and in 1766 he, with other recalcitrants, made an unwilling submission at Oswego. Three years later he was slain in the forest near St. Louis by another Indian to whom an English trader had promised a barrel of rum. He was one of the ablest and most patriotic men of his race.

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CHAPTER VII

SOCIAL PROGRESS IN COLONIES

THE CONDITIONS OF SETTLEMENT

THE desire to own land was the impelling cause of most of the early migration to America. Land was sold cheap, but the amount one person might buy was sometimes restricted. Free distribution to settlers was usually made. Such allotments, "importation rights," were as large in some colonies as fifty acres for each adult brought in, and they were allowed to male indentured servants at the expiration of term of service. In the South, where money crops could be raised, the tendency was to own large farms; for though the men of a community were usually poor at first, some would be thrifty and would eventually buy up and consolidate into large holdings what had originally been a series of small farms. In New England agriculture was not as profitable as in the South, the soil was stony, the crops were not abundant, and the farms were small. Where the farms were large, population was widely dispersed, and where they were small it was denser.

In all the colonies the settlers first took up the richest land, generally along the rivers. This was advantageous because the rivers were the best means of transportation. In the southern colonies, in which streams abounded, the land between them came slowly into settlement. This "ridge land" was the home of the poorer people, and the result was that roads came slowly into existence. When constructed, they were merely traced through the forest and became very difficult in wet weather. In the compact settlements of the North roads were early laid out, bridges were built, and inns were provided. But land traveling was not comfortable before the revolution in any part of the colonies.

In the royal colony land was granted by the governor and council in the name of the king, in a proprietary colony it was granted either directly or indirectly by the officers exercising a similar jurisdiction. In New England the assembly created trustees of a town with authority to grant the land to settlers. The trustees then met and selected the site for the meeting-house, reserving a portion of the land for a common, and assigning the lots around it. Land not granted was held by the town for common use, as grazing, the taking of firewood, and wood for necessary buildings. From the compact nature of New England settlements the

**Distribu-
tion of the
Land.**

Roads.

**The New
England
Town.**

towns were relatively small, from ten to fifteen miles across, and most of the settlers were located conveniently near the meetinghouses. When the danger of Indian wars passed and the inhabitants became numerous at the "center" of the town, they began to form outlying villages on the better land in other parts of the town. Sometimes they moved to the frontier and established another town with the consent of the assembly.

The county was the unit of organization in the South. It was from four to ten times as large as the New England town. The frontier county was usually a vast area with only a fringe of settlement on the edge nearest the older settlements. When this fringe thickened a new county was set off still nearer to the frontier. The county was created by the assembly.

The
Southern
County.

As the colony grew in wealth, the oldest counties were more conservative than the newer ones and were unwilling to create the latter as rapidly as the growth of population seemed to demand, lest the control of the assembly pass into the hands of "back counties." The early counties were relatively small, and they took pains to have the newer ones very large. As representation was not in proportion to population, the older counties were thus able to keep a large influence in the assemblies. This led to bitter conflicts. As the people of the newer counties were, from Pennsylvania southward, largely of Scotch-Irish stock and poor men, the contest often took the shape of a democracy against an aristocracy. In North Carolina the controversy between the counties was peculiarly bitter, because those in the Albemarle region, the oldest in the province, had five representatives each, while the new ones had only two. The old counties thus had an overweening influence in the assembly, which the governor sought to break down. He finally called the assembly to meet on the Cape Fear, so remote from the Albemarle region that not all of the large delegation from the old counties could attend. The result was that all the Albemarle delegates refused to attend, disputed on the ground of no quorum the legality of the laws passed without them, and refused to pay taxes levied as well as to recognize the legality of a new law apportioning representation. So unpleasant a situation was created that for eight years the wheels of government were nearly at a standstill. Ultimately there was a compromise by which the older counties retained their disproportionate representation and a number of new counties were created.

By 1760 the opposition between new and old settlements had taken on a territorial character. In Massachusetts, as well as in Virginia and the Carolinas, the wealthy men lived on the coast. As men of education and conservative business instinct, they were at odds with the small farmers of the interior over many questions. They called the popular party "the mob" and its leaders "demagogues," while the popular party

"The Mob,"
and "the
Aristocrats."

called them "aristocrats" and oppressors of the poor. When the revolution was coming to the explosion point, the latter class held back a long time and many of them ultimately repudiated a movement in which were so many of the "demagogues." It must not be forgotten that each side gave an important impulse to our development. One was a conservative force and checked the dangers which came from inexperienced leaders: the other incited to liberty and political equality and checked the tendency of society to settle down into an aristocracy of wealth. This tendency of the newer communities towards democracy has continued throughout our history, steadily following the frontier westward.

When an individual had a right to a grant of land, that is, a warrant, he sought a surveyor, a public officer, who ran the bounds of the grant from any ungranted lands open to settlement. The survey with the warrant was returned to the proper officer, in most cases the secretary of the colony, who made a deed which when signed by the governor constituted a legal title. For the warrant, survey, and deed fees were paid; and they constituted a large part of the remuneration of the officers concerned. There were many complaints, especially in the royal provinces, that the fees were exorbitant. In all but trading and fishing communities land speculation was the favorite means of making money. The surveyor, who from his travels into all parts of the forest had opportunity to find the best tracts of ungranted land, was much concerned in the operation, either buying outright and selling later when the advance of population had raised the price, or becoming the agent of some rich man who could make the investment. Many of the great fortunes of the colonies at the beginning of the revolution were derived from land speculation. This was particularly true in the southern colonies, into which immigrants moved rapidly from 1730 to 1775. The shrewd men who bought the frontier land in the early part of this period reaped handsome profits from their ventures.

In 1760 the total population of the colonies was 1,596,000, of which New England had 473,000, the middle colonies 405,000, and the South, including Maryland, 718,000. Virginia was the largest colony, with 315,000 inhabitants, and Georgia was the smallest, with 9000. At that time slavery existed everywhere, but in the colonies north of Maryland it had only 10 per cent of the population, while in the others it had 41 per cent. North Carolina alone of the southern colonies had not yielded largely to this form of labor, the slaves being here only 17 per cent of the population, while in South Carolina they were 70 per cent, and in Virginia 47 per cent.

Most of the immigrants to America, both before and after the revolution, were poor people seeking to improve their fortunes. In all the colonies were exceptions to this statement. There were per-

**Taking up
Land.**

**Population
in 1760.**

sons who came as officials, or ministers in early New England, and in Virginia were a number of gentlemen adventurers in the Cromwellian days, and always a few superior men to whom the charm of the wilderness was strong; but all these together were a small part of the population. And yet this part had an influence larger than its size would seem to warrant.

**Most
Settlers
Poor People.**

It contributed the social ideals of a new community. The educated clergy and other leaders of early New England were the models for later clergymen and leading men of colonial birth. The early gentlemen adventurers of Virginia, Maryland, and South Carolina were the men whom the colonials who became rich sought to imitate. Thus the aim of the South became to found estates like those of the lower English gentry and to reproduce their manners, their sports, and their intellectual life. In New England, sports, manners, and intellectual life had the serious cast of the early Puritans. In every royal colony the governor and other officers sent over from England were very influential in all social matters. The history of American society reveals the evolution of a healthy, earnest, and teachable democracy, forming its social ideals by those of Europe, and seeking to reject what was bad in the old and to improve in its own way that which it had inherited from its own past.

LABORING CLASSES

In the beginning the colonists had white laborers, persons who arrived with their masters under contract to work for stipulated periods. But when the settlers needed more servants it was difficult to get them in the colony, where any industrious freeman could easily become a proprietor. Orders were accordingly sent to agents in England to send over servants, the employer paying the commission of the agent who secured the servant and the passage money demanded by the ship captain who brought him over. Under these conditions the supply was small, while the demand was ever greater. Colony products were bulky and many ships sailed to America in ballast, and their captains were eager to get cargoes wherever possible. The agents who collected servants were urged to furnish servants and no questions asked about those they produced. Thus grew up the practice of kidnapping, or "spiriting" children, or even adults. They were enticed on board a short time before the ship sailed and were soon beyond the reach of effective protest. Arrived in the colony, the captain delivered the cargo to the planters who paid most. If such a servant was a minor, he was apprenticed to the master who paid his passage under forms prescribed by law. Many instances of hardship occurred in the English ports; for the kidnappers were of the lowest class of criminals and stood on little ceremony in selecting their vic-

**White
Servants.**

Kidnapping.

tims; but most of those whom they sent to America were the children of the laboring class, whose condition in the colony was probably better than that of their parents. After such an apprentice completed his term of service, he was a free man, and in most colonies received a grant of land. In many a community was a man of mark who had come to America in this way.

The free servants who could not pay their passage had the habit of contracting to serve for a term of years the captain who took them to

**Voluntarily
Indented
Servants.**

America, and he would transfer the contract to a planter for money. This class made up most of the indented servants. Colonial law fixed the period for which they could be required to serve, usually from three to five years, provided that the master must furnish proper food and clothing and that the servants should each receive a small tract of land when the term of service expired. In some colonies persons who had thus served out their time were called "redemptioners."

**Convicts
and Vaga-
bonds.**

A third source of labor for the colonies was convicts and "sturdy vagabonds," whom the English authorities sent abroad to be rid of the burden of supporting them. Virginia passed many laws to forbid these importations, but the king vetoed them. Maryland seems to have had little objection to them. Industrial conditions in New England did not favor a large servant class. Neighbors frequently hired themselves to neighbors, or even bound out their children to learn trades, but doing so did not imply a loss of social esteem on the part of the servants. In the colonies in which large plantations were the rule this was otherwise. To be a servant was to belong to a lower social rank than the master, and it was difficult for time and success to remove the stigma. The liberated servant in this part of the country found his refuge in the frontier, where he settled among persons as lowly born as himself and where his future rank was determined by his own exertions.

The three classes named did not furnish sufficient labor for the tobacco and rice growers of the South. Here were two crops for

Slaves.

which the world was willing to pay liberally and capable, as the producers thought, of extensive production. On the other hand, everywhere was an abundance of cheap land. Nothing was wanting but labor. The white servants were hard to obtain and rarely served longer than the term of the indenture, so that they must continually be replaced by new ones, who in turn would be away to the frontier in four or five years. Under these conditions negro slaves, already largely used in the Spanish colonies, began to be employed. The first African slaves in America arrived in Virginia in 1619, but they were not satisfactory laborers. They were intractable and unacquainted with the labor requirements of a civilized community. To control them and get them to labor profitably was difficult, and most planters objected to it. The number in the colony

grew so slowly that in 1700 it was only 6000. By this time it was observed that "new negroes," those recently imported from Africa, worked very well if distributed among colony-born negroes; and this reconciled the planters to the use of this form of labor. The wide expansion of tobacco culture fixed the practice of slavery in Maryland and Virginia. The early South Carolinians were chiefly from Barbados, where slavery had already gone through its experimental stage, and they had this kind of labor from the beginning. Slavery existed in the North as well as in the South; for there was at this time very little public opinion against it. But it was not profitable on the small farms of the North, and in this region the slaves were chiefly in the towns as domestic servants or laborers. In 1760 there were only 87,000 blacks north of Maryland to 299,000 in the other colonies.

When England began to have colonies, her law had no provision for slavery. In fact, the institution had nearly died out in later Roman times, and from that period the impression prevailed in Europe that no Christian could be enslaved. Negro slavery existed in Morocco, and when the Spaniards found that Indian slaves succumbed before the hard work in the American mines they introduced it into their colonies. The African has accepted bondage more readily than any other race. The Spaniards found him a satisfactory slave, and their example was followed in the British and French West Indies. In this part of America, therefore, slavery was formed after the ancient model, and the absolute dominion of the master over his slave was generally recognized. In the continental colonies this was not at first the case. Here early slavery was a kind of continuous indented service, the master being required to give his slave proper food and care. But slowly a code of laws evolved which recognized slavery and gave it a legal status.

Slavery, the
Spanish
Type.

The English
Type.

The settlement of South Carolina chiefly by men of Barbados introduced the West Indian type of slavery on the continent; and the success which followed undoubtedly stimulated the spread of slavery in the tobacco colonies. In 1739, when the number of slaves in South Carolina largely exceeded that of the whites, there was a serious slave outbreak. One result was a revision of the slave code in the colony, and this example was followed in other colonies. Out of these codes one may gather the following general features. All negroes or persons of mixed negro blood were slaves whose mothers were slaves. They could be punished by their masters, and if one died from chastisement where malice was not evident the slayer was not punished. But maliciously killing a slave was forbidden. For serious offenses, as murder, arson, theft, and maiming, the slave was not punished by the master, but he was tried by a court of two or three justices and several freeholders, who took such evidence as they saw fit, and, sitting as a jury but without form of

The Colonial
Slave Code.

law, gave the verdict. For minor offences the usual punishment was thirty-nine lashes. A negro could not testify against a white person, the assumption being that all negroes, bond or free, were hostile to the whites and unreliable witnesses, either from prejudice or from mental incapacity to observe accurately. Slaves were not allowed to go about without written permission, they might not have firearms, and restrictions were placed on their trading and their meeting together. At this time the fear of slave insurrections was as great as later, and it was provided that conspiracy against the whites should be punished by death. If a negro showed violence to a white person, he might be whipped, or even killed if the case were aggravated. The slave codes of this epoch remained in force with slight modification until the general revision which followed the inauguration of the abolition movement in 1831.

The slave code was made to meet a peculiar condition. If men of a lower stage of civilization were brought into the colonies, they must not, it was held, be admitted to the same privileges as the whites. That this was the opinion of all parts of the country is shown by the regulations enforced in all parts of the North where there were many negroes. Boston, the ports in Rhode Island and Connecticut, Philadelphia, the town of New York and the great plantations along the Hudson held most of the slaves in the North. In all these places restrictions were imposed on the slave's right to go about at night, and his right to traffic and to have arms; he was tried by special tribunals, and freely whipped by his master.

COLONIAL INDUSTRY

Agriculture was the most extensive industry. Every colony produced its own food in normal times, and most of them had some for export. The sugar islands, foreign as well as British, offered a good market for such supplies, for they found it most profitable to devote themselves exclusively to their one staple. To them the middle colonies sent great quantities of flour, pork, and beef, and New England sent potatoes, vegetables, and fish. From Virginia, Maryland, and North Carolina went out tobacco for the world, and from South Carolina rice and indigo. The Carolinas also exported tar, pitch, and turpentine. Lumber, either as sawed timber or as boards and staves, was exported from all the colonies. The masts which came from the New England forests were famous in western Europe.

Manufacturing in the modern sense was unknown in the colonies, but it must be remembered that the factory system had not yet developed in Europe. In England weavers, shoemakers, and other handworkers lived in villages and followed their trades solely. In the North most of the farmers knew some trade which they followed when they could not work on the farms.

Thus the coarser grades of cloth, hats, shoes, joiner's work, tools, and nails were made in the colonies. In the South each large plantation had its artisans, many of them slaves. Importations were usually the better grades of cloth, ironware, implements, etc., and articles which in the very nature of things the colonists could not make, as queensware, cutlery, silks, articles of luxury, and wines. Iron ore was found and smelted from New Jersey to Virginia. In 1755 pig iron to the amount of 3425 tons was sent to England. Rum was extensively manufactured in New England. It was made out of the molasses which the sugar islands gave

Rum.

in exchange for fish, lumber, and food products. It is estimated that early in the eighteenth century 1,260,000 gallons of rum were made in Boston annually. Until the whiskey of the Scotch-Irish supplanted it late in that century, this form of spirits was the common tippie in America. It was sold everywhere, north and south, and largely exported to Africa, where it was exchanged for slaves.

England made many restrictions on colonial manufactures; for she was determined to keep the American market open for her own inhabitants. In 1700 the colonies learned that they might

not export woollen goods, or send them from one colony to another, or send them from place to place in the same colony. In 1732 the exportation of hats and their intercolonial sale were forbidden by an act of parliament. This was done at the instance of the London hat makers,

**British Re-
strictions on
Colonial
Manu-
factures.**

for it was known that the colonists made beaver hats cheaper than the same articles could be made in England, and were beginning to gain the market for them both in England and on the continent. The growth of the iron industry caused alarm to the English iron makers, and to satisfy them it was enacted in 1750 that the colonies should export to England only pig and bar iron and that no more mills for the higher iron products should be erected in the colonies.

Fishing was an important industry in New England. The fact that French and British fishermen reaped a large harvest in adjacent waters naturally led the colonists to seek to share it.

When the first settlers arrived, the cod was found as far south as the cape which now bears its name; but being taken in large numbers, it retreated northward until finally it must be sought off Nova Scotia and Newfoundland. In the early stages a rowboat and some lines sufficed to outfit a fisherman. When one must go to the northern waters, a larger vessel and a crew of several men were necessary. Fishing then became a matter of capital and organization. Sometimes the boats were owned by those who sailed them, the crew serving for shares. Sometimes they were owned by capitalists, who gave the crew shares in proportion to the value of the ship. The early spring witnessed the departure of the fishing fleet. If luck was good, the craft came in early and were even known to make a second

Fisheries.

voyage in the same season. The life was perilous and demanded the best qualities of character and physical endurance. It was an excellent school of democracy. By the end of the colonial period share fishing was being replaced by capitalistic enterprise. The fish merchant, who bought and exported the catch, now became a great factor in the industry. He sent out the ships, hired the crews, and reaped the larger part of the reward. Alongside of the cod fisheries developed whaling. This industry was at first confined to off-shore fishing, the waters around Nantucket being especially full of these great fish. But here, too, in time it was necessary to follow the quarry into distant seas. Large ships were built, voyages became lengthened from weeks to months, and from months to years, and at last every ocean was the hunting ground of these hardy New Englanders. The whaling industry lost much of its prosperity with the discovery of mineral oils in the central West, about the middle of the nineteenth century.

TRADE

In the northern colonies trade established itself in much the same way as in England, that is, trading towns on shore and river supported a merchant class which distributed merchandise to, and collected the products from, the people around them. Also, there arose such large importing centers as Boston, Providence, New York, Philadelphia, and Charleston. The growth of these places was rapid, for each was the commercial metropolis of a large and rapidly developing back country. In 1760 Boston and Philadelphia each had a population of 20,000. New York came next with 10,000; Charleston, whose merchants exported rice to many parts of Europe, had 9000, and was the home of much wealth and luxury. Boston's size was not what might be expected from the oldest city of the group, located in a large commercial colony. The explanation, however, is not far to seek. The New England trade was shared by a number of smaller towns, as Salem, Marblehead, Gloucester, Newport, Providence, Portsmouth, Falmouth, New Haven, New London, and Hartford. It was not until the era of manufactures that Boston by becoming the financial center of a large industrial area attained her modern predominance.

Meanwhile, Virginia, and to a certain extent Maryland, had a commercial development of their own, the basis of which was the tobacco trade. No town of importance was established. In Maryland the rise of Baltimore begins with the settlement of the Susquehannah valley in the first decades of the eighteenth century, and in 1760 it had less than 5000 inhabitants. The planters of this region dealt directly with London or Bristol commission agents. Ships came to their plantation wharves, took aboard the year's crop of tobacco, and returned

**Trade in
Virginia
and Mary-
land.**

next year with the proceeds in merchandise ordered by the seller. The river planters were the rich men of their communities. Behind them on the less fertile high land were the poorer farmers whose small crops were not profitably consigned to English agents. The large planters, therefore, became traders, buying the tobacco of their poorer neighbors and opening plantation stores in which the small farmers bought necessary merchandise. Under these circumstances, competition in trade was difficult, and towns could not develop. More than once the governor by instructions from the crown tried to get laws passed in the Virginia assembly to encourage them, but the planters, who controlled that body, were able to defeat his efforts. In 1760 the largest Virginia town was Norfolk, whose prosperity arose chiefly from the trade which came to it from the Albemarle section of North Carolina, where the poor harbors prevented the coming of ocean-going ships. Rice grew in the Cape Fear section which, after its settlement about 1725, had a thriving export trade from Wilmington; for its harbor was adequate for the ships of the day.

Spite of the navigation acts (see page 83) colonial trade prospered. These laws, in fact, benefited colonial shipping in some respects, since they allowed it to share the monopoly due to excluding foreign ships from the British trade. Moreover, they left fish, food products for the West Indies, lumber, and many other articles, untouched. Of the "enumerated commodities" of the act of 1660 only one, tobacco, was grown in the continental colonies. The price of this article, it is true, fell steadily after 1660, and much suffering ensued in Virginia and Maryland; and this was of great significance, since tobacco aggregated about half of the total colonial exports. But with the operation of the law of 1660 went a series of duties on tobacco in England by which in Queen Anne's time a pound paid six and a third pence to the royal treasury, which was three times the price of the commodity in Virginia. At the same time there was a vast increase in the colonial supply. It is impossible to say to which of these three causes one should attach most importance in accounting for the distress of the planters.

Navigation
Acts and
Trade.

The
Tobacco
Trade.

As time passed other articles were added to the "enumerated commodities." Rice was placed on the list in 1706, which raised the price so much that South Carolina lost her trade to Spain and Portugal, one-tenth of her entire exportation. This, however, was regained in 1730, when parliament opened the trade to ports south of Cape Finisterre. In 1706 naval stores and molasses were also added to the list; but a bounty was placed on the former, and of the latter only that had been exported which formerly was brought into continental ports in exchange for products in the West Indies. In 1722 copper, of which very little was produced, and beaver and other

History of
the "Enu-
merated
Commodi-
ties."

skins were placed on the "enumerated" list. Undoubtedly these laws limited the development of trade, and they raised the price of merchandise by requiring that all goods imported into the colonies must come from British ports. But spite of these restrictions colonial commerce developed rapidly. Fish, food products, lumber, and many less important things were not directly affected by the navigation laws.

**Commerce
Grows Spite
of Restriction-
tions.**

Moreover, one must not forget that the navigation acts were never strictly enforced. Their very existence made it profitable to violate them; for both trader's profits and freights were enhanced in the prohibited channels. The most alluring field of such operations was the French and Spanish colonies in the West Indies and in Central and South America.

**Evasion of
the Naviga-
tion Laws.**

Various means of violating the law were used. One was to bribe officials to issue permits to trade with foreign sugar colonies, another was to clear for a British port and visit a foreign place under a false registry. On returning home a few casks of British sugar on the top of a large quantity of French sugar would satisfy a conniving customs inspector; and if a vessel was seized now and then because the game did not go smoothly, the ordinary profits were so great that the owner could stand the loss. Before condemning these people we should remember that they considered the laws unjust and that many British officials in the colonies themselves winked at their violation. The same conditions followed the enactment of the navigation acts in England, where it was estimated that 40,000 persons were engaged in illegal trade.

In 1733 parliament passed the "Molasses Act," laying prohibitory duties on molasses, sugar, and rum made in foreign colonies and imported into the British colonies in America. It grew out of the complaint of the British sugar islands that the French and Dutch islands sold their molasses to the New England rum manufacturers, who, it was intended, should now take their raw product from the British colonies, whatever the price. The British islands did not produce enough molasses for the rum makers, and the situation thus created was preposterous. The law became practically a dead letter soon after it was passed. Some ingenious Yankees avoided it by sailing from Jamaica with cargoes of empty casks formally cleared as molasses. Stopping at a French island these barrels would be filled, and the Jamaica clearance protected them on the return to New England. The "Molasses Act" did much to turn New Englanders against England and to teach them to despise her laws.

**The "Mo-
lasses Act,"
1733.**

The slave trade was an important feature of the commerce of Boston, Rhode Island ports, New York, and Philadelphia. Laden with rum, a vessel would sail for Guinea, the Congo, or Madagascar, and exchange her cargo for slaves, palm oil, or gold dust. The slaves,

"black ivory," were bought in 1676 for three pounds each and were worth seventeen in Jamaica. By 1760 the demand for them had raised the prices so that they now cost twelve pounds each in Africa and brought thirty-five in Jamaica. A ship that carried two hundred negroes under these conditions netted a handsome profit to her owner. Before 1698 the slave trade was monopolized by the Royal African Company; but in this year it was thrown open, and the colonial shipowners took an active part in it. Most of the slave ships sailed from Africa to the West Indies or to the southern English colonies. The slave trade necessarily inflicted horrors on the imported negroes. They were crowded into holds without ventilation. If a storm was encountered, the hatches were nailed down and left so until it abated, when the hungry and thirsty wretches were allowed on deck again, and at such a time there were usually dead bodies to be brought out. The "Middle Passage," as the voyage was called, was long a synonym of terror; and this was true in spite of efforts of the slave's captain to reduce the hardship. For since his slaves sold best if they seemed healthy and strong, it was to his interest to feed and care for them as well as possible.

The Slave
Trade.

RACE ELEMENTS IN COLONY PLANTING

The beginning of all the colonies but New York and Delaware was English. The English life and law was the rule, or became so when the foreign planted colonies fell into English hands. New England, dominated by peculiar ideals, received only a small stream of immigration after the restoration of the Stuarts, 1660. It remained the most English of the great sections of America until the era of manufacturing began about 1808. The English stock filled the eastern parts of Virginia, Maryland, and the Carolinas, and most of New Jersey, while it mingled with the Dutch of New York and Delaware and was the controlling element in early Pennsylvania. But in all the middle and southern colonies were many non-English persons who came singly or in small groups. Such was the situation about 1680. At that time opened a new era of American immigration. Into the valleys that lie east of the Alleghanies, from southern New York to Georgia, came a vast tide of settlers — some of them colony born, but most of them of foreign Protestant origin. The foreigners are to be distinguished in the following groups:

Early Colo-
nists Mostly
English.

Other
Sources of
Population.

1. *The Huguenots.* They began to arrive with the revocation of the Edict of Nantes, 1685. They settled in several colonies, but the Santee river region of South Carolina received the largest number. Here in a compact settlement they preserved their own church organization, accumulated fortunes, and became a center from which a French influence was transmitted to other parts

Huguenots.

of the colony. Some of the leading soldiers, politicians, merchants, and literary men of South Carolina were of this stock. Another Huguenot settlement was on the James river, near Richmond, Virginia; and another, on Pamlico river in North Carolina, began well but was nearly extinguished in the Indian war of 1711. There were also many of this faith among the settlers in New York. Coming singly or in small numbers, Huguenots settled in many places. Of all the great European nations France has contributed the smallest portion of the American population.

2. *The Germans.* The Mennonites, German Quakers, were induced to come to Pennsylvania soon after it became a colony. The movement began in 1683 with the settlement of Germantown **Germans.** by a group under Rev. Daniel F. Pastorius. About 1710 a great wave of German immigration began, the origin of which was the devastation of the Palatinate by Louis XIV of France. Most Palatines were Protestants, and a large number fled to England for succor. Huddled together in tents, objects of charity, it seemed well to send them to the colonies. The government gave aid, and five hundred were sent to the help of de Graffenreid, who was taking a small Swiss colony to found New Berne, North Carolina. The Indian massacre in 1711 fell heavily on this settlement, many of whose members fell or fled; but a small remainder continued on the spot. In the same year three thousand Palatines arrived in New York, where Governor Hunter set them to preparing pine trees for making tar. The industry proved a failure, and the Palatines moved to the Schoharie valley, where the Mohawks sold them land. When the colonial authorities demanded that they also have English deeds from their hands, a large number refused, and moved to Pennsylvania, settling near Reading. In this migration was the father of the noted Conrad Weiser, long prominent as an intermediary between the whites and the Indians. By this time the Pennsylvanians had discovered the possibilities of the German peasantry as a source of indented labor. Plausible agents went everywhere in the Rhine valley, proclaiming the riches of the province. They collected great numbers who articulated came to Philadelphia, where they were transferred to agents who led them about the colony until they were disposed of to the farmers. The German "redemptioners" suffered much hardship, as did most of the indented servants who came to the colonies; but they had good powers of resistance, and, their service ended, they settled into sturdy and thrifty citizens. Not all the German immigrants were servants, however. Many came as small farmers, or artisans. The Pennsylvania counties of Berks and Lancaster, and the Lehigh and Lebanon valleys received most of this stock, and in 1760 they were about one-third of the population of the colony. They were divided into many sects, and clung tenaciously to their language. From the Pennsylvania settlements an overflow reached Virginia, in the Shenandoah

valley, and North Carolina, where they made a large portion of the population of the Yadkin and Catawba valleys. Among the Germans a prominent group were the Moravians, followers of Huss, who after a discouraging attempt in Georgia settled Bethlehem, Pennsylvania, from which a colony about the middle of the century settled Salem, in North Carolina. Many Germans moved from Pennsylvania into New Jersey.

3. *The Scotch-Irish.* It was also Penn's liberal policy which first turned these people toward America. They were the descendants of those Scotch Presbyterians whom James I settled in North Ireland, hoping thus to turn that country from Catholicism. After a century of conflict with a barren soil and unfriendly surroundings they were as poor as when they began, and the native Irish were no whit less Catholic. Seasoned by this experience they made the best frontiersmen in America, where both natural and human environment was more favorable than in Ireland. They began to come to Pennsylvania in considerable numbers early in the eighteenth century, settling in Lancaster county and to the west of it as far as Pittsburg. From that region they turned into New Jersey, or crossed the narrow part of Maryland into Virginia, moving thence into North Carolina. By 1760 they were going into every valley in this region, and another stream, coming from Charleston, was filling the South Carolina uplands. The sons of these immigrants, still loving the pioneer life with its perils and its rewards, passed over the Alleghanies and laid the foundations of Kentucky and Tennessee. Of this stock came John C. Calhoun, Andrew Jackson, and many another important leader.

The Scotch-Irish.

4. *Minor Groups.* Besides the Dutch in New York and the Swedes in Delaware one ought also to remember the Swiss. If but few of them remained in de Graffenried's settlement at New Berne, North Carolina, a still larger number settled and survived in Pennsylvania. Speaking the same language, most of them were confounded with the Germans. Another distinctive element was the Scotch Highlanders, who came in large bands to the Cape Fear valley after the failure of their cause at Culloden, 1745. Like the Scotch-Irish, they were stout Presbyterians. Scotch traders were found in every port. The same was true, but to a less extent, of the Jews. In New York, Rhode Island, and Philadelphia these shrewd traders of both races were important factors in business. The Welsh were not a large colonizing race, but small settlements were found in New Jersey, Pennsylvania, North Carolina, and perhaps other colonies. The Irish, as distinguished from the Scotch-Irish, furnished no distinct colony group of importance; but they contributed largely to the laboring class from the earliest times, and were widely distributed.

Other Sources.

But the best colonizers were native-born colonists. Every settled

community produced men of adventurous disposition, to whom the forest was more attractive than the farmsteads of the East. Selling their lands, if they had any, they turned westward where axe and rifle would enable them to found homes and enjoy freedom in a new settlement. They were not thrifty, and they have left few memorials except the paths they made and the fields they cleared, but they did important and lasting work for posterity.

The American-born Frontiersmen.

RELIGION IN THE COLONIES

The Puritan churches in New England, and the Established Church elsewhere were the strongest religious organizations in the colonies.

The Work of the Churches.

Along with them went a large number of smaller churches, Presbyterian, Lutheran, Dutch Reform, and Baptist. This enumeration does not include the Roman Catholics, who were numerous only in Maryland. After the first days of settlement most of the immigrants came to America from purely economic motives. They took land where they wished, and for years a new community might care little for church or baptism. But as it became populous the churches concerned were apt to begin to gather up their own people into congregations, to establish meeting-places, and to send preachers. This was especially true of the settlement of the interior. Too much cannot be said in appreciation of these efforts as a civilizing influence. Often the preacher was the only man from the outside world who ever visited the valley in which his flock was located. He was usually the herald of schools, and the counselor of social reform.

Creating two royal provinces in New England — Massachusetts and New Hampshire — weakened Puritanism there.

The Anglican Church in New England.

Anglican churches appeared in the principal towns, and in them the royal governors and their friends, to the horror of the stricter Puritans, instituted the celebration of Christmas and Easter, as well as funerals and marriages according to the elaborate ceremonies of the English Church. Anglicans also protested against being taxed by the towns to pay the Puritan ministers' salaries; and it was finally enacted in Massachusetts and Connecticut that this burden should be remitted when there was an Anglican organized congregation in the town in question.

But the Puritan régime received its strongest check from internal causes. By 1690 the original settlers were dead. The new generation was American-born and did not feel so keenly as their fathers the old resentment toward the Anglican Church. Nor did they hold so strictly to the older dogmas. At the head of this modernist feeling was Harvard College and some of the Boston ministers. Opposed to it was a reactionary party, regretting the decay of the old faith, and striving under the

Weakening of Early Puritanism.

lead of Increase and Cotton Mather to bring back the existing generation to the older faith. This party was strong in the rural towns. It was through its predominance that the witchcraft incident of 1688-1693 stained the page of Massachusetts history.

During the Middle Ages, all Christendom believed in witchcraft and voiced in laws the Biblical injunction, "Thou shalt not suffer a witch to live." The Puritans, accustomed to interpret the Bible literally, accepted this as final; and in the colonies as well as in England they thought death should be the penalty for witchcraft. It is for opposing witchcraft with death that history condemns the ruling party in

The Existence of Witches Generally Conceded.

Massachusetts, but it should be content to condemn the excessive and blind zeal with which the law was executed in this particular case. New England Puritans believed thoroughly in the guidance of God. When, for example, their charter was threatened the council implored divine enlightenment and believed that God wished them to resist. For all that, the charter was lost. This but increased the despair of those who saw everywhere a relaxation of the pure faith of their fathers. The ravages of the Indians were not forgotten before this new calamity was upon them. To the stricter party it seemed that the anger of God was heavy on his people, and the natural consequence was a heightening of mysticism.

Puritan Faith.

Circumstances turned this tendency of the time so that it hit upon witchcraft. About 1680 a number of clergymen around Boston began to investigate the history of witchcraft in New England. A short time later Increase Mather, in a book called "Illustrious Providences," described the nature of witchcraft, and his pedantic son, Cotton Mather, desiring to study the subject experimentally, began to gather data for a book on "The Wonders of the Invisible World," a discussion of the "nature, number, and operations of the devils." In 1688 two children of Boston declared themselves bewitched by an Irish laundress, who was tried and executed. He took the two girls to his own house, observed their actions, and published his conclusions in 1689. Thus the public mind was made ready for the sad affair at Salem.

The Mathers and Witchcraft.

In a village (now Danvers) in the town of Salem some girls who had been reading about and discussing witchcraft began to act in the strange ways bewitched persons were said to act, and they alleged that certain friendless old persons had cast spells upon them. The pastor of the town accepted their statement and demanded the punishment of the witches. Investigation was had, but the whole community was so excited that a cool judgment was impossible, and the verdict of ministers and laymen was that witches, emissaries of the devil, were brazenly established in the village. Many accused persons were arrested, while the village and several other communities held days of fast and prayer to avoid

The Outbreak in Salem.

this additional infliction of divine anger. Then the governor was requested to appoint a special high court to try the imprisoned ones. He complied, and in the summer of 1692 nineteen persons were convicted and executed for witchcraft. By this time the people of the country were in terror of the witch-hunters, and many persons when accused admitted guilt and sought to escape punishment by throwing the blame on others. The court took "spectral" evidence, *i.e.* when a "bewitched" person declared he saw an alleged witch coming in the form of a yellow bird it was held good evidence, though no one else could say he saw a yellow bird. To declare that the prosecutions were foolish was to bring down a charge of witchcraft on oneself. At first only miserable old men and women were accused. But in time people of high social position were aimed at, one of them being the wife of the governor himself. At last public opinion underwent a revulsion, the special court was dissolved, and the prisons were emptied. After a while reason resumed sway and the conservative leaders suffered a loss of influence.

The doctrines of the liberals, however, caused dismay in many quarters. One of the innovations was a relaxation of the old doctrine of conversion. In 1662 it had been agreed that conversion

The "Half-way Covenant."

was not essential to church membership. In a régime in which civil status depended on church relations this was rather a natural conclusion. But it found steady opposition

with those who insisted that the ancient faith should be preserved. It was scornfully referred to as "The Halfway Covenant." It was even declared by the more venturesome of the party that many ministers had not been converted. In 1734 there began in Northampton, Massachusetts, through the preaching of Jonathan Edwards, a great

The "Great Awakening."

revival, the foundation of which was the necessity of conversion. The preacher was eloquent and fervid, and under his fiery words many persons were convicted of sin, fell into

trances, or shouted joyfully in the assurance of forgiveness. The meetings attracted attention throughout western Massachusetts, and much was done to create a more fervent spiritual life. In 1740, when the fame of the Northampton meetings was still fresh, George Whitefield, former associate of the Wesleys and a most remarkable preacher, arrived in New England. At first he was received favorably by all parties and his meetings, attended by immense crowds, resulted in professions of conversion by many thousands. His strong insistence on the necessity of conversion at last aroused the opposition of the liberal clergy. He replied in kind, and soon the colony was divided into two religious factions. The same result appeared in Connecticut. Both Harvard and Yale colleges were opposed to the revival in its later stages. Whitefield is not prominent in the movement after 1745, but he was followed by many earnest preachers who had less ability. The upshot was a separatist movement, the seceders largely joining the

Baptists. The "Great Awakening" was also strong on Long Island and in New Jersey, where many New Englanders had settled.

In this connection one must not forget the significance of Rhode Island in the cause of toleration. To Roger Williams and his followers was due the steady assertion of this theory, in the face of the strict Puritan conformity in the adjacent colonies. Small as his colony was, it was a safe refuge for all who demanded freedom of worship. He received the Quakers and refused to persecute them, although he believed their doctrines false and dangerous. The seed he sowed bore fruit many years afterwards. Rhode Island, through this course, became a home of sects, and their clashing purposes often produced social confusion, but the religious history of America could not well do without their influence.

**Religious
Freedom in
Rhode Is-
land.**

The English Church was established by law in Virginia, Maryland, and the Carolinas. In the first it was recognized in the beginning of the colony's existence. At this time the Puritans had not begun to leave the Church of England, and the result was that "Low Church" forms were planted in this, the oldest colony, the effects of which survive to this day.

**The Eng-
lish Church
in Virginia.**

But dissenters were not tolerated, and in 1643 a law, passed under the influence of Governor Berkeley, forbade any other than an Anglican minister to conduct religious services in the colony. Late in the century the Baptists began to appear, and seem to have suffered little inconvenience. The coming of the Scotch-Irish, all of them Presbyterians, in the eighteenth century made matters worse. At first they were ignored by the religious authorities, but when traveling preachers appeared and began to gather them and any others whom they could influence into churches the Anglican pastors protested. The ministers were arrested because they had no licenses, but the juries generally acquitted them. Thus broke down the attempt to exclude all but the Anglican faith from Virginia. By 1760 the Presbyterians, Baptists, and Quakers were well planted in the colony.

In the beginning, Maryland, though settled by Catholics, had no church establishment. In 1649, when Puritanism was supreme in England, the assembly passed an act for religious toleration. If it was passed, as seems probable, to enable Baltimore to continue in possession as proprietor, it at least was a good example. But it did not satisfy the Protestants, who were a large majority of the population; and in 1692 and 1702 they carried laws establishing the English Church, and those were followed by severe laws against the Roman Catholics. South Carolina established Anglicanism in 1706, after a long struggle with the dissenters, the victory being won at last by a combination with the Huguenots, who were in return given the status of an establishment in the parishes in which they were the large majority of the population.

**In Mary-
land and
Carolinas.**

In North Carolina a law to establish the church was adopted about the same time by manipulation during the troublous era of the Cary Rebellion, but there were so few adherents to the Anglican Church in the colony that it was enforced in only three or four parishes. In 1765 there were only five Anglican clergymen in the province. In these colonies the law provided for parishes, usually identical with the counties and for a tax paid by all to support the clergymen. The parish affairs were left to vestries, self-perpetuating in Virginia and North Carolina, but chosen by the freeholders in Maryland and South Carolina. There was much complaint about the morals of the established clergy in Virginia and Maryland, "Cock-fighting parsons" being the term with which posterity dubbed them. Some of the clergymen seem to have fairly won the epithet.

In New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Delaware no laws could be passed to establish one form of religion. Here the dissenters

**In other
Colonies.**

prevailed, each racial element having its own religious forms to which were added many others of non-racial origin. Pennsylvania was particularly concerned with them. "Africa is not more full of monsters," wrote a horrified Anglican clergyman, "than Pennsylvania is of sects." In New York the governor tried to give the Anglican Church the position of an establishment by limiting the right of ministers of other churches to preach. The attempt failed, but he got the assembly to give certain churches the right of support by public taxation. The British Toleration act of 1689 giving liberty of worship to dissenters in England and Wales, but in no way favoring the Catholics, had its reaction in America. It was reenacted in Virginia, Massachusetts, New York, and in other colonies. Feeling in England and America was then strong against the Catholics, who were believed to be plotting to regain England through the restoration of the Stuarts. Virginia required them to take the test-oath if they gave evidence or held office; New York and Massachusetts,

**Treatment
of the
Catholics.**

with eyes on the missionaries to the Indians, forbade a Catholic priest within their respective jurisdictions. Maryland, although only about 3000 out of a total population of 40,000 were Catholics, forbade the public celebration of the Roman services, nor could any of that faith teach school or purchase lands.

The administration of the Anglican Church was under the direction of the Bishop of London, who ordained ministers for the provinces.

**The Bishop
of London.**

In 1689 he adopted the policy of having a commissary to represent him in a colony, James Blair being appointed for Virginia and Thomas Bray for Maryland. A commissary had the right to inquire into the conduct of the clergy, but he could not dismiss an incumbent. In 1701 was organized the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel, a missionary organization which sent ministers to most of the colonies. The reports of these missionaries are an important source of knowledge of colonial social conditions.

EDUCATION AND CULTURE IN THE COLONIES

In another place this book treats of the origin of the New England public school system, probably the chief educational institution of the day (see page 476). Aside from that one must notice the beginning of the American college and the general attitude of the people toward middle schools. The first step toward providing higher education in any continental English colony was taken by the liberal group of which Sir Edwin Sandys was leader, when in 1620 a university was decreed for Henrico, in Virginia. A beginning was actually made, a teacher was employed, and funds were subscribed, but the Indian massacre of 1622 wiped out all traces of town and university. As the enterprise had depended on philanthropic gentlemen in England, who now lost control of the colony, and as it had little support by the people in Virginia, it was not revived.

Early
Schools.

The next step was taken by the general court of Massachusetts, which in 1636 voted 400 pounds for a "shoale or colledge" to educate the English and Indians in "knowledge and Godliness."

In 1638 Rev. John Harvard died, leaving the college a legacy of books and money, and from him the institution was called Harvard College. In 1650 it was formally incorporated. The town in which it was situated was called Cambridge, from the English university town in which several of the Massachusetts ministers had studied. Two degrees were offered, Bachelor of Arts, for which the requirement was ability to read the Old and New Testaments in the originals and to translate them into Latin; and Master of Arts, for which seven years' study was necessary, as in Cambridge and Oxford. In a new colony it was not always possible to live up to these excellent standards, but for over half a century Harvard was the only center of learning in America, and it furnished New England during this time with a body of well-taught ministers.

Harvard
College
Founded,
1636.

By 1700 Harvard was identified with the religious liberals, spite of the fact that Increase Mather was its president. This displeased the conservatives, who were at length rejoiced to know that a new college, sound in theology, was in 1701 established in Connecticut. Eli Yale, who had been governor of Madras, gave it a sum of money, and in 1718 it was called Yale College. After tentative location at several places, it was in 1716 definitely placed at New Haven. Its governing body and faculty were required to accept the Saybrook Platform, a statement of faith formulated by a legislative commission and adopted by the assembly in 1708. Yale maintained outward conformity to this type of orthodoxy for a century, but by 1750 it had advanced far on the road of liberalism.

Yale College
Founded,
1701.

In 1691 Commissary Blair arrived in London to try to get a royal charter and to raise funds for a college in Virginia. When he broached the matter to Attorney-General Seymour, whose aid he needed, he was asked why the colony desired a college. The answer was that it would furnish an educated ministry to save the souls of the colonists. "Souls!" exclaimed Seymour, "D—n your Souls! Make tobacco!" But the commissary had great Scotch persistence, his request succeeded, and in 1693 a royal charter was issued for William and Mary College. It created a college and "free school" under the auspices of the Anglican Church. Commissary Blair was its first president, and its professors were clergymen. It had a large influence in colonial Virginia. Williamsburg, where it was located, soon became the capital of the colony and an attractive colonial society grew up under the protection of the governor and the college. For some years the "free school," free only in the sense that it admitted all students who met the intellectual and financial requirements, was the chief feature. When the curriculum of the college was organized, it had less Hebrew and Syriac than Harvard, but there was more of general culture.

Thus at the beginning of the eighteenth century Anglicanism and the two branches of New England Puritanism had each its college. Fifty years later other religious organizations were developed so strongly that they also could venture to establish seats of learning. The first of these was the College of New Jersey, now Princeton University, established in 1746. Its support was Presbyterian, and it drew largely for a hundred years from the Scotch-Irish population extending from New Jersey southward. It is probable that the Great Awakening stimulated its creation. By this time the desire for colleges as expressions of local pride had come into existence; and in 1749 the University of Pennsylvania was founded, in 1754 King's College, now Columbia, in 1764 Rhode Island College, now Brown University, and in 1769 Dartmouth College in New Hampshire. In all these institutions except the University of Pennsylvania the chief impulse to found the college came from a church. Higher education at the time found its support in America in the necessity for the education of the ministers. In the charters of Yale, William and Mary, Princeton, King's (Anglican), and Brown (Baptist) arrangements were made to perpetuate the influence of the respective churches which founded them. Higher education in America, now so well able to stand on its own feet, was born of religion and long nourished by it.

As to subjects taught, the colleges began with the high ideal of reproducing English college curricula. Harvard is supposed to have been modeled after Emanuel College, Oxford, at which several Massachusetts men had studied. But the wilderness does not favor intel-

lectual culture. The Emanuel men eventually passed away, and a colony-born generation took their places. Neither here nor elsewhere was actual education higher than in a good modern preparatory school. The colleges, like other features of American life, began low and developed slowly out of their own experience. The very conditions around them made them in colonial times but large academies, but they have gradually lifted themselves out of these conditions.

The Curriculum.

The southern and middle colonies had a few public schools, but private schools were widely established. Often they were taught by clergymen. In the towns, as Philadelphia and New York, schools were early established. In the South the planters coöperated in supporting schools for their own children. The subjects taught were elementary. The elements of Latin and Greek were given to those who sought to enter a college. How much this was may be seen in John Adams's entrance examination at Harvard in 1751. He was required to write a good hand and with the aid of a Latin grammar and dictionary to translate a piece of English into Latin.

The Middle Schools.

Cultured men were found in the colonies from the beginning. Probably they were more numerous in the early years of a colony's history, because the contact with England was then closest. In the first fifty years of her existence Virginia saw the production of many books about her history; in the second fifty years the output was smaller. The richest planters of Virginia, Maryland, and South Carolina educated their sons in England. Colonel William Byrd, of Virginia, a man of fine mental gifts, was trained in England and Holland, though not in a university, and spent many years in London, where he had some of the leading literary men for his associates. His old age he spent in Virginia, where he relieved the tedious hours by writing some of the sprightliest English prose that colonial America produced. Philadelphia was distinguished for a group of scientists, chief of whom were Franklin and James A. Logan. Boston was the center of an indigenous literary movement. It showed little immediate English influence and was, undoubtedly, the flowering of New England culture, nourished faithfully by Harvard and the congregational ministry. Several of the royal governors were notable friends of culture. But in this field we must not assert too much. Poets and essayists we had, and a few historians; but they rarely rise into high rank.

Colonial Culture.

LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN THE COLONIES

Three types of loyal government appeared in the English colonies; the county, the town, and the mixed type. The first came with the settlement of Virginia and was an adaptation of the English county

to Virginia conditions. The county was a unit of representation in the lower house of the assembly. Over it was a sheriff and a lieutenant-colonel of the militia. It had local justices of the peace

The County. who were appointed by the governor and council, as a rule men of social and political prominence. They held the county court of quarter sessions, which was both an administrative and judicial body. In the former capacity it supervised the roads, apportioned taxes, cared for county property, and looked after any general business relating to the county. As a court it tried minor cases, although few justices were lawyers. Sheriff, lieutenant-colonel, and clerk of the court were generally appointed by the governor. In the southern county, as normally organized, the only elective office was member of the assembly. He was chosen by the freeholders, all meeting at one voting precinct, the ballot being *viva voce*. Under such conditions the governor with the council had great power. He selected the county officials from the leading families, and they usually controlled the election of assemblyman, who in turn became the governor's adviser as to the further appointment of county officials. The office-holding oligarchy of a southern county was an aristocratic influence, genuinely English in character, usually honest and efficient, and of sound American principles, as the local history of the revolutionary era shows.

The New England town was a revival of the early English town, which for centuries had survived in the English parish, both a civil and an ecclesiastical institution. The fundamental idea was that the business of the town should be transacted in town meeting by all the qualified freemen. In earliest New England these were the persons of good standing in the town church; but as the king objected to the exclusion of Anglicans from the suffrage, it was provided that any person of good character could be admitted to the suffrage on the certificate of a minister. This rule, discretely administered, relieved pressure from the exclusion of Anglicans, but left the control of town affairs safely within the church. The town meeting levied the taxes, appointed selectmen who executed its rules, chose subordinate officers, and supervised roads, bridges, and public property. Any voter might speak in town meeting; but it was part of the genius of the people to respect the advice of the elders. The minister had great influence in town affairs, the selectmen were the men of wealth and prominence, and between the two the direction of local affairs was in as restricted a group as in the South. Here, too, it must be said that the oligarchy ruled well. It was honest, patriotic, and economical, and it gave satisfaction to the majority.

The mixed form first appears in New York. When Nicolls conquered New Amsterdam, eastern Long Island was settled by New Englanders, who had never acknowledged the right of the Dutch over

them. They had bought their lands from the Indians, established town meetings without authority from any superior, and desired to go on as they had begun. As they had helped Nicolls against Stuyvesant he could not ignore their request. Neither could he grant it; for the Duke of York meant to rule his province by absolute right, so far as he could. The result was a compromise which the Long Islanders accepted with disappointment. Nicolls prepared a code of laws on the basis of the enactments of the assemblies at Boston and New Haven and proclaimed it as law for the Long Island towns, where it was known as the "Duke Laws." It provided that the town administration be in the hands of overseers and constables elected by freeholders, but there was to be no town meeting. Local justice was to be administered, as in the South, by judges appointed by the governor. In a few years the "Duke's Laws" were extended to the rest of the province. In Nicolls's time there was no legislature. When it later came into existence, the county, made up by a union of several towns, became the basis of representation. Thus we have a system of counties divided into towns, or townships, imitated in the other middle colonies, and largely reproduced in the newer states of the union. Indeed, its advantages are so obvious that it has since the civil war been adopted in modified forms in the Southern states.

**The Mixed
Type of
Local Gov-
ernment.**

PAPER MONEY IN THE COLONIES

Until the end of the seventeenth century specie was the money generally used throughout the world, but shortly before that time it had been discovered that a state's promise to pay might be made to serve as currency, although no country had used the invention extensively. To issue bills which might be paid back to the government for taxes and then destroyed seemed a wonderful idea, and it was destined to be tried on a large scale in the colonies, where neither gold nor silver was mined, and where there was always a demand for money to develop the abundant natural resources. The idea was seductive, but it ignored the fundamental law that the volume of currency should be nearly stable in proportion to population. To increase it by a new issue would undoubtedly aid the debtors temporarily, but it worked a counteracting hardship to the capitalists, and to contract it would injure the borrowers while it benefited the capitalists. As the majority of people were not lenders they were continually asking for more paper money, once they learned of its effects, and they generally protested loudly against attempts to reduce its volume. The capitalists, merchants, and town's people generally, continually opposed such currency, and they had the support of the crown, which usually was tender of the interests of the trading class. Out of this opposition of

**The Cause
and Effect
of Paper
Money.**

purpose grew up in most of the colonies important political divisions which seriously affected the people's loyalty to the mother country.

The first colony to have paper money was Massachusetts. In 1690 an unsuccessful expedition against Quebec left the treasury in debt and to pay it off notes were issued and made receivable for public dues. In the wars that followed and lasted until the French were driven out of Canada there were many similar issues, so that by 1745 a silver dollar was worth eleven dollars in currency. Other New England colonies

Massachusetts Leads the Way.

had followed the example set them, and the whole country was overwhelmed with depreciated paper. The ruling classes, chiefly in the seacoast towns, were dismayed at the situation, and when parliament voted 175,000 pounds sterling to repay Massachusetts for her expenses in the expedition which took Louisburg, 1745, they were able to get a vote passed for the redemption of the outstanding notes at the rate of seven and a half for one. After that the currency of the colony was specie.

Massachusetts's lead in issuing paper currency was followed in most of the other colonies, Virginia being the most conspicuous opponent of the paper money system; and even she yielded in 1755.

In Other Colonies.

The largest issues were in Rhode Island, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and the Carolinas. In these colonies the demand for currency became a veritable fiat money craze. Bills were printed and lent to individuals on the security of lands and commodities. Sometimes it was issued by the public direct and sometimes through corporations on a very slender basis of specie. Virginia's reluctance to employ this kind of money was not so much due to correct ideas of finance as to her habit of using tobacco for currency. Tobacco when not sold immediately was deposited in public warehouses, and the certificates received by the depositors were transferred to other persons in payment of debt or for trade.

The protests of the merchants against the payment of debts in colonial paper soon reached the ears of the British government.

Accordingly, colonial governors were instructed to allow the passage of no more acts authorizing paper money, and sometimes those already passed were vetoed in England. But the governors were not always able to obey their instructions without arousing more resistance than they cared to encounter. During the last struggle with France, 1754 to 1763, the colonies took the plausible ground that they could not furnish troops in aid of the war unless they be allowed to issue more paper money, and when this argument was insisted upon it usually prevailed. The irritation occasioned by the efforts of the crown to check paper money weakened the respect of the people for the British government, and was a powerful factor in preparing them for participation in the revolution. It also opened the way for the flood of public notes which inundated the country as soon as independence was declared.

Efforts of the Crown to Check the Craze.

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CHAPTER VIII

THE CAUSES OF THE REVOLUTION

THE PRINCIPLES AT STAKE

WHEN the British government was about to make peace with France in 1763, it was suggested that the French hold Canada as a restraint on the colonies. The suggestion brought forth a pamphlet from Franklin in which he said the colonies would not desire independence if they were treated fairly.

Bute's
Policy.

Pitt accepted his argument but was out of office before the treaty was concluded. Bute, his successor, grasped at Canada, but forgot all about Franklin's stipulation that the colonies be treated fairly. In fact, if we interpret his policy in the way which seems most justifiable, he was bent on holding Canada and making British authority sufficiently energetic to deal with whatever spirit of self-assertion America might manifest. He meant that the colonies should contribute to the commercial support of England, that the king's prerogative should have ample scope in colonial administration, and that parliament should exercise the right to lay taxes on the colonists. That the colonists should consider this treatment fair was impossible; that they should find legal arguments in opposition to it was natural. Had the British government been in the hands of wise and well-informed men, the crisis of 1763-1776 might have been avoided, which does not, however, mean that it would not have come later.

But the government acted on a basis of strict legality. It was legal for parliament to legislate in any way it saw fit; it was legal for the crown to exercise its prerogative in the veto of laws; it was legal for the royal governors to interfere in many ways with the growth of colonial self-government; and finally it was legal for England to impose the navigation laws on the colonies and to exploit the children's labor for maternal prosperity. These things had been done until they had all the sanction of precedent. Moreover, the Englishman thought them reasonable. Of all the moderns he is least liable to take other people into consideration. A few statesmen have proved an exception to this rule, but George III, Lord Bute, and the existing cabinet were not of the number. Those who directed English colonial affairs in 1763 knew little of that better art of government by which the mind of the governed is as much respected as the interests of the governing class.

Legal Basis
of the Eng-
lish Policy.

The colonies were developing rapidly in numbers and in ideals. In twenty-five years the population had doubled, and with greater strength came greater confidence in the future; and they naturally felt disposed to demand a clearer definition of their relation to the British government. This was difficult because of two apparently conflicting principles which had hitherto been considered binding. One was that the colonists had all the fundamental rights of Englishmen. Under this they believed themselves entitled to the benefits

**Two Con-
flicting
Principles.**

of Magna Charta, the Habeas Corpus Acts, and such other great statements of personal liberty as the Bill of Rights of 1689. There was no disposition in England to deny this claim in its abstract form, but the application given it by the Americans was disputed. From English experience the colonists also deduced the clear right of "no taxation without representation," a principle at the bottom of every great English reform of the preceding two centuries. The other principle related to the power of parliament to legislate for the colonies. From time immemorial Englishmen have held parliament absolute in regard to the scope of its authority. No colonial charter ever dealt with the matter explicitly; but in most of them the assembly was given the right to make such laws as did not conflict with the laws of England. It had come about that the assemblies dealt with local matters and had nothing to do with affairs involving the empire, such as external commerce, the regulation of money, and the collection of debts due to British subjects. To see that this principle was not violated, the

**Veto in Eng-
land and in
the Colonies**

king insisted on the right to veto colonial statutes, although in England his veto of an act of parliament was long since abandoned. The colonists could not but look on this as a wrong. Their own view of their rights was that a colonial assembly was in a small way another parliament, guardian of popular rights and liberties, and ruling its colony as formerly the Scottish parliament ruled Scotland under British supervision. They did not in general dispute the authority of parliament to legislate for the colonies; but they resented the exercise of the right in a very vital way. Never did a more perplexing problem of imperial federation and home rule arise in British political history; and in 1763 England was not ready for it.

GRENVILLE'S POLICY

The men into whose hands the problem fell were George III and George Grenville. The former had been three years king, and had just got the reins of government firmly in his hands. **George III.** The power of Newcastle and Pitt displeased him, and he drove them out of office by combining under his patronage all who had a grudge against either. The war was popular with the country

and enhanced Pitt's influence with the people. The king, therefore, hastened to make a peace which many Englishmen regarded as a sacrifice of national interests. The obloquy of it fell on Bute, the tool who formulated the terms of peace, and he was forced out of office. But George III would yield nothing to the old whig party. He made Grenville prime minister, and by favor and flattery consolidated a parliamentary majority in his support. From that time his purpose was to rule England. He knew little of the colonies and would not have distressed them capriciously. But his love of prerogative was a ruling passion, and once it was questioned by the Americans, his stubborn nature would risk much in its support.

Walpole and Newcastle had paid little attention to the colonies; Grenville, more conscientious and more given to detail, not only gave them attention, but prepared a definite scheme involving their relation to the empire. The national debt was exorbi-

Grenville.

tant, 140,000,000 pounds, and much of it grew out of the late war, fought in behalf of the colonies. To protect the empire a large fleet and a standing army were necessary. To Grenville, logical and prosaic statesman, it seemed the most natural of conclusions that the colonies, a part of the empire, should share this imperial burden. He did not think of the practical difficulties before him, nor did he stop to look at the matter from the colonists' standpoint. His conclusion was made, and three measures were devised to carry it into effect. The situation was well summed up in the remark of a treasury official that, "Grenville lost America because he read the American dispatches, which none of his predecessors had done."

The first of these three momentous acts provided for the strict enforcement of the navigation and customs laws in America. On examination Grenville learned that the duties paid in America did not exceed 2000 pounds a year, and that it cost nearly 8000 pounds a year to collect this sum. Smuggling existed on a large scale, and he proposed to break it up. Ships-of-war were sent to patrol the American coasts, rigid instructions were given to the resident customs officials, and delinquents in office were replaced by men who seemed more trustworthy. In 1764 the "molasses act" of 1733, which had been generally violated with the connivance of the government, was revived and enlarged by the addition of coffee, Spanish and Portuguese wines, and several other less important articles. Thus on the chief articles which New England received in return for her fish, lumber, staves, and food products sold in French and Spanish colonies, such duties must be paid as would practically annihilate the trade. The effects of this would be more far-reaching than Grenville could have known. Besides furs, New England and the middle colonies exported little to England, which did not take their flour, lumber, staves, and cheaper fish; and yet they bought English merchandise heavily. As a result,

1. Naviga-
tion Laws to
be Enforced.

there was a large annual balance against them for which they paid from the cash proceeds of the trade to the islands. Take from them the French and Spanish parts of this trade, and not only would colonial industry suffer, but English merchants would find American orders restricted and American merchants would be hopelessly involved in debts to their British creditors. The act of 1764, therefore, with the stricter revenue regulations accompanying it, brought consternation not only to the smugglers but to all the colonial merchants.

The second measure concerned an army. Grenville decided to maintain 10,000 men in the American colonies and announced that the duties arising from the act just mentioned would defray one-third of the expense. The other two-thirds he would have the king pay. This measure was justified on the ground that the troops were needed to defend the colonies against foreign attack. To the Americans it seemed that the soldiers were designed to overawe them, to support the collection of customs, and to nip in the bud any plans which might be made to support the colonies in their contention for what they considered their rights. And they asked with much pertinence why, if protection were needed, it had not been sent earlier, when French and Indians were a real menace? To this question no satisfactory answer has been given by those who see in Grenville's second measure merely a precaution against foreign dangers.

The third measure was a stamp act. It was not offered in 1764, but Grenville introduced, and parliament passed, a resolution declaring that it might be proper to enact it. A protest came at once from every colonial agent in London, to which Grenville replied by saying that the colonies must assume a part of the military burden, that a stamp tax was easily laid and collected, but that he would be pleased to consider any better scheme of raising the money if the colonies would suggest it. He intimated that by seizing this opportunity the colonists might make a precedent for giving money to the crown only when previously consulted by the ministry. A little reflection showed that this was impracticable unless the colonies should first adopt some satisfactory form of authoritative coöperation in apportioning their respective shares of a contribution and in devising the means of raising the funds.

News of Grenville's measures aroused the apprehension of all the colonists, but it created consternation among the traders of New England. A Boston town meeting declared: "There is no room for further delay. . . . These unexpected proceedings may be preparatory to new taxations upon us; for if our trade may be taxed, why not our lands? Why not the produce of our lands, and everything else we possess?" In this way the commercial class endeavored to make the rural classes see that the cause of one was the cause of all. It was a peculiarly opportune

2. A British
Army in
America.

3. The
Stamp Act.

Alarm in the
Colonies.

time for such agitation; for New England was then in commotion over a proposition, urged by the Anglicans in England and in the colonies, for the creation of an American bishopric. Such a step could not but strengthen the position of that church, lead to the enlargement of its membership, and promote its wider influence in political affairs. New England was especially opposed to such a step, her ministers, the most influential class of her people, were debating the question in every town, and to the alarms they thus felt was now added the feeling that parliament was asserting the right to tax Americans at will. The fact that Grenville's policy bore more hardly on New England than on other sections may explain why it was that the first steps of the revolution were taken by her people.

An Anglican
Bishopric.

In July, 1764, was published in Boston James Otis's "Rights of the British Colonists Asserted and Proved." The author was the most advanced of what was to become the revolutionary group, and his pamphlet may be taken as a statement of the constitutional views of the most extreme Americans. In it is no advocacy of independence. Could the colonists choose, he said, they would prefer the status of British subjects to independence, unless the former condition involved absolute slavery to England. The right of parliament to make laws for the general good of the colonies was admitted, but to allow it the right to tax American trade was to say it might tax any form of American property. In England a distinction had been made between "external" and "internal" taxes: Otis rejected the distinction, saying taxes were taxes, wherever collected. For remedy he suggested that the colonies should have representation in parliament "in some proportion to their number and estates." Already the cry had been raised, "Taxation without representation is tyranny."

Position of
the extreme
Americans.

Two objections may be made to these arguments. One is that they were always overstated. The patriots talked about "British tyranny," and declared that they were about to be "reduced from the character of free subjects to the miserable state of tributary slaves." Such lurid phrases must have been unconvincing to the British ministry, on whose good will depended an exit from the existing confusions. Moreover, these arguments lacked that self-restrained dignity which thoughtful men admire. The cause of the patriots was a good one. The relation of the colonies to England was threatened with a precedent full of possible future calamity, but it was not likely to be removed by calling names. The second objection is that the suggestion of colonial representation was impractical. If it had been adopted, the Americans would have had very little influence in parliament, and they could not have prevented taxation of the colonies. This was so apparent that the demand was soon dropped by the Americans.

Two Ob-
jections.

By the spring of 1765 Grenville knew the views of the colonists on a stamp tax. Instead of suggesting any other method of contributing to the burden of empire they had given unmistakable evidence of repudiation of all British taxes. **The Stamp Act Passed, 1765.** Determined to have the revenue, which he thought essentially just, he now brought in the stamp act, and like the revised "molasses act" of 1764, it passed parliament without serious challenge. It required stamps on all legal and commercial documents, bonds, insurance policies, and newspapers, the proceeds to be expended exclusively on the colonies. Offenses against the act were to be tried by admiralty courts in America or in England, and Grenville proposed to appoint only Americans as agents to distribute the stamps. He wished to soften the execution of the law as much as possible, and he thought the colonists would accept it calmly after a brief state of irritation.

When news of these proceedings came to America there was a storm of protests. The memorials of colonial assemblies to parliament were not received by it, the vote in the House of Lords was unanimous for the tax, and in the commons it was 205 to 49. Truly it seemed that the wishes of the children were despised by the mother. One notable speech had been made against the bill in the commons by Colonel Isaac Barrè, who fervently praised the Americans as "Sons of Liberty." The phrase was taken up in America, and bands of "Sons of Liberty" were soon organized to express the popular disapproval.

But the outburst did not come at once. For some weeks after the act was known to have passed there was a stupefied feeling of outrage, but no one suggested a means of action. The man who took the initiative in protest was Patrick Henry, a Virginia lawyer of Scotch ancestry, who in 1763 had made himself the popular hero in a Presbyterian community by his wonderful speech in the celebrated "Parson's cause." He was now a member of the Virginia house of burgesses, but was distrusted for his extreme views by the old and experienced leaders of the body. To the consternation of the latter, he introduced resolutions condemnatory of the stamp act, in which he claimed for Virginians the exclusive right of taxing themselves in their own assembly. The leaders of the aristocratic East had hitherto been masters of the house, and they considered the young backwoodsman's resolutions too extreme. After a hot debate he carried the day by a close majority. It was here that he made the famous utterance: "Tarquin and Cæsar each had his Brutus; Charles the First his Cromwell; and George the Third" — [from the speaker and others, "Treason! Treason!"] — "may profit by their example. If this be treason, make the most of it." Having won the victory, Henry departed for his home, and his opponents, taking advantage of his absence, carried a motion

**Patrick
Henry's
Resolutions.**

to expunge the most significant words of his resolutions. But the effect was not what they intended. Henry's words had aroused Virginia, and his original resolutions were printed everywhere and no notice taken of the expunging action of the conservatives. Henry became a conspicuous leader in the struggle then beginning. As governor of the state and as counsellor among the revolutionists his work was hardly more than ordinary, but in the task of arousing public sentiment by means of burning and exaggerated descriptions of colonial wrongs he was unequalled in the South. James Otis, of Boston, was his counterpart in the North. Each played his part in the drama about to open.

The popular indignation was general, and associations of "Sons of Liberty" were formed in every colony. They found leaders as fervent as Henry and Otis, intimidated the stamp agents, and forced them to resign, in many places employing violence. In Boston the mob destroyed a building which they thought was to be the stamp office, and pillaged and wrecked the residence of Chief Justice Hutchinson. Defenders of the crown were now denounced as "tories" while friends of the colonies were called "whigs." But the "Sons of Liberty" were only a part of the whigs; for there were in America many conservatives who opposed taxation by parliament but who did not participate in the demonstrations of the radicals. At this time no one openly advocated independence.

Parties
Forming.

The hope of the conservatives was in appeal to the crown, and for that purpose, at the suggestion of Massachusetts, the Stamp Act congress met at New York, October 7, 1765. Delegates came from all the colonies but New Hampshire, Virginia, North Carolina, and Georgia, and from these came unofficial messages of encouragement. The result was petitions to king and parliament and a declaration of the rights of Americans. In the latter we have the first statement of a purpose common to all the colonies. The congress repudiated the notion that the colonies should have parliamentary representation as impossible "from local circumstances," and it admitted the right of parliament to make general and trade laws in reference to the colonies, but denied its authority to lay taxes. The right of taxation, said the delegates, was a sacred right of Englishmen, guaranteed to all the colonists in their charters, and on it they stood. After the congress adjourned committees of correspondence, formed as an afterthought through the suggestion of New York whigs, took up the question of trade reprisal. Thus were made non-importation and non-consumption agreements, which secured wide acceptance by the people. "Touching the pocket nerve," as this course was called, was sensibly felt by the British merchants who signed many memorials for the repeal of the stamp act.

Stamp Act
Congress,
1765

Non-im-
portation.

The state of affairs in America was well known in England when parliament met, December 17, 1765, and it was evident that the objectionable measure must be executed by force or repealed. For the former course neither king nor people were ready. The latter was made easier by the recent retirement of the Grenville ministry for causes not connected with its colonial policy. The first sign of retraction was when inquiry was made to know if the colonies would be satisfied if the stamp act were "moderated." Franklin, agent for Pennsylvania, was interrogated on this point at the bar of the house of commons, and declared that nothing but absolute repeal would be accepted by the colonies. Asked if there were no means by which they would erase their resolutions against parliamentary taxation, he answered, "None that I know of; they will never do it unless compelled by force of arms." Pitt, who was ill when the act passed, now took the floor for repeal. Twitted by Grenville for encouraging the Americans to defy England, he exclaimed: "I rejoice that America has resisted. Three millions of people so dead to all the feelings of liberty, as voluntarily to submit to be slaves, would have been fit instruments to make slaves of the rest." He urged the repeal of the stamp act, but favored a strong assertion of the authority of parliament to "bind their trade, confine their manufactures, and exercise every power whatsoever, except that of taking their money out of their pockets without their consent." The outcome was that March 18 a repeal bill was signed by the king. At the same time passed, the "declaratory act," an explicit statement that parliament could rightfully make laws for "the colonies and people of America, subjects of the crown of Great Britain, *in all cases whatsoever*."

**Stamp Act a
Dead Letter
before its
Repeal.**

In America a few stamps had been sold in South Carolina and Georgia: in all the other colonies the law was not executed in the four and a half months it was formally in force. November 1, the day set for the beginning of its enforcement, was ushered in with the tolling of bells, and processions marched through the chief towns to bury or burn the stamp act. In Connecticut the stamps themselves were seized and burned. In North Carolina the governor found his house surrounded by more than 700 Sons of Liberty, who did not go away until the stamp agent resigned and with other officers swore not to attempt to enforce the odious act. When this situation began, business came to a standstill. No one dared accept an unstamped instrument, and no ship could get stamped clearance papers. But with the triumph of the protestants courage came to the timid ones and business went on as before in disregard of the stamp act.

From such confusions the colonies were thrown into joy by the news of repeal. The bells now rang another tune, liberty poles were erected, and the health of the king was drunk in every kind

of tippie from the rum of the laboring man to the punch and Madeira of the wealthy merchant. Virginia ordered a statue of the king and New York ordered statues of both the king and Pitt. In Philadelphia the substantial citizens gave their homespun clothes to the poor and appeared in handsome suits of British cloth. In their excitement the colonists thought little of the declaratory act, the Sons of Liberty dissolved as a society, and every thought of resisting the mother country disappeared.

Rejoicing at
Repeal.

GROWING IRRITATION

Popular rejoicings did not last long; for spite of the repeal of the stamp act the colonists and the king were wide apart in principle. In New York was a large detachment of regulars who by a parliamentary billeting act of 1765 were to be furnished with quarters by the colony. When the matter was laid before the assembly a partial refusal was obtained and trouble began, with the result that in 1767 the assembly was suspended until it complied with the law. In Massachusetts the governor blundered into a quarrel when he demanded of the assembly compensation for the sufferers through the stamp act riots. Objection was made to the demand, as well as to a call for supplies for the garrison under the billeting act. Next the governor vetoed the election of James Otis as speaker of the assembly. There was much bickering, but a compromise was effected. Old quarrels might have been forgotten if Charles Townshend had not been at the head of the British ministry. His first prominent appearance in colonial affairs was in 1763, when he was first lord of trade in Bute's cabinet. He then formulated a plan to remodel the colonial government on a uniform scale, to enforce the acts of trade, and to use the revenue raised in America to support an army and civil establishment at the will of the crown. The scheme was more thoroughgoing than that inaugurated by Grenville, but it passed out of sight with the fall of the Bute ministry.

The Quarrel
Reopened.

Townshend did not forget it, and when through the fall of the Rockingham ministry in 1766 he became head of the exchequer he returned to his older policy. Without the support of his colleagues in the cabinet he announced that he would bring in a bill to raise in the colonies the money to support an army in America, a bill, he said, which would have the approval of the Americans themselves. Had the cabinet been a strong one, he would probably have been forced to resign; but Pitt, now Earl of Chatham, was ill, and Grafton, the nominal head, was weak-willed, and Townshend was allowed to proceed in the course he mapped out. In May, 1767, he secured the passage of three acts relating to America. In one, duties were laid on tea, glass, red and white lead, and paper. The colonists had admitted

The Town-
shend Acts,
1767.

the legality of external taxes, and such was the kind now laid. But as the revenue from the five articles named would not be more than £40,000, this act was inadequate to the support of an army, for which ten times that much was necessary. It was designed, it seems, for a precedent, to be followed by a much wider list of taxable articles. To secure larger revenues immediately he carried through a law creating a board of commissioners to supervise the execution of the navigation acts in America; and as this would likely lead to commotions, he got a third bill passed as a warning to any colony which disputed the parliamentary act to billet soldiers. It suspended the New York assembly for its recent refusal to furnish supplies at the demand of the governor. The blow fell heavily on that province, in which were many tories, and in 1769 the assembly yielded and was restored to full vigor. The Townshend acts were carried through parliament without serious difficulty. The landed interest controlled both houses and were pleased to throw off their own shoulders any part of the heavy burden of taxation. To them the colonies seemed ungrateful and rebellious children, for whom a little parental sternness would be good. The king fully approved the sentiment. Recalling now the prophecy of 1762 it seems well to say that England lost the colonies, not because Canada was no longer French, but because the mother country thought that the time was come to take them into a stricter control than had hitherto been exercised over them. Whatever might have happened later, the American revolution came, when it did come, as the result of events which England, and not the colonies, initiated.

The colony most affected by trade restrictions was Massachusetts, and she was the first to move in protest. The assembly had a good leader in Samuel Adams, who was the author of several protests of the assembly to king and parliament. He also wrote a circular letter which the assembly sent to the other colonies, suggesting that coöperation was essential in a cause that touched all the continent. Most of the colonies revived the non-importation agreement; but the state of feeling differed from that of 1765 in that it was less vociferous. There were no riots, and the conservative whigs played a larger part. This feeling was well expressed by John Dickinson, of Pennsylvania, in his "Farmer's Letters." He declared that a most serious crisis was on the country and urged that it be met in the spirit of prudence, bravery, and magnanimity. He set aside all thought of independence, saying, "Let us behave like dutiful children, who have received unmerited blows from a beloved parent." But he asserted that if England could tax American imports, she could tax in a prohibitive way the articles she did not wish the colonists to manufacture, and that done, he concluded, "the tragedy of American liberty is finished." From 1767 we hear little

Colonial
Protests.

the other
cause that

Sam. Adams
and John
Dickinson.

in America about the difference between "external" and "internal" taxes. Indeed, it was now freely asserted that England had no right to "legislate" for the colonies.

Townshend died September 4, 1767, Lord North succeeded him as head of the exchequer, and Lord Hillsborough became secretary for the colonies, a new office of cabinet rank; but the Townshend policy was not to be relaxed. When Hillsborough saw the Massachusetts circular to the other colonies, he pronounced it seditious, and ordered the individual governors to adjourn their respective assemblies, if notice was taken of it. To Governor Bernard, of Massachusetts, he sent a demand that the assembly should revoke the circular. In a secret session, by a vote of 92 to 17, the demand was refused, and an address was sent to Hillsborough in which it was said that the colony stood on the principles of the English revolution of 1689. All the colonies were now keenly alive to the situation, and Virginia, the oldest and largest, took a determined position by the side of the trading colonies of the North. When parliament knew of this it passed resolutions of censure on Massachusetts and suggested that the leaders of the whigs in America be sent to England for trial under an obsolete law of Henry VIII's reign. This suggestion brought out a protest from every colony. From this time the controversy was probably beyond the possibility of compromise, although there remained in America many who still hoped England would yield.

New Ministry and an Old Policy.

Meanwhile the spirit of mob violence reappeared, its first outbreak being in Boston, where it was impossible to enforce the revenue acts. In 1768, for example, a cargo of wine was landed without paying duty and carried boldly through the streets under a guard of "stout fellows, armed with bludgeons," and the revenue officials were not rash enough to attempt a seizure. On the contrary, they asked that troops be sent to the town. The request was reasonable from the British point of view; if the laws existed, they should be executed. So thought the government, and in September two regiments with artillery, about 1000 men in all, landed in Boston. The people refused to submit to the billeting law on the ground that there was room for the troops in the barracks at Castle William. General Gage, commander-in-chief in the colonies, protested, but the soldiers had eventually to be placed in buildings hired at dear rentals. They had come to intimidate the town, and between them and the inhabitants relations were unpleasant from the beginning.

Troops sent to Boston.

For eighteen months officers and soldiers avoided serious conflict. They were criticized in the journals, flouted in the streets, and sometimes involved in personal conflict with the more violent townsmen. Nor were they always patient and considerate of the people. They raced horses on Sundays, played

Growing Resentment.

unseemly music near the meetinghouses during divine worship, and planted cannon to command the state house, in which the general court sat. In 1769 Otis was attacked by a revenue commissioner for an article in a newspaper and received a sword cut, from which he sank into insanity. Though the troops had nothing to do with the outrage, it produced high popular resentment for every British agent.

Early in 1770 violent affrays became numerous. It is evident that the long residence of the soldiers in the town had given the

**Bloodshed
in Boston,
1770.**

more radical leaders a text for agitation, and it may be that the populace had reached a point of excitement beyond the control of the leaders. In February a wooden image appeared over the door of a shop whose keeper

flouted non-importation, and a mob interfered when a friend tried to remove it. Thereupon the friend fired into the crowd, killing a boy. At the victim's funeral 500 children walked in front of the remains and 1300 persons followed them to the grave. Such an outburst of sympathy shows how well the whig side was controlled by its leaders. March 5, 1770, came a more serious affair. Two soldiers were attacked and beaten by townsmen, and an ugly spirit

**The
"Boston
Massacre,"
March 5,
1770.**

was aroused. The bells were rung, a large crowd gathered, and a sentinel in front of the customhouse was attacked.

Captain Preston, officer of the day, with thirteen men, went to his support. The mob was not intimidated. They threw snow, shouted vile epithets, and cried: "Fire if you dare, fire and be damned! We know you dare not!"

The soldiers behaved well until one of them, struck with a stick, discharged his musket without orders. The mob rushed forward to take him, but fell back when several other muskets were fired. Drums were beat and all the troops in Boston seized arms to repel a general attack. At this point the governor appeared, and by his appeals induced the angry citizens to disperse. At the first shot, Crispus Attucks, a mulatto, was slain, and subsequently four others were killed and six were wounded. Preston and several of the soldiers were indicted for murder, John Adams and Josiah Quincy appearing as their counsel. All were acquitted but two, who, convicted of manslaughter, pleaded benefit of clergy and escaped with branding on the hand. The day after the shooting a town meeting was held under the leadership of Samuel Adams and John Hancock. The latter was a rich merchant and many times a smuggler. Before their determined protest the governor yielded, and the soldiers were withdrawn from the town. The victims of the "Massacre," as the affair was called, were given a public funeral, and for a dozen years the anniversary of their death was observed in Boston. The incident, described in a pamphlet as the culminating act of British tyranny, had a marked influence on all the colonists. It was the kind of argument that the average citizen could understand.

Meanwhile, events moved rapidly in England. The cabinet, now headed by Lord North, but delivered hand and foot to the will of the king, was surprised to find the revenues from America were only £295 more than the cost of collection and to learn that extraordinary military expenses there were £170,000. For these results the government was creating the spirit of resistance in the colonies; and although North declared in parliament that the Townshend acts ought not to be repealed "till we see America prostrate at our feet," it is certain that he and the king were anxious to escape from the situation without complete defeat. It was with this hope in mind that he announced on the day of the "Boston Massacre," March 5, 1770, a bill to repeal all the duties imposed by the Townshend acts, save that on tea, which was kept to maintain the rights of parliament. "The properest time to assert our right of taxation is when the right is refused," said he with a tone of confidence which must have been assumed for the occasion. For to make palatable the tax of threepence a pound he allowed a drawback of nearly twelve pence a pound on the tea sent from England to America; thus offering cheaper tea to the colonists than to the people of England. The law passed, and its financial effect was good. Colonial imports from Great Britain, which aggregated £2,378,000 in 1768, and fell to £1,634,000 in 1769, rose to £4,200,000 in 1771. Non-importation was relaxed on all articles except tea, but public opinion in regard to that article was expressed in the formation of societies to refrain from tea-drinking. The issue between parliament and the colonies now appeared in a new form: the Grenville plan to tax America for revenue was given up, and in lieu of it was the king's plan to tax it on principle.

**North's Tea
Tax, 1770.**

At this stage we may take a glance at the general situation produced by seven years of controversy. 1. The colonial loyalty of 1763 was gone, and instead were suspicion and bitterness. 2. With it were mingled a feeling of self-confidence and a conviction that England could not carry out the program she had undertaken. She had been obliged to confess failure in regard to the stamp act and the larger part of the Townshend duties; and was to see the same result in regard to the tea duties. 3. The losing controversy provoked a spirit of bitterness between the royal officials in the colonies and leaders of the people there. The former felt impelled to assert their rights, and there were numerous incidents which they took for challenges. The colonials were equally stout-hearted, and in fiery appeals aroused the people on the one hand while they awakened the wrath of the officials on the other. Each side accused the other of usurping authority, and mutual hatred became strong. 4. The colonial assemblies became the centers of resistance to the king. Persons who felt otherwise could not be elected to these bodies; and if any man was disposed to balance between the two

**A Summary
View.**

sides the prospect of defeat by his constituency was apt to make him decide against the crown, and 5. Colonial politics acquired dignity and strength from having a great common cause of protest. Hitherto the contention was about some local matter, as issuing paper money, or the favoritism of a class, and on such a subject men might divide in mere factious feeling. But now there was a cause as great as any that had ever aroused a people. It involved equally the upper and the lower class; it appealed alike to the reason and to the highest emotions; and it had in it every hope of the future.

In 1770 the colonists were divided into three groups: 1. The tories, out and out prerogative men, who either believed that a government was strongest when ruled by the crown or who found it their interest to say so. In this party were those who derived advantage from royal favor, many others who were conservatives by nature and believed the militant whigs were irresponsible and led by demagogues. 2. The whigs, ardently protesting against the plan of king and parliament to bring America under a stronger British control. Some of them were undoubtedly now willing to carry resistance to extremities, but felt it was not wise to say so. Among the leaders were chiefly those who had hitherto dominated the assemblies. Both inclination and interest prompted them to their course; for by establishing the principle of colonial control of taxation they enhanced the power of the assembly, which but increased their own influence. Some whig leaders were accused of demagogy. They organized bands of working men, whom they harangued most passionately against British despotism. Others, and the majority, were more quiet. There was always some difficulty in keeping the extremists from going too fast. 3. A middle class, who considered the defenders of royalty either selfish or misled, but who looked on the whigs as agitators. For the most part, they thought more of their personal affairs than politics. This class was very numerous, especially in the agricultural sections. The desire to bring them to the support of the revolution was a wholesome check on the more impetuous whigs.

At this time Massachusetts was most prominent in opposition to the British policy, and for this Samuel Adams was chiefly responsible.

**Samuel
Adams.**

He was able and persistent, and he lost no opportunity to appeal to the people. In 1772 he carried a vote in a Boston town meeting to create a committee of correspondence to exchange views and information with other towns in the colony. The other towns accepted the suggestion, and thus Adams became the head of a colonial organization in the whig cause. In the following year a group of Virginia whigs, among them Patrick Henry and Thomas Jefferson, carried a resolution in the assembly to appoint a committee for Virginia to correspond with committees of the other colonies in reference to all matters relating to the common

good. Rhode Island, Connecticut, New Hampshire, Massachusetts, and South Carolina adopted this suggestion, and thus was created a central organization in behalf of the continental cause. When these steps were taken three years had elapsed since North had substituted the tea tax for the Townshend duties, and although there had been various irritating occurrences¹ in the several colonies, there was nothing to which the colonies could point as an act of aggression on the part of parliament. Why then should this step toward a united America have been thought necessary? The answer must be that the whigs were gaining in power, and themselves becoming more aggressive. They had ample reason to know that the king and his officers had not relaxed their purpose to exercise the mastery, and they were preparing to meet a danger they felt inevitable.

A small incident brought the blow they were expecting. In 1773 the East India Company, which imported England's tea, was in financial straits, due, it seems, to its inability to sell tea in the American colonies. It appealed to the government for a remission of duties. Lord North and the king willingly gave the relief asked for, and the company was now allowed to send its tea to America without any duty paid in England. North was asked to give up, also, the duty of threepence a pound imposed by the act of 1767; but he refused, saying the king was determined to make its collection a test of authority with America. On this small point, it seems safe to say, hung the question of American revolt.

The East
India Com-
pany.

The company took the favor granted it, and in 1773 sent to the colonies a number of ships laden with the tea which for months had been accumulating in its warehouses. All this was known in the colonies, and the people were determined to resist. The whig leaders at once put into operation their machinery of arousing opinion. The governors and higher officials who led the tories had no means of checking the whigs, and the middle group were indifferent. At Charleston the agents of the company resigned before the popular storm, and as the duty had not been paid at the end of twenty days the tea was seized by the collector and stored in damp vaults. Three years later it was sold at auction. In Philadelphia the whig leaders called large popular

Cargoes of
Tea.

¹The most important was the destruction of the *Gaspée*, a small ship with eight guns which was very active in arresting smugglers in Rhode Island. The commander was applauded by his superiors for his zeal, and became overconfident. He went so far as to send some of the seized property to Boston for adjudication, alleging, with probable truth, that justice would not be obtained in Rhode Island. He became very unpopular in this colony, and when, on June 9, 1772, his ship ran aground near Providence, a group of citizens attacked it, wounded the commander, overpowered the crew, and burned the hated craft. The party were well known by common report, but when a commission appeared to inquire into the outrage no evidence could be had. The incident promoted colonial defiance and strengthened the conviction of the British government that the supreme problem in the colonies was to teach the colonists to respect authority.

meetings which denounced the tea tax. Here, as in New York, the agents declined to act, and the cargoes went back in the ships which brought them. In Boston excitement was high. The agents, two of whom were sons of Governor Hutchinson, refused to resign, and took refuge in the castle. When the captains of the tea ships wished to go back to England with their cargoes, the governor forbade their departure. He seemed determined to force the issue to a settlement, and Adams met it squarely. On the night of December 16, 1773, about fifty men disguised as Indians and directed by Adams himself went aboard the ships at the wharf and emptied 342 chests of tea into the water. No effort was made by the town officials to prevent this affair, nor were any of the participants prosecuted for destroying property. This act of violence is to be defended only on the ground that Adams and his associates considered war inevitable and looked upon themselves as its heralds.

**"Boston
Tea Party,"
Dec. 16,
1773.**

CONTINENTAL ORGANIZATION AND ATTEMPTS AT ADJUSTMENT

While the news of the "Boston Tea Party" was fresh in England, parliament came together, March 7, 1774. The king was determined that Boston should be made to respect his power and lost no time in calling to the attention of the lawmakers the state of affairs in America. With the majority the only question was to make authority respected, and though Chatham in one house and Burke in the other pleaded for a restoration of the laws to the state they were in before Grenville, a policy of coercion was adopted. It was stated in five acts, the substance of which was as follows:

**The Colo-
nists Must
Obey the
Laws.**

1. The port of Boston was closed, the customhouse was moved to Salem, and ships were stationed in the harbor to enforce the law.

**Boston Port
Bill.**

The ban was to be removed by the king when compensation was made for the tea destroyed and when he was satisfied that the duties would be paid in the future.

2. The charter of Massachusetts was remodeled so as to remove several of its liberal features. Councillors, who had hitherto been chosen by the assembly, were now to be appointed by the crown.

**The Massa-
chusetts
Charter.**

All the minor executive and judicial officers were also to be appointed, and not elected, as formerly; and the town meeting was not to meet, except for elections,

without the consent of the governor, who must specifically authorize the kind of business that could be transacted. Lawyers were then divided on the question of the authority of parliament to annul or amend a colonial charter; but so good an authority as Chief Justice Mansfield supported the right. He proceeded on the theory that the English parliament may do anything but a physical impossi-

bility. But granted this be true, what shall we say of the political wisdom of the men who thus jauntily tried to uproot a form of government which had developed through a century and a half? Could they have expected any other answer than resistance? From being a home of democracy Massachusetts was now to be a centralized province, with no other feature of popular government than the right to choose the members of the lower house.

3. To secure a fair trial for officials charged with capital crimes while executing their duties, the governor might, if he saw fit, send them to England for a hearing. In such a case he must send witnesses. The law seems to have been suggested by the trial of Preston and the soldiers concerned in the Boston "Massacre."

Trial in
England.

4. The law of 1765 to authorize quartering troops had been allowed to expire; but it was now revived. It was ominous, also, that General Gage, commander of troops in America, was made governor of Massachusetts.

A Quarter-
ing Act.

5. The domain ceded by France in 1763 was organized into a province of Quebec, governed by a legislative council appointed by the crown, with the Catholic Church established by law, and with limits including the region between the Ohio and the lakes. The act was the result of a long investigation by English officials and lawyers, and plausible reasons not connected with the seaboard situation are assigned for its important features. But it came at an inopportune moment. Virginia, New York, Connecticut, and Massachusetts claimed territory in the Northwest and resented the loss of it. To all the whigs it seemed that England wished to build up beyond the mountains a great power dependent on the St. Lawrence and lake systems of transportation, with a government highly centralized and held firmly in hand by the crown, and with an established religion which would preclude any sympathy with the Atlantic colonies. Recent investigations have shown that these assumptions were unwarranted. The Northwest was attached to Canada, it is said, for the better regulation of the fur trade, and the government and religion established in the province were necessarily adopted for a population mostly French Catholic and accustomed to the French régime. The seaboard colonies knew nothing of this. Had they known, the "Quebec act" must have aroused their apprehension. From early days they had dreamed of the time when they should subdue the wilderness as far as the Mississippi. It now seemed evident that the dream was shattered, for whatever the motive of the government the Northwest was to be closed to the Atlantic colonies by being handed over to a people peculiarly dependent on the crown and largely alien in political and religious sentiment.

The
"Quebec
Act."

The acts of 1774 brought consternation to the colonists, for they left no choice between resistance and submission. June 1, Boston was

blockaded, no goods might go out or come in, business stood still, and want invaded the homes of the poor. May 13 General Gage arrived with four regiments, and assumed the duties of military governor. It was expected that the town would soon be forced into submission and the other colonies be overawed by the fate of Massachusetts.

**Boston
Punished.**

But there was little thought of submission. From the neighboring towns and from the remotest colonies came relief for Boston's poor.

**The Effect
Elsewhere.**

A shower of pamphlets appeared in every quarter arguing that the cause of Massachusetts was the cause of all the colonies. So threatening became the situation that Gage fortified the neck of land then joining the town to the mainland, and gave up all thoughts of offensive operations against the interior. The officials appointed under the remodeled charter dared not show themselves outside of his lines.

By this time much was being said about a congress representing the whole continent after the manner of the stamp act congress of 1765.

**A Conti-
nental
Movement.**

The suggestion was generally approved, and Virginia took the initiative. In May her burgesses set aside June 1, the day the Boston Port Bill began to operate, as a day for fasting and prayer, and for this Governor Dunmore dissolved the house. Then the members, in a meeting at the famous Raleigh tavern in Williamsburg, sent out a summons for an annual congress to consider "the united interest of America," and called a Virginia convention to elect delegates to such a congress. The response was immediate and hearty. In three colonies only, Rhode Island, Massachusetts, and Pennsylvania, delegates could be chosen by the assembly. Elsewhere the royal governor adjourned that body to keep it from acting, and the people followed Virginia's example of calling a convention on their own authority. How completely the whigs now controlled colonial politics is shown by the fact that the personnel of these conventions was usually the same as that of the several assemblies.

When the delegates assembled in Philadelphia, September 5, 1774, all the colonies were represented but Georgia. They were the best

**The First
Continental
Congress,
1774.**

men among the whigs, all trained by years of leadership in their respective struggles against royal governors or rival factions. The sessions were secret, but we know that two groups appeared among the delegates.

One wished to have a union of the colonies, with a president appointed by the king and a council of delegates which could make laws subject to parliamentary veto and which could also veto laws of parliament relating to the colonies. Had this plan been adopted and allowed by England the colonies would have remained English. It

Two Sides.

was favored by the most conservative, among them Jay, Duane, Colden, Galloway, and Edward Rutledge. It had the serious defect that it would most certainly be rejected by the king.

The delegates from Virginia and Massachusetts led the other group. War alone, it was evident, could shake the will of George III, and if we must fight, let it be for independence. This was a bold idea and the supporters of it did not venture to announce it openly. A great many whigs clung lovingly to the name "Briton," and it was finally decided to publish the American contention to the world and await the formation of public opinion. Thus it was that the congress took up the preparation of a series of "Declarations and Resolves." The differences among the delegates show in the utterance in regard to legislation. It distinctly claims for the colonies the "exclusive power" to legislate for their own affairs, subject only to the king's veto, but it promises acquiescence to parliamentary acts for the *bona fide* regulation of external commerce and made in the commercial interest of the empire. As to ordinary rights of person and political liberty the resolutions were clear and strong. The congress also prepared addresses to the king, the British nation, and to the people of the colonies.

The most important action of the congress was the adoption of the "Association," an agreement to import no English products after December 1, 1774, and to export nothing to any British port, European or colonial, after September 10, 1775. This action occasioned serious opposition from New England and the middle colonies; but every section must sacrifice something. Virginia gave up the exportation of tobacco to England, Massachusetts the West India trade, and Rhode Island the slave trade. The local committees were urged to see that the "Association" was not violated. They became a very important factor in the revolutionary movement, administering oaths to those who seemed of doubtful loyalty, publishing lists of persons who violated the Association, and in many other ways making life unpleasant for tories, as all opponents of revolution soon began to be called. The "Association" was readily ratified by all the colonies but New York, where there was a strong tory element, and Georgia, which was badly divided between factions of New England and Southern origin. But in both these colonies the whigs were numerous and organized local committees to promote the colonial cause.

October 26 congress dissolved, ordering a new congress to meet May 10, 1775, unless the grievances of the colonies were previously redressed. Its chief significance was that it gave cohesion to the whigs. They had come to understand one another. Their appeals discountenanced independence, but advised that the people be ready for the worst. At the same time the country was full of warlike preparations. Arms were bought and military companies were formed. Provincial congresses and committees of safety gave the revolutionary movement an efficient organization. The royal governors reported to the home government

Non-im-
portation
"Associa-
tion."

What the
Congress
Signified.

all that happened, but they were powerless to arrest the preparations which led directly toward revolution.

Gage, behind his Boston barrier, watched anxiously the gathering storm in Massachusetts. Reliable information convinced him that the advent of spring, 1775, would make his task a difficult one. To anticipate his opponents seemed good policy, and on the evening of April 18 he sent 800 men to seize some stores at Concord, 18 miles away. The whigs were on the watch, and sent messengers to arouse the countryside. A lantern in the tower of the North church flashed information of the departure to Paul Revere, on the other side of Charles river, who rode hastily to Lexington. Signal guns and galloping horses soon told the regulars that their movements were known. On Lexington common at dawn they encountered sixty minute men in military line, who refused to disperse. Suddenly there was a single shot, and then a volley, before which the militiamen fled, eight killed and ten wounded. The British lost none, and proceeded to Concord, where they destroyed such stores as the natives, warned of the movement, had not carried away. By this time the countryside swarmed with militia, and the British hastily retreated. Every rock, tree, or fence that offered cover concealed angry Americans from whose fire the regulars suffered severely. Gage, informed of the situation, sent Percy with 1500 fresh troops to escort the column to safety. By this means it came back to Boston, but with a loss of 273 killed, wounded, and missing. The militia lost 93 in all, and following the retreating column in force began the siege of Boston.

The news from Lexington and Concord flew rapidly southward. In five days it reached Philadelphia, six days later it reached Virginia, and May 4 it was at Edenton, North Carolina. Everywhere it brought forth patriotic resolves and preparations for war. Its most outspoken reception was in Mecklenburg county, North Carolina, the center of a large Scotch-Irish population. Here on May 31, the militia companies being met for their muster, a series of resolutions was passed, declaring the commissions of civil and military officers null and void, and appointing a method of local government "until laws shall be provided for us by Congress." A copy of these resolutions was sent to England, where it is preserved, and they were also printed in a Charleston newspaper. The original was destroyed by fire, and being rewritten from memory survived in a form resembling the national declaration of independence. Many people have taken this paper, whose date, May 20, is supposed to be accounted for by the difference between new and old chronology, for the resolutions actually passed on May 31. This "Mecklenburg Declaration of Independence" is not supported by reliable contemporary evidence, and is now rejected by the best historians.

May 10, 1775, the second continental congress assembled in Philadelphia. Events in Massachusetts filled every heart with dismay, and preparations were made for war. The New England volunteers, which had been called out to the number of 20,000, were taken into the pay of congress, and Washington was appointed to the command. But still the conservatives hesitated to declare for independence, and to preserve harmony the advanced wing consented to defer that step. All united in a declaration of "the Causes and Necessity for taking up Arms," and made a last address to the king. The march of events was bringing the colonies inevitably to separation from England, and the progressives could afford to wait.

In this sense nothing could have been more propitious than the progress of the siege of Boston, where Gage, with more than 6000 men, was held in close lines. His position was insecure by reason of high ground behind Charlestown on the north and behind Dorchester on the south. If either place were fortified, his own position would be untenable. On the night of June 16 the Americans attempted to secure

Second
Continental
Congress,
1775.

Bunker Hill.

the former position, and for that purpose Colonel Prescott occupied Breed's Hill, constructing redoubts, at which the British opened fire from fleet and batteries early on the 17th. Prescott held his position, and throughout the morning groups of colonials came to his support. Gage saw this, and sent General Sir William Howe with a strong attacking column to carry the redoubts



in front. Breed's Hill, like the adjacent Bunker Hill, which gave name to the battle, is on a peninsula whose upper part, a narrow plain, was commanded by the fleet. Had Howe taken this point and fortified it, the Americans must have hastened from their position or been starved into surrender. But neither Howe nor Gage had respect for the fighting qualities of their foes, and for their rashness paid dearly. It was in the afternoon when the regulars landed and slowly formed their lines along the shore. Prescott, following the best tradition of the American frontiersmen, ordered his men not to fire "until you see the whites of their eyes." At close range they delivered such deadly volleys that the attacking column recoiled, and fell back with great

loss. Rallied again, they again were driven back. A third time they approached the crest, now supported by a body of marines, and moving carefully. At first the Americans fired effectively, and then, to the surprise of Howe, their fire ceased and they retired from the field. Their ammunition was exhausted, and they had no bayonets to withstand a charge. The British took possession of the crest, having lost over 1000 killed and wounded. The American loss was 441, and General Nathanael Greene remarked, "I wish we could sell them another hill at the same price." This engagement was considered a brilliant victory by the Americans, and after it the revolutionary war was inevitable.

Washington, commander-in-chief, arrived in Cambridge July 2. The army was in confusion, supplies were lacking, enthusiasm was cooling, and many of the men were going home at the expiration of their terms of service. Had Howe, who succeeded Gage in command, attacked vigorously, the Americans must have given way. Washington's presence worked a change. He was a man to be respected; order reappeared, recruits came in, and the army recovered spirits. Supplies came from an unexpected source. Ethan Allen, of Vermont, acting on his own authority, raised a force of "Green Mountain Boys," surprised and captured Ticonderoga and Crown Point, after which Fort St. John fell. At these points the British had left large quantities of guns and ammunition, which now proved very helpful to the Americans. Especially useful were the cannon, which were carried to Boston over the snow. Other important assistance came from an improvised fleet, one ship of which, the *Lee*, commanded by John Manley, took an ordnance brig with 2000 muskets with bayonets and a large store of ball and powder.

Thus provided, Washington, in the spring of 1776, determined to force the siege to an end. March 4 he seized Dorchester Heights and placed cannon there. Howe sought to drive him away, but a storm luckily kept the British for several days from crossing the harbor, and when it subsided the Heights were too strong to be taken. Boston and the fleet were now at the mercy of the American guns, and Howe agreed to go away and leave the city without further damage if he was not molested. March 17 the departure began, the British carrying with them to Halifax about 1000 residents of the town who were loyal to the king, and some of whom had been so prominent on that side that they did not trust themselves in a community ruled by the whigs.

While Howe spent the winter inactive in Boston the British projected an expedition against the Carolinas, where the loyalists were numerous. It was expected that a fleet would easily take Charleston and overawe the rich planters of the South Carolina coast, who were the leaders of the

**Washington
in Com-
mand.**

**Ethan
Allen.**

**Boston
Evacuated.**

**Loyalists
in the
Carolinas.**

American cause in the colony. It would then go to the mouth of the Cape Fear, where it would be joined by a loyal army from North Carolina and the British authority would thus be reestablished in the two colonies. Along the Cape Fear were many Highlanders, who had no sympathy with the whig doctrines, and it was certain that most of them would come out to defend the crown. In this province, also, were the Regulators, members of an organization which existed from 1767 to 1771 to deal with extortionate lawyers and exorbitant country officials in what were then called the "back counties." They at last rose in impotent wrath, whipped such lawyers as they could lay hands on, and broke up the Hillsborough court. Governor Tryon suppressed them at the battle of Alamance, 1771; at which most of the men now prominent in the revolution in North Carolina fought under the governor. The Regulators had good memories, they would have little to do with the whig movement, and when the news went abroad that a force was gathering at Fayetteville by command of the king to deal summary punishment to Caswell, Harnett, Ashe, and others of the old legislative oligarchy, they came to its assistance to the number of several hundred.

The Regulators.

Thus it was that 1600 Highlanders and former Regulators under Donald MacDonald started from Fayetteville February 18, 1776, to join the expected fleet at Wilmington. Caswell was on the alert, and they were intercepted by a whig force of 1000 men at Moore's Creek Bridge on February 27. In a sharp battle the loyalists were defeated, their baggage taken, and all who were not killed or captured were driven in confusion to their homes.

Battle of Moore's Creek.

Meanwhile the coöperating fleet was delayed, and it was the middle of April when it reached the mouth of the Cape Fear. Here it loitered six weeks until convinced that no successful demonstration would be made in the interior, and then it proceeded against Charleston. Six thousand militia held the town, and a fort of green palmetto logs on Sullivan's Island commanded the channel, Colonel Moultrie in charge. The British might have surrounded this work and forced it to surrender, but with characteristic contempt for the colonials, they tried to batter it down, June 28, 1776. Their solid shot only buried themselves in the soft logs of the fort, whose well directed fire swept the decks of the fleet, and the attacking party were glad to withdraw with the loss of only one vessel. The Carolinas were saved, the South remained unshaken, and the Americans were encouraged generally.

British Failure at Charleston.

At Boston and in the South the patriots acted on the defensive and succeeded. The result was otherwise in Canada, where they assumed the offensive. It was thought that the French Canadians would gladly throw off the British yoke, and in the autumn of 1775 two columns

marched against Quebec. One, led by Montgomery, 1500 strong, took Montreal by way of Lake Champlain, while another, under Arnold, starting with 1100 men, marched through Maine and came, after terrible sufferings, with only 500 survivors before Quebec. Here the two columns united, but a joint attack failed to take the place. Montgomery was killed, and Arnold remained through the winter before Quebec. The natives gave him no assistance. Reënforced, he was gradually forced back by Sir Guy Carleton, commanding in Canada, but by disputing every mile of the way he delayed his antagonist and prevented Carlton's coöperation in the movements which Howe, as we shall see, was about to make against the lower Hudson.

**Expedition
against
Quebec.**

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CHAPTER IX

THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION

THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE

By the close of 1775 only the exporters and merchants in England thought of yielding to America. The landholders, who controlled parliament, and Englishmen generally, believed that rebellion existed and should be suppressed. The king was for coercion. He would not receive the petition of the second continental congress, and when he heard of Bunker Hill, proclaimed the Americans rebels and forbade commercial intercourse with them. Parliament closed the American ports and authorized the impressment of American sailors for service in the royal navy. As further notice of the unyielding intention of the British, Falmouth, Maine (Portland), was burned in October and Norfolk, Virginia, on January 1, 1776. At this time the second continental congress was sitting in a second session, holding back such impetuous members as Samuel Adams and Patrick Henry, and waiting for sentiment to form. It was now so evident that the colonies must submit or fight that most of the conservatives gave up their opposition to independence. Jefferson expressed the general opinion when he wrote: "I will cease to exist before I yield to a connection on such terms as the British Parliament proposes."

In January, 1776, appeared at Philadelphia a pamphlet called "Common Sense," by "an Englishman." It stated the case of the colonies in the plain language of the people, and was widely read. What all had been thinking was here plainly stated. "Common Sense." "The period of debate," said the author, "is closed. Arms, as the last recourse, must decide the contest. The appeal was the choice of the king and the continent hath accepted the challenge." At first this bold utterance was attributed to Franklin, but it soon became known that it was written by Thomas Paine, an Englishman then resident about a year in America. In later years he became unpopular on account of his writings against the Christian religion; but history cannot forget that he was an important promoter of the revolution.

By the spring of 1776 the conservatives were driven to the last ditch. They desired some form of colonial home rule which should preserve British sovereignty and leave the colonies a large measure

of self-direction. They were strong in the middle colonies, especially in Pennsylvania and New York, where the older settlements felt much apprehension at the prospect of a democratic upheaval which should disturb the political center of gravity. New England, Virginia, and North Carolina were clearly with the radicals, and South Carolina and Georgia were undecided. Colonial home rule was far from the thought of king and parliament, and as this fact became more apparent in America the more the conservatives found themselves at sea.

Waning Influence of the Conservatives.

While Congress thus hesitated in the hope of uniting the two factions within its membership, North Carolina, the one democratic Southern colony, authorized her delegates at Philadelphia to support independence. It was the step uppermost in the minds of the radicals, and other colonies followed rapidly. May 15 congress advised the colonies to continue no longer in the parlous state in which they then were, but to erect themselves into states, with governments resting on the consent of the people. The advice had already been anticipated by Virginia, where a convention met on May 5, and on the 15th declared Virginia independent of Great Britain. This action by the oldest and largest of the thirteen colonies had a most powerful effect on the hesitating ones. South Carolina and Georgia could not hold out longer, and Maryland and New Jersey showed signs of weakening:

State Action in Behalf of Independence.

June 7, Richard Henry Lee of Virginia gave further evidence of the leadership his state had assumed when he introduced in congress three important resolutions. They declared: (1) that the thirteen colonies were and ought to be free and independent, (2) that foreign alliances should be made, and (3) that steps should be taken to adopt a general plan of confederation. The conservatives, led by Dickinson of Pennsylvania, who still clung to colonial home rule, suggested that the first resolution might well await action on the third, and the idea was adopted; but a committee consisting of Jefferson, Franklin, John Adams, Roger Sherman, and Robert R. Livingston was appointed to draught a declaration. Preparing a form of general government proved a slow affair, and July 1 the question of independence was again taken up. Little discussion was necessary, and July 2 congress voted in its favor and called on the committee for a written declaration, the New York delegates refusing to vote. Then was brought in the famous paper, chiefly the work of Jefferson, which with slight changes was formally adopted on July 4. August 2 an engrossed copy was signed by the members present, some of whom were not in attendance on July 4, and later on some signed who were absent on August 2. By this time the New York delegates had been instructed to sign, and thus the declaration had the support of all the thirteen colonies. The report of the committee to prepare a plan of confederation was made

The Declaration of Independence.

July 12, but it met such opposition that it was not until November 17, 1777, that an agreement could be reached (see page 238).

The Declaration of Independence is one of the great documents of history. All that Locke and his followers in England and France had asserted about the nature of government was here re-asserted and made a practical matter. Here we read that "all men are created equal," that they have the right to "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness," to secure which governments are established, that the right to rule is derived "from the consent of the governed," and that when a given government ceases to guarantee these privileges, "it is the right of the people to alter or to abolish it, and to institute a new government, laying its foundation on such principles, and organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their safety and happiness." Here was stated the theoretical basis of the American government. In justification of the revolution the Declaration further set forth a long series of acts of tyranny committed by the king and parliament against which the colonies had protested in vain. It closed with the noble assertion that "these united colonies are, and of right ought to be, free and independent states," and for the support of this assertion they mutually pledged to each other "our lives, our fortunes, and our sacred honor."

THE CAMPAIGN AROUND NEW YORK, 1776


The central position on the Atlantic coast is New York. Howe, in Boston, well knew it, and would have gone thither directly had he not been forced to leave that city with a beaten army. His stay at Halifax was short. Gathering supplies and recruits he soon sailed southward, and June 25 was off Sandy Hook, welcomed warmly by Governor Tryon and the loyalists, whom the whigs had forced to leave the city. By the beginning of August he had 32,000 men on Staten Island, and an excellent fleet under his brother, Earl Howe, lay in the lower harbor.

Washington also appreciated the importance of New York, and repaired thither with his army as soon as the evacuation of Boston gave him opportunity. He strengthened the defenses of the city, then on the lower end of the island. The approach by water was defended by works on Governor's Island, and at Paulus Hook (Jersey City), and Red Hook, on Long Island, and by obstructions in the channel. As a second line of defense, if such should be necessary, Forts Lee and Washington were constructed on opposite sides of the Hudson at a point near what is now 183rd street. So far the work was good; but reflection showed that the easiest approach was by way of Brooklyn, and that the key to that position was a wooded ridge, Brooklyn Heights, or the Heights of Guana, two miles behind the village and extending

**Howe on
Staten Is-
land.**

**The De-
fenses of
New York.**

from the Narrows to the northeast. It was passable by artillery at the shore, at Flatbush Pass, and at Jamaica Pass, the last six miles or more from the shore. To hold Brooklyn and this approach to it he detailed General Nathanael Greene with 7000 men. The rest, about 21,000, were distributed among the various fortified positions or held in readiness in the city.



Howe's first operations against New York, unlike his later movements, were energetic, and showed a disposition to utilize his advantage of superior strength. August 22, he threw a large part of his army across the Narrows and lay before Greene's force at the western end of Brooklyn Heights. This American commander was ill from fever, and Washington sent General Israel Putnam to take command. Putnam's courage and patriotism had been proved on many occasions, but he was not a commander either by training or natural endowment, and in this case he left the several parts of the army to take care of themselves. Howe's attack was made on the morning of August 27. Dividing his army into three columns, he sent the first to threaten the Americans along the shore, another was to move

The Battle of Brooklyn Heights, August 27, 1776.

through Flatbush, on their center, while a third, which he led in person, was to make a wide detour around their left. The turning movement was made in the night of August 26, and took Putnam completely by surprise. Knowing by the cannonading that it was time to advance, the first and second columns then attacked vigorously, and the Americans, taken in front and rear, were forced back into the defenses of the village of Brooklyn with a loss of 1500 men, 1100 of whom were captured.

Washington threw reinforcements across the East river to save the remnant of the army. He was reluctant to abandon the position; for the cliff-like "Heights" of Brooklyn, now the abode of the city's most prominent families, and not to be confounded with the scene of the battle of the 27th, dominated lower New York. A day's experience showed him that he had committed an error. If the British fleet forced its way into the river, he would be caught in a trap from which he could not hope to escape. That such a thing did not happen probably was due to a strong northeast wind which held for three days, and made it impossible for the ships to beat up the river. In the evening of the 29th Washington began to transfer his army in such boats as he could find. Late in the night the wind fell, and in the following morning a dense fog settled over the scene. Under its protection the army and all the supplies except a few heavy guns were removed to safety, to the extreme disgust of Howe, who had thought the victims all but taken.

New York was now abandoned, the Americans retreating toward the north end of the island. A British force followed, but was beaten off in a rear-guard action, the Battle of Harlem, over ground on which Columbia University now stands. It was now, September 22, that Captain Nathan Hale, formerly a Connecticut schoolmaster, was shot for a spy. He had volunteered to go into New York to obtain information, and when arrested avowed his mission. His dying words, "I only regret I have but one life to lose for my country," were soon repeated at every patriot's fireside in the land. For a short time there was an interval of inaction, after which Howe moved eastward to get around Washington's strongly intrenched position north of Harlem. At Pell's Point Colonel Glover, of Massachusetts, with 750 men held back the British column of 4000, inflicting a loss of 800, and by his spirited resistance changing Howe's determination to make a turning movement. The result was the battle of White Plains, October 22, an attack on Washington's front, delivered deliberately. The Americans were driven back after inflicting a serious loss. Howe had penetrated their lines, but a rain storm intervened, and Washington withdrew to a strong position at Newcastle.

Howe now gave up the idea of crushing his antagonist, who was clearly too wary for such a fate, and attempted to take Forts Washington and Lee. His ships had passed freely between them, and Washington told Greene, who was in direct command, to abandon them if it seemed advisable. He himself took steps to construct in the Highlands other defenses of the important river, which seemed to invite invasion from

**Forts
Washington
and Lee
Captured.**

Canada. As the British threatened New Jersey, he moved a portion of his army across the river, thus dividing his force. Then Howe closed in on Fort Washington and forced it to surrender with 2600 men, the best in the American army. Rapidly moving across the Hudson he took Fort Lee with a large quantity of supplies, barely giving the garrison opportunity to escape to the western wing near Hackensack. The eastern wing, 7000 strong at Newcastle, was commanded by Lee, whom Washington vainly ordered to his aid in New Jersey. Lee was willful and selfish. Second in command, he enjoyed the prospect of promotion to first place if calamity befell his superior; and by his disobedience he was willing to contribute to that end.

**The Contest
transferred
to New
Jersey.**

Flushed by success, Howe now believed the war all but ended. His opponents were divided and discouraged, and many of their regiments anxiously awaited the end of the year when their terms of enlistment would expire. All this he well knew from the Tories, who were numerous. It seemed easy to complete the destruction of a foe thus situated, and that honor he awarded to Lord Cornwallis, who with 5000 men moved quickly against the 6000 Washington now had at Newark. Under these circumstances, battle was impossible, and the campaign resolved itself into an American retreat. At Brunswick most of the Maryland and New Jersey militia marched home, spite of the pleas of their commander, because their terms of service had expired. Washington, left with only 3000 men, fell back rapidly, and December 8 placed his army with the baggage on the south side of the Delaware at Trenton. As he transferred his last battalions, the British vanguard arrived, but he had secured all the boats for seventy miles along the river and was safe for the time. To congress he appealed for help, urging that militia were inadequate, and asking that a continental army be enlisted for the war.

**The Retreat
through
New Jersey.**

Meanwhile, to many people, the cause of independence seemed doomed. Howe issued a proclamation, offering pardon to those who submitted, and 2700 people accepted it, among them the president of the New Jersey committee of safety. In Philadelphia, thirty miles from Trenton, there was great terror. Merchants closed their stores, congress adjourned to Baltimore, martial law was established, and the roads were thronged with fugitives. In its dismay, congress gave Washington full power to carry on the war as he saw fit.

**Dismay
of the
Americans.**

The manner in which he justified their confidence is one of the gratifying stories of the war. At Trenton was Colonel Rall with 1400 men, mostly Hessians, who by committing numerous outrages on the inhabitants had made themselves thoroughly hated. On Christmas night Washington undertook to seize this force. Dividing his army into three columns he ordered them across the Delaware to surround the enemy's position. Two were turned back by obstacles, but the third, with which he himself marched, reached the north bank of the river, advanced eight miles through a storm of sleet, seized the only road which offered a means of escape, and forced the Hessians to a battle in which Rall was killed and 1000 of his men were captured and carried safely into Pennsylvania. Immediately recrossing the Delaware, he again faced the enemy, who concentrated a strong force at Trenton and believed they were about to crush their opponents. But Washington, leaving his camp fires burning brightly, slipped away during the night, passed the British flank, and in the early morning of January 3, 1777, defeated a strong column at Princeton. From these two victories came a revival of hope, which promoted the enlistment of troops, and as the remnant of Lee's army had now joined, the worst of the recent danger was passed. Washington manifested his confidence by taking position at Morristown, New Jersey, where he was not disturbed. Howe, on the other hand, did not dare leave his army in outposts throughout New Jersey, and that province once more passed under American authority. Washington's military prowess has sometimes been questioned, and one cannot deny that there were long intervals when he seemed to be content to let well enough alone, but in the battles of Trenton and Princeton, as in the campaign against Yorktown, when spurred by a great necessity, he showed aggressiveness and resourcefulness of the highest order. Frederick the Great said that Washington's success from December 25, 1776, to January 4, 1777, was "the most brilliant" in military history.

The Battles of Trenton and Princeton.

THE CAMPAIGNS OF 1777, PHILADELPHIA AND SARATOGA

For a time events had seemed to confirm the hope of the king that the war would be short and easy. But the end of the year 1776 changed the prospect. "All our hopes," said Germain, the colonial secretary, in 1779, "were blasted by that unhappy affair at Trenton." In fact, when spring came in 1777, two years after the affair at Lexington, the British held no parts of the colonies except New York and Newport, Rhode Island. Elsewhere the people went quietly about their business, saw the whig politicians call provincial congresses and adopt state constitutions, read the laws of the continental congress, and gave a passive obedience to the new régime. But the call for soldiers was slightly heeded,

Indifference in America.

partly because the people were accustomed to look to the states for political authority, and had no love for the newborn congress, partly because of inherited jealousy of a standing army, and partly because there had in the past been so little popular participation in government that the ordinary man felt little responsibility on its account. Try as it might, congress could not raise an army. Making allowance for the Tories and slaves, there were in the thirteen states in 1777 about 200,000 men of the military age, yet Washington, with power to offer as liberal terms as he chose, had in the early spring no more than



4000 regulars. Besides these, his hope was the militia, which the experience of the preceding year taught him to esteem lightly.

It was a small force to oppose the operations then being planned by the British government. Three strong columns were to coöperate in seizing the Hudson in order to cut in two the area of resistance; one under General Burgoyne was to move from Montreal by way of Lake Champlain; another under St. Leger was to march from Oswego through the Mohawk valley, and a third, Howe's army, was to advance up the Hudson from New York. The three armies were expected to meet at or near Albany. By Germain's carelessness, an order to participate in this movement was not sent to Howe, who, thinking himself free to fight where he chose, decided to take Philadelphia.

British
Plans, 1777.

Leaving the militia of New England and New York to impede Burgoyne, Washington kept a sharp eye on the force in New York. To his astonishment that force first moved to Staten Island, then embarked on a great flotilla of 250 vessels. This action Washington considered a ruse, but as the ships stood southward the American army entered Pennsylvania. After some days of anxiety lest Howe, doubling his tracks, should get far up the Hudson before the Americans reached New Jersey, Washington at last learned that his opponents were at Elkton, at the head of Chesapeake Bay, thirty-five miles southwest of Philadelphia. He moved southward immediately to protect the capital, and on September 11 the two armies faced one another on opposite sides of Brandywine Creek. The Americans, including the militia, were 11,000, and the British 18,000. Howe used his superior numbers, as at Brooklyn Heights. Leaving 5000 men in front of Washington, he marched around the American right wing and placed his opponents between two fires. Washington was taken by surprise. While the flanking movement was being made he gave orders to fall on the British in detail. The attack was just beginning when an erroneous dispatch arrived, seeming to indicate that Howe's flanking movement was a feint. Then followed an hour's hesitation, by which the opportunity of defeating a divided foe was lost. The Americans threw themselves bravely on the two divisions, and by hard fighting held the field until night enabled them to withdraw in safety to Chester, each side losing about 1000 men. September 26 the British entered Philadelphia and began to fortify it.

Most of the British army went into camp at Germantown, seven miles from Philadelphia, and Washington, hovering in the neighborhood, determined to surprise it early in the morning of October 4. He now had 9000 continentals to whom recent campaigning had given the fiber of regulars. The attack was made in a dense fog, which made the surprise a success, but led to confusion on both sides. But the Americans carried all before them and seemed to have won a victory, when six British companies took refuge in the stone house of Chief Justice Chew and offered such resistance that the attacking line was delayed until the retreating regiments could make a new stand. By that time reinforcements had come up from Philadelphia, and Washington withdrew from the battle with a loss of 1100 men, while his opponents lost 500. In December he went into winter quarters at Valley Forge, where he could keep his eye on Philadelphia.

Burgoyne's campaign was the sequel of the American expedition against Quebec in 1775. After Montgomery's death, Arnold remained in command of the invaders and contested every foot of the ground over which they fell back. Sir Guy Carleton, his opponent and governor of Canada, pressed

**Battle of
Brandywine.**

**Battle of
German-
town.**

**Arnold
Delays
Carleton.**

him vigorously, and when Howe began his campaign against New York, August, 1776, the two forces had reached the northern end of Lake Champlain. To hold this lake each side began to construct a fleet of small boats. Arnold's squadron was weaker than that of his foe, but he directed it with great skill, and though twice defeated, delayed the British until early November, when Carleton concluded that it would be unwise to continue a progress involving the capture of Ticonderoga in the winter. He accordingly withdrew his entire force to Canada. Arnold's bold resistance had been of great service; for had Carleton found less opposition he would have reached the Hudson in time to join hands with Howe before Washington was able to escape out of New Jersey.

A practical difficulty now arose in regard to the command. Carleton ranked Howe in the British army, but the latter had been promised a free hand in America. To avoid an unpleasant clash of authority the command of the former was, therefore, by orders from England limited to Canada, and the conduct of the invading operations of 1777 was given to Burgoyne, a man of less ability. Carleton could only submit, but it was a bitter pill to see 8000 of his best troops march away in June, 1777. Of this force 675 went with St. Leger, the rest with Burgoyne, both columns accompanied by Indians.

**Burgoyne in
Command.**

The main body were before Ticonderoga on July 1, and St. Clair, who commanded there with 3000 men, abandoned the place rather than allow himself to be besieged. The Americans withdrew in good order, fighting a sharp rear-guard action at Hubbardton. They were in good spirits, and by obstructing the roads made the enemy's progress tedious. Boats and supplies must be carried overland to Lake George, and from the southern end of that body of water by portage to the Hudson, at Fort Edward. It was July 29 before the latter place was reached, and another month passed before thirty days' rations were transported thither. By that time Burgoyne's commissary was so much depleted that he was impelled to replenish it by a raid in Vermont, then a part of New Hampshire. Thus was projected Baum's expedition to Bennington.

**His Slow
Advance.**

Burgoyne had been told that the people of Vermont were loyal, and he thought 500 men, all Brunswickers, enough for the task assigned to Baum. The event showed how much he was misinformed. The Vermonters rose in great numbers when they heard that the Germans were among them. They found an excellent leader in John Stark, until recently a colonel under Washington, but now without a command on account of the indifference of congress to his worth. Placed in command of the New Hampshire militia, he raised 800 men and was beyond the mountains before Baum knew of his movement. He came upon the Germans at Bennington, cleverly surrounded them, and in a vigorous battle on August 16

**Battle of
Bennington.**

killed or captured nearly all. In the moment of victory a second body of British came up to reënforce Baum, and they too were defeated, the total British loss being 800.


Burgoyne heard the news with dismay. Hard after it came the information that St. Leger's expedition through the Mohawk valley was driven back to Canada.

St. Leger Driven Back. That officer had reached Oswego safely. Proceeding up the Seneca river to Lake Oneida, and thence by a short portage, he came to Fort Schuyler, or Stanwix, on the upper Mohawk. This post had, to his surprise, been recently strengthened, and was so well held by a garrison of 750 men that St. Leger was obliged to resort to a regular siege. By this time a large number of settlers, mostly Germans, occupied the valley. They were loyal Americans, and flew to arms under General Herkimer, who led 800 of them to the relief of the beleaguered fort. At Oriskany they marched into a trap set for them by St. Leger. But instead of retreating they leaped behind trees and stones and fought so well in the frontier fashion that the British were driven back to the fort, only to find that during their absence the garrison, sallying out of the walls, had entered the camp of the besiegers and carried off enough supplies to enable them to protract their defense many days. This success aroused enthusiasm in the American army on the Hudson, and Arnold, with 2000 soldiers, was sent to drive off St. Leger. That officer was now in extreme danger, and withdrew hastily to Lake Ontario, August 22, his Indian allies deserting in a body.

These two successes encouraged the Americans, and militia from New England and New

Gates in Command against Burgoyne. York gathered daily at Albany and marched up the Hudson to meet the invaders. By September 1 they were 10,000, and a month later 20,000. Massachusetts

sent a large number commanded by General Lincoln. At first General Schuyler was in chief command, but he was unpopular with the New Englanders, and dissension was imminent. To secure



harmony, congress now sent General Gates, formerly an English officer who, like Charles Lee, had offered his services early in the war and had been made a major general. Like Lee, also, he had intrigued against Washington. He was loyal to the cause, but incompetent, and the success he now won was chiefly due to his able subordinates, Lincoln, Arnold, and Morgan. He placed his army across the British line of approach, at Bemis Heights, on the Hudson, about twenty-five miles south of Fort Edward. Before it Burgoyne appeared September 19, his force reduced to 5000 men

by recent losses, by desertion, and by the necessity of leaving garrisons behind him. In front of this position, at Freeman's Farm, or Stillwater, was fought a very vigorous skirmish, in which the British lost nearly 500 men. Then Burgoyne, although his troops were on reduced rations, lay inactive for three weeks. October 7 he threw out his right wing to ascertain Gates's strength, and the result was another engagement at Freeman's Farm, the British loss being 600 men, several cannon, and much ammunition. Convinced that he could go no farther southward, Burgoyne turned about in an indecisive manner and came to Saratoga. His position was precarious, for the Americans had

**First and
Second
Battles of
Freeman's
Farm.**

already appeared in strength on his line of communications; but had he acted with energy after the 7th he might have escaped to Fort George without entire defeat. His slow movements enabled his opponents to surround him, and at Saratoga, October 17, he surrendered his army, the conditions being that the troops should march to Boston, whence they might return to England with the understanding that unless they were exchanged they were not to serve again in North America during the war. Two weeks before the capitulation Clinton had started from New York for Albany with a naval and military force. He took Forts Montgomery and Clinton, and a part of his force reached Kingston, but at that point it turned back because the channel was too shallow for the ships. Thus ended the British campaign on the Hudson.

**Surrender
of Bur-
goyne.**

Gates's terms at Saratoga were lenient, and were granted because of Clinton's demonstration up the Hudson. Though Burgoyne's troops could not again serve in America, they might replace European garrisons which were sent across the Atlantic, and as France was now about to join the United States they might be used against her. These reflections awakened

**The Con-
vention Re-
pudiated.**

keen disappointment in congress and out of it. Demands were made for the repudiation of the convention, but the same end was reached in a less outspoken manner. Burgoyne fell to wrangling over the quarters furnished his officers and declared the convention broken. This, it was said, indicated that the British themselves would not keep it, and it was decided to hold the captives until the agreement was ratified by England. When it was discovered that Burgoyne had failed to

hand over some cartouch-boxes, congress made it the ground for openly repudiating the terms. Some of the prisoners were exchanged, most of the Germans were released to become American citizens, and the rest were held until the war ended. The British bitterly charged us with broken faith.

THE ALLIANCE WITH FRANCE

From the beginning of the revolution the Americans looked to France for aid, but when in June, 1776, Silas Deane arrived in Paris as an American agent he was not received by Vergennes, the foreign secretary. He found many friends in private circles, and when the news came that independence had been declared the attitude of the government changed, although open recognition was still carefully withheld. About this time the firm of "Hortalez et Cie" began to sell general merchandise in the capital, its largest dealings being with "Timothy Jones," of Bermuda, to whom were sold large quantities of ammunition and firearms. Those behind the scenes knew that "Jones" was in reality Silas Deane, that the merchant company was Beaumarchais, better known as a dramatist, and that most of the money with which "Jones" settled his accounts was derived from secret loans from the kings of France and Spain. Each monarch thus advanced a million livres (\$200,000), with which Deane purchased 30,000 stands of arms, 250 cannon, and supplies of clothing. The British ambassador complained of these proceedings, but Vergennes put him off with fair words. In the autumn, Franklin and Arthur Lee were appointed to aid Deane. Soon after his arrival Lee quarreled with Deane and withdrew from Paris in anger. Franklin, however, remained, and by his simple manners and genuine kindness charmed all Paris. But he could not at that time secure from the king the recognition of American independence.

With the French people he had better success, and the American cause became very popular in Paris. With the young French noblemen it became the fashion of the day to offer their services to the struggling American republic. Most of them were mere enthusiasts, and their offers were declined; but one, who was accepted, proved a notable exception. The Marquis of Lafayette, having come over at his own expense, arrived at Philadelphia with Kalb and twelve other French officers, just before the battle of Brandywine. He offered to serve in any capacity; Congress made him a major-general, and the results justified their action. Kalb, as well as Pulaski, a Pole, whom Franklin also sent to America, proved efficient officers, and both fell in the cause they espoused. We must not forget Baron von Steuben, a Prussian officer, who also came to help the Americans, and whose best service was to organize and drill the continental army.

**Early Aid
from
France.**

**French
Volunteers.**

**Lafayette
and Others.**

In 1777 Vergennes was ready to give open aid to America if Spain would do the same. Before he could take the proper steps, news came that Howe was in Philadelphia and that Burgoyne had taken Ticonderoga, with the upper Hudson valley at his mercy. Vergennes's enthusiasm suddenly cooled, and even Beaumarchais began to despair. Then came, December 7, the story of Burgoyne's defeat. Beaumarchais, beside himself with joy, is said to have dislocated his arm in his haste to inform the king. Paris rejoiced as though Saratoga had been a French victory. Vergennes sent off messengers to Madrid urging the king of Spain to recognize American independence, and set to work at once on two treaties which, signed February 6, 1778, created political and commercial bonds between France and the United States. Each nation promised to make war on the enemies of the other, while the United States guaranteed the sovereignty of the French West Indies, with certain privileges in American ports. England and France were at war immediately, but Spain held back. She had a new ministry and would not encourage revolution in America; but in 1779 she declared war on England, not, however, as an ally of the United States. The action of France was undoubtedly due to her desire to weaken England, but it is due to Vergennes and Louis XVI to say that they treated the United States generously. If they had demanded harder terms, we must have accepted them.

**Treaties of
Alliance,
1778.**

The battle of Saratoga had also its echo in London. Lord North, the prime minister, announced, December 10, a forthcoming scheme to end the war by conciliation. Two months later the plan was revealed, and in March, 1778, parliament approved. The coercive acts of parliament were to be repealed, full pardon was to be granted, and America was to have all she demanded except independence. Commissioners of pacification were sent to Philadelphia, but they found the Americans indifferent. Only British self-confidence could assume that in this situation the United States would desert the newly made French alliance and accept the old position of colonies.

**England
Offers a
Compromise.**

The French alliance came none too soon, for the winter of 1777-1778 was a gloomy period for America. Without funds congress could do nothing for the army, which suffered terribly at Valley Forge. Food was plentiful in Pennsylvania, but the farmers would not sell it for the depreciated continental currency, although they gave it readily in exchange for British specie at Philadelphia. In that city there was a festive season, loyalists were numerous, and, Saratoga forgotten for the time being, men began to think the continental cause desperate. From these depths the public mind was raised by the news that France would help with money, men, and ships.

**Gloomy
Prospects
Retreat.**

The spring saw a change in England's military plans. It was decided to take again the French West Indian islands, which had been handed back in 1763, and to carry out that program the war on the American continent was suspended. At the same time Sir William Howe was superseded by Clinton, who was ordered to concentrate his army at New York and to abandon Philadelphia if necessary. Obeying these orders, he sent off his heavy baggage and abundant supplies by water and marched with the army northward through New Jersey. Washington followed closely, and July 28, 1778, forced him to fight at Monmouth, where the Americans seemed to have the advantage. Washington wished Lafayette to lead the attack, but Charles Lee, just released from a British prison in which he had been conspiring to betray the Americans, claimed the honor, and was placed in command. When the British appeared in front of his position, he gave way after very little resistance. Washington, preparing to support Lee by an attack elsewhere, learned that the advance was falling back. Placing his troops across their way he checked the British advance, and with the reformed columns of Lee held the enemy at bay until night. Next morning the British were gone and reached New York safely.

While Washington checked the flight of his advance troops he met Lee, their commander. Suspecting treachery he broke forth in angry reproaches, which posterity has easily forgiven. Lee could do nothing less than ask for an investigation, and a court martial suspended him a year for disobedience and "misbehavior" before the enemy. During the year he sent congress an improper letter, and for that was dismissed. He was a vain and showy man, whose tall talking won him much respect when he threw in his fortunes with the Americans. The men who could understand him soon discovered that he wished to supplant Washington.

**Philadelphia
Evacuated.**

**Battle of
Monmouth.**

**Charles Lee
Dismissed
from the
Army.**

MINOR EVENTS IN THE NORTH, 1778-1782

The battle of Monmouth was the last general engagement in the North, but it was followed by several minor incidents which history cannot ignore. One was the operations of a French fleet under Count d'Estaing which arrived at Philadelphia nine days too late to intercept Lord Howe's squadron, sent to convoy General Howe's store ships back to New York. Prevented from following them by the assurances of the pilots that his largest frigates could not enter New York harbor, d'Estaing decided to attack Newport, Rhode Island, which the British had held since December 6, 1776. He had 4000 French troops on board, and 9000 Americans, mostly New England militia, were gathered at Providence

**Siege of
Newport.**

to coöperate in the attack. As the British had but 6000 men in Newport, a great success seemed certain. Misunderstandings occurred from the first between the Count and Sullivan, the American commander, but the French troops were landed, and the initial stages of the siege were entered. Then Howe's British fleet appeared and offered battle, and the Frenchman, embarking his soldiers, sailed out to meet him. As the ships maneuvered for position a storm broke and both fleets must look to their safety. D'Estaing went to Boston for repairs, and his attempt against Newport was not renewed. Meanwhile Sullivan had invested the place and carried most of its outworks. He and his officers protested against the departure of the French; and when they heard that Clinton was sending a fleet and army to raise the siege, they withdrew from Rhode Island lest they be surrounded. An irritating controversy arose over the conduct of d'Estaing, and Washington, as well as the continental congress, interfered to make peace. In November the French fleet went to the West Indies, where its operations, though not brilliant, served to draw off part of the British forces from New York and left the Americans for a time in comparative peace. In 1779 the British army at Newport was withdrawn for the campaign against the Carolinas.

Reduced to inactivity, Clinton was fain to resort to the destruction of the towns he could reach by water. In May, 1779, Norfolk and Portsmouth, in Virginia, were destroyed, a hundred vessels were taken, and 3000 hogsheads of tobacco were carried back to New York. In July following, Tryon, commanding a body of tories, raided New Haven, Fairfield, and Norwalk, all in Connecticut, leaving smoking ruins behind him. Such operations did not promote the conquest of the Americans, and only served to increase the horrors of war. In the same year Clinton moved up the Hudson and took Stony Point and Verplanck's Point in the Highlands. Two months later the former was retaken by General Anthony Wayne in a well-planned night attack, which greatly enhanced Wayne's reputation. But the Americans could not hold the place, and it was reduced to ruins.

West Point, several miles higher up the river, was the chief reliance for keeping back the enemy, and its command was given to Benedict Arnold. This pathetic figure now approaches the end of a thorny path whose exit was complete calamity. No man in the army had better reason to complain of his treatment. After the death of Montgomery he was the life of the stout resistance in Canada, but he was passed over by congress when it promoted four less deserving brigadiers to the rank of major-general. At the time he was being investigated by a court martial on charges which were plainly the result of spite and of which he was completely exonerated. After that he was made a major-general, but was not given the rank to which his former rating entitled


**Tryon's
Raid.**

Stony Point.

**Arnold's
Disappoint-
ment.**

him. In the Saratoga campaign he was the soul of the American army, and his leg was shivered as he charged recklessly in the second battle of Freeman's Farm. Gates hated him cordially, and Washington, too just to ignore his merit, made him commander in Philadelphia, after the withdrawal of Howe. Arnold was tactless, and soon quarreled with congress, whose former treatment he openly resented. Charges were brought against him, but an acquittal was had on all but two, and these were so trivial that they should have been ignored. But his enemies triumphed, and it was ordered that he be reprimanded. Washington, in executing the judgment, made the reprimand a eulogy: but Arnold was not pacified. During his residence in Philadelphia he had married Margaret Shippen, a noted wit and beauty in tory circles; and an extravagant manner of living had run him into debt. In disgust at his treatment by congress he decided to betray the cause he served. He applied to Washington for the command of West Point, the request was granted, and a bargain was made by which the post was to be given up for 10,000 guineas and a brigadier-general's commission.

Major John André was Clinton's adjutant. He was young, intelligent, and socially popular; but he did not mind playing spider to Arnold. While the British army was in Philadelphia he was a friend of Margaret Shippen, and he conducted the correspondence by which Arnold was led into mischief. September 21, 1780, the two men met near Haverstraw to complete the treason. Arnold handed over plans of West Point, with a description of its garrison, and gave André a pass to return to New York. As the latter approached "Sleepy Hollow," near Tarrytown, he was stopped and searched by three "skimmers," American marauders, who found his papers and carried him to the nearest American post. A report was sent to Arnold, who fled quickly to the British. André was tried as a spy. He urged that he was a soldier on regular service and demanded to be treated as a prisoner of war; but the court martial held that wearing a disguise and carrying concealed papers fixed his status as a spy, and he was executed. Washington would have exchanged him for Arnold, but Clinton felt obliged to protect the traitor whom he had led into his present plight. West Point was saved to the Americans, but the price promised was paid. Arnold's foolish error blasted a brilliant career. Had he retired from the army as a protest against his wrongs, the justice of the future would soon have brought him vindication. In the British army his position was not pleasant, and it was said that just before he died he called for his old American uniform, saying, "May God forgive me for ever putting on any other."



THE WAR IN THE WEST

Before the revolution began, hardy settlers had crossed the Alleghanies from both Virginia and North Carolina. The Indians saw their advent with alarm, and in 1774 the settlements of Kentucky were ravaged. Governor Dunmore, of Virginia, marched against them and forced them to make peace after a sharp defeat, the Indians relinquishing their claims to Kentucky. This outbreak was known as "Lord Dunmore's War." When the colonists began to resist England, both sides sought to conciliate the savages of the West. The Indians, however, leaned toward the stronger side, and with British aid the Cherokees in 1776 began hostilities. The most exposed part of the frontier was the Watauga valley, in North Carolina. The inhabitants had warning, and retired safely into stockades. North Carolina, South Carolina, and Virginia sent out bodies of militia which ravaged the Indian towns, and the Cherokees made peace. For a time the Watauga settlements had relief, but Kentucky continued to suffer from the Indians north of the Ohio.

"Lord
Dunmore's
War."

The
Cherokees
Conquered.

The British also had influence with the Iroquois, who aided Carleton in 1776 and Burgoyne in 1777. After Saratoga, the savages were not needed for large military operations on the Canadian border, but they were incited to raid the western settlements of New York and Pennsylvania. The most important action was a raid into the latter state by Colonel John Butler with a force of Tories and Seneca Indians. They fought and defeated an American force near Wilkesbarre, and then devastated the Wyoming valley at leisure. Women and children were slain, and the rich valley was left desolate. In the same year, 1779, a band similarly composed inflicted ruin nearly as complete on Cherry valley, in central New York. A retaliatory expedition under General Sullivan laid waste the Seneca country and reduced the population to a crowd of starving fugitives; but their chieftain, Joseph Brant, gathered them into a fort at Niagara and continued the raids against the settlements. The employment of Indians by the British was strongly condemned by the Americans. The practice of paying them for scalps only added to the horrors of the war and did not hasten its end. Hamilton, British governor of the Northwest, who paid for many scalps, was called the "Hair Buyer."

The Wyo-
ming Valley.

Cherry
Valley.

After 1776 the Kentuckians were not left free from molestation, and this led to an act of retaliation which had a vast significance for the "Hair Buyer." The stroke was nothing less than the conquest of the Northwest, and George Rogers Clark was the author of the scheme. In January, 1778, he secured from Governor Patrick Henry, of Virginia, a commission as lieutenant-colonel with authority to raise 350 men for a secret expedition against

Clark's
Expedition.

the British posts north of the Ohio. In May he set out from Wheeling, going down the Ohio to the falls, where Louisville was soon to be founded. After waiting here a month the expedition proceeded into what is now Illinois, directing its course to the French town of Kaskaskia. The place was taken by surprise and without resistance. The inhabitants willingly took the oath of allegiance when told that France was now an ally of the United States, and when promised religious toleration. The people of Cahokia and Vincennes also submitted on the same terms. Thus all the settlements of the Illinois country passed into the hands of Clark, who had less than 200 men.

Hamilton, at Detroit, knew how weak was Clark's resources, and retook Vincennes in December. Feeling perfectly secure, he sent away all his troops but 80, and awaited the spring. He underestimated the determination of his opponent, who on February 5 set out for Vincennes with 170 men, some of them of French blood. Before him the road, 170 miles long, ran through a flat region, much of it covered by water. Around Vincennes the country was a shallow lake through which the command waded, sometimes up to the neck. To add to their sufferings, their provisions gave out, but luck sent them a deer, and three days later they captured an Indian canoe with some food in it. February 24 Clark came to Vincennes and invested the fort. Hamilton was completely surprised and next day surrendered. There was great joy in the western settlements when news came that "the Hair Buyer" was taken and sent to Virginia, where he was kept in close confinement.

The western country was organized as Illinois county, Virginia. The French settlements remained under American protection until the end of the war, but Detroit continued in British hands, and from it went forth many Indian raids. Clark, now a brigadier-general, was anxious to take it, but was not given the requisite means.

THE NAVY IN THE REVOLUTION

England's naval superiority gave the United States little opportunity for achievements at sea; but small cruisers well commanded might inflict severe loss on British merchantmen, and privateers might operate successfully. In December, 1775, congress ordered thirteen small men-of-war, and before the end of the conflict forty-three others had been placed on the ocean. Their average number of guns was twenty. Many of these ships were captured before they did serious damage to the enemy. Besides the continental ships, war vessels were owned by all the states except New Jersey and Delaware, but most of the state navies were for harbor defense. The ill disguised friendship of France early enabled us to use her harbors for the sale of prizes,

The "Hair
Buyer"
Captured.

Illinois
County.

Small
Cruisers and
Privateers.

and several cruisers as well as many privateers operated from that safe base. Fitted out and furnished with a mongrel crew, such a ship would intercept British vessels off the French coast, or in the channel, or range along the British shore itself. Great Britain protested vigorously to France against the abuse of neutrality. Sometimes her complaints were heard and the American ships were warned to leave; but the Americans invariably came back, and others followed their example. When the war had gone on a year London merchants estimated their actual losses at £1,800,000, besides having to meet a great enhancement of freights and insurance. After the French alliance was made the profits from seizing British ships must be shared with Frenchmen. New England sent out most of the privateers, and her citizens reaped vast profits from the business.

Of all our naval achievements during the revolution the most notable are associated with the name of John Paul Jones. Scotch by birth and christened John Paul, he made several voyages to Virginia, where his brother was settled. In 1773 this brother died, and John Paul inherited his property. About this time he changed his name, taking that of his friend Willie Jones of Halifax, who was probably that Willie Jones of Halifax, North Carolina, who led the radical element in that colony in the days of revolution. In December, 1775, he was appointed a lieutenant in the infant navy and hoisted the first flag on a regularly commissioned American war vessel. A year later he was a captain, and in one ship after another displayed great activity and took many prizes. In one of them, the *Ranger*, in 1778 he cruised in the Irish Sea, entered by night the harbor of Whitehaven, and captured a sloop-of-war of twenty guns. This showed him what could be done by a daring man with a small squadron. By much entreaty he at last got from the French king four ships, which, added to one of his own, made a squadron to be reckoned with. The largest, the *Bon Homme Richard*, a converted Indiaman, carried 44 guns. Another, the *Pallas* carried 30, and the rest carried 36, 18, and 12 respectively. The crew was largely European, but all the ships flew the American flag.

John Paul
Jones.

His
Squadron.

August 14, 1779, the squadron began its memorable voyage. Passing along the west coast of Ireland and Scotland, destroying many prizes, it came off the east coast of Scotland, where a storm frustrated Jones's plan to destroy the shipping in Leith harbor. September 23, near Hull, he sighted forty merchantmen convoyed by the *Serapis*, mounting 50 guns, and the *Countess of Scarborough*, 28 guns. Jones gave chase and selected the *Serapis* as his antagonist. He ordered his other ships to do the same, but only the *Pallas* obeyed, her captain giving his attention to the *Scarborough*. The engagement resolved itself into a conflict between the *Serapis* and the *Bon Homme Richard*. At the first fire two of the American guns burst, and Jones, realizing his inferiority in that line determined

Defeat of
the *Serapis*.

to close and board. At his first attempt the ships did not come alongside. Pearson, commanding the *Serapis*, called out to ask if the *Richard* had struck her colors, and Jones's answer rang back: "I have not yet begun to fight." A second attempt to come alongside proved successful, and Jones lashed the two ships together with his own hands. Then followed a severe hand to hand struggle which cleared the deck of the *Serapis* of defenders. After this had gone on for two hours, hand grenades fired the British ship and she was forced to strike. Jones's own ship had six feet of water in the hold and was on fire. She sank two days later. The *Serapis* and the *Scarborough* were carried into port as prizes. Jones established the tradition for heroism in the American navy. He was personally eccentric, and congress was slow in recognizing his services.

The participation of France in the war relieved the United States of the necessity of contending against England by sea. It also promoted the formation of the league of Northern powers for "armed neutrality." England used her immense naval power with little regard to the interests of other nations. She impressed seamen and seized neutral goods not contraband as freely as she found them on foreign ships. The other nations were equally interested in the policy that "free ships make free goods," except as regards contraband articles. This principle was asserted before our revolution by individual writers and even by states, but it had not the force behind it necessary to secure its acceptance. In 1778 France, whose goods were now being seized, asked Russia to head a movement for united protest. The request was accepted, and out of it proceeded the "Armed Neutrality" agreement, signed at first by Russia, Sweden, and Denmark, but later accepted by Prussia, the Netherlands, the German Empire, Portugal, Naples, Turkey, and the United States. The acceptance of the league by the Netherlands led England to make war on that power, although another reason was given for this breach of an ancient friendship. Thus England's war against the colonies had enlarged its scope until she saw arrayed against her, besides the colonies themselves, France, Spain, and Holland.

THE CAMPAIGN IN THE SOUTH, 1778-1781

Having failed to conquer the North, the British concluded to make their next attempt in the South. They were told that the interior parts, inhabited by small farmers who had not keenly felt the restrictions on commerce, were largely loyal, and would welcome the arrival of a force strong enough to afford them protection. The plan adopted was to begin with Georgia, the weakest of the Southern states, and to roll up the South from that point. Accordingly, in December, 1778, the work

British
change
their Plan of
Attack.

began with the seizure of Savannah, from which place strong columns proceeded to occupy the interior. To deal with the situation General Lincoln was sent to assume command in the South. He found the British general, Prevost, in the act of subduing South Carolina and was able to drive him away from the vicinity of Charleston. Then d'Estaing appeared off the coast, and a coöperative attack on Savannah was begun. Here, as at Newport, the French admiral was soon out of sympathy with the American general, and sailed away, alleging that he could not expose his ships to the autumn storms of a dangerous coast. As soon as he was gone Clinton came south with a strong fleet and an army of 7000 men and began to besiege Charleston. Lincoln unwisely allowed himself to be shut up in the city, and in May, 1780, was forced to surrender with 5000 men. South Carolina was now at the mercy of the enemy, who marched at will through the interior. The governor of the state fled to Philadelphia to implore aid from congress, and no American army worthy of the name existed in the state. A mere remnant was in the field under Colonel Buford, but Tarleton's Legion overwhelmed it at Waxhaw. Some of the Americans escaped, but 500 asked for quarter. For reply, Tarleton fell on them with sabers and pistols, leaving 113 dead and 150 so badly wounded that they could not be moved. This harsh affair and other less notable examples of British cruelty cowed the people. But much resentment was also stimulated, and the result was the organization of several partisan bands which kept up a vigilant warfare against such small detachments of the enemy as fortune sent their way. Of the partisan leaders the most famous were Sumter, Marion, Pickens, Clarke, and Davie, the last being of North Carolina. Clinton did not esteem these bands highly. He thought the province well reconquered, and early in June returned to New York, leaving Cornwallis with 5000 men to hold what had been taken and to extend the conquest into North Carolina. The British were pleased. At the end of four years' fighting, one colony, Georgia, had been forced to receive her repudiated royal governor, and in another the revolutionary government had collapsed.

**Charleston
Taken.**

**Partisan
Bands.**

To save the situation, congress sent General Gates into the South. The appointment was against the advice of Washington, who suggested Greene; but the "hero of Saratoga" was still popular. Charles Lee, who knew him well, offered this advice: "Take care that your Northern laurels do not change to Southern willows." Gates had 3000 troops, half of them militia, and in August attacked Camden, an important position in central South Carolina held by Lord Rawdon. Had he moved promptly, he might have won the fight, for his force was the stronger; but by delaying he allowed Cornwallis to arrive with reënforcements, and the battle, fought August 16, was a crushing defeat. The militia, from

**Gates at
Camden.**


Virginia and North Carolina, fled at the first attack, and the regulars were surrounded and badly cut to pieces, while Kalb, who fought bravely, was killed. The total American loss was 2000 killed, wounded, and captured; that of the British was 300. Gates rode sixty miles that summer's day, and did not cease his flight until in four days he reached Hillsborough, North Carolina, 180 miles from the scene of his defeat. He tried to call out more militia to oppose the enemy, but his day was past. December 2, he was succeeded by General Greene.

Before that time, the British had met their first check in the South, at King's Mountain, October 7, 1780. After Camden, Cornwallis moved into North Carolina, gathering food and horses. He halted at Charlotte, — where the Mecklenburg Resolutions of May 31, 1775, were adopted, — while Major Ferguson, with 1000 tories, scoured the country to the west, collecting supplies and enlisting recruits; for that country was strongly loyal. The whigs fled before him, and alarm spread even to the transmontane settlements of Watauga and Kentucky. From this distant region, bands of mounted men, under leaders of their own choosing, marched eastward, September 26, to bag Ferguson. Having crossed the mountains, they were joined by 510 North Carolinians and 400 South Carolinians, a total force of 1800. Ferguson heard of their approach and moved toward Charlotte. Thirty-five miles from that place, he came to King's Mountain, the northern end of which is cut by the state line. It is a hill sixty feet high, flat at the top, a third of a mile long, and Ferguson believed it impregnable. On its top he placed his 900 men and awaited attack. The whigs were riding hard behind, and October 7, a picked band of the best mounted arrived at the hill, surrounded its base, and began a vigorous attack. On alternate sides they charged up the slopes and then fell back, using whatever cover they could find. Early in the fight, Ferguson was killed, and at the end of an hour the white flag was raised: 700 survivors surrendered; the rest were slain. It was a small battle, reckoned by the numbers engaged; but it was very important. It forced Cornwallis back into South Carolina, it gave courage to the whigs in the Carolinas, and it checked the advance of the British until Greene could arrive and organize his defense. It marked the change of the tide in the South.

Greene, now in command of the American army, had 2300 men, half of them regulars. Cornwallis outnumbered him, and all his troops were trained soldiers. Greene, therefore, did not attack, but in his camp at Cheraw awaited the purpose of his opponents. To encourage the whigs west of him, he threw out General Morgan with 600 men to threaten the British post at Ninety-six. This divided the American army, and Cornwallis,

Battle of
King's
Mountain.

Battle of
Cowpens.



THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR IN THE SOUTH

at Winnsboro, tried to get between the two wings. He sent Tarleton to drive Morgan off to the Northwest, while he himself moved northward. Morgan was an excellent officer and was not to be caught napping. He had recently been joined by Pickens with several hundred men, and fell back rapidly. But January 17, he offered battle at Cowpens. Tarleton's troopers were exhausted by a five hours' march, but they charged impetuously, thinking the Americans would flee before them. Morgan's army was drawn up in three lines, the first a body of skirmishers who were ordered to begin firing when the enemy was at fifty yards and to fall back on the second line, composed of 270 militiamen under Pickens. This line was to await the approach of the British, fire two volleys, and then fall back to the third line, which contained 200 Maryland regulars, two companies of Virginia militia, and a company of Georgians. Morgan had a total force of 940, and Tarleton had 1150.

When the first and second lines began to fall back as ordered, the British believed the victory won and advanced in disorder. To their surprise they found the third line in good formation and resisting them hotly. Thrown into disorder, they sought to restore a regular line under a rain of bullets, when Pickens's men came up on their left flank, while a small body of cavalry, hitherto out of sight, came up on their right. Finding themselves surrounded, 600 troopers threw down their arms after 184 had been killed or wounded. The Americans also took some important stores, and their loss was 72 killed or wounded. The battle had two important effects: it showed that the Americans could fight effectively when well led, and it nettled Cornwallis and induced him to march far astray into North Carolina in an unwise effort to repay on Morgan the defeat of Tarleton.

Tarleton
Defeated.

The situation was now critical for the Americans, since 125 miles separated Greene and Morgan, and Cornwallis was between them, about fifty miles from the latter. Operations resolved themselves into a race across North Carolina, the two American wings ever drawing closer together and the British commander bending every effort to crush Morgan while still detached. Greene knew the danger, and, sending the left wing northward, rode across the intervening country and joined the right wing January 30. Morgan was a soldier by instinct, and his alertness now saved the day. He beat Tarleton at Cowpens in the forenoon and began his retreat in the afternoon of January 17. Seven days later he crossed the Catawba. Cornwallis was then only twenty miles behind, but he had to halt two days to collect supplies, and when he came to the Catawba, floods had raised the water so high that he must wait five days before he could cross. Fifty miles to the northeast is the Yadkin, which Greene, now in command, crossed February 3, Cornwallis coming up in time to seize a few of his wagons; but here again the rising of the

river gave the Americans an advantage. At Guilford Court House their two wings united; but Greene did not feel strong enough to risk a battle, and marched for the Dan river, which he reached safely. Meanwhile, militia from North Carolina and Virginia had been sent to him, and with his army raised to 4400 men he recrossed the Dan and offered battle at Guilford Court House. Cornwallis's force was only 2200, but it was composed of regulars.

March 15, 1781, the two armies came to blows. The Americans were in three lines, with intervals of 300 yards. The first was composed of North Carolina militia, the second of Virginia militia, and the third of the continentals, in numbers 4400. On either flank was a small body of cavalry. The first was ordered to fire two volleys and retire behind the third line; but at sight of the British it fired only a partial volley and fled. A few of these men, however, joined other bodies of troops and fought through the battle. The second line gave way before a bayonet charge, but did not leave the field. Against the third line, Cornwallis found it necessary to put forth his best efforts. He was at first driven back, but rallied his troops for a desperate attack, before which Greene withdrew in good order, but with the loss of his artillery. The Americans lost 1307, including the 1046 militia who dispersed to their homes. The British lost 532, and, after vainly waiting several days to see if the inhabitants would come to the standard, fell back to Wilmington, where they found a fleet with supplies. Greene followed for a while, offering battle, but when Cornwallis's destination became evident, he turned against the interior posts of South Carolina. The good generalship of Greene and Morgan, the long and tiresome marches in the North Carolina forests, and the unwillingness of the inhabitants to join the British, had shown here, as formerly in New Jersey, that the British could not expect to recover any other part of the country than that which they held by actual occupation.

News that Cornwallis was sent back to his ships at Wilmington, and that Greene was coming to drive Lord Rawdon out of the interior of South Carolina, aroused the American spirit in that state. It brought grave alarm to Rawdon, commanding in South Carolina, who was at Camden with 1400 men, while small garrisons held Ninety-six and other posts. Greene proposed to strike at Camden first, and ordered a South Carolina force under Marion, Sumter, and Lee to cut the communications between that place and Charleston and join him for the final stroke. Meanwhile, he took up his position at Hobkirk's Hill, two miles from Camden. Rawdon dared not let the two American divisions unite, and marched out to crush Greene, March 25. Greene awaited the attack, but was driven from his position after a sharp engagement. His army, however, was still intact, and Rawdon,

**Battle of
Guilford
Court
House.**

**Greene in
South
Carolina.**

after burning Camden, fell back to Monck's Corners, 30 miles from Charleston. Post after post was now retaken, until at last only Ninety-six held out in the western counties. Greene besieged it so closely that Rawdon with two new regiments, just landed at Charleston, marched to relieve it. Greene raised the siege and eluded his enemy, who destroyed Ninety-six rather than undertake to defend it. The British power was now driven back toward the coast as far as Orangeburg, and against this Greene, his army recruited to 2600, marched late in August, 1781. Stewart, the commander, fell back, but was overtaken at Eutaw Springs, September 8. Greene attacked and seemed to have the victory, but Stewart rallied his troops at a brick house and drove the Americans from the field; but he was forced to retire, with a loss of 700, to Charleston. In Georgia a similar movement had resulted in driving the British into Savannah. In General Greene's nine months' warfare in the South, he fought four important battles, lost them all, and yet gained, in the long run, all the results of victory. This singular fact was due to his steady self-control and his ability to bring his army out of a repulse without demoralization.

**Battle of
Hobkirk's
Hill.**

**British
driven back
to Charles-
ton and
Savannah.**

While Greene's work thus progressed, the army which he declined to follow to Wilmington was approaching its doom in Virginia. Cornwallis left the Cape Fear, April 25, and, marching leisurely through eastern North Carolina, reached Petersburg, Virginia, May 20. Here he found over 3000 British troops under Arnold, who for five months had marched at will through the region adjacent to the James river. Richmond and Manchester had been burned, and Portsmouth had been fortified as a base of operations. Harrying Virginia, however, did not secure its submission. When the redcoats had gone, the people resumed their former defiance. At Petersburg Cornwallis superseded Arnold, and at the head of 5000 troops turned toward Richmond, where Lafayette, commanding the American forces, lay with half as many troops. The British general must have felt that the province was nearly conquered, since it had in the field to oppose him, at the end of a five months' campaign, in its very center, no more than 2500 men. It was, in fact, long marches rather than men and muskets that put an end to the British power in America.

**Cornwallis
in Virginia.**

Lafayette left Richmond as the enemy approached, and Cornwallis sent Tarleton to break up the legislature at Charlottesville. The task was accomplished brilliantly, and Governor Jefferson barely escaped from his residence at Monticello ere it was surrounded by the British troopers. Cornwallis, meanwhile, continued to chase Lafayette in the region north of Richmond. Convinced at last that the pursuit was useless, he withdrew to Portsmouth, and in August moved his base to Yorktown, which he fortified. With him were


7000 men. Lafayette, with his forces reënforced to 3500, was between Yorktown and Richmond.

At this time Washington, with about 6000 men, lay watching Clinton in New York, and Rochambeau, with 5000, was at Newport. About the time that Cornwallis moved to Yorktown came a letter from Count de Grasse in the West Indies offering the coöperation of his fleet during the summer. Here was a brilliant opportunity, and Washington seized it. De Grasse was requested to go to the Chesapeake, blockade Cornwallis, and drive off a relieving squadron; Rochambeau, by orders of his own government under the command of Washington, was brought to New York, where, by feigned activity, Clinton was made to believe that he was to be besieged; and finally, with admirable celerity, a combined American and French force numbering 6000 was moved to the head of Chesapeake Bay and thence by water to the James river, where it landed, and, joined by Lafayette, instituted the siege of Yorktown, September 2, 1781. To his great contentment Washington found that De Grasse was already at hand and that the fleet had brought 3000 additional French troops who were at his disposal. Thus Cornwallis's 7500 men in Yorktown were surrounded by 16,000 enemies, of whom 7800 were French regulars.

Clinton, alarmed for Cornwallis's fate, sent Arnold with 2000 men to raid New London, hoping thereby to draw Washington from Virginia. It was the region in which Arnold was born, but he did not spare it. A part of New London and thirteen ships were burned. Fort Griswold, on the other side of the river, held off a storming column until resistance was impossible. When it was taken, Colonel Ledyard, in command, and nearly a hundred of his men were cut down in cold blood. But Arnold was unable to penetrate further into Connecticut and returned to New York, his ships laden with spoils. Clinton also sought to aid Cornwallis by sea. Admiral Graves, with five ships, sailed for the Chesapeake. Within the capes was De Grasse, who came out and gave battle so vigorously that Graves returned to New York much disabled. Another expedition for the relief of Yorktown was fitted out at New York, but it sailed too late to be of service to Cornwallis.

Meantime, the siege went on vigorously. The Americans and French seized the high ground around Yorktown, and their first line, along the entire British front, was completed by September 29. Immediately a first parallel was begun, and then a second, which by October 12 brought the besiegers to within 300 yards of the British lines. Two redoubts stood in their way. Since they commanded his own lines, Cornwallis would not abandon them, and until they were taken, the American lines could not be advanced. They must, therefore, be stormed, and the task was divided between the French and the American troops.

October 14, in the night, a French detachment under Colonel Deux-Ponts carried one, and an American force under Colonel Alexander Hamilton carried the other. Cornwallis's defenses were now at the mercy of his opponents, and he tried to escape across the river to Gloucester; but a storm blew his boats down the stream after only a portion of his force had crossed. His defenses crumbling under the hot American fire, he could resist no longer, and on the 17th raised a white flag and accepted Washington's terms. October 19, the surrender was signed, the land forces becoming prisoners to the United



States and the naval forces prisoners to France. The total number surrendered, including seamen, was 8000, and 580 of the British had been killed or wounded in the siege. The combined French and American loss was 274. At the moment of surrender Cornwallis pleaded illness and sent his sword by General O'Hara. By Washington's direction it was received by General Lincoln, who had been forced to surrender Charleston, and was by him handed back to O'Hara.

Cornwallis
Surrenders,
October 19,
1781.

After Yorktown the military history of the war is of slight interest. Both sides realized that the struggle must end with victory for the Americans. After six years' fighting and at great expense, England had proved her inability to subdue the country. Each great expedition into the interior became a failure when deprived of succor from the coast; and such would be the result indefinitely. In confession of her failure, all the Southern posts were abandoned, one after the other, — Wilmington in January, Savan-

End of
the War.

nah in July, and Charleston in December, 1782. In New York Clinton awaited the result of peace negotiations, which were already begun.

THE TREATY OF PEACE

The surrender of Cornwallis broke the English resistance. Before it occurred, the English nation was tired of a war which only accumulated debt without winning victories. March 5, 1782, parliament passed a bill to enable the king to make peace. Fifteen days later Lord North resigned, and the whigs, under the leadership of Rockingham, formed a new ministry, with the understanding that American independence should be acknowledged. It was a bitter pill for the king, whose plans for a personally directed ministry was staked on the issue of the war. That he had lost was the only grain of comfort a discerning Englishman could find in the situation. In July, Rockingham died and Shelburne became prime minister, but the policy of peace was not changed.

After some preliminary inquiries in reference to the terms likely to be demanded, negotiations began at Paris in the summer of 1782.

The King Beaten.

To Franklin, our minister to France, were added, as American negotiators, John Jay, who for a long time had been fruitlessly seeking to induce Spain to become an ally of the United States; John Adams, minister to Holland; and Henry Laurens, a prisoner in England until the negotiations were nearly completed. Great Britain was represented by Oswald, a Scotch merchant who was in close communication with Shelburne.

The American commissioners were instructed to proceed in open coöperation with France, but Jay satisfied himself that Vergennes, directing the policy of France, would sacrifice the interests of the United States, and he began to favor a separate treaty with England. Personally, Vergennes seems to have been disinterested, but he was under obligations to

Peace Com- missioners.

Spain, who feared to enhance the power of the new republic in the West. In September came from him an informal proposition that the region south of the Ohio be set aside for the Indians, part of it under the protection of Spain and part under that of the United States. At the same time it was intimated that at the conclusion of peace, France would support England's claim to the territory north of the Ohio. This scheme, if adopted, would leave the United States merely a seacoast power. If it should come before a conference composed of all the parties to the war, it could not fail to have the support of Spain and England, and, with France's additional advocacy, must be adopted. Franklin trusted Vergennes, but the facts of the case, ably set forth by Jay, induced him to consent to make a separate arrangement with England, which was pointedly against the instructions of the American commissioners. An intermediary was sent to

Separate Negotiations with England.

England, where the ministry, glad to settle the difficulty with one power so that they might be the more free to deal with the others, fell in with the suggestion, and on that basis negotiations proceeded smoothly.

Vergennes's conduct has occasioned much discussion. Some persons have supposed that he wished to keep America dependent on France, others that he acted in good faith and was unjustly suspected by Jay and Adams. He undoubtedly hoped that Louisiana would some day come back to France, and this Vergennes's Conduct. fact has suggested that he wished to keep the United States out of the Mississippi Valley in order that it might be more easily secured by France. The theory, however, does not explain why he should have been willing to enhance the power of England in the northern part of the valley. Probably the most acceptable explanation is that he cared little about the disposition of the interior, and merely accepted the proposed arrangement to please Spain, to whose interest alone it was that England should have the Northwest; Vergennes's indifference in the matter is shown by his calm acquiescence when in December he learned from Franklin that the American commissioners, on November 30, had concluded a separate treaty with England to be effective when peace should have been made between France and England.

This treaty, after recognizing the independence of the United States, dealt with four principal heads, each of which had been fully discussed. The boundary was all we could have desired. On the northeast it ran up the St. Croix river to the source, Terms of the Treaty. north to the highlands separating the tributaries of the St. Lawrence from the streams flowing into the Atlantic, thence with the highlands to the forty-fifth parallel, and along that to the St. Lawrence. It was then to pass along the middle of rivers and lakes to the northwest corner of the Lake of the Woods and thence due west to the Mississippi, Boundaries. [down which it went to the thirty-first parallel and along that to the Chattahoochee, thence southward to the source of the Flint, whence it ran in a straight line to the mouth of the St. Mary's, and thence to the Atlantic. The British posts within this line were to be given up as soon as possible. A secret clause provided that if in the general peace England retained West Florida, its northern boundary should be a line from the mouth of the Yazoo east to the Appalachicola. The navigation of the Mississippi was to be open to both nations. No arrangements were made for running the boundary line, and as geographical knowledge was then imperfect, trouble occurred when the succeeding generation came to interpret that part of the treaty which referred to the northeastern and the northwestern boundaries.

The Americans were anxious that the New Englanders should continue to have their former facilities in the fisheries, and after much

difficulty it was agreed that the Americans might fish on the Banks of Newfoundland and wherever else they had been in the habit of fishing, and that they might land and cure fish in any uninhabited parts of Nova Scotia, Labrador, and the Magdalen Islands, but not in Newfoundland. For this concession, so important to New England, Adams's pertinacity was chiefly responsible.

On boundaries and fisheries, the treaty thus favored the United States. On the two other important points of discussion, the payment of British debts and compensation of the loyalists it ought, thought the British commissioners, to favor England. But their contention was vigorously resisted. Franklin thought the debts were properly canceled, because parliament, by closing the American ports and inflicting the horrors of war, had destroyed the power of

the debtors to pay these obligations. Adams and Jay were anxious to preserve the credit of Americans, and the demands of the British were accepted, at least negatively. It was agreed that no legal impediment should be placed in the way of the payment of any debts owed by American to British subjects. As to compensating the loyalists, the commissioners held out a long time. King and ministers were insistent; for they believed that England was in honor bound to succor those whose fortunes had been seized because they were true to the crown. The Americans were equally unyielding, because they looked on the loyalists as wicked conspirators, authors of much bloodshed, and proper victims of the popular wrath. In one of the discussions of the subject, the American commissioners said that congress could not order a state to repeal its confiscation laws, and that the limit of its authority was to recommend a repeal. The English commissioners, anxious to close the negotiations, caught at this expression, and it was agreed that congress would make the desired recommendation. The result was a double interpretation. Englishmen, under the necessity of defending the treaty, assured the public that the advice of congress would be received by the states as binding. The American commissioners authorized no such impression. When, as later happened, the states paid no attention to the advice of congress, the British public charged the United States with breach of faith.

When this preliminary treaty was announced in parliament, there was an outburst of anger which produced a change of ministry. Hart-

ley was sent to Paris to replace Oswald, and he was ordered to make better terms. He did his best, but the American commissioners would not give more than they had already promised, and September 3, 1783, when a general peace was signed by all parties to the war, the treaty completed on

November 30, 1782, was accepted as defining the political relations between England and her former colonies. It did not deal with commercial matters, a subject reserved for much irritating discussion in the future.

**The
Fisheries.**

**British
Debts and
Compensation
to the
Loyalists.**

**A General
Treaty,
September
3, 1783.**



CIVIL PROGRESS DURING THE REVOLUTION

The continental congress was a revolutionary body, and derived its authority from the success of the revolution. Since the Articles of Confederation were not adopted until 1781 the war was all but won under the sole direction of this body. It was composed of delegates chosen and paid by the states, and its votes were generally in accordance with instructions from the states. It did not levy taxes, direct or indirect, but merely made requisitions on the states for funds needed. It was little more than a convention of ambassadors from states acting together in a league or confederacy. This loose form of union was only slightly strengthened by the Articles of Confederation (see page 238). So weak a congress inevitably encountered many difficulties. It always lacked money and was forced to borrow at home and abroad and to issue paper currency which eventually became worthless.

The Authority of the Continental Congress.

The congress realized its inherent weakness and became so accustomed to it that it almost ceased to struggle against fate. It was badly organized, though it is difficult to see how a body with no more power to make itself obeyed could have prepared a better organization. Each state had a vote, each was jealous of its own interests, and the defection of any one would have been a serious calamity to the common cause. Nearly every vote on a debatable question resulted in compromise, or in a decision to do nothing. Under these circumstances the *personnel* of congress deteriorated; for the capable men preferred to serve the states rather than continue to sit in the body of do-nothings in Philadelphia.

Inefficiency of Congress.

The state governments varied in character in accordance with local conditions, but in New England they were more democratic than elsewhere. Thus, in New England, the executive was chosen by the voters, in New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, the Carolinas, and Georgia by one or both houses of the legislature, in Pennsylvania by a council chosen by the electors, and in New York by the freeholders worth £100 or more. No state had universal manhood suffrage. Three, New Hampshire, Pennsylvania, and Georgia, required a voter to be a taxpayer; other states had a property qualification. The manner in which the royal governors had interfered in politics, proroguing assemblies, deferring elections, and continuing in existence houses which did their will, had created by reaction a strong love of frequent elections. Accordingly in nine states the governor was to be elected annually, in New York, Pennsylvania, and Delaware triennially, and in South Carolina biennially. In six states both houses of the assembly were to be elected annually, and in two more, Connecticut

The Character of State Government

and Rhode Island, the lower house was to be chosen semi-annually. South Carolina elected assemblies biennially, and the other states, New York, Delaware, Maryland, and Virginia elected the lower houses annually, and the upper houses for longer terms.

In the beginning of the revolution little was said about sovereignty. The common danger was the great fact of the time, and men were chiefly concerned about how to secure enough union to meet it effectively. But as time passed, and the central power became more and more a fact, and as a group of leaders continually urged that it ought to exercise many of the powers then exercised by the states, a disposition was manifest to define more closely the powers of the states. Thus arose the contention that sovereignty rested with states. It was supported by the logic of the situation. Far larger numbers of people loved the states than loved the central power. The politicians of the day had been bred under a system of state politics, and these politicians not only controlled the states, but they made up the very membership of the continental congress. The result was seen in the committee of congress which prepared the Articles of Confederation. They voted down every effort of a few enlightened men to establish a central government with vital control of taxation, and devised a confederacy without the right to make its ordinary laws respected. Thus the belief in state sovereignty got a strong support in the day. We shall soon see that its inherent practical weakness proved its own undoing.

The state constitutions usually contained bills of rights; for it was to the state that the citizen was to look for guarantees of life and property. The pre-revolutionary contention was that the colonies should not be subject to legislation by parliament but should make laws for themselves. They were not now apt to lay aside this contention in order to create a congress which might take over the function just denied to parliament. It took years of confusion to make it evident that the small and disunited states were not able to establish a successful government in general affairs. At present no such conviction existed, except in the minds of a few intelligent ones to whom the majority paid little attention.

It was natural that the government should be republican. So far as internal feelings were concerned, it had ever been republican. The monarchy had been, in the minds of the people, an affliction, a sign of oppression. Washington, it is said, refused a suggestion that he might become a king. Nobody would believe that he was ever willing to be king; but it seems certain that if he had appeared in that capacity his popularity would have dissolved in a day. The example of a numerous people setting out on a separate course as a nation with the flag of a republic over them aroused grave apprehensions in Europe. No great nation then

State Sovereignty.

Functions of the States.

Republicanism Inherent.

flew such a flag. Switzerland was not a case in point, since it was divided by mountains into natural states and protected by its physical inaccessibility from outside attacks.

The revolution had many leaders from the older politicians, but its fundamental support was the mass of small farmers. As a popular movement it aroused the apprehension of the wealthy classes. It was one thing to establish a republic and another to attempt an absolute democracy. Moreover, to hold that all men should participate equally in government was against the practice of any colony. The question was debated long in the bodies that made the state constitutions, and the division between democratic whigs and conservative whigs which then appeared was a forerunner of the party divisions which began in the first years under the national constitution. The question hinged on the suffrage and qualification for officeholders. As already said (page 217), the suffrage was everywhere restricted in some way. The conservatives were able to force a compromise which gave them a firmer control of the upper house of the legislature than of the lower house. In some cases this was by requiring that a member of this house should own a relatively large amount of property, or that only well-to-do men should vote for him. In some cases the upper house was appointed by the lower, and in Maryland it was chosen by an electoral commission selected for that purpose by the freeholders. While the war lasted it was not advisable for the whigs to wrangle over these points, but there came a day when the compromises of the revolution were no longer acceptable, and one by one the old restrictions on equal participation in government were removed. This democratic movement belongs to the history of the second generation after the revolution (see page 472).

Conservative and Radical Republicans.

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CHAPTER X

THE FIRST YEARS OF PEACE, 1783-1787

FINANCIAL EMBARRASMENTS

THE first years of independence were naturally full of difficulties. An immense debt, state and continental, must be provided for, trade, interrupted by the war, must be reëstablished, the vast tracts of western land must be developed, society must be readjusted on a purely American basis, the bitterness felt by the patriotic party for the tories must be allowed to cool, remnants of local jealousies must be dealt with, and the feeling for union, so weak that the Articles of Confederation were but "a rope of sand," must be strengthened and formed into a central government which could command respect at home and abroad. Many persons felt that these embarrassments could not be surmounted. They thought chaos would ensue, and after that would come some violent reorganization which would result in two or more states under some kind of European protection. They did not understand the practical quality of the Americans, who, through many years, had boldly solved new and formidable problems, and who, under the lead of men like Washington, Hamilton, Madison, John Adams, and James Wilson, discovered a way to bring the people to accept an efficient form of central government, under which financial, industrial, and social difficulties disappeared. The years 1781-1787 were full of these perplexities: the three years following saw them passing away through the efforts of the people.

The expenses of the revolution were met by taxation, loans, and issues of paper money. Congress could not lay taxes, but made requisitions on the states, receiving from this uncertain source half a million dollars a year. From foreign loans \$7,830,517 was received during the war, and so great was the distress that of this sum \$1,663,992 was used to pay the interest on the domestic debt. The foreign loans were derived as follows: from France \$5,352,500, from Holland \$1,304,000, and from Spain \$174,017. During the next six years over \$2,000,000 was borrowed abroad, most of it to pay the interest on the foreign debt. Nevertheless, in 1790 we still owed \$1,640,071 foreign interest. The domestic continental loans of the war amounted to \$28,353,832, and as the interest on these was not paid after March 1, 1782, there was in 1790 an arrearage of this kind of interest amounting to \$13,030,168.

The Revolutionary Debt.

The state debts in behalf of the war were very large. Some states were paying their portions as fast as they could, others were doing little or nothing in that way. No suggestion of assumption had yet been made. After the enactment of Hamilton's assumption scheme in 1790 the national government assumed these debts to the amount of \$18,271,787. The condition of the debt was a blot on the country's honor and plainly indicated that the tax-laying power of congress ought to be strengthened.

The first issues of continental paper money were moderate, and for a year the bills passed at par, but as larger quantities were emitted they depreciated rapidly. In two years their value as compared with specie was three to one, by September 1, 1779, it was thirty-eight to one, and in March, 1780, fifty to one, nearly \$200,000,000 being then in circulation. Depreciation continued until the ratio was one hundred to one. In March, 1780, congress called in the currency at forty to one, to be paid in taxes and destroyed. It also provided for a "new tenor" issue at forty to one, bearing interest at 5 per cent. About \$120,000,000 was thus paid in and canceled. After 1790 the government redeemed \$6,000,000 more at one hundred to one, and the rest was lost to the holders. The continental currency became an object of popular contempt, and in 1781 a facetious fellow of Philadelphia plastered his dog with dollar bills and led him through the streets to the amusement of the on-lookers. The states also issued paper money, about \$200,000,000 in all. It depreciated alarmingly, and much of it was not redeemed. This large amount of unredeemed money, continental and state, was a forced contribution from the people who held it, and involved a great sacrifice on their part for the cause of independence.

The wretched state of the finances brought congress to the verge of conflict with the army, which in the last winter of the war remained in camp at Newburg, on the Hudson, watching the British force in New York while the negotiators in Paris completed their task. The pay of the soldiers was badly in arrears, and they began to fear that if they went home without it they would lose it entirely. Some of the officers inflamed their suspicions, and in January, 1783, an address in their behalf was presented to congress. It contained a veiled threat of misfortune if redress was not granted. Congress could do nothing more than promise a month's pay, and the discontent increased.

All this did not occur without arousing keen interest elsewhere. Gouverneur Morris, assistant superintendent of finance and an extreme advocate of stronger government, declared that good must come out of the convulsion he thought imminent. Hamilton, also hoping for a stronger government, but more practical as a public man, hoped that Washington would take control of the movement and through it force the country

**Continental
Money.**

**Discontent
in the Army.**

**Possible
Results.**

to strengthen the hands of congress. He wrote cautiously to Washington to that effect; but all his calculations were lost. Washington was not supple-minded, like Hamilton. He was a man of simple loyalty, and he considered the threats of armed interference disloyal and dishonorable.

It cannot be said that men like Hamilton and Morris encouraged the dissatisfaction of the army, but the holders of the continental bonds were not so guiltless. This class was strong in Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and New Hampshire, former trading states where capital was thrown out of employment during the war. Agricultural states, lacking a market for their products, were in no position to invest in bonds, but were more likely to sell what they already had. Thus by 1783 the speculators had bought up the certificates of debt, and the representatives from the commercial states favored a strong financial policy, while the delegates from the agricultural states were not so urgent in the matter. Then the impression got abroad in the army that the capitalists in Philadelphia sympathized with the soldiers and would help them force the delinquent states to their duty. Early in March an agent of the speculators arrived at Newburg and was closeted with General Gates, second in command to Washington. On the tenth an address was secretly circulated, urging the men not to disband until they were paid, and warning them against any man who would counsel otherwise. At the same time a meeting of the higher officers was called for the eleventh.

Washington discovered the plot a few hours before the officers were to meet and acted with characteristic decision. He published at once a general order decrying meetings secretly called and openly appointing a meeting for the fifteenth. Gates was checkmated, abandoned his own meeting, but hoped to control the one just called, where as senior officer he would preside. No one thought the commander-in-chief would attend, but the deliberations had hardly begun on the fifteenth when he entered and took the floor to speak. Ordinarily of a quiet manner he was now agitated and greatly in earnest. He denounced the arguments of the secret address, assured his hearers that the best exertions in their behalf would be made, and left the room with the confidence of all but the chief plotters, many of his hearers being in tears. Resolutions were then offered full of patriotic utterances and expressing abhorrence of the recent secret circular. Gates, in the chair, put the question and had the humiliation to announce it was carried unanimously. Thenceforth the army was loyal. June 2 it was disbanded, and the soldiers went quietly home, their accounts unsettled, and, as Washington said, "without a farthing of money in their pockets."

One incident only marred the dispersal. A body of raw recruits were at Lancaster, Pennsylvania, their pay also in arrears. When

**Part of the
Speculators.**

**Washing-
ton's Action.**

they heard the Newburg army was going home without pay they became mutinous, and eighty of them marched to Philadelphia, vowing they would have their rights. They were joined by some veterans, and marched through the streets, drinking, threatening, but attempting no actual violence. Congress applied to the Pennsylvania executive, a Council of State, for protection, but they replied that they dare not call out the militia lest they join the mutineers. Then congress adjourned, and after three days fled to Princeton. Philadelphia declared the flight unnecessary and thought it was instigated by delegates who wished to deprive the city of the honor of being the capital of the confederation.

Congress in Flight.

The financial distress of the day suggested a grant of taxing power to the central government. In 1781 the states were called upon to amend the articles of confederation to allow congress to collect an import duty of five per cent. All consented but Rhode Island, whose refusal defeated the proposition. Her very smallness made her jealous of the loss of authority, and her large dependence on commerce made her unwilling to surrender a part of what was her surest source of revenue. Virginia, who assented at first, withdrew her approval on reflection. The prospect of mutiny in the army led congress to take up the question again in 1783. This time imposts were to be laid for twenty-five years on specified articles, the proceeds to go to paying interest on the debt; and the plan was to be adopted if all the states consented. Now was seen how much more the states clung to their power with the disappearance of danger from England. Virginia and North Carolina accepted without hesitation, but other states held back. Impost and no-impost became slogans for two classes, merchants, owners of the public bonds, and those liberals who foresaw the advantages of union constituting one class, and the great body of farmers, shopkeepers, and illiberal persons who believed concentration would lead to despotism constituting the other. Interest and theory were combined on each side. After three years' debate, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Connecticut, New Jersey, South Carolina, and Pennsylvania had granted the impost, and Delaware was willing if all the other states granted it. New York, Rhode Island, Maryland, and Georgia held out, or granted it on such conditions that the benefit was slight. The failure of this second attempt to give the central government authority to collect taxes made a deep impression on the people, before whom a proposition for a revision of the articles of confederation was already submitted.

Two attempts to give Congress the Taxing Power.

INDUSTRY AND TRADE AFTER THE WAR

Although the war greatly reduced exports of grain, tobacco, fish, lumber, and rum, and cut off the importation of a hundred useful

articles, it did not produce absolute distress. Food and the simpler articles of manufacture could be had in abundance; and while men fought for liberty they would forego finery. They were generally used to hardships and could bear them lightly when they would. When independence was won it would be time enough to think of making money.

**Industrial
Conditions.**

But peace brought unexpected difficulties. The British ports were closed to us now as to other foreigners, unless we paid high duties.

**Trade with
England.**

Continental ports were open, but England was the great manufacturing country of the world: it was her implements, cloths, and other merchandise we were accustomed to use, and how could we buy them unless we sent her our products? Have them we would, £3,700,000 worth in 1784, and as we sent to England only £750,000 worth in that year there was a mighty draining of specie to settle the balance. At the same time England laid a high duty on whale oil, a blow at our whalers, and the trade with the British West Indies, so lucrative before the war, was now forbidden by the navigation laws, in order to protect the British merchants and shipowners. Some men of the day resented the idea that we must trade with England. Was not France our friend and her ports open? But every merchant knew it was not possible to build up trade with France. We were bred on British commerce, and our taste would not change quickly. So while trade with the continent and in the Orient gradually reëstablished itself, it did not fill the want.

It was, of course, England's interest to keep our trade, but it was hard to make her realize it. She seemed to think we could not choose

**England's
Attitude.**

but trade with her. Then retaliation was thought of. But no one dreamed that thirteen states could act effectively against England. It was a task for the central authority, and in 1784 congress asked the states to grant for fifteen years the right to pass a navigation law. As England had shown no willingness to make a commercial treaty, the power was also asked to exclude from our ports certain goods, the property of citizens of a nation not in treaty with us. The New England states were earnest for the measure, the Middle States supported it without enthusiasm, but the South suspected that it would lead to an advantage for the trading class at the expense of the farmers. So many restrictions were placed by the states on the exercise of the power that their votes granting it were futile.

Then diplomacy was tried. John Adams, in Paris, was appointed minister to England, with instructions to make a commercial treaty

**Adams sent
to London.**

and secure the execution of the treaty of 1783. He arrived in London in May, 1785, and was received with marks of good will by the king; but the negotiation proceeded slowly. England understood her advantage. She commanded the situation and knew it. Why should she give up her ancient

system to please America? Adams replied: "Because it is England's interest to cherish her trade with America, and if a hard policy is adopted America will trade elsewhere or build her own factories." The British merchants flouted the idea: America, they thought, could not establish manufactures, or trade elsewhere. After eight months of parley in which no progress was made, an answer came to Adams's propositions. America, it said, had obstructed the payment of British debts, contrary to the treaty of peace, and no concessions would be made, since we did not keep our agreements. Although Adams remained in London until 1788, he could get no further comfort. He was deeply humiliated, and advised that we should not succeed as long as we collected 10 per cent duty at Boston and paid as high as 50 per cent at Liverpool. He seemed not to realize that high duties at home would increase the prices of imported merchandise, lay an extra burden on our own people, and only injure England by lessening through high prices the amount of goods we imported from her. Nor was stronger government, as we now know, a sure cure for the situation, else why did we not retaliate after the adoption of the constitution? The only remedy was to manufacture our own goods, and it was not until thirty years later, after an eight-year period of isolation had intervened (see page 311) that we were able to begin to depend on ourselves in this respect.

The confiscation of British debts was a serious grievance. These were obligations of Americans to British merchants incurred before war began. The English commissioners for making the treaty insisted that they should be collected, and it was British
Debts. agreed that congress should recommend the states to place no obstacle in the way of such procedure. England was also anxious that the tories should be allowed to live in peace in the states. But the people were bent on confiscating the debts. England had made it impossible for the Americans to pay them by establishing a blockade and sometimes seizing the goods for which the debts were contracted before they reached the American harbors. As for the tories, they were much hated because they sided with the enemy in the war, and because in some states they took part in civil strife which destroyed much property and life. As trade concessions were not made and as the Western posts were not given up or the fugitive slaves restored, Americans took no steps to pay the debts or lessen the hardship of the tories; and the question remained a source of irritation for many years. Meanwhile, the tories moved away to Canada, where the mother country gave them land and aid in planting themselves, and the debtors largely evaded obligations by becoming bankrupt and moving to the frontier, where they were lost sight of, and so escaped suit for recovery of the obligations.

The need of a sound currency turned men's minds to bank notes.

Several states had established such institutions on moderate scales, but they did not answer the requirements of business or give the central government the facility it required in lending money in emergencies. This, it was thought, could be furnished better by a great national bank, patterned after the Bank of England. Hamilton suggested such a scheme to Robert Morris, superintendent of finance from 1781 to 1784. Morris probably had already formed such a plan in his own mind. At any rate, he got congress to charter the Bank of North America in 1781, with a capital of \$400,000 paid in specie. It was enlarged to \$2,000,000 in 1784. It had many difficulties, but managed to weather them all, and its notes were received at par. As doubt was cast upon its legality by repeated assertions that congress had no power to incorporate a bank, it secured a Pennsylvania charter in 1782, which though repealed in 1785 was renewed in 1787. When the old congress ceased with the establishment of the new government in 1789, the bank continued under the state charter. It did not receive recognition under the new régime, but its existence was uninterrupted, and in 1864 it became a national bank under the acts then recently passed by congress. In the dark period of 1782-1789 it did good service by lending money to the government at times when no other resource was apparent. Its first president, Thomas Willing, was an old business partner and friend of Robert Morris, and gave him steady support in the many arduous efforts by which the latter, as superintendent of finance, supported the struggling congress.

FORMING A NEW SOCIETY

The men of the revolution hated nothing more than monarchy and aristocracy. They realized that every step they took was likely to be a precedent, and were exceedingly suspicious lest some of the dreaded forms should get recognized. Posterity now thinks their fears were unnecessary. Probably not even Washington could have made himself king of a people so fiercely attached to their self-government. As for an aristocracy, which depends on permanent forms of hereditary wealth and rank, it is not possible that people who had so little of such forms could have tolerated their introduction. Primogeniture, which existed in colonial days in New York and the Southern colonies, and the assignment of double share to the eldest son in other colonies, were now done away with. Entails were abolished, and with them went manorial privileges, which had survived in New York and Maryland. The rights of the proprietors in Pennsylvania and Maryland were seized by the state, payment to the Penn family being made in the former, but none to the Calverts in the latter. But unequal suffrage was retained in one way or another in every state. In some only taxpayers could

vote, in others only the possessors of property. Manhood suffrage came at a much later day.

Jealousy of rank flared up hotly when officers of the continental army seemed about to be elevated into a superior class. These officers, whose influence did much to induce the privates to enlist, were promised half pay for life with the advent of peace. The war was not over before a cry arose against executing the pledge. It would, said the objectors, create an aristocracy of the most dangerous kind, an aristocracy on a military basis. States passed resolutions, and so much excitement was manifested that congress commuted the obligation to a payment of five years' full pay in cash. Even this caused great indignation. Everywhere the people raged against a standing army, the greatest enemy to liberty. When it was disbanded in 1783, it was reduced to eighty men, enough to guard the arsenals at West Point and Pittsburg. Nor could congress be induced to create a stronger establishment. Motion after motion was rejected to raise a continental force to protect the frontier. The best that could be done was to recommend the states to raise 700 men for this purpose for one year. In 1788 the total strength of the army thus raised was 666 men and officers.

Half Pay
for the
Officers in
the Army.

The popular dislike of a military aristocracy came to fever pitch when it was known that the officers before disbanding had formed the Society of Cincinnati. Its threefold object was to perpetuate the friendships formed in the war, to deliberate in secret on the welfare of the country, and to create an order membership in which should be an honor to pass to the eldest son to the end of time. It adopted an eagle and a blue ribbon as its badge, established state and central organizations, and arranged for regular meetings. The second and third objects of the order aroused most opposition. The mass of the people resented the idea that a group of any men, least of all military men, should secretly direct public opinion on political matters, and they wanted no hereditary aristocracy however formed. They acknowledged the services of those who fought for liberty, but felt the merits would be greater if such men took their places with other patriots in future efforts for good government.

The Cin-
cinnati.

The opposition to the order was not confined to the unthinking people. Franklin, Samuel Adams, and John Adams were among those who raised a warning voice. They but did in a dignified way what a thousand less important men did hysterically. Denunciatory pamphlets were written by the ton. The society became an issue in the campaigns, and candidates pledged themselves against it in order to get votes. Legislatures disfranchised the members of the order, and the citizens of Cambridge, Massachusetts, petitioned that it be suppressed. Before such a tempest of invective the Cincinnati could not stand. Mem-

Denuncia-
tions.

bers who had political ambition renounced their allegiance, and others lost interest in a scheme which was so great a source of commotion. For a time the meetings were suspended, but in later years they were revived, and the society now exists as a patriotic order.

The men of 1785 should not be measured by modern standards. Descended from the middle and lower classes of England, they had often had occasion to reflect on the disadvantages of a hereditary aristocracy. It was the English landed gentry that made up the party in support of the king's prerogative. The gentry had monopolized offices in state, church, and colonies, and the aristocracy had furnished a barrier across which American farmers could never expect to pass. The mass of the colonists, even the wealthy ones, were descended from those who had felt the burdens of an aristocracy. Opposition to such a form of society was inherent. Twenty years of struggle, political and military, had developed their passions and confirmed their hatred of the words "king," "nobility," and "privilege." They controlled opinion among their neighbors and determined the actions of state legislatures. They were the average men who were going to build the life of the nation.

Nor did their imaginations rise to the ideal of a great American nation. They were born into a struggle between crown and colony.

Their first political ideas were to defend the colony against monarchical control. For them patriotism, political liberty, and self-government began with the defense of the colony. In 1776 they gave up with reluctance as much of state authority as would enable the states to act together for the continental cause. When the war was over, they did not cast off their opinions easily. The states acting together had won independence, and with the restoration of normal conditions could they not solve the simpler problems of peace? And if it should be necessary to strengthen the general government, they felt it ought to be done with the greatest care, reserving to the states, which they loved better than any great coming nation, all power not absolutely essential to future existence. The state, they felt, was the protector of individual rights, which were more important than the impression we made on the world as an American nation. Much inconvenience was endured before their hold on the popular mind was lessened and a stronger working plan of union adopted.

Their attitude toward the tories was equally characteristic. They thought it was for the state to regulate the life of its inhabitants. It

was for the state to decide what penalties should be imposed on persons who had aided the enemy in time of war, and who had carried the torch and sword into communities struggling for their dearest rights. If the states had lost, who could doubt what punishments would have been visited on the whigs? Those who took the sword should perish by it. Was it not, therefore,

The Social Ideal.

Loyalty to the States.

Attitude toward Tories.

a mercy to spare the miscreants their lives? and was it not wise to insure a homogeneous society in the future by driving away those who had supported the king's tyranny and still believed a monarchy the best form of government?

The lot of the loyalists was indeed hard, especially in New York. This city was in British hands throughout the war. Its merchants were largely loyal, and to it came for refuge king's true subjects from many towns in New England and the Middle states. While the war lasted, they bore themselves haughtily toward the whigs of the city, driving them away to New Jersey or Pennsylvania to escape insults and discriminations, and seizing their property when they were gone. Now the tables were turned. The outcasts returned to the city, hot for revenge. With great difficulty conflicts were averted when the two classes met on the streets. The legislature disfranchised all who would not swear they had not aided the enemy. In 1784 it passed a trespass act, giving the patriots the right to recover damages from tories who had occupied the houses of fugitive whigs. Many suits at once began, and the damages claimed were usually exaggerated. One of the first cases tried was that of a widow, Mrs. Rutgers, against Waddington. Alexander Hamilton, twenty-seven years old, was the counsel for the defendant, and argued so brilliantly that the court decided that the trespass act was contrary to law. Then followed an outburst of indignation. Meetings were held, pamphlets appeared, and the press teemed with threats for the tories who dared to remain in the city. North and South Carolina had suffered during the war from bitter internal strife, and here the feeling against the tories was exceedingly strong. Every state had driven loyalists into exile by law or by irritating practices which made their remaining unendurable; and the bitterness of the time yielded slowly to milder feelings. Spite of the efforts of the British government in their behalf and the interference of many liberal-minded whigs, the lot of the tories continued very uncomfortable. They were deprived of the franchise, their property could not be recovered in the state courts, and large numbers of them, estimated at 60,000, definitely abandoned their homes and settled elsewhere in the British dominions. Those who left the Northern states went chiefly to New Brunswick and Canada; those from the South went to Florida and the Bahamas. Great Britain felt obliged to succor them, and by 1790 had given them as much as \$16,000,000, besides large tracts of land. The exclusion of the tories, largely of the upper class, strengthened the democracy of the day.

Hardships
of the
Tories.

THE WESTERN LANDS

Seven of the states had claims to Western lands, founded on the terms of their colonial charters. They were Massachusetts, Connecti-

cut, New York, Virginia, North and South Carolina, and Georgia. The other states looked with jealousy at the prospect of being swamped by these mighty neighbors when the lands should be well settled; and Maryland flatly refused to accept the articles of confederation unless these claims were relinquished. Promises to that effect were made before she finally signed, March 1, 1781. By 1786 all the claims to the Northwest were ceded to Congress with the understanding that when the vast Western region was settled, it should be divided into states and admitted into the union. Land from colonial times was the most popular form of property, speculations in it the foundation of many fortunes, and to the people of the day the possession of these immense Western tracts added greatly to the national resources, made the payment of the debt seem more probable, and promoted the union of the states.

Jefferson, then a member of congress, was deeply interested in these lands, and was chairman of a committee appointed to prepare a scheme for settling them. The report, spoken of as the Ordinance of 1784, provided for a number of states, fourteen or sixteen, north and south of the Ohio. Nine were marked out north of the river, and names were selected for them.

One was to be "Washington," another "Saratoga," while others were given names of classical origin, as "Metropotamia" ("Mother of Rivers"), for the plain where several rivers rise, and "Sylvania," for the forest region west and south of Lake Superior. The report also provided a system of laws to be enforced until the states were admitted to the union. Its most important provision was the exclusion of slavery from the Western lands after 1800. Jefferson hoped earnestly that it might be adopted, but the Carolinas and Georgia thought they would by this means be excluded from a share in the settlement of the lands they ceded, and the provision was stricken from the report, which was then adopted by congress. The scheme was too complete for the Western conditions. The backwoodsmen who were already settling in Ohio, Kentucky, and Tennessee needed a simpler government, and this was embodied in a second ordinance which ignored what had been done in 1784.

In 1787 a newly organized Ohio Company, composed of Massachusetts men, asked congress to sell them one million and a half acres of land on the Muskingum river for \$1,000,000, to be paid for in the bonds of the government, then worth less than 50 per cent of par. The application was urged by Manasseh Cutler, who proved himself a good lobbyist. He encountered much opposition from members of congress, who thought the price too low. Finally he joined with his scheme another purchase, in which the leading members took part, of 3,000,000 acres at the same price; and on that basis the two schemes were enacted. It was proposed to establish the colony at once, and by spring, 1788, an advance party of 47 began

"Northwest
Ordinance
of 1784."

The Ohio
Company.

to build the town of Marietta, the first settlement in what was to be the state of Ohio.

Just before the grant passed congress, that body hurried through the Northwest Ordinance of 1787, establishing a government for the territory northwest of the Ohio. It provided that the region north of the river should have a governor, secretary, and three judges appointed by congress; that when the population reached 5000 free men of full age, they should have an assembly of governor, council, and elected house of representatives. Not less than three nor more than five states might be made out of the region, and when any territory had a population of 60,000 it might be admitted into the union with equal status with the older states. The Ordinance of 1787 became the model for all the other territories and states carved out of the western domain. It contained a bill of rights, one feature of which was that slavery should not be tolerated in the Northwest. The South, which opposed the exclusion of slavery from the Ordinance of 1784, because it applied to all the West, made no objection to its elimination from the region north of the Ohio.

**Second
Northwest
Ordinance.**

In 1785 congress adopted a scheme for the sale of western lands, and it was applied to the lands of the Ohio Company. It ordered that the territory should be laid out in townships six miles square, or thirty-six sections in a township. Each sixteenth section should be reserved for the support of schools, and the Ohio Company was required to set aside two townships for a university. This township system has been generally followed in the West.

**The Town-
ship System.**

Before this time settlements had already been planted in what later became Kentucky and Tennessee. This region was widely known for its fertility and abundant game. Hunters went thither, and, charmed by the country, built huts, established farms, and fought off the Indians, who bitterly resented the invasion of their best hunting-grounds. The most famous of the adventurers was Daniel Boone, whose efforts opened Kentucky to the world. Leaving his home on the Yadkin, in North Carolina, he went, with a small party, to hunt in Kentucky. He loved the country from the first glimpse, and though robbed by the Indian, and warned to leave under penalty of death, and deserted by most of his companions, he roamed and hunted for a year and a half, and then spread such glowing ideas of Kentucky among the Yadkin people that in 1773 he set out with a band of settlers for the land of his dreams. Halted by Lord Dunmore's war he encamped in Tennessee, renewed his efforts with the return of peace, opened a road into the upper valleys and on to Louisville, where a trading post had long been established, and soon saw the country filled with hardy settlers who won their way against the dangers of Indian attack and the hard struggle of nature. The

**Kentucky
Settlements.**

settlers were within the bounds of Virginia, but felt its yoke lightly. They were sufficient of themselves for the tasks before them. They considered the mountains a barrier to permanent connection with the states of the East, and looked already to the mouth of the Mississippi, the natural outlet of their trade. Wise men talked of the prospect of a great valley confederacy which, when strong enough, would sweep the Spaniard out of the way and take its place as an intracontinental nation.

What Boone did for Kentucky, James Robertson, with less of romance, did for Tennessee. By 1772 he had come with some hardy settlers from North Carolina across the mountains to the fair Watauga valley, east of the Cumberland mountains. They fled from the hard rule of Tryon, who was busy suppressing the Regulators. When they found they were not in the bounds of Virginia, as they first imagined, they set up a government of their own, with rules embodied in a written "Watauga Association." Many others came to share their lot, and by the outbreak of the revolution several valleys were dotted with their peaceful homesteads. John Sevier was of their number, and led them with men from Virginia and from the upper Yadkin to the victory over Ferguson at King's Mountain. When North Carolina began the struggle against the king, they organized the District of Washington and recognized the state's authority. In 1779 a party from Watauga, led by James Robertson, began the settlement of Nashville, on the Cumberland, many miles to the westward, and held it, spite of severe attacks by the Indians. Thus when congress established the Northwest Ordinance in 1787, the first work of colonization had already been done by hardy men acting on their own initiative in the regions which were going to be the states of Kentucky and Tennessee, but were still under the jurisdiction of Virginia and North Carolina respectively.

One picturesque incident in the West remains to be mentioned. When North Carolina ceded her western lands in April, 1784, she reserved jurisdiction over them until they were accepted by congress.

News of what was done brought dismay to the people on the Watauga and Holston rivers. They wished to be protected from the Indians, and feared a period of nerveless government, during which congress would hold them as unprotected dependencies. To meet this, protect their land titles, and secure the continuity of orderly government, they launched a movement for a state government. They held meetings of regularly elected delegates, adopted a constitution, took the name of the "State of Franklin," chose John Sevier their governor, and asked congress to recognize them as a state. This happened in the latter part of 1784. Just at that time North Carolina revoked her act of cession, sent officers to execute her authority in the transmontane region, and brought civil war to the very doors of the western people. Congress

**Tennessee
Founded.**

**The "State
of Frank-
lin."**

dared not antagonize North Carolina by intervening, and the people were unable to defy their eastern masters. At the end of two years Sevier's term of office expired, and, as no successor was elected, the "State of Franklin" fell into abeyance. He was then arrested for treason and sent across the mountains for trial, but friends interceded and he was not prosecuted. The incident shows the desire of the western people for self-government and the difficulty of ruling them as dependencies of the East.

POPULAR DISSATISFACTION

The limitations which most of the states placed on popular government (see page 217) caused dissatisfaction, and struggles soon began to remove them. There was universal fear of a strong executive, and before the federal constitution was adopted, Massachusetts and New Hampshire, become a little more democratic, decided to have governors chosen by the people, and in 1790 and in 1792 Delaware and Pennsylvania did the same. In all the states but Georgia the judges were elected by the assembly or appointed by the governors. In most of the states it was as if the constitution-makers had erased the word "king" in the old charters and written the word "assembly" in its place. Yet this was a long step toward popular government; for the assembly represented the will of the responsible people.

This predominance of the conservative classes was not received quietly in all the states. It gave too much power, it was thought, to men of property; and parties began to divide between the rich and the poor. The latter, suffering from the scarcity of money, desired to issue paper currency and urged the assemblies to pass laws to that end. The former thought of the effect on trade and opposed the demand. Connecticut, Massachusetts, Delaware Maryland, and Virginia resisted the cry. They all had conservative classes who were able to keep control of the situation. The victory was hard won in most of them, especially in New Hampshire, where a mob crying out for paper surrounded the meetinghouse at Exeter in which the legislators were assembled in 1786, threatening their lives if the demand was refused. They were dispersed by the militia, and their cause failed, probably because it was identified with mob rule. In the other states, seven in all, paper money was issued.

In Rhode Island the agitation led to serious trouble. The merchants opposed the proposition, but the country people carried it through the legislature. Then the merchants tried to avoid the law. They closed their shops and refused to take the new currency. They were denounced as enemies of the people, and when John Weeden, a butcher, refused in 1786 to sell meat for scrip, he was haled into court. He was ably defended by Varnum, who urged that the state law violated the

Paper
Money De-
manded.

The "Know
Ye" Men
in Rhode
Island.

constitution and was null. The judges sustained his contention and dismissed the case. This angered the legislature: they summoned the judges into their presence and delivered a reproof; and in the next election all but one member of the court were rejected. But the decision held, and after a time quiet was restored to the community. One of the certificates issued by the paper-money party began with the words, "Know ye," and the party came to be known as the "Know ye" party. They were ignorant people with real need, but they did not deserve all the contempt visited upon them.

The farmers of western and central Massachusetts were strong for paper. They were in debt, and many suits were entered against them in the courts. They hated the lawyers who prosecuted the claims and the rich men in Boston, whose influence predominated in the legislature. They found a leader in Daniel Shays, whose fervent appeals stirred them to a frenzy of rebellion. At Northampton and Worcester they broke up the courts in order to defer the trial of the cases against them, and elsewhere they held the quiet people in terror. Finally they besieged the town of Springfield, and seemed to have the whole western region on their side. Governor Bowdoin assembled an army of 4400 men under General Lincoln and sent it against them in the winter of 1786-1787. Shays fled as Lincoln approached Springfield, but was pursued and defeated at Petersham, on February 3, 1787. His men dispersed and he was captured. Resistance was at an end, but the feeling for the insurgents was so strong that he was not punished, and Governor Bowdoin was defeated at the next election by John Hancock, who as Professor McLaughlin says, "loved nothing better than sunning himself in the smiles of the crowd." Shays's Rebellion alarmed many a sober friend of government in every state. It seemed that the foundation of government was breaking up, and that the often predicted chaos was at hand.

Shays's Re-
bellion.

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CHAPTER XI

MAKING THE CONSTITUTION

THE ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION

JUNE 12, 1776, the continental congress appointed a committee to prepare a plan under which the states could act together in the future.

Two schemes came before this committee. One was suggested by Franklin in 1775, and provided for a congress with representation based on population. The other was prepared by John Dickinson, of Delaware, and provided for equal representation of states. Here appeared the

Articles of
Confedera-
tion
Adopted.

deep jealousy of the small states for the large ones. The latter clung tenaciously to their opinion, but yielded for expediency's sake. Every state was needed in the struggle then beginning, and the smallest was in a position to win concessions if it only stood firm. The committee reported July 12, but the matter was deferred, after a short discussion, until it could be considered by the states. It came up again in the autumn of 1777, the delegates having had ample time to learn the state of opinion at their homes. Again the large states tried to change the will of the small, and again they failed. A confederation of equal states was better than no confederation at all. The articles

Power of the
Small States

passed November 17, but they were not to be binding until approved by all the states. They were a compromise in which the least progressive side won. As congress said in submitting them for ratification, it was a difficult and delicate task to combine "the various sentiments and interests of a continent divided into so many sovereign and independent communities."

The articles of confederation were designed to give the central government no more power than it needed to carry on national affairs, and they reserved all others to the state. Congress was to conduct foreign affairs, to declare war, to provide for admiralty courts, to regulate the coinage, to establish standards of weight and measure, to have sole jurisdiction over Indian tribes, but not to infringe the rights of any state in this respect, to establish and regulate post offices and post roads, to build and equip a navy, to issue letters of marque and reprisal, to have an army made up of troops furnished by the states at the call of congress, to appoint the higher army officers, to borrow money, and to emit bills of credit. Most of these rights had formerly been exercised by the crown, and they were now

readily granted to the general government. None of them could have been exercised easily by the states individually.

Some powers were expressly reserved to the states; as raising the militia, appointing regimental officers in the army, granting letters of marque in time of war, repelling invasion without waiting for the consent of congress, and keeping an army or navy in time of peace if congress consented. Other

**Powers of
the States.**

important powers were not mentioned, and by implication were reserved to the states; as, to control commerce and navigation, to levy imposts, and to lay direct taxes. Nine states must consent to the most important acts of congress, and an amendment of the articles must be unanimous. Ordinary votes in congress would pass by having the approval of a majority of the states, but an adjournment could be ordered by congress if the majority of the delegates present consented. Congress could not levy or collect a tax on individuals, but must get its revenues by making requisitions on the states apportioned on the value of land in private hands; and the state was to collect the amount required as it saw fit. Thus, the basis of power was the state and not the citizen.

Revenues.

The revolution was a protest against the strong executive in England, and care was now taken to give the new government the weakest possible executive. Congress might appoint a president from their own members to have office for only one year in three. He had no veto or appointing power, but received foreign ministers. Congress was to appoint high executive officers to act under its authority. Thus it appointed a secretary for foreign affairs, who reported to congress. A "committee of the states," one delegate from each of the thirteen, was to carry out the directions of congress in a recess of that body.

**The Execu-
tive.**

Another weakness was the absence of a federal judiciary. No such courts were provided. Cases arising under the articles would be referred to the state courts, which would naturally lean toward the states. Admiralty courts, however, should be established by congress with jurisdiction over piracy and over offenses on the high seas, and there was a court of appeals for prize cases. A dispute between states was to be referred to congress, who should appoint seven or nine arbiters, no two from the same state, who were to pass on the dispute and report their verdict to congress; but there was no way of enforcing the decision, if the contending states did not choose to obey it. The articles declared in the beginning that "Each state retains its sovereignty, freedom, and independence," and described the government now created as "a firm league of friendship," but near the end they say, "and the Union shall be perpetual." In view of the narrow power given to the congress, we may conclude that the word "Union" here was understood to be a mere act of association. The historical

**No Federal
Courts.**

significance of the articles of confederation is not to be overlooked. They were a step in the development of the union. Weak as they were for the purposes demanded of them, they were a conscious sacrifice of some of the powers of the hitherto disunited states, and their very impotence pointed out in what respect they ought to be strengthened.

MOVING TOWARD A STRONGER UNION

The weakness of the articles surprised nobody. Even the men who opposed a strong union were not surprised. They had resisted concentration because they feared the power of a strong central government over the states. The four years of turmoil following the victory at Yorktown showed them that there was something worse than a vigorous congress. They saw in the financial chaos the obstruction of trade, and in the tendency of states to fall on one another the probability that even the small amount of union already established would be lost. If such a state of affairs continued, it was likely that each state would look out for itself. In such a condition the large states would fare best, and small states would either fall into the hands of their great neighbors or have to place themselves under the protection of foreign powers. It was, therefore, the interest of small states to give up some of their reserved powers, provided they could effect an arrangement by which they could preserve their integrity as states.

Meanwhile, the strong union men did not cease to try to develop public opinion. Chief among them was Washington, who wrote letters to his friends and to legislatures. Hamilton, also, exerted himself, and Madison, who was coming into great influence in Virginia, was another who lost no opportunity to help the cause. After the fashion of the day, many pamphlets appeared on the question, one of the most important being by Pelatiah Webster, suggesting so many features of the constitution later adopted that his admirers have called him the father of the constitution. Congress itself took up the work, and passed several sets of resolutions looking to a stronger government. Few of these advocates desired a unified government: most of them looked to a federal government, with power to collect its revenues and to make itself obeyed. Some men said that all that should be done was to add to the central authority the least possible vigor the situation demanded. All these efforts made ready for the work of 1787.

As the discussion went on, the idea of amending the articles in a convention continually came up. It was plain that the method in the articles themselves was futile; for one state would probably be found to oppose anything suggested. But a convention would not be bound by the existing agreement, it would build the union anew,

**Opposition
to Union
Receding.**

**Union Men
Active.**

and if an agreed number of states accepted its work, the union might go forward without the consent of the others. Besides, to take part in it would commit no state, and if it should be held it would be the interest of each state to be represented, lest the plan prepared should infringe her interests. As the suggestion of such a step was repeated it gained ground in the popular mind. Many of the discouraged friends of central government thought it worth trying, and the friends of the states were willing to attend and discuss the points at issue, although they were quite sure they would not yield one iota of their cause more than was necessary to preserve the fruits of the revolution. In all this congress took little active part. It could hardly be expected to do a thing that would destroy its own life.

Constitu-
tional Con-
vention
Suggested.

While opinion thus ripened, events happened which led to the convention. In 1784 Madison learned that much confusion in navigation and some smuggling existed on the Potomac because of different customs regulations on the opposite sides. He undertook to remedy the matter, and got the two states concerned to appoint commissioners to prepare a code of rules. They met in 1785, had no trouble to agree on the matter in hand, but saw that if Maryland changed her regulations, her northern neighbors must do the same, or the same difficulty would exist on the northern border. This would necessitate changes on the northern borders of Pennsylvania and Delaware. In other words, the regulation of navigation was a question common to all of the states, and the commissioners ended by suggesting a general convention for that purpose. Madison, one of the commissioners, was a member of the Virginia legislature, where he worked hard to strengthen the hands of congress. A strong party opposed his efforts, because of their devotion to the sovereignty of the states. Spite of their plans, he got the assembly to call on all the other states to send delegates to a convention to consider commercial regulations. The place was to be Annapolis, remote from New York, where congress then sat, and far away from any large port whose merchants might influence its deliberations. The time of meeting was to be September 11, 1786. This convention, be it remembered, was to be a creature of the states, to report to them, and was not concerned with the continental congress.

Virginia and
Maryland
Confer.

At the appointed time delegates assembled from Virginia, Pennsylvania, Delaware, New York, and New Jersey; and Massachusetts, Rhode Island, New Hampshire, and North Carolina named delegates who did not attend. The other states, Georgia, South Carolina, Maryland, and Connecticut, took no notice of the call. More discouraging than these absences was the fact that no real good could be accomplished unless a power existed strong enough to enforce common regula-

The Annap-
olis Con-
vention.

tions, if they were made. The convention, therefore, gave up the task before it and issued an address to the states urging them to call a constitutional convention to meet in Philadelphia the second Monday in May. Its action was to be binding when approved by congress and confirmed by all the state legislatures.

This was a bold step. Congress was only half pleased, and took no notice of a call coming from a source outside of itself. But Virginia

**Delegates
to the Phila-
delphia Con-
vention.**

was of another mind. Spite of her recent opposition to amendments, she now indorsed the convention without debate and elected delegates, among them Washington, Madison, Patrick Henry, and Governor Randolph, but Henry refused to serve. Other states followed her lead, and congress unbent enough to call a convention at the same time and place, but without allusion to the work at Annapolis. Rhode Island alone refused to take action, although New Hampshire hesitated until June, and her representatives took no part in the earlier deliberations at Philadelphia. The quick response of the other states was in strong contrast with their opposition to amendments. Though disgusted with congress, they were loyal to the American cause and hoped with a new trial to make a better form of government than they then had. For this purpose they put forward their best men. The American congress had not contained, since the first days of its existence, such men as gathered at Philadelphia; Benjamin Franklin, James Wilson, Gouverneur Morris, Alexander Hamilton, Rufus King, William Patterson, Oliver Ellsworth, Charles, and Charles Cotesworth, Pinckney, and Luther Martin. Though divided in their opinions, they were among the best leaders of the day, and no superior men could have been found for the task before them.

Washington was chosen president of the convention, and the meetings were held in the strictest secrecy. At the close the journal

**Meeting of
the Con-
vention.**

was delivered to him sealed with instructions to hand it over to the congress of the United States, if the constitution now prepared was adopted. In 1818 congress ordered its publication, but it was the merest skeleton of the proceedings. A fuller record was made by Madison, the best versed member in political science, and such an earnest supporter of the practical measures of the convention that he came to be called "the father of the constitution." At the first session he took a seat from which he could hear all that was said and made as full a record of the debates as he could. His "Notes" were first published in 1841, and constitute our best information of what was done. Other members, particularly Yates, of New York, made notes less explicit, and these also have been published.

The opposition between large and small states came up with the meeting of the delegates. Four days after the convention organized

Governor Randolph, of Virginia, offered a tentative plan of union. It favored the large states and provided for a congress of two branches, the lower elected by the people on the basis of population or land values and the upper elected by the lower branch. The significance will be seen if we remember that by the first census, 1790, Virginia had a population of 747,610, Massachusetts, including Maine, had 475,327, Pennsylvania had 434,373, North Carolina had 393,751, and New York had 340,120. The combined population of Rhode Island, Delaware, New Jersey, and New Hampshire was only 453,943. The combined population of the five largest states was 2,391,181, and that of the other eight states was 1,334,238. Georgia, with a population of 82,548, had vast undeveloped areas and usually acted with the large states, so that these six great states had 66.1 per cent. of the entire population, and since the other states had restricted boundaries, the progress of settlement could be expected to increase their advantage. If land values were taken for the basis of representation, the distribution of power would be nearly the same as if population were taken.

The Virginia Plan.

Position of the Large States.

The congress thus delivered over to the large states should have authority to make all the laws the existing confederation could make, as well as to veto a state law in conflict with the constitution, and to coerce a state failing in its duty. There was to be, also, a national executive chosen by congress, but its composition was not defined. There was to be a council of revision, of which the executive was to be a part, with power to veto a law of congress or a congressional veto of a state law; but its veto might be overridden by a subsequent session of congress. There was to be a national judiciary selected by congress with jurisdiction over admiralty cases, issues in which foreigners or citizens of different states were parties, impeachments of national officers, and cases concerning the collection of the national revenues. It was also provided that officers of the states should be required to take oaths to support the constitution of the union, and that the constitution when completed should be submitted to the people of the states for approval through their legislatures or conventions chosen for the purpose. This plan, which was largely the work of Madison, was distinctly popular in its character. It was supported because a popular basis of government favored the large states, and it had the opposition of the small states for the same reason. Pinckney, of South Carolina, submitted a plan, much like Virginia's, but the convention took little notice of it. Alexander Hamilton also had a plan as strongly central as Virginia's, but he did not submit it to the convention.

Congress under the Virginia Plan.

The debates began in the committee of the whole. The Virginia plan had the solid support of the large states, except New York,

which, under the influence of George Clinton, thought to hold out for special terms. Six of the eleven states represented, — Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia, — over-riding the arguments of the small states, carried the main features of that plan through the committee. They were in no mood to compromise. If the small states would not federate on the proposed plan, said Wilson, the most masterful of its defenders, let them know that the large states would federate on no other. And the small states, not prepared for such a spirited assault, could only repeat their assertion that they would not put their heads into the lion's mouth. Their leader was Paterson, of New Jersey, as determined a man as Wilson himself. He thought it better to remain out of the union than to accept the domination of the victors; and one need only look at the map to see that a group of states around New York harbor, from Connecticut to Delaware, could have laid the foundation for a great independent federation if they had thrown in their fortunes in a common cause.

When the committee reported to the convention, Paterson, therefore, offered the ultimatum of the small states, itself a plan of government. He was willing to strengthen the hands of congress, to allow it to lay and collect import duties, to regulate trade, and to coerce a state which did not pay its requisitions. He would even grant a national judiciary with large powers, but he would not agree to distribute power according to population, and he demanded equal representation of the states in congress. Had the minds of the delegates been free from passion they would have seen that even this was a great improvement over the articles of confederation: it would have remedied most of the abuses under the old system. But the question was now beyond the mere fact of remedying abuses; it was: Should a nation be founded on a popular basis or on a state basis? and around that fundamental point began a discussion whose acrimony made every cautious and patriotic delegate tremble for the issue. After five days the vote was taken. Maryland was divided, and Connecticut, in sympathy with the small states but not willing to defeat union, voted against the ultimatum. Thus the large states again won, the vote being seven to three against Paterson's plan, and the convention took up the report of the committee of the whole.

**Fight over
the Make-
up of Con-
gress.**

June 29, came the first division on the make-up of congress. It was voted to have proportional representation in the lower house, Maryland being divided and New York, Connecticut, New Jersey, and Delaware voting in the negative. It was a critical moment. If the same combination carried the vote on the composition of the upper house, the small states, if they fulfilled their threats, would abandon the

convention. Wilson was inexorable. "If the minority of the people of America," said he, "refuse to coalesce with the majority on just and proper principles, if a separation must take place, it could never happen on better grounds." To which a Delaware delegate replied: "The large states dare not dissolve the Confederation. If they do, the small ones will find some foreign ally of more honor and good faith, who will take them by the hand and do them justice."

Fortunately, there were some moderate men in the convention who thought a compromise better than disruption. Several times in the debates small-state delegates had suggested that at least the upper house should be based on equal representation of states, and no notice had been taken. But at this critical point the idea recurred to the small-state men, and Ellsworth, of Connecticut, pleaded eloquently for it as a guarantee to the small states that they should not be swamped by the influence of their large neighbors. It seemed a small concession in order to preserve the union of all the states. The appeal reached one man, Baldwin, of Georgia, Connecticut born and a Yale graduate. On the vote being taken, he was for compromise, and divided his delegation, thus leaving the large states with only five votes. At the same time Luther Martin's colleague was absent, and he cast Maryland's vote for the resolution. The vote in convention was, therefore, five to five, and the power of the large states was checked. The pathetic appeal of the small states at the last had reached the hearts of some of their adversaries, and a committee of one from each state was appointed to arrive at a compromise. Franklin was a member, and suggested the report that the lower house be based on representation and have the right to initiate revenue laws, and that the states have equal voice in the upper house. After eleven days of bitter debate, with many futile motions to amend, the report was carried, North Carolina voting for the compromise. Four large states held out, Pennsylvania, Virginia, South Carolina, and Georgia, while Massachusetts was divided. They took defeat badly, and asked for an adjournment to consider what they should do. Everybody left the hall in the deepest gloom. The event had come which the larger states had said would justify withdrawal: would they carry out the threat? Early next morning they held a meeting to decide upon their course. Some were for withdrawal, but the majority were for remaining. They were not willing to give up the last hope of a united government. Thus the compromise was allowed to stand and constitution-making was resumed.

**Ellsworth's
Appeal for
Com-
promise.**

**Baldwin, of
Georgia.**

**Compromise
Adopted.**

The compromise had vast influence on the future. It broke at a vital point into the scheme of a national government on a popular basis. It divided the lawmaking power between two dissimilar and, in some cases, opposing sources of authority. If the large states,

four of whom were Southern, had won in 1787, slavery would not have found refuge in the senate fifty years later, and the secession movement might have been dealt with before it was strong enough to venture its cause on the field of battle. The equality of the states in the senate nourished the secession movement through three decades of its early growth.

This compromise was soon followed by another. Congress was given power to lay direct taxes to be apportioned according to population, and representation was to be based on population.

Its Influence in the Future. Since the slaves did not vote, some Northern men thought they should not be counted in representation, it being logical to found political power on citizenship. They also thought that slaves should be included in apportioning direct taxes, because they were property, and taxation should rest on the ability to pay. The South opposed each proposition. Williamson of North Carolina suggested that three-fifths of the slaves be counted in representation. There was some sharp debate, showing the deep feeling of the North against the advantage slavery gave the South and the resentment of the South that it should be a basis of discrimination against her. At the end a compromise was adopted, three-fifths of the slaves being counted in apportioning both representation and direct taxes.

Still another adjustment of conflicting interests was to be made. The four states south of the Potomac were agricultural, and all the others had strong commercial interests. Since the states were to be equal in the senate, the South, remembering the British navigation acts, feared that the North might combine to make discrimination against the non-commercial section. They, therefore, hesitated when it was proposed to give congress control over commerce. At the same time the regulation of the slave trade came up. Virginia and Maryland had as many slaves as they could profitably employ, and there was no popular demand for more. Their leading men saw the evils of the system and would have been pleased to eliminate it. They joined with the men of the North in a desire to forbid the foreign slave trade at once. This alarmed South Carolina and Georgia, where slaves were more profitable. The people of these two states looked with hope to the settlement of the Gulf region, where rich lands awaited development through slave labor. Georgia and South Carolina, therefore, objected to an immediate checking of their slave supply and a consequent enhancement of slave prices. Here again came a warm debate in which the southernmost states resorted to the usual argument that they would not federate if their interests were overridden. They had the sympathy of North Carolina, and it was evident that a powerful state could be formed if the three, with the vast Gulf section, set up a government of their own. Finally the spirit of compromise

Three-fifths of the Slaves Counted.

Commerce and the Foreign Slave Trade.

prevailed. Congress was given control of navigation, which satisfied the North, and it was agreed that the foreign slave trade should not be prohibited before 1808.

Other points of difference appeared in the convention, but they concerned the theory of government, and not the interests of the parts of the union. They were usually won by the advocates of a national government. Thus the powers of congress, methods of election, the functions of the executive, the creation of a system of federal courts, the powers denied to the states, the methods of amending the constitution, and other similar points were passed upon after much contention. The sessions lasted until September 17. Of the fifty-five delegates who had attended, only thirty-nine were present and signed: some of the others had gone home in disgust to oppose adoption when the completed instrument should appear before the states. Probably few of its supporters believed it was all it should be, but they held it was better than the old system, and they believed time would show its defects and lead to amendments. These, also, went to their homes resolved to do what they could to secure adoption.

The Constitution Completed.

THE ADOPTION OF THE CONSTITUTION

The country waited anxiously while the convention deliberated behind closed doors: it was in commotion as soon as the constitution was published. As the members returned to their constituencies full of arguments for nationality, the immediate response was enthusiastic. The people were accustomed to follow leaders, and the federalists, as the advocates of nationality, had the advantage of early organization. Newspapers teemed with articles on both sides, speeches were made, and pamphlets appeared. The most notable utterance was a series of papers by Hamilton, Madison, and Jay, under the title of "The Federalist," then and to this day an excellent summary of the meaning of the constitution. On the other hand, some of the most prominent men of the day began to denounce ratification. They favored a stronger government than the old confederation, but they thought the suggested plan too national. They slowly rallied their following into a group known as antifederalists, and by speaking and writing urged that the liberty of individuals would be destroyed if the powers of the states were reduced.

Received by the People.

In the convention the small states were the champions of state rights, but now they were most eager to ratify. They had won their fight in regard to the composition of the senate, and made haste to "come under the roof," as the phrase ran. Delaware ratified first, December 7, 1787, New Jersey on the 18th, and Connecticut on January 9, 1788. The first large state to act was Pennsylvania, where the antifederalists appeared in

Early Ratifications.

strength. They fought so well that a compromise was adopted. The federalists agreed to ten suggested amendments which should be submitted to congress in the hope that they would be referred to the other states for approval; and on that basis the constitution was accepted on December 12. January 2 Georgia ratified unanimously. By this means five states accepted the new government within a month and two days, and the federalists were much encouraged.

In Massachusetts the antifederalists were strong in the interior towns where distrust of the merchants and capitalists of the seaports, now generally federalists, had been marked since the days of Shays's rebellion. All eyes turned to John Hancock and Samuel Adams, who had much influence with the popular party. They were both known to hesitate, but the former was won over by the promise of support for either the presidency or vice-presidency in the new government. The latter could not be so easily convinced. He was devoted to his state and thought her interests were sacrificed. In the convention Hancock was induced to offer a number of proposed amendments supporting the rights of the states. Adams announced that he was satisfied, and on February 7 ratification was carried by the relatively small majority of 19. The Pennsylvania amendments had been in the nature of a bill of rights, and were considered a safeguard of personal liberty: those offered by Massachusetts went farther and sought to lessen nationality and strengthen the states. Without them it is doubtful if the Old Bay State would have accepted the constitution.

The antifederalists pronounced them a subterfuge and asked who was so simple as to believe that attention would be paid to amendments once the nationalists got the government established to their liking? and would it not be more sensible to announce that they would not ratify until the amendments were adopted? The federalists replied that if the constitution were now rejected, there was slight hope that the states could be got to consider it again. Their success in urging amendments as a means of overcoming the arguments of the Massachusetts antifederalists induced them to use it in all the states who later raised strong objections. Of the seven states voting after this all but one ratified with amendments. The consent of Massachusetts determined New

Hampshire, who at first adjourned her convention to see what her great neighbor would do. April 26 Maryland ratified, and South Carolina on May 23. This made eight states, and by the constitution the new system was to go into effect when nine had ratified. Which would be the one remaining necessary accession? The question was answered when on June 21 New Hampshire accepted the constitution.

Before the South knew of New Hampshire's action Virginia, after a hard and doubtful battle, had decided for union. Although the

**Massachu-
setts
Ratifies.**

**Significance
of the
Amend-
ments.**

**Other
States.**

state's delegation voted steadily for nationality in the Philadelphia convention, in no ratifying convention was there a harder fight against nationality. It was led by Patrick Henry, who had refused to go to the convention as a delegate. He **Virginia.** opened the attack in the Richmond convention by boldly proposing to call to account the Virginia delegates, Washington included, on the ground that they had been untrue to the state when they made a plan for a national government. He was supported by George Mason, a delegate who refused to sign the constitution, and by R. H. Lee, leader of a group of disappointed men who long opposed the policy of the great planters in eastern Virginia. They attacked the constitution at every possible point. It would make a tyrant of the president, it would enslave the states, it would destroy individual liberty: these and other arguments were marshaled by the impetuous Henry with dramatic force. Madison and John Marshall met his arguments coolly. The proposed plan, they said, left the states with all necessary powers over local affairs and gave the union only what power was needed to direct the affairs common to all the states. At the end of three weeks of excited debate amendments were brought forward, forty in all. Henry laughed at them. They were designed, he said, to lull the fears of the antifederalists, but once adoption was secured they would not be heard from again. Madison replied with a pledge that they should be fairly considered and submitted to the states. The promise was trusted by some members of the convention who were in doubt, and ratification was carried on June 25, 1788, by a majority of ten.

Ten states had now "come under the federal roof," and the battle shifted to New York, where George Clinton led the antifederalists. When the convention met in June a majority of the members were with him. Hamilton, Jay, and Robert R. **New York.** Livingston led the federalists with great ability. The same arguments used in the other states were bandied back and forth; but when it was known that ten states had ratified, the situation changed. New York was not willing to be left out of the union in company with Rhode Island and North Carolina. Some antifederalists now became discouraged, and when the vote was taken, July 26, the federalists won by three votes. A resolution was passed asking congress to call a new convention to consider a constitution. It won some votes for ratification, but it elicited no response from either congress or the other states. Everywhere men were tired of the discussions of the past year and were willing to test what had been won before they began to revise it.

Two states now remained out of the new union, North Carolina and Rhode Island. In the former a convention was held, controlled by the antifederalists. It was decided to adjourn without action. The leaders hoped that other states would do the same and be able

to force the union to amend the plan adopted. Rhode Island submitted the constitution to the people, who rejected it by a large majority. After the new government was organized these two states became ashamed that they were without the fold, and accepted the constitution, the former on November 21, 1789, and the latter on May 29, 1790.

North Carolina and Rhode Island.

NATIONALITY AND STATE INTEGRITY IN THE CONSTITUTION

There is a trace of nationality in the articles of confederation, but the constitution has a great deal more. By it the legislature may do the following things: 1. Lay and collect taxes, direct and indirect, "to pay the debts, and provide for the common defense and general welfare of the United States," but taxes must be uniform throughout the union; 2. Regulate foreign and interstate commerce; 3. Pass naturalization laws; 4. Pass uniform bankruptcy laws; 5. Enact copyright and patent laws; 6. Raise and support an army; 7. Call out the militia to execute the laws of the union, suppress insurrection, or repel invasion; 8. Have exclusive control over the district, not more than ten miles square, to be selected for the national capital; 9. Buy with the consent of the state in which they lie sites for forts, arsenals, and other public works and buildings, and have exclusive control of the same; 10. Make laws to carry into effect any of the powers granted to it in the constitution; 11. Suspend the writ of *Habeas corpus* when necessary in cases of rebellion or of invasion; 12. Determine the times and places of choosing presidential electors; 13. Judge of the validity of the election of its own members, each house acting for itself; 14. Dispose of and govern the territory and other property of the United States; and 15. Admit new states into the union, but no state to be divided without its own consent. Of the powers granted to congress by the articles of confederation the following were reaffirmed: 1. To establish and control post offices and post roads; 2. To borrow money; 3. To coin money and fix the standards of weights and measures; 4. To define and punish piracies and felonies on the high seas; 5. To create and maintain a navy; 6. To make rules for the regulation of the army; 7. To declare war; and 8. To grant letters of marque.

Composition of Congress.
1. The House of Representatives.

The composition of congress is as follows: 1. *A house of representatives*, composed of not more than one representative for each 30,000 inhabitants and each member to be chosen every two years; but each state must have at least one representative. In apportioning representation and direct taxes three-fifths of the slaves and all the whites shall be counted. Each representative must be at least

twenty-five years old, seven years a citizen of the United States, and a resident of the state from which he is chosen. The house of representatives elects its own officers and has sole right of impeachment. It originates all bills for raising revenue, but the senate may amend them.

2. *The senate*, composed of two members from each state chosen for six years by the state legislatures, each member to have one vote. One-third of the members are chosen every two years.

Each senator must be at least thirty years old, nine years a citizen of the United States, and an inhabitant of the state from which he is chosen. The vice-president presides over the senate but has no vote unless there is a tie. The senate tries impeachments, but when the president is impeached the chief justice presides, and a two-thirds vote is necessary for all convictions. It also confirms the appointment of officers nominated by the president and by a two-thirds vote ratifies treaties. It chooses a president *pro tempore* to preside when the vice-president is absent or fills the office of president.

2. **The
Senate.**

Congress shall meet in regular session at least once a year, on the first Monday in December, or on some other day selected by itself. The state legislatures shall direct the time, place, and manner of electing members of each house, but congress

Elections.

may, if it wills, make other regulations for choosing senators and representatives. All persons vote for representatives and presidential electors who vote for members of the most numerous branch of the state legislature. Each house is judge of its own elections, each elects its own officers, each prescribes its own rules of procedure, and each must enter the yeas and nays in its journal when one-fifth of the members present demand it. No member shall be called to account for words spoken in debate or arrested during attendance on the sessions, except for treason, felony, or breach of the peace. Each bill to become a law must be passed by each house and signed by the president of the United States, but if he vetoes it, congress may pass it over his veto by a two-thirds majority. If he keeps it ten days without either veto or approval, it becomes law. If he receives a law within ten days before adjournment and does not act upon it, the bill is not law. Congress may not create a title of nobility, and no federal official shall accept a foreign title or present without the consent of congress.

**Yeas and
Nays.**

The Veto.

The executive function is exercised by a president of the United States chosen for four years by electors appointed by the states as they may see fit. Each state is to have as many presidential electors as it has representatives and senators, and each elector has one vote. The selection of electors may be regulated by congress. The president must be a natural-

**The Presi-
dent.**

born citizen of the United States, at least thirty-five years old, and for fourteen years a resident of the United States, and he shall take an oath faithfully to execute the office and to defend the constitution. His powers are defined as follows: 1. He shall be commander-in-chief of the army and navy; 2. He shall make treaties with the concurrence of two-thirds of the senate; 3. He shall appoint ambassadors, judges, and other officers with the consent of the senate, and, if congress gives him the power, inferior offices of his own accord; 4. He shall call congress in extra session; 5. He shall receive ambassadors and conduct negotiations with foreign states; 6. He shall see that the laws be executed; 7. He shall be liable to impeachment for "treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors"; 8. He shall have the power to pardon all offenses but cases of impeachment; and 9. He shall send to congress information on the state of the nation.

The constitution also creates a vice-president, to serve when the president is incapacitated for office and to preside over the senate.

The Vice-President. He is chosen in the same way as the president. Originally the electors were to vote for two men, and the one having the highest vote was to be president and the next to be vice-president. The growth of parties showed weakness in this feature of the system, and the twelfth amendment, 1804, provided that the presidential electors should vote separately for president and vice-president, the majority vote electing to each office. If no candidate for president has a majority, the election goes to the house of representatives, which, voting by states, shall choose from the three highest candidates.

The president is given power to call on the heads of the executive departments for written opinions relative to their respective departments. This clause is all the constitution contains in reference to the cabinet. Out of it have grown important functions. It is held that a president may appoint or remove the members of his cabinet; but congress alone may create a new department, whose head thus becomes a member of the cabinet.

The Cabinet. In creating a strong executive and a congress with large powers of legislation, the constitution added greatly to the nationalism of the government. It went still further when it established a system of federal courts. It provides that the judicial power of the union shall reside in a supreme court and such

The Federal Courts. lower courts as congress may establish. The judges are appointed as other federal officers and hold office during good behavior. Their most important jurisdiction extends to cases arising under the constitution, laws, and treaties of the United States, cases affecting foreign ministers and consuls, admiralty cases, cases in which the United States is a party, and controversies between two or more states, or between a state and citizens of another state, or between citizens

of different states, or between a state or its citizens and a foreign state. The supreme court has original jurisdiction only in cases concerning foreign ministers and consuls and those in which a state is a party. In other cases it has appellate jurisdiction. Treason against the United States consists of "levying war against them, or in adhering to their enemies, giving them aid and comfort"; and conviction of treason shall only occur on the evidence given in open court of two witnesses to the same overt act, or upon confession in open court.

**Treason
Defined.**

The old congress had as much judicial jurisdiction as the articles of confederation allowed to the central government. The makers of the constitution considered this union of legislative and judicial functions unwise, and they took pains to make the executive, legislative, and judicial organs independent of one another, holding that each would check the evil tendencies of the other. As a result, great power was given to the federal courts. They have become interpreters of the constitution and in that capacity have declared null laws of congress, laws of the states, and even state constitutions, when there has seemed to them to be a conflict with the powers of the general government. Creating the federal courts was one of the most powerful expressions of nationality adopted by the convention of 1787.

**Their Juris-
diction.**

The constitution provides two methods of amendment: 1. Two-thirds of each house may approve an amendment, and it becomes effective when accepted by three-fourths of the states; 2. The legislatures of two-thirds of the states may call for a constitutional convention, which congress must summon. The product of a constitutional convention becomes law when ratified by three-fourths of the states.

**Amend-
ments.**

In several general ways the constitution modifies the power of a state: 1. It guarantees to each a republican form of government and to the citizen of one state residing in another all the rights of a citizen of that state; 2. Fugitives from justice and from labor are ordered to be surrendered on the demand of the state from which they fled. 3. No state may emit bills of credit, make anything but gold and silver coin a legal tender, or pass a bill of attainder, *ex post facto* law, or a law impairing the obligation of a contract; 4. No state may lay imposts or duties on imports or exports without the consent of congress; and 5. The constitution and laws in pursuance thereof are to be the supreme law of the land.

**Limitations
on the
States.**

Besides these specific limitations we must consider the immense national authority and prestige, which was bound to reduce the state's pretension to complete sovereignty. But the state felt its inferiority less because it had not exercised many of the powers now relinquished, and because it retained most of the functions vital to

its own interests. It was still a self-governing community, making laws to govern personal and property relations, controlling its own plans for social improvement, regulating the police power over its own citizens, choosing its own government, administering its own laws in its own courts, and doing other things which were not themselves connected with the life of the general government. In all things properly within its own sphere it was conceded to be supreme.

**Overweening
Prestige
of the
Nation.**

In 1789 the bounds between its authority and that of the nation were not well defined, and if there should be conflict between the two in a matter of interpretation, it seemed probable that the stronger would win. Three features of the national constitution were ominous: 1. Congress had power to lay taxes to provide for the general welfare. If the phrase "general welfare" were given a broad interpretation, it was difficult to say what congress might not do. 2. The constitution and the laws of congress were made supreme law, and the federal courts were given power to declare null state constitutions and laws in conflict with them. If, therefore, a controversy between a state and the nation should come before such a court, it seemed probable that the federal supreme court would support the authority of the latter. 3. Congress was given control over interstate commerce. This was not of great apparent importance at the time, but the development of means of communication would increase interstate commerce, enlarge the activity of the federal government in supervision of it, and produce frequent situations in which a state should be unable to regulate commerce within its borders, on the ground that to do so would interfere with interstate relations.

**Probable
Sources of
Conflict.**

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CHAPTER XII

WASHINGTON'S PRESIDENCY — A PERIOD OF ORGANIZATION

THE WORK OF ORGANIZATION

**End of the
Old Con-
gress.** JULY 2, 1788, the president of the old congress, in session in New York, rose and announced that nine states having ratified the constitution, it was in order to take steps to establish the new government. His hearers agreed with him, and it was resolved that the states should choose presidential electors on the first Wednesday in January, 1789, who, a month later, should select a president and vice-president; and that a congress elected under the constitution should meet the first Wednesday in March following. After some debate, New York was selected for the place of meeting. This was the last important legislation of the congress which for fourteen years had guided the fortunes of all the states through the dangers of war and the hardly less difficult trials of peace. Would success crown the new system, over whose adoption there had been so vast an amount of dispute? Some wise ones had serious doubts, and the most hopeful admitted that it was an "experiment," but urged that it be given a fair trial.

**Washington
the First
President.** For president the unanimous choice was Washington. He was a good general, though not a brilliant one. He was not a good speaker and was not versed in the principles of government. But he was honest, fair-minded, dignified, and faithful to the liberty of America. He had the power of commanding obedience, and everybody, federalist and antifederalist, trusted him. With Washington at the helm, faction would be checked and the authority of the union respected. His personal character was worth a great deal to the "experiment." It gave it the confidence of Americans and foreigners. John Adams was elected vice-president.

**Congress
Meets.** At the time designated very few members of congress were in New York. The weak-hearted thought this was because nobody cared for the new plan, but others showed that it was because the roads were bad. April 6, the senate had a quorum, the electoral votes were counted, and a messenger went to summon the president-elect to the seat of government. April 30, he was in the city and took the oath of office. On his journey to New York he received every mark of affection from the people.

The problems before president and congress were numerous. All that the old confederation could not do had now to be taken up. In the first place, the government was to be organized. The officers of state, great and small, must be appointed; federal courts, high and low, must be created; a revenue law must be devised; the revolutionary debt must be placed on a sound basis; commerce must be regulated; those parts of the treaty of 1783 which were not executed must be carried into effect; our relations with foreign states must be defined in proper treaties; a site for the federal capital must be selected; and many other minor affairs must have attention. They were tasks which demanded the wisdom of the best men in the country, and they engaged the attention of Washington and congress through most of his two administrations. Men approached them with the greater caution, because they felt that all that was done would be taken for precedents in the conduct of the affairs of the future.

**Problems of
the Day.**

The first thing was to raise a revenue. Madison, a member of the house of representatives — generally called “the house” — introduced the subject by moving an import duty of 5 per cent on all articles brought into the country. A Pennsylvania delegate objected. He wished a small tax for revenue, but asked that it be laid so as to protect articles produced in America. The Middle states were then the chief center of American manufactures. After much discussion, the protective principle was adopted, but it was for a long time made incidental to the purpose of getting a revenue.

**The
Revenue.**

Then congress took up the task of creating great administrative departments. In July it created a department of state, in August, a department of war, and in September, a department of the treasury. Over each was to be a head of department, who should ever be nominated by the chief executive and confirmed by the senate. Over the first the president appointed Thomas Jefferson, of Virginia, who had just come back from Paris, where he had been our minister since 1785. Over the second he placed Alexander Hamilton, of New York, then, as later, known for one of the best-informed Americans in questions of finance, a man of fine mind, versed in principles of government, and a leading politician. Over the third he placed Henry Knox, of Massachusetts, a man of no great ability, but popular because he was a revolutionary general and had influence in New England. Congress also created the office of attorney-general, to which Edmund Randolph, of Virginia, was appointed. He was merely law adviser to the administration, had a small salary, and was expected to have outside practice if he wished it. The first three heads of department were brought together to advise the president about problems of administration, and this was the beginning of the cabinet. It was not until 1870 that

**The Admin-
istrative De-
partments.**

the department of justice was formally organized with the attorney-general at the head, but he attended cabinet meetings from the first. Although the laws creating the departments said nothing about the right of removing the heads, it was generally held that it lay with the president, and on this theory later practice has proceeded. It would be unwise to force the president to keep in his cabinet a man who is uncongenial, or who does not have his confidence.

Next came the judiciary. No one objected to a supreme court, but some thought that the state courts should be given jurisdiction over federal cases in the lower stages, with appeal to the higher court. This did not please the majority of congress, who wished that the government should have a complete court system of its own. It was accordingly decided to create, besides the supreme court, with one chief justice and five associate justices, four circuit and thirteen district courts, whose judges should be appointed by the president and confirmed by the senate. The number of these lower courts has been increased with the growth of the union.

Another duty was to deal with the amendments sent up by the ratifying states. Henry and other prominent antifederalists had pronounced the plan of ratifying with suggestions of amendments a subterfuge; and for a time it seemed that they were right. Weeks passed and congress took no notice of amendments. Then the complaints at home became so loud that congress dared not delay longer. The suggested amendments were referred to a committee. All that looked toward a modification of the plan of union were ignored, and the twelve which congress sent to the states for adoption were in the nature of a bill of rights. Ten of these were accepted. The antifederalists declared that this confirmed their previous suspicions, and criticized congress roundly. But the subject did not interest the people, and the antifederalist party soon disintegrated; for other measures were coming up to divide the voters into two great parties.

The constitution designed that congress should be entirely independent of the executive. The president could communicate information, but neither he nor his cabinet could speak on the floor or vote in its proceedings. Each house was very jealous of interference from that quarter, and he, therefore, has no initiative in legislation. This important function was referred to committees. To them were sent important bills introduced by members. The most powerful standing committee in the house was the committee of ways and means, created in 1795, whose functions were connected with raising and expending revenue. At first the committees were special, but in time standing committees came into general use. In the first congress the committees of each

**Federal
Courts Es-
tablished.**

**The Amend-
ments.**

**The Initia-
tive in
Congress.**

**Congres-
sional Com-
mittees.**

house were elected by the members, but from 1790 to 1911 the speaker of the house, who has been a party man since 1791, appointed the committees in that branch. The senate committees are still elected by the members of the senate.

FINANCIAL REORGANIZATION

The first session of congress lasted until September 29, 1789. One of its last acts was to ask Hamilton, secretary of the treasury, to prepare a report on the state of the finances. He took up the task with accustomed energy, and the result was four reports covering every phase of the matter intrusted to him. The first was submitted January 14, 1790, and dealt with the public debt; the second, submitted December 13, 1790, recommended an excise; the third, December 13, 1790, recommended a national bank; and the fourth, December 5, 1791, argued for the protection of manufactures. The fourth report was not considered when introduced, but the others were enacted into law.

**Hamilton's
Four Finan-
cial Reports.**

The debt was then, including arrears of interest, divided as follows: due to foreigners, \$11,710,378; to domestic creditors, \$42,414,085; and a floating debt of \$2,000,000. Hamilton proposed to refund all this at par. Now, the domestic debt had been selling as low as 25 per cent of par, and the first suggestion of paying at par had led the speculators to buy the old certificates wherever found. Should the government enable them to make the handsome profits anticipated now became an urgent question in congress. Hamilton claimed that such a course was necessary to place the public credit on a sound basis; others, mostly men from rural constituencies, urged that the idea was preposterous. They thought he wished to found a party whose center was men of wealth, through whose influence persons dependent on them for financial prosperity should be dominated. It was the first appearance in the new government of party division. Madison supported the latter view and proposed that the debt be paid at par, but that the speculators be given only the ruling price and that the rest up to par be paid to the original holders of the debt. This plan found favor with some members, but the majority thought it impossible to determine who were the original holders, and it was decided to pay the debt as proposed by Hamilton.

**Refunding
the Conti-
nental Debt.**

The secretary of the treasury wished also to assume the debt incurred by the states in aid of the revolution. This proposition aroused still greater opposition. Some states had paid much of their revolutionary debt and objected to assuming a part of that of others, as they must do as a part of the union, if the measure carried. But those states which had

**Assumption
of State
Debts.**

not settled their debts were in favor of the plan. As leader of the former, now appeared Madison. In 1787 he had been prominent in the party of nationality, but he now argued that the constitution gave congress no power to assume state debts. After weeks of discussion the opponents of assumption had a small majority. But before the vote was finally cast, a compromise was effected, chiefly through the efforts of

**A Southern
Capital.**

Hamilton and Jefferson. The Southerners favored locating the capital on the Potomac, but lacked a few votes for that purpose. It was agreed that enough Southern votes should be got for assumption to carry it, if enough Northern votes were secured to get a Southern location of the capital; and on this basis both measures were carried in the spring of 1790. Hamilton and the nationalists were pleased, because they thought assumption would strengthen the national government and invigorate the national credit by removing from the sphere of doubt a large mass of securities which the states, in the existing distress, could not hope to pay for many years. As it turned out, assumption increased the obligations of the United States by \$18,271,786.

Refunding, as time showed, was a slow process. In 1795 over a million dollars of the old debt was still unfunded. Including this amount, the total was \$77,500,000, of which the foreign debt, **The Total Debt.** \$11,710,000, paid interest at 4 per cent, $4\frac{1}{2}$ per cent, and 5 per cent. Of the domestic debt of \$65,800,000, about half, 45.4 per cent, paid interest at 6 per cent, while 30.3 per cent paid at 3 per cent, and 24.3 per cent was at 6 per cent with interest payments deferred until 1801.

To pay the debt, Hamilton got congress to establish a sinking fund which, it was supposed, would eventually absorb the entire indebtedness. He did not fear a national debt, but said it might even become a national blessing. His adversaries charged that he wished to make it perpetual, like the debt of Great Britain. The majority of the people, like thrifty husbandmen, wished to pay it gradually. But a national debt, by causing the capitalists who held it to look to the government for payment, was a strong bond of union.

Hamilton considered a great national bank, like that of England, a necessity. It would issue large quantities of its notes and thus provide

**First Bank
of the
United
States.**

a much-needed and safe currency; it would enable the government to sell its bonds quickly at home and abroad; it would furnish a safe and cheap means of exchange for the people; by establishing branches in the leading cities, it would enable the government to transfer its funds cheaply; and it would furnish a safe place for keeping the public funds. His opponents objected that it would give the bank a monopoly in exchange; that by making its notes receivable for government dues, it would have superior privileges; that it would interfere with the operations of state banks; and that the constitution gave congress

no power to establish a bank. They stressed the last objection most; and when a bill to create such a bank with a charter for twenty years passed congress, efforts were made to have it vetoed. Washington hesitated, but finally called on his cabinet for advice. Hamilton argued for approval, and Knox supported him. Jefferson took the other side and had the support of Randolph. The president at last decided for Hamilton, on the ground that he would favor the man in whose department, the treasury, the matter lay. The bank began business in 1791 and had a capital stock of \$10,000,000, of which the government owned \$2,000,000 for which it was to pay in installments. The fact that the government was a large stockholder added to the public confidence in the bank.

The third feature of Hamilton's scheme was an excise, a tax collected on distilled liquors. Congress passed the bill to that effect, and Washington approved it. Hamilton supported it both because it would give a revenue and because, by collecting the tax at the stills, owned chiefly by farmers, the power of the general government would be brought home to the people of every part of the country. Thus, each feature of Hamilton's scheme stood for strong national authority. In opposition to him grew up a party opposed to centralization. The federalists, who supported Hamilton, embraced the large business interests, capitalists, merchants, and manufacturers, together with men who favored a strong government generally. The opposition, led by Jefferson, opposed further concentration and had strong support from the farmers in the South and in the rural parts of the Middle states. Among them were many former antifederalists; but the name was unpopular, because they no longer opposed the constitution. They preferred the name "republican," which gradually came into use.

**The Excise
Tax.**

**Hamilton's
Nationalism.**

Hamilton's financial plans proved very successful. No one could doubt that a country with such immense resources as the United states could pay its obligations, if it wished; and the enactment of the laws he recommended expressed its purpose in the matter. Accordingly, the bonds sold well, the bank he established proved successful, and confidence in the future was high. Bold imagination characterized every scheme he espoused, and in each case he was justified by the result. With the enactment of his suggestions vanished all fears that the nation would be embarrassed by its debts.

**Results of
Hamilton's
Plan.**

ADJUSTING FOREIGN RELATIONS

Meanwhile, our foreign relations demanded attention. England had not paid for the slaves carried away at the end of the revolution, and she still held five frontier posts extending from Lake Champlain to the north of Lake Superior, all of which was contrary to the treaty.

She justified her failure on the ground that we still impeded the collection of British debts and had not relaxed our regulations against the loyalists. These Western posts were centers of a rich Canadian fur trade, to which our own traders wished to get access, and we justly attributed her action to her desire to prolong as much as possible her advantage in that respect. Another complaint was that she would not make a commercial treaty. American traders wished to have her modify her navigation laws so as to allow them to share in the trade with the West Indies. Washington took early notice of the situation, and in 1789 sent Gouverneur Morris to London to see if arrangements could be made. The British ministry was immovable, and Morris, like Adams several years earlier, could think of nothing better than to advise that we draw near to France in commercial affairs,—a threat as impotent now as formerly; for France did not manufacture the merchandise we needed. It was not until the autumn of 1791 that the first British minister to the new government arrived in Philadelphia, the seat of government from 1790 to 1800, but he brought no instructions to make a treaty, and the futile negotiations still went on.

By this time the Indians south of Lake Erie were in a state of ferment. White settlers were appearing north and west of the Ohio, in pursuance of a treaty at Fort Harmar in 1789, which the savages claimed was obtained through fraud. Their fears were stimulated by the Canadian traders, who were alarmed at the prospect of losing a region rich in furs. General St. Clair, governor and military commander in Ohio, asked congress for troops to reduce the Indians to order. Two thousand recruits were sent him, with which he marched from Cincinnati into the forest north of it, where, November 4, 1791, he carelessly allowed himself to be ambushed by the foe. Of the fourteen hundred men on the field, only fifty escaped uninjured, and all the baggage was lost. It was the first battle fought under the new government, and the news of the disaster caused great distress in the East. Washington himself gave St. Clair a severe rebuke and appointed Anthony Wayne, of revolutionary fame, to conduct another expedition against the Indians. October 7, 1793, Wayne marched with 2600 men for the enemy's country. He built Fort Greenville there, and went into winter quarters. In June, 1794, he was joined by 1600 mounted men from Kentucky and began an advance.

The war had now taken on a new phase. From the beginning the Indians received ammunition and guns from the British, and Canadian traders and officials gave them open encouragement. Canada thought England would eventually retain the Western posts, and wished to preserve the Indian tribes intact, both on account of the fur trade and because they would thus have a buffer between their own territory and that of the

**The Treaty
not Ex-
ecuted.**

**St. Clair's
Defeat.**

**Wayne in
Command.**

**British
Complica-
tions.**

United States. In 1793 the hostiles showed a willingness to make peace, but continued the war through the persuasion of the British. In the following February, Dorchester, governor of Canada, made a speech to a number of chiefs, telling them they were wronged by the Americans, and that England and the United States would soon be at war, when the Indians could recover their lands. At the same time British soldiers from Detroit, one of the retained posts, were erecting a fort sixty miles south of that place in territory unquestionably American. All this was known in Philadelphia, and Washington ordered Wayne to carry the intruding fort, if it was in his way. The Indian war, therefore, seemed about to become a war against England.

This eventuality was averted by the rashness of the savages, who chose to risk a battle south of the offending fort. They met Wayne in a body of fallen timber and were repulsed in a sharp encounter. They fell back, but the fort refused to receive them, and they dispersed into the forest. Wayne sent out detachments to destroy their fields and villages, but he did not attack the fort. After some time, he received overtures from the hostiles and appointed a council to make a permanent peace in the summer of 1795. The meeting was at Fort Greenville, where a treaty, concluded on August 4, adopted a line from the Ohio to Fort Recovery, thence eastward to the Muskingum, and thence with that river and the Cuyahoga to Lake Erie; and the Indians recognized this line as their eastern and southern boundary. Thus, most of Ohio was definitely open to white ownership and soon became the scene of active settlement. The war had the good effect of convincing England, and her more confident colonists in Canada, that something must be done to settle the dispute about the Western posts; but it was in another negotiation that the affair was adjusted.

**Battle of the
Fallen
Timber.**

**Treaty of
Greenville,
1795.**

At this time Spain held Louisiana and viewed with alarm the advance of the new republic into the transmontane region. In order to check it she resorted to three intrigues, two with the adventurous settlers themselves and one with the southwestern Indians. Holding the mouth of the Mississippi, the outlet of the Western trade, she had a powerful argument for the men of Kentucky and Tennessee. In 1785 Spain sent Gardoqui, an able negotiator, to the United States to make a treaty. Three questions came up, the navigation of the Mississippi, recognition of the secret clause of the treaty of peace of 1783, and commercial relations with Spain's American possessions. The men of the seaboard were concerned with the last, those of the West thought most of the first and second. After much discussion, in which the Spaniard asserted that he would never yield on the first and second point, Jay asked permission to make a treaty in which we got concessions only in respect to the third. The Eastern and Middle states seemed complaisant,

**Spain's
Intrigues.**

but those of the South, who had lands on the Mississippi, objected strenuously, and the proposed Jay-Gardoqui treaty of 1786 came to naught.

But the Western settlers were deeply dissatisfied. They took Jay's proposition to mean that the East cared nothing about them. Their discontent was stimulated by agents whom the Spanish governor at New Orleans sent among them. It was his hope that the Western communities could be induced to revolt and place themselves under Spanish protection. One of his paid agents was James Wilkinson, who distributed Spain's gold among some Kentucky leaders and organized a party who supported the intrigue. The prospect of getting free navigation of the river served, also, as a strong lure to the men of the West. In 1788 the intrigue came to a head in Kentucky, the strongest Western community. But the forces of order were greater than those of revolt, and the Kentuckians rejected Wilkinson's appeals and contented themselves by asking Virginia to consent to the creation of a new state out of her transmontane lands. When the Old Dominion granted this in 1789 much of the discontent subsided, and a still better feeling was engendered when Kentucky was made a state in 1792. In 1790 North Carolina transferred her Western possessions to the union, but they were not admitted as the state of Tennessee until 1796. In 1791 Vermont had been received as a state, and all this was a pledge that the West should have fair treatment as it grew in population. In this way Spain failed in her scheming to stay the growth of the power of the United States on her borders.

The controversy over the northern boundary of West Florida was not so soon settled. The United States stood firmly for the secret clause of the treaty, Spain stood against it. She had the advantage of holding Natchez, within the disputed area, and an attempt to oust her by force must lead to war, a thing for which we were not ready. The president and cabinet thought the matter should be deferred without prejudice to our claim; for it could be settled better when our population in that region was strong enough to threaten occupation with decisive effect. But about this time their plan seemed likely to fail by the intrusion of settlements in the disputed region itself. In 1789 Georgia, who claimed that the lands in the disputed region were within her borders, made grants to three great companies, which proposed to plant settlements. One of the companies went so far as to open negotiations with the governor of New Orleans, promising to recognize the authority of Spain if the settlements were not opposed. Such a course must bring us into conflict with Spain and Washington promptly issued a proclamation warning the people to have nothing to do with it. In consequence, the scheme failed, but

the claims of the land companies remained as a source of irritation for many years afterwards.

Spain's third intrigue was destined to come to a fate equally futile, and for this Washington's diplomacy was also responsible. Between Florida and the Tennessee settlements lived the powerful Cherokee, Creek, Chickasaw, and Choctaw tribes, inhabiting a rich territory and strong enough to muster 10,000 warriors. They were friendly with the Spaniards, who bought their furs and sold them merchandise, and whose trading posts were never followed by farming communities. Alexander McGillivray, a rich and capable half-breed Creek, a tory in the revolution who had suffered at the hands of the whigs and who now hated the Americans, became a Spanish agent to preserve Spain's influence with the Indians. A treaty made in 1784 contained an Indian pledge that no white man should visit the Creeks without a Spanish permit, and efforts were made to get a similar treaty with the three other tribes. About this time Indian attacks began to be made upon the growing settlements in Tennessee, and it was evident that the officials of Florida encouraged the attacks in order to impede settlement in that region.

Spain and
the Indians.

Thus was created a situation demanding the intervention of the general government. Washington resorted to diplomacy, although the men of the frontier thought that war should have been the instrument. McGillivray was induced to appear at New York, where he received \$100,000 for the damages sustained during the revolution and was made a United States agent in matters of trade with the rank of brigadier general. In return he promised that the Creeks should be at peace with the United States. The treaty was immediately broken, and his death in 1793 did not improve matters. The Tennesseans grew restless under their sufferings and wished to retaliate; but the government was carrying on a long-drawn-out negotiation with Spain and ordered that the peace should be observed. For a while the frontiersmen complied, but at last they were goaded to action. In 1793 Sevier, with a band of East Tennesseans, and in 1794 Robertson, with a party of West Tennesseans, made raids on the bands of offending Cherokees, burning their villages and killing without mercy. From that time the settlements had peace.

McGillivray's
Duplicity.

Vengeance
of the Ten-
nesseans.

Happily, at this time the negotiations which had gone on haltingly at Madrid since 1791 took a favorable turn. France was at war with Spain, and Genêt, just arrived at Charleston, was organizing forces to move, regardless of our neutrality, against Florida and New Orleans. Three expeditions were proposed, one against Florida and two against Louisiana. Spite of Washington's efforts to interfere, preparations went forward rapidly, and only Genêt's recall averted, it seems, serious trouble of this kind. The response of the men of Kentucky, Georgia, and the

Treaty with
Spain, 1795.

Carolinas showed Spain how much unpopularity her policy was developing in our back country, and her tone became more conciliatory. Washington seized the opportunity to quicken the currents of diplomacy, and the result was a treaty arranged by Thomas Pinckney, our minister, with Godoy, a liberal Spaniard, on October 27, 1795. It confirmed the secret clause of the treaty of 1783 relative to the Florida boundary, gave the Americans the right to use the river, and allowed them to deposit in New Orleans products intended for exportation. Kentucky and Tennessee thus got easy access to outside markets, Georgia acquired a better title to the southern half of her Western lands, and the national government closed an annoying dispute with Spain.

THE UNITED STATES AND THE EUROPEAN WAR

In 1793 France beheaded her king, and almost immediately was at war with England and Spain. The year before she had begun a war with Austria and Prussia. The South generally was enthusiastic in her behalf, as well as the farmers and ordinary townsmen of the Middle states. But the trading class everywhere, closely dependent on England, felt otherwise, and they were supported by the rural New Englanders, who, under the influence of the congregational clergy, hated a republic which had enthroned a Goddess of Reason. Washington feared that the ardent French partisans would, by some rash action, bring on war with England, and issued a proclamation of neutrality. Inasmuch as the treaties of 1778 (see page 199) were still in force, the French party took this for British partisanship. The proclamation was roundly denounced in the newspapers of the newly founded republican party and defended in those of the federalists. At this time our politics became divided in accordance with the division in Europe, and from this situation they did not emerge until Napoleon was definitely defeated and France ceased to be at war against the powers around her.

April 8, 1793, Genêt, first minister from the French republic, arrived at Charleston. The merchants and great planters received him coolly, but the populace were mad with joy. Carried away by his reception, he raised troops for operations against Spain and commissioned privateers against England. Departing for Philadelphia by land, he was received enthusiastically by the farmers of the Carolinas and Virginia and became convinced that the American people were in sympathy with France. Washington received him with reserve, and Genêt grew angry and informed his government that the American people did not approve the neutrality proclamation. He described the president as a weak old man, under British influence. Many of his deeds were as foolish as his words. The republicans gave him encouragement at first, and he

Attitude of
Americans.

Neutrality
Proclama-
tion.

Genêt's
Arrival.

formed the intention of getting congress to force Washington to act in behalf of France. Finally, he talked openly about his appeal to the people. The federalists attacked him from the beginning, and they made so much of his ill-advised attitude toward the administration that even the republicans began to forsake him. No calm patriot would tolerate an open attempt by a foreigner to influence the internal policy of the country.

Washington was rarely moved by popular clamor, and he intended to preserve neutrality. The treaties of 1778 provided that the French might bring their prizes into our ports and that enemies of France might not fit out privateers there. Genêt interpreted this to mean that French prizes brought in might also be sold, and that France might fit out privateers in American ports. His view was brought before the cabinet, where Hamilton opposed it totally and Jefferson would allow as much of it as would not bring us into war with England. Washington held the balance. He would do all the treaties required; and it was decided that France might fit out privateers in our ports but send them away at once and not use our ports as a base of operation, or send in and sell prizes captured at sea. Genêt complied unwillingly. He had already complied fourteen privateers which had taken eighty prizes.

Interpreting
the French
Treaties.

A month later, July, 1793, it was known that he was fitting out a prize, *The Little Sarah*, with cannon and was about to send her to sea. When approached, he became angry and talked of appealing to the people; but when he learned that the ship was about to be seized, he agreed that she would not sail without notice. Ten days later the promise was violated.

Genêt's
Last Of-
fense.

Washington was outraged. "Is the minister of the French republic," he said, "to set the acts of this government at defiance with impunity?" He convened the cabinet, which decided to ask France to recall Genêt. It also determined to exclude French prizes and privateers in the future. The demand caused no dissatisfaction in Paris, where a fresh revolution of party had left the luckless Genêt in danger of his life. In fact, Fauchet, his successor, was instructed to arrest Genêt and send him home for trial. He owed his safety to Washington, who generously refused to allow him to be extradited. He remained in America, married a daughter of Governor Clinton of New York, and died in that state at an old age.

THE WHISKY INSURRECTION

Hamilton's excise law, passed in January, 1791, was very unpopular in the western counties of Pennsylvania and the states southward, a region through which the Scotch-Irish were widely settled. They brought with them the habit of making whisky out of grain, and by 1791 their stills on every farm furnished so much of the liquor that it superseded the New England rum, which

The Excise
Opposed.

in colonial times was the common tippie throughout the colonies. The tax was not large, but it was resented because it was inquisitorial. The opposition reached actual violence only in Pennsylvania, where four counties had been organized in the valley of the Monongahela, all lying to the south of Pittsburgh. The people there were near enough to the new settlements in the Ohio valley to feel much of that spirit of independence which had caused some men to fear a separation of the West from the East at no distant day.

In 1791 popular meetings began to be held to urge the inhabitants to defy the excise law. The leaders were in a violent mood, and threatened to deal with officers collecting the tax. Albert Gallatin, later to have a distinguished career in national politics, lived in the region, attended the meetings, and sought to check the trend to violence. His efforts were futile; for the angry farmers listened more willingly to the harangues of the men of action. They paid no attention to a proclamation of warning which Washington, at Hamilton's suggestion, issued in 1792, and continued to hold meetings, threaten the revenue officers, and cut up the stills of those who obeyed the objectionable law. In 1794 fifty warrants were drawn for persons concerned in these outrages and made returnable to the federal court in Philadelphia.

Trouble arose when they were served. A mob surrounded the house of Neville, an inspector, to make him give up his commission, and six men were wounded and one killed by shots fired from his house. The people fled to arms, and Neville fled for his life. The leader of discontent was now Bradford, a noisy demagogue, who summoned the counties to send delegates to a general meeting at Parkinson's Ferry in the following August. In the excitement of the time the mail was robbed and the discontented ones assembled in great numbers near Pittsburgh, probably to overawe the small garrison there. But the leaders lost courage and contented themselves with marching through the town as a demonstration of their power.

It was high time for the forces of order to assert themselves, but Governor Mifflin, of Pennsylvania, feared to make himself unpopular with the farmers, and refused to call out the militia. Then Washington decided to interfere. He sent out a proclamation against the rioters and called for fifteen thousand men from Virginia, Maryland, and Pennsylvania, to march by the first of September. Meanwhile, he sent commissioners to visit the back counties to see if the people could be persuaded to submit to the law. They arrived, with two commissioners appointed by Mifflin, while the Parkinson Ferry meeting was in session. The quick response of the militia was by this time known in the West and caused the people to hesitate. Gallatin took advantage of the lull to urge moderation, and it was decided to

Violence in Pennsylvania.

The People in Arms.

Troops Called Out.

Insurgents Submissive.

appoint a committee to treat for peace. Bradford raised the cry that the enemy was winning through the use of money. There was much dissension in the back counties themselves, but the onward march of the army gave powerful support to those who wished peace. It was finally decided to send men across the mountains to ask Washington for better terms.

Meanwhile, two divisions of troops were converging on the disaffected region, one by way of Carlisle and Bedford, the other by way of Cumberland and the old Braddock road. They met at Parkinson Ferry on November 8, but no force showed itself against them. At the demand of the military power the people now submitted and took oaths of loyalty; and 2500 troops were left in the country for the winter. Hamilton, who accompanied the army in a civil capacity, secured the arrest of such leaders as did not flee westward, and eighteen of them were sent to Philadelphia for trial. Of these only two were convicted, and they were pardoned by Washington. No further opposition was made to the excise, but it was still denounced by the republicans and was repealed when Jefferson became president.

**Collapse of
the Insur-
rection.**

The force called out against the four counties in insurrection was larger than the number of men of military age in their limits. It was larger than most of the revolutionary armies, and larger than any army under Washington before the French alliance. It was only one thousand men smaller than the allied American army which captured Cornwallis with 7000 men at Yorktown. A thousand men could have suppressed the insurrection. In calling for 15,000 Washington followed the suggestion of Hamilton, who wished to demonstrate the power of the government; and in this respect the plan succeeded. But his opponents denounced it as showing the tendency of the federalists toward militarism. Hamilton's general policy of a strong government, which could intimidate the unruly, suited England, which he thought the best-governed country in the world. But it was a mistake in a country in which the unruly all had the ballot, for it tended to make them the political opponents of the party in power.

**Significance
of the Army.**

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT UNDER WASHINGTON

Washington was elected president without regard to party. During the revolution all whigs stood together and division in the ranks was deplored. The first cabinet and the first congress were composed of men who had favored the adoption of the constitution; for it was not probable that men should be selected to organize a government which they had not wished to establish. Washington's first appointments in the civil service were generally from the same class. When North Carolina and Rhode

**Washington
and Party.**

Island gave in their tardy submission to the constitution, he removed the antifederalist revenue officers within their borders and appointed successors who were federalists. Nobody objected, for the antifederalist group had no occasion to continue its existence and immediately disappeared. Washington hoped that his supporters would remain undivided and was distressed when he saw them forming parties.

This process began with the introduction of Hamilton's financial plan, which pleased the property-owning class and the advocates of a strong central government. Hamilton thought wealth and intelligence would rule, partly because they could act promptly and with bold initiative, and partly because they would ever have great influence over less competent classes. Washington sympathized with this view and supported it when occasion arose throughout his administration. Thus was organized the Hamiltonian party, which took the name federalist because it sought to promote nationality. It was strongest in the trading cities, most of which were north of the Potomac, and among the large planters of the South. It was conservative and mildly aristocratic.

Opposed to these views was Jefferson, who had ever rejected a privileged class and who believed in democracy. He had great organizing ability, but was not a good public speaker. He realized that the middle and lower classes were a vast majority of the voters and might control the government if they could be organized into an effective party. The superior classes had their own organization; he must make one. They had influence over the mass of voters; he must break down that influence. He found many men who disliked Hamilton, never a considerate man to those who differed with him, others who held, as Jefferson, to the democratic theory, others who feared the concentration of national power, and still others who wished to make careers for themselves as leaders of a great party. Jefferson was able to select the best men of these groups, unite them in a common cause, restrain their passions, and furnish them with successful campaign issues. He founded newspapers which, in seeking to destroy the prestige of the federalists with the masses, accused them of many harsh purposes. They even attacked Washington, pronouncing him a monarchist. By these fierce onslaughts, and by taking advantage of every mistake of their adversaries, they slowly increased their power, and in 1800 obtained control of the government. They were known as republicans.

There was some discontent in interior New England, but the power of the seaports overwhelmed it, and here the republicans had little hope. Hamilton's enemies in New York, headed by Clinton, came readily into the movement. In Pennsylvania the country people were opposed to the ruling class in Philadelphia and became republicans gladly. In Virginia

**The Federal-
ist Party.**

**The Repub-
lican Party
Forming.**

**Republican
Feeling in
the States.**

and North Carolina the great planters lived in the counties along the coast and the small farmers, far more numerous, lived in the uplands and generally followed Jefferson. In Georgia the same thing was true. In South Carolina the planters in the east and the Charleston merchants formed a powerful ruling class, but the men of the interior were republicans. In the new states of Kentucky and Tennessee the frontiersmen were fiercely democratic. Jefferson, therefore, had strong hopes of carrying all the South except Maryland and South Carolina, and had good chances in Pennsylvania and New York. In 1792 these states had a majority of the electoral votes.

Hamilton considered the situation alarming. Washington intended to retire to his estate, and it was likely that the federalists would support John Adams for his successor. Adams was honest and capable, but unpopular out of New England. In this dilemma Hamilton decided that Washington must stand for reëlection. He was met at first with a refusal, but he got others to persuade Washington. Only one man, it was felt, could harmonize the contending parties. So strong was this feeling that even Jefferson joined his voice to the general demand, and in the end Washington consented to run. The republicans did not oppose him, but supported George Clinton for the vice-presidency against Adams. Washington received the votes of all the states, and Clinton those of New York, Virginia, North Carolina, and Georgia, with one from Pennsylvania, a total of 50 to Adams's 77.

Washington
Reëlected.

The hope that Washington would reconcile parties proved futile. In 1793 the European war began, the republicans espoused the cause of republican France, and denounced the neutrality proclamation. For a time this seemed to be an advantage, but the excesses of Genêt reacted against them, and the federalists, most of whom leaned toward England, gained by declaring that their opponents would sacrifice the honor of the country for the sake of the infidel French republic. Indeed, from that time until 1800 the French ministers were in cordial relations with republican leaders and did as much as **they** dared to secure the defeat of the federalists. Jefferson, now definitely head of the opposition, recognized that he was out of place in the cabinet and withdrew at the close of the year 1793 to give all his efforts to the republican cause. His place was taken by Edmund Randolph, a mild republican, but so strong was the tendency to party government that he retired within a year and was succeeded by Timothy Pickering, an avowed federalist.

The Euro-
pean War.

The republicans early in 1794 took a bolder attitude. Ceasing to plead for France, they began to demand war against England; and they had cause enough. When the European conflict began, France opened to the world the trade with her West Indian possessions. Too weak at sea to succor them herself, she expected that they would sell their produce, chiefly

Wrongs
from
England.

sugar, to the United States and receive American merchandise in exchange. England declared this unlawful, asserting that a trade denied in time of peace could not be opened in time of war. Her men-of-war began to seize American ships bound for the French islands and to treat the captured crews with unusual rigor. The stories of hardship that came back to our shores aroused the deepest horror, and the republicans took advantage of the opportunity to demand retaliation. The first move was made by Madison, in the house of representatives.

**Madison's
Trade
Resolutions.**

If England, he urged, made restrictions on our trade, we ought to make restrictions of her trade with us. The federalists replied that since seven-eighths of our trade was with England and could not be shifted to another nation, we should injure ourselves more than England by passing the proposed restrictions. It was the same argument which England used against Adams's suggestion of retaliation in 1785. The argument was so good that Madison's resolutions were postponed.

About this time came news that England had ordered the seizure of all neutral ships carrying French goods. In America the excitement was great; for we held that neutral ships made neutral goods. The republicans talked earnestly of war, and congress authorized the erection of fortifications, the enlistment of artillerymen, and the levying of a force of 80,000 militia, to be ready for an emergency. The extreme republicans, led by Dayton, of New Jersey, introduced a resolution in the house to sequester British debts as an offset to the loss from the seizure of American ships. If this were passed, the result would probably be war.

**Neutral
Ships and
Goods.**

Washington was alarmed and decided to try to settle the dispute by making a treaty with England. Conservative republicans as well as federalists thought the attempt ought to be made; and in May, 1794, he sent Jay to London with powers to make a treaty which would secure the surrender of the Western posts still in the hands of England, get compensation for the ships recently seized, and effect a commercial treaty which would remove the irritation from further seizures of ships having French goods on board and which would open British West Indian ports to our trade. If these points could be arranged, thought Washington, war would be avoided. When Jay was dispatched, the war feeling cooled and the nation awaited the result.

**Jay's
Mission.**

Jay was a federalist and of an easy temperament. He found the British government determined to maintain their existing navigation laws, and in his desire to make some kind of arrangement accepted terms not allowed in his instructions. The treaty he sent back early in 1795 provided for surrender of the posts by 1796, and admitted us to the trade with the British East Indies, but only put off a settlement for the ships seized by Britain. It contained

Jay's Treaty.

commercial regulations which admitted our ships not larger than 70 tons' burden to British West Indian ports and denied us the right to carry West Indian products, including cotton, to Europe, while British ships were to be unrestricted in our own trade. It also provided that privateers should not be fitted out in our ports by England's enemies, that Americans serving against England should be treated as pirates if captured, and that British trade in America should be on the footing of the most favored nation. These latter provisions were aimed at the French treaties of 1778. The West Indian clause of Jay's treaty were to end two years after the termination of the existing war.

A storm of indignation greeted its publication in America, the republicans leading the chorus. Even the federalists could support it only faintly, and Washington was much in doubt. But reflection brought soberness. If the treaty were rejected, the nation would almost surely drift into war, for which it was not prepared. This view had weight with the senate, which cut out the features relating to the West India trade and passed the treaty by the necessary two-thirds majority. Washington hesitated to sign it, but finally yielded. He thought that if we could endure for twenty years the inferiority it forced us to accept, we should be strong enough to defy an unjust measure of any power in the world.

Treaty ac-
cepted with
Amend-
ments.

An interesting question now arose. The treaty provided for some modifications of the laws and for the appropriation of money to execute it. But this required the consent of congress, and thus the whole matter was debated in both houses in the year 1796. Here conservatism again won, and it was ordered that the treaty be executed. The action in this case became a precedent in making later treaties. The long struggle over the question, culminating in the vehement debate in congress in 1796, served to harden the lines of the two parties, and their strength is seen in the votes; in the senate the resolution to execute the treaty passed without serious opposition, but in the house the vote was 51 to 48, and a resolution declaring it highly objectionable was only defeated by the deciding vote of the speaker.

Execution of
the Treaty.

When this vote was taken, the country was already thinking of a new presidential election. Washington let it be known that he would not be a candidate, and the federalists turned to Adams. He was their strongest available man; but he was tactless, though honest and experienced in public affairs. He was so independent that he would not follow the lead of Hamilton, who had formed a dislike for him, and who now sought to defeat him by an unworthy scheme. He had Thomas Pinckney, of South Carolina, brought forward for vice-president. Both men, he thought, would have equal votes in the choice of electors, but at the last moment he

Election of
1796.

would have some of the electors go for a third candidate instead of voting for Adams, who thus having the second highest vote would be vice-president, while Pinckney, whom Hamilton could probably influence, would be president. The republicans united on Jefferson, their best man. In the final vote some of the electors who were friendly to Adams refused to support Pinckney, lest Hamilton's scheme should succeed; and the result was that 71 men voted for Adams, 68 for Jefferson, 59 for Pinckney, and 78 were divided among ten other candidates. Each elector, it will be remembered, voted for two men. Adams thus became president and Jefferson vice-president. As Adams had only one more vote than a majority of the electors, he was dubbed by his opponents "a president by one vote," an epithet which greatly annoyed his sensitive soul.

Washington, thinking chiefly of his retirement, took little interest in the election. His last care was to prepare his celebrated "Farewell Address," in which he gave much good advice on the problems of the day. As these problems were necessarily related to the policies over which the parties were divided and as his federalist leaning appeared in his advice, the

Washington's Retirement.

"Address" was received with coolness by the republicans. He had become very unpopular with that party, and some of its leading men and newspapers rejoiced openly that he was going out of office. As the passions of the moment subsided, he recovered the popularity to which his character entitled him, and the next generation came to look on the "Farewell Address" as a priceless political heritage. Among other things, it counseled his fellow citizens to be loyal to the union, to cultivate harmony at home, and to shun entanglement with European policies. His administration was most important, because his great name had been able to hold in abeyance through the first eight years of the national government the inevitable wrangling of

His Best Service.

parties, thereby giving an opportunity to launch the government on a safe and enlightened plan. That critical early period safely past, it was not dangerous for party leaders to battle for their views, a necessary feature of all republican government.

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CHAPTER XIII

ADAMS AND THE DOWNFALL OF THE FEDERALISTS

THE POLITICAL CHARACTER OF THE ADMINISTRATION

JOHN ADAMS began his presidency with a divided party. On one side were his own friends, neither numerous nor well organized; on the other were Hamilton and his supporters, probably two-thirds of the federalists and not inclined to submit to the leadership of the other third. Adams retained Washington's cabinet, which supported Hamilton in all party matters, so that the president came at last to realize that he was not head of his own administration. The internal conflict which thus arose weakened the federalist organization and contributed to its overthrow. Adams regretted the situation; for he was peculiarly desirous of having a harmonious administration. When at last he found his cabinet in practical rebellion, he reorganized it, casting out the extremists and calling in moderate federalists, the chief of whom was Marshall of Virginia. But this occurred too late to avert party defeat.

Adams's first action as president was an attempt to reunite the two political parties. He had been widely accused of favoring a form of monarchy; but in his inaugural address he sought to overcome this view by announcing his confidence in the constitution. The republicans openly expressed their satisfaction. He also proposed to appoint either Jefferson or Madison minister to France, but the offer was declined by both gentlemen. When the Hamilton faction heard of these negotiations, they objected flatly, and there was no more talk of reconciliation. The negotiations had, no doubt, been encouraged by the wily Jefferson, with the object of widening the breach between the federalist factions.

Party rancor now became worse than ever. For Washington even his enemies had a respect which moderated the jibes of the bitterest foe. For Adams there was no such regard. He was pitilessly painted as a monarchist, a tyrant, and a selfish manipulator of patronage. Yet no president strove harder to carry on the government in the spirit of its founders. It was the youth of political discussion in America, and editors and pamphleteers on both sides fought relentlessly for their principles. In France opponents of republicanism had recently gone to the guillotine in shoals; in England defenders of republicanism had been im-

prisoned or forced to flee the country; it was, probably, as much as could be expected that in our own newly established republic the only violence that occurred was in the exchange of epithets.

It was, also, inevitable that in such a discussion should appear the sharpest division between the British and French sympathizers. Republicans, in defending France, expressed their loyalty to popular government; federalists, in favoring the British constitution, expressed their approval of government by the conservative upper classes of society, which implied a distrust of the rule of all the people. To the former the triumph of the Jay treaty seemed to show that British influence was alive in the country; to the latter the ill-concealed attempts of the French ministers in Philadelphia to direct American politics seemed convincing evidence that the court in Paris worked in behalf of the republican party throughout the union.

**Foreign
Politics In-
volved.**

Unfortunately, the latter contention was true, as events connected with the dismissal of Monroe, late in Washington's second term, made clear. This ardent republican was sent to Paris in 1794 to succeed Gouverneur Morris, whose monarchism made him unacceptable to the French republic. He arrived in August, when no other state, except the small republic of Geneva, had sent a minister to the new government. The Convention then ruled France, and so busy was it with its own struggle for existence that no arrangements had been made to receive foreign ministers. Monroe, not to be thwarted by this fact, made arrangements to be received by the Convention itself. He was accordingly admitted to an open session of that body, where amid the applause of the members he exchanged embraces with the president of the Convention and presented a glowing address, pledging the coöperation in behalf of liberty of the two great republics, the one in the Old, and the other in the New, World. This display of fervor, occasioned protest in England, where Jay was negotiating his treaty; and the federalist administration of Washington sent a reproof to the enthusiastic Monroe.

**Monroe's
Mission.**

Meanwhile, France was concerned at rumors of a treaty of amity between the United States and England, but Monroe, relying on assurances from superiors, assured her that nothing would be accepted in the proposed agreement prejudicial to the interests of our oldest friend among nations. When the treaty was made, however, it was evident that it did weaken that preferential relation which the treaties of 1778 gave to France (see page 201); and the government in Paris felt that it had been deceived. Monroe himself was deeply chagrined, and neglected to defend the Jay treaty in Paris, as he was instructed to do by Pickering, then secretary of state. More than six months had passed in this way when he learned that the ministry was about to send an envoy to America to make a new treaty. Believing that such an attempt would result in

**His Position
in Paris.**

failure, and peaceful relations would therefore be imperiled, he induced the ministry to delay their project. He was suspected of holding out to them the prospect of a republican victory in the coming presidential elections, then only nine months distant. As the campaign opened, he was known to be sending information to republicans at home, which was used to convince the voters that the federalist administration was about to plunge the nation into war with France.

Washington considered this action a breach of trust, and
His Recall. ordered Monroe's immediate recall. The affair caused much comment, the republicans defending and the federalists condemning the dismissed minister.

Monroe returned anxious for vindication, and took two ways of getting even. He prepared a long defense and published it in 1797,

endeavoring to show that he had been badly treated by
His Pickering and Hamilton, the chief authors of federalist
Revenge. policy. It was a piece of specious pleading, but it satisfied the republicans and served to bring French affairs sharply to the front in the political arena.

His other stroke was at Hamilton particularly. Some years earlier that gentleman was the subject of an investigation to meet the charge of misusing public money while secretary of the treasury. The committee of inquiry, consisting of Monroe and two others, pronounced him innocent, but did not publish the evidence. In fact, Hamilton had proved his innocence only by admitting that the charges grew out of an illicit relation with the wife of the worthless man who preferred the charges, and this evidence the committee agreed to conceal. Soon after Monroe's return it was given

to the public in such a distorted form that Hamilton felt
Hamilton's impelled to confess the whole matter in a published state-
Ignominy. ment. The two other committeemen showed that they had not disclosed the affair, and posterity has concluded that the revelation was made by Monroe. It left a smirch on Hamilton's reputation, which is not removed by the admiration we are compelled to feel for his courageous explanation of it.

THE QUARREL WITH FRANCE

When Charles C. Pinckney, who succeeded Monroe at Paris, arrived at his post of duty, he found the government in a resentful mood. He

sent his credentials to the Directory, now the head of the
Pinckney government, only to be informed that France would not
Rejected. receive an American minister until her grievances were redressed. A law of the republic, passed when most strangers were held to be spies, forbade foreigners to remain in France without written permission. Pinckney asked for such permission, but received no reply. He disregarded an intimation that a further stay made him liable to arrest, because he wished the responsibility for his departure,

if he must go, to rest clearly with the government. After two months of delay he received an official notice that he was liable to arrest, whereupon he asked for his passports and shook the dust of France off his feet in February, 1797. His rude reception was thrown into bolder relief by the evidence of good will which the Directory showered on Monroe, when he took his departure about the same time.

When Pinckney's humiliating treatment was known in America, there was a violent outbreak of feeling, and many expressions of hostility were heard; for the people are ever ready to resent an insult to the national dignity. Among the politicians the extreme federalists wished to suspend relations with France, and if reprisals occurred, which would lead to war, they would be all the better pleased. They were led by Pickering and Wolcott, in the cabinet, and by Harper and William Smith, in congress. The republicans could not defend the action of France, but declared that it only indicated the mismanagement of the federalist party. Between these two views was a middle ground taken by moderate men, who defended the national honor, but were willing to try other diplomatic efforts while preparations for war went on. Of this opinion was President Adams, who in all the clamor of the day did not lose his poise. Hamilton, not willing to sacrifice country to party, took the same ground, although in doing so he failed to act with the faction which generally supported him. The upshot was that Adams nominated Charles C. Pinckney, John Marshall, and Francis Dana commissioners to try to adjust the existing difficulty with France. The republicans supported the nominations which were confirmed. But Dana refused to serve, and Adams, returning to a favorite idea, nominated Gerry, a Massachusetts republican, in his stead. He thought the presence of a republican on the commission would tend to conciliate the Directory.

Clamor for
Redress.

Commis-
sioners sent
to France.

Steps were also taken to put the nation in a state of defense. Three years earlier, congress had ordered the construction of six frigates, three of which were actually begun, but were still unfinished through lack of funds. They were now ordered completed. They were the *United States* and the *Constitution*, of 44 guns each, and the *Constellation*, of 36 guns, the first ships of our navy under the constitution. They were heavily armed for their size, and foreign naval officers predicted they could not be managed safely in battle,—an expectation which later events did not justify. Other measures of defense were a law authorizing the president to call out 80,000 militia when needed and a law to strengthen the fortifications.

Prepara-
tions for
War.

By this time serious grounds for trouble had arisen in connection with our trade at sea. When, four years earlier, England began to seize our ships carrying French goods, France retaliated by ordering her

naval officers to seize neutral ships which recognized England's pretensions. If we allowed England's claim that provisions were contraband, contraband they were; and on that ground France would seize them when they were bound for British ports. Between the pretensions of the two great powers it was impossible for a nation which had no navy to maintain a position of strict neutrality. It was equally difficult for it to retaliate, unless it was willing to join one of the nations in war against the other. For such action we were not ready, and the best we could do was to endure our wrongs and hope to get reparation for losses after peace returned in Europe. Neither America nor Europe could foresee that the war then waged was to continue without considerable interruption until 1815. As time passed, many cases of seizure occurred, and there was now danger that American shipowners, already aroused against France, would by some act of reprisal provoke such severe individual conflicts that it would be impossible longer to restrain the war feeling on the part of our people. Adams, therefore, issued an order forbidding merchant ships to go armed, and congress passed a law prohibiting privateering against a nation with which we were at peace. By such means it was hoped to preserve peace until the commissioners to France could make a settlement of the existing quarrel.

Arrived in Paris, Pinckney, Marshall, and Gerry began to negotiate in October, 1797. To their surprise they made not a step of progress. Talleyrand was head of foreign affairs, and the Directory was corrupt to the core. They had taken an overbearing attitude toward small European states, each of which had some selfish end to advance, and were collecting bribes from them before they would allow any arrangements to be made. What they did so freely with such states, they were now determined to do with the United States. While our commissioners waited for their business to be taken up, they were visited by agents, designated in the published reports of the commissioners as X, Y, and Z, who suggested that progress would be made if the minister were given \$250,000. To this suggestion, several times repeated, the commissioners opposed a steadfast negative. Then they refused to see the agents, but prepared a statement of the American case and sent it to Talleyrand. His reply, delayed two months, was insulting. He accused the United States of prolonging the misunderstanding for their own benefit, asked why three republican commissioners were not sent, and closed by saying that he would treat with Gerry alone. To this coarse message a dignified reply was made, and the commissioners prepared to withdraw. Ere they went, Gerry was invited by Talleyrand to remain and continue communication with the ministry. He hesitated a moment and then accepted, declaring that he did so only as a private citizen and in the hope that he might be

French Restrictions on American Trade.

X, Y, and Z.

Gerry's Conduct.

able to prevent war. His action was ill advised. It produced resentment at home, and Adams summoned him to return instantly.

April 3, 1798, the "X, Y, Z papers," as the correspondence of the commissioners was called, was sent to congress by the president, who declared: "I will never send another minister to France without assurances that he will be received, respected, and honored as the representative of a free, powerful, and independent nation." The moderate federalists now joined the extremists, and many acts were passed looking to war. By one of them a navy department was created, by another three new frigates and thirty smaller vessels were ordered, by another the navy was authorized to take French ships interfering with our commerce, and by still another the treaties of 1778 were repealed. Another law authorized an army of 10,000 men to serve for three years. All this fell short of a declaration of war, and to that extent the extreme federalists were disappointed. From this time Hamilton was for war.

An Outburst
of Indigna-
tion.

The few ships in the navy were quickly in West Indian waters, fourteen men-of-war and eight converted merchantmen. There the *Constellation* fell in with *L'Insurgent*, whose commander had seized many of our merchant vessels and was much hated in America. An hour's chase followed, the Frenchman trying to avoid conflict, as he was instructed to do by his superiors. At last he was overhauled, and a spirited action of an hour and a quarter forced him to surrender. As the angry French captain came aboard the *Constellation*, he exclaimed: "Why have you fired on the national flag? Our two nations are at peace." The reply of the American captain, Truxtun, was laconic: "You are my prisoner." The victory aroused great enthusiasm in America. A short time later Truxtun met and fought a drawn battle with the French ship *La Vengeance*, and many other smaller engagements followed. In two years and a half our ships had taken 84 French ships, mostly privateers. The result was a lessening of the number of seizures and added prestige for the navy. This period of retaliation has been called a war with France, but no state of war was recognized by the two governments.

Sea Fights.

Meanwhile, the organization of the new army was begun. Washington was appointed its commander and accepted, on condition that he should name the chief subordinates. He sent three names to Adams, — Hamilton, Charles C. Pinckney, and Knox. Confirmed in this order, the first would rank next to Washington. Adams remembered old scores and ordered that they should rank according to their station in the old army, — Knox, Pinckney, and Hamilton. Now the last named was a good military man, and Washington wanted him first among the three. Since the head of the army was too old to take the field, it meant that Hamilton would conduct the field movements. A strong controversy arose between the friends of Knox and Hamilton. Adams decided at first for Knox,

The New
Army.

but when Washington made a vigorous protest, the president dared not ignore it, and Hamilton received the coveted station. He had retired from civil life, but he loved the soldier's career, and as the federalists meant to make the augmented army a permanent thing, the appointment was very attractive to him. He had much influence with Washington, and used it freely to get that final intervention which forced Adams to change the order of nominations. Adams did not relish the way he was treated; he felt that he was hardly commander-in-chief of the army, as the constitution provided; but he was not willing to withstand the will of Washington.

Hamilton's success did him no good. Recruiting went on so slowly that 1799 was well advanced before a fair beginning was made. By this time enthusiasm was waning, and the newly-formed camps became scenes of discontent and disorder. The republicans denounced the whole affair as ill advised. They divined their enemy's purpose to have a permanent establishment, and pointed out the tendency to militarism. This new army became an important argument in the campaign of 1800.

In fact, a little reflection showed that war was unnecessary. France did not wish it, or she would have resented our attacks on her men-of-war. To have asked our commissioners for a bribe was discreditable to her, but we need not fight on account of it. Many people saw this, Adams among them, and he decided to secure a restoration of harmony, if it could be done with dignity. The proper occasion offered when in October, 1798, Murray, our minister at The Hague, wrote that he was assured from Talleyrand that a minister would now be received. Adams wished to send one, but his cabinet, led by the factious Pickering, opposed. As the winter passed, he realized that the extremists were bent on bringing on war for their own ends, and determined to take affairs into his own hands.

Without warning, he nominated Murray minister to France, and the senate received the news in disgust. Hamilton, disappointed, declared nothing better could be expected from Adams, and the other extremists raged inwardly. But they could not resist, and accepted the suggestion after substituting three commissioners for the one minister proposed. The result was an acceptable treaty, made in 1800, which settled for a time the chief points of controversy between the two nations. Napoleon was now in control in France. Occupied with vast plans in Europe, he wisely gave up the policy pursued by the directory of nursing American politics in the hope that a republican triumph on this side of the water would promote French interests.

OVERCONFIDENCE OF THE FEDERALISTS

Adams's attitude toward France has the approval of posterity. Unfortunately, his political principles were as narrow as those of other federalists. Like the rest of his party, he wished to enforce respect for public officials, and he resented the vast amount of abuse which came from the republican editors and writers. As many of these men were of foreign birth, some of them fugitives from their own countries, he felt that they ought to be restrained. Their activity during the year war was imminent with France was the basis of a charge that they were French spies; and on that basis it was easy to conclude they should be sent out of the country. From this conviction proceeded four laws of congress passed with the support of extreme and moderate federalists.

Adams's
Political
Views.

The first related to naturalization. A law of 1795 made five years of residence necessary for naturalization. To most federalists this seemed too short, and many would have withheld the right entirely. But the words of the constitution seemed to imply that naturalization should not be denied, and it was at last agreed to require fourteen years' residence, with the provision that naturalized persons must have declared their intentions five years before the right could be operative. The law was resented by the republicans, and the provisions of 1795 were restored by a law enacted by them in 1802.

Naturaliza-
tion Act.

The second law dealt with aliens in times of peace. It gave the president the power to order out of the country any alien whom he thought dangerous to the welfare of the country. If he were not obeyed, he might order the person concerned to be imprisoned for three years, and if such a person should return after going away, imprisonment might be inflicted at the will of the president. This act was to continue two years.

The Alien
Laws.

The third act concerned aliens in time of war. They might be ordered out of the country or imprisoned as long as the president chose. The act was limited to the duration of a war. The republicans deplored loudly the fate of the "poor aliens," whose safety was thus put at the disposal of the president. In time of war or an invasion he was to have the power to issue a proclamation declaring what classes of aliens should be allowed to remain in the United States, and the federal courts were to see that it was not defied. Many Frenchmen left the country when the law was about to pass, which is probably all it was expected to accomplish. No attempt was made to apply either alien law to those who remained.

The fourth act dealt with American citizens, who denounced the administration or upheld France. It made it a high misdemeanor

“unlawfully to combine” against the legal measures of the government, to impede any officer in the execution of his duty, or to attempt to form any conspiracy, insurrection, or unlawful assembly against the administration. The penalty was to be imprisonment not more than five years and a fine of not more than \$5000. It also made it a misdemeanor to issue a false or malicious writing against the president or congress in order to stir up hatred against them. For this offense the defendant, on conviction, was to be fined not more than \$2000 and imprisoned not longer than two years. With some difficulty the republicans and moderates introduced into the law a clause allowing the accused to prove the truth of his assertion. The first of these four acts was passed June 18, the last on July 14, 1798.

Many persons were indicted under the sedition act: only ten were brought to trial, and all of these were convicted. The most notable case was that of Dr. Thomas Cooper, then an editor in Pennsylvania. He was arrested for saying that President Adams was incompetent and had, as president, interfered to influence the course of justice. In our day we should hardly notice such a charge, so freely is the conduct of even the highest official held up to ridicule and condemnation. He was tried before Chase, a federal judge, who displayed, as in all such cases, the greatest amount of partisanship. Cooper offered to prove the truth of the charge by summoning Adams and some members of congress as witnesses; but they refused to attend. In default of such evidence he was convicted, fined \$400, and sent to prison for six months. Adams was willing to pardon him, but the prisoner refused to petition for pardon unless the president acknowledged wrongdoing in giving out a letter Cooper had written him. The president would make no such acknowledgement, and the sentence was not remitted.

Every man convicted became a martyr to free speech, in the eyes of the republicans. The issue came up in the election of 1800 and had great weight in convincing the voters that the federalists were drunk with power. All these repressive laws were, in fact, ill-advised. They rested on the theory that the people should not be free to discuss, as they chose, the actions of their rulers. European governments, as Chase pointed out in the case of Dr. Cooper, exercised the right to punish libel; but the European governments were not republican. Punishing a citizen for political utterances is a bad policy in a government resting on popular suffrage.

The republicans believed the alien and sedition acts an invasion of the personal rights which, as they held, were properly within the sphere of action by the states. They also decried the creation of an army under the control of the aggressive Hamilton. It seemed to them that by a system of loose construction the federalists would concentrate the powers of government in the hands of president, congress, and the

federal courts, and reduce to a much lower rank the authority of the states, to which the republicans looked as the guarantee of the rights of the individual. The federalists, as in 1787, replied that the rights of the individual would be as safe at the hands of the general government as at the hands of the states. The reply did not satisfy the republicans, who demanded a strict interpretation of the constitution. Some of them despaired of checking the plans of their opponents, and, recurring to an idea entertained by some of the representatives of the large states in the convention of 1787, proposed to Jefferson to begin agitation for the secession of Virginia and North Carolina, in order to establish a great Southern republic into which the power of the trading states of the North would not enter. Such a movement would almost surely have the support of Kentucky and Tennessee; Georgia would probably support it with her control of the great unsettled Gulf region; and it was hardly to be doubted that it would eventually carry with it the state of South Carolina, in which the federalist families of the seacoast held only temporary supremacy. The whole region was more than half of the national domain, giving to the North all the vast unsettled Northwest. It had, however, only 40 per cent of the entire population, and its political strength was still less proportionally through the provision that only three-fifths of its slaves counted in representation.

These suggestions were rejected by Jefferson. We ought not, he said, to become discouraged because of the triumph of opponents, but endeavor to overcome it by political means. Then he unfolded his plan. Believing that all the states had the same interest in protecting their authority, he would unite them in a crusade against national concentration. He secured the coöperation of Madison, and each wrote resolutions condemning the recent enactments of the federalist congress and pointing out in what ways the rights of the states were threatened. Madison's resolutions were adopted by the Virginia assembly. Jefferson's were intended for North Carolina, but the elections of 1798 in that state showed federalist gains in the legislature, and he would not send them thither for adoption. They were placed in the hands of friends in Kentucky, where republicanism was strong, and passed the legislature of that state by a large majority.

**Jefferson's
Plan.**

The purport of each set of resolutions was the same, although the Kentucky resolutions used language more explicit and emphatic. Both sought to find in the states a power to stay the general government in its assumption that it could interpret the constitution. Suppose a controversy exists as to whether the union or the state should exercise a certain power, who shall determine it? The federalists asserted that the supreme court had the decision. They stood by the idea that the constitution was made by the people and that the national authority rested on popular con-

**The Com-
pact Theory.**

sent as truly as the state authority. Jefferson and Madison declared that the states founded the national government by making a compact whose terms were expressed in the constitution and that it was for the states, the creators, to determine when the compact was broken. Both sets of resolutions declared that the alien and sedition acts, and some other recent legislation of congress, violated the constitution, and called on the states for coöperation in preventing their execution.

By what means should the state's veto be given? Virginia was discreetly general on the point. If ungranted power was exercised, said she, the states could and should "interpose for arresting the progress of the evil, and for maintaining within their respective limits the authorities, rights, and liberties appertaining to them." Interposition by the states might be construed as calling a convention to amend the constitution, as provided in the constitution. But Kentucky was more explicit. The states, said her resolutions, founded the union for specific purposes and gave it expressed powers, reserving all authority to themselves which they did not grant to the union; an exercise of ungranted power was illegal; the union was not a judge of its own powers; and each party to the compact of the union is a judge of the terms of union, as in all cases of compact where there is no common judge. In accordance with this principle they declared the alien and sedition acts and certain other laws of congress "void and of no force."

In the hot debates of the convention of 1787 nothing was said directly about the compact theory. Virginia and most of the South then stood for a national government on a popular basis, evidently thinking their greater size would enable them to control it. Except for equal representation in the senate and the tenth amendment reserving to the states all powers not granted to the national government, there was no specific limitation of nationality in the constitution. If the convention had held so important a view, it can hardly be doubted that it would have defined it. Neither Jefferson nor Madison, in fact, claimed that words in the constitution, except the tenth amendment, supported the compact theory. It was a deduction from extra-constitutional sources. No government with a due respect for its own authority will accept in practical matters a principle so purely speculative.

Both Jefferson and Madison were experienced politicians. They did not expect the federal government to accept their view and relinquish its pretended authority. But they believed that state resolutions were powerful means of calling attention to the federalist tendency toward concentration. Although the two sets of resolutions were sent to the other states in the union, they did not expect them to be accepted by the federalist then generally dominant in the Northern legislatures. But they

**Means of
Correction.**

**Efficacy of
the Compact
Theory.**

**A Political
Measure.**

thought the attention of the voters would be called in the most striking way to an evil they believed to exist with good effect on succeeding elections. Madison asserted in his old age that the Kentucky and Virginia resolutions were planned for political effect. When the republicans came into control of the government two years later, they made no effort to amend the constitution in accordance with the compact theory.

All the states north of the Potomac, through their legislatures, made replies unfavorable to the resolutions, some of them expressed in terms hardly polite. None of the legislatures of states south of Virginia voted on them, probably because the republicans thought it wise to let well enough alone. When the Northern replies were received, Kentucky and Virginia passed resolutions reasserting the views in the first sets. In those now announced by Kentucky occurred the sentence: "A nullification, by those sovereignties, of all unauthorized acts done under color of that instrument, is the rightful remedy." This is the only appearance of the word "nullification" in any of the resolutions, but the essential idea is in the first set passed by Kentucky. Thirty years later it came up again in the Nullification movement in South Carolina, whose promoters thought that stressing the similarity of their doctrines with those of 1798 would draw Virginia to their side.

Attitude of
Other
States.

Relation to
Nullification.

OVERTHROW OF THE FEDERALISTS

The congressional elections of 1798 came while the country still looked for war with France, and the results favored the federalists. But that party was still divided into radicals and moderates, the former led by Pickering with the support of Hamilton, the latter led by Adams with the strong support of Marshall and a group of Southern federalists in the house. When the president threw over the war policy of his party in the spring of 1799 he had the support of the moderates, and the extremists lost a valuable political issue. They expressed their contempt for Adams openly, which only divided his party more than ever. The split became more evident when Adams, in 1800, dismissed Pickering and forced McHenry to withdraw from the cabinet because they refused to carry out his policy with regard to making a treaty with France. He retained Wolcott, equally guilty with the men dismissed, because he did not know the extent of Wolcott's treachery. In Pickering's post he placed Marshall, who was not popular in the North, and the dispossessed faction began to plot to defeat the reelection of a president who showed them so much hostility. As it was evident that the federalists would take Adams for their candidate in 1800, this dissention augured little for party success.

Federalists
Divided.

Meanwhile, the republicans were united for Jefferson. The Virginia and Kentucky resolutions gave them a strong principle on which

**Republicans
United.**

to appeal to the voters, and they strengthened their position by criticizing the administration at every possible point. Preparations for war had involved heavy expenses, the national debt had grown during the eleven years of federalist control, and this gave ground for charging the party with extravagance. The evident desire of Hamilton to make the new army permanent induced the charge that he leaned toward militarism. In March, 1800, congress ordered the dismissal of the new army, and this was a blow at the extreme federalists. The assertion of the right to impress

**Their
Principles.**

American sailors aroused great feeling against England, which reacted against the party which had usually stood by that country. Beneath all the arguments drawn from these and other sources was the continual assertion that the federalists stood for the rule of a selfish upper class, dominated by the capitalists, while the republicans represented the mass of the people. The assertion was generally true. The federalists had ignored the popular nature of American government, and Jefferson at last had organized the great mass of farmers and working people in a party which would correct recent tendencies toward class domination. It was the first of several great periodic popular upheavals by which the people have shown that they mean the government to rest on the will of all the people.

In this campaign the nominating caucus was fully developed. In 1796 republican and federalist senators and representatives, acting

The Caucus.

for their respective parties, held conferences and recommended presidential candidates to the people. But their action was not accepted as binding the party leaders; for although the electors generally favored the caucus candidate for president there was much scattering in the vote for vice-president. Early in 1800 caucuses were again held. Adams was recommended by the federalists, and his friends insisted that the entire party was bound to support him. When Hamilton and his faction showed a contrary purpose they were pronounced party traitors. The republicans had their own internal jealousies. Virginia expected to carry most of the South for Jefferson, but she needed the support of a strong Northern state, for which purpose New York seemed best suited. Clinton, of that state, did not like the Virginia leadership, as was shown in the convention of 1787; but at this time he was held in check in New York by Aaron Burr, able, but distrusted by many men. Burr was willing to make alliance with Virginia, and in 1796 he was supported as the regular candidate for vice-president. But in that year he received only 30 votes to Jefferson's 68, and only one of the thirty was from Virginia. He felt he was badly dealt with, and in 1800 demanded assurances that he would be supported equally with Jefferson. His terms were

accepted by the caucus and by the party; and for many years thereafter the decision of the caucus was considered binding on the party.

In the autumn of 1800 the differences between Adams and Hamilton precipitated a disastrous factional fight. Adams, frank by nature, expressed himself freely about the opposition of the adverse faction. As several members of the group lived in Essex county, Massachusetts, he dubbed them the "Essex Junto." Hamilton was stung to the quick. He thought his own position in the party threatened, and wrote a pamphlet for secret circulation among the federalists, in which he declared that his friends did not constitute a British faction, as charged by Adams. Had he stopped there the result would not have been bad; but he went on to attack Adams, recognized party leader, and the gleeful approbation of his friends shows that they thought the best part of the affair would be the destruction of the president. The pamphlet fell into the hands of the republicans, who republished it with exaggerations, and thus forced the author to issue an authentic copy. Then the world believed that Hamilton had violated his party allegiance. There followed a reaction more damaging to Hamilton personally than to his opponent. Each man had his followers, and they became so embittered toward one another that party success was impossible.

Hamilton's
Intrigue
against
Adams.

While the country was still talking about this incident, the election was held. Adams got all the votes from New England, 39 in number, 10 from New Jersey and Delaware, 7 of Pennsylvania's 15, as well as 5 of Maryland's 10, and 4 of North Carolina's 12 — in all, 65. One elector in Rhode Island, fearing treachery on the part of the extremists, voted for Adams and Jay, so that Pinckney, running with Adams, had only 64 votes. Jefferson had all the other votes, a total of 73. Burr, who ran with him, had the same number, and as neither had the highest number of votes cast, there was no election, and the house of representatives must select a president, the delegation of each state having one vote.

The Vote
for Presi-
dent, 1800.

The republicans had a majority of the electoral college, and the people had voted with the intention of making Jefferson president and Burr vice-president. Would the house execute the popular will, or would it act on its own judgment? The federalists were of the latter opinion, and made a plan to carry their own states for Burr with a hope of bringing him into the presidency while Jefferson got the second place. In a caucus of their party they carried through their plan. Burr protested against it, but in such weak tones that it was thought that he was privy to the scheme. It is hardly probable that the federalists would have supported him without some kind of promise in their behalf, though this does not mean that Burr meant to keep such a promise once he was president. When the house came to act, Jefferson

Decided in
the House,
1801.

had eight of the sixteen states and Burr had six, two being divided. Then Hamilton showed that moral quality which raised him in great crises above party. He disliked Jefferson, but believed him better than Burr, whom he well knew to be faithless to promises. Through his efforts the federalist representatives from Vermont, Delaware, and Maryland were induced to refrain from voting, and on the thirty-sixth ballot, February 17, 1801, Jefferson received the votes of ten states and was declared president-elect. Burr never forgave Hamilton his part in the election and, although vice-president, was thenceforth an ill-disposed partner in the republican administration. This situation, which caused so much anxiety at the time, was responsible for the adoption of the twelfth amendment, 1804, by which electors voted specifically for president and vice-president.

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CHAPTER XIV

INTERNAL HISTORY AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS UNDER JEFFERSON AND MADISON

REPUBLICAN REFORMS

FROM the beginning of his administration Jefferson rejected the ceremonials which his party had denounced, and which the federalists defended on the ground that they created respect for the government. The carriage of state with six horses was discarded, and he rode horseback and unattended through the streets of the capital, like any other well-mounted citizen. The formal weekly receptions became levees to which any citizens who chose might come unannounced. The annual speeches to congress, which reminded the republicans too pointedly of the king's speech to parliament, became written annual messages, reports of the executive on the state of the nation. Federalists ridiculed these changes, but the people were pleased.

Democratic
Simplicity.

The inauguration was equally simple. Jefferson came to Washington as a private citizen, lodged at a tavern, and just before noon on March 4 walked up Capitol Hill, accompanied by a group of friends, to take the oath of office administered by John Marshall, a strong and determined federalist, whom Adams a few weeks earlier had appointed chief justice. His inaugural address has long been considered a great state paper. Good citizens, he said in effect, must recognize the right of the majority to rule, but the majority must not oppress the minority. It was time to lay aside the bitterness of controversy and to remember that political intolerance was as bad as religious intolerance. Differences of opinion are natural, but federalists and republicans are alike Americans and should unite to preserve the union and representative government. He pleaded in noble language for peace, coöperation in developing the resources of a great country, and patriotism and good will in realizing the blessings of liberty. These words were calculated to pacify the fears that the republicans would overthrow the foundations of society, so sedulously aroused by the federalists in the late campaign. It was Jefferson's dearest wish to conciliate his enemies, especially those in the North, who had been led to believe him an atheist and something of an anarchist.

The In-
auguration.

Conciliation.

He announced his principles in terms his followers never forgot. He wished to see, he said, "a wise and frugal government, which shall restrain men from injuring one another, shall leave them otherwise free to regulate their own pursuits of industry and improvement, and shall not take from the mouth of labor the bread it has earned." He enumerated many means of achieving these ends, among them "equal and exact justice to all men," "honest friendship with all nations, entangling alliance with none," the preservation of the rights of the states as the best guardians of domestic concerns, the support of the union "in its whole constitutional vigor," "the supremacy of the civil over the military authority," the rights of popular election as the only arbiter short of revolution, the sufficiency of a well-established militia, payment of the national debt, and economy in public expenditures. So deeply did these principles sink into the minds of the people at large that no later party or candidate has dared to repudiate them.

The new cabinet was wisely chosen. Madison became secretary of state, Albert Gallatin, the best financier in the party, became secretary of the treasury, General Dearborn, of Massachusetts, was secretary of war, Levi Lincoln, of the same state, attorney-general, and Robert Smith, of Maryland, secretary of the navy. The postmaster-general, Gideon Granger, of Connecticut, was not then in the cabinet, but the post was important because of the many subordinates. Assigning three of these places to New England shows how much it was desired to conciliate the people of that section. Dearborn and Smith were not strong men, but Jefferson did not propose to make much use of army or navy.

In their day of power the federalists were very bitter toward the republicans. They called them "the rabble," filled the offices with their own partisans, appointed only their friends to the federal judgeships, and in February, 1801, created a number of new courts, spending their last moments of power in filling them with their own followers. Their opponents were naturally exasperated, and came into office eager for spoils. Jefferson wisely withstood the demand; for he saw that the thing for his party to do was to dispel the charge that it would overthrow the established order. He refused to remove officials unless it was shown that they were guilty of misconduct or of partisanship. He was thus able to prevent wholesale removals, which disappointed some of his hungry supporters. He refused to deliver commissions for the "midnight appointments," that is, the court officials under the act of February, 1801, which Adams had signed but left undelivered in the executive offices. At his suggestion congress repealed this act in 1802. On the other hand, Jefferson appointed his own followers, saying when as many republicans were in office as federalists he would continue the parity.

Political Principles.

The Cabinet.

Appointments to Office.

Next, he turned to the national debt, which under the federalists had grown from \$77,500,000 to \$80,000,000. Jefferson was pledged to reduce it and gave Gallatin a free hand. That careful financier examined his resources and concluded that the debt could be paid in sixteen years. The revenue then yielded \$10,600,000 a year, of which \$4,500,000 went for interest, \$5,500,000 for army and navy, and the rest for general expenses. Gallatin proposed to pay \$7,300,000 a year for interest and to curtail the debt, and as the ordinary expenses could not well be lessened he would effect most of the saving by reducing the army and navy. At the outset he encountered a difficulty in the loss of \$650,000 of the revenue, because the republicans were pledged to abolish internal revenue duties. Thus it happened that he had but \$2,650,000 for the support of army, navy, and the civil establishment. This sum he divided with the greatest care. To the army he allowed \$930,000, to the navy \$670,000, which left \$1,050,000 for ordinary expenses. This made it necessary to reduce the army to a mere handful and to tie up in the dockyards most of the ships of the navy. Jefferson was pleased. He did not like a standing army, and considered a navy a useless toy which, as he said, might well be assembled in the eastern branch of the Potomac, where the ships "would require but one set of plunderers to take care of them." Many congressmen winced under Gallatin's economy; but he was inexorable, Jefferson supported him, and the plan was adopted.

Gallatin's
Financial
Policy.

Jefferson
and the
Navy.

The result justified Gallatin's hopes. At the end of a year the revenue was nearly \$3,000,000 more than he had expected, which gave him a comfortable surplus. In 1803 we purchased Louisiana, paying \$11,250,000 in bonds and \$4,000,000 for claims (see page 299). Gallatin announced that he could pay the latter out of the surplus and that the new bonds would postpone the payment of the debt only eighteen months. In 1804 congress ordered the construction of a frigate to replace the *Philadelphia*, lost at Tripoli (see page 296), and all eyes turned to Gallatin for the money. He would not take from the funds set aside for the debt, and congress had to lay a special duty, the "Mediterranean Fund." In 1805 the revenues rose to \$14,000,000, and in 1806 to \$14,500,000, yielding a surplus of \$6,000,000. Many congressmen thought the time for economy was now past, but Gallatin and Jefferson urged patience, promising if the policy of economy were followed for two years longer there would be an ample reserve and at least \$5,000,000 for such uses as congress might deem fit. 1807 was another fat year, and the surplus was now \$7,600,000, and the debt, including the bonds paid for Louisiana, had been reduced from \$92,000,000 to \$69,500,000. In 1808 the embargo was in force, revenues fell off, and this splendid progress was halted.

Gallatin's
Achieve-
ment.

Gallatin's financial policy pleased the mass of thrifty people. It was that of the careful husbandman, who, finding himself overwhelmed with debt, sets aside from his annual income a sum necessary to liquidate his obligations within a reasonable time and rigidly reduces expenditures accordingly. It looked to the ultimate extinction of the debt, on the principle that freedom from debt is as good for a nation as for an individual. In contrast with it was the policy of Hamilton, who thought little of paying the debt and much of making the nation strong enough to weather financial storms. He would have a navy to protect commerce, which would increase the revenues, manufactures to build up the industrial efficiency of the country, and a strong capitalist class to promote the development of the nation's resources. He looked farther into the future than Gallatin, but he did not appreciate so well the desires of the average citizen.

**Gallatin and
Hamilton
Contrasted.**

Jefferson's first term saw a remarkable and probably an unexpected development of the power of the federal courts. Asserting the right to interpret the constitution, they began to declare null laws both of congress and the state legislatures (see page 357). (As the judges were federalists, it seemed that the opposition, ensconced in this seat of power, were defeating the will of the people expressed in the elections.) The case seemed more difficult, because the constitution afforded no other way of removing a judge than impeachment, which must be for "treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors." But if the senate, as a court of impeachment, chose to consider partisanship in a judge a misdemeanor, no power could gainsay them. So clear was this that the republicans determined to proceed, believing that if they established the principle that the senate could remove the judges, future partisanship in that quarter would be avoided.

**The Repub-
licans and
the Judi-
ciary.**

The first case was that of Pickering, judge of a district court in New Hampshire, a man whose inebriety had led to insanity. He was impeached and removed from office in 1803, and the people approved, although it seemed singular that insanity was pronounced a misdemeanor by the highest court in the land. Then the republicans turned to Judge Samuel Chase, of the supreme court. He was a violent partisan, as his conduct in the cases under the alien and sedition laws in 1800 showed. He expressed his views openly, and in 1803 declared to a federal grand jury in Baltimore that the republicans threatened the country with mob rule. At this the house impeached him, and the senate sat as a tribunal. John Randolph, an able but erratic Virginian, was chief prosecutor on behalf of the house. (He included so many charges besides partisanship that opinion rallied to Chase and the impeachment failed.) It was believed that a contrary verdict would have been followed by the impeachment of Marshall. As it was, the republican attack on the courts was checked, and the

chief justice remained in a position to exert a powerful influence upon the development of constitutional law.

THE WAR WITH TRIPOLI

For many years Morocco, Algiers, Tunis, and Tripoli laid tribute on trade in the Mediterranean, and the powers of Europe acquiesced. After the revolution our ships began, also, to be seized, and we were forced to buy treaties with handsome presents of arms and money. First and last we paid enough money in this way to build several excellent ships, but for all that the freebooters were not satisfied. In 1801 the pacha of Tripoli cut down the flagstaff of our consulate as a declaration of war, because Tunis received richer presents than Tripoli; and about the same time Algiers showed symptoms of ill will. Jefferson desired peace, because, like Washington in 1795, he felt we were not strong enough to make war on a great power. But this policy did not apply to Tripoli, and early in 1801 he sent Captain Dale with four ships, the *President*, *Philadelphia*, and *Essex*, frigates, and the *Enterprise*, a sloop of war, to teach the Barbary States to respect us.

Origin of
the War.

Dale could not attempt land operations, and when the Tripolitans collected an army and drew their navy up under the guns of their fortifications, he could only establish a blockade and cruise along the coast. Fortune, however, threw in his way an enemy's cruiser, which was quickly taken. Because congress had not declared war, Jefferson had not authorized captures, and the conquered ship, disarmed and dismantled, was allowed to escape to Tripoli, where her crew told such stories of American ferocity that the pacha's soldiers were filled with a respectful terror. In 1802 a second squadron went to the Mediterranean, but did nothing effective. These meager results disappointed the people at home, and the commander, Captain Morris, was dismissed the service. In 1803 a third commander of squadron went out, Captain Preble. With the aid of some small boats borrowed from the king of Sicily, who was also at war with the pacha, he conducted a bombardment of the city of Tripoli, but inflicted little damage. Preble remained in the Mediterranean during the winter, and showed a determination to isolate the enemy completely. In the spring of 1804 he received important coöperation from William Eaton, an eccentric but patriotic American in Egypt, who, without authority from his government, sought Hamet, dispossessed elder brother of the pacha, and set out from Egypt to capture the government of Tripoli by land. The pacha was a usurper and yielded rather than endanger tranquillity at home, although the army of Eaton and Hamet was only 500 men. In 1805, when the eastern half of his kingdom had been won over, he concluded a treaty, retaining his throne, but

Naval
Operations.

End of the
War.

agreeing to remain at peace with the United States in the future without tribute, and to surrender all Americans held in his country. Nothing was done in behalf of Hamet, who was now forced to retire from the positions he had won, but the next year we allowed him a life pension of \$200 a month.

The war with Tripoli had a wholesome effect on the other Barbary States, and they were content to remain at peace without further presents. It also gave the navy exercise in a theater of actual war, and brought it added prestige at home and abroad. It contained incidents of heroism which fired the

**Results of
the War.**

American imagination. Two of them especially were long remembered. While Preble held Tripoli closely invested from the sea he

**Death of
Somers.**

sent Lieutenant Somers among the enemy's ships in the ketch *Intrepid*, loaded with bombs and powder, to explode it in their midst and escape if possible. The American ships waited at a distance for the return of the brave crew. After a time they saw the ketch blow up when in contact with the Tripolitans, but neither Somers nor his men came back. Their fate was not known, but it was believed that he leaped into the magazine with a lighted torch, devoting himself to death to accomplish the object for which he was sent out.

The other adventure was more successful. The *Philadelphia*, pursuing the enemy too eagerly, went aground at the mouth of the harbor of Tripoli, and Bainbridge and his crew were taken.

**The Phila-
delphia.**

Shortly afterwards the ship was floated by the enemy and taken under the protection of their guns, where she frowned unpleasantly at the Americans in the offing. Stephen Decatur, commanding a ketch, sailed boldly into the harbor, boarded the *Philadelphia*, filled her with combustibles, set her on fire, and escaped in his ketch through a shower of badly aimed shots from land batteries and the ships in the harbor. He was a cool and capable officer, and was promoted for his conduct. In 1815 he returned to the Mediterranean with a formidable squadron and dictated favorable treaties with the Barbary States at the mouth of the cannon.

THE PURCHASE OF LOUISIANA

In 1800 most Americans believed that the settlement of the eastern half of the Mississippi basin would inevitably be followed by the acquisition of the western half. Acute alarm was occasioned in Washington's administration when it was thought England was about to get a foothold in this region; for while no one feared Spain's control of the region in question, England's ownership was another matter. Fortunately, the danger soon passed, but apprehension was again aroused when in the spring of 1801 it began to be reported that Spain had

**The Im-
portance of
Louisiana.**

transferred Louisiana to the powerful and aggressive Napoleon, who intended to build up a vast colonial power in its borders. The rumor soon became a certainty, but as months passed and the province remained in the hands of Spain the public mind remained calm. Late in 1802 it was violently agitated when news came that the Spanish governor in New Orleans had withdrawn the right of deposit granted in the treaty of 1705. The public construed this as a change of policy in anticipation of the new régime in Louisiana, and the West was for seizing the mouth of the river before it was too late. Jefferson wisely thought the action of the governor unauthorized, and restrained the popular wrath while he negotiated. Five months later he was informed by the Spanish minister that the right of deposit would be restored, and this removed the question from the range of possible war and left it freely in the field of diplomacy.

**Right of
Deposit.**

It was the president's plan to impress France with our seriousness in the matter, and to that end he used the strongest language. Let France know, he said, that the nation which held the mouth of the Mississippi was our enemy, and if Napoleon persisted in his purpose we should "marry ourselves to the British fleet and nation," so that England and the United States, coöperating for supremacy at sea, would hold at their mercy the revived French colonial establishment. He let the British minister see what he meant, and at a dinner paid him such marked attention that the French minister made it a subject of comment in his letter to Talleyrand. Generally speaking, Jefferson was pacific, not because of cowardice, as his enemies thought, but because he abhorred war and thought it was usually undertaken through unreasonable impulse. His vigorous attitude toward France shows how positive he could be when he considered a vital issue at stake. Meanwhile, Livingston, our minister in Paris, was instructed to sound Napoleon in regard to the purchase of the Isle of Orleans and West Florida. It is not probable that Jefferson thought the proposition would succeed, but it offered a point of departure in the negotiation.

**Jefferson's
Diplomacy.**

Unknown to him, events in Paris were shaping themselves more favorably than he dared hope; and to understand them we must go back to the treaty of San Ildefonso, October 1, 1800. By that agreement Napoleon induced Spain to transfer Louisiana to him in exchange for the Grand Duchy of Tuscany, which, elevated to the kingdom of Etruria, was to be given to the Duke of Parma, son-in-law of the king of Spain, when a general peace was made in Europe. Napoleon promised not to sell the territory thus acquired to any nation but Spain, and it was agreed that later negotiations should be entered into for the cession of West Florida. The treaty was kept secret for the time being, but its essential features were soon known. This vast acquisition of land

**Treaty of
San Ilde-
fonso.**

was to be the basis of a revived colonial empire, which the rising Napoleon thought would increase his popularity with the glory-loving French people.

Before that scheme could be realized the island of Santo Domingo must be conquered. Here Toussaint L'Ouverture, at the head of an army of blacks, was fighting to maintain the power he had founded. Every step he took in the progress of military despotism seemed but a shadow of the course of a greater despot in France. The world took notice and smiled, whereat Napoleon, deeply irritated, felt the greater need of suppressing the man who made him ridiculous while he defied French authority. In February, 1801, Napoleon made the treaty of Lunéville and was at peace with the continent. England continued the war with little heart, and brought it to an end a year later in the treaty of Amiens. This period of victory offered the triumphant First Consul the opportunity to bring Santo Domingo back to obedience.

January, 1802, arrived in Santo Domingo Leclerc, one of the best French generals, with an army of 10,000, and the war of reconquest began. Toussaint wished to use guerilla methods, but his officers overruled him. After three months of struggle they began to yield to the blandishments of Leclerc, thinking that it booted little to suffer further in behalf of the black emperor. At last Toussaint himself ventured to surrender, being assured of personal safety. After six weeks of fancied security he was arrested, sent to France according to the orders of Napoleon, and in less than a year died in a fortress in the Jura Mountains. Then Napoleon sent an order to restore slavery, his intention from the beginning. But for that, he might have ruled the island and proceeded with his colonial plans in Louisiana. As it was, the negro laborers rose to a man. Toussaint's officers were true to Leclerc, but all the efforts of the combined white and black forces did not check the onslaughts of the maddened laborers who saw slavery restored in the neighboring island of Guadeloupe. Then yellow fever appeared. In three months 24,000 men, soldiers and sailors, had died, and Leclerc demanded 17,000 more, with a vast sum of money, before the work of subjugation was done. He announced that this could only be done by killing over half the lower classes, male and female, above twelve years of age; and he thought that peace once restored, annual revolts might be looked for in the future. Before such a stupendous undertaking even Napoleon's resolution quailed, and it was decided to abandon the island.

Louisiana was now useless to Napoleon, and although he had assured Spain he would not sell it, he looked around for a buyer. April 10, 1803, he told Marbois, head of the treasury, to see if the United States would entertain an offer to buy. The shrewd Talleyrand, scenting an opportunity for

profit, anticipated Marbois, and the following day opened the matter with Livingston, our minister. The two were discussing the purchase of the Isle of Orleans when Talleyrand said, "What would you give for all Louisiana?" The suggestion was unexpected, but Livingston concealed his eagerness, and said that as he expected a special envoy from the United States in two days, he wished the matter to be deferred that long. The envoy was Monroe, whom Jefferson had sent to try to purchase the Isle of Orleans and West Florida. On the thirteenth Marbois and Livingston talked until midnight about the affair, the former inquiring if we would pay 60,000,000 francs in cash and also assume claims of Americans against France worth 20,000,000 francs. Livingston said this was too much, but he felt inwardly that it was a good bargain, and after some haggling the purchase was made on that basis. The treaty was signed on May 2, although it was antedated to April 30. It increased the national domain by 140 per cent.

The transaction pleased Jefferson, but also alarmed him. A strict constructionist, he could find no authority in the constitution for purchasing foreign territory, and he began to prepare an amendment granting congress the right. He seems to have forgotten this when he proposed to buy the Isle of

**The Treaty
Ratified.**

Orleans. An intimation from Paris that Napoleon might change his mind before an amendment could be adopted caused the president to abandon his plan, and the treaty was duly ratified October 21, 1803. December 20, to the gratification of every American in the Mississippi valley, the stars and stripes was hoisted over New Orleans.

Now arose the question of boundaries. According to the treaty we received "the colony or province of Louisiana, with the same extent that it now has in the hands of Spain, and that it had when France possessed it, and such as it should be after the treaties subsequently entered into between Spain and

**Louisiana's
Boundaries.**

other states." The words were from the treaty of 1800. Livingston asked Talleyrand what they meant. "I do not know," was the reply, "you must take it as we received it." "But what did you mean to take?" said Livingston, to which the astute Frenchman again said, "I do not know," adding, "You have made a noble bargain for yourselves, and I suppose you will make the most of it." At that time Talleyrand had in his cabinet a copy of the instructions designed for Victor, who was to have been the first French governor of Louisiana, informing him that the boundary on the west was the Rio Grande, and on the east the river Iberville, *i.e.* the eastern border of the Isle of Orleans. This was quite definite, but it was unknown to Jefferson for some time, and meanwhile he adopted a theory worthy of Talleyrand himself.

Before 1762 Louisiana extended to the Perdido, including Mobile, which as the outlet of a river system reaching from Georgia to Mississippi was greatly desired by the United States. Jefferson saw in the

words of the treaty, "that it had when France possessed it," an opportunity to claim this part of what he must have known was undoubtedly West Florida, *i.e.* Spanish territory, and, in Talleyrand's words, he "made the most of it." He communicated his opinion to congress, which accepted it, and passed, February, 1804, the Mobile act, erecting the region in question into a customs district and annexing it to Mississippi territory. Lest this lead to war with Spain, Jefferson tactfully located the customs house for the new district north of the Florida line. His plan was to hold the dispute in abeyance until Spain was in a war, and then seize the desired district. The Southwest, to whom the Coosa-Alabama line of river communication was of the utmost importance, approved his plan, and thought nothing of the points of national honor involved. But Jefferson did not trust entirely to the prospect of war. He would use it, if possible, as a means of forcing Spain to withdraw, and to that end he hoped to enlist the efforts of Napoleon, whose influence in Madrid was all but supreme. The French emperor understood this game and skillfully turned it against the American president by holding out West Florida when he wished the good will of Jefferson, and by withdrawing it when his temporary purpose was accomplished.

DISSENSION IN THE REPUBLICAN PARTY

By the beginning of 1804 Jefferson's popularity was well established. None of the calamities prophesied by the federalists had followed his election. On the contrary, the debt was being paid through Gallatin's wise economy, Louisiana had been acquired, party rancor was dying, business was prosperous, and the president manifested a desire to conciliate all sections and interests. It was also evident that Jefferson directed his party with a strong hand. He early recognized Burr as a disturbing element and proceeded to crush him. The character of the New Yorker would have justified this, to say nothing of his intrigue for the presidency in 1801. Burr was attacked through the New York patronage, which was sedulously given to Clinton, his bitter enemy. The vice-president was the least submissive of men, and now began to lean toward the federalists, and this only increased the difference between him and his party. Finally, he fell into the net of Pickering and the extreme New England federalists. They were so bitter against Jefferson that they planned to carry their section out of the union before his insidious conciliation should warp it out of their hands. It was an erratic scheme, and probably would have been rejected by the people, but the schemers decided to make the attempt if New York, the great commercial state of the North, could be induced to join them. To that end they approached Hamil-

How Jefferson Settled It.

Jefferson a Success.

His Attitude toward Burr.

ton, who rejected their proposals. Then they turned to Burr, who was complaisant. They got him accepted as federalist candidate for governor in the spring of 1804, thinking that his own friends and the federalists would elect him. But now Hamilton exerted himself, and defeated Burr at the polls by disclosing the object for which he had been nominated. This angered the discredited man, and the result was the duel on July 11, 1804, in which Hamilton was killed and Burr's political influence blasted. Jefferson in national affairs and Clinton in state affairs reaped the fruits of that foolish crime.

Burr Over-
whelmed.

A more serious party disturbance came through the opposition of John Randolph, a vehement and caustic speaker against whom few members of congress could stand in debate. As chairman of the ways and means committee in the house he was a chief exponent of the administration policy. His lofty manner offended many republicans, particularly the men from the North, for whom he openly expressed contempt. His ideas were not always practical, and Jefferson in a quiet way began to oppose the most impossible of them. Randolph then struck back, the occasion being the Yazoo claims, whose origin goes back to Washington's administration.

John
Randolph.

After the revolution Georgia claimed the lands to the Mississippi by a title formally as good as that by which the other states claimed their Western lands. She also held that the region involved in the secret clause of the treaty of 1782 should come to her because it was originally a part of her domain. The United States might well dispute the latter claim, but left it in abeyance, hoping that all the region would soon be transferred to the federal government. But Georgia wished to realize on the lands, and by several grants sold them to great land companies, known as Yazoo companies. The last of these grants, including the others, was made in 1795 at about a cent and a half an acre. The sale was made by a corrupt legislature, and the next legislature declared it null. Now resulted a pretty piece of confusion, in which the Yazoo lands were claimed by Georgia, the United States, since most of them were in the disputed region, and the grantees, who held that a state could not annul a grant for the corruption of its own agents. Georgia was defiant, and as President Adams did not wish to coerce a state, a compromise was arranged by which Georgia relinquished the lands to the federal government, which undertook to erect them into Mississippi Territory, and to pay damages to Georgia and the companies. Commissions were appointed for the latter purpose, and reported among other things that the United States should pay Georgia \$1,250,000, and the grantees the proceeds of the sale of 5,000,000 acres of land. In 1803 a bill was before congress to put this compromise into effect.

The Yazoo
Companies.

Compromise
Proposed.

It was at this point that Randolph opened his attack on the administration. He disliked Madison greatly, thinking him a trimmer. Most of the Yazoo stock was owned by speculators living in the North, and the representatives in congress, from that section, republican and federalist, were anxious to pass the bill. Jefferson favored it, probably because he wished to build up his party in the North. All this aroused the suspicion of Randolph. He made no objection to reimbursing Georgia for her claim, but he denounced the project to pay the companies. His scathing words defeated the bill at that time, but it came up again in 1805, when the speculators employed Granger, postmaster-general, to lobby for the measure. This angered the sharp-tongued Randolph, whose bitter strictures were now thrust at the administration which harbored the lobbyist. The republicans were divided into Yazoo and Anti-Yazoo men, the latter being chiefly Southerners. They were nearly equally divided, and Randolph was able to defeat the bill at this time. Although taken up again from time to time, it was not passed. In 1810, in the case of *Fletcher vs. Peck*, the supreme court held that the Georgia grant of 1795 was a contract, and that the legislature of 1796 could not annul it, and this strengthened the cause of the Yazoo men. In 1814, when Randolph was no longer a member of congress, it was voted to give the company \$8,000,000 in settlement of the claims, and with this the matter came to an end.

Randolph
and the
Yazoo Com-
promise.

End of the
Con-
troversy.

At first Jefferson kept himself clear of the dispute, and he was too strong to be openly attacked. In 1804 he was reelected president by 162 to 14 electoral votes, getting all the votes of New England but Connecticut's. For the support of New York, Clinton received the vice-presidency. Jefferson, at the height of his glory, announced in 1805 that he would not be a candidate for another term, and it was generally thought he would make Madison his successor. Randolph and his friends began to make plans to support Monroe, who had acted with them. While the breach in the party was thus widened, Jefferson brought before congress a scheme to acquire Florida, which gave Randolph another opportunity to show hostility to the president.

Jefferson
Reelected.

Jefferson's
Hope for
Acquiring
Florida.

While Jefferson deferred occupation of West Florida to a more favorable time, he renewed diplomatic efforts to get Spain to yield what we wished; but to his overtures the king returned a haughty refusal. In 1805 Talleyrand entered into the affair, communicating an informal suggestion that we trust Napoleon to conduct negotiations for the purchase of all Florida for \$7,000,000. He meant that the money sent to Madrid should find its way into the French treasury to pay subsidies which Napoleon exacted from prostrate Spain. The suggestion pleased Jefferson, although he hoped to get the Floridas for

less than the price named, and December 5, 1805, he sent a secret message to congress asking for authority to offer \$2,000,000. Randolph, chairman of the ways and means committee, was the man to move a grant; but he was obdurate. His influence with the committee was great, and he induced them to report in favor of measures of defense, saying he would never vote a penny to buy territory which we justly owned. The house overrode him, voting after a long debate, 72 to 58, that the money be placed at the president's disposal. But so much time was consumed in discussion that the opportunity was lost. When the suggestion was made, Napoleon needed money. Within four months he won the victories of Ulm and Austerlitz and dictated the treaty of Pressburg, and his coffers were overflowing. He accordingly refused to bring pressure to bear on Spain.

From that time, 1806, Randolph was in open opposition. Now came an unexpected development. His followers would support him when he appeared as a mere critic of one of the administration measures, but when he was an acknowledged insurgent they began to fall away, fearing the power and popularity of Jefferson. Of the ablest and truest were Nicholson, of Maryland, Macon, of North Carolina, the speaker, and Monroe. Jefferson sought to detach them from their leader, and succeeded with the first by appointing him a federal judge. The second remained unmoved, but the congress elected in 1806 was against Randolph, and Macon was not reelected speaker. His defeat insured a new chairman of the ways and means committee. Monroe acted with Randolph until the election of 1808 elevated Madison, Jefferson's choice, to the president's chair. In 1809 an arrangement was made, through Jefferson's aid, to make Monroe secretary of state under Madison, an agreement consummated in 1811. Randolph, shorn of his strength, continued to annoy Jefferson. In the house none dared encounter his withering scorn, and he had his way in debate. The president wisely ignored the attacks, although he probably winced in secret under them. The retirement of the annoyer in 1813 to make place for Jefferson's son-in-law, Eppes, only interrupted Randolph's career. He was reelected in 1814, and with a short interruption served in congress until 1829, an able but eccentric free lance and sometimes a nuisance.

**Randolph
Shorn of his
Strength.**

THE SCHEMES OF AARON BURR

When Burr saw his career ended in the East he turned to the West. Had he settled in New Orleans, or some other city in which a duelist was not unpopular, he might have risen to professional and political prominence. But his ambition looked to larger things, and he wished to found a state of his own in the West. For such an adventure he had genius in leadership, but he

**Burr Turns
to the West.**

lacked men and money. The first he hoped to get in the West and the latter from either England or Spain.

Historians are not agreed on the nature of his plans. He was indicted for treason in that he attempted to wrench Louisiana from the union and set it up as an independent state. Most of his contemporaries believed him guilty as charged, and some living historians accept the same view. According to them he was to collect 1000 men on the Ohio, reach Louisiana about the time the territorial legislature declared the province independent, and with the connivance of General Wilkinson, commanding the union forces there, establish his supremacy. It is known that he tried to get money for this purpose from the English minister and failed, and that he then tried to get it from Spain, where he also failed. He promised England to place his new state under English protection, thus opening a vast field for British commerce. He told Spain that his state would present a useful barrier between the United States and Mexico, then in Spanish hands. It is also known that he was in close conference with Wilkinson, who was capable of any treachery.

The other contention is that his real purpose was to conduct, in coöperation with a band of New Orleans adventurers, a filibustering expedition against Vera Cruz and Mexico City. He did, unquestionably, tell some of his followers this was his object, and he had maps and other information about Mexico which seemed to substantiate his words. He revealed this plan to some of the most influential leaders of the West, Andrew Jackson among others, and won their approval; for Spain was much hated in this quarter. To the plainer people of the West he spoke of a colony on the Red river, where he had acquired a large land grant, but this was admittedly a subterfuge. The real controversy is as to whether his conspiracy was aimed at Louisiana or Mexico.¹ If it was at the former, Burr lied when he spoke of the latter; if at the latter, he lied when he spoke of the former. Probably we shall never know in what respect he told the truth. Wilkinson testified that the conspiracy was against Louisiana; but Wilkinson's word is not ordinarily to be taken. He was a pensioner of Spain, and was concerned in most of the plans to separate the Mississippi valley from the United States. Wilkinson shared whatever guilt Burr incurred, and he was talking to clear himself; but this was true of some of those who testified that Mexico was the objective. It must be remembered, also, that it is possible that Burr meant to do both of the things alleged. It was quite within the power of his audacious imagination to hope to secure Louisiana first and then operate against Vera Cruz.

¹ For the view that Louisiana was Burr's objective the best authority is Henry Adams, *History of the United States*, III, chs. 10-14. For the other view see McCaleb, *The Aaron Burr Conspiracy*.

Be this as it may, Burr gave himself earnestly to his scheme, going hither and thither in the West, collecting boats, supplies, and men at Blennerhassett Island, near Parkersburg, West Virginia. November 15, 1806, was the date set for their departure. **The Scheme Fails.** Rumor was rife all through the West that he would attack New Orleans, and in October, he was indicted for treason in Kentucky. As no positive evidence could be adduced he was acquitted, and continued his preparations. But the indictment checked volunteering, and he could not set out on the appointed day. It was an untoward event; for at New Orleans the situation favored success, if Burr had designs there. The legislature was about to meet, and Wilkinson had taken his army to the Texan frontier, leaving the city unprotected. If the adventurer had appeared with 1000 men, as he promised, the city would have been at his mercy. But the men were wanting, and Wilkinson, able to take care of himself in an emergency, decided to desert a failing cause. He informed Jefferson of a conspiracy to seize Louisiana, but concealed his connection with it. He hastened to the city and noisily gave orders to make the place safe against assault. The president, meanwhile, received Wilkinson's letter. He had heard rumors against Burr before that, but took no action, lest friends of the accused charge him with persecuting a political rival. But now the charges were definite, and he sent a proclamation through the West for the arrest of all conspirators. Burr's friends warned him that it was coming, and hastily gathering all his resources, sixty men and thirteen flatboats, he set off for New Orleans in the last days of the year. He still counted on Wilkinson, but when he learned at Natchez how vain was this reliance he abandoned his followers to their fate, and, disguised, sought to escape through the forest to West Florida. **Arrest of Burr.** At Fort Stoddert, when nearly across the boundary, he was recognized, arrested, and sent to Richmond, Virginia, for trial.

The case aroused wide interest. Chief Justice Marshall presided at the hearing and John Randolph was foreman of the grand jury which presented Burr for trial. Both men were bitter enemies of Jefferson, and seemed to wish Burr's acquittal. **Burr's Trial.** By the constitution, treason is levying war against the government, or giving aid and comfort to the enemy, and two witnesses to the same overt act are necessary for conviction. Marshall ruled that a man must be present when the overt act was committed in order to be guilty of treason within the meaning of the constitution. As Burr was in Kentucky when his followers assembled on the Ohio river, he was not guilty as charged, although it was well known that he planned the whole movement. The ruling was fatal to the prosecution, and Burr was acquitted. Luther Martin, leading lawyer for Burr and long an enemy of Jefferson, outdid himself in making it uncomfortable for the president. One expedient was to summon Jefferson to testify

and to bring certain papers with him. The summons was disregarded on the ground that the president was not to be at the command of the federal courts. Marshall was a bold judge struggling to establish the independent power of the judiciary, and in this notable case, in which the executive appeared as prosecutor, he went as far as he dared go in his attempt to make the president do the will of the court. In refusing this subpoena, Jefferson, as Adams in the case of Dr. Cooper, 1800, and other presidents at later times, laid out the line beyond which the court was not to go.

Clash between the Executive and the Judiciary.

RELATIONS BETWEEN ENGLAND AND THE UNITED STATES

When Burr took up his Western schemes, England and Napoleon were joined in the final struggle to determine the destiny of Europe.

America and the Carrying Trade.

Each striving to cripple the resources of the other came at length to attempts to restrain the trade of neutrals. As Napoleon after 1806 was dominant on the continent from the Adriatic to the Baltic, the only important neutral was the United States, whose citizens for a time reaped large profits from the sale of American products and by carrying freights between European ports. American ships were rapidly built, and foreign ships were transferred to American registry, to the discomfiture of British owners, whose own profits were lessened by the high insurance they must pay in the dangerous days of French licensed privateers. The mobile sailor population of the world was also drawn into the American service, so that not only the British merchant marine but the British naval ships also suffered for lack of service. Out of this situation grew regulations to impede the American neutral trade, and a greater activity in impressing sailors on American ships. The weakness of the American navy, under Jefferson's pacific policy, invited these discriminations.

Trade Restrictions and Impressments.

Impressment rested on inalienable citizenship, held at the time by all the nations of Europe. America, as a new country, held for transferable citizenship, and the naturalization laws of the United States were framed on that basis. But in actual practice neither party to the controversy confined itself strictly to the principle at stake. Sailors on British ships frequently deserted in American ports, took out naturalization papers, and shipped on American vessels without much concealment and with open approval of the American population. Such duplicity was not to be endured by the mistress of the sea. British ships-of-war retaliated by boarding American vessels, mustering the crews on deck, and taking off all whom they chose to declare British subjects. Sometimes they took men who were undoubtedly American born. Some-

Grounds of Impressment.

times, also, the men they took had forged papers certifying to American birth. Between these difficulties the ways of Presidents Jefferson and Madison were hard. Impressment was practiced under the federalist presidents, and much negotiation occurred to remedy it, but no results were reached. It recurred with increased energy under Jefferson. Each instance of this wrong announced in the American papers aroused the popular wrath and prepared the way to the war of 1812. When finally the British ships cruised off the American harbors searching all vessels that came out or went in, it was hard for the president to restrain the people from acts which must have led to hostilities.

Less irritating, perhaps, but of greater real hardship, was the increasing number of seizures of ships charged with violating British rules of war. Of these regulations the most noted was the Rule of War of 1756, declaring that a trade not open in peace could not lawfully be opened in time of war.

Case of the
Polly.

The dispute, as we have seen, came up in Washington's administration, but it was not settled. American skippers found a way around it by taking cargoes from the West Indies to their home ports, where the goods became American, and if reexported to Europe as such were not, as they held, liable to seizure. It was a nice point, but the British courts allowed it, the rule being laid down in the famous case of the *Polly*, 1800, that such goods became American goods and were not liable to capture if they were landed on American docks and paid American duties. For some time after the European war reopened, 1803, this rule favored the Americans. So profitable was the trade that the expense of landing and paying duties was comparatively insignificant. Then came the complaint of British shippers that the Yankees used this as a subterfuge to engross all the trade of the French and Spanish possessions in America. The British government opened certain ports in their American colonies to the goods of enemy nations, with the hope that the trade drawn thither would go thence to England in British ships; but even this did not break up the objectionable Yankee practice. Then

Case of the
Essex.

came the decision of the British court in the case of the *Essex*, 1805, in which it was held that a neutral ship pleading the right accorded in the decision of the case of the *Polly* must prove that in landing her cargo in a neutral port it was the intention of the owners to make the cargo neutral goods and not merely to evade the rule of 1756. As this intention must be shown to the satisfaction of the British courts, proving it was difficult. Under the new rule, many ships were seized, and complaints were loud in America. In England the merchants applauded because insurance rates were now raised for their Yankee rivals, and the navy was pleased because officers shared in the prizes seized.

In 1806 died William Pitt, head of the ministry under which this severe policy was conducted. The changes which followed brought

Charles James Fox, long a friend of America, into the foreign office. He assured Monroe, our minister, that he would endeavor to have the recent restrictions modified, but warned him not to expect payment for the 500 prizes already taken. Even this concession was difficult to obtain; for the cabinet as a whole dared not antagonize the merchants and navy by openly modifying their rules. Then Fox resorted to a subterfuge, known as "Fox's Blockade," May 16, 1806. A proclamation declared blockaded the coast of Europe from Brest to the Elbe, but the naval officers were instructed to enforce it only from the Seine to Ostend. Neutral ships, therefore, bound for ports between Brest and the Seine, and between Ostend and the Elbe, were allowed to go undisturbed, spite of the rules formerly enforced. It was a clumsy way of doing us a favor, but it left us the Netherlands with the Rhine valley and the northwest corner of France; and it might have served until the end of the war had France acquiesced.

But Napoleon scorned to get his foreign supplies through the connivance of his enemy. Feigning to believe Fox's Blockade effective for the whole coast line involved, he replied, November 21, 1806, with the Berlin Decree, declaring: 1. Complete blockade for all the possessions of Britain in Europe; 2. All British property, public or private, and any merchandise coming from Britain, whoever owned it, to be prize of war; 3. No ship coming from Britain or her colonies to be admitted into a port controlled by France, and 4. Confiscation for vessels trying to evade this blockade by false papers. This outrageous decree, for which Fox's proclamation was no justification, ignored the doctrine of contraband, and announced, in effect, that its author was greater than international law. Moreover, he had not a respectable squadron to enforce it. Only a few minor class ships-of-war were left to France after the battle of Trafalgar, 1805, and these, darting out of the protected harbors at the unprotected merchantmen, besides her privateers, were the only means of enforcing the blockade against the mistress of the seas. The only redeeming feature of the decree was that it was not enforced against the United States for nine months after promulgation.

The decree was a challenge to England, and touched her pride. The reply of the ministry was two Orders in Council, which only increased the distress of the American shippers. The first, January 7, 1807, forbade neutrals to trade from port to port of France or her allies. It was a severe blow at our skippers, who were accustomed to dispose of cargoes in various markets as prices favored. In April a new election gave the government a parliamentary majority of two hundred, mostly country squires chosen on the ground that the church was in danger. In the tory ministry which now came into power George Canning, sometimes coarse, sometimes clever, but always patriotic and able,

Fox's Blockade, 1806.

The Berlin Decree, 1806.

First and Second Orders in Council.

was foreign secretary. November 1, six weeks after Napoleon began to enforce his decree against our shipping, there appeared, in Great Britain, the second Order in Council. It forbade neutral trade with the entire coast of Europe from Trieste to Copenhagen, unless the neutral vessels concerned first entered and cleared from a British port under regulations to be afterwards announced. Canning thought France could not exist without American food products, and he expected by this means to force her to take them by permission of Britain. But Napoleon did not yield readily. December 17 he issued the Milan Decree, ordering the seizure of every neutral ship which allowed herself to be searched by England, or which cleared from an English port. Beyond this was nothing that could distress our commerce. Any ship bound for Europe, except for Sweden, Russia, or the Turkish possessions, was liable to capture by one side or the other. By the end of 1807 our merchant marine, distressed on every side, was threatened with destruction, and loud complaints reached the administration by every ship from abroad.

The Milan
Decree,
1807.

JEFFERSON'S REPLY TO EUROPE

Jefferson abhorred war as a means of settling disputes, and thought most questions could be settled by appeal to interest. Neither he nor the majority of his party thought the country able to bear the burden of war. Like Washington, when he accepted the Jay treaty in 1795, they thought it better to bear the insult offered them than appeal to a course which would increase the national debt, involve great expense for a navy, and put in jeopardy the independence of the nation. Neither he nor his party lacked patriotism, but they represented the rural classes and did not feel the attacks on commerce as keenly as the merchants and ship-owners, chiefly federalists. All these considerations prompted the adoption of pacific means of defense.

Desire for
Peace.

The first was the non-importation act of 1806, passed to force concessions from England. It provided that certain specified goods which could be produced in the United States or in other countries than England should not be imported from the ports of Great Britain after November 25 following. The president did not favor the bill, but accepted it when the republicans made it a party measure. Randolph opposed it, declaring with his peculiar vehemence that we ought either to fight or submit to England. The act was to be followed by negotiations, and Monroe, minister to England, and William Pinkney, now sent thither as his colleague, were authorized to make a treaty which would rectify our wrongs. All this was a reply to the decision in the case of the *Essex*. The act did not go into effect until December 14, 1807.

Non-Im-
portation
Act, 1806.

Fox died soon after Monroe and Pinkney began negotiations, and his successor was less friendly. They did the best they could, but got no concessions worthy of the name. The treaty they signed in London, December 31, did not give up impressment, but insisted that West India products pay a duty of not less than 2 per cent before they be exported to Europe as American goods, and that European products pay not less than 1 per cent duty in American ports before being exported to the islands. It was to be inoperative unless we bound ourselves not to abide by Napoleon's Berlin Decree. Thus it seemed that England dictated our own taxes and that she was bent on driving us into war with France. Jefferson realized that the treaty would not be ratified, and would not submit it to the senate. He concealed its terms to protect Monroe from the criticisms he believed it would bring down on the negotiators. It showed how futile were the non-importation act and the hopes from negotiation.

Then Jefferson turned to the embargo, in an especial sense his own policy. He would keep American ships from the sea until the time of danger was past, avoid the irritating incidents which were likely to arouse the war spirit in his own people, and force England and France to yield in order to get our products. He would thus prove that war is unnecessary and that armies and navies are a useless burden. Congress gave its support, and December 21, 1807, the embargo act was passed. It prohibited the departure for a foreign port of any merchant vessel, except foreign vessels in ballast, and required vessels in the coasting trade to give heavy bonds to land their cargoes in the United States. The president was given discretionary power to modify the operation of the law in specific cases, but its duration was made indefinite. Peaceful coercion was an untried experiment of far-reaching effects, yet it passed the two houses in four days and was a law before the people understood its significance. Congress accepted it on the authority of Jefferson at a time when it seemed that all other measures were futile. If successful, it would be a brilliant climax of a presidential career in which were such achievements as Gallatin's financial policy, the purchase of Louisiana, and the dissipation of partisan bitterness.

The first attempts at enforcement showed that peaceful coercion was impracticable. Shipowners would not give up a trade which became more profitable as it became more dangerous. They hurriedly instructed their captains to avoid American ports and to continue in the carrying trade between foreign ports. Those whose ships remained at home in idleness complained loudly, and the law was evaded so much that two supplementary acts were soon passed to make it effective (January 8 and March 12). At first the farmers did not feel the embargo as the traders felt it; for the crops were sold when it

**Futile
Treaty of
Monroe and
Pinkney.**

**The Em-
bargo Act.**

**Difficulty of
Enforcing
the Em-
bargo.**

passed. But by the end of summer it came home to them in lower prices. Products which in 1807 sold unusually high, on account of the war abroad, now sold unusually low because they could not be exported. The federalists made much of this discontent, and their course stimulated it, and thus encouraged evasions of the law. In the autumn two more enforcing acts were passed. Even a rowboat was now subject to the law, and collectors of the ports were given despotic powers over every ship that sailed.

Such was the situation when the election of 1808 occurred. Madison was the administration candidate, C. C. Pinckney had the support of the federalists, and John Randolph was rallying his friends for Monroe. The result was 122 electoral

Election of
1808.

votes for Madison, 47 for Pinckney, and none for Monroe. George Clinton, who also had 6 votes for president, was elected vice-president, although he had shown great uneasiness under the Virginia domination. All New England but Vermont was again in the federalist column, and for this change the embargo was responsible. In the house the federalists also gained strength, but their adversaries still held control.

These events, and the increasing defiance of New England, which seemed ready to take arms if the embargo were strictly enforced, shook the determination of the republicans, and sentiment for repeal began to develop in the party. Jefferson observed the trend with great disappointment. He had not lost faith in peaceful coercion as a theory, but he was forced to see that it could not be enforced unless the majority of the people believed in it, and he was at last brought to sign a bill to supersede the embargo by the non-intercourse law of 1809.

Failure of
the Em-
bargo.

It decreed non-intercourse with England and France, leaving the president to suspend it for whichever of the two nations should first abandon her restrictions. Jefferson signed the bill in much bitterness of spirit, and a few days later retired from office. The new law left open the trade with every nation but England and France, and to these our products went indirectly. For one year this situation continued, the government trying meantime to effect a settlement by negotiations. All was in vain, and May 1, 1810, a third act concerning trade, known as "Macon's Bill No. 2," was passed. It repealed all restrictions on commerce with the two nations, but authorized the president to reinstate them for one nation when the other repealed its offensive decrees or orders. It was a bid for relaxation, and if accepted by one power was likely to be accepted by the other. The result showed it to be as futile as the preceding measures. Our commerce was caught in a bitter conflict between two great states who would hardly stop cutting one another to pieces to secure the good will of the United States. Jefferson's embargo had important significance in the economic history of the time (see page 349).

Non-Inter-
course Law
of 1809.

"Macon's
Bill No. 2,"
1810.

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For Independent Reading

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CHAPTER XV

THE WAR OF 1812

ORIGIN OF THE WAR

BOTH England and France seized American ships under the restrictions on commerce just described, but as England had the stronger navy her offenses were more numerous. The losses from this source fell most heavily on the merchants and ship-owners, chiefly federalists and friends of England, who wished for peace with that country. Since Macon's bill No. 2 removed the restrictions on trade, pleasing the maritime class, and as we could not well fight France for doing what her rival did to a much larger extent, the prospect for peace would have been brighter in 1810, if seizures had been the only source of irritation. But another source of resentment was impressments, practiced, it is true, by both nations, but on a much larger scale by England. Here the brunt of wrong fell on the sailor class. As story after story was told of native Americans carried away into the hard service of the British navy, the popular ire rose higher and higher. British ships took sailors from ships in American harbors without regard to the neutrality laws, and lay in wait off the chief ports of the Atlantic coast, searching the vessel that came out. All the old hostility which lingered in American minds from the days of the revolution, or sprang up in connection with Jay's negotiations, now flared up again, and the nation drifted toward war.

War not due
to Seizures
Alone.

Impress-
ments.

Had England been wise, much of this irritation would have been avoided. It is true she did not wish war with the United States. Engaged in a life and death struggle to stay the advance of Bonaparte in Europe, she had adopted the policy of starving her enemy into subjection. If our merchants tried to evade her regulations, so much the worse for them, and if she seized stringently the sailors she claimed as hers to enable her to man her ships-of-war, so much the worse for the sailors. It was no time, thought Canning, for the niceties of international courtesy. But America did not desire war, and had Canning's position been asserted with more consideration, war would probably have been avoided. As it was, there occurred several harsh incidents, which Jefferson and Madison were willing to overlook, but which goaded the popular mind until they resulted in a wave

England's
Attitude.

Irritating
Incidents.

of hatred which the administration could not resist, until congress at last forced the president to begin the struggle against his best judgment. In this sense George Canning was the chief author of the war of 1812.

The first of these incidents was the *Chesapeake-Leopard* affair, 1807. At that time impressments were very frequent. An English squadron searching for some French ships came into Lynnhaven Bay, near Norfolk, Virginia, and anchored there. Several of their sailors deserted, some of them Americans previously impressed into the British service. At that time the naval ship, *Chesapeake*, was taking on her heavy guns preparatory to her departure for the Mediterranean. It was reported that she had shipped some of the deserting British sailors, and Admiral Berkley, commanding the British ships on the station at Halifax, ordered that she be intercepted at sea and searched. Her captain, Barron, was ordered by the president to take care that no British deserters were in his crew, and thought he had fulfilled his instructions, but one man under an assumed name escaped his notice. Just before he sailed, the British ship, *Leopard*, came to Lynnhaven Bay with Berkley's orders. June 22 she followed the *Chesapeake*, as the latter stood out to sea, came alongside at close range, and signalled that she had dispatches. Barron allowed her to send a boat, and an officer coming on deck handed him Berkley's order with the announcement that if deserters were aboard, they must be handed over. Barron replied that he had none of the kind mentioned. He should have prepared for action, but the letter from the *Leopard* was not explicit, and he did not realize he was about to be attacked. A few minutes after the officer left the *Chesapeake* the British ship came within pistol shot, having the advantage of the wind, fired a shot across the *Chesapeake's* bow, and followed it by a broadside. The two ships were of nearly equal strength, and the British captain did not wish to lose the advantage of beginning his work before his opponent was ready. Barron was entirely unprepared for battle, but hastened his efforts while his helpless vessel sustained for fifteen minutes the enemy's fire. All he could do was unavailing, and he hauled down his colors with three men killed and eighteen wounded. Ere they touched the deck, one of his officers, for the honor of the flag, managed to fire one gun, the only reply the Americans made to the cruel punishment they received. Then the British came aboard, found three Americans who, having been impressed on a British ship had deserted and joined the *Chesapeake*, and the one native British deserter who had enlisted under an assumed name; and these were taken off. The American ship made her way to Norfolk, where her arrival was received with an outburst of rage which spread over the country until the whole nation quivered with excitement comparable to that which ninety-one years later was aroused by the destruction of the *Maine*. Barron was sus-

1. *Chesapeake-Leopard Affair*, 1807.

pended for five years because he had not been prepared for action, and Jefferson exerted all his art to prevent immediate war.

He recognized the strength of the popular indignation, and for a time showed energy. He promptly issued a proclamation ordering British public ships out of American waters and forbidding American citizens to furnish them supplies. He sent off to London a demand for reparation, for the punishment of Berkley, and for the relinquishment of impressments generally. When Canning received this demand he offered to investigate the incident and do what was just, but he refused to consider the demand that the British government give up impressments. The British press and public, long accustomed to resent the pretensions of the Yankee nation, applauded his position and demanded war, if war was necessary to support England's supremacy at sea. Here was a direct challenge, but Canning thought the president would not accept it. He recalled Berkley, who had acted without orders, but a proclamation was issued warning British seamen who had been "enticed" into foreign service to return to their allegiance, declaring that if taken on board enemy ships they would be treated as traitors, and commanding naval officers to seize them on merchant vessels and to demand them from captains of foreign naval ships. At the same time it was decided to transfer negotiations in regard to the recent affair to Washington, where Erskine was the British minister.

Jefferson's
Course.

Canning's
Attitude.

When this was known in America, congress was in session, and the embargo act was soon passed. It showed Jefferson's purpose to negotiate while he employed "peaceful coercion." Four days after it passed George Rose arrived to treat for the settlement of the *Chesapeake* affair. He was instructed to demand the withdrawal of Jefferson's recent proclamation as a condition precedent to negotiations. After some hesitation the president agreed that this should be done and asked Rose to show his instructions. The latter unwillingly complied. He would restore the impressed seamen, he said, if we would disavow Barron for encouraging the desertion of British sailors. This was distinctly what Barron had not done; to concede it would put us in the wrong, and the negotiations came suddenly to an end. Probably Canning had not intended that they should have a more successful course. Rose returned to England, the recent outrage was not redressed, three American-born sailors remained in a British prison, "peaceful coercion" was demonstrating its inadequacy to deal with the situation, and a large portion of the people were coming to the conviction that nothing but war would force the stubborn Canning to a reasonable attitude. But Rose discovered one fact while in America to which he later clung tenaciously. He learned how much opposed to war was the federalist party in New England, and he

2. Rose's
Mission,
1808.

Rose and
Pickering.

made a fast friend of Senator Timothy Pickering, of Massachusetts, who led him to believe that in case of war the states east of the Hudson might be withdrawn from the union and attached to England. Pickering cherished the idea, and his correspondence with Rose in the years immediately following gave prominent Englishmen a mischievous idea of American affairs.

Rose's short course ran through the three first months of 1808. He left British interests in the hands of the regular minister, Erskine, a whig, a friend of conciliation, and a man who saw with alarm the rising tide of hostility toward England. Advising Canning that war feeling was increasing, he was in the spring of 1809 instructed to make arrangements for a treaty which would remove all the differences between the two powers. The terms proposed were very hard, but Erskine believed himself justified in modifying them, and concluded a treaty so favorable to America that Canning repudiated it at sight. Before this was known in America many ships loaded with produce set sail for Europe, assured that British restriction would be inoperative when they arrived. Their disappointment was keen, but Canning allowed them to return home without seizure since they sailed under misapprehension.

Erskine was now recalled, and Jackson, a narrow and obstinate Briton, took his place, with the promise that he should retain the post at least a year. He began by tactlessly telling Madison that Erskine had been overreached by the American government. He was asked to withdraw the expression, and when he refused received a curt notice that no further communications would be held with him. He departed from Washington in high rage, leisurely visiting Baltimore, Philadelphia, New York, and Boston, where the federalists received him with demonstrations of sympathy. According to promise, he was allowed to hold his position until September, 1810. It was evident that England cared little to preserve peace with us, and all the time the popular resentment increased.

At this point the course of our story turns to France. Napoleon's attitude toward the United States was as unfair as England's, but his power to injure was smaller because of his weakness at sea. He chiefly exercised it in seizing our ships by two notable decrees. Just after he knew of the embargo act, he ordered, in the Bayonne decree, April 17, 1808, the seizure of all ships in French ports flying the American flags. Such vessels, he said, could not be truly American, since the embargo act forbade them to leave their home ports. A great deal of property was thus confiscated, and the American government spent much time trying to get payment for it. March 23, 1810, Napoleon issued the Rambouillet decree, confiscating every ship which had entered a port of France or her dependencies since the preceding May

3. Erskine's Treaty.

4. Jackson's Futile Mission.

The Bayonne and Rambouillet Decree.

20. Under it several hundred vessels were taken. The procedure was justified on the ground that the non-intercourse act forbade ~~French~~ ^{American} ships to come to ~~American~~ ports and authorized their seizure if they violated the act. It was really taken because Napoleon needed money, which he got in large amounts from the sale of the confiscated property.

Before America fully understood this deliberate perfidy, Napoleon was planning another stroke, the object being to lead us to war with England. With Macon's bill No. 2 in mind he caused Madison to be told that the Berlin and Milan decrees would be repealed November 1, 1810, his understanding being that congress had abandoned non-intercourse and would

Napoleon
Hoodwinks
Madison.

oppose England's restrictions. We had not undertaken to resist England, but only to apply non-intercourse to her commerce. Madison should have remembered this, but he was anxious to open the suspended commerce, and too readily accepted the promises of France. November 2 he gave notice that France had removed her restrictions, and March 2, 1811, congress reimposed non-intercourse on England, as Macon's bill No. 2 contemplated. It was soon evident that Napoleon had hoodwinked our president; for by a system of licenses and a high tariff he made it as hard as ever for the American ships in French harbors. England could see this as well as anybody. She refused to repeal her Orders and complained that we favored France, her enemy. By this time American feeling was so strong against England that our people did not care how she felt. We forgot to blame Napoleon, as we well might have done, and the government had begun to take a stiffer tone toward Great Britain. It was just at this time, April 1, that Monroe, according to the agreement made in 1809, succeeded Smith as secretary of state. He had suffered many indignities while minister in England, and he must have taken keen delight in the rising tide of resistance which he observed in the country and the administration.

A clear manifestation of this altered spirit came soon afterwards. In May, 1811, the British frigate *Guerrière* was impressing sailors off Sandy Hook, and the American frigate, *President*, Captain John Rodgers, forty-four guns, was ordered to repair to the post and stop the practice. He sailed promptly, passing the scene of the affair of the *Chesapeake* and *Leopard*, four years unredressed by England, and May 16, off the Virginia coast, encountered a British ship of war headed southward. Hoisting his colors, he gave chase, thinking the *Guerrière* was before him. At sunset he was overhauling the fugitive, who at last came to in the twilight but refused to give her name. Suddenly a shot was fired which struck the *President's* mast. Immediately the American ship began to fire, and after a fifteen-minute battle the stranger ceased to fire and reported herself in distress. Rodgers lay to until morning, when, to his disappointment he learned that he had not attacked the

The *President* and
Little Belt,
1811.

Guerrière, as he supposed, but the *Little Belt*, about half his size. Her captain alleged that the *President* fired first, but the evidence to the contrary was overwhelming. A short time later a new British minister arrived in Washington, announcing that he was instructed to settle the *Chesapeake-Leopard* dispute; but the nation, glowing with enthusiasm for Rodger's action, cared little for the overture. The minister was asked if the trade restrictions would be relaxed, and when he said "No" his work was at an end.

Additional hostility to England was engendered by the outbreak, in 1811, of Indian troubles in Indiana, where the white settlers were now steadily penetrating. By a treaty of 1809 the Indians of central Indiana ceded a large tract of land on the Wabash. It was the ninth similar step since the treaty of Greenville, 1795. The more patriotic Indians opposed this relinquishment of their ancestral lands, and declared the treaty of 1809 illegal. They found leaders in two brothers, Tecumseh and "The Prophet," men of exceptionable ability, who lived peaceably with an agricultural tribe where Tippecanoe Creek joins the Wabash. They had great influence with the neighboring tribes and united them in a league to oppose further encroachments by the whites. In 1811 Tecumseh went to the South to form a similar league among the Creeks, Cherokees, Choctaws, and Chickasaws.

Taking advantage of his absence, William Henry Harrison, governor of Indiana Territory, with 800 men, marched into the region recently ceded and came at last to the town on the Tippecanoe. Here he was surprised in the early morning by about 400 Indians, and lost 188 killed and wounded before he beat off the attack. As the foe retreated and left their village to be burned, Harrison was hailed victor throughout the Northwest. The Indians had received arms and ammunition from Canada, and this was taken as an additional wrong from England.

Meanwhile, the popular resentment had expressed itself in the election of 1810, when seventy new members were sent to congress, most of them replacing advocates of peace. Before this the leaders in congress were men whose experience went back to the time of the revolution. They had seen so many dark days that they feared to hope for bright ones. The new men were young. Their leaders were Clay and Johnson of Kentucky, Porter of New York, Grundy of Tennessee, and Lowndes, Cheves, and Calhoun of South Carolina; and the average age of the seven was only thirty-four. They had fought for their election

most vigorously, and felt bitterly toward the old Virginia group of leaders, who never quite forgave them their victory. Both factions called themselves republicans, but the newer men rejected many of the more theoretical principles of the old school. They believed that the national honor *had* been insulted,

**Harrison
and the
North-
western In-
dians, 1811.**

**Battle of
Tippecanoe.**

**Changed
Sentiment
in the
Election of
1810.**

**The War
Party.**

and demanded war, their eyes meanwhile being cast at Canada. They began their work by electing Clay speaker and securing the important committees.

Before congress met on November 4 Madison accepted the demands of the war party, and his annual message recounted our wrongs and suggested measures of defense. The old leaders opposed this, but the federalists, thinking to embarrass their ancient enemies, joined the new party in raising an army of 25,000 men and in putting the navy on a war footing. An attempt to raise taxes, however, resulted in failure, and the government was left to support war, if war came, by means of a loan. For that kind of an operation it was seriously handicapped by the refusal of the preceding congress to recharter the United States bank. The many state banks could not make the loan of \$11,000,000 now called for. At this time the bonds could not be sold in Europe, and the federalists, who were chiefly the trading class, would not take them because they opposed the war, and when the bids were opened only \$6,000,000 had been subscribed. Lack of money was most serious throughout the war about to begin.

**Madison
Yields to
the War
Party.**

**U. S. Bank
not Re-
chartered.**

In May, 1812, a republican caucus renominated Madison for the presidency. He had the support of the war party and his small personal following; but the friends of Samuel Smith did not attend the caucus. In New York, where the two Clintons dominated the republicans, much jealousy of the Virginia supremacy appeared, and a movement was rapidly forming for a coalition between the malcontents and the federalists, in opposition to Madison. George Clinton died in April, and Virginia, turning away from the alliance with New York, took Massachusetts for her Northern yoke-fellow, offering the vice-presidency to Elbridge Gerry, who had recently been republican governor of that commonwealth. Clinton's death, however, did not end the plans of the New Yorkers. His nephew, De Witt Clinton, took up his mantle, was nominated for the presidency by the New York legislature, and ran the race with the endorsement of the federalists. When the votes were cast in the following November Madison had 128 of the 217, eight from Vermont and all those from the states south of the Delaware. Had Pennsylvania not given him her twenty-five votes he would have been defeated.

**Madison
Renomi-
nated.**

England now saw plainly the drift of the United States toward war. To the American protests was added the fact that the English people were suffering for food products. Wheat sold at nearly four dollars a bushel, and the trade with the continent went on under a system of forged licenses, both British and French, for which honest Englishmen could only blush. Under these conditions there arose a powerful demand that the Orders in

**The British
Relenting.**

Council be repealed, and the ministry were urged to relieve a disastrous situation before an American war should be added to the other burdens. At last they were willing to yield, if the French government would state publicly that its decrees had been repealed. No such statement was expected, but the offer showed that the government was weakening. May 11, 1812, the prime minister, Spencer Percival, who had stood stoutly for the Orders, was assassinated by a fanatic. The friends of America, led by the brilliant Henry Brougham, now pressed harder than ever for repeal. Then came news that the United States had declared an embargo for two months as a preliminary step to war. With the nation clamoring for peace, and with Brougham eloquently pleading the cause of the starving people, the new ministry at last gave way, announcing on June 16 that the Orders would be withdrawn, a promise which they redeemed on the 23d.

**The Orders
Repealed,
June 23.**

The British relaxation came suddenly, and the Americans were unprepared for it. The war party was in control in congress, and carried the president with it. June 1 he sent a war message which occasioned a short and sharp debate, followed on June 18 by a declaration of war for which the vote was 19 to 13 in the senate and 79 to 49 in the house. Had there been a cable the war would probably not have occurred. As it was, there was a feeble attempt to patch up differences when news came from London, but feelings were now too much aroused for such a step, and the project failed. Fourteen of the senators and 62 of the representatives who voted for war lived south of the Delaware. Only 11 of those who voted against it lived in that region, and of these but two were republicans. Thirty-three federalist representa-

**Feeling not
United.**

tives issued an address declaring the struggle unjustifiable. Thus the war was sectional, and began with dissension in the nation. The war party thought that harmony would be restored once fighting began, but the event showed how much they were mistaken.

In fact, the country was not ready for war. The president, timid, diplomatic, and unable to control the politicians around him, could not inspire with energy an administration in which the only first rate man, Gallatin, was harassed out of his peace of mind by enemies in his own party. The army, neglected by the republicans, was without trained officers. The West Point Academy, authorized in 1802, had as yet yielded none of the fruits for which it later was distinguished. Officers who had served in the revolution were now too old for effective duty, and the new political appointees were pompous and inexperienced, and lacked the respect of the privates. The navy, disdained by Jefferson, had only the frigates built by the federalists, and some smaller vessels constructed for use against Tripoli, less than twenty in all. But their officers were excellent, and the sailor popula-

**Weakness
of the Ad-
ministra-
tion, Army,
and Navy.**

tion was as good as could be found in the world. The gunboats Jefferson built for harbor defense were not able to take the sea. The treasury was without money, and the country shuddered at the thought of higher taxes. Loans were the only resource, and these were difficult with the moneyed class opposed to war and the money markets of Europe prostrated by the struggle then raging there. The young leaders in the house realized these difficulties, and strove to surmount them. They carried through congress a bill to raise the army, now a little more than six thousand strong, by 25,000 men, and another bill to authorize the president to call out 50,000 militia. They also asked for an addition to the navy of twelve seventy-fours and twenty frigates, but this was refused. When they moved war taxes there was further denial, and they were forced to content themselves with a loan of \$11,000,000. All this happened early in 1812.

Efforts of
the War
Party.

The war party planned a vigorous campaign in Canada and the occupation of Florida, if Spain, England's ally in Europe, should make war on America. They thought the Canadians would willingly throw off the British yoke in order to unite with the great republic to the southward, and they believed that the war would end quickly and victoriously. They expected the Atlantic ports to be blockaded, and trade to be driven from the sea, but so much had been endured on that score that a little more suffering would hardly make a difference. Kentucky and the Northwest were keen for the Canadian campaign, while Tennessee longed for the signal which would open to them the Coosa-Alabama line of communication, with free exit at Mobile. As it turned out, there was no war with Spain, but Mobile was occupied without resistance. On the other hand, England's plan, more slowly formed, was to beat back the attempt on Canada, to blockade the coast, and crush our ships at sea, and in the latter part of the war to carry offensive operations into the home of the war party, Virginia and Louisiana. Into these four phases, therefore, the actual fighting of the war of 1812 was resolved.

Canada and
Florida.

England's
War Plan.

THE STRUGGLE FOR CANADA

The Canadian defenses were along the lakes, a series of posts from Mackinac to Lake Champlain. It was proposed to break this line at the eastern end, while supporting expeditions carried it at Fort Malden, near Detroit, at Fort Erie, on the Niagara river, and at Kingston. Those places taken, all the columns would concentrate on Montreal. It was thought the campaigns would be accomplished with little or no opposition. Had the commanders been good and the coöperation perfect, such might have been the result.

Canadian
Line of
Defense.

The first move was from Detroit, where General Hull commanded with nearly 2500 men. In July he crossed the Detroit river and marched toward Malden. General Brock commanded the British force and made heroic efforts to defend the position.

Hull at Detroit.

Hull moved slowly, gave him time to concentrate, and then fell back because he dared not attack a force half the size of his own, nearly half of his opponents being Indians. The army was disgusted, their want of confidence in their leader only increased



Hull's panic, and when Brock, following the Americans to Detroit, surrounded the place and demanded its surrender, the fort, garrison, and supplies, to his surprise, were handed over without an effort to defend them. Hull pleaded that he was surrounded, his communications cut, and his men likely to be butchered by the hostile Indian if he resisted to the end. His position was indeed perilous, but a braver man would have made some effort to defend himself. A year and a half later he was convicted by a court martial of cowardice and neglect of duty and sentenced to be shot,

Disgraceful Surrender.

but the president pardoned him on account of honorable revolutionary services. The loss of Detroit left the frontier open to Indian raids and created disgust for the men directing the war at the time when there ought to have been enthusiasm.

Nor was there more success at other parts of the border. The column sent against Montreal got under way after much delay and in November reached the Canadian line, whereupon the militia refused to leave the country and were marched back by their commander, Dearborn, to winter quarters at Plattsburg. The other column failed also. Assembled on the Niagara to the number of six thousand it essayed to carry the war into Canada under General Stephen Van Rensselaer, a New York politician and an inexperienced general. The regulars under General Smythe refused to coöperate, and Van Rensselaer was driven back from an attack on Queenstown with a loss of 1000. Then Smythe was placed in command. He was as bad a commander as his predecessor, and his attempted invasion in November was repulsed so easily that he was freely accused of cowardice. In these three forward movements the private soldiers showed ability, but their commanders and many of the other officers were evidently unfit for their posts. By the middle of 1813 all these commanders were removed.

Repulse of
Second and
Third
Columns.

After Hull's defeat William H. Harrison, of Tippecanoe fame, was placed over the Western army, which he organized as fast as a poor commissary department permitted. Late in the autumn of 1812 he was in a position to move forward, and marched to attack the British at Malden. He sent General Winchester forward to make preparations at the rapids of the Maumee, fifty miles from Malden. While there, Winchester was called to the help of Frenchtown, on the Raisin river, thirty miles beyond. He hurried forward with 900 men, took the place, but could not fortify it. January 22, 1813, he was attacked and defeated by Proctor commanding more than 1000 whites and Indians. Surrounded in the snow, the Americans were cut down or massacred by the Indians, until the remainder, over 500 in all, were forced to surrender. At night the savages, crazed by liquor, fell on the wounded prisoners, whom Proctor left without guard, and killed them to a man. The act infuriated the men of the frontier, and "Remember the Raisin" became their battle cry for the rest of the war. Harrison was forced to give up his advance, but he did not lose the confidence of the Western people.

Harrison's
Campaign
in the
Northwest.

Throughout the spring and summer of 1813 he made ready for another attack, and in September was before Malden with 4500 men. By this time the Americans had gained control of Lake Erie, and the British, not daring to withstand a siege with no help possible by water, burned Detroit and Malden and retreated. Harrison pursued them on Canadian territory, forced a fight at the river Thames, and won a signal victory. One of the slain was Tecumseh, who from the first had aided the British. It was the first successful battle in the long announced invasion of Canada, and it gave peace to the Northwest.

Detroit
Recovered.

Battle of the
Thames.

For this valuable result the gunboats on Lake Erie deserve much credit. Hull's surrender showed that we never could retake Detroit as long as it could be supplied by water. Accordingly every effort was made to build and buy ships for service on the lake. By September, 1813, Captain Oliver H. Perry had six vessels well armed and manned. On the 10th he met and destroyed the British lake fleet, slightly weaker than his own. His dispatch announcing the victory ran: "We have met the enemy and they are ours. Two ships, two brigs, one schooner, and one sloop." The victor became very popular.

Holding Lake Erie and Detroit did not mean the conquest of Canada. Montreal was still to be taken, and for that purpose General

**Wilkinson's
Failure on
the St.
Lawrence.**

James Wilkinson was called from New Orleans to take command of the large force at Sackett's Harbor, near Kingston. He was to march down the St. Lawrence, supported by another army led by General Wade Hampton by way of Lake Champlain. The only virtue in Wilkinson's appointment, which was due to his friendship with Armstrong, now secretary of war, was that it made way for Andrew Jackson's command in Louisiana in 1814. Wilkinson was incompetent, and Hampton, who was a good general, coöperated with him reluctantly. Wilkinson moved slowly, as if he did not desire to succeed. Hampton reached an advanced position on the Chateaugay, held it until convinced that the other army would do nothing, and then returned to winter quarters at Plattsburg, on Lake Champlain. Wilkinson, who had fought some skirmishes without success, then fell back to Sackett's Harbor. Hampton, who resented being placed under the incompetent Wilkinson, resigned, and his superior was at length removed from command. Thus ended in failure the second year of fighting on the New York border. The most valuable thing accomplished was that through defeat the army was seasoned to fighting, the old generals had been weeded out, and a number of capable minor officers had been given an opportunity to show their abilities. Of the latter were Major General Jacob Brown, in command of the forces on the Niagara, and Brigadier General Winfield Scott, who served under him, an excellent drill master and a bold fighter.

The year 1814 began gloomily for the Americans. They were discouraged by a war which brought so little success, New England seemed on the point of withdrawing from the union, volunteering had nearly ceased in the Atlantic states, and the treasury was empty. Moreover, Napoleon was checked in Europe, and England might be expected to carry on the war with more energy in America. All this sobered the people, and as the months passed men began to forget that it was a republican war and to realize that the life of the nation was at stake.

**Sobering
Effect of
Defeat.**

They were encouraged by news from Brown. All thought of a grand offensive movement into Canada had been given up, but he was not willing to remain idle. Moving about 2500 men into the enemy's territory, he attacked gallantly. Scott, who was selected to lead the advance with 1300 men, met, July 5, Riall with 1500 men and won a signal victory at Chippewa. The Americans showed great efficiency in marksmanship, and lost only 297, while their opponents lost 515. Brown now united with Scott, and they met the main body of the British three weeks later at Lundy's Lane. The action began in the afternoon and lasted five hours, until darkness intervened. Every part of the field was hotly contested, and the Americans gradually pushed the British from their positions. When the fighting ceased they had lost 853 out of 2000 engaged and the enemy had lost 879 out of 3000. So far as actual fighting went, Brown had the better of it, but he considered it advisable to fall back when his opponent received reinforcements. The movement into Canada was abandoned. It had accomplished all that could be expected in showing that American soldiers could win victories when properly led and trained.

Chippewa
and Lundy's
Lane, 1814.

While this campaign was being fought, Sir George Prevost, commanding in Canada, led a splendid army of 11,000 men along Burgoyne's old route, hoping to pass Lake Champlain and create consternation on the Hudson. Such a campaign, if successful, must have an important influence in New England, where an active group of leaders wished to have those states join Canada in order to be rid of the Virginia predominancy. General Macomb, commanding at Plattsburg, on Lake Champlain, had only 2000 men to meet this invasion, and Prevost felt that he could easily dispose of them. On the lake were two small fleets, the American commander being Captain Thomas McDonough, a young man of thirty, who proved to have remarkable capacity. The fighting strength of the British ships was double that of the Americans. To succeed in his plans Prevost must destroy McDonough, and the two squadrons joined in deadly combat on September 11, while the army before Plattsburg awaited the result. The British expected the victory because their largest ship, a frigate of thirty-seven guns, outclassed our strongest vessel. They concentrated their attack on the *Saratoga*, McDonough's largest ship. After two hours' fighting it was disabled, when the commander, by a daring maneuver, turned it around so that a fresh broadside was brought to bear, with the result that the British frigate struck her colors in half an hour. By that time the whole British squadron was defeated, and Prevost's army retreated to Canada. McDonough's achievement occasioned an outburst of joy throughout the country, and, like Perry's victory on Lake Erie, it rendered safe an important part of the frontier.

McDon-
ough's Vic-
tory on
Lake
Champlain.

For the blundering in this important part of the theater of war the Virginia régime was chiefly responsible. Jefferson's non-resistance policy was more creditable to his heart than to his head. His predecessors filled army and navy with federalist officers and showered contempt upon republicans who might have been appointed. He repaid their scorn with interest, and in army appointments he ignored the federalists and collected as weak a group of incompetents as could be found in any service. Their selection can only be explained on the theory that he believed they would never have anything of importance to do. That the navy did not undergo the same deterioration was due to the fact that its officers were taken from the maritime class, mostly federalists in sympathy, and to the effect of the Tripolitan war in keeping alive the best traditions of the navy. With regard to the army Madison continued the same course as Jefferson. Eustis, secretary of war from March 7, 1809, to December 31, 1812, was a shiftless politician who knew not how to choose the generals or to plan a campaign. His successor, Armstrong, more active than Eustis, muddled things by holding to his friend, the incompetent Wilkinson, and by going to the field himself, where he produced confusion by interfering with plans of better men, until at last, overwhelmed by the loss of the capital, he was forced out of office August 30, 1814. He was succeeded by Monroe, a more practical administrator though not an ideal secretary, who outlasted the war. Hamilton, secretary of the navy from March 7, 1809, to January 13, 1813, was as weak as Eustis and did little to strengthen his department. His successor in office until December 1, 1814, was more active and strengthened the navy by constructing small ships of war to operate against the enemy's commerce. Thus in these two important departments defeat and disaster taught wisdom as truly as in the command of the armies. It required much sad experience to teach the nation the necessity of training in order to conduct such an important affair as a great national struggle.

OPERATIONS AT SEA

The war party did not despise the navy, as their project to build seventy-fours and frigates shows; but they could not overcome the prejudices of the regular republicans. In 1807, when Barron's failure to fight the *Leopard* caused great disgust among those who opposed a navy on principle, it was decided to discharge the crews of the leading frigates and to raise the number of gunboats to 257. Congress indorsed the policy. Jefferson preferred gunboats because they confined the navy to harbor defense and were cheap. The federalists jeered at his idea that small craft armed with light guns could keep the enemy's ships out of our ports, and the experience of war showed they were

Why the
Army was
Weak.

State of
the Navy
in 1812.

right. The war party in 1812 had come to realize this, and failing to get the new ships they wished they put the vessels we had in a proper state of service. Eight ships, four of them forty-fours, with an equal number of smaller vessels, was the strength of the navy. Most people thought that to send them against the mistress of the sea was but to throw them away; but many inward-bound merchant ships were on the ocean in need of protection. Five ships, commanded by Rodgers and Decatur, were in New York harbor when the official information of the declaration of war reached that place, and in an hour they were at sea searching for a British convoy known to be on the ocean. They sailed boldly across the Atlantic to the English coast, thence to the Madeiras, and then to Boston without adventure.

The day before Rodgers arrived in Boston came, also, the *Constitution*, Captain Isaac Hull, nephew of the commander at Detroit, with thrilling news of victory. August 19 she met and defeated the British ship *Guerrière*, 38 guns, after a fight of half an hour. The disabled ship could not be taken into port, and was fired and abandoned. She had been very active in impressments, and her destruction occasioned joy from one end of the coast to the other. Then followed a series of naval duels in which the Americans bore themselves with distinction. In October the *Wasp* captured the *Frolic* and started with her for an American port, but both ships were later taken by a larger enemy vessel. Shortly afterwards the *United States* took the *Macedonian* and carried her safely into Newport, while in December the *Constitution* defeated and burned the *Java*, 38 guns. February 24 the *Hornet* sunk the *Peacock* after an action of fifteen minutes. In all these affairs the American ship, except the *Wasp*, was stronger than her opponent; but the accurate fire and good seamanship of the Americans astonished the enemy and brought them to realize that their best efforts were demanded on this side the Atlantic. In America, also, the effect was marked. A wave of enthusiasm for the navy swept the country, and congress voted to build sixteen new ships of war.

Successful
Naval
Duels.

June 1, 1813, came a disaster which sadly checked the American ardor. Captain Lawrence, who commanded the *Hornet* against the *Peacock*, was now in charge of the *Chesapeake*, fitting in Boston, with orders to cruise off the mouth of the St. Lawrence in order to intercept supplies for the British in Canada. Blockading the harbor was the *Shannon*, Captain Broke, with some smaller ships. He was anxious for a combat with the *Chesapeake*, sent in a challenge, and ordered his companion ship away so as to induce Lawrence to come out. The latter needed little urging. He was rashly brave, and the recent victories had made him overconfident. He had been in command only ten days, his best officers were ill and absent, and his crew were raw and sullen.

Defeat of
the *Ches-*
apeake.

The ships were nearly of equal size, but the *Shannon* was manned by a well-drilled crew who adored their commander. Lawrence had not received the Briton's challenge when he learned that only a frigate kept the blockade. He was not averse to action, and the opportunity to get to sea seemed too good to miss; so he boldly sailed out, and at six o'clock the action began at the outer edge of Massachusetts Bay. In sixteen minutes Lawrence was mortally wounded, and his ship had surrendered after a brave battle. The *Chesapeake* was carried to Halifax, where the body of her commander was given honorable burial by the victors. The remains were later reinterred in New York. Lawrence's utterance as he was carried below, "Don't give up the ship," was repeated far and wide, and the people forgot his rashness in admiration of his courage.

The repeal of the Orders in Council by England led her to hope that the war might be avoided, but she would not give up impressments, and the hope of adjustment vanished. It thus happened that it was not until the spring of 1813 that she gave her best strength to the task before her. At this time the blockade was made stringent, commercial ships were vigorously seized, and a strong naval force continued off the coast. Decatur, with the *United States* and *Macedonian*, trying to get to sea by way of Long Island Sound, was forced into New London harbor and bottled up for the rest of the war. In the spring of 1814 he was transferred to the *President*, blockaded at New York. It was not until the following January that he was able to get out in a storm, the blockaders pursuing and forcing him to an unequal fight, in which he surrendered. Similar fates awaited most of the other ships in the navy. The *Adams* was burned in the Penobscot, 1814, to prevent capture by the enemy; the *Argus* was defeated by the *Pelican* off the coast of Wales in 1813; the *Enterprise*, the newly built *Frolic*, and the *Essex* were all taken before the close of the war. The *Constellation* and the *Congress* were also securely blockaded in American harbors. At the beginning of the war we had

**Growth of
Navy, 1812-
1815.**

ten effective ships and seven smaller vessels ranked as brigs. So fast had the navy grown, spite of losses, that at the close of 1815 it contained seventeen ships, three of them new seventy-fours, nine brigs, thirteen schooners, and three sloops.

War was hardly declared before American privateers were on the seas. Subscription lists posted at the merchants' coffeehouses

**American
Privateers.**

invited all adventurous persons to share the expense and profit sure to come through despoiling Great Britain's rich maritime trade. In Massachusetts, New York, and Maryland the response was particularly generous. Three-fourths of the 492 licensed privateers were from these three states. Good sailing and the ability to get out of tight places were necessary qualities

of a good privateer. Some of the captains displayed great boldness, attacking British privateers, and even small naval ships, with success. Half of the ships engaged in the field did not come up to these requirements and took no prizes, but those best fitted for the enterprise paid their owners handsome profits, while they enriched our naval history with some of its most thrilling exploits. In the war of 1812, 1344 prizes were thus taken from Great Britain, the last in which the United States have resorted to privateering.

THE BRITISH CAMPAIGN ON CHESAPEAKE BAY

In the summer of 1814, as Prevost prepared his invasion of New York by Lake Champlain, a British fleet under Admiral Cochrane and a army of 4000 men under Major General Ross appeared in the Chesapeake to create a diversion for the benefit of the northern operations. The plan was to take the capital and to seize Baltimore, especially disliked for its part in privateering. Ross landed without opposition at Benedict, on the Patuxent, forty miles from Washington, and marched unopposed on the city. News of his movement had reached the president seven weeks earlier, and the militia were frantically called out. They came together slowly, commanded by General Winder, a man of little determination. Falling back before the advancing foe, he at last faced them at Bladensburg, five miles from the capital. His position was good, a hill commanding a bridge across the Patuxent, and he had sufficient artillery. His forces were between six and seven thousand, all raw militia except five hundred marines and sailors under Captain Barney, of the navy. They were just assembled, did not know their officers, and Winder had no influence over them. As the British approached the bridge they received the American artillery fire, but dashed across, formed, and advanced on the Americans. The militia delivered one or two fires, and fled pell-mell. Barney's men stood their ground,

Object of
the Ex-
pedition.



firing with steadiness until about to be surrounded, when they fled from a field on which they now had no support. The British on the evening of the same day, August 24, entered Washington, from which president, officials, and many residents had fled. The capitol, president's house, and the executive offices were burned by the troops. Ross justified this piece of vandalism as retaliation for the destruction of the parliament building at Toronto in the preceding year. The Americans did not pretend to justify the outrages at Toronto, but asserted that it was the action of privates, whereas the torch was applied in Washington at the direction of the commanding general. As an act of retaliation Ross's course went far beyond the action alleged as its justification, and it was committed with such evident relish by him and his officers that it cannot be defended as soldierly conduct.

While Ross moved against Washington seven small vessels appeared before Alexandria, levied a contribution, and rejoined the main force as Ross, his work at Washington done, embarked his force and moved on Baltimore. September 11 he landed at North Point, twelve miles from the city, against which he advanced on a narrow neck of land between the Patapsco and an arm of the bay, saying he would winter in the city even if "it rained militia." Next morning he was mortally wounded in a skirmish, but his army continued to advance. The people of the city and state had collected to the number of 14,000, and earthworks were constructed to protect the place. The harbor was impeded by sunken hulks and defended by Fort McHenry, well garrisoned by regulars and sailors. While the army approached by land the navy under command of Admiral Cochrane began to shell the fort. After several hours' bombardment the admiral reported that he could not advance; and although the infantry had carried the American first line, they did not feel like charging the works before them, and it was decided to withdraw to the ships. The expedition dropped down the bay, and a month later sailed out the capes to take part in the expedition against Louisiana.

**The Value
of Militia.**

The attack on Washington showed as clearly as the operations in Canada the weakness of untrained militia. It is still more evident that the disaster was due chiefly to the lack of intelligent general officers. But the campaign about to be conducted around New Orleans revealed the value of militia when well trained and well led. The destruction of the capital aroused great indignation against the administration, and Armstrong, secretary of war, resigned. He was chiefly responsible for the inertness in his department, although

**Resignation
of Arm-
strong.**

Madison and congress, it must be admitted, had given him slender resources. Armstrong was succeeded by Monroe, who for nearly a year was head of the state and war departments.

Meanwhile, British troops had landed at various harbors in Massachusetts and Connecticut, burning such crafts as they found. A more serious demonstration was an expedition against the eastern coast of Maine. The country as far as the Penobscot was seized after little resistance by the natives, with the intention of holding it after peace was made, in order to establish a safe route from Montreal to Halifax. When it was given up in 1815, the inhabitants, it was said, regretted that they did not continue under British sway.

Attacks on
Maine and
Elsewhere.

THE WAR ON THE GULF COAST

It will be remembered that the war party hoped for an opportunity to acquire Florida. Spain was England's ally, her South and Central American colonies were revolting one after the other, at home she was struggling for existence against Napoleon: what better opportunity could there be, thought the expansionists, to oust her from the part of the coast which destiny evidently meant us to occupy? Madison accepted the idea, and would have carried it out by invading Florida without other pretext than the Louisiana treaty, had not the senate restrained him. Spite of this, two important events happened on the Florida border, one of them resulting in increase of American territory.

The Desire
for Florida.

In 1810 the inhabitants of the part of West Florida nearest the Mississippi revolted against Spain, proclaimed themselves a state, seized the post at Baton Rouge, and asked for annexation to the United States. Madison by proclamation ordered the governor of the territory of Louisiana to extend authority over this district without coming into conflict with any Spanish post. He asserted our right to West Florida by the Louisiana treaty and proposed to hold the region in question subject to future agreement with Spain. Thus our authority was extended to the Pearl river, beyond which was Mobile in undisturbed Spanish possession.

Baton
Rouge
Acquired.

The revolt of the Spanish colonies in South America was suggestive, and a plan was made for a similar movement in East Florida. When it was accomplished, the United States, it seems, was to step in and annex the territory, as at Baton Rouge. In 1811 congress in a secret act authorized the president to take possession of Florida under certain conditions, and Madison appointed two commissioners who repaired to the Georgia frontier. Amelia Island, just within the Florida line, was the scene of much smuggling, which it was desirable to break up. Here occurred a weak attempt at a revolution, and American soldiers occupied the island, but the revolt had so little support from the inhabitants that Madison did not dare carry out the plans made for him. Amelia Island was held, however, until 1813.

Amelia
Island.

In the autumn of 1812 Madison called out 2070 west Tennessee militia under Andrew Jackson, to march to Natchez, expecting to use them against Florida. This was merely an executive act, and when congress refused to sanction the proposed expedition Jackson was recalled to Nashville. The west Tennessee militia were eager for war, and had confidence in their leader. Their opportunity came late in 1813, when it was decided to send them as one of three expeditions against the Creek Indians, who were on the warpath in sympathy with the Indians of the Northwest. The Tennesseans were to march into the Creek country from the north, the Georgia militia from the east, and an expedition from New Orleans was to approach through Mobile Bay and the Alabama river.

**Seizure of
Florida
Balked by
Congress,
1813.**

The most difficult task was Jackson's, but it alone was successful. When the winter closed in he had reached the upper Coosa, after winning two victories over his adversaries. Four days of marching and one good victory would have given him complete success, but he could not get supplies, and his men mutinied and were sent home. With only a handful of followers he held what he had gained until new troops were raised, and March 27 completed the subjugation of the Creeks in the victory of Horse Shoe Bend, or Tohopeka. His campaign showed that he had remarkable power of command as well as resourcefulness and energy. In consequence he was made a major general and assigned to the command of the seventh military district. Besides Louisiana, the district included Mobile, which had been annexed without resistance in April, 1813. Now, as in regard to Baton Rouge, Madison acted under his interpretation of the Louisiana treaty.

**The Creeks
Subdued.**

**Mobile
Seized.**

Jackson's first act in his new capacity was to make the treaty of Fort Jackson, August 9, by which the Creeks gave up their lands in southern and western Alabama. He thus opened a vast region to white settlement, and made safe the Coosa-Alabama line of communication. Next he turned to Mobile. The advance guard of the great expedition against New Orleans had arrived at Pensacola; Jackson seized the town regardless of neutrality obligations, and the British sailed away.

**The Treaty
of Fort
Jackson.**

**Pensacola
Occupied.**

He was hardly back in Mobile when he learned that New Orleans was threatened by a body of more than 10,000 troops. He hastened to the city, which was nearly undefended, calling the militia from Tennessee, Kentucky, and Georgia as he went. Had Winder, in the preceding summer, shown half Jackson's energy, Ross would not have reached Washington.

December 10, the British fleet anchored in Lake Borgne, and early on the 23d a division of the army was landed eight miles below

the city on a strip of land less than a mile wide, between the river and the swamp. Instantly Jackson was in motion, delivering in the evening and early night a sharp battle which drove the enemy to take refuge under the levee until reinforcements came up from the ships. Then Jackson fell back and began to construct breastworks. Pakenham, the British commander, was cautious, and would not move until all his forces were landed, including the artillery. He thus allowed Jackson time to construct formidable defenses, which the royal artillery could not destroy. On January 8, 1815, he threw away his caution and attempted to carry these works. He and his whole army held American militia in contempt, and thought they would break when charged vigorously by British regulars. In the early dawn two red-coated columns rushed on Jackson's lines, one near the river and one near the swamp. They met a withering rifle-fire from which the bravest soldiers must have recoiled. Twice they were rallied and led forward by their best officers, and each time repulsed with great slaughter. Pakenham and General Gibbs were killed, and General Keene severely wounded. The loss in this part of the army was 1971 killed and wounded, and on Jackson's side 13. Meanwhile, Colonel Thornton, with 600 regulars, crossed to the west bank of the river to carry some batteries there, which bore on the ground over which the British must attack on the east side. He met an insufficient force of Louisiana and Kentucky militia, swept it aside, took the batteries, and held the west bank at discretion. Fortunately for the Americans, this movement was delayed until after the attack on their intrenchments on the east bank was repulsed, and by that severe blow the British were so crippled that they relinquished the campaign and withdrew to their fleet.

Arrival of
the British
at New
Orleans.

Battle of
New
Orleans.

The victory at New Orleans was one of the great events in American history. It not only saved the mouth of the Mississippi from conquest and restored to the people confidence in their ability to win battles, but it gave the Western people, who had won it without much help from the seaboard, the confidence to assert a greater influence in national affairs.

Significance
of the
Victory.

To these people, and to many others in all parts of the country, Jackson became the greatest living American. He had, besides his military qualities, political courage and integrity, which sustained him in a long and important career. He was unschooled in the arts of war and statesmanship, but in each field his remarkable natural sense made him essentially efficient. No American has left a stronger mark on our political history.

Before Jackson's victory was won, peace was made between England and the United States. The Russian Czar, from 1812 an ally of England, sought to end the war, and believed it might be done since

the Orders in Council were repealed. He offered each party his services as mediator. Madison accepted, and in the spring of 1813, Bayard, of Delaware, and Gallatin, set out for St. Petersburg to join John Quincy Adams, our minister there, in a peace commission. The action was hasty; for England had not accepted the mediation. She told the Czar that the question between her and the United States did not admit of mediation. But she did not wish to offend her powerful ally, and expressed a willingness to treat directly with the American commissioners. Such a course would give her a freer hand in the negotiation. After some delay the British ministry repeated the offer to Madison, and congress, accepting it for what it was worth, sent Clay and Jonathan Russell as additional commissioners of peace. England appointed three men of little prominence, Lord Gambier, Henry Goulburn, and Dr. Adams. The Americans took it as a slight that more capable men were not named, but the ministry expected to keep the negotiations well in hand. The commissioners began their labors at Ghent early in August, 1814.

The Americans asked that impressments and the right of search be relinquished. The British replied with such demands that it seemed they did not desire peace. We were asked, for one thing, to accept an Indian buffer state on our northwest as an offset to our attack on Canada. The war against Napoleon was then believed to be ended, the English people were elated, they had not heard of the better fighting of the Americans on the northern frontier in the third year of the war, and the result was stout demands on their part. The American commissioners reported the demands to Madison, who made them public. An outburst of indignation ensued in nearly every part of the United States. Lord Castlereagh, the prime minister, seeing that the war would go on with more energy than before, concluded to modify his terms. England was exhausted by the long war on the continent and needed peace more than she needed to triumph over America. Castlereagh had begun to see that the continental nations would be secretly against England in adjusting the affairs of Europe, and he did not wish at that time to be embarrassed by a transatlantic war. So it happened that as the American commissioners were about to go home the British abandoned the worst of their conditions. From day to day they gave up still more, with the result that finally a treaty was signed, December 24, in which neither side gained or lost. It provided for the cessation of arms, the restoration of conquests, and a commission to settle the long-disputed Canadian boundary. The matters for which we went to war were not mentioned; but as England was to reduce her navy with the coming of peace, the question of impressment was no longer important. February 15, 1815, the treaty was unanimously approved

**Peace Ne-
gotiations
Begun.**

**Progress at
Ghent.**

**A Treaty
Signed Dec.
24, 1814.**

by the senate. For the first time since the constitution was adopted the United States faced the future without anxiety about their foreign relations.

NEW ENGLAND DISCONTENT

New England generally chafed under Southern control. Non-importation, embargo, and non-intercourse affected her business prosperity more than the South's. Moreover, it seemed likely that she, a trading community, would continue to be outclassed by the agricultural section. Every new state admitted to the union added to the strength of the rural classes. New York itself, once fair fighting ground for the commercial class, was becoming a farmer's state through the settlement of her rich western lands. What hope was there that commercial New England should get justice from this powerful aggregation directed by the authors of the existing policies? Probably the majority of New Englanders were not concerned with this question, but it rankled in the breasts of the federalists. Their only hope of return to power was in the defeat of the republicans, which seemed impossible, or in separation from the union. In 1803-1804 Pickering and his friends planned for separation with the support of New York, but they failed through the opposition of Hamilton (see page 300). When war against England threatened, they took up the plan again, this time hoping to join New England with Canada under British protection, thus making a great state in which the New England states would have good opportunity for commercial and political expansion. Not all New Englanders favored this plan, but the radical federalists cherished it and hoped to utilize the popular discontent to carry it through.

**Isolation of
the Com-
mercial
States.**

**Plans of
the Ex-
treme
Federalists.**

Their attitude was known in England. Did not Pickering keep his friend Rose, minister for the early months of 1808, well informed? And did not Jackson revel in federalist flattery from Baltimore to Boston? In 1809 came John Henry to Boston, an agent of the governor of Canada, seeking to learn just what could be expected in that quarter. His letters were discreet, but they reveal great dissatisfaction on the part of the leading federalists there. In 1812 Foster, the English minister in Washington, was in close coöperation with the federalists, they urging that England should not yield to the administration. If war came, said they, it would be short and disastrous to America, and the administration would be overthrown. And when war was declared, 34 federalists in the house, 19 of them from New England, issued an address declaring the war unjustifiable and defending England's attitude. All this was well considered in London, and as a token of appreciation the ministry in establishing the com-

**Efforts to
Turn Dis-
content into
Disunion.**

mercial blockade exempted the New England ports north of New London. When Madison called on the states for quotas of militia in 1812, Massachusetts and Connecticut refused to raise troops to serve out of the state, but took steps to equip their forces for state defense. There was much unemployed money in the New England banks; probably half the specie in the country was in New England. Yet the war bonds of the government could hardly be sold there, less than \$3,000,000 being disposed of, while the Middle states took nearly \$35,000,000. With this opposition the president could not deal. He was forced to conduct the war without much aid from the states east of the Hudson.

Early in the war the federalists in Essex county, Massachusetts, issued an address written by Senator Pickering for a convention to consider the situation within the state. There was much animated discussion in other parts of the state, but a number of conservative federalists in Boston, led by Dexter, secretary of war under Adams, checked the movement in that city, and the other towns hesitated also. The movement was revived in the autumn of 1814, when Washington was in ashes and part of Maine, then under Massachusetts authority, was occupied by the British. Governor Strong, much opposed to the war, now called out the militia to repel the invader. He placed it under state officers and asked the secretary of war if the expenses would be paid by the national government. He was told that the secretary had no authority to pay troops not in national service. Then the extremists declared that the state was abandoned in time of need, that the taxes she paid generously were not used for her defense, and that she must look out for her own interests. The governor called a meeting of the legislature, in which the program of the extremists was adopted by 250 to 76 votes in both houses. The majority chose twelve delegates to a convention at Hartford, December 15, to consider the condition of the country. Connecticut approved the movement and appointed seven delegates, while Rhode Island appointed four. The lower house in New Hampshire's legislature approved, but the council was republican and no delegates were named. Nor were any sent from Vermont. It was a rural state and had no sea-going commerce, and it was not so badly alienated.

While these things occurred, came the congressional elections of 1814. In New England the federalists gained nine seats, and of the whole forty-one the republicans had only two. But in the entire country the federalist representation shrank from 68 to 65. Thus while the war party gained 12 places outside of New England, it lost within that region. The explanation is that the calamities of 1814 were uniting the people of the Middle and Southern states, and it seems that but for the efforts of the extremists the same results would have occurred in the Northeast.

**Hartford
Convention
Called.**

Senator Pickering, in Washington, observed the meeting of the Hartford convention with delight. He had his following in it, mostly young men, who wished immediate steps taken toward separation. But another spirit prevailed. A group of more conservative men gained the ascendancy and made George Cabot, a timid man, president. Two delegates appointed by popular meetings in New Hampshire and one chosen by the town of Windham, Vermont, presented themselves and were given seats, making the membership 26. The meetings were secret, and continued until January 5, when an adjournment was ordered to meet in Boston at the call of the president. An address was published in justification of its conduct, filled with ideas taken from Madison's Virginia Resolutions (see page 285), and upholding the opinion that a state should conduct her defense when invaded. Seven suggested amendments to the national constitution were also announced, which, with the report, were submitted to the states represented in the convention. From the people at large and from the legislature they met a warm approval; and Massachusetts and Connecticut sent delegates to lay the demands of New England before the national government. Just at this stage, when disunion seemed inevitable, came news of the treaty signed at Ghent, December 24, and the whole movement collapsed.

**The Con-
vention in
Session.**

Contemporaries freely charged the Hartford convention with promoting disunion, and sometimes it was pronounced traitorous. One of the members, Harrison Gray Otis, to vindicate himself in after years, published the journal of the convention. But it was a mere skeleton of the proceeding, and contained no speeches or other matter to show what the delegates really intended. Theodore Dwight, secretary of the convention, published a history of the convention, but it was in the tone of an advocate, and has not been received as a frank statement. The amendments proposed by the convention demanded concessions which congress and the nation must have denied. They asked for a relinquishment of the compromise of the constitution by which three-fifths of the slaves were counted in representation and in the apportionment of direct taxes, for a two-thirds vote to admit a new state to the union, for a like vote to declare war, or to establish commercial non-intercourse, for the prohibition of officeholding to naturalized citizens, for the ineligibility of a president for two terms, and for the denial of the authority to lay an embargo longer than sixty days. The men who announced this program were experienced political leaders. They must have had some policy in reserve to be adopted if their demands were refused. They doubtless knew they had aroused a great popular impulse which could hardly be turned backward. It is difficult to believe they expected the national government to yield, and failing that, it seems very probable

**Significance
of New
England
Discontent.**

that they meant to carry the movement they had so carefully and ably developed to its logical conclusion, some sort of disunion.

On the other hand, it must be remembered that the union in 1814 was not so sacred a thing as later. Recently entered into on the ground that it was best for the states to act together, it was to most men still a thing of political expediency. The New Englanders were in a position to ask what it was worth to their section. The extreme federalists repudiated the republican doctrines, rejected government by all the people, and Puritan as they were, felt an aversion to a government controlled by men openly charged with skepticism. They thought, also, about their commercial interests and about the possibility of being overwhelmed by new states. From their standpoint it was not unnatural to ask if the union was an advantage to New England. These thoughts were strongest in the minds of the extreme federalists. To them the collapse of their plans with the end of the war must have been a disappointment. But to the mass of New Englanders, moderate federalists as well as republicans, the passing of the crisis was probably a relief. They quickly regained their confidence in the union, and New England discontent immediately disappeared. The federalist party, from its apparent sympathy with the Hartford convention, received a blow from which it did not recover.

One test of the efficiency of a state is its ability to meet a great crisis; for example, its ability to wage war. In this sense the war of 1812 gives us an opportunity to see how far we had come in the road of political self-direction since we became an independent power. Badly as the struggle was fought out, it was carried on more successfully than the revolution. Until it began we had not seriously determined whether or not we could make war. We had no army, and a weak navy. We had no corps of trained officers to marshal the citizen soldiers. We had no machinery of credit to enable the government to place its emergency loans, and the sense of nationality was not developed to enable the government to draw the support it ought to have from all sections. The calamities of the first two years of war showed every man these weaknesses, and the lesson was well learned. When war ended, the people were aroused, they had acquired a good military organization, they were determined to have an adequate navy, they had come to see the need of common effort, they were ready for a better financial system, and they were fighting their battles better than before. When the struggle was over, the whole system of inefficiency was a thing of the past. From that time to the present the nation has never gone back to the old state of unpreparedness, the army has been better organized, the navy has been respectable, and the national resources have been held in hand with a reasonable sense of national needs. The war of 1812 was worth all it cost in national humiliation; for it taught the American people to take seriously its function of national defense.

**The Lesson
of the War.**

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CHAPTER XVI

SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT

GROWTH OF THE WEST AND SOUTHWEST

THE vastness of the natural resources of the continent impressed the colonists from the earliest days, and the success of the revolution strengthened this confidence. Masters of their own future, the men of 1783 eagerly looked forward to an era of rapid empire-building. In imagination they saw the interior of the continent settled by many people and divided into rich and happy states. Already the tide of settlement had passed into Kentucky and Tennessee and was beginning to penetrate the region north of the Ohio and south of Lake Erie. Further south a similar movement was rolling back the forests of western Georgia.

A glance at the early census returns shows how well the hopes of the men of 1783 were realized. In 1790 the West, exclusive of Georgia, had a population of 109,368, in 1815 the same territory contained about 1,600,000 inhabitants; and in these were not included a very numerous migration from the East to western New York. This progress was achieved at the expense of the older states, which increased in the same period from 3,819,846 to about 6,800,000 inhabitants. As all Europe was then at war, emigration to America was inconsiderable, and the rapid gain in Western population came chiefly from the older states. The South contributed its share to Tennessee and Kentucky, and to the region immediately north of the Ohio. New England was not well adapted to agriculture, and stories of the opportunity in the West carried away a constant stream of humanity from her farms and villages. New England saw their departure with chagrin. The census reports indicate how disastrous it was for her. The population of Connecticut, 237,946 in 1790, was only 275,248 in 1820, and the population of Massachusetts, exclusive of Maine, grew from 378,787 to 523,287 within the same period. Albany was the immediate objective of those who migrated, thence they traversed the Mohawk valley to the rich Genesee lands beyond it, and on to the lake, which was reached at Buffalo about 1800. In all western New York were fertile lands to which the incomers were diverted. They soon passed beyond the state's borders, following the shore of the lake into northern Ohio, and thence into the much greater forest still farther

**Westward
Migration.**

**Western
New York.**

west. While many New Englanders settled in the West by other routes, this direct road from Albany to Buffalo, a highway for canal and railroad traffic in our own day, was the route by which most of the New England life went to its new home in the West. Since the

**Two Strata
of Popula-
tion in the
West.**

Southerners settled largely in the region just north of the Ohio, it happened that for a long time there existed a clear divergence of ideals between the northern and southern parts of Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois. The advance into Georgia was almost entirely Southern, the immigrants being from Virginia and the Carolinas. They carried slaves with them, and quickly established cotton plantations which became the basis of vast wealth.

The sale of the public lands was closely connected with this progress. As long as the settlers were concerned with the Western lands claimed by New York, Connecticut, Virginia, North Carolina, and Georgia,

**The Sale of
Public
Lands.**

regulations by congress were of no importance; but beyond these were the rich tracts on the Ohio, for whose disposal a land policy had to be devised. From colonial times a usual method of selling public lands was to grant them to large companies or rich individuals who could afford to open them to settlement and to import European purchasers, if necessary. Such a course was less likely to draw off the population from the older parts of the country; and for that reason it now commended itself to the majority in congress. For this reason large tracts were sold in 1788 to the Ohio Scioto Companies, and Symmes, a private speculator, got another great grant in the same year. These projects were located respectively on the Muskingum, the Scioto, and the Great Miami, all more than a hundred miles beyond the point at which the Ohio crosses the boundary between Pennsylvania and Ohio. The land adjacent to that boundary was to be sold by the government to the settlers directly.

This first plan adopted to sell the latter land, announced in 1785 and slightly modified in 1787, provided that the region between

**The Town-
ship Sys-
tem.**

Pennsylvania and the eastern corner of the Ohio Company's lands should be surveyed in townships six miles square, each containing thirty-six sections one mile square, or 640 acres. The smallest amount to be sold to one buyer

was to be a section, and sales were to be at auction at the seat of government at not less than one dollar an acre. The sixteenth section of each

**Settle-
ments
North of
the Ohio.**

township was to be reserved for schools. In 1787 Ohio was organized as a territory, with General St. Clair for governor. When Washington became president, the Ohio Company had planted the settlement of Marietta, and Symmes that of Cincinnati. The Scioto Company was an inflated speculation, and was soon in a collapsed condition. Between the Scioto and the Little Miami in a large tract were the mili-

tary lands reserved by Virginia for her revolutionary soldiers. In 1790 nearly 4300 white inhabitants were in the Northwest Territory, 1300 of them in and around Cincinnati, 1000 at Marietta, and 2000 in the country of the Illinois, at Kaskaskia, and on the Wabash. Six years later the population of the territory was placed at about 15,000.

The men of the West freely declared that this slow growth was due to the illiberal policy of land sales. The remedy, they said, was to make purchases easy to the actual settler. In 1796 they got a small concession. Lands might now be sold in sections of 640 acres, at not less than \$2 an acre, and land offices were to be opened at Pittsburg and Cincinnati.

Laws of
1796 and
1800.

As sales did not increase, further relaxation was made in 1800 in a law for which William Henry Harrison was chiefly responsible. Four additional land offices were opened in Ohio, tracts as small as 320 acres might be bought, and four years' credit was allowed the purchaser. The price remained \$2 an acre. This law promoted immigration, as was desired. In 1800 the population of Ohio was 45,365, in 1810 it was 230,760, and in 1815 it was about 400,000.

Another result was a vast amount of land speculation, by small owners as well as large, who bought on credit, hoping to sell at a profit before the last payments were due. The suffering connected with the war of 1812 caused a collapse of this speculation, and in 1820 a new law gave up the credit system and provided that small holdings, not less than 80 acres, should be sold for cash at not less than \$1.25 an acre, which since that time has been the minimum price at which the public land has been sold. Offering a small farm cheap for cash made it

Further
Changes.

Law of 1820.

possible for any man to acquire a homestead who could pay \$100, and it favored the rapid settlement of the West. Distribution was made still easier by laws of 1830 and 1841 providing that poor persons settled on land without title should have a preëmptive right to their holdings. The next and last step in easy distribution was the homestead act of 1862, for the gift of small farms to actual settlers. The provisions mentioned refer to farming lands: since 1820 timber lands have brought not less than \$2.50, mining lands \$5.00, and coal lands \$10.00 an acre. All these prices were minimums. Early in the century auctions were continually held. As the lands were opened in districts and the best offered first, they frequently brought more than the minimum. This was particularly true of the cotton lands in Alabama and Mississippi.

The Northwest Ordinance, 1787, created the Northwest Territory, with governor, council, and judges appointed by congress.

When it had 5000 free male adult inhabitants a territorial legislature was to be organized to make local regulations.

Northwest
Ordinance,
1787.

It was later to be divided into not less than three nor more than five territories, and each, when it contained 60,000

inhabitants, might be admitted to the union as a state. Slavery, except as punishment for crime, was not to exist in its limits. The first congress under the constitution confirmed the ordinance and in 1790 it was adopted for the territory south of the Ohio, with some modifications, chief of which was that slavery was not forbidden in this region. It is the basis of our territorial system.

In 1800 that part of the Northwest Territory west of a line from the mouth of the Kentucky to Fort Recovery and thence north to Canada was set aside as Indiana Territory. The eastern part retained the old name, and in 1803 Ohio was admitted to the union, congress agreeing to turn over the school lands, one thirty-sixth of the total area, and to pay 3 per cent of the proceeds from land sales in the state to the construction of roads. In

**Indiana
Territory.**

**Other
Territories.**

1805 Michigan Territory was organized, and Illinois in 1809. These four states and territories, larger than all the Atlantic states north of the Carolinas, had in 1820 a population of 792,719, and were receiving an enormous tide of immigration. Wisconsin became a territory in 1836. As the settlers advanced the Indians fell back. Defeated by Wayne in 1794 and discouraged by the victory of Harrison at the Thames in 1813, they did not resist the encroachments on their domains. In one treaty after another they sold their possessions and retired westward.

South of the Ohio the unsettled region was on the Gulf. The compromise of 1798 (see page 301) was followed by the creation of Mississippi Territory, between the Chattahoochee and the Mississippi, bounded on the north by a line from the mouth of the Yazoo to the Chattahoochee. The lands north of this territory were conceded to Georgia. In 1802 a second

**Settlement
of the Gulf
Region.**

and more extensive agreement was made, by which Georgia ceded to the United States her lands beyond her present boundary, receiving in return the narrow strip just south of Tennessee, \$1,250,000 from the proceeds of land sales, and the promise that the national government would extinguish the Indian titles in Georgia "as early as the same can be peaceably obtained on reasonable terms." All this

**Mississippi
Territory.**

region was now made Mississippi Territory, and congress promised to admit it as a state when its population was as much as 60,000. Within it were Creek, Chickasaw, and Choctaw Indians, the first in what is now Alabama and western Georgia, the second and third along the Mississippi. Settlement in the South proceeded more slowly than in the North, probably because slavery kept back the poorer whites. In the first and second decades under the constitution Georgia absorbed most of the migration southward, and after 1804 Louisiana received another portion of it. During these decades the intervening region, occupied by Indians, was not reached by settlers. Jackson's victory over the Creeks, 1814, and the treaty which followed, cut a wide zone out of the heart of the Indian country,

approximately three-fourths of the later state of Alabama, and opened it to settlement. The land was very fertile, and sold at auction at high prices on credit. A few years later the price of cotton fell, and there was much suffering among the incautious speculators. But the movement brought in a large number of settlers, and in 1816 Alabama Territory was cut off from Mississippi. The settlement of this region increased the demand for slaves, prices rose, and spite of the law of 1807 against importations a great deal of smuggling followed in the Gulf region. In 1800 Mississippi Territory had 8850 inhabitants, in 1810 it had 40,352, and in 1820 it had 75,448. In 1820 Alabama had a population of 127,901. The former became a state in 1817, the latter in 1819.

Alabama
Opened to
Settlement.

Meanwhile, the west bank of the Mississippi was yielding to civilization. In 1805 congress created the Territories of Orleans and Louisiana, respectively, south and north of the thirty-third degree, the seat of power of one being New Orleans and of the other St. Louis. They grew moderately. In 1810 Orleans had 76,556 inhabitants and in 1812 was admitted to the union as Louisiana. At the same time Louisiana Territory changed its name to Missouri. Thus by the end of the period under consideration, 1783-1815, the vast Western region had been staked out for the reception of a great number of inhabitants as far as the western limit of the rich strip bordering the Mississippi, and just beyond Lake Michigan in the extreme Northwest. It was not until near the middle of the century that more westerly limits were staked out.

Louisiana
and Mis-
souri.

INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT

In the West, as in the older states, the chief industry was farming. Raising food for the inhabitants themselves was the first necessity of colonies and frontier settlements. Beyond this they had supplies for the outside world, sending them down rivers to the Atlantic seaboard or to the Gulf port of New Orleans from the Mississippi valley. The acquisition of Louisiana gave a great stimulus to the latter region, because it opened to unquestioned use the great river across which Spain's hand in one way or another was generally placed in restraint of our trade. The years under consideration saw the rapid advance of manufactures in England, which raised the price of English wheat and made it more profitable for Americans to send their grain abroad. Then came the long period of European war, lessening the foreign food supply and drawing on the American market at favorable prices. Spite of restrictions on the carrying trade our exports of food products grew steadily.

Agriculture
and the War
in Europe.

But the most advance in American agriculture was in cotton production. The interior parts of the South were not adapted to rice, sugar, or tobacco. Cotton they could raise, but the removal of the seed was slow and expensive. In 1793 Eli Whitney, a native of Massa-

chusetts, a graduate of Yale, and for a time a schoolmaster near Savannah, invented the cotton gin, next to McCormick's reaper the most important agricultural machine now in use. It gave a great impetus to cotton raising. From North Carolina southward was an immense region, not well suited to wheat production or grazing, and destined to slow development had not this invention opened another possibility. As it was, the road to wealth became suddenly broad and plain. Cotton was worth forty-five cents a pound in England, and the recent development of spinning and weaving there had made it possible to supply the world with great quantities of cloth. In 1791 only 38 bales of cotton, of the modern standard size, 500 pounds each, were exported from the United States. In 1809 the whole crop was 218,723 bales, and in 1816 cotton exported was worth \$24,106,000 and was by far our most valuable single export. At that time the price was twenty-eight cents a pound.

The Cotton Gin.

The production of cotton stimulated the spread of slavery in the interior parts of the South. Vast areas of cheap land awaited cultivation for a crop yielding a ready money return, and the only lack was labor. White men might have worked them, but it was easier and quicker to employ slaves. Besides, the social system already established in the South looked to the creation of estates, not to a mass of small farmers; and for the maintenance of estates a permanent laboring class was necessary. In a new country, where the free laborer became a landowner with facility, slave labor was the only certain form of a permanent laboring class. Thus, the introduction of cotton farming on a large scale, just when slavery seemed in a way to be extinguished (see page 350), hardened the grasp of the institution on the far South, and checked the growth of antislavery sentiment, then very strong, in the non-cotton-raising slave states, Virginia, Maryland, and Delaware.

Cotton and Slavery.

Before the adoption of the constitution the state of our commerce was confused, and statistics for it are unsatisfactory. In 1790 the exports were worth \$19,000,000. The war which soon began in Europe stimulated our commerce both by raising the price of products abroad and by making our merchants the purchasers of the products of the French, Spanish, and Dutch colonies, products reexported to Europe at a good profit. This colonial trade was so profitable that complaint was made that it seriously injured other industry by drawing to itself all the available capital in the country. By 1795 our total foreign exports reached \$67,000,000, of which \$26,000,000 were reexported products. The colonial trade was irregular, but it rose generally, until in 1806 it reached a maximum at \$59,640,000, while the exports of domestic origin were then less than \$49,000,000. After that came restrictive measures at home and abroad which reduced the total exports to an average of about \$33,000,000. There was much speculation connected with commerce in its

Commerce.

prosperous years, and the influence was probably bad. Merchants took chances in whatever field seemed to offer opportunity, and expected to recoup themselves by one lucky stroke for the loss through an unlucky one.

This rise in commerce was accompanied by similar progress in navigation. Before the revolution more American ships were engaged in the trade with the West Indies than in that with the British ports in Europe. After the revolution the West Indian trade was lost on account of the navigation laws, which induced congress to establish restrictions of its own. In 1789 and 1790 it enacted discriminating duties in behalf of American ships, and the consequent increase in American tonnage was so rapid that the British shipowners were in consternation. Foreign traders then employed 41.19 per cent of all the tonnage engaged in our trade. It fell slowly, until in 1795 it was only 9.7 per cent; and from that time until the war of 1812 its highest proportion was 17.2 per cent. Meanwhile, our actual tonnage grew, until in 1807 it was eight times as great as in 1789. After that it decreased under the operation of our various restrictive acts, but it recovered after the war, and in 1816 was 77.48 per cent of all the tonnage engaged in our foreign trade. The statistics available show that far the larger part of this tonnage was American built.

The fisheries also demanded governmental assistance. In colonial days they yielded great profits and were encouraged by the mother country as a breeding source of seamen. The treaty of 1783 guaranteed the American fishermen the right to fish on the Banks, and in territorial waters as well, but did not allow them to dry fish on any but unsettled shores. Whatever advantage lay in this was later neutralized by restrictions passed in England forbidding the importation of the product of foreign fisheries and by English bounties to fishermen. Loud complaints now arose from the whale and cod fishers of America. Deprived of their best market, they petitioned congress for aid, and so much was it felt that our own nurseries of the sea should be sustained that one of the first steps taken by congress under the constitution was to allow a drawback on fish exported equal to the duty on the salt used in curing them. In 1792 the law went farther, and awarded a bounty in money to persons engaged in cod fishing. Under its operation the industry revived and became prosperous.

The embargo, the subsequent restrictions, and the war which followed again checked the fisheries, to the great satisfaction of the Canadians, who resented having to share the inshore fishing with the Americans. In their behalf the British government, in making the treaty of Ghent, sought to withhold the right. It held that the war ended the treaty grants of 1783, and would not yield them again unless we allowed

American
Shipping.

The
Fisheries.

The
Fisheries
after 1815.

British subjects to navigate the Mississippi. To this Clay, one of the negotiators, objected so stoutly that the treaty as finally made was silent on each question. It was, however, agreed that later negotiations should settle the fisheries question. With the return of peace Americans appeared in their old haunts only to be warned off by armed vessels. They might fish, they were told, on the Banks, but they would not be allowed within territorial waters. Then came negotiations, the upshot of which was provisions in the convention of 1818 that our fishermen might take fish off the Magdalen Islands, in the Gulf of St. Lawrence, and along the most unsettled shores of Newfoundland and Labrador, with the privilege of curing fish and getting certain necessary supplies in uninhabited parts. On this basis the fisheries continued with a restricted prosperity.

The years immediately following the revolution saw a sad disorder in the currency. Exports were relatively small and much of the

**The Cur-
rency.** foreign specie which had come into the country in the channels of trade was drained out to pay balances. Seven

states sought to remedy the deficiency by a return to paper money, or state notes, a form of currency forbidden in the constitution soon to be adopted. In 1791 a national bank was created with a capital stock of \$10,000,000. Its notes were issued cautiously, and were gladly received everywhere. Its power to present for redemption the notes of state banks enabled it to check overissue by such banks. Thus the paper currency was sound until the charter of the bank expired in 1811. The bank asked for a continuation of its existence, but the republican majority was very hostile, and would not even allow an extension to wind up its affairs. Then a swarm of state banks sprang up, each issuing its notes without restraint. The government

**Distress in
the War of
1812.** was soon at war, and, anxious to get money of any kind, gave its bonds for these insecure overissues, and received them for its dues, with the result that it lost \$5,000,000 in the process. In 1811 there were 88 state banks with a

total circulation of \$22,700,000: in 1816 there were 246, with circulation of \$68,000,000. This alarming inflation led to the incorporation of the second United States bank, 1816, and by 1820 the circulation of the state banks had fallen to \$40,641,574. In the panic which followed the capture of Washington, 1814, all the banks south of New England suspended specie payment and did not resume until 1817. During the war of 1812 \$36,680,000 of treasury notes were issued, nearly half of which was outstanding at the end of 1815.

The last quarter of the eighteenth century brought a great revolution in the world's manufactures. Before that time weaving, spinning, nail-making, and most everything else was done by hand in the homes of cottagers. But beginning with Hargreaves's spinning jenny, 1764, several inventions led to the power loom, by which the textile industry was shifted

**New Era in
Manu-
factures.**

from the cottages of the operatives to the factory of the great manufacturer. The same thing happened in other lines, and the result was the factory system, with its large outlay of capital and its peculiar relation of employer and employees. This process was first established in England, and it was well developed by 1800.

For a time no response to this English development was seen in American industry. There was from colonial days a good deal of manufacturing of the old kind, ironware, hats, shoes, nails, and farm implements being some of the notable products. The lack of capital, the profits of agriculture, and the ability of British manufacturers to undersell served to delay the introduction of the new system. But spite of the difficulties, some advance was made. In 1793, the year Whitney invented the cotton gin, Samuel Slater, in partnership with Moses Brown, set up at Pawtucket, Rhode Island, the first successful cotton factory in the United States. It was supplied with machinery of the British design, and its example was imitated in many other places, although the enterprises struggled along with many drawbacks.

**Early
Manu-
factures in
America.**

In 1807 began the restrictions of the importation of British merchandise, lasting in one form or another until the war, which, with the blockade that followed it, effectually shut out foreign goods. Thus for eight years the American manufacturers had the home market to themselves. The result was a marvelous rise in manufacturing. In 1807 the cotton industry employed 8000 spindles, two years later it had 80,000; and similar progress was made in other lines. Among all classes spread an enthusiasm for articles made in America, and politicians wishing to be popular appeared on public occasions in homespun clothes. Since the failure in commerce resulted in much unemployed capital and labor in the seacoast region of New England, it was here that manufactures gained most rapidly. The proverbial Yankee skill with machinery and the hard conditions of farming added to the stimulus. At the close of the war New England supplied a large part of the country's merchandise, and the agricultural South was sending thither \$6,000,000 a year to settle balances for goods purchased at higher prices than it formerly paid abroad. It seemed to the federalists a just retribution that they who forced the war on the country should thus be made to feel one of its burdens. The rise of manufactures created a new class of rich men, less prominent in social and business matters than the old aristocracy of commerce. Between the two classes there followed sharp dissensions, but the manufacturers had greater natural strength than their rivals, and with the aid of a protective tariff gained so rapidly in wealth that ten years after the war they dominated the policy of the government in relation to business.

**Influence of
the Em-
bargo and
the War.**

**Effects of
Manu-
facturing on
Society.**

SLAVERY MADE SECTIONAL

In 1776 slavery existed in all the states. Many of the colonists wished to arrest its spread, but the British merchants protested, and the king vetoed the restrictive colonial laws. The colonists resented his action, and seized the first opportunity to act for themselves. In the "Association" of 1774 slave importations were forbidden, the first congress after independence reasserted the restriction, and for the rest of the revolution the trade was checked. After the war commerce generally was controlled by the states, all of which but those in the far South forbade the slave trade. There were vast unsettled regions in the Carolinas and Georgia, and it was thought they must have negroes to develop them. But even here the advocates of restriction won, and by 1798 each of these states had forbidden further importations. The constitution, it will be remembered, declared that congress could not prohibit the trade before 1808.

The Slave Trade in the Revolutionary Period.

Emancipation in the North — under Constitutional Provisions;

Meanwhile, a movement for emancipation had swept over the entire North. In this section were few slaves, and the opponents of the institution needed only to organize the non-slaveholders, a large majority, to carry laws for emancipation. Vermont led the way in 1777 by declaring slavery illegal in the bill of rights incorporated in her constitution, and New Hampshire did the same in the constitution of 1784. In each state the few slaveholders could only convert their slaves into servants for wages or sell them out of the reach of the state's jurisdiction. The Massachusetts constitution of 1780 declared that "all men are born free and equal," and in 1783 the court in a test case held that this annulled a master's right to the labor of his slave. Thus in three states the institution passed quietly out of existence.

In others the cause of freedom encountered greater opposition, but its advocates had recourse to the legislatures. Their request for emancipation by state statutes was met with argument that to free the slaves was to confiscate property. After struggles of varying length, they carried each Northern state but one for gradual emancipation, which meant that slave children born after the enactment of the said statutes should be free on reaching a specified age, usually twenty-five years. The first victory of this kind was in Pennsylvania, chiefly through the efforts of the Quakers; and it came in 1780. Connecticut and Rhode Island followed in 1784, New York in 1799, and New Jersey in 1804. The men of New York were not satisfied with their achievement, and in 1817, when the power of the slaveholders was much weakened, a law was carried for complete emancipation after 1827. Delaware alone of the Northern states retained slavery, and here it was safe until the end of the civil war.

by Statute.

The movement for freedom was felt south of the Mason and Dixon line and was strong in Virginia, where Jefferson, Washington, and many other leading men wished to rid the state of an unprofitable form of labor and of the presence of an alien and undeveloped element of the population. But here was encountered a more serious obstacle than had yet appeared. The small proportion of blacks in the North involved no menace to the civilization there, were they slave or free. But the people of Virginia knew not what to do with a great mass of freed blacks. To leave them masters of their own actions in the white population seemed to invite trouble, and to send them to Africa, which many thought the only proper accompaniment of emancipation, was so expensive that it was out of the question. These objections proved fatal to the efforts of the more far-seeing ones; and thus it happened that two plans for abolishing slavery, one announced in 1779 and the other in 1796, were found impracticable. At this time the invention of the cotton gin had begun to have its effect on slavery, making a great demand for slaves in the states to the southward and raising the prices of them to such a point that masters felt a growing unwillingness to part with such an important source of wealth. Thus the seaboard states settled down to a free and a slave section, a basis of opposition in interest which proved very fruitful of later conflict. West of the mountains the same principle was followed. By the Northwest Ordinance the Ohio divided slavery from freedom between the Mississippi and the Alleghanies. Then came the Missouri Compromise line for the Louisiana purchase; but eventually the matter no longer admitted of compromise.

The Emancipation Movement fails in the South.

From the beginning of the national government the South feared the North would use her position in the union to restrict slavery. There was warm debate when in the first congress petitions for restrictions of the slave trade came from abolitionists. The result was the adoption of a set of resolutions guaranteeing that slavery should be left to the jurisdiction of the states and that the slave trade should be undisturbed before 1808. In 1793 a fugitive slave law was passed. It gave the master the right to recover an absconding slave by proving ownership before a magistrate without jury or ordinary forms of law. The law was hard on the slave, but it was necessary from his owners' standpoint. To provide otherwise would enable the slave to have the trial postponed, at heavy expense to the claimant, who might at last lose the suit through the sympathy of a Northern jury. On the other hand, it left the disposition of the freedom of a human being to the irresponsible decision of the lowest rank of courts, a thing not ordinarily allowed in the pettiest property suits. Later it was charged that unprincipled men, by bribing some magistrates, carried away to slavery negroes who were unquestionably free. The recalc-

Slavery in Congress.

First Fugitive Slave Law, 1793.

tion of the historian on this matter is that slavery at its best was an unhappy relation, involving hardship in its primary and secondary relations, and supporting itself by destroying the commonest personal rights.

For some years after 1793 the question was not discussed in congress. The Haytian insurrection of 1791 was accompanied by murder and

**Revived
Movement
for Slaves in
the South.**

outrage, and a spasm of terror shot through the South and North at the thought of what might happen in our own land if slaves once began to strike for freedom. By general consent it was thought well to let the subject alone.

But the approach of 1808, when the foreign slave trade might be forbidden, reminded the South that it must act at once if it recruited its slave supply before the doors were closed to importation. In 1803, therefore, South Carolina repealed her law against the slave trade. This brought protests from the North, and futile efforts were made to get congress to lay an importation tax of ten dollars a head on slaves. In 1806 Jefferson, always an enemy of slavery, took up the cause, recommending congress to pass a law to prohibit the foreign slave trade after January 1, 1808.

The suggestion was acceptable to congress, but it was hard to agree upon details, the greatest difficulty being the disposal of slaves illegally

**Importa-
tions For-
bidden.**

brought in. To return them to Africa was impossible, the suggestion that they be liberated in the place of capture was resented by the Southerners, who would not have free negroes among them, and the idea that they be sold

by the government was rejected by Northerners, since it made the federal government party to slave selling and but increased the South's number of slaves. After much discussion it was decided that such slaves should be turned over to the state in which they were seized, to be disposed of as it chose. The captured slave dealer should forfeit ship and cargo, be fined from one to ten thousand dollars, and be imprisoned from five to ten years. To prevent irregularities, it was also ordered that in the future the coastwise interstate slave trade should be limited to vessels of forty or more tons and that the slaves thus carried should be registered. The act of 1807 was to go into force with the beginning of the following year. It was frequently

Smuggling.

violated. Slave prices now became higher than ever, and adventurous slavers took cargoes into the isolated bays and rivers of the unwatched coast, where the planters, ever anxious to get slaves, were as reticent as the smugglers.

RELIGIOUS DEVELOPMENT AFTER THE REVOLUTION

The English Church was established by law in Maryland, Virginia, and North and South Carolina, although it had a real hold on the people only in Virginia and South Carolina. In Massachusetts, Connecticut, and New Hampshire the Puritan form of religion was

established by law. Only Pennsylvania, Delaware, and Rhode Island had no state church. But the war brought a spirit of religious liberty, and at its end every establishment except those of New England was swept away. The clergy of the English Church in America, bound by strongest ties to the royal prerogative, had been generally loyal to the crown. Most of them had left the country with the other tories, and the old church, discredited by its opposition to the revolution, was in a state of disintegration, a condition which afforded excellent opportunity for the dissenting churches to gather up the scattered fragments.

**The Fate of
the Estab-
lishments.**

The first to take advantage of the situation were the Methodists, who appeared in the colonies about 1760. Their preaching was popular, and their followers, though formed into "societies," were first considered members of the English Church. When that church was prostrate on account of the revolution, the "societies" appealed to Wesley, the father of the Methodist movement, who in 1784 advised them to unite in one body, with superintendents, who later were called bishops, and a system of church government, called "the discipline." The result was the organization of the Methodist Episcopal Church at Baltimore during the Christmas holidays, 1784. The world has rarely seen a more zealous body of leaders than the itinerant preachers who now began to penetrate to the remotest settlements, kindling the imagination of the masses by fervid appeals to the conscience, portraying the effects of irreligion, and exalting the power of the spirit. Their most prominent leader was Francis Asbury, a man of heroic zeal, aptly compared by his followers with that other Francis, who in the thirteenth century filled Europe with the echoes of his good deeds. In New England, where congregationalism was firmly rooted, the results were comparatively small; but in the Middle states and the South, and particularly in the new communities of the West and Southwest, they had wonderful success and made themselves a powerful agency in the lives of the people.

**The
Methodists.**

Meanwhile the older non-episcopal churches extended their influence. Most numerous, perhaps, were the Baptists, who were especially strong in the South Atlantic states. In colonial times they were generally Calvinists. Their government was congressional and they were not held together in a general organization. But the renewed religious life around them, together with the common impulse toward union which came from the formation of a national government, led to the organization of a general convention in 1814. One of the chief objects of this movement was to promote missions, a thing to which those who held to the older forms objected so strenuously that they gradually withdrew from the convention. The seceders called themselves Primitive Baptists, while

**The
Baptists.**

the others, a more numerous group, were called Missionary Baptists, in contrast. It was a time of general religious activity, and resulted in renewed prosperity of the Presbyterian, Lutheran, Quaker, and other organizations, and several newer bodies, the results of separating impulses, now came into existence. The Roman Catholics, at first strong in Maryland, and planted in every large seacoast town, also began to increase in numbers, chiefly through the accession of immigrants, many of whom were from Ireland. In this manner did the leaven of nationality work in the creation of a strong native American movement for the establishment of the American type of religion.

All this had its effect on the English Church in America. Threatened with extermination through the failure of its connection with the Church of England, it began soon after the revolution to reorganize itself on an American basis. Its first need was a national organization, something it could not have in a system which had for cardinal doctrine the ecclesiastical supremacy of the English king. All efforts to secure the creation of an American episcopate had failed before the revolution, but peace was hardly made before they were renewed. At last Samuel Seabury, of Connecticut, was in 1784 consecrated bishop of Connecticut by three non-juring bishops in Scotland. Then the British parliament gave way, and by act allowed the archbishops of Canterbury and York to consecrate, in 1786, two American bishops, and three years later these, with Seabury, completed in Philadelphia the organization of the Protestant Episcopal Church in the United States. As the survivor of the English establishment, it had much dignity in the new nation and embraced in its membership a large proportion of the men of influence outside of New England, while the Methodist, Baptist, and Presbyterian churches took place as the great popular religious bodies.

Although Puritanism maintained formal hold on New England, it was internally at the point of disintegration. Of its three factions, these who held to strict Calvinism, and the "Hopkinsans," who were followers of Jonathan Edwards, and promoted missions and revivals, considered themselves more orthodox than the third party, who were soon to be called Unitarians. This third group was strong in the Boston churches and among the wealthier class on the seaboard. They opposed revivals and questioned so many of the orthodox principles that men began to ask, "Shall we have the Boston religion, or the Christian religion?" The controversy became warm in 1815 when it was known that leaders of the party corresponded with the English Unitarians. The result was a separation in many of the older churches and the open avowal of Unitarian doctrines. The most eminent leader of the movement was William Ellery Channing, of Boston. In 1825 the American Uni-

Other Churches.

The Protestant Episcopal Church Organized.

The Congregationalists.

tarian Association was founded with general oversight of the movement. In the struggle against the Unitarians the two older factions drew closer together, merged their doctrinal differences in a system which became known as the New England Theology, and established in 1808 Andover Seminary as the nourishing center of the faith. Long before this the New England churches had been called "Congregational," to distinguish them from other churches. The term became of special significance in the West, where the large body of New Englanders, planting their own religion, was thrown into contact with other strong organizations. True to the congregational form of government, they had no general law-making authority, but their great common undertakings, as home and foreign missions, were committed to general boards, which gave cohesion to the common movement.

One other reform needed to be made to modernize the religious life of New England: it must accept disestablishment, already existing in Rhode Island and in the Middle and Southern states.

Episcopalians, Baptists, Methodists, and every other independent church, and eventually the Unitarians, demanded a change. Defenders of the "Standing Order," as the old system was called, pronounced the demand irreligious and asserted that the power of truth against the reign of evil would be destroyed if the state, by means of the public taxes, ceased to support an orthodox and fearless clergy. As Jefferson was the leader of disestablishment in the South, his political party, the republicans, became defenders of liberalism in New England. Similarly the Standing Order, that is, the town clergy, were stout federalists. The battle was hard, but the orthodox party was worsted. The first relaxation was a compromise, following a line which had appeared in the colonial struggle between Puritans and Episcopalians. It was provided that members of a dissenting church might be relieved from taxes to support religion if they presented certificates that they supported their own organizations. This did not benefit those who were members of no church, and it was resented by all who believed in the separation of church and state as a principle. So the struggle went on until the liberals triumphed in state after state. Vermont led the way and adopted complete separation in 1807; Connecticut followed in 1818, New Hampshire in 1819, Maine in 1820, the year she secured statehood, and Massachusetts after a long struggle in 1834.

Disestab-
lishment in
New Eng-
land.

EXPLORATION IN THE FAR WEST

Although the Mississippi was our western boundary in 1783, we could not but be interested in the vast region beyond it. Owned by Spain, as it was, its Indians might be a menace in war or a source of profitable trade in peace. For many years our sole information about

them came from chance travelers and traders, and Jefferson, soon after he became president projected an expedition which should secure more reliable intelligence and establish, if possible, friendly relations with the Indians of the plains. Congress consenting, Captain Meriwether Lewis and Lieutenant William Clark, with 43 men, soldiers and others, began to ascend the Missouri on a voyage which was to make them famous. By this time Louisiana had been purchased, and their exploration had thus acquired added significance. They went into winter quarters near the present town of Bismarck, North Dakota, where they met a squaw, the "Bird Woman," formerly captured from the mountain tribes, who with her husband agreed to accompany them.

**Lewis and
Clark Dis-
patched.**

In the spring they proceeded to the mountains, encountering many difficulties of a physical nature. Here the savages avoided them until it was discovered that the chief of the tribe was brother of the "Bird Woman." Guides were now furnished, with whose aid the explorers reached the tributaries of the Columbia. Building canoes in the Indian fashion they embarked, and November 7, 1805, reached the mouth of the river, the Pacific ocean before them. The neighboring tribes were hardly friendly, but the explorers built a fort for the winter, claiming the country in behalf of their government. Next spring they returned with many difficulties to the East, exploring, after they crossed the mountains, the Yellowstone river and other tributaries of the Missouri. They were men of intelligence, and their narrative of travel, though full of the irregular spelling of the day, has come to be considered a classic among American books of exploration. Their discovery furnished the most important basis of our claim to Oregon.

**Their Dis-
coveries in
Oregon.**

Another famous explorer of this period was Lieutenant Zebulon Pike. In 1805 he explored the headwaters of the Mississippi, seeking its source. He encountered many hardships in a winter journey and was forced to accept hospitality from agents of the British Northwest Company, who were illegally trading within our boundaries. The frozen condition of streams rendered his conclusions about the headwaters of the great river unreliable. He was back at St. Louis in April, 1806, and in the following August set out to explore the Arkansas and the Southwest. He reached the Rocky mountains and penetrated them near the peak which bears his name. His object is not definitely known, but it is supposed that he intended to reach the Rio Grande and examine the country east of it, which we claimed under the Louisiana purchase. It was a great task, and he lost his way, suffered much from hunger and cold, and at last fell into the hands of Spanish soldiers, who relieved his wants, conducted him in a roundabout way through Texas, and finally set him at liberty on the Louisiana border. Some of his followers were never heard of after they left him in an independent attempt

**Pike's Two
Journeys.**

to return home. Pike published an interesting and very popular account of his travels. He was a brave man and rapidly rose to distinction in the war of 1812 until he met his death as brigadier general at the capture of York, in 1813. His explorations in the Southwest and those of Lewis and Clark in the Northwest appealed to the American imagination and stimulated powerfully the desire to own and settle the Far West.

EARLY CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION

The makers of the constitution expressed its meaning as clearly as the limitation of language and the necessity of compromise permitted. But however clear its meaning, it was to be expected that congress, president, and the states themselves would construe their rights under the new instrument, each to its own advantage. The arbiter between such contending interpretations was the supreme court, endowed with the power to pass on cases arising under the constitution. It could thus decide whether or not congress, state, or president improperly read the charter of government, and its decision was final. If a question arose of its own power under the constitution, the court passed on this also. Since final power must rest somewhere, it was, perhaps, best to leave it with a small body of learned and unprejudiced men. But many people of the day did not readily accept this view. The three great spheres of government, they said, should be mutually coördinate, and apparently it was so intended by the fathers. Nothing short of a constitutional amendment could settle the dispute clearly, and in default of that the court asserted final jurisdiction in the matter under consideration.

The Function of the Supreme Court.

At first the supreme court was not inclined to assert its powers, partly because the judges were naturally cautious and partly because they wished to avoid exciting criticism in the early years of the union. But its attitude changed when, in 1801, John Marshall, of Virginia, became chief justice. This strong-willed and aggressive man, who believed the union ought to have the necessary power to execute its will, was the controlling personality on the supreme bench from his appointment until his death in 1835. By his strong mind and character he won to his views the associate justices, even the appointees of the republican presidents, and laid down a large body of precedent on the loose-construction theory of the constitution. "He was born," said Pinkney, of Maryland, "to be chief justice of any country in which he lived."

The Influence of John Marshall.

His first important decision of this nature was in the case of *Marbury vs. Madison*. February 13, 1801, the federalists, about to relinquish power, created sixteen new federal judges, with the ordinary

complement of marshals and clerks of court. The law was denounced as unnecessary and as an attempt to fill the courts with federalists before the republicans took control, and one of the first acts of the new administration was to get the law repealed. The original bill was passed so hurriedly that Adams was not able to appoint and install the new officials ere he gave up his power. When the new secretary of state took office, many of the commissions were found in the office undelivered; and Jefferson, holding that an appointment was not complete until the commission was signed, sealed, and delivered, ordered that the commissions should be withheld. He thought an appointment followed the procedure of a deed. Marbury asked the supreme court to issue a mandamus for the delivery of one of these commissions, and the matter was argued in the supreme court. Marshall, who gave the opinion, held that since the supreme court by the constitution did not have original jurisdiction in such a case, Marbury had no right to bring suit in that tribunal. This ordinarily would have ended the matter, but he went on to say, and it was an *obiter dictum*, that a commission was not analogous to a deed, that Madison had no right to withhold one duly signed, and that Marbury, if he had brought suit in proper form, would be entitled to his office. The republicans denounced this decision as partisan. But it had a still wider significance. Congress had previously passed a law giving the court the right to issue a mandamus, and it was under that act that the suit was brought. In declaring the contrary, therefore, the court had annulled a law of congress, and this is the chief constitutional import of the decision.

In *Fletcher vs. Peck* the act of a state legislature was in question. The assembly of Georgia had granted certain lands, and afterwards declared the grant null on account of fraud. Peck claimed land under this annulled grant and brought suit in the federal courts, urging that Georgia had violated the clause of the constitution which forbids a state to pass a law "impairing the obligation of a contract." Georgia put herself on her sovereignty and replied that a land grant, made by the state in the disposal of its domain, was not a contract. The court held, Marshall giving the decision, that a grant is a contract and that the attempt of Georgia to repeal the grant was illegal. Here the court declared unconstitutional an act of a state legislature. But now appeared a difficulty which has since then limited the power of the court. Who was to execute the decision of the court against a state? Ordinarily it would be the president, but if he thought it advisable to decline to act, there was no power to compel him. This happened to the decision in *Fletcher vs. Peck*. Georgia thus defied the court, and the only way out of the difficulty was the compromise, made in 1814, in which congress by paying money salved the feelings of the claimants under the Georgia grants.

These two decisions, it will be seen, were aimed at two doctrines dear to the heart of the republicans. In the first it was held that the popular will as expressed in a congressional law must be restrained by the constitution: in the second the doctrine of state sovereignty was shorn of some of its power; for Georgia's claim that the people of a state acting through the legislature were sovereign in state affairs was made to yield to the supremacy of the federal constitution. The supreme court, under Marshall's leadership, was intent on establishing this general view, and after the war of 1812 proceeded to do so in several other important cases. Two of them are especially significant, and both were decided in 1819.

Political Aspect of the Decisions.

First came *McCulloch vs. Maryland*, relating to the power of congress under the "implied powers" clause of the constitution, article I, section 8. Much popular opposition existed to the bank of the United States, and several states passed laws to tax its notes, one of them being Maryland. The bank resisted the taxes, and the matter came before the supreme court. Two questions arose: Has congress power to create a bank? and have the states power to tax a bank, if created? Marshall answered the first in the broadest possible manner. The government, he said, has all the power implied in the act of its creation: "Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited but consistent with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional." If congress should pass a law which by the constitution it may not pass, the court would declare that law of no effect; but if the court pretended to annul a law of congress made in the field proper to the activity of congress, the court would by that action enter the field of law-making, a thing it had no right to do. As the creation of a bank was not prohibited to congress, and as a bank was a thing useful in the happy and prosperous government of the nation, the court must hold that it was within the power of the national legislature to establish it. As for the second question, the right of a state to tax the bank, that was also opposed; for if a small tax could be laid, a large one could also be laid, and thus the bank, lawful in itself, could be taxed out of existence. "The power to tax," said Marshall in words long remembered, "involves the power to destroy."

McCulloch vs. Maryland, 1819.

The second great case decided in 1819, and nearly as important as the *McCulloch* case, was *Dartmouth College vs. Woodward*. The New Hampshire legislature, in response to the political feeling of the day, wished to get control of the college and amended its charter with that end in view and against the protest of the college authorities. Suit was brought, and the case went before the supreme court, Webster,

The Dartmouth College Case, 1819.

a Dartmouth alumnus, appearing among the lawyers for the college. Is a charter granted to a corporation inviolate by the legislature? was the question. The court held that a charter is a contract and not to be recalled by the legislature provided the grantee observes the conditions on which it was granted. The decision became a precedent in all cases arising under acts of incorporation, a large part of modern law. Under it banks, manufacturing, and many other kinds of corporate companies have insisted that they could not be disturbed in their business relations. As Marshall laid down the principle, the companies seem to have had absolute immunity from interference, a position quite contrary to modern ideas that corporations should be under state control. This difficulty has been obviated by several subsequent decisions by which it is held that a legislature may modify a charter under the exercise of the police power, under its right to pass laws for good morals, and on other grounds. These later decisions have greatly modified the force of Marshall's ruling, but in ordinary cases that rule still remains the great principle for the government of corporations. It was, when made, a direct blow at the assumed right of a state to limit the action of an individual through the exercise of its sovereign power over him.

These decisions were received with indignation by the ultra republicans. Victorious in the elections, masters of the executive and legislative parts of government, they writhed to see the judiciary annul the will of the people as expressed in the elections, while in decision after decision it completed a system of centralized power greatly at variance with the principles of the party which ruled. But for all their contempt, Marshall did not quail. Doffing the neutrality of an ideal judge he boldly set himself the task of shaping the constitution in its most plastic period. His decisions became precedents in every court in the land. They gave strength and steadiness to a government, which by the nature of the case, was in the hands of the least competent portion of its citizens. They saved popular government from the effects of radicalism while the ideals of conservatism struck root in the crude but ripening society then spreading itself over the face of a new continent. No greater deed of firm leadership has been performed in our country than this persistent assertion of the vital will of the federal republic.

Another case, *Chisholm v. Georgia*, decided that a state might be sued by a citizen of another state. It displeased the states and resulted in the eleventh amendment, 1798. Six years later the twelfth amendment was in force, providing that electors should vote separately for president and vice-president.

**Significance
of Mar-
shall's De-
cisions.**

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CHAPTER XVII

THE LAST OF THE VIRGINIA DYNASTY

REFORMS OF 1816-1817

AMERICAN history comes to a new period in 1815. Before that year our chief concern was foreign affairs. This was not through the desire of the men of the day, but partly because the new nation must first of all adjust its relation with other powers, and partly because we could not rid ourselves of a connection with the prolonged commotion in Europe. In 1815 all this was past, and the government could give its attention to domestic affairs. Another change was in leadership. For many years after the revolution the men in power were those who planned and won the struggle for independence. They were anxious for the "experiment" of republican government to succeed, and distrustful of federal centralization. In 1815 a new group was in control. They had grown up during the time when Americans thought more of the glory than of the difficulties of the revolution. They had confidence in the future, they were not afraid that a strong central government would destroy liberty, and they were deeply conscious of the evils of weak government as revealed in the experiences of the recent war. They were boldly American, and took up the task of legislation with firm hands.

**A New
Period.**

Their plan of reform contained four measures: 1. All were agreed that adequate provision should be made for the national defense. The army and the navy, which to the old republicans were useless and dangerous to liberty, were now placed on a respectable peace footing, and the military academy was remodeled on the plans of Washington as a place to train officers for the army.

**Proposed
Reforms:
1. National
Defense.**

2. Next the second bank of the United States of America was incorporated, 1816, in order to aid the government in its financial operations and to establish a sound paper currency by creating a check on the overissue of notes by the state banks. Its capital was \$35,000,000, one-fifth owned by the government, which appointed one-fifth of the directors, and its charter was to run for twenty years. The privileges were valuable: its notes were receivable for government dues, it kept the deposits of the government without paying interest on them, and it was exempt from taxes. In return, it paid the treasury a bonus of \$1,500,000, and

**2. The
Second
Bank.**

agreed to transmit public funds without cost. Five of the members of the committee that reported the bank bill were Southerners, and its chairman was Calhoun. He was then a young man of great promise, popular because he defended the war, and likely to remain so because he espoused all the features of the national program then before congress. Many years later his own state, South Carolina, would not support a national policy, and then he became the chief leader of the Southerners. The bank opened its doors early in January, 1817, and was able to bring the state banks to resume specie payment on February 20. It served so well to correct the state of the currency that the circulation of the state banks fell from \$68,000,000 in 1816 to \$40,641,000 in 1820. Its headquarters were in Philadelphia, but within a year it had nineteen branches widely distributed.

3. The tariff of 1816. The curve of tariff rates in the United States has two points of sharp ascension, one beginning in 1812, and the other in 1861. The first tariff rate was about five per cent, and rose

**3. The
Tariff.**

gradually until in 1812 it was twelve and a half per cent. To raise funds for the war it was now doubled with proviso that it should fall to the former level a year after the return of peace. The war being over, the newly established manufacturers were alarmed lest the reduction of the duties should bring them into dangerous competition with British manufacturers, who had accumulated vast stocks of merchandise produced at cheap rates and selling so low that they could break up the American competitors. The American manufacturers called on congress for protection. The commercial interests, who thrive on free importation, opposed this request, but the republicans supported it because they wished to make the nation independent of foreign supplies in time of war. They felt that it was for the national interest to make our own supplies at home. As the commercial interests had opposed the war and were mostly federalists, they got little favor now. Thus was passed in 1816 a new tariff bill continuing the war tariff with some modifications. It was intended as a temporary measure, but when the manufacturers once got a taste of protection they continually asked for more until many thought them insatiable.

The tariff of 1816 was of Southern origin. The bill was reported by Lowndes, of South Carolina, and supported by Calhoun and Clay.

**The South
and the
Tariff of
1816.**

The former war party, thoroughly national, was now transformed into the new republicans, equally national. They represented the agricultural parts of the country, which had no selfish interest in a tariff, but they felt that all might sacrifice something to be independent of European manufacturers. Later on they concluded that protection had gone too far, and opposed it bitterly. In this change of attitude the South, as the great non-manufacturing section, was most prominent.

4. Another measure which aroused much interest was public aid in constructing roads and canals, known as the policy of internal improvements. The war aroused much interest in the rich lands of the Northwest, and peace was hardly established before a great movement of population, partly from Europe and partly from the East, set toward that region. Two ways of reaching it appeared. One was by water, up the Mississippi from New Orleans, a process which the use of steamboats on the great river from 1811 made easier than before. The other was overland from Philadelphia and the Potomac or through western New York to the lakes. But roads and canals were too expensive for individual effort. Moreover, they were of national benefit, and why, it was asked, should not the federal government aid in their construction? Would they not enhance the value of the public lands, and were they not necessary to move troops to defend the frontier, both important national enterprises? Thus originated the demand for internal improvement, for fifteen years one of the great political questions of the day.

**4. Internal
Improve-
ments.**

Against them two objections were found. Did the constitution give congress power to raise money for such a purpose? They could be justified only under the general welfare clause, and all the old strict construction school came to life to protest against such a wide departure from their tenets. Secondly, they were really local improvements. If the merchants of the East, it was said, wished them as an outlet for their trade, let them pay the bills. Pennsylvania and the adjacent states were chiefly concerned, and they ought to pay the cost of these very expensive works. The second argument appealed very strongly to the more remote states, which had constructed their own works and hoped for little of such aid from the general government.

**Objections
to Internal
Improve-
ments-
Policy.**

Before 1816, in fact, as early as Jefferson's presidency, appropriations for such a purpose had begun on a small scale. But now the demand was for larger appropriations, and it was likely to grow with time until every community would have its own scheme, pushing it so skillfully by log-rolling in congress that it was impossible to say where the scheming would stop. Most of the representatives from the West and from the Middle states were of the internal improvements group, and several of the leading new republicans gave support.

**"Log-
Rolling."**

Among them the most conspicuous leader was Calhoun, who in December, 1816, as chairman of a committee on internal improvements, introduced a bill to set aside the \$1,500,000 bonus from the newly established bank as a perpetual fund for constructing roads and canals. He declared that roads and canals were needed to bind together the East and West and to prevent disunion. Clay also favored the project, and it passed both houses by safe majorities. Madison had declared himself for internal

**The Bonus
Bill.**

improvements, but at last he vetoed the bonus bill because he thought the constitution did not authorize such an expenditure. He was ever a strict constructionist, and the arguments of the opponents of the bill aroused all his fears. In his veto message, however, he suggested that an amendment to the constitution might well be proposed in order to avoid the difficulty he foresaw. In the existing condition of parties such an amendment could not be carried, and for a time the demand for internal improvements at national expense was checked.

Roads and canals continued to be built, some by the general government, and many more by the states. Virginia and South Carolina authorized large undertakings, and at this very time Pennsylvania had spent over \$2,000,000 for the same purpose. But the great achievement was in New York. Much earlier than this her statesmen had realized the need of a canal from the Hudson to Lake Erie, Albany to Buffalo, across that depression between the Alleghanies and the Adirondacks which nature had provided as the easiest way of getting from the sea-

**Internal
Improvements
by
the States.**



board to the lake system in the heart of the continent. Many plans had been made, and something was about to be done when the war began and deferred further effort. In 1816 De Witt Clinton was elected governor of the state. He was strongly in favor of the canal and won the legislature to the undertaking. Ground was broken July 4, 1817, and eight years later the task was completed at a cost of \$7,000,000. The Erie canal was 363 miles long, and was the greatest engineering feat in the country up to that time. It lowered freight to the West, brought a rich trade to New York city, and enabled that port to wrest from Philadelphia the distinction of being the metropolis of the New World.

1816 was presidential election year, and Monroe was to have his reward. Many republicans objected to the bargain. Some thought Monroe too theoretical, others distrusted him because he deserted old friends to enter the cabinet, some of the strait Virginia school could not forgive his early support of Randolph, and the Clinton-Smith faction had ends of their own in

**Election of
1816.**

view. This opposition united on William H. Crawford, of Georgia, a man of real leadership, a student of Gallatin's financial policy, and an astute politician. For a moment it seemed that Crawford would secure the nomination, but when the caucus met means had been found to change the New York members to Monroe, who was chosen by a vote of 65 to 54. Tompkins, of New York, was nominated for vice-president, thus restoring the New York-Virginia alliance which the defection of Clinton in 1812 disrupted. Later in the year Crawford became secretary of the treasury, and whisperers said that it had a bearing on the succession. The federalists nominated Rufus King for president, but in the election he got only 34 votes to Monroe's 183. The Hartford convention and the national program of the new republicans had proved too much for the federalists.

PARTY CLEAVAGE UNDER MONROE

Monroe's best quality was conciliation. By bringing factions together, by calming the feelings of disappointed men, and by avoiding the initiation of positive measures, he held together for eight years a party which had no opposition and which contained many possibilities of disruption. "The tall and eel-like Monroe," as a scoffer called him, who had no cure for social hypochondria and only wished to solve the difficulties he encountered, gave the country eight years of political peace, which is more than one says of any other American president.

James
Monroe.

He wished to bring into his cabinet the strongest of the new republicans. John Quincy Adams was recalled from diplomatic service abroad to become secretary of state, an office he filled with distinction; Crawford was retained as secretary of the treasury; Clay was offered the war department, and when he refused it, the office went to Calhoun, while William Wirt, an able lawyer, popular with the old republicans, was made attorney-general. Clay's refusal was the only discordant note. He would have taken first place if it had been offered; but he thought it advisable to decline the third place and remain speaker of the house to become leader of the opposition sure to develop.

His
Cabinet.

The opportunity he anticipated came speedily. Since 1810 the Spanish-American colonies had been in revolt. They had overcome the weak Spanish garrisons, but were not able to establish effective governments in the large and sparsely settled areas over which their authority stretched. Much sympathy for them existed in the United States, particularly in the Mississippi valley; and the Gulf ports freely furnished them aid until congress in 1817 passed a more stringent neutrality act. In 1817 the question of recognizing the independence of these colonies was brought up, but the cautious Monroe, rather than offend their

Attitude toward South
America.

many sympathizers, sent agents to see if the revolutionists deserved recognition. Clay introduced resolutions to accord recognition and to repeal the recent neutrality act, supporting them in a beautifully ornate speech. The administration men united against him, and his resolutions were overwhelmed in the house. But he had done all he could expect; for he had given fair warning to the country that he was leading an opposition, and henceforth all who had grievances against Monroe gathered under his banner. In the winter of 1818-1819 he repeated his action, when the administration was forced to defend Jackson's invasion of Florida but again the administration cohorts defeated him.

By such means Monroe resisted attacks and came to the election of 1820 without a defeat. There was no thought of denying him the honor of a reelection, — not even Clay went that far, — and he was chosen without opposition. However, one elector who favored him had the whim to throw away his vote on another man, lest Monroe should share with Washington the honor of a unanimous vote. This period of harmony was called "The Era of Good Feeling." The thought pleased the president, and he tried to promote it by what he called his "amalgamation policy," which was to appoint both federalists and republicans to office. His party friends resented the policy, and he was too wise to insist upon it. Already men were beginning to look to 1824, and although the cabinet was officially harmonious, it contained three men who were keenly planning to contest the prize of the presidency when the time came.


THE ACQUISITION OF FLORIDA

Jefferson was our first president who tried to buy Florida, but he made no progress in his plan. While Napoleon occupied Spain, we received no minister from that country, but diplomatic relations were resumed with the reestablishment of the old monarchy, and our minister at Madrid renewed the offer to buy the province. He had a polite refusal, but shortly afterwards a political upheaval in Spain brought a new ministry into power, and the envoy in August, 1817, was surprised to receive an offer to exchange Florida for Louisiana. The proposition was inadmissible, but it indicated that Spain was yielding. Secretary Adams now took the matter into his own hands, carrying it on with success, until in June, 1818, diplomacy was rudely interrupted by news that Jackson had invaded West Florida, seized its fortified posts, and expelled its governor and garrison. The information referred to the Seminole war.

The Seminoles were a Creek tribe, living in Florida. To them in 1814 fled a large number of Creeks, escaping the vengeance of Jackson at Horse-Shoe Bend. When the treaty of Fort Jackson in August of

the same year ceded a great deal of the Creek patrimony to the United States, these fugitives protested against its legality. The reply was that they had due notice to attend, and failing to do so had no right to object. The treaty of Ghent provided that the United States should give up all the land taken from Indians at war when the treaty was signed. The fugitives were advised by some officious British subjects that this applied to their land and promised that England would support them

Cause of
Seminole
Discontent.



in a demand for its restoration, but the British government repudiated the promise at sight. The whites held that they were exempt from the clause in question because the Creek war was terminated by the treaty of Fort Jackson. They disliked greatly the British subjects whose assurances had rendered the Seminoles warlike. One of these persons was Alexander Arbuthnot, a Scotch trader, who wrote the letters in which the Indians delivered their protests, and the other was

Captain Ambrister, an army officer who for the love of adventure drilled an Indian company and led it to war. Hostilities began when the savages raided the white settlers on the disputed lands. In November, 1817, the Americans retaliated by burning Fowltown, killing four of its Indian inhabitants, and dispersing the rest, who fled into Florida.

The war department, Calhoun being secretary, now authorized a campaign against the Seminoles, and Jackson, commander of the southern military division, took command. His orders **Invasion of Florida.** allowed him to follow the enemy into Spanish territory, but forbade him to attack a Spanish post. He considered this limitation unwise, and in a letter to Monroe suggested that he privately be given permission to attack the forts if the Indians took refuge in them. He claimed afterwards that he received the required authority, but Monroe denied that assertion. On it hinged the question of Jackson's responsibility for what was about to happen. He marched straight into Florida, took the forts at St. Marks and Pensacola, sent their garrisons with the governor of West Florida to Havanna, and raised the American flag over the province. At St. Marks he captured Arbuthnot and Ambrister, tried them by court martial, and hanged them forthwith, spite of their British citizenship. Two prominent Indian chiefs, who were also captured, were hanged without the formality of trial.

These occurrences caused consternation in Washington, where foreign complications were feared. England was at first inclined to protest against the execution of her subjects, but as they were where they had no business to be, the event was allowed to pass. To appease Spain was not so easy. **Attitude of England and Spain.** She demanded the surrender of the province and the punishment of Jackson. The first was readily granted, but the action of the general pleased the people, and the administration dared not make him suffer. The secretary of state was, therefore, intrusted with the task of bringing Madrid to reason. In some bold and able dispatches he justified the invasion on the evident ground that Spain had not properly preserved the neutrality of her territory. She had undoubtedly given encouragement, if not aid, to our enemies, and she could not well complain if at last we did what she herself ought to have done. Adams drove this point home with so much energy that Spain accepted the situation, and the waters of diplomacy were at length unruffled. For a time Jackson resented what he took for a reflection on his conduct, but some skillful touches by Monroe brought him to accept in a reasonable spirit the solution of the difficult situation.

At this junction the opposition took up the matter. Resolutions were introduced in each house to investigate the violation of neutrality obligations, Clay taking a prominent part in their defense. Those

before the house occasioned a long debate, at the end of which Jackson was acquitted of wrongdoing. The senate referred the matter to a committee which made an adverse report, but by this time popular opinion ran so strongly for the hero of the invasion that the opposition did not press the report to a vote. The upshot was that Jackson, already mentioned as a presidential possibility, gained rather than lost in the public esteem.

Clay's At-
tack on
Jackson.

Before this phase of the Seminole affair was complete, the negotiations for the purchase of Florida were resumed. Recent events served to promote them by showing Spain by what a slender hold she possessed the province, and she now came to a decision to cede. February 22, 1819, the senate received a treaty to that effect and passed it with little hesitation. It provided that we should pay claims against Spain amounting to not more than \$5,000,000, and take all Florida. It fixed the western boundary of Louisiana at the Sabine river. The latter point had been in dispute since the purchase of Louisiana. By that bargain our claim to the Rio Grande was good, but the president thought we might safely relinquish it in view of the advantage of having an unbroken coast line from the Atlantic to the Sabine. Congress took the same view, but when the Texas boundary question came up more than twenty years later Monroe received much criticism because he had thrown away our claim to the rich region between that river and the Sabine. The treaty of 1819 was not ratified by Spain until late in 1820. July 17, 1821, the province was formally handed over to the United States and Jackson became its first American governor. It was made a territory, and in 1845 was admitted into the union as a state.

Florida
Purchased.

THE MISSOURI COMPROMISE

In 1812 Missouri became a territory, with a legislature of its own, and a population of something more than 20,000. St. Louis, at the junction of the Missouri and Mississippi, was the center of activity, its chief industry being the rich fur trade of the Missouri valley. Three-fourths of its 2500 inhabitants were French, proud of their origin and resentful of the aggressive Americans who established the laws of the English and offended the common taste by paving the streets and introducing rattling, iron-wheeled vehicles. The clash between the two civilizations was of short duration. The French were contented with their state, fond of amusements, in every house a fiddle and on every night a dance, and they accepted with satisfaction a paternal form of society which embraced a benevolent ruling class and a large number of care-free dependents. The Americans were ambitious, eager for wealth, forever busy and boastful of their patriotism, and bent on establishing

Develop-
ment of
Missouri
before 1820.

self-government for the bustling white immigrants who felt their responsibilities as builders of a new commonwealth. The tide of immigration was strong after the war of 1812; for stories of fertile lands in what from its position must certainly be a great state attracted many settlers from the East. They came chiefly from the South, passing through Kentucky and Tennessee in long wagon trains accompanied by their slaves and cattle. By 1820 the population was 66,586. It was the first, and for many years the farthest, advance of the white man's civilization into the great mid-continental plain beyond the Mississippi.

We have seen that by 1800 the states north of Maryland, *i.e.* north of the Mason and Dixon's line, had restricted slavery, and those to the southward continued slave states. By the ordinance of 1787 the Ohio was made the dividing line between freedom and slavery for the region beyond the mountains; and thus the country between the Atlantic and the Mississippi was amicably divided between the two great interests.

**Division of
the West
in Respect
to Slavery.**

Nothing was done about a similar division when Louisiana was acquired or when territories were first created within its bounds. In the absence of restrictions the slaveholders felt they had equal rights there with other Americans, and they were a large part of the population of Missouri when in March, 1818, congress was asked to make the

**Missouri
asks for
Statehood.**

territory a state. No action was taken at that time, although under the rule that a territory could expect statehood when it had 60,000 inhabitants, there should have been no objection to the request. The petition was renewed in the next session, and in February, 1819, the house was considering a state bill when Tallmadge, of New York, offered an amendment to exclude further introduction of slaves into Missouri and gradually to emancipate those already there. After a short and angry debate, the amendment was carried in the house, but lost in the senate.

This discussion lasted but two weeks. It was unexpected, and produced violent commotions. Whenever slavery had been discussed

**Significance
of the
Debate.**

before that in congress, hot words had been used; for some of its opponents would denounce it as a crime and some of its defenders would reply bitterly. The quieter men,

North and South, had usually agreed to avoid occasions for excitement, and the number of free and slave states was equal. With the admission of Alabama, then imminent, there would be eleven free and eleven slave states. It was to the interest of the new republicans and of every man who had hope of being president in 1824 to keep in abeyance a question which would surely realign political groups and make impossible the enactment of such national measures as tariffs and bills for internal improvements. Jefferson said the debate was "like a fire-bell in the night." The leaders of the party, therefore, regarded with apprehension the hot discussion and the

voting of warm resolutions by public meetings and legislatures North and South through the summer of 1819.

The question was intimately related to that sectional jealousy which to this time had not been entirely absent from most of the deliberations of congress. The rule of Virginia was distasteful to New England, and even the New York republicans, though partners in that rule, were restless under it. Tallmadge, who introduced the resolution, was a close friend of Clinton, and Rufus King, leading defender of it, was an old federalist of New York. To the men of the North it seemed that Southerners, by extending their peculiar institution into the great Northwest, would establish their power in the Missouri valley and eventually lay hands on all the region west of it. If such a thing was to be prevented, it must be prevented now. If this advance was allowed, there would be a union of the South and the great Northwest, slavery being the common bond which would dominate the future as relentlessly as the Virginia combination ruled the present. Besides this feeling, there was in the North a growing conviction that slavery was a blot on our civilization, and ought to be restricted in area. A small number of Northern people even declared that slavery was a crime and slaveholders criminals. Thus the Southern supremacy in the government was attacked by a powerful combination which threatened to take from it all its support in New York, Pennsylvania, and other Northern states.

Sectional-
ism the
Issue: the
Northern
Side.

Several combined interests existed in the South. Its leaders desired to perpetuate Southern control, in order to ward off unfavorable legislation; they also felt that the growing immigration into the free North would enable that section to people quickly the vast West and establish control in congress. Such a result achieved, it was not doubted that an attempt would be made to amend the constitution with regard to the three-fifths representation of slaves, and perhaps efforts would be made to abolish slavery itself. Besides these considerations, many Southerners were irritated when told that slaveholding was a crime. Their best people owned slaves, and everywhere were seen efforts to make the lot of the blacks as happy as the necessities of bondage permitted. Thus it was that sentiment North and South through the summer of 1819 hardened, and practical leaders became convinced that only a compromise could prevent a general disarrangement of existing party alignments.

The South-
ern Side.

January 3, 1820, four weeks after the new congress met, the house passed a bill to admit Maine. Massachusetts, which formerly had authority over Maine, had consented to this action provided congress approved before March 4, 1820. Earlier in the session Alabama was admitted, so that the admission of Maine would give the free states a majority. The situation suggested a compromise, and when the Maine bill reached

The Mis-
souri Com-
promise.

the senate, it was combined with a bill then before that house to admit Missouri without restriction. This step was approved by the senate by a vote of 23 to 21. Then Thomas, of Illinois, moved to amend by admitting Missouri with slavery and by prohibiting slavery north of 36° 30', north latitude, in the rest of the Louisiana purchase. Here was the compromise that conservative men wished. It was much like that by which the Northwest was reserved to freedom in 1787 while the Southwest was left to slavery. It would remove the many dangers for persons and measures, and it passed the senate by a vote of 34 to 10. The house had a safe majority for restriction, and was disposed to throw away every thought of other ends to place slavery in a way of extinction, and voted to reject the senate compromise. It seemed that a complete deadlock was reached, when a conference committee was at last appointed. Then came further relenting, until enough members yielded to carry the compromise by a majority of three. Of the 87 who made the minority 33 were from New England, 46 were from the Middle states, and 8 were the solid Northwestern delegation. No Southern or Southwestern representative voted for restriction in Missouri, and 7 New Englanders and 8 Middle states men voted against it. The Missouri Compromise was the work of moderate men, chiefly those who lived in the Middle states and in the northern tier of Southern states. Many years later the South attacked the compromise, and pointed to the fact that it was not accepted by those Southerners who, as it was then put, were true to the rights of the South in 1820.

This debate aroused the Missourians, thoroughly under the control of the slaveholders; and the constitution they framed reflected their determination to hold the state. It guaranteed the existence of slavery in the new state and forbade the immigration of free negroes.

The Missouri Constitution. When in the succeeding autumn it came before congress for approval, it was opposed by the Northern members of the house, who declared that it violated the federal constitution. There was a hot debate over the right of congress to shackle a sovereign state, and the result was deadlock. Clay took a prominent part in the first compromise, and he now came forward with another. He induced the legislature of Missouri, then in session, to agree that the objectionable clause should never be construed to lessen in Missouri the rights of citizens of other states, and with that the constitution was approved.

One other difficulty appeared. Missouri, assuming that statehood was complete, chose presidential electors in 1820 favorable to Monroe, and the returns were sent to the senate. The Southerners favored their reception on the ground that Missouri became a state by the first compromise act, March, 1820.

Clay the "Pacifist." If this was allowed, the restriction on her constitution was illegal, and the North accordingly insisted that the returns be rejected.

Here was the possibility of an angry dispute, but Clay again smoothed the difficulty, proposing that the result be announced in words like these: If the vote of Missouri be counted, Monroe had 231 votes; if not, he had 228 votes, and in either case he was elected president. For his work in these compromises Clay was called the "Pacifator," a title which pleased his friends. It was considered a great thing to bring jarring factions together and to avert the threatened dangers of disunion.

THE MONROE DOCTRINE

Monroe's unwillingness to recognize the independence of the South American states in 1817 was based on his conviction, shared by Secretary Adams, that the revolutionists had not established a settled government, and on the feeling that rash action in this respect would imperil the plans of purchasing Florida. By 1822 these two reasons were not operative. Florida was secured, and continued successes by the South Americans had made it certain that Spain, unassisted by other European powers, would not be able to reconquer what she had lost. Meanwhile, Clay continued to agitate for recognition, and aroused such enthusiasm that congress early in 1821 resolved that it would support the president whenever he thought fit to extend recognition. Monroe delayed a year and then yielded, notifying congress on March 18, 1822, that he would send ministers to the new states when money was provided for the expenses. Immediate action on the question was retarded by a far more complicated aspect of the matter in the field of general diplomacy.

South
America
Recognized.

England had watched the South American revolutions with great interest. Having lost the North American colonies as an outlet of trade, she wished new markets in the new republics of the south. All the efforts of the revolutionists had been made with her assistance, sometimes covert, but often open.

England's
Alarms.

Her fleet gave important aid on the Pacific, and her citizens sold supplies to the insurrectionary armies. When the European wars were over, the nations of the Old World united in the Holy Alliance to restore the conditions existing before the European upheaval, and began to think of helping Spain to regain her colonies. This would upset the commercial plans of England, and she gave notice that she would not coöperate in the matter. But the other powers were disposed to act of themselves, and England, not wishing to oppose them alone, thought of uniting with the United States to prevent such action. George Canning, the minister whose rude attitude did so much to bring on the war of 1812, was now head of the British foreign office. He turned to Monroe, who was keenly alive to what was going on, and suggested, August 16, 1823, that he unite with England in declaring that Europe should not extend her possessions in the western hemisphere. At that time France was subduing a liberal revolution in

Spain, and it was believed that the Spanish monarch, too weak to pay for the service in money, would allow France to indemnify herself by seizing the South American states.

Adams only half approved Canning's suggestion. He did not like, as he said, the idea that his country should "come in as a cock-boat in the wake of the British man-of-war." If we undertook to save the South American states, it was, he thought, more in keeping with our dignity that we act on broad principles announced on our own initiative. The knowledge that England at that time had designs on Cuba and that Russia was seeking to get recognition of a very shadowy claim to the Pacific coast south to the fifty-first degree of latitude convinced him that it was time to take a positive stand. Clay's continual appeals in behalf of a republican system in America with an eye to the recognition of the South American states had prepared the country to support such a policy as the secretary had in mind. It was out of such conditions that the Monroe Doctrine had its origin.

Adams's determination was reached after many months of negotiations. Monroe must have been cognizant of what was done, and he gave it his approval. His cabinet were freely consulted, and the members also accepted the ideas of the strong-willed secretary of state, who was at his best in asserting the dignity of his country. And Canning himself could not object; for it was the United States, and not England, which was most concerned in the step about to be taken. His boast some years later that he "called a New World into existence to redress the balance of Old" was not entirely true. His suggestion was doubtless of great importance, and the coöperation of England was essential, but the Monroe Doctrine was an American doctrine and was designed to operate as much against English as continental aggression. He had little confidence in the ability of the United States to enforce their policy to the exclusion of England, and seems to have thought that in future emergencies England would manage to plant herself firmly in South America, a hope which the strong spirit of our government was to make ineffective.

The policy of the United States being formed, it only remained to place it before the world, and the annual message of 1823 was selected as a fitting means. It reached congress December 2 and asserted in clear and simple language two interrelated purposes, one referring to the New World and the other to the Old. The language of the message is worthy of perusal by all Americans. "In the wars of the European powers, in matters relating to themselves," it runs, "we have never taken any part, nor does it comport with our policy so to do. It is only when our rights are invaded or seriously menaced that we resent injuries or make preparation for our defense. With the movements in this

**The Views
of Adams.**

**Canning's
Share.**

**The Doc-
trine An-
nounced.**

hemisphere we are of necessity more intimately connected, and by causes which must be obvious to all enlightened and impartial observers. The political system of the allied powers is essentially different in this respect from that of America. . . . We owe it, therefore, to candor and to the amicable relations existing between the United States and those powers to declare that we should consider any attempt on their part to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety. With the existing colonies or dependencies of any European power we have not interfered, and shall not interfere. But with the Governments who have declared their independence and maintained it, and whose independence we have, on great consideration and on just principles, acknowledged, we could not view any interposition for the purpose of oppressing them, or controlling in any other manner their destiny, by any European power in any other light than as a manifestation of an unfriendly disposition toward the United States."

THE ELECTION OF 1824

December 3, 1822, an observer in Washington described the political situation there in these words: "While he who now fills the halls of the White House is slowly closing his eyes upon the rich trifles of the world, like an old father he stands surrounded by three full-grown sons, each seeking the inheritance on his departure. John Q., from the favors bestowed by the old man in his lifetime, has been deemed a favorite always: J. C., however, from being possessed of a sanguine temper, sets up also pretensions to the inheritance. William and the old gentleman, you know, it has been reported, are constantly disagreeing in opinion and are hence not quite so friendly as father and son should be; be this as it may, it seems pretty well settled that the Virginia estate, if not already done, will be apportioned to the Latter." These words well describe the opening of the campaign of 1824, but they do not mention two other candidates, Clay and General Jackson.

Division in
Monroe's
Cabinet.

Of the five aspirants Adams had the support of New England and some strength outside of it in sections where the federalists had been strong. Crawford was the heir of the old organization which directed the Virginia-New York alliance, now sadly shorn of its power. Every other candidate made inroads on it. Calhoun took South Carolina, and Pennsylvania seemed his through his support of internal improvements. Clay had Kentucky and was accorded the new states north of the Ohio with Missouri and Louisiana. Jackson had Tennessee, and was making hard efforts to shame North Carolina out of her old practice of following Virginia blindly. Thus, in getting the old organization, Crawford got little more than his own state, with Virginia, and the support of the

Support of
the Five
Candidates.

anti-Clintonian faction of New York republicans. In so confused a state of party no one expected any candidate to have a majority of the electoral votes, and an election by the house of representatives seemed likely.

Before the campaign closed, Calhoun was eliminated as a contestant for first place. He had counted on Pennsylvania because the politicians there were for him. But Jackson, whose candidacy was announced late, gathered strength with the people of the state, and the politicians early in 1824 came to realize that they could not carry Calhoun to victory. They quickly took up Jackson, and Calhoun, anxiously waiting to hear that this great state had declared for him, was astonished to learn that it had been swept over to Jackson. It was fatal to his hopes, but he calmly acquiesced in a plan to make him vice-president, and in that field he had little opposition. His decline in position implied the improvement of Jackson's chances.

**Calhoun
Takes
Second
Place.**

Crawford was generally esteemed the leading candidate until a stroke of paralysis laid him low in September, 1823. His friends declared it was slight, his enemies said he was at death's door. Neither assertion was correct, but he was an invalid all through the year 1824, and was, in fact, not physically strong enough to come back into active national politics. The organization which had adopted him strove hard to hold its grip on its following, and was so successful that in the election he had the third place among the candidates.

**Crawford's
Illness.**

As the organization candidate he would naturally have the strongest following in the republican caucus, hitherto a strong recommendation.

**Destroying
the Caucus.**

To overcome this advantage his opponent united to break down the caucus. This piece of party machinery was undemocratic, and tended to make the presidency subservient to a congressional ring. It had been tolerated only because it was the sole attainable means of securing concentration of purpose in a largely disorganized party group. To oppose it, nomination by state legislatures was now resorted to. Various states recommended their favorites to the people and issued severe criticisms of the caucus system. So unpopular became the institution that none but the Crawford men would attend, and when in February, 1824, the last republican caucus that was to meet was called to order, only 66 of the 216 republicans in congress were present. Of these, all but four voted for Crawford. In the attack on the caucus, the friends of Jackson, who was hailed as the people's candidate, were most active.

The campaign of 1824, like its two predecessors, was conducted on personal grounds. This does not mean that principles were then unknown, but that on the leading principles under discussion, tariff and internal improvements, the candidates were practically of the same

opinion. Clay was the peculiar champion of the tariff, but neither of the others opposed it. Calhoun was preëminently for internal improvements, but all the others mildly favored them. Crawford's friends in the South talked about his devotion to the "principles of 1798," the doctrines of strict reconstruction; but national measures were so popular that they dare not press the point. Some Southerners wished to raise the question of Adams's attitude on the Missouri question, but he replied that he was for conciliation. In fact, no one dared bring up this point, since it would injure a Southern candidate in the North as much as a Northern candidate in the South. As the only Northern candidate, Adams got the vote of that large portion of the inhabitants of his section who resented the Virginia domination. He was not personally popular there, spite of his many excellent qualities.

A Personal Campaign.

No one awaited the election returns more impatiently than Clay. In 1823 he was triumphantly reëlected speaker, and if the election went to the house and he were one of the three highest, his popularity in that body would give him excellent prospects. His fate hung on the action of Louisiana and New York. In the former state he had a majority of the legislature, which chose the electors, but a vote was taken when three of his friends were absent, and the Jackson and Adams men combined and carried the day. In New York the legislature also had the choice, and by skillful manipulation three of the men chosen as Clay men voted at last for his opponents. A loser at these two points, he got only 37 votes, while Crawford got 41, Adams 84, and Jackson 99. His narrow failure to fall among the lucky three was partly atoned for by the knowledge that in the field into which the contest was now committed he would be the arbiter between his rivals.

Clay a Losing Candidate.

The Result of the Voting.

THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION OF 1825

Both judgment and interest showed Clay the way he should lean. Crawford, incapacitated through health, was out of the question, and the choice was between the other two. Adams was an educated man, Jackson's training was chiefly obtained from frontier conditions. Adams was experienced in public affairs at home and abroad, Jackson was a good fighter and a passable head of a military district, but his temper was violent, he could not make a speech, and in his only administrative office, governorship of Florida, he had, through lack of ordinary tact, allowed affairs to get into a most unnecessary muddle. Between two such men, who could hesitate who had the interest of the country at heart? Moreover, Clay's future interests pointed to Adams, who was really unpopular in the North and would hardly be able to perpetuate his leadership

Clay Turns to Adams.

more than four years. In the readjustment of parties, which was inevitable, it was more likely that the older states of the North would unite with Clay, popular in the Northwest, than with Jackson, popular in the Southwest. Clay was now the most outspoken champion of the tariff. Was it not more natural for him to expect support in the North, where the manufactures were rapidly increasing, than in the South, where they could not hope to succeed? All these arguments were urged upon him by the friends of Adams, from the time congress met early in December. He seems to have made up his mind from that time, but he said nothing. Meanwhile the friends of Jackson besought him to favor their candidate as a Western man and as the candidate who had the highest number of votes in the recent election. To all their appeals he gave good-humored attention, but was careful to promise nothing.

The number of states was then twenty-four, and the successful candidate must have a majority, or thirteen. Crawford had four states without dispute, Virginia, Georgia, North Carolina, and Delaware, the heart of the old Virginia group. Adams had seven, New England and Maryland, the old federalist stronghold. Jackson had Tennessee, Alabama, and Mississippi, representing the new Southwest, South Carolina, a result of his coöperation with Calhoun, and Pennsylvania and New Jersey, which he and Calhoun had wrung from the ancient combination. This group was rather incongruous, and had no other common bond than its opposition to the Virginia school, from which its component parts had formerly received little recognition. Jackson also had Indiana, for local reasons, which gave him a total of seven. Of the other six Clay was able to control four, — Kentucky, Ohio, Missouri, and Louisiana. Illinois, with only one representative, hung for a time in the balance, and then came over to Adams, who, with Clay's four, now had twelve states, and lacked only one of a majority; and that one was New York, whose delegation in the house was badly divided.

Half of New York's delegation were for Adams, the rest for Jackson and Crawford. The leader of the Crawford men was Van Buren, then a senator. He hoped the state's vote would remain divided on the first ballot. Thus there would be no choice on that ballot, which would give him opportunity at a later time to cast the New York vote for Adams and secure for himself the honor of president-maker. It was a shrewd scheme, and if successful, would have lessened Clay's prestige. But at the last moment one of Crawford's New York supporters, General Van Rensselaer, changed to Adams, which gave that state to the New Englander and made him president on the first ballot. Much seems to have depended on this action; for if Van Buren could have delivered the Crawford group to Adams, they must have supported his administration for a while, possibly for a long time. As it was, they

**The Groups
in Congress.**

**New York
Decides the
Election.**

remained unattached for a year, and then joined the opposition. In 1828 they were, under Van Buren's leadership, an important element of the party which followed Jackson.

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CHAPTER XVIII

THE ADMINISTRATION OF JOHN QUINCY ADAMS

PARTY FORMATION UNDER JOHN QUINCY ADAMS

ADAMS's first action was to make Clay secretary of state; notice that henceforth the two men would act together. The Jackson-Calhoun group, resenting the coalition which had defeated their leader, began a violent opposition. They voted against the confirmation of Clay, and returned to their homes full of scorn at what they proclaimed a corrupt bargain to obtain the presidency. The mass of people, to whom Jackson was a hero, believed the charge and began to look to the day of vindication. Meanwhile, it was evident that Crawford's health would not be reëstablished, and there was much anxiety about the future conduct of his followers. Van Buren was their leader, and was in close relation with the Virginians and the Georgian, who spoke for the Southern half of the group. Had they divided, he might have gone for Adams, but it was decided that both sections should act together.

For leadership the group now looked to Van Buren, and for a year he gave no intimation of what he would do. Then came Adams's first annual message, a strongly national document. It advocated internal improvements and a generally paternal attitude of the government in many measures to promote the common welfare. It was as gall to the old republicans, who, strong in the Virginia faith, had gone with Crawford. Until that time Van Buren had coquetted with the Adams party: if he had continued that course, he would have had no following outside his own state. He now shifted position, and before the winter of 1825-1826 was over was aiding the Jackson men in their onslaught on the president.

Van Buren's accession to the Jackson party was welcome, for dissension was already beginning between the Tennesseans and the South Carolinians. Calhoun was an experienced public man, Jackson was inexperienced. It angered the followers of the latter to hear it said that Calhoun's wisdom would have to save the party. It seemed to them that the junior partner was seeking to assume the functions of the senior. Now Van Buren was as skillful a leader as Calhoun, and not so self-

assertive. From the time he became a Jackson man he was in close association with the peculiarly Jackson group, and thenceforth the party contained a factional conflict which only the necessity of meeting a common danger kept within bounds.

Until 1829 all factions acted together in the bitterest warfare on Adams. He was an honest and able president, but he and his secretary must be broken down. The first occasion was the annual message, in which Adams gave forth his national program. Jefferson had thought the government's functions should be few, and much should be left to individual initiative. Adams frankly announced another policy. Government, he said, should seek to improve the condition of the citizens. Roads and canals should be built, a national university should be founded, scientific discoveries should be promoted, distant seas should be explored, and observatories, "light-houses of the skies," should be established. All this was recommended in an academic sense. There was also high praise for internal improvements and for a nationally organized militia. On these features of the message the opposition fell furiously. Did they not show, it was said, that Adams was mad for concentration? The echoes of the attack were heard in every part of the country, the state rights men leading the van.

**Bitter War
against
Adams.**

Immediately came a specific measure on which the opposition could rally. Bolivar, leader of the South American revolutionists, had conceived a plan for a congress of delegates from the new states north and south of the Isthmus of Panama, and in the spring of 1825 Clay was asked if the United States would accept an invitation to attend. The object of the

**The
Panama
Congress.**

meeting was not clearly stated, but Clay saw in it an opportunity to extend American influence, and favored an acceptance. Adams was more cautious, and it was decided to ask for more definite information about the objects of the meeting. In the autumn came formal invitations to attend a congress at Panama. They came from Mexico, Guatemala, and Colombia, and named as objects of consideration resistance to the attempts of European powers to interfere in America, the recognition of Hayti, the regulation of the slave trade, and the formation of an American league to offset the continental alliance in the Old World. This announcement seems hardly candid; for the Colombian official press declared that the object of the congress was to form a league to oppose Spain, to liberate Cuba and Porto Rico, and to execute the Monroe Doctrine. Clay's imagination was warm and his diplomacy was aggressive. He welcomed the opportunity to extend the commercial and political interests of his country, and he carried the more cautious Adams with him. Accordingly, a special message went from the president to congress, December 26, announcing the nomination of delegates and asking that appropriations be made to pay their expenses. It disclaimed an intention to incur obligations

of a belligerent kind or to enter into a league of defense with the states represented at the congress, but it left badly defined the objects proposed for consideration.

Then came an excited debate. The Jackson group questioned the constitutionality of the president's action, said he made too much of Monroe's recently announced Doctrine, and pointed out that dire disaster awaited the slave states if the nation participated in a congress in which sat representatives of the black republic of Hayti and at which plans would be made to free Cuba and Porto Rico from Spain and from the régime of slavery. The last argument was far-fetched, but it appealed to the South. It amounted to saying that if the government gave its countenance to the movement for emancipation in the Spanish American communities, it would thereby weaken the cause of slavery in the South, and that this was an interference with local institutions. Such reasoning could only have been intended to arouse the Southerners against the administration. It had little effect in congress. The senate confirmed the nominations and the house after a hot debate voted the money for expenses. At last the representatives set out for the isthmus, but the debates in congress had so delayed them that it was summer, 1826, before they departed. One of them died on the way, and the other arrived to find that the congress, after a fruitless session, had adjourned, to meet again at Tacubaya. He lingered until the appointed day, but when it arrived internal commotions reigned, and the congress did not assemble.

As to political significance the Panama incident was important. It furnished a rallying point for the "friends of Jackson," and their strength is shown by the votes of 24 to 19 in the senate and 134 to 60 in the house. Van Buren is said to have remarked: "If they had only taken the other side and refused the mission, we should have had them." The debate, through the use made by the Jackson men of the slavery argument, tended to bring all the old Virginia following in the South into one alliance with the Tennessean at the head.

**Attitude of
the Jackson
Men.**

**Significance
of the In-
cident.**

THE TARIFF AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF SECTIONALISM

In 1816 the South accepted the protective tariff, but it soon had reason to regret it. The westward migration injured all the old Atlantic states, north and south; but in New England the loss was balanced by the growth of manufactures. In the South was no such compensatory process, and land values fell steadily. The steady fall in the price of cotton through the rapid extension of its area of cultivation in the Gulf region increased the suffering. Then arose a Southern cry that it was all due to the evident inequality of the tariff, which

**Effects of
the Tariff;
North,
South, and
West.**

built up the North at the expense of the parts in which the people had no manufactures, but paid ever higher prices for their supplies. The West was in the same position logically, but it did not feel the burden in the same way. In the first place the continued improvement in transportation tended to lower prices of supplies, while land values naturally rose with the increase of population, and thus the burden was not apparent. Besides this, the prevalent idea in the West was confidence in the future of America. Imagination was keen on the subject, and the people readily adopted the theory of the home market. Let us have manufactures to develop our own cities, which will purchase our own raw product, said Clay, in announcing his famous "American System," and the idea found ready popular response. Add to this the fact that the protectionists wove into their system protective rates for raw wool and hemp, articles produced by the Western farmers, and we shall see why the Western farmers tolerated a system which their Southern brethren thought unjust.

In 1819 occurred a severe panic. A period of prosperity and feverish speculation followed the war of 1812, credit was expanded, and the inevitable collapse came surely. Now arose a cry of hard times. Banks were embarrassed, agricultural products sold at lower prices, labor was unemployed, and manufacturers suffered from competition with foreign goods produced at stagnation prices. Then arose a demand for further tariff legislation, and the result was the tariff bill of 1820. It provided for an increase in most of the schedules, especially in those on woollens, cotton goods, iron, and hemp. It passed the house, but failed in the senate by one vote. In the former body it received all the votes from the Northwest, and all but one from the Middle states. All but five of the votes from the older South were against it and all but four of those from the Southwest, including Kentucky. The parts of New England which represented the older commercial and farming interests were against it, while those which favored the manufacturers were for it. Thus, the agricultural South and Southwest and the commercial and agricultural parts of the Northeast were opposed to protection, and the manufacturing and agricultural Middle states and the Northwest were for it. Defeated by so close a vote, it was inevitable that the measure should come up again.

Growing
Demands of
Protection-
ists.

Several attempts to take up the tariff followed the bill of 1820, but none succeeded until 1824, when an act was carried through the house by a vote of 107 to 105 and through the senate by a vote of 25 to 21. It did not provide as high duties as those of the defeated bill of 1820. By raising the rates on hemp it got the entire vote of Kentucky, and it had the solid support of the Northwest, whose growth in population gave the protectionists a considerable advantage as compared with the former vote. It also raised

Tariff Law
of 1824.

the duty on raw wool, which was largely produced in the Northwest. Here again was seen a strong opposition in the South and Southwest, and New England was again divided, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Maine casting in opposition 22 of their 25 votes in the house. In these states the commercial interests were in political control, and Webster, voicing their wishes, made an excellent speech against the bill. Every vote of the Northwest and of Kentucky was in the affirmative and every vote of the South and the Southwest, except three from Maryland, one from Virginia, and two from Tennessee, was in the negative. Save for New England, the tariff had become a sectional issue.

The bill of 1824 was a compromise, and the protectionists were resolved to make another effort. In 1827 a woollens bill was introduced, raising the rates on both the manufactured article and the raw product. It passed the house, but was defeated in the senate by the casting vote of Calhoun, the vice-president. But the manufacturers did not lose heart. In the summer of the same year they held at Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, a great convention, at which it was agreed to frame a bill in which all interests were represented and to try to induce congress to pass it. Meanwhile, the press teemed with arguments for and against protection, and feeling became high.

Such was the situation when congress met in December, 1827, the Jackson party in control in the house. Divided nearly equally between friends and opponents of the tariff, they must suffer severely did not some astute politician devise a plan of escape. Keeping their leader in the background, they prepared in committee a bill which should be objectionable to New England but satisfactory to the Middle states. It lowered the rates on the medium priced woollens and raised them on molasses and articles used in ship building, all of which injured New England interests; and if Adams approved, as he must do or lose the support of the Middle states, he would suffer in his own section. It was expected that efforts would be made to amend, and all the Jackson men, Northern and Southern, agreed to reject amendments and force the bill to a vote as it came from committee. They kept their agreement, spite of the bitter jibes of the New Englanders. But at last the unexpected happened: enough New Englanders voted "aye" to pass the bill with the support of the Jackson men of the North and the high tariff men of the North and Northwest. The result left Jackson untouched by unpopularity. His Northern friends could point to their votes to show that they favored the tariff, and his Southern friends could point to their solid vote against it to show that they had fought ably to defeat it. John Randolph pointedly said that the bill "referred to manufactures of no sort or kind, but the manufacture of a President of the United States." But it was an unfair measure, and

Attempted
Law of
1827.

Tariff Law
of 1828.

was popularly called "the tariff of abominations." In the senate the woollen schedule was increased, and this secured better recognition from New England. Webster, now a senator from Massachusetts, voted for the bill, announcing that manufactures had progressed so far in his section that protection was henceforth its chief interest. It was a correct assertion. The long opposition between commerce and manufactures in New England was at an end, and the latter had triumphed. This last stronghold of antitariff sentiment in the North had surrendered. The tariff was now wholly a sectional policy.

This meant that the South had lost. Every one expected that the fight would soon be renewed, and her leaders were actively engaged in formulating an opposition which would stay the victors in what was then considered a selfish and unequal policy. In this process Virginia took an attitude of inactivity. Not herself a cotton-raising state, and lacking very able leaders, she allowed the more positive South Carolinians to take the initiative. From that time the cotton states dominated the Southern policy, and Calhoun, who was soon to be at odds with Jackson, became its spokesman.

South
Carolina
assumes
Southern
Leadership.

The weapon with which South Carolina proposed to secure success was nullification, as the event showed, too extreme a measure to command the support even of the South. Its inception goes back to the Crawford faction in the state, committed to state rights and hostile to the national policy of Calhoun. They became outspoken with the enactment of the tariff of 1824 and held many vehement meetings of protest. They gave their cause a constitutional bias, declaring that neither protection nor internal improvements were justified by the fundamental law. Calhoun saw the growing feeling with alarm. He must join, or fight it. He did not hesitate long. By defeating the woollens bill of 1827 he indicated his preference for the support of his own state, while he lost that of the North. In this year appeared "The Crisis," a series of letters by Turnbull, an extreme state rights man, counselling that South Carolina should "resist oppression." He did not say how this should be done, but the inference is that he wished her to use force. In the same spirit were many of his fellow citizens, but they objected to using force. A more pacific way was suggested by Calhoun, who in 1828 wrote a paper which came to be known as "The South Carolina Exposition." It was prepared at the request of the state rights party and was submitted to the legislature as the report of a committee on relations with the federal government. Calhoun's authorship was not revealed at the time, but it was suspected.

Origin of
Nullifica-
tion.

"The Exposition" harked back to the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions, 1798. It declared: (1) that the union was a compact of equal states; (2) that the federal government, created by the states, was their agent to carry out what it had been commissioned to do;

(3) that the constitution was its body of instructions; (4) that the action of the agent was null when it violated the instruction; and

**Theory of
Nullifica-
tion.**

(5) that it was for the state to determine when the instructions were violated. Applying this doctrine, it was held that the protective tariff was not authorized in the constitution, and that South Carolina, a sovereign state, might lawfully and without incurring any serious penalty resist its execution within her borders. This declaration was not adopted by the legislature, but it was widely published, and found ready acceptance by a people exasperated by the steady increase of a species of taxation which awarded to South Carolina none of its advantages and all of its burdens. To put it into practice was to reduce the national authority to a nullity. Calhoun well knew this, but he thought that the principle once granted, congress would never make laws which would furnish the opportunity to put the theory into force. If it was said that the states could not be trusted to exercise nullification moderately, the reply was that supreme authority was with the state and that it was as reasonable to trust the state to use it moderately as the federal government, which the nationalists wished to make supreme.

Having formulated this doctrine, the South Carolinians rested on their oars, for the necessity for putting it into operation was not immediately apparent. They looked to the approaching election with much confidence; for was not Jackson, the probable victor, a Southern man and a cotton planter? and was not Calhoun, ranking second in his party, the highest defender of nullification? And if the election were favorable, might not all come right without an open contest?

**No Inter-
mediate At-
tempt at
Execution.**

THE ELECTION OF 1828

In 1825 many men thought that the candidacy of Jackson was a bit of enthusiasm which would subside with his defeat. The union of his own and Calhoun's followers with those of Crawford soon showed they were mistaken. It was a strong combination, and kept a united front to its enemy, spite of the slumbering internal feud. Jackson proved a good leader. He was impetuous by temperament, his career was filled with quarrels, and his foes hoped and his friends feared he would commit some deed of anger which would overwhelm him in disgrace. But Jackson in the pursuit of his own affairs and Jackson as a national figure were distinct personalities. Though he chafed inwardly at the attacks showered on him, he was outwardly calm and dignified. In their hope of arousing him, the enemy went so far as to charge that his marriage was contracted at the expense of the happiness of another home. In other times this would have brought from him the fiercest denunciation, but he realized the tactics behind the charge and left the task

**Jackson as
a Leader.**

of dispelling the calumny to his friends. He had married a divorced wife, but was in no sense the cause of her separation from her husband. Thus he came to the end of his campaign without misadventure of the kind expected. To his supporters he was an abused man, a great and good defender of his country, an upright citizen, and the champion of the people against an aristocracy indifferent to the welfare of the people.

Besides his own popularity, the voters were influenced by three kinds of arguments directed to them by the vigorous Jackson leaders:

1. The first was the bargain and corruption cry. No dispassionate man objected to whatever understanding may have been made between Adams and Clay in the winter of 1824-1825, but to the people at large it had enough support in fact to make it appear that very wicked things were going on at Washington, where, as they thought, politicians sold the offices for their own advantage. 2. It was urged that the rights of the states were jeopardized by the centralizing policy of a New England president, an argument which appealed strongly to the old Jeffersonian school. To support it was Adams's first annual message, as well as the demand for internal improvements and for a high tariff. Was it not time, said the objectors, to check a process which, if continued, would eventually place the national government in the hands of a selfish majority to tyrannize over the minority?

1. The Cry
of Bargain.

2. State
Rights.

3. Another plan of attack was to accuse Adams of abusing the patronage. The charge was unfounded, for no president had been less inclined to appoint men for his own advantage. He was rigidly honest, and lost support by refusing to appoint men because they worked for his reelection. One of them expressed his disgust by telling him to his face that he might be right but he would not be reelected. Yet Adams persisted, even retaining in his confidence McLean, a Calhoun supporter, who as postmaster-general used his large patronage in the interest of the opposition. In truth, the opinion of the country ran strongly for political appointments. Political leaders would not work in the election if they did not have assurance of reward. Edward Everett expressed the feeling of every shrewd observer when he said in 1828: "For an Administration then to bestow its patronage, without distinction of party, is to court its own destruction." Thus, while Adams lost the support of his own friends, he was charged with abusing the patronage, and the country came to believe that the cause of good government demanded that a party be placed in power which, as one Jackson man expressed it, would "cleanse the Augean stables."

The
Patronage.

Arguments like these pleased the mass of citizens. The government had long been based on the idea that the best men should be chosen to represent the people. The Jackson leaders declared that the

representatives had ceased to act as upright agents. They declared that the remedy was to replace the old leaders by others closely responsive to the popular will. So far as they utilized the Crawford and Calhoun organizations they had trained leaders; but here, as in the formation of all new parties, they had many others who had little experience in politics, men of vehement prejudices and radical ideas. Such was the earliest composition of the Jacksonian democracy.

On the other side were ranged the forces of conservatism. The commercial classes, the manufacturers generally in the Middle states, the city people, and the larger landowners, had little sympathy with the cause of a Western military hero in whose name class was set against class. With them worked the followers of Clay, strongest in the Northwest, and the Adams men, strongest in New England, whose instincts likewise were for conservative policies. Adams was their logical candidate for the presidency, and Richard Rush, of Pennsylvania, ran with him for the vice-presidency. For the second place the Jackson men supported Calhoun.

As the campaign progressed, it was evident that Jackson's prospects were good. Adams had New England, but hardly anything else. Not even Clay's influence could carry the West for him against such a popular hero as Jackson. The South stood together, and with it went Pennsylvania, destined for many years to be a democratic stronghold. In New York the commercial class favored Adams, but the farmers of the interior, marshaled by the skillful Van Buren, were for Jackson. They were rent in twain, however, by the antimasonic movement, and not even Van Buren could promise a solid Jackson vote from the state. Of its 36 votes, as it fell out, 16 went for Adams and the rest for Jackson. Thus was revived under the leadership of Jackson that old combination of the South and the great Central states under which the Virginia régime was long in power. The total vote was 178 for Jackson and 83 for Adams. The latter got every New England vote but one in Maine, with 6 in Maryland, 8 in New Jersey, 3 in Delaware, and 16 in New York. He had none from the region south of the Potomac and west of the Alleghanies. The result was the defeat of one of the most conscientious of presidents because he could not withstand the tide of popular government then running strong, a movement much like that which carried his father and the federalist party to destruction in 1800.

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CHAPTER XIX

PROBLEMS OF JACKSON'S FIRST ADMINISTRATION

THE NEW PRESIDENT IN CHARGE

MARCH 4, 1829, Washington was filled with visitors come to see the "people's champion" take the oath of office. They covered the slopes of Capitol Hill from where the peace monument now stands to the crest, where a picket fence inclosed the open square which now separates the capitol from the library of congress. Within this yard another great crowd awaited the inaugural ceremony from the east portico. Just before noon the watchers on the slope saw a knot of gentlemen issue from a hotel on the avenue and move slowly up the hill. In the midst walked Jackson, bareheaded, tall and erect, his white hair conspicuous above the shoulders of his companions. A few minutes later he had entered the building, and in a short time stood before the great crowd in the inclosure and took the oath which John Marshall administered. Then came an inaugural address, safely scanned beforehand by his advisers, lest it say something which would give the carping opposition an opportunity to upbraid him. All went well. The spectacle was so impressive that Francis Scott Key, who stood at a gate of the picket fence, exclaimed: "It is beautiful, it is sublime!" The oath taken, the president mounted his horse and rode to the White House, where a reception was tendered to any one who chose to come.

Now followed a saturnalia. Statesmen and stable-boys, fine ladies and washerwomen, white people and blacks, all pushed into the mansion, grasped the hand of the president, if they could reach him, and rushed upon the waiters serving refreshments. From the rabble he was glad to escape by a side door, but the jostling crowd surged through the rooms, upsetting the trays in the hands of the servants, breaking the dishes, and leaping on the furniture in their eagerness to be served, until at last they were turned aside by some thoughtful person who had tubs of punch carried to the lawns, whither the mob quickly followed. Thus was inaugurated the rule of the democracy.

The cabinet was already announced. At the head was Van Buren, secretary of state, whom most persons thought an excellent selection. The others were nearly evenly divided between his own followers and the friends of Calhoun. They had all been selected after much conference between the two factions,

and it seems that Jackson had been forced to submit to such a choice. The fact shows how far the party had come to be a definite organization, of which the president was only the leader. There was much disappointment, especially among the Virginians, whose state, save for a short time in Madison's presidency, had always had a seat in the cabinet since the beginning of the government. Not another Virginian was to sit there until the ill-starred administration of Tyler, himself a Virginian. The disappointed ones made the best they could of the situation, and some of them were later consoled with high diplomatic appointments.

This cabinet was not to be a body of political advisers. The members who supported Calhoun had not the president's confidence to the same extent as Van Buren, Eaton, and Barry, the inefficient postmaster-general. These men, with W. B. Lewis, F. P. Blair, J. A. Hamilton, A. J. Donelson, The
"Kitchen
Cabinet." and some others, established such superior influence that they were dubbed the "Kitchen Cabinet." They constituted a private cabal in the interest of Van Buren. Flatterers and others who sought favors secured its influence. It was the real council of the anti-Calhoun faction until the reorganization of the cabinet in 1831 enabled the president to have a cabinet in which no Calhounite had place. With that change he consulted his regular advisers more freely, and the "Kitchen Cabinet" lost its importance.

Among the inauguration visitors were a vast number of office seekers. The impression that Adams officials would be removed was general, and every Jackson man who could do so was present with petitions for reward for party service. Jackson was little inclined to resent the pressure brought to bear upon him. He announced frankly his belief in rotation in office, saying that one honest citizen was as capable as another of serving the public. He believed the campaign charges that the old officials were largely incompetent or touched with partisanship. It must be remembered that the old method of selecting officials was by personal recommendation, that many old men were in office who were no longer able to do the duty assigned to them, which facts gave some basis for the desire to adopt a new system. The treasury, we are told, was popularly called by residents of Washington "the octogenarian department." The removals which followed the inauguration were many more than had occurred before that time, but not so many as were made by later presidents. Most of Jackson's appointees were inexperienced men, many of them were incompetent, and a few proved dishonest. The system he inaugurated had previously grown up in several states, notably in New York. It was characterized by Marcy, of New York, in the phrase, later generally adopted, "To the victors belong the spoils!" Appoint-
ments.

The selection of one member of the cabinet brought out an unexpected protest. Senator John H. Eaton, of Tennessee, a staunch friend of Jackson's, was made secretary of war. January 1, 1829, he was married to Mrs. Timberlake, daughter of a Washington tavern-keeper, who was reported to have had many adventures, a woman whom the society of the city would not receive. Remonstrances were made to Jackson against bringing into his official family one who would undoubtedly be rejected socially. He believed her innocent, and refused to discriminate against her, saying he came to Washington to make a cabinet in the interest of the country and not to please the ladies of the capital. Trouble began immediately, but as official entertainments were not held until society returned to Washington after the summer season was past, an open break was deferred until the fall. Then Jackson gave a dinner, to which all the invited ones came. But their restrained looks showed their feelings toward Mrs. Eaton. When other cabinet officers gave dinners, some members refused to attend. At other places Mrs. Eaton was treated so coolly that before the end of the winter she ceased to accept invitations. Jackson was deeply offended. He took the conduct of society as an affront to himself. He thought a combination was made to discredit his administration.

So far, this was only a social affair, but it soon assumed a political aspect. Van Buren was a widower. He had no family to object to Mrs. Eaton, and won the regard of the president by conspicuous attentions to her on every possible occasion. Of those who took the opposite course, Mrs. Calhoun was the leader, and she was supported by the wives of several other cabinet members. Thus Jackson came to associate the vice-president with what he called the conspiracy, and he drew nearer to the friends of Van Buren. He called the protesting cabinet members before him and told them he expected them to induce their wives to treat more courteously the wife of his friend. The only reply they made was that they could not interfere with the social affairs of their families. There was no improvement in the situation of the unhappy woman, and the breach in the administration party grew steadily wider.

INTERNAL IMPROVEMENTS CHECKED

While this affair progressed, Van Buren was able to give his rival another deadly thrust by bringing the president over to the opposition to internal improvements, whose champion Calhoun had long been. The vice-president was the author of the bonus bill, 1817 (see page 365), which Madison vetoed on constitutional grounds. But the friends of improvements persisted, and in 1819 passed resolutions calling on the secretary of war, Calhoun, to report on the roads necessary for

**Mrs.
Eaton.**

**Political
Significance
of the
Matter.**

**Calhoun
and Internal
Improve-
ments.**

military defense. The secretary complied, but his comprehensive scheme was not acted upon. However, so many appropriations were made for single works that Monroe, himself a strict constructionist, decided to give the country another warning like that of Madison. Accordingly he vetoed, in 1822, a bill to establish toll-gates on, and otherwise to regulate, the Cumberland road, a great national highway designed to run from the Potomac to the capital of Missouri, then the westernmost state. Jackson was at that time in private life, but he wrote to Monroe, congratulating him on the veto. In 1824 a bill was passed directing the secretary of war to have made surveys of such roads and canals as were needed for national development. Next year Calhoun reported a system of roads and canals, the chief features of which were: (1) a canal from the Potomac to the Ohio, to be extended finally to Lake Erie, (2) an inland waterway along the coast from the Potomac to Boston harbor, and (3) a national highway from New Orleans to Washington. Besides these works he pointed out others which ought to be undertaken, some in the South, and some in the West. To the opponents of improvements it seemed a bid for the support of all the parts of the country which would be affected. Nothing was done to carry out this scheme while Adams was president, but it was still in the minds of men at the accession of Jackson. The large group who favored it, strong especially in the Middle and Northwestern states, looked to Calhoun, second in the party and probable successor in 1832, to carry it out. If the weight of Jackson's opposition could be aroused, it would weaken the scheme and at the same time deal a hard blow to the hopes of Calhoun.

Van Buren was the daily companion of the president. He was not a great statesman, but he had tact and common sense, and Jackson, who knew little about practical administration, asked his advice continually. The two men talked freely about the dangers they believed to exist in the growing tendency to get congress to vote money for roads and canals which were purely local, and it was decided that at the first good opportunity a veto should be given which would again call attention to the evils in the practice. Soon afterwards a bill was introduced to authorize the government to take stock in a road from Maysville, Kentucky, to Lexington, in the same state. The road was purely local, and a veto of it could be easily defended. Its passage through the two houses was carefully watched from the White House, and the veto was duly sent May 27, 1830. Many of the president's best friends feared the consequences, saying that it would alienate Pennsylvania and the West. He replied that it was only the contractors and land-boomers, with the politicians who feared them, that opposed the veto, and that the people at large would approve the measure. The news from the people confirmed this foresight. The Maysville veto proved one of the popular measures of Jackson's career. In delivering it he

**The Maysville Veto,
1830.**

showed one of his most characteristic traits, his ability to divine what the people wished and his willingness to appeal to them over the heads of the politicians.

After rejecting the Maysville bill Jackson objected to many similar measures. He effectively checked appropriations for roads in the states, although many were built in the territories. He did not make the same objection to appropriations for improving rivers and harbors, destined to be for many years the congressman's means of getting benefits for his district. The veto came just when railroads were coming into use, the burden of constructing them was transferred to the states, which made, in the next generation, lavish gifts to such enterprises. The rage for railroad construction at state expense led to much extravagance in the West and was a vital cause of the panic of 1837. After 1850 the Jackson policy was reversed, when great land grants began to be made for the construction of railroads, the most important being the grants in aid of the transcontinental roads during the civil war and immediately afterwards.

Later History of Internal Improvements.

DIVISION IN THE JACKSONIAN PARTY

In 1830 Calhoun was committed to state rights, the program of his friends in South Carolina, and he could not seriously object to the checking of internal improvements. In fact, the South supported the Maysville veto nearly unanimously. It was more concerned in impeding the progress of protection; and the doctrine of nullification, announced for that purpose, was in danger of becoming the general slogan of that section. Many Northern men felt that the doctrine ought to be opposed, and the great Hayne-Webster debate, which occurred at this time, gave them a feeling of relief, since it afforded the greatest champion of the union, Daniel Webster, an opportunity to place before the country the arguments for a stronger federal government.

State Rights and Union Men.

The occasion of this celebrated debate was some resolutions offered December 29, 1829, by Senator Foote, of Connecticut, looking to the restriction of land sales. The Western senators objected immediately, thinking that Foote merely wished to check the drain of Eastern population to the West. Benton, of Missouri, a forceful but bitter debater, took up the cause of the West in one of his characteristic speeches, and much feeling was aroused in the senate. Then the advocates of states rights thought they saw an opportunity to draw the West to their side. They wished to show that it was not strictly constitutional for the federal government to pass laws which bore hardly on any section, and that an attempt to do so was but in keeping with the policy of building up one section at the expense of another, a policy which must lead to hostility of

Foote's Resolution.

section against section with a resulting weakening of the bond of union.

It was impossible to ignore the bearing of this argument on the Southern protest against the protective tariff. It was set forth with much skillfulness by Hayne, of South Carolina, a ready and able debater, the equal, in the opinion of the Southerners, of any debater in the senate. Then Webster, senator from Massachusetts, came to the defense of the North. He denied that his section wished to sacrifice to its own interest any other section, and resented with special force the charge that it was hostile to the West. Hayne had hinted that there was a constitutional way by which a state could undo an unauthorized act of oppression at the hands of the federal congress; and Webster now boldly challenged the theory, his purpose being to force Hayne to a more specific declaration of his meaning. By this time the debate had ceased to be concerned with the sale of Western lands and had become a discussion of the fundamental principles of the constitution. The point at issue was: Can a State legally defy the laws of congress, however much it may think them unwarranted by the constitution?

Webster
Called
Forth.

Hayne could not well avoid Webster's challenge, and to do him justice he had no desire to do so. All the state rights group were with him and waited confidently for his reply. Many times in debate their theory had been appealed to, but never had it been set forth in all its completeness by a master of the art of presentation. Their expectation was well known in the city and the chamber and galleries were crowded when on January 21, 1830, the Southern champion rose to make his great speech. He was a man of fine appearance and spoke with much grace, although he could utter the sharpest criticisms on an adversary. He was given to making his arguments personal, and resorted to the practice in this speech. In this respect his utterances were neither dignified nor able. But he soon passed on to the constitutional phase, where he spoke with better effect. He accepted the "South Carolina Exposition" of 1828 as sound doctrine, showed that it was in line with the Virginia and Kentucky resolutions of 1798, and affirmed that it was the doctrine that New England espoused when in Madison's administration she found herself, like the South in 1830, suffering from laws enacted by the majority in control of the national government. And then he took up the cause of the South with great earnestness. Is the federal government, he asked, the judge of its own power? To assert the affirmative, whether the power be exercised by congress or by the supreme court, is to make the central government "a government without limitation of powers"! It is to reduce the states to the level of mere corporations. He would speak a word for South Carolina. She was but seeking to preserve herself from measures which had prostrated her industry and would soon impoverish the whole South; she

Hayne's
Argument.

sought to preserve the union of states as it was founded, and to save the states from usurpations which would leave them nothing they could call their own.

Webster's reply was made on the 26th, the senate chamber being crowded to its utmost capacity. Tall, dignified, with a striking leonine face, a rich baritone voice, and a deliberate manner, he was easily the best orator in the senate. He met the personal thrusts of Hayne with a satirical courtesy which left nothing to be desired by the friends of the speaker, watching anxiously to see if their champion would meet the demands of the occasion. In this respect neither speaker was calm nor properly self-restrained, but even here Webster showed his mental superiority.

It was in his presentation of constitutional argument that we find our chief satisfaction with the Northern champion. Frankly accepting the consolidation theory, he proceeded to combat the doctrine that a state may declare null a law of congress without an appeal to revolution. This doctrine, he said, rested on the false assumption that the federal government was the creature of twenty-four states, each with a will of its own, wills which were apt to be at variance with one another, the exercise of which would reduce the central government to an absurdity. But where lies true sovereignty but in the people for whom both the federal and state governments are agents? Each government derives authority from the same source, each is supreme in its own sphere, and the constitution in all that it pretends to regulate is, by the authority of the sovereign people, the supreme law of the land. So far as the constitution restrains the states, in so far is the authority of the states not supreme. The constitution is a fact. Gentlemen may wish it had been made otherwise than it was made: with that we have nothing to do. It must be obeyed until it is changed. In one state, we may say, the tariff is declared an act of usurpation, in another it is declared constitutional; how shall we reconcile the two points of view if we accept the theory that a state may pass on the matter? If the general government has no power to pass on the contending assertions, is it not "a rope of sand"? It is not claimed that the federal government has unrestricted power. It has all the power given it in the constitution made by the people, all this and no more. Among the specified powers is the creation of a supreme judiciary to pass upon all questions arising under the constitution, and it is to this court and not to any state that we ought to refer the question of the power of congress to make any law it assumes to make. Suppose South Carolina should declare the tariff law null: must her agents not try to enforce the declaration? But the federal government declares it legal, and must its agent not seek to enforce it? What would the result be but civil war? To oppose the execution of the law is treason. Can a state be allowed to commit treason with impunity? If the constitution is imperfect

**Webster's
Reply.**

**His Con-
stitutional
Argument.**

it can be amended by the people who made it, but as long as it is law it should be obeyed.

From this splendid debate each side withdrew with complacent feelings. The Southerners were pleased that their champion had set forth their views of state sovereignty, the Northerners took courage in seeing Webster support the glory and power of the union by such masterly reasoning. But the debate, final as it was as a statement of theory, went beyond the practical situation. The country was not yet ready to follow the controversy to the end which Webster so clearly foresaw, to civil war. Each side treasured its own argument in memory for a more strenuous day, while the practical politician took up the tasks actually before him. Of this class were Jackson and Van Buren, generally supposed to lean to state rights, but in their inner hearts willing to see Calhoun and the South Carolinians discredited by the powerful forensics of Webster.

**Practical
Results.**

By this time we may freely speak of the South Carolina theory as nullification. Would it be generally adopted in the South? The insistence of its defenders that it was but the doctrine of 1798 shows their anxiety to draw the Virginians to its support. It proved a futile hope; for Virginia, slighted in the make-up of the new administration, would not adopt the leadership of South Carolina. More important was the attitude of Jackson, on whose action the nullifiers waited uneasily. They supported him in 1828, their leader, Calhoun, was high in party councils, and they well knew that if the president, a Southerner himself, came over to their side, they would unite the South and be able to force the North into a relinquishment of its high tariff policy. Constitutional arguments are but the theoretical basis of a political movement, and if practical ends could be attained, Webster's reasoning might be ignored.

**Nullification
not
Checked.**

April 13, 1830, was Jefferson's birthday, generally celebrated by his followers with speeches and toasts. This year the South Carolinians controlled the arrangements of the celebration in Washington and planned to have the speeches express their peculiar views of state rights. The president was invited and was expected to give a toast. He was fully conscious of all that was going on and consulted with Van Buren in regard to his toast. Now at this time Jackson was in sympathy with the Van Buren faction, as were, in fact, all of his "Kitchen Cabinet," and it was decided that he should give such a toast as would show his disapproval of Calhoun's theories. He arose at the feast with this sentiment, "Our federal union, it must be preserved!" The nullifiers could only gasp. Calhoun, who was next called on, tried to retrieve the situation by giving as his toast, "The union, next to our liberty, most dear! May we all remember that it can only be preserved by

**Jackson's
"Union"
Toast.**

respecting the rights of the states and distributing equally the benefits and burthen of the union!" But the words of the president were most significant. They indicated that he would not be brought into the general Southern movement which the nullifiers planned.

In another respect Jackson thwarted the plans of the South Carolinians. In 1802 the United States, approving the cession of Georgia's claim to Alabama and Mississippi, agreed to remove the Creek and Cherokee Indians from the limits of Georgia proper "as early as the same can be peaceably obtained on reasonable terms." By several treaties all but 9,000,000

acres of the Indian lands were purchased before 1825 and opened to settlement. But at this time the Indians decided in a council that they would sell no more land. They had their separate form of government, and their land, much of it very fertile, was desired for white settlement. Georgia naturally thought it intolerable that there should be a civil power within her borders which defied her authority, and she called on the federal government to execute the agreement of 1802. Adams hesitated to do anything decisive. Then the state announced that if the Indians were not removed she would exercise her right as a sovereign state, by dividing the Indian lands into counties, opening them to settlement, and establishing a white man's government over them. By the constitution, congress had authority over trade with the Indians and made treaties with them. It was also provided that treaties should be the supreme law of the land. As the Indians pleaded that they were protected by treaties, would not the proposed action of Georgia violate the constitution? The state urged her own sovereignty over the territory within her limits, but the Indians took the matter to the courts. Two important decisions of the federal supreme court were the result. In one, the Cherokee

Status of an
Indian
Tribe.

Nation vs. Georgia, it was held that an Indian tribe, while not an independent nation, was, nevertheless, a state, and under the protection of congress. In the other, *Worcester vs. Georgia*, it was held by the court, Chief Justice Marshall giving the decision, that the attempt of Georgia to extend her jurisdiction over the lands formerly held by the Indians was illegal.

These matters ran past the period to which our story has come, for they extend from the beginning of Jackson's term to 1833; but the sharp controversy they produced was in its critical

Georgia and
the South
Carolina
Con-
troversy.

phase in 1830. They were related to the general attempt of South Carolina to draw all the South to her support because they involved the theory of state sovereignty. If Georgia leant so decidedly on the theory in her Indian controversy, would she not make common cause with her sister state in the fight to lower the tariff? The nullifiers undoubtedly expected as much, but they were disappointed. In the first place the

men of Georgia were devoted to Crawford, who was bitterly opposed to Calhoun. They supported Jackson in 1828, but adhered to the Van Buren, rather than the Calhoun, faction. In the second place, Jackson gave them continual support in the Indian matter, informing the Indians soon after his inauguration that there was nothing for them but to submit and remove beyond the Mississippi. As the controversy was still unsettled in 1830 Georgia dared not move against the declared opposition of Jackson, who let it be known to the Georgians that he expected their support in the defense of the cause of union. Thus it happened that South Carolina saw her hopes of uniting all the south in a common cause of nullification fall to the ground; and the turn of events augured no good for the Calhoun faction, whom the Van Buren faction were bent on reducing, with Jackson's help, to a position of inferiority. It was a sad blow to the ambition of the great South Carolinian. Face to face with the loss of his own state in 1828, he had been compelled to turn a somersault from nationalism to a state rights position, and while he was in mid-air the artful Van Buren struck him a blow which made his landing precarious.

In the autumn of 1829, when Jackson was deeply touched by what he considered the combination to discredit Eaton through the exclusion of Mrs. Eaton from society, the "Kitchen Cabinet" revealed to him that Calhoun, formerly secretary of war, wished in 1818 to discipline him for the invasion of Florida. Jackson knew that such a purpose was entertained in the cabinet at the time, but he supposed that Crawford was its author. Calhoun should have removed this suspicion, but fearing Jackson's wrath, had allowed him to go on thinking that Crawford was the author of the suggestion. When the truth at last came out, Jackson, suspicious and of violent temper, would believe nothing but that the South Carolinian had acted traitorously. He said nothing openly until the Jefferson birthday dinner brought him to the point of declared opposition; for Calhoun had a powerful following, and a false move would cause the public to think that party harmony was jeopardized by personal intrigue. But now Calhoun was identified with disunion and might be attacked with greater safety.

**Jackson
Turned
against
Calhoun.**

The day after the birthday dinner a friend of Van Buren at the side of the president wrote to Crawford for verification of the story that had been privately revealed. The reply of Crawford, who still hated Calhoun, was all that was expected. Then began a bitter correspondence between president and vice-president, the highest man and next highest in the administration party, in which neither convinced the other of his wrongdoing. It ended with a curt note in which Jackson told his correspondent that future friendship between them was impossible. Van Buren was too shrewd to take open part in the affair. He was careful

**An Angry
Corre-
spondence.**

not to talk with Jackson about it, but it is impossible to suppose that he was ignorant of a matter so full of weight for his future. The breach it produced was accentuated by the selection of a new party organ, which up to this time had been the *Daily Telegraph*, edited by Duff Green, a devoted Calhoun man. Frank P. Blair, destined to become one of the most influential party editors of the day, was brought to Washington, and in December, 1830, he founded the *Globe*, whose influence was soon widespread. Blair was a firm friend of Jackson and gave all his energy to promoting the cause of Van Buren.

Since the president did not publish this correspondence, Calhoun concluded that he feared to do so. Friends, to whom it was freely shown, held the same view and thought that its publication would crush the crafty New Yorker. Then Calhoun took the initiative, laying his case before the public in a pamphlet which saw the light of day in February, 1831. The *Globe* immediately charged Calhoun with an attempt to sow dissension in the party, the administrative press and politicians, fearing the wrath of Jackson, took up the cry, and by the end of spring Calhoun was fiercely denounced as a party traitor.

By the spring of 1831 the anti-Calhoun men were so strong that they were prepared to thrust their opponents out of the cabinet. But even here the proceedings were marked by consummate skill. Fearing that a bald dismissal would plant irreconcilable hatred within the party, it was arranged that Van Buren and Eaton should resign voluntarily. They gave as their reason the desire to relieve Jackson from the embarrassment of their presence, but before resigning they had been promised other positions. Van Buren was to be minister to England, and it was thought that Eaton could be elected senator from Tennessee. When this faction had withdrawn, the president, with every outward appearance of impartiality, called for the withdrawal of the others, so that neither should have the advantage in the cabinet. He thus got rid of the Calhounites, but he did not on that account fail to fill the new cabinet with men opposed to Calhoun. He thus remade the government on a Van Buren basis.

The next feature of the party program was to look out for the nomination for the presidency in 1832. Jackson had formerly declared that he would accept only one term. But his friends knew that if he now withdrew, it would be difficult to secure the nomination for Van Buren, openly charged with the intrigue against Calhoun. They had good reason to fear that the South Carolinian, the next most popular democrat to Jackson, would be indorsed by the party. Jackson himself understood the situation, and in the autumn of 1831 let it be known that he would again be a candidate. He planned to have Van Buren remain

The *Globe*.

Calhoun pronounced Traitor.

A Purged Cabinet.

Jackson Re-nominated.

in London until the excitement of the recent quarrel subsided, and to return in time to be made candidate in 1836. But in January, 1832, the senate rejected Van Buren's nomination as minister by the casting vote of Calhoun, the vice-president; and such an outburst of feeling came from the Jackson following that it was decided that the only way to vindicate the rejected man was to make him Jackson's running-mate. Thus was taken the last step in the identification of the favored New Yorker with the head of the party. In 1829 the party was threatened with disintegration through the fierce rivalry within it. By the most skillful management, the Calhoun faction had been reduced to a harmless minimum, and led through its own blundering into open revolt at a time when its secession was not a serious danger. At the same time, Jackson had grown in strength with the masses and was at the head of a mighty host which looked to him as the chosen leader against forces of corruption. Jacksonian democracy was completely organized and confident of the future.

THE ELECTION OF 1832

Meanwhile, an opposition was forming under Clay's leadership. All who criticized Jackson's appointments, or rejected his policy of internal improvements, or opposed his attitude toward the bank, — already announced but not pressed to its conclusion (see page 411), — and many others whose chief impulse was dislike for a leader of the Jackson type, all these now came together under the name of national republicans. In calling themselves by this title they seem to have had in mind the division of the party which prevailed in the years immediately after the war of 1812. They also proclaimed themselves faithful tariff men, but on this issue Jackson was not openly against them.

The Na-
tional Re-
publicans.

Besides these, a third party was in the field. In 1826 William Morgan, of Batavia, New York, who had published a book purporting to expose the secrets of freemasonry, mysteriously disappeared, and many people believed he had been destroyed by the masons. A frantic movement spread through the adjoining counties for the outlawry of the order, which was denounced as a secret political society. The anti-masonic party was thus organized. As Clinton was a mason, it opposed him, and as Jackson was also a mason and had the support of Clinton, it supported Adams in 1828. The party was organized in several other states in this election, and generally opposed Jackson. They were able to hold the balance of power in some states and elected several members of congress.

The Anti-
Masonic
Party Or-
ganized.

As the election of 1832 approached, attempts were made to get them to support Clay; but he would not declare for their principles, and they decided to act alone. In September, 1830, they held a national

convention in Philadelphia, in which it was decided to organize a national party. This assembly made an appeal to the people and called a convention at Baltimore, September 26, 1831, to select a candidate for the presidency, the first national nominating convention in our history. It met in due time and selected William Wirt,

**First National
Nominating
Convention.**

of Virginia, as its candidate for the presidency and Amos Ellmaker, of Pennsylvania, for the vice-presidency. The example of the antimasons was followed by the national republicans, who in December, 1831, assembled in Baltimore and nominated Clay for president, and Sergeant, of Pennsylvania, for vice-president. In the following May a convention of young men who supported Clay met in Washington, accepted the Baltimore nominations, and issued the first "platform" of a political party in America. It indorsed protection and internal improvements, and arraigned Jackson's administration for its policy in appointments to office, and its attitude toward the Indians in Georgia. In May, 1832, the democrats followed the example of their opponents and met in a convention at Baltimore. They nominated Jackson unanimously, and Van Buren by a vote of 208 to 75. This convention ordered that a two-thirds vote should be necessary to a nomination, a rule followed in every succeeding convention of the party.

The convention system, thus introduced, has proved a permanent feature of American political life. After the caucus was repudiated in 1824 candidates were nominated by state legislature. In 1828 the candidates were so well designated by the trend of events that this system was satisfactory. It would probably have been satisfactory, so far as Jackson was concerned, in 1832; for his party had no thought of rejecting him as a candidate. Indeed, as the election year approached, he was nominated by many legislatures and local or state conventions. But the other parties were not so fortunate. The antimasons were at sea until the convention assembled, and the national republicans, though united in Clay's favor, needed the effect of a great display of their strength to impress themselves on the minds of voters. In the democratic party a convention was necessary to secure the acceptance of Van Buren, in whose behalf Jackson exerted all his power over his followers. It was, probably, only the fear of offending Jackson which made Van Buren the candidate.

**Convention
System a
Develop-
ment.**

The adoption of nomination by convention shows how democratic parties had now become. The delegates, at first chosen in varying manners, represented the party in the localities from which they came. Their selection was the best utterance of the party's voice then possible. The earliest method was generally to allot to each state as many votes in convention as it had in the electoral college. Later practice has given each state twice as many votes as it has presidential electors.

**Democratic
Character of
the Party.**

The campaign which followed these nominations was vehement. The democrats relied on the popular confidence in Jackson. He was, they said, the people's candidate, he would pay the national debt, he would deprive the bank of its privileges, and he protected the treasury from the wiles of the people who wished to have roads and canals at the expense of the national revenues. Clay's support was of a complex character. In one section he relied on the friendship of the business classes for the bank, in others he appealed to the protectionists, and in still others he talked about the radicalism of Jackson. In July, while the canvass progressed, the president vetoed the bill to recharter the bank. Clay's friends had urged the bill, thinking that a veto would array against Jackson the state of Pennsylvania as well as the powerful financial class. The national republicans received the veto message with undisguised pleasure and pressed the battle more vigorously. They were soon undeceived. The farmers of Pennsylvania cared nothing for the bank, and they rallied to the support of its arch foe in proportion as the capitalists proclaimed their hostility to him. The result of the election was 219 electoral votes for Jackson, 49 for Clay, and 7 for Wirt, while South Carolina, piqued over the treatment of Calhoun, threw away her 11 votes on Floyd of Virginia. Van Buren carried all of the Jackson votes but the thirty from Pennsylvania, which were given to Wilkins, of that state. Wirt's vote came from Vermont, the only state the antimasons could carry. This poor showing was the death knell of that party. Jackson very naturally took his overwhelming victory as an indorsement of his policies, and prepared to put them into complete execution.

The Bank
Veto.

Jackson
Elected.

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CHAPTER XX

JACKSON'S PRESIDENCY COMPLETED

THE END OF NULLIFICATION

IT was natural for Jackson to think his triumphant reëlection an evidence of popular approval for all his important policies. Thus reassured, and supported by a united party, he could take up the incomplete work of his first administration with the assurance of success. He might secure the removal of the Georgia Indians, bring to an end the negotiations with France, and break down the power of the bank of the United States, which he considered a menace to democratic institutions. But the first serious problem after the election was to deal with nullification. It was a problem he did not invite and could not avoid; for the South Carolinians, having lost hope of placing their great leader in the White House, were now determined to put their theory to the ultimate test.

It will be remembered that Calhoun came to open breach with Jackson with the publication of his pamphlet in February, 1831, which he at first hoped would destroy Van Buren and not provoke the opposition of Jackson (see page 401). By the middle of May he realized that this expectation was futile and became the public, as for three years he had been the secret, leader of the nullifiers. July 26 he issued his famous "Address to the People of South Carolina," in which were restated the arguments in the "Exposition" of 1828. It was the avowed platform of his followers, and was widely read, North and South. All through the autumn, winter, and following spring it was widely discussed in South Carolina. The union party there was of respectable size, though not in a majority, and they naturally sought to lessen the weight of his doctrine. In the discussion various explanations were given of its meaning, for it was not clear in all its points. At last the nullifiers themselves called on him for a simpler statement, and August 28, 1832, he published such a summary in what became known as his "Fort Hill Letter," addressed to Governor James Hamilton, Jr. The result of this agitation was that the nullifiers carried the legislature by a large majority.

Work to be Done.

Nullifiers become Aggressive.

Calhoun's Three Great Papers on Nullification.

To this body soon after it met in October came a message from the governor urging that, inasmuch as the federal government was committed to the tariff which was believed to be unconstitutional, it was the duty of the state to look out for the interests of the people. Since the constitution, it said, was authorized by the people of the state, it was for them now to call a convention to inquire if the federal compact had been violated. The legislature accepted the suggestion, and by a large majority called a convention to meet November 19, 1832.

**The South
Carolina
Convention.**

No one could doubt what that body would do. By a vote of 136 to 26 it passed on the 24th the South Carolina Ordinance of Nullification, declaring the tariff acts of 1828 and 1832 not binding on the people of the state, forbidding appeals to the federal courts in cases for the enforcement of the said laws, and requiring state officials to take oath to uphold the ordinance. February 1, 1833, was fixed as the day on which nullification should go into effect, and the legislature was directed to pass such laws as should be necessary to put the ordinance into effect.

**The Ordinance of
Nullification.**

November 27 the legislature reassembled. It was foreseen that if a citizen refused to pay duties on goods, the articles in question would be seized by federal officers, and to enable him to recover them the replevin act was now passed. It provided that the owners of goods seized might recover twice their value from the official holding them. As this was a state law, and as the state officials were all nullifiers, it was likely that the replevin act would be executed with liberality toward the persons who refused to pay duties. On the other hand, it seemed certain that the federal government would not tamely give up its power to seize goods for failure to pay duties, and if war came it would come at this point in the controversy. The legislature did not overlook the fact, and it authorized the governor to call out the militia to enforce the laws of the state. There was a great deal of excitement in the state, unionists and nullifiers held nightly meetings, and threats of war and secession were heard on every hand.

The Replevin Act.

While affairs progressed to this state President Jackson kept his eye on the situation. Knowing that the nullifiers only threatened in the hope that they could force congress to modify the tariff, he felt that they would hesitate to go as far as war. But he took occasion in several ways to drop quiet hints that the laws must be obeyed. It was not until the autumn that he came to believe that nullification would actually be attempted. Then he ordered the secretary of the navy to be ready to send a force to Charleston, if necessary. He also directed the commanding officers of the forts in the harbor to be vigilant in detecting resistance, sent a special messenger to report on sentiment in the state, gave constant encouragement to the union party there, and deposited arms in convenient

**Jackson's
Precautions.**

places in North Carolina to be ready for an emergency. Seven revenue cutters and the *Natches*, a ship of war, appeared in Charleston harbor and cast anchor where they could rake the fashionable "Battery," on which were the residences of the leading citizens. For many weeks the tension was extreme. Nullifiers and unionists, equally desirous of delaying bloodshed, strove to restrain the feelings of their followers, lest some accident should precipitate war before the last efforts for peace were exhausted.

In Washington two groups of men were seeking to meet the situation. One, under the lead of the president, planned to meet force with force and to assert the authority of the government.

From this source came Jackson's nullification proclamation, December 10, 1832. It was a firm argument against the theory of nullification, and closed by warning the people of

The Nullification Proclamation.

South Carolina against the advocates of nullification. "The laws of the United States must be executed," said Jackson in words like those of Lincoln twenty-nine years later; "I have no discretionary power on the subject; my duty is emphatically pronounced in the constitution. Those who told you that you might peaceably prevent their execution, deceived you; they could not have been deceived themselves. They know that a forcible opposition could alone prevent the execution of the laws, and they know that such opposition must be repelled. Their object is disunion. But be not deceived by names. Disunion by armed force is *treason*." Many of Jackson's followers were state rights men, and they were not pleased with his open espousal of consolidation doctrines. But all the unionists of the country, of whatever party, took fresh courage when they read the proclamation. For once New England and the great cities of the northern coast, following the lead of Webster and John Quincy Adams, were in hearty support of Jackson.

Its Effect.

The second group wished to solve the difficult problem before the nation by enacting a bill for a lower tariff. That done, nullification as a practical measure would vanish. They were lead by the particular friends of Van Buren, who could not hope to have the democratic support in 1836 if the northern and southern portions of the party fell into conflict over state rights. They brought in the Verplanck bill, proposing to

The Verplanck Tariff Bill.

lower duties to a basis of 20 per cent in two years, hoping that with the support of the South and as many votes as Van Buren could rally in the North the measure would pass. If the project succeeded, Van Buren would be applauded as "Pacifator." Jackson countenanced the plan, but gave most of his attention to his own plans for preserving the authority of the federal government.

Meanwhile, the attitude of the other Southern states became very important, both to South Carolina and to the president. Georgia wavered for a while, but the fear that she would lose Jackson's sym-

pathy in regard to her Indian question held her in check. If she had gone over to the nullifiers, it is probable that the other Gulf states would have followed her lead. Much anxiety was also felt for Virginia, and the nullifiers tried hard to convince her that they but stood for the Virginia resolutions of 1798. Agents were sent to Richmond to labor with the legislature there. Their best effort could not accomplish their purposes. Although there was strong sentiment in that state for state rights, the most the legislature would do was to send an agent to South Carolina to try to make peace between the state and the federal authorities. North Carolina took an even more conservative stand, declaring that she would defend the cause of union. The nullifiers were thus made to see that if war came, they must proceed alone. But many people feared that if fighting once began, it would be impossible to restrain all the South from rallying to the support of South Carolina in her struggle against the tariff.

Jackson was now thoroughly aroused, and thought only of using force. Offers of troop came from many states, and Washington was full of war talk. January 16, 1833, he sent congress a special message on the situation, and on the 21st one of his friends introduced the "force bill," called by the Calhounites the "bloody bill." It gave the president the authority to call out the army and navy to enforce the laws of congress. Jackson used all his influence to have it passed. Calhoun proclaimed it a tyrannical measure, and the states rights men generally considered it an invasion of the rights of the states. This bill and the Verplanck tariff bill were urged contemporaneously, one by the unionists, the other by the democrats generally.

As January neared an end, it became evident that the tariff bill could not pass. In fact, only one man could get enough Northern votes to pass a bill lowering the tariff, and that man was Clay, the father of the "American System." Many people urged him to exert himself for peace and save the union from civil war. For a long time he hesitated, but so much was gained for compromise that on February 1 the leading nullifiers met and decided to suspend the execution of the ordinance of nullification until they could see what congress would do. Then Clay at last yielded. February 12 he introduced in the senate a bill to reduce the tariff gradually during the next ten years, until in 1842 it should be at 20 per cent. The nullifiers and the South supported it, and enough of Clay's friends followed him to make it a law in the last days of the short session. To secure this result Calhoun agreed not to oppose the "force bill," which also became law as the session was about to adjourn. Thus ended the controversy. South Carolina, having secured the reduction of the tariff, repealed her nullification ordinance, and peace returned to the troubled face of national affairs. Clay, and not Van Buren, was hailed "Pacificator!"

JACKSON'S "WAR" AGAINST THE BANK

Jackson was pleased to have nullification off the stage, because he thought the time was come to finish his long struggle against the Bank of the United States. Early in his career he concluded that a bank controlled by one group of capitalists was dangerous to the welfare of the country and of doubtful constitutionality. Most of the bank's officers, at its headquarters in Philadelphia, as well as in the branches, were anti-Jackson men, and this gave rise to the charge that the institution worked for Jackson's defeat. The new party believed the allegation, although it was not very clearly proved, and they came into office disposed to use their power against the bank. They at once preferred charges against the Portsmouth, New Hampshire, branch. Nicholas Biddle, president of the "mother bank," as it was called, defended the branch in some warm words which only provoked further the party in power. After a while, he became more moderate, and an investigation showed that the Portsmouth branch was not guilty of the charges made. The incident was later pronounced the origin of the attack on the bank, the argument being that all the opposition that followed was because in this affair the administration was thwarted in a plan to get political control of the bank. The statement is not true. Jackson's attitude dates back at least twelve years, and he had nothing to do with the Portsmouth incident. On the other hand, in the autumn of 1829 Biddle had allowed the Jackson men to get control of several of the Western branches and was trying through friends in Washington to induce the president to agree that a recharter should be granted. Several members of the "Kitchen Cabinet," and the majority of the regular cabinet, favored his scheme, and he was confident of success.

The Begin-
ning.

The Ports-
mouth, N.
H., Incident.

Biddle's
First Sug-
gestion of a
New
Charter.

But Jackson's mind was made up. Rash in the outburst of his feeling, he could be as prudent as any one when policy demanded. He left Biddle in the dark for a month, and gave him a sad disappointment in the first annual message, December 8, 1829. The bank's charter, he said, would expire in 1836, and it was not too soon for congress and the people to begin to consider the wisdom of a recharter. He added that there were grave doubts about the constitutionality of the bank, and that it certainly had failed to establish "a uniform and sound currency." He suggested a bank founded upon the credit and revenues of the government, having in view chiefly the note-issuing and deposit functions. From all that came after, it is clear that he wished to take from private hands the large power and profit the bank then had. Probably he did not realize how severe a shock such a change would give

Jackson
Disappoints
Biddle.

to business. His party was more prudent, and it shrank from a battle with the powerful bank. On every hand his foes decried the suggestion in the message, and many of his friends held back. But the believers in state rights and the mass of people, whose instincts were against monopoly, were more favorable. In congress two committees reported that the bank was in a good condition, and thus the matter rested for a time.

But in his second annual message, December 6, 1830, Jackson returned to the charge, now unfolding a detailed plan for such a bank as he thought advisable. It was to be connected with the treasury department and managed by public officials. The scheme was at once attacked on the ground that it would vastly increase the patronage of the administration; and the point was a good one; for Jackson's appointments were bad and it did not seem safe to enlarge them in the way he now suggested. Nothing was done in the matter, and congress adjourned in March. The net result accomplished was that the question had been placed fairly before the country and opinion was forming on the inevitable problem, which must be met in one way or another before 1836.

When congress met again, the country was on the eve of a presidential election. Jackson's friends knew they would be embarrassed if the bank were an issue, and he yielded to them so far as merely to restate his position in his message, not asking for positive legislation. Biddle, watching the situation keenly, took this for a sign of weakness. If the attack were made, might it not come better now, when Jackson's cause was before the people, than later, when he was triumphantly reelected? The national republicans, Clay at their head, thought the bank very popular in the country; they wished to force a new charter through congress, believing that if it were vetoed the president would lose Pennsylvania and other strong commercial states in the East, without which he could not be reelected. This view appealed strongly to many of Jackson's friends, among them the secretary of the treasury, McLane. During the first weeks of the session there was much conferring in order to prepare a bill which both Biddle and Jackson would accept; but the upshot was that the president would yield nothing, and in January, 1832, Biddle, deciding to proceed without Jackson's approval, formally asked congress for a charter. He was warned that if his bill passed it would be vetoed. Indeed, after all Jackson had said against the bank he could hardly do otherwise. But recharter was pressed, the bank employing an able lobby in its behalf, and Biddle himself, a man of great ability, going to Washington to lead the fight. In July the charter passed by safe majorities and was immediately vetoed. The veto message was a shrewd campaign document. It declared

**Jackson's
Idea of a
Bank
owned by
the Gov-
ernment.**

**Biddle
Carries a
Charter
through
Congress.**

**The Veto
Sustained.**

the bank unconstitutional, pronounced it a monopoly, and appealed to the people's hostility toward great capitalistic institutions. To the friends of the bank these reasons seemed very flimsy; but the veto appealed to the people, and supported by Jackson's prestige it proved unassailable. His election by a vote of 219 to 49 for Clay and 7 for Wirt was received as evidence that the country indorsed the veto.

In the next session of congress nullification and the tariff played a leading part, and the bank question was not brought forward. But Jackson had his plan made, and as soon as the South Carolina crisis was safely passed he began to put it into execution. It was evident that Biddle did not accept the

**Biddle still
has Hope.**

election as a final verdict. To close up the business of the bank in 1836 would mean calling in a great mass of loans and the withdrawal from circulation of much bank money. From both processes business must suffer. Many men foresaw this, foes as well as friends of the bank. Would the country at the last willingly undergo the calamity? Biddle thought that when the crisis came he might be able to carry a charter over a veto; Jackson believed the same, but he put it another way. He said that the bank would wait until the last and use its power of calling in loans to produce a panic and thus wring a charter out of congress in spite of a veto. He was thoroughly angry with Biddle, and believed him capable of any wickedness. He therefore proposed to meet the emergency by breaking the power of the bank in 1833, so that in 1836 it should not be able to produce a panic; and his means of breaking it was to withdraw the public deposits, place them with the leading state banks, and gradually strengthen those institutions, so that in 1836 they would be able to take over the duties of the great institution and lessen the shock of the country from its destruction.

**To be
checked by
the Removal
of the
Deposits.**

The charter provided that the deposits might be removed by the secretary of the treasury while congress was not in session, provided he gave his reasons for the removal to congress when it assembled.

As congress would not meet until December, there was ample time for the proposed action; but Secretary McLane was unwilling to order removal, and Jackson, wishing to avoid another explosion in his cabinet, hesitated to dismiss him. After some conference it was agreed to send Livingston, secretary of state, to France as minister, to promote McLane to the vacant place, and to get a new secretary of the treasury. The man hit upon was William J. Duane, son of that former editor of the *Aurora*, who was long the tribune of the people in the important state of Pennsylvania. If the order for removal were given by such a man, it would go far to relieve the act from the expected criticisms of the enemy in the home state of the "mother bank." The offer flattered Duane, who was hitherto little known, and he entered upon his new duties late in May.

**The Ap-
pointment of
Duane.**

But now appeared many difficulties. The new secretary said he was not sure the deposits were in danger, and he was told to take time to consider. At the end of a month he thought the matter could be left until congress met. Then there were many conferences, at the end of which he assured the president that he would examine the question again and would resign if he did not give the desired order. At the middle of September he was again interviewed, and declared finally that he would neither remove the deposits nor resign. Jackson was very angry, and dismissed Duane summarily. The bank men said much about the sacrifice of a faithful secretary, but posterity has little sympathy for him. He must have known for what purpose he was appointed, and he should have refused in advance or withdrawn as soon as he knew the attitude of the president. On the other hand, there is no reason to believe that the deposits in the bank were unsafe, as Jackson claimed.

Roger B. Taney was now appointed secretary of the treasury, and an order issued at once designating certain great state banks at which all government funds should be deposited from October 1, 1833. July, 1833, the public deposits were \$6,512,000, and it would have been disastrous to withdraw so large an amount at once. Jackson, therefore, was satisfied to cease to deposit with the bank and to draw out the money very gradually. January 1, 1836, it still had \$627,000 of government funds. Nevertheless, the action of the president caused serious financial distress. The bank must call in loans, and making ready to close its business it could not increase its circulation. The winter, spring, and summer following removal brought severe business depression to the country. Jackson's friends declared that the distress was artificial, and due to Biddle's malice; and they declared that it was only a speculator's panic and did not injure the mass of merchants and producers. It is hard to say how much truth was in this opinion. Certainly Biddle was in an ugly frame of mind, and did little to soften the blow his adversary had given to business. By refusing to lend money in the darkest days of necessity he brought the country to think the charges against him were true. His own friends began to leave him, and at last he was forced to resume lending. This happened in March, 1834, and by the middle of summer business was returning to normal conditions.

Meanwhile, the matter was in the hands of the politicians. Taney sent to congress, as required by the charter, his reasons for transferring the deposits. Clay made them the occasion for two resolutions, one of which declared that Jackson acted illegally in regard to the deposits, and the other that Taney's reasons for his action were not sufficient. After an angry debate Clay carried his resolutions through the senate. Jackson made a dignified protest against the resolutions censuring him, and when they passed,

**Duane a
Disappoint-
ment.**

**Taney and
Removal.**

**The Effect
on Busi-
ness.**

**Jackson
Censured.**

his friend, Benton, of Missouri, gave notice that he would in the future move to expunge them. This he did in successive sessions, until at last there was a majority of democrats in the senate, and January 16, 1837, an order was passed to write across the original entry in the journal the statement that the resolutions of censure were directed to be expunged. Clay in 1834 was also able to get the senate to reject Taney's nomination as secretary of the treasury, but in 1836, through support of Jackson, Taney became chief justice, in succession to John Marshall.

Thus ended in complete triumph Jackson's attack on the bank, the severest political conflict in our national history. It was the occasion of many angry and false charges. The bank was well managed and rendered valuable service to the government and people, and the allegations to the contrary were the outgrowth of ignorance and prejudice. On the other hand, it was a private monopoly, which reaped rich reward for the service it rendered, and it was destroyed because the people, in support of the president, felt that no corporation should have so much advantage. Jackson represented the popular will. He went into the conflict with a divided party, but he fought so wisely and boldly that he united his party and made his word its law. His success was the despair of his enemies.

Significance
of the
"Bank
War."

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Jackson displayed in foreign affairs the same energy and directness that characterized his conduct of domestic relations. Three important problems of this nature came before him, and they were all disposed of in such a manner as to satisfy the American people and to increase our prestige with other nations. Two of them were old disputes which had dragged on without prospect of fair settlement under his predecessors, and one was a new problem.

The first concerned the trade with the West Indies, before the revolution a source of great prosperity. This branch of our commerce was of great importance to New England and the Middle states, and many efforts to secure it on an equal footing with England were made while the federalists controlled the national government. The same eagerness was not manifested by the republicans under Jefferson and Madison, and the development of manufactures, absorbing much of the business energy of the country, lessened the demand for commerce. But all the time there was a feeling that the lost trade should be recovered if England could be induced to yield it. The matter was under consideration in making the treaty of Ghent, but it offered so much difficulty that it was postponed for a separate convention, which met in 1815, but effected no results. It was taken

The West
India Trade.

up again by Secretary Adams in 1818, and was a constant subject of negotiation during his secretaryship, but nothing was accomplished. Indeed, the net result was that each side became irritated, the United States undertook to retaliate, and England became firmer than ever in her refusal. Adams was ever an outspoken man, zealous for national interests, and apt to be assertive in his diplomacy. To force concessions from the self-sufficient and rather overbearing Briton required more tact than he possessed.

The real obstacle to success was the navigation laws. From their enactment it had been the policy of England to consider her colonies the proper field for the profit of her merchants and her shipowners. Our ministers might try as they could to show her the advantage of open trade, but they

The Navigation Laws Receding.

were not able to convince her. Preferential duties continued to be charged in the West Indies against all comers, and the United States fared as the rest of the world. But just at this time English opinion was changing in regard to the navigation laws. The loss of the American market through the development of manufactures here and the raising of the tariff bars had put the British merchants to thinking. On the other hand, a wide demand for British goods in South America and elsewhere had produced a great wave of prosperity, which tended to make the merchants think their remnant of colonial trade of less importance than their commerce with the outside world. At the same time, a group of liberals under the leadership of Huskisson and Robinson were striving to bring the British public to see that the existing acts did not suit the needs of a nation dependent on happy trade relations with the whole world. In 1825 they induced parliament to make a first step in concession. Foreign

The Concession of 1825.

nations were now offered in the colonies such commercial privileges, both as regards tariffs and tonnage duties, as they themselves conceded to Great Britain; and one year was allowed during which the offer might be accepted. The concession was open to any government, but it most concerned the United States, by their position and industrial enterprise the strongest competitor of the mother country in these colonies. Many nations accepted the offer, but our rising sentiment in favor of protection and a willingness of the opposition to impede any action suggested by the administration prevented concessions by congress within a year. At the end of that time English prosperity had been checked, parliament abandoned its liberal attitude, and although a special American envoy went to England to make a treaty, nothing could be gained in that quarter.

This was the situation when Jackson became president, with the tactful Van Buren secretary of state. To win a victory where others had failed appealed to both men, and McLane, the minister to London, departed in full hope of doing something. He was allowed to

write his own instructions, and he incorporated in them the sentiment that our former position was wrong and had been repudiated by the people in a national election. For this Van Buren was severely criticized by his enemies, and it was urged as a main reason for his rejection as minister in 1832. It was certainly not dignified for a secretary in a communication to a foreign power to take cognizance of a domestic party difference.

The Negotiation resumed under Jackson.

But the advance pleased Great Britain, and the negotiations then resumed soon led to success. Acting on a hint from McLane, congress gave the president power to remove the discriminating tonnage duties as soon as England did the same. This condition was easily met, and October 5, 1830, Jackson by proclamation opened the trade with the British West Indies. The arrangement did not involve a remission of custom duties, but we could hardly expect another nation to give up her tariff against us as long as we maintained our tariff against her. The best result of the agreement was to remove a source of irritation between the two nations. The democrats declared it a great victory and were disposed to think it might have been secured sooner if Adams had used more tact and patience.

Their Success, 1830.

The second diplomatic success concerned claims we had long urged against France for property seized by Napoleon. Other nations had formerly had such claims, but they were paid after the fall of the Corsican. The United States had no friend at the congress of Vienna and were left to deal with the French government as they could. To their protests the Bourbon kings replied that France could not undertake to pay for all the depredations of Napoleon, the usurper. Our rejoinder that she had already paid for those committed by him against other powers met this position effectively; but the monarchy was continually in need of money, and the claims were left unsettled. Rives, our first minister under Jackson, went out with instructions to press vigorously for settlement. He proceeded so well that in less than a year he got the French ministry to propose to pay a definite sum to cover all losses. Then France advanced a counterclaim for damages alleged under a clause of the Louisiana purchase treaty guaranteeing certain commercial privileges to France. This checked the negotiations until it was finally proposed to offset it by lowering the American duties on certain French wines. Rives now hoped for success, but all came to naught when in July, 1830, the king, Charles X, was driven from his throne and Louis Philippe took his place. After some delay negotiations were resumed, and July 4, 1831, the persistent and cautious Rives was gratified by signing a treaty by which we were to receive 25,000,000 francs for all our claims, to make the re-

The Claims against France.

Rives's Treaty, 1831.

ductions desired in wine duties, and to pay 1,500,000 francs for claims made by France. The amount promised was to be handed over in six annual installments, the first to be paid a year after ratification, which, as it turned out, was consummated February 2, 1832. In this, as in the arrangement with England, we gave up some of our demands, taking what we could get, and removing a long-standing source of ill-feeling between the two powers.

But the matter was not entirely ended; for the French chambers must appropriate the money for actual payment, and as the country's revenues were much embarrassed, the money was not voted.

The Money not Promptly Paid. The treaty was unpopular in France, spite of the advantage it gave the wine growers; and so it happened that when the first installment was due, no provisions had been made to meet it. Jackson was himself scrupulously honest

in money matters, and considered the course of the French government essentially dishonorable. He met it in a characteristic manner. He ordered the secretary of the treasury to draw a draft on the French treasury, placed it with the bank of the United States, which sent it to Paris, where it was duly protested. Then came a sharp conflict with Biddle, already at odds with the administration, who demanded protest charges at the ordinary rate, amounting to nearly \$170,000. The demand from a bank having in hand many millions of the public money was indignantly refused. Biddle replied by holding back the disputed sum out of the dividends due the government on its stock in the bank.

This controversy diverted attention for only a short time from the issue between the president and France. Jackson was convinced that nothing but a firm stand would bring the chambers

Stern Measures advocated by Jackson. to execute the treaty, and in his annual message of 1833 he recommended that congress authorize the seizure of enough French property in our borders to satisfy our claims. Such a course, if carried out, would mean war.

Probably it was only a threat; but the suggestion of it created a storm of indignation in Paris. The French minister in Washington was recalled, and Livingston, now in Paris, was informed that his passports were at his disposal. A bill to vote the money was then before the French legislature. After a long and angry debate it was passed with the proviso that the money should not be paid until

Intercourse Suspended. Jackson's offending language was explained. At this Livingston withdrew from his post, leaving the office in the hands of a *chargé d'affaires*, who, when the ministry still further refused to pay, closed his office and withdrew also. This was November 8, 1835, and for a year we had no representative in Paris.

For a while the American public expected war, but time brought reflection. The point at issue was too trivial to justify hostilities,

for it was now only a question of words. Clay, leading as caustic an opposition as that which embarrassed Adams in 1825-1829, carried unanimously through the senate resolutions opposing war. The campaign of 1836 was approaching, and that also tended to moderate the attitude of the administration.

The Affair
Adjusted.

A further step was taken when in the annual message of 1835 the president expressed the hope that France would pay the money and so remove the obstacle to harmony between the two powers. Then England offered her good services to bring the two states together. Her advances were acceptable to both sides, and by the next spring France had declared herself satisfied with the amicable words of the message of 1835 and four of the promised installments were paid. Jackson's course had undoubtedly been abrupt, as was his nature; but it showed Europe that the American government could act energetically, and it thus strengthened our influence in many a court.

The third diplomatic problem arose in connection with Mexico. The region now embraced generally in the states of Texas, New Mexico, Arizona, Utah, Nevada, and California, and a part of Colorado was in 1829 in the hands of the newly created federal republic of Mexico, which ruled its inhabited parts as states and provinces. One of these states was known as Coahuila and Texas, divided into four departments, one of which was Texas. The state had a constitution of its own and exercised its functions under the authority of the federal republic.

Mexico and
the Posses-
sion of
Texas.

The department of Texas, vast and inviting, lay between the Sabine and Nueces rivers. Under Spanish rule it contained a large number of Indians and about 4000 white men, chiefly in the region of San Antonio. Its fine lands early attracted the adventurous land hunters of the East, and from 1821 to 1827 there was a continuous stream of settlers from the United States. Among them Stephen F. Austin, who led the first colony, was the leading man. In 1832 arrived Samuel Houston, a friend of Jackson, a distinguished soldier in the Creek war, formerly a congressman and governor of Tennessee, who for personal reasons wished to begin life in a new country. These two men played an important rôle in the early history of Anglo-American Texas.

Early His-
tory of
Texas.

At first the Mexican authorities encouraged the immigration of men from the East, giving them large grants of land; but the community showed much vigor, and the authorities began to fear a movement for a separate state. It was probably this apprehension that caused them to attach Texas to the distinctly Mexican state of Coahuila, giving it only one-sixth of the representation in the state's legislature. But immigration was steady, and the new arrivals numbered 15,000 by 1827 and about 30,000 in 1836. Then came efforts to restrict immigration. In

Mexico
fears the
Growth of
Texas.

1829 the Mexican president, of his own unauthorized power, issued an order abolishing slavery in the republic. As this institution then existed only among the Anglo-American settlers of Texas, the manifesto was construed as a blow at that community. Austin, however, protested, and was able to secure a second order exempting Texas from the operation of the first order. In 1830 came a Mexican law forbidding further colonization from abroad and prohibiting the subsequent introduction of slaves. The Texans saw in this a deliberate attempt to check their growing power. They were not disposed to abide by its purpose, and colonists and slaves were secretly received in defiance of the weak central authority. From that time the Texans began to dream of revolution with ultimate annexation to the United States.

Meanwhile, the American government made an effort to purchase Texas. Adams authorized our minister to Mexico to open negotiations to that end, but the minister discovered so much sensitiveness on the part of Mexico on the subject that he did not press the matter. The southern republic was in dire straits, one president after another overthrew his predecessor only to be driven out by a more formidable rival, and each had such an insecure hold on power that he dared not risk the displeasure of his country by consenting to a division of the republic's domain. When Jackson became president, he took up the matter, but met the same difficulties. His representative in Mexico, Colonel Anthony Butler, was a shifty adventurer, suspected by the Mexicans, and when he could accomplish nothing by direct diplomacy, he undertook to gain his ends by corrupting some of the men nearest to the Mexican president. His intrigues became known, and the only results were to discredit Butler, who was duly recalled, and to create on the part of the Mexicans a disgust for our diplomacy. It is fair to say that Jackson was not a party to the trickery of his agent.

The story now returns to the Texans, who had come to believe that they could escape the annihilation of their political rights only through a revolution. The outbreak came in 1835, the people rising to a man and driving the Mexican forces beyond the Rio Grande within the space of two and a half months. Then came a convention to form a civil government, while arrangements went on to meet the counterstroke which Mexico was sure to attempt. Never did the American stock fight better than the Texans in the next three months. For a time bravery seemed useless. The Texans were assembled in small bands which fell singly before the army of several thousand with which Santa Anna crossed the Rio Grande to crush the revolution. In the early days of March, 1836, post after post was lost and the revolutionists began to lose heart. But one small band of 183 under W. B. Travis gave an evidence of courage and devotion which restored the

Futile Attempts to buy Texas.

The Texan Revolution, 1835-1836.

spirits of the whole community and enabled it to make the united stand which insured final success. They held the old fort of The Alamo, at San Antonio, and refused to retreat, although more than a thousand Mexicans under Santa Anna closed in around them. After a thirteen-day siege all the defenders but six fell at their posts before the place was taken by storm. The remnant of survivors was shot by Santa Anna, spite of the protest of some of his officers. This created great horror among the Texans, and after that their battle cry was "Remember the Alamo!"

The Alamo.

News that the Texans were struggling for liberty aroused great sympathy in the United States. The Mississippi valley and the Gulf states were most outspoken, but mass meetings and contributions indicated the warm interest of the seaboard region as far north as Boston. Many boatloads of sympathizers sailed from New Orleans for Galveston.

**Sympathy
for the
Texans.**

In response to protests from Mexico, orders were given to stop all volunteers for Texas, but the intercepted ones declared they were colonists seeking homes in Texas and were allowed to pass freely. Arrived at their destination, they at once joined the ranks of the revolutionists, whose power of resistance thus increased daily.

After the first disastrous efforts to hold various disconnected positions in the South, the Texan forces were united under General Sam Houston, who, ever falling back, drew Santa Anna far northward. For a time it seemed that all was lost, but Houston only waited his opportunity. April 21 he turned on Santa Anna, who was overconfident and unprepared, and crushed him in the battle of San Jacinto. The Texans charged irresistibly, breaking the enemy's lines, shooting down those who ran, and finally capturing all but fifty of the survivors of the 1600 men who faced them in the beginning of the engagement. Santa Anna himself was taken, and 630 of his followers were slain. Two months later he secured his release by signing treaties in which he and the other Mexican generals in Texas agreed to remove all their troops and to endeavor to secure the independence of the country with the bounds no farther south than the Rio Grande. This agreement proved the actual achievement of Texan independence; for although Mexico repudiated it and meant to reinvade the rebellious region, she was so beset by internal struggles that Texas was left undisturbed.

**Battle of
San Ja-
cinto, 1836.**

But the 30,000 inhabitants of the wide area between the Sabine and the Nueces could not support the burden of its defense, and appeals were made to the United States for annexation. Jackson acted cautiously. Texas had made the preservation of slavery one of the grounds of revolution, and if annexed it would be slave territory. The question immediately became a sectional one. Calhoun and the South urged that

**Shall we
Annex
Texas?**

this vast region be acquired without delay. John Quincy Adams and Webster both made speeches on the other side. Jackson was bending all his efforts to carry the election of Van Buren and so perpetuate his policy against the bank; and he was unwilling to jeopardize party harmony by introducing the Texan question into the campaign. Then it was urged that we recognize the republic as independent. He disposed of this by sending a special agent

The Recognition of Texas.

to Texas, who reported that the new republic could not sustain itself against its enemies. On this basis Jackson advised congress that recognition should be deferred. But in February, 1837, when it seemed that England was about to grant recognition, he changed his attitude, and resolutions favorable to Texas passed in each house, and the president sent a minister. Annexation, however, must wait until another day.

THE END OF JACKSON'S PRESIDENCY

Jackson and his party were now supreme in national politics. A man of little education and not broadly informed in statecraft, he nevertheless was trusted by the people, whose champion he was. He had an average man's view of good government and extraordinary ability to organize and rule a party. The hopes of Clay, Webster, and Calhoun were reduced to nullity by his success. The first and second, each a little suspicious of the other, were holding together the Northern minority, which, dropping the name national republican, now began to be known as the whig party. It embraced avowedly the conservative and property-holding class, and was in plain contrast with the democrats, who declared themselves champions of the people. Many of the older states retained a property qualification for voting and allowed the legislature to select governors and judges. Such practices were approved by the whigs, but the democrats considered them unequal privileges, and demanded a wide popular participation of the people in the government. Rotation in office, strict economy in expenditures,

and the least possible federal concentration were also fundamental principles of the democrats. In 1835 the last of the national debt was paid, much to the gratification of Jackson, who, however, warned the country that this ought not to be made the excuse for future extravagance.

Meanwhile, the position of Calhoun was singular. Committed to state rights, and dependent upon South Carolina, he could not find a place in the party of Webster and Clay; nor could he return to the democrats while Jackson's influence predominated. He was a democrat, but he led a small faction at war with Jackson. In 1832 he had hopes of defeating the nomination of Van Buren for vice-president, but failed signally.

Party Divisions.

The National Debt Paid.

Calhoun's Position.

Then he sought to embarrass the administration in its bank and other policies, but he failed in this also. In some minor matters he played a similar rôle with varying results. But his opportunity came with the reviving importance of the slavery issue. By the most vigorous appeals to the South he stimulated sectionalism, made a Southern faction in the democratic party, and laid the train that led to secession. Jackson understood this purpose and foresaw its results long before the country could see them. With characteristic warmth he pronounced Calhoun a traitor, bent on disrupting the democratic party, whose integrity, said Jackson, was the best guaranty against disunion.

While the democrats saw the opposing factions thus arrayed, they had to give strict attention to domestic finances. The twenty-three "pet banks," as they were dubbed, which received the public money after October 1, 1833, were selected with all possible care, but it was impossible to keep political motives entirely in the background. They were denounced by the whigs as unsafe, and their notes, with which the government paid some of its bills, frequently were less than par. This led to a new act in 1836, imposing stricter conditions for the selection of such banks of deposits, requiring them to furnish security, and to redeem their notes in specie. The payment of the national debt, and the steady increase of the revenues, resulted in a surplus of government funds, and it was so profitable for a bank to have the deposits that pressure was brought on the treasury to include other banks in the list. Thus it happened that in 1836 the number of "pet banks" was 89, with total deposits of nearly \$50,000,000.

The Deposit Banks.

Along with this development went a wide expansion in the volume of bank notes. Thoughtful people foresaw that in an emergency these notes could not be redeemed in specie, and a demand arose for laws which would force more gold and silver into circulation. The demand came most loudly from Senator Benton, of Missouri, who for his part in this movement got the nickname of "Old Bullion." The result of the agitation was laws to make foreign gold and silver coins legal tender and a law to change the ratio of gold and silver so as to allow free coinage of the former, which at the old ratio was more valuable than silver. Under the last law \$1,500,000 in gold was coined by the mint. Democratic orators provided themselves with green silken mesh purses through which shining yellow coins, popularly called "Benton's mint drops" could be seen, and these were ostentatiously displayed in taverns and on the stump in illustration of the politicians' arguments for what they called the "currency of the constitution." Attempts were made to make bills of less value than five dollars no longer legal tender, in the hope that the vacuum thus created in the currency would force the ingress of specie

Attempt to force Specie into Circulation.

from abroad. At that time we mined little of either precious metal and were dependent on importations. All these well-meant attempts to establish a hard-money currency accomplished little. Local banks, protected by state law, existed everywhere, and the country was full of their bills. The whigs cast derision on all that was done. They wished to prolong the existing confusion in the hope that it would make necessary the recharter of the bank of the United States, which they asserted was the only way out of the country's financial bewilderment.

Another evil of the day was the accumulation of a government surplus of many millions after the payment of the debt of the nation.

The Problem of Surplus Revenue.

It could not be reduced by lowering the tariff, since the compromise tariff of 1833 was to run through ten years, until 1842. No better method of disposing of it was suggested than to deposit it with the states. Jackson in the beginning of his presidency favored the suggestion, but soon changed his mind. He came to believe that the constitution did not authorize such a use of public money. On the other hand, the measure was favored by Clay, who was not embarrassed by similar constitutional views. He thought the principle might be applied to the proceeds of the land sales, since the land belonged to all the states. In 1832 he carried through both houses a bill for such a distribution, but it was given a "pocket veto" by Jackson, who thought a better way would be to sell the lands more cheaply, a plan which pleased the West greatly. In fact, it was a perilous thing to lead the states to look to the federal government as a source of largesses.

But the surplus continued to grow, and in 1835 Clay carried another distribution bill through the senate. So strong was opinion for it

The Distribution Act of 1836.

that the administration became alarmed and introduced into the house a slightly different bill, which, it was said, would be accepted by Jackson. It was carried through both houses with a rush, and was approved by the president June 23, 1836. It did not give, but loaned, the surplus to the states and provided that all the surplus in the treasury on January 1, 1837, above \$5,000,000 should be deposited with the states in four equal quarterly installments according to federal population. The money thus deposited might formally be demanded for repayment at the discretion of congress, but it was understood that no such demand would ever be made. Jackson accepted the bill with great reluctance, and he said plainly it should not be a precedent. He yielded, undoubtedly, because the measure was very popular, and because he feared a veto would imperil the election of Van Buren, whose success he believed of supreme importance. As it turned out, \$36,000,000 was on hand to be distributed, and the first and second installments were paid and half of the third; but the panic of 1837 then intervened, and there was no money in the treasury to pay the rest.

The last notable incident of his administration was the specie circular, issued July 11, 1836. The West was carried away with land speculation. Here, too, were a large number of insecure banks, whose notes were being received in payment for lands. It was evident that the bubble must soon burst; for the lands could not go on increasing in value, speculators in them would fail, and the banks from which they had borrowed would be embarrassed and cease to pay their notes in specie. The result would be that the government in such a contingency would find its hands full of worthless paper money and the loss would be immense. Jackson, therefore, ordered land offices to take no money but specie. For a time there was a feverish movement of gold and silver to the West, but soon that failed. Then creditors of the Western banks began to demand specie of them. Thus came the panic of 1837. The specie circular did not produce this crisis, as the whigs charged, but it hastened its coming.

The Specie
Circular,
1836.

While these things happened, the country came to the election of 1836. Jackson was supreme in his party and was able to dominate it, though he did so by the most wanton exercise of his personal will. May 20, 1835, more than a year before the election was to come, a convention, half of it office-holders, met in Baltimore and nominated Van Buren for president and R. M. Johnson, of Kentucky, for vice-president. Outside the convention was much party dissatisfaction with the nomination, but no one dared oppose the will of Jackson. Van Buren, accepting the proffered honor, said he would "tread generally in the footsteps of General Jackson," a sentiment which received much ridicule from his opponents.

Election of
1836; The
Democrats.

The whigs were not strong enough to carry one man through triumphantly, but they hoped to take advantage of the dissatisfaction among their opponents and throw the election into the house, where they expected to defeat the democratic candidate. They, therefore, held no convention, united with all the malcontents, and sought to win a total majority for three men. In the Northeast they supported Webster, whom the Massachusetts whigs nominated. In the Northwest they united on General W. H. Harrison, and in the Southwest on Senator White, of Tennessee, nominated by the legislature of his own state. Ohio had her own candidate, Judge John McLean, who was popular with the remnant of the antimasonic party. South Carolina would support none of the candidates; and she was especially opposed to Van Buren, whose intrigue had prostrated her champion, Calhoun.

The Whigs.

The result was a surprise to the whigs. Van Buren received 170 electoral votes against 124 for all his opponents and was declared elected. Johnson had only 147 against a combined opposition of 147 and

was, therefore, not elected. For the only time in our history the senate was to choose a vice-president, the choice being Johnson by a vote of 33 to 16. Of the defeated candidates

Election Results.	Harrison had 73 votes, White had 26, among them the votes of Tennessee, Webster had the 14 votes of Massachusetts, and the 11 votes of South Carolina were thrown away on Willie P. Mangum, of North Carolina. As the democrats maintained their control of each branch of congress, Jackson retired from office, assured that the bank would not be rechartered and the great democratic principles for which he had striven would be perpetuated. He closed his labors with a "Farewell Address," in which he summed up the chief features of his political faith. He retired to his home at the "Hermitage," near Nashville, saying: "When I review the arduous administration through which I have passed, the formidable opposition, to its very close, of the combined talents, wealth, and power of the whole aristocracy of the United States, aided as it is by the monied monopolies of the whole country with their corrupting influence, with which we had to contend, I am truly thankful to my God for this happy result."
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CHAPTER XXI

EARLY PERIOD OF THE SLAVERY CONTROVERSY, 1831-1850

THE ANTISLAVERY AGITATION

Two phases of antislavery agitation occurred in the United States during the nineteenth century, one pacific and intended to persuade the South that slavery should be given up, the other seeking to induce the North to use her influence in congress to wipe out what was considered a blot on American civilization. Of the first movement Benjamin Lundy, a New Jersey Quaker, was the leading spirit. He was persistent and patient, and wished to secure the coöperation of slaveholders, who generally feared that antislavery agitation would suggest insurrection to the minds of the slaves. He traveled extensively in the South, organized emancipation societies, and published a paper, *The Genius of Universal Emancipation*, as a means of promoting his ideas. He met no opposition from Southerners, but succeeded only in the sections in which there were few slaveholders, and chiefly with his fellow Quakers. His period of activity extended from about 1815 to 1831.

**The Two
Move-
ments.**

**Benjamin
Lundy.**

**American
Colonization
Society.**

In 1816, while his movement was still in its hopeful stage, the American Colonization Society was founded. Its first president was Bushrod Washington, a justice of the supreme court, and Clay and many other prominent men gave it support. The object was to promote emancipation by sending the freedmen to Africa; for it was believed that slaveholders would emancipate more readily if the emancipated ones were returned to their original homes. To aid its operations the government in 1822 established the colony of Liberia, on the west coast of Africa, and branch colonization societies north and south collected money to sustain it. By 1830 the society had sent 1162 negroes to Liberia, most of whom fell victims to the pestilential fevers of the place.

At that time it was evident that colonization, like emancipation by persuasion of the masters, was a failure. The truth is that the expansion of cotton farming and the consequent rise of the prices of slaves were increasing the hold of slavery in the South. A new generation of Southerners had grown up since 1800. They had not the zeal for human rights so prevalent in revolutionary days and they were eager to develop their immense regions of fertile lands. To such men the

**New Atti-
tude of the
South.**

negro, who accepted bondage easily, seemed happier in slavery than out of it; and so it came about that most conscientious men in the South, while recognizing the harshness of slavery, eventually came to consider it fixed in Southern life. The efforts of Northern men to remove it seemed to them mischievous interference with Southern affairs, a course likely to lead to insurrection and massacre.

The second movement originated in 1831 when William Lloyd Garrison began to publish the *Liberator* in Boston. He was young, poor, and friendless, but a passionate hatred of slavery filled his heart. He had been imprisoned in Baltimore for an article in Lundy's paper, and the remembrance of it whetted his purpose. "I shall contend for the immediate enfranchisement of our slave population," he said; "I will be as harsh as truth and as uncompromising as justice on this subject—I do not wish to think, or speak, or write with moderation—I am in earnest—I will not equivocate—I will not retreat a single inch, and *I will be heard!*" Drawing to himself the more earnest opponents of slavery in New England he was soon a power in the land. Local societies were founded, money was raised by contributions, fairs, and other means, and then he proceeded to unite the local societies into a common organization. In 1832 was formed the New England Antislavery Society, and in 1833 the American Antislavery Society. The object was to oppose slavery in every possible manner. In 1840 there were 2000 local organizations, with a total membership of nearly 200,000. Soon after its origin this phase of the antislavery movement began to be called "abolitionism."

William
Lloyd
Garrison.

While Boston remained the center of abolitionism in the East, Oberlin, Ohio, became the center in the West. This village was founded around a coeducational school in 1833. In 1835 it received an accession of three professors and thirty students from Lane Theological Seminary, Cincinnati, all abolitionists who had left Lane Seminary because it frowned on their opinions. Oberlin college was incorporated, and negro students were admitted to its courses. The village became an important point for Western abolitionists. A leading Ohio abolitionist was James G. Birney, who had left Kentucky because he was opposed for teaching the doctrine of freedom.

Oberlin and
the West-
ern Aboli-
tionists.

About this time appeared the "underground railway," conducted by abolitionists to help slaves to escape from the South. "Stations" were formed at regular distances at the homes of trusted persons, called "agents," while other persons, known as "conductors," went South and escorted fugitives secretly from "station" to "station" until safety was reached at last in a free state or in Canada. The persons connected with the "underground railway" were men of great probity in ordinary matters, but they thought it no crime to snatch a slave from bond-

The "Un-
derground
Railway."

age. It is estimated that 2000 slaves a year thus escaped from their masters from 1830 to 1860. By such means as these the abolitionists attracted a great deal of attention, exasperated the Southerners to the point of fury, and called the attention of Northern people to the harshness of slavery. Their efforts at first were denounced by most people in the North, and sometimes their meetings were violently broken up, but opinion there gradually changed, so that the Northerners, by 1850, would do nothing to aid masters in recovering runaway slaves.

Let us look at the other side of the picture. In 1831 the South was probably already more proslavery than in 1800. It received the Garrisonian movement with violent scorn. Many bitter things were said about those who would recklessly

Effect in the South.

incite the slaves to murder their masters. The "black terror" was ever the nightmare of the community. In 1831 Nat Turner, a black slave in Southampton county, Virginia, began an insurrection, killing sixty whites before he was captured and hanged. It was believed he had read the literature of the abolitionists. The incident sent a shock of horror throughout the South. Out of the shock came the motions in the Virginia legislature to abolish slavery, and a great debate followed in the succeeding winter. But no one could suggest a satisfactory way of disposing of the freedmen, and all the discussion came to naught. Virginia was not willing to have the negro population freed and left within the state. The upshot was

The Revised Black Code.

to convince the South that the blacks were a fixed part of its population and that if they remained, they could be best controlled as slaves. From that time the negro's lot became harder. Laws were passed to forbid his instruction in reading and writing, his free use of the roads, his preaching to his own people, his right to assemble in meetings of any kind where no white man was present, and whatever else might enable him to combine for any action which might lead to freedom. This new "black code" now became common to all the Southern states, and by 1860 the negro was completely cowed. As abolition gained in the North, proslavery gained in the South. In 1800 Southern statesmen and preachers generally considered slavery an evil, though they knew not how to remedy it: in 1860 Southerners of both classes were found who argued that slavery was a blessing to the negro, a benefit to the South, and a beneficent institution whereby peace and happiness was established for society.

This growing division between the sections soon found expression in congress. Southerners were alarmed when abolition literature began to be sent South, some of it to negroes, and in 1835 a great group of indignant citizens of Charleston, South Carolina, seized and burned a mass of such papers before they were delivered. Appeals were sent to the

Antislavery and the Mails.

postmaster-general to refuse the use of the mails for such purposes. He did not think such action legal, and a compromise was reached by which abolition papers were to be accepted by postmasters when offered for mailing, but need not be delivered at the offices to which they were directed. Then Calhoun offered a bill in the senate to forbid sending antislavery literature through the mails to places in which it might not lawfully circulate; but the proposition received an adverse vote. The incident attracted much attention, and that helped the abolitionists in the North.

Much more excitement was aroused a few months later by the attitude of the house of representatives toward antislavery petitions. Many such appeals had come to the house in recent years, and they were beginning to irritate Southern members. Yet the number of petitions did not diminish; for the abolitionists got them signed more with the purpose of giving their efforts a definite form than with the expectation of success in the object asked for. Finally on May 26, 1836, the house resolved that such memorials in the future be tabled without reading or other action on them. John Quincy Adams, now a member of the house, protested against the resolution as unconstitutional, and a violation of the rights of his constituents. The abolitionists could now say the right of petition, the ancient bulwark of liberty, was denied, and more memorials than ever were sent to Washington. Adams took upon himself the task of presenting them. Whenever the regular hour for petitions arrived, he could be seen at his desk in the house, a huge pile of papers before him. As the order of the day was announced, he would rise with words like these: "I hold in my hands a request from citizens of the town of ——— praying the abolition of slavery in ———." At this point the hammer of the speaker would fall, and Adams would be declared out of order. Not abashed, he would take another paper from the pile, begin with the same words, only to be cut off in the same manner, proceeding thus until the pile was exhausted. His action made him very unpopular with Southern members, but he became the honored champion of the abolitionists. At last the friends of slavery came to see that the "gag rule" in regard to petitions but strengthened the abolitionists in their appeals to the North, and in December, 1844, the offending rule was repealed. In resenting an irritating practice of the abolitionists the Southern members had put themselves in the wrong and given their adversaries a point to support the general argument that slavery tinged with cruelty and despotism whatever it touched.

Antislavery
Petitions.

John
Quincy
Adams.

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VAN BUREN'S PRESIDENCY

Van Buren became president through the grace of Andrew Jackson. He had all the virtues of mediocrity without the capacity of leadership.

**Character
of Van
Buren.**

He was honest, cool-headed, courteous to his contemporaries, and loyal to his cause. He favored economy in expenditures, and although the spoils system thrived during his administration, he sought to secure efficient persons for the offices within his gift. He was an intimate friend of the New York literary men of his day, and appointed Paulding, the novelist, secretary of the navy. His weakness was that he had not the capacity of command, and his party, no longer restrained by the strong will of Jackson, fell into confusion and lost the confidence of the country.

The first incident in his administration was the panic of 1837, symptoms of which began to appear before he was inaugurated. The

**Panic of
1837; its
Cause.**

cause was overspeculation, chiefly in the newer parts of the country. The past six years had been a period of great confidence everywhere. Railroads were being built, immigrants were buying land at rapid advances, banks were lending money far in excess of their means, cotton rose to sixteen cents a pound in 1835 and fell to ten cents in 1836, "wild-cat banks" were incorporated whose chief activity was to issue money to the land speculators, and the whole industrial community lived on the expectation that the morrow would carry the wave of speculation higher than it was to-day. Only a slight shock was needed to hurl the whole structure to the ground.

Two things operating jointly served to furnish this check. The specie circular of 1836 (see page 425) forced land buyers to pay in

**The Specie
Circular.**

specie, they asked the Western banks for gold and silver in redemption of notes, and the institutions which had most overissued began to suspend specie payment. The distribution of the surplus (see page 424), beginning in January, 1837, drew money from the deposit banks to transfer it to other

**The Distri-
bution of the
Surplus.**

places. This necessitated the calling in of loans, which implied the suspension of industrial development, and the reaction reached the remotest point of the country's business life. Then demoralization quickly arrived. European holders sent back bonds and demanded cash, owners of specie locked it in vaults, importations of goods fell off, and the public revenues ceasing, the government expenses used up the treasury's surplus so that the third installment of the deposits was suspended when only half of it had been distributed.

So acute was the situation that congress was called in extra session in October. Though the government was out of debt, it had no

money for its expenses, and since the law required public dues to be paid in specie or in notes of specie-paying banks, there was not enough currency in the treasury to enable it to carry on its business. The first thing, therefore, was to issue temporarily \$10,000,000 in treasury notes. Van Buren was urged to repeal the specie circular, but refused steadfastly. The whigs declared that all the trouble came from the destruction of the bank of the United States and hoped to carry a bill for recharter, but congress and president remained firm, and this demand failed.

An Extra
Session of
Congress.

Then Van Buren brought forward a plan to have the government take care of the deposits, known later as the sub-treasury bill. Let the government, he said, keep its own money, leaving it with the treasurer, the mints, postmasters, collectors, and other receivers until it was ordered paid out. At once arose a cry that these keepers were not responsible, and that the scheme, if adopted, would dangerously enlarge the patronage. The whigs hoped the distress would make a new bank seem necessary, and voted steadily against the sub-treasury. The democrats were divided; one part, strong in the Eastern cities, opposing the suggestion as unsafe, and the other supporting it. The second faction called itself the antimonomopolists, but it was generally known as the "Locofocos," a nickname given by its enemies in New York. In the popular parlance of the day the sub-treasury bill was "the divorce bill," because it sought to "divorce the government from all banks." It failed in the extra session, came up in a simpler form in 1838, but was again lost. It was taken up again and successfully passed and signed July 4, 1840. When finally passed, it created sub-treasuries to keep and pay out the public money at Boston, New York, Philadelphia, St. Louis, and New Orleans, which, with the treasury at Washington left the funds in six important centers of business. It also provided that after the end of June, 1843, only specie should be received for public dues. The whigs fought the bill to the last, for its adoption meant the relinquishment of their hope for a bank; they repealed it in 1841, in the first days of their triumph, but the democrats restored it in 1846, omitting the specie feature.

Sub-treas-
ury Sug-
gested.

Adopted in
1840.

Before this law was passed, the presidential campaign of 1840 was being conducted. Van Buren's nomination by his party was easily secured in a convention at Baltimore, May 4, 1840. Several states had named candidates for the vice-presidency, and the convention thought it best to refrain from deciding between them. It was probably expected that the choice would at last fall to the senate. A platform strong in Jacksonian principles was adopted as the ground on which the country should continue to manifest its confidence in the existing administration.

Election of
1840.

The whigs approached the election year in high spirits. The long period of financial stringency, the inability of the democrats to unite on a positive remedy, and the many opponents of Van Buren in his party indicated that the democrats would have strong opposition. Clay saw the situation and had high hopes. It seemed that his opportunity was at last at hand. The convention was called at Harrisburg, December 4, 1839. As the time approached, a strong anti-Clay opposition appeared within the party. He was a mason, he had spoken against the abolitionists, and he was already twice defeated for the presidency. These facts, it was urged, made him an unavailable candidate, and Harrison, leading whig candidate in 1836, was pointed out as a stronger man. The opponents of Clay were well led by Thurlow Weed, party manager in the important state of New York. When the convention met, Clay had 102 votes on the first ballot, mostly from the slaveholding states, Harrison had 91, and General Winfield Scott had 57. Scott was a stalking-horse for Clay's enemies, who now began to shift their support to Harrison, with the result that the latter was finally named. Clay, deeply disappointed, burst into a rage when he learned the news. Walking rapidly to and fro, in a group of his friends, he exclaimed, "If there were two Henry Clays, one of them would make the other president!" John Tyler, of Virginia, deeply attached to the defeated leader, was nominated for vice-president. No platform was adopted, for in the groups of men supporting the action of the convention were so many of conflicting views that it was perilous to attempt to devise a body of principles on which they should appeal to the people. The whigs were content to rest their fate on the cry of "Down with Van Buren!"

No one doubted how New England and the bank men outside of it would vote, but it was not certain what the rest of the country would do. Fortunately for the whigs the campaign had hardly opened when a lucky accident showed how they could be reached. A disappointed friend of Clay was heard to say that Harrison, whose talents were very limited, if given a pension and a barrel of hard cider would retire to his log cabin and think no more of the presidency. The democrats seized on the remark and dubbed Harrison the "log-cabin candidate." But the blow reacted. The whigs made it a symbol of honor, saying it showed that their candidate was a man of the people, disdained by the aristocrats, whose heads were turned by their long lease of power. At every political meeting of the whigs a log cabin, a jug of cider, and a coon were displayed as tokens of their candidate's love of the people. A popular song lauding him as the "hero of Tippecanoe" also did much to create enthusiasm for his cause. This wave of popular excitement accomplished the object for which it was raised, and in the final test Harrison and Tyler, "Tippecanoe and Tyler too," were chosen by 234 to 60 electoral votes. Van Buren lost his own state

"Tippe-
canoe and
Tyler Too."

and carried only Virginia, South Carolina, Missouri, Alabama, Arkansas, Illinois, and New Hampshire.

This overwhelming victory resulted fatally for the victor. Duly inaugurated in March, 1841, he was at once overwhelmed by a horde of hungry whig office seekers, who dogged his steps, exhausted his strength, and so disturbed his peace of mind that he yielded to an attack of pneumonia one month after he took the oath of office. One of his last acts was to call congress in extra session for May 31, 1841. When it met, Tyler was president.

Death of
Harrison.

THE ADMINISTRATION OF TYLER

Tyler now found himself at the head of a party with which he had little political sympathy. He believed in state rights, opposed a bank and a high tariff, and had only left the democratic fold because he resented the towering methods of Jackson. His nomination had been made without the slightest expectation that he would ever be in a position to veto a bill which the whigs had carried through congress.

Tyler's
Position.

On the other hand, Clay, the real head of the party, was in no mood to resign his leadership. Harrison, had he lived, would have had a sharp struggle with this imperious man, who was not disposed to bow before so insignificant a figure as Tyler. When, therefore, the extra session began, Clay, a member

Clay's
Attitude.

of the senate, took charge of the situation like a military commander. He offered a resolution specifying what work the extra session should perform, the chief features being: the repeal of the sub-treasury act, the incorporation of a bank, the enactment of a higher tariff law, and the distribution of the proceeds of land sales. Tyler was very cautious, but he was also stubborn, and Clay's dashing assumption of power aroused him. He accepted a bill to abolish the sub-treasury, but sent back with a veto a bill to incorporate a great bank in the District of Columbia with branches in the states. The whigs had a safe majority in each house, but they could not pass a bill over a veto. They were greatly disappointed; for hearing rumors of Tyler's objections they thought they had eliminated from their bill all the features to which he was opposed. Smothering their resentment outwardly, they conferred with the president to know what kind of a bank bill he would approve. What he said became later a matter of dispute, but they hastily prepared a charter for a "Fiscal Corporation," passed it without difficulty, and sent it to the president. Tyler had expressed his opposition to the word "bank," and so the word was not used. The bill was said to have been shown to the president and to have had his approval. Great was the anger of its friends, therefore, when it came back in six days with a veto. Many had expected such action,

Tyler and
the Bank
Question.

spite of his previous approval; for the second bill differed from the first in little but the names it gave to bank and branches. Under it the great institution would have been able to do most of the things which Jackson had found so distasteful. Both vetoes showed that Tyler was fundamentally opposed to a bank on constitutional grounds. He had evidently tried hard to reconcile his desire for party harmony with his long-proclaimed principles, but the badly veiled discourtesy of Clay and other leading whigs in setting him aside as leader had wounded his pride and made him feel disposed to show them that he was still president. While the second veto was being prepared, congress passed a bill to distribute among the states the proceeds of land sales. Tyler accepted the bill, but it was repealed in the following year.

The "Fiscal Corporation" was vetoed on September 9, 1841. Two days later all the cabinet but Webster, secretary of state, resigned as a token of their disapproval. They published letters denouncing what they declared Tyler's false conduct, and Clay, wishing to detach as many whigs as possible from the administration, secured a caucus of the leading members of the party which solemnly declared that "all political connection between them and John Tyler was at an end." Webster also gave reasons for his conduct, saying that he did not think it wise to leave the cabinet without giving the president time to select another secretary. Negotiations pending for the determination of the Northeast boundary made it desirable that he should remain in office. He was not on good terms with Clay, and resented the manner in which that leader sought to bend the whigs to his will. Tyler saw in this a good omen. He hoped to build up a party in which the dashing Kentuckian should not be supreme, and immediately filled the cabinet with men who, like himself, had once been Jacksonians, but who had left the democratic fold because they did not like the Jacksonian rule. As a party move, the step was a failure. Even Webster soon came to realize that Tyler was not the man to lead the whigs, and in May, 1843, when the administration was leaning strongly toward the annexation of Texas, he also withdrew from the cabinet.

The only other distinctly whig measure passed through congress during Tyler's presidency was the tariff of 1842. The term through which the compromise of 1833 was to run was to expire June 31, 1842. Before that date the treasury had a deficit. There was much alarm for the future, and some attempts were made to devise a plan for relief; but the president stood by the compromise of 1833, and it was allowed to run its course. Finally, on August 30, 1842, a bill was passed fixing the duties on most articles at the rates in force in 1832, and the president gave it his approval. It involved the repeal of the distribution act of the previous year, and on that ground received enough democratic votes to pass the senate.

Tyler re-
pudiated
by the
Whigs.

The Tariff
of 1842.

THE MAINE BOUNDARY AND THE WEBSTER-ASHBURTON TREATY

When Webster decided to remain in the cabinet in 1841 he had begun important negotiations with England. The treaty of 1783 provided that the Northeast boundary should begin at the mouth of the St. Croix river, follow its course to the source, thence due north to the highlands separating the tributaries of the St. Lawrence from the streams that flowed into the Atlantic, along the said highlands to the source of the Connecticut, thence with that river to the parallel 45° north, and thence due west to the St. Lawrence. The commissioners knew little about the real geography of the Northeast. There were several rivers which the early inhabitants had called the St. Croix, and the British naturally claimed that the westernmost should be taken for the true starting point, while the Americans held for the easternmost. From the source of the stream claimed by the British a northward line reached the eastern end of some hills running westward, which it was claimed were the highlands which ought to be accepted as the boundary. The Americans were sure that the real St. Croix was either the river now known as the St. Johns or a smaller stream called by the Indians the Magaguadavi, about twenty-five miles east of the present St. Croix. A line due north from the source of that stream did not touch the hills just mentioned, but passed on through level country, across the St. Johns, until it reached high ground which paralleled the St. Lawrence, about 140 miles northward, and following these hills south-westwardly this boundary gave to the United States about 12,000 square miles of territory more than that conceded by the British line. This disputed region was drained in part by the Aroostook river, which flows into the St. Johns, and whose valley by 1840 was being settled by inhabitants of Maine. Various attempts to determine the rights of each nation in the matter had been made, but none succeeded. Maine meanwhile exercised jurisdiction over the Aroostook lands, frequently driving out persons cutting timber under Canadian authority. In 1838 the intruders were more numerous than ever, and Governor Fairfield, of Maine, sent 150 men to oust them. The intruders fell back to New Brunswick, gathered reënforcements, and only the exercise of moderation on the part of the governor of New Brunswick prevented bloodshed. Throughout Maine was great indignation, and the president was called on for help. Van Buren advised negotiations, but congress with practical unanimity gave him the authority to call out 50,000 men to defend the rights of the country, if he thought force necessary. Several irritating incidents had recently occurred on the Canadian frontier, and the country was in no friendly mood toward Great Britain. At this time the English and American governments

Nature of
the Dispute.

The "Aroostook War."

agreed to desist from further operation on the Aroostook, and Maine, already prepared to enforce her claim by force, was induced to withhold her hand until diplomacy had its opportunity. This period of disturbance was popularly called the "Aroostook war."

Such was the situation when Webster became secretary of state in 1841. He immediately opened negotiations with England, which had no other wish than to dispose of the Aroostook incident without injury to her rights. Lord Ashburton, a reasonable and courteous diplomatist, was sent to Washington to have special charge of the British side of the case, and on August 9, 1842, the Webster-Ashburton treaty was signed, disposing of the controversy through a compromise satisfactory to all moderate persons. It adopted a line which gave 7015 square miles of the disputed area, including the Aroostook valley, to the United States. The treaty also pledged the two contracting powers to keep a joint squadron in African waters to suppress the slave trade. Maine and Massachusetts received from the United States money payments for land claims they had in the region awarded to England. A British map not accessible to Webster in 1842 supports the American claim and makes it evident that England gained by the treaty 5000 square miles more than the treaty of 1783 allowed her.

**The Treaty
Concluded.**

THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS AND THE OCCUPATION OF OREGON

During Van Buren's administration the annexation of Texas was held in abeyance. The South desired it, but the North was sure to object, and the question was too dangerous to party harmony to be taken up as long as it could be avoided. Texas herself understood the situation, and after 1838 ceased to offer herself where there was no prospect that she would be accepted. Meanwhile, she had many difficulties. Immigration was not very rapid, the struggle for independence over, many of her adventurers returned to the United States, and the expense of keeping an army and navy to repel Mexico but added to her heavy debt. She was in need of foreign assistance, and some of her people were showing a willingness to accept it from any available source.

**The Situation in
Texas.**

In 1843 Washington learned that England and France had induced Mexico to make a truce with Texas with a view to a permanent treaty.

Our government was surprised that these European nations were taking such active interest in Texan affairs. Then came reports that England was to advance money to free the slaves in Texas, the republic guaranteeing the interest on the loan. Why was Great Britain, it was asked, concerning herself in this quarter? The answer was in order that she might have the trade of Texas and secure a vast source for the supply

**The Alleged
English
Scheme.**

of cotton she needed for her factories. Moreover, it was evident that if she got as strong a hold over the country as this plan involved, nothing but a war would shake her off. The report, although denied by the British government, was credited in the South and by many people in the North, and the impression grew that if we did not wish to see this valuable region slip out of our grasp, we must act at once. The North, however, laughed at the rumors and declared they were manufactured to influence the action of congress. Later investigations have made it clear that they were well founded, although England's activity had not gone as far by 1843 as the Southerners believed.

Tyler and Upshur, his secretary of state, believed the reports and suggested to the Texans that it would be well to renew offers of annexation. Samuel Houston, the Texan president, assumed indifference, saying that if negotiations were now reopened the newly established friendship of Texas and England would be weakened. This whetted the desire of Tyler, and he consulted with his friends and satisfied himself that a treaty of annexation could be carried through the senate. He took a warmer tone with Houston, who at last offered to treat for annexation if the United States would send an army to the frontier to aid the republic in case Mexico attacked while negotiations progressed. The condition was accepted, but later modified, so that we did not promise to aid the republic until a treaty was accepted. At this juncture Upshur was killed by the explosion of a cannon on the ship-of-war *Princeton*, and when the negotiations actually began, Calhoun was secretary of state. They ended in a treaty, signed April 12, 1844, in which Texas was to become an American territory and surrender its public lands, its indebtedness of \$10,000,000 being assumed by the United States.

Tyler suggests Annexation.

All this was done as quietly as possible, but secrecy could not be maintained when the document came to the senate. Its publication was not a surprise to the country, but it met none the less a vigorous protest in the North. The South, it was said, had assumed the aggressive and was seeking to acquire an immense region for the extension of the sphere of slavery. On the other hand, the Southerners replied that they only wished to enlarge the national domain and that the North selfishly sacrificed the glory of the country in order to gratify an unreasonable feeling against the South. As early as this the two sections had come to the inevitable conflict between slavery and freedom. The problem now became a very practical one for the politicians. The presidential campaign was beginning, neither party was willing to assume the responsibility of annexation, and so the treaty, which at first seemed safe, was defeated in the senate. Calhoun and Tyler had the matter much at heart, and were sorely disappointed at the miscarriage of their plans.

Treaty Rejected.

While Texas thus engaged the attention of the South and North, Oregon had become an important matter to the people of the West.

For many years after the explorations of Lewis and Clark little was done to occupy that region. But by 1840 many settlers following the Missouri river had crossed the Rocky mountains to the fertile valley of the Columbia, where England also had claims to territory. The controversy to which these conflicting claims gave rise was an intricate one. The British claim went back to 1778, when Captain Cook sailed along the Pacific coast as far as about 54° north latitude; Spain also had claims in the same region, but relinquished them in the Florida purchase treaty of 1819, by which she gave up to the United States all right she may have had to the coast north of 42° north latitude. Russia, also, had once held that her Alaskan possessions extended south as far as Oregon, but in 1824 Secretary Adams induced her to agree that her authority should not extend south of $54^{\circ} 40'$. Thus in 1824 the region between 42° and $54^{\circ} 40'$ was free of Spanish and Russian claims, but there was still the dispute with England. This we tried several times to arrange, but always without success. In 1818 it was decided to leave the country, now definitely known as "Oregon," to the joint use of both powers for ten years; and at the end of that period joint occupancy was renewed indefinitely, either party to terminate it by giving a year's notice. The Hudson Bay Company, with strong trading interests at Vancouver, was the center of the British influence, and the Americans, missionaries and traders with a few farmers, were settled chiefly on the Columbia. In 1841 they numbered 400. In 1818 England and the United States had agreed that the parallel 49° north should be the common boundary as far as the Rockies, and the United States were now willing to extend it directly to the Pacific, but to this proposition England objected. She wished to have the Columbia for the southern boundary of her Pacific coast possessions. On this basis nothing could be determined, and so the matter was left to drift along until the settlement of Oregon should make it necessary to come to a more definite understanding.

The Oregon Question.

Claims of England, Spain, and Russia.

Joint Occupancy of Oregon.

Oregon a Political Issue, 1844.

The transference of American life to Texas, creating in Jackson's administration a lively interest in southwestern expansion, could not but awaken a similar feeling in regard to the Far Northwest. About 1838, therefore, Linn, senator from Missouri, a state whose position gave her great interest in Northwestern expansion, opened a campaign for the erection of forts along the Oregon trail as far as the mouth of the Columbia. Of course, this would violate the existing agreement with England and might lead to war. Another objection was that Oregon was so far away that when settled it would become a colony, a thing for which the constitution made no provision. Linn's efforts met strong opposition in the East and for a while in the South. But in 1843 the

Texan question came up, and Southerners concluded that it could be united with the Oregon question, since both related to expansion. This gave the Northwest more hope. The feeling in that quarter was now intense. Ignoring our former offer to accept the 49th parallel, the West demanded all of Oregon, and the slogan, "Fifty-Four Forty or Fight" was originated to express its position. It was accepted by the democrats, who in the platform of 1844 demanded the "reoccupation" of Oregon and the "reannexation" of Texas.

Meanwhile, the settlers in Oregon were rapidly increasing through immigration, for agitation stimulated interest in the country. So much did the people suffer from lack of a legal government that in 1843 they formed an irregular government of their own to continue until congress made further provisions for them. In May, 1844, a caravan of 1000 persons, with 1967 oxen, horses, and cattle, started from the Kansas river on the journey across the mountains. They were mostly from Missouri. These events of necessity aroused the diplomats and led to a renewal of negotiations. Great Britain opened the question, but offered nothing better than the old terms, which were promptly rejected. Then she suggested arbitration, but this was also refused. At this point the negotiation was suspended, probably to await the result of the election, then near at hand.

Immigra-
tion into
Oregon.

Renewed
Negotia-
tions.

THE ELECTION OF 1844

Early in 1844 Van Buren and Clay were generally considered the inevitable candidates of their respective parties in the coming campaign. The former had much reason to feel satisfied with the outlook, for the congressional elections of 1842 gave the democrats a majority of 70 in the house, and the discouragement of the whigs through the quarrel with Tyler had added greatly to their embarrassment. Across this promising sky fell the cloud of antislavery. The year was hardly begun before each candidate was forced to reply to questions as to his position on the annexation of Texas. The democratic leader replied in a letter which showed that he was at last in the same position that his ancient enemy, Calhoun, was in when the nullifiers forced his hand in 1828. He must oppose annexation and lose the support of the South, or favor it and lose the support of his own section. He chose the former course, hoping, no doubt, that he could so soften the blow as to retain the good will of the South. He believed annexation constitutional, he said, but inexpedient because it would involve a war with Mexico, violate our neutrality obligations, and hold us up to the world as willing to extend our power through a war of conquest; but if Mexico

Van Buren
and Texas,
1844.

carried herself toward Texas so as to threaten our interest, the people of the United States could be relied on to unite against her, and in that case he would, if president, submit the matter to the wisdom of congress.

Calhoun must have remembered the days of his own humiliation when he saw this letter. He had spent the past thirteen years in arousing the South on slavery, and the result was now apparent. From every slaveholding state came protests against the man who could temporize in such a situation. Van Buren's Failure. Van Buren, said the Southern democrats, could not be trusted; he was intimidated by the Northern antislavery men, and he must not be nominated. From that time his selection, as even his best Southern friends admitted, was impossible. Andrew Jackson, old but keenly watching the political field, could only exclaim: "I would to God I had been at Mr. V. B.'s elbow when he closed his letter, I would have brought to his view *the proper conclusion*. We are all in sack-cloth and ashes!"

If Clay thought he would profit by his rival's predicament, he was mistaken. He also had written a letter, known as his "Raleigh Letter," from the place in which it was written; and in it he took almost exactly the same ground that Van Buren took. Clay and Texas. It did not defeat his nomination, for it pleased the North, where his greatest strength lay; but it caused dismay in the South, and so many requests that he soften his expressions came from the whigs there that later in the summer he wrote other letters saying that he had no personal objection to annexation "without dishonor, without war, with the common consent of the union, on just and fair terms." We shall see how this apparent juggling of the question worked his ultimate undoing.

The two leading parties held their conventions in Baltimore in May, 1844. The whigs made their choice harmoniously, naming Clay without a dissenting voice, and Frelinghuysen, for vice-president, on the fourth ballot. The democrats were in sad confusion. A majority of the convention was instructed for Van Buren, but some of the pledged delegates were opposed to him, and the two-thirds rule was used to prevent his nomination. For a time it seemed that the party would be seriously divided. Most of the Northern delegates stood by Van Buren, while the Southerners were divided, some going for Cass, of Michigan, who had strong Western support. As the ballots were taken, Van Buren declined and Cass gained strength, until on the seventh he seemed in a fair way to succeed. He was unpopular with the Old North, and an adjournment was carried until next day in order to stop the trend toward him. During the night much was done to find some man to beat him. James K. Polk, of Tennessee, urged by his friends as a man vouched for by Jackson, was now brought forward. On the first

The Candi-
dates
Selected.

ballot taken next morning he had 44 votes, and on the second Van Buren was withdrawn and Polk nominated by a union of North and South which swept away in the enthusiasm with which it was received even the original Cass support. The nomination for vice-presidency was offered to Wright, of New York, Van Buren's ablest lieutenant, but he declined peremptorily, and it was then given to George M. Dallas, of Pennsylvania. The platform declared for Texas and Oregon and reaffirmed the party's opposition to a bank and to the distribution of the funds derived from lands. Polk was not a brilliant man, but he was a steady and industrious politician, and his party put away its dissensions and entered the canvass hopefully.

Two other conventions were held. One nominated Tyler for president with no other platform than his Texas record. The other was held by the Liberty party, organized 1840, when it cast 7100 votes for James G. Birney. He was now re-nominated, with Morris, of Ohio, the candidate for vice-president.

**Tyler,
Birney.**

The campaign was full of bitterness and excitement. Clay traveled widely, making speeches to immense audiences. The Texas men of the South began to declare for annexation or a dissolution of the union with such fervor that whigs and democrats became alarmed, and hastened to say that no one ought to think of disunion. In Pennsylvania Polk was openly accused of being a free trader. In a letter to Kane, of that state, he said he was for a judicious tariff yielding enough revenue for the expenses of government economically administered. It was a clever statement, pleasing the South, which was alarmed at the turn toward protection manifested in the tariff of 1842. It also gave the democrats in protectionist Pennsylvania an opportunity to proclaim him a supporter of the tariff of 1842, which was enacted to get money to defray the expenses of government. They raised the cry, "Polk, Dallas, and the tariff of 1842!" and thereby held the state in its old political faith. Still more important was the attitude of the antislavery whigs, strong in New York. Their first inclination was for Clay, but his quibbling over annexation was so evident that several thousand of them voted for Birney, thus reducing his vote until it was below Polk's by 5104. If he had received New York's 36 electoral votes, he would have been elected. As it was, he got 105 votes, while Polk got 170. Polk lost North Carolina, the state of his birth, and Tennessee, the state of his residence. He carried all the Gulf states, where annexation was strongest, and all of the Northwest, where Oregon was an important issue, while Clay carried all New England, where annexation was opposed, and the Middle and the upper Southern states were divided.

**A Suggest-
tion of
Disunion.**

**The Tariff
in Pennsyl-
vania.**

**The New
York Vote.**

**Polk
Elected.**

Polk's victory indicated that Texas would be annexed, and Tyler used the last weeks of his administration in securing the prize. He was now completely identified with the democrats, having proved his friendship in the summer before the election by withdrawing from the campaign lest the South be divided. When congress met in December he again brought up the Texan question, recommending immediate annexation by a joint resolution. This method, requiring only a majority vote in each house, was preferred to annexation by treaty, which required a two-thirds majority in the senate. The Texas men took up Tyler's suggestion with alacrity. The house passed it by a vote of 120 to 98, and the senate by the close vote of 27 to 25. The democrats generally voted in the affirmative, and a few of the Southern whigs, not willing to go against the strong feeling of their section, took the same position. The resolution, as passed, provided that Texas might become a state when her constitution was accepted by congress, that four additional states might with her own consent be formed out of her territory, that boundary disputes should be settled by future negotiations between the United States and any other foreign power who made objection, that Texas should assume her own debt and surrender her land and water defenses, that the principle of the Missouri compromise should be extended to the Texan territory, and that the president should have authority to complete annexation by negotiating with Mexico or by an agreement with Texas, as he saw fit.

The last clause was to meet the objection of a few senators who insisted that honor demanded that Mexico be conciliated. They asserted that they had assurances that Polk would follow this plan if the resolutions passed, but he later denied that he gave such a promise. In fact, Tyler gave him no option in the matter. Though only seven days of the term remained to him, Tyler hurriedly dispatched a messenger to Texas with an offer of annexation. It arrived none too soon, for Texas was considering a proposition for a joint British and French guarantee of Texan integrity, with further joint mediation with Mexico on the question of boundaries. If Polk had resorted to negotiations, he must have encountered this scheme, and Texas might have been lost. As it was, Tyler's offer, and not England's, was accepted by the Texans, and December 29, 1845, a new state was admitted to the union. Mexico, watching the progress of annexation, broke off diplomatic intercourse with the United States as soon as congress passed the joint resolution, and a few months later she declared that the admission of Texas into the union would be equivalent to a declaration of war.

**Annexation
Authorized.**

**Tyler Anticipates
Polk.**

**Texas a
State.**

POLK'S ADMINISTRATION

The war with Mexico is the chief event under Polk; but before we begin with it three other measures must be described. The first was a new tariff bill, passed and approved by the president in disregard of the campaign assurances of his friends in Pennsylvania. The tariff of 1842 was about as high as that of 1832, and it pleased the protectionists. It did not suit the democrats, who now controlled all branches of the government. They, therefore, lost no time in passing a new bill, to which has been given the name of Secretary of the Treasury Walker. It became law July 30, 1846, and provided for a reduction to a strictly revenue basis. It was in force until 1857, when there was still further reduction. It did not injure the manufacturing interests of the country, and supplemented by other laws yielded sufficient revenue, even in the period of war which followed its adoption.

The second measure was the settlement of the Oregon boundary. Polk was especially anxious to make the Pacific coast American, and showed firmness in executing the Oregon clause of his party's platform. His first move was to offer to settle, on the old basis, the extension of the parallel 49° to the Pacific. The British minister in Washington refused the offer bluntly without referring it to his government. Polk then asked congress to do three things: (1) give notice to terminate the joint occupation of the disputed region; (2) erect forts there; and (3) extend the laws of the United States over Oregon. Such a course might undoubtedly lead to war, but Polk believed that England would yield when she saw we were in earnest; and the result showed he was right.

But congress was divided. The whigs wished to avoid war, the Northwestern members were firm for all the coast to the parallel 54° 40', and began to suspect that the South, having got Texas, was willing to sacrifice Oregon, while some of the extreme Southerners did not like the idea of enlarging the area which must eventually be free territory. Congress wrangled until late in April, when it was finally decided to give notice to end joint occupancy. England had watched the proceedings closely. She did not wish war over so trivial a matter, and suggested unofficially that we renew our former offer. Polk thought this beneath the national dignity, and suggested that it was for England to reopen the negotiation. She was clearly in the wrong, and yielded as gracefully as possible. June 6, 1846, she submitted a treaty accepting the 49th parallel, and Polk, first getting the approval of the senate, signed the treaty, which was later formally ratified. The Northwest was deeply disappointed, but the rest of the country were satisfied

1. Tariff of
1846.

2. The
Oregon
Question.

The Ad-
justment,
1846.

with the compromise. The Mexican conflict was now beginning, and no one wished two wars at once.

The third matter related to California and New Mexico, a vast and thinly populated possession of Mexico. The Oregon immigrants were already entering California, and Polk believed that San Francisco harbor was necessary to the development of American power on the coast. Its acquisition, therefore, was a prime consideration in his policy from the time he became president. In September, 1845, spite of the rupture of relations with Mexico, he sent Slidell to Mexico to purchase the country, to settle the Texan boundary, and to adjust a mass of claims of American citizens. Slidell was instructed to assume the Mexican claims and pay \$20,000,000 for that part of California from and including San Francisco northward, while he might offer \$5,000,000 more for the part including Monterey. For New Mexico, part of which Texas claimed, he might offer \$5,000,000; and he was to endeavor to get Mexico to accept the Rio Grande for her Texas boundary. The affairs of Mexico were in great confusion, she was badly in need of funds, and as she had intimated that she would be willing to settle her relations with the United States, it was believed that Slidell by skillful management could get what we wanted.

The result showed that Polk did not understand the Spanish-American temperament. We were so unpopular with the Mexican people on account of the annexation of Texas that our offer was not even received, and Slidell was forced to return without the slightest success. Then Polk realized that if we got California and New Mexico we must resort to war, and for that contingency he was prepared.

Of the three matters of dispute the boundary question was the occasion of the war. Under Spanish and Mexican control Texas had never extended south of the Nueces, but the agreement with Santa Anna, 1836, had recognized the Rio Grande as the boundary (see page 421), a concession Mexico promptly repudiated. But the Texans persisted in their claim, and our government now took it up. The disputed region was uninhabited, and it is probable that time and diplomacy would have given it to us without a struggle. Such a course was not to be followed, for Polk had other ends in mind.

Pending the results of Slidell's diplomacy, General Zachary Taylor, with 1500 men, took position at Corpus Christi just south of the mouth of the Nueces, where he remained until early in 1846. When it was seen that Slidell would accomplish nothing, Taylor was ordered to the Rio Grande, and promptly obeyed. General Ampudia, with a Mexican force, was at Matamoras, on the south bank of the Rio Grande near its mouth. He considered the last move of the American general an act of invasion, and demanded that he fall back to the Nueces. He sent a force

**3. An Offer
for Califor-
nia and New
Mexico.**

**The Texas
Boundary.**

**The Begin-
ning of the
War.**

across the river, which on April 24 surrounded a reconnoitering party of Americans, killing and capturing them all. To Polk this was an act of invasion, and he advised congress that war had been begun by Mexico and that preparations for meeting it ought to be made. The nation was deeply excited, and congress, accepting the statement of the president, ordered the enlistment of 50,000 soldiers, and appropriated \$10,000,000 for war expenses. In this way began the Mexican war, May 12, 1846.

Three chief offensive movements were planned by the Americans. One was intrusted to Taylor, who was to conquer the northern Mexican provinces and distress the enemy until they were willing to sue for peace. When in time this was seen to be insufficient, a second was organized to march from Vera Cruz against the Mexican capital. A third expedition, launched in the beginning of the war, was to invade and take New Mexico and then to proceed to the coast and occupy the weakly defended province of California. The purpose was to occupy the disputed region and hold it by force, to distress Mexico until she sued for peace, and to secure California, which Slidell could not get, as war indemnity.

**The Three
Phases of
the War.**

Taylor moved first. News of hostilities had aroused the whole nation, and May 6, before congress had acted, reënforcements arrived from New Orleans, with which he took the field against the enemy, who had crossed the river. In two sharp engagements, Palo Alto and Resaca de la Palma, he defeated them, forced them to recross the Rio Grande, and then took Matamoras on May 18, Arista, the Mexican general, falling back to Monterey. Taylor now paused until he could make more deliberate plans. August 5 he resumed his advance, and September 20 invested Monterey, a strongly fortified town in which a large body of Mexicans were posted. After three days the enemy were so crippled that they asked for terms. They were allowed to march out with their arms, and Taylor agreed not to continue his march for eight weeks. The armistice displeased the president and was set aside, and Taylor advanced and occupied Saltillo without opposition. December 29 he occupied Victoria, the capital city of the state of Tamaulipas. He now had 10,000 men, and was holding a line 200 miles long. To his surprise and disgust he received an order to send half his force to Vera Cruz to join another army designed to march against the city of Mexico. Like a good soldier he obeyed orders, and began to drill the troops left him, chiefly raw recruits.

**Taylor's
First
Battles.**

Almost immediately he learned that he was in great danger. Santa Anna, the Mexican commander-in-chief, had concentrated 20,000 men and was marching northward to crush him. To fall back to the Rio Grande meant a loss of all the prestige of the campaign, and Taylor decided to fight. He took position at the hacienda Buena Vista, five miles south of Saltillo,

**Battle of
Buena Vista.**


where he was attacked by the Mexicans on February 23. His army was posted between two mountains, and beat off the first attack with a splendid rifle and artillery fire. Santa Anna then rallied his men, turned Taylor's left, and made a bold dash at his line of retreat. Troops less cool would have been thrown into confusion, but the Americans trusted their commander and stood their ground. The flanking party was driven back to the mountain, and only a ruse of a pretended flag of truce saved them from capture. Santa Anna now made his last effort. Massing his reserves, he fell on Taylor's center, took its batteries, and penetrated the line for a considerable distance. Then Taylor pushed forward a battery commanded by Bragg which opened with grape and canister, while Jefferson Davis's Mississippians and a small band of Indiana troops cut them to pieces on the flank. Repulsed here, the enemy withdrew, leaving their dead and wounded on the field. The battle of Buena Vista, taking comparative numbers into consideration, was the best fought engagement of the war. After it was won Taylor remained undisturbed on the Rio Grande.

The expedition of Scott was undertaken because an army could not reach the enemy's capital from the Rio Grande. It was decided to land at Vera Cruz, take well-fortified defenses, and fight through the intervening region until the objective was reached. Selecting a commander caused much trouble. Taylor was a whig, his victories were fast making him a popular hero, and he was already mentioned as a presidential candidate. Ought a democratic administration to continue to afford him an opportunity to achieve laurels? General Scott, head of the army, was also a whig and open to the same objection. But the democrats had no good general of high rank, although Senator Benton, who had great confidence in himself, was willing to resign his seat and lead the second army of invasion. There was much wrangling over the point, and valuable time was lost, but at last good judgment prevailed, and Polk, putting political considerations aside, intrusted the command to Scott, who on March 9, 1847, began to land at Vera Cruz with more than 12,000 men. Before his operations are described we must follow the fortunes of the third movement, undertaken for the conquest of California.

Its conduct was intrusted to Colonel Stephen W. Kearny, who in June set out with 1800 men from Fort Leavenworth, on the upper

Missouri, for Santa Fé. His greatest hardships were those of the march through an arid country, but on August 18 he entered Santa Fé, the Mexican army fleeing before him. Following his instructions, he set up a temporary government under the American flag, and a month later set out for California, going by way of the Gila valley to the Colorado and thence due west to San Diego. He started on this part of his campaign with only 300 men, but meeting Kit Carson with news that California was

Kearny's
California
Expedition.



already conquered, he sent two-thirds of his detachment back to New Mexico and proceeded with only 100 men.

The events to which Carson referred were strange, and filled with the spirit of adventure. Early in 1846 Commodore Sloat, with a squadron, was off the coast, with instructions to seize the harbors if war began, and the American consul at Monterey was instructed to promote the spirit of independence among the inhabitants. At that time Captain John C. Frémont, prominent as an explorer, was in California, engaged in geographical research, and secretly longing for an opportunity to raise the population, a portion of whom were Americans by birth, against Mexico. The knowledge that war had begun put all these forces into activity. Sloat took the ports of San Francisco and Monterey, and Commodore Stockton, who relieved him, took Los Angeles. Meanwhile, the inhabitants of the province rose against the Mexican garrisons and raised the American flag, Frémont giving such help as his small body of explorers afforded. Thus the whole province fell into American hands, and when Kearny arrived in December, 1846, only the remnants of resistance were to be suppressed. His authority superseded that of Stockton and Frémont, and he was soon at odds with them over the form of government to be established. The latter wished to have a territory with Frémont for governor. But Kearny was ordered to proclaim a provisional civil government with military support, and his compliance with the order was approved by the president.

The Province
Seized.

When the news from California arrived in Washington Scott's army was beginning to execute the third important phase of the land operations. March 9 it landed three miles from Vera Cruz and invested the place, while a fleet blockaded the harbor. After five days of heavy bombardment, the town, suffering from hunger and exhaustion, was surrendered.

Vera Cruz
and Cerro
Gordo.

Scott was an excellent general, as his proceedings now showed. Two hundred and fifty miles away was the capital of Mexico, reached by a good road which at eighty miles from the coast crossed a mountain range, the pass of which was guarded by the hill of Cerro Gordo. Here Scott, who advanced rapidly, found the enemy strongly posted on April 17. In a battle which consumed most of two days the army carried the well-fortified hill, drove Santa Anna into disastrous flight, and captured 3000 prisoners and a large quantity of arms and supplies.

Now followed nearly four months of inaction, while futile efforts for peace were made. Early in August the advance was resumed, and on the nineteenth the army had passed around Lake Chalco and faced the enemy at Contreras and Churubusco, two strong places a few miles south of the city.

The Capital
Taken.

In four days' fighting both positions were taken in the most gallant

manner. The prize was now all but won, when an armistice was granted and negotiations for peace were again begun. The demands of the Mexicans were impossible, and Scott, convinced that they were only made to gain time, broke off negotiations and took Molino del Rey on September 8. He was now four miles from the city, but before him stood the rock Chapultepec, 150 feet high, crowned with batteries and flanked with outworks, all well manned. On the thirteenth he attacked this place, carrying it after the most desperate resistance and coming at nightfall to the very gates of the city. There he was ready to storm on the following morning when the city officials appeared with a flag of truce and handed over the keys. By this time the army of the defenders had withdrawn to Guadalupe Hidalgo, and his own troops marched through the gates to the great plaza, where they raised their flag over "the Halls of the Montezumas." With due allowance made for the inferior fighting ability of the Mexicans, it was a splendidly won campaign; and many an officer who served gallantly on one side or the other in the civil war saw here his first active service.

Polk began the war, thinking that Mexico would yield at the show of force, and Trist, chief clerk of the state department, accompanied Scott with the draft of a treaty of peace. This policy was called "conquering a peace." It was Trist's presence that caused Scott to halt twice in his march on the capital, a course which only made the Mexicans think the Americans timorous. This naturally angered Scott, who saw it interfered with the vigor of his campaign. His protests at last reached Washington, and just as the city of Mexico was entered there arrived orders for Trist to desist and return home. A strong feeling was arising in administration circles to demand all of Mexico. Meanwhile, Trist remained in Mexico, spite of his recall, and February 2, 1848, he signed the treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, in accordance with the instructions given him nearly a year earlier. It provided that the boundary should follow the Rio Grande to the New Mexican line, thence west to the first branch of the Gila, thence with the river to the Colorado, and from that point with the boundary between upper and lower California to the Pacific. The treaty was not strictly binding; as Trist's authority had expired; but Polk sent it to the senate, where it was accepted, March 10. It gave us New Mexico and California, for which we agreed to pay \$15,000,000 and to assume the claims of American citizens against Mexico.

**Treaty of
Guadalupe
Hidalgo.**

THE SLAVERY QUESTION IN A NEW FORM

Had the spirit of 1820 now prevailed it would have been possible to divide the newly acquired territory between freedom and slavery. Moderate men generally desired such an arrangement, but the most

earnest persons on each side of the controversy would not have it. The North generally considered the war an act of Southern aggression and prepared a countermove. In 1846 a bill was before the house to appropriate money to enable the president to make peace, when Wilmot, a Pennsylvania democrat, offered his celebrated proviso that none of the territory acquired in the war should be open to slavery. It passed the house, where the North was in control, and was barely defeated in the senate. It aroused a storm of protest in the South, which believed itself about to be excluded from its fair share in the domain for which it had borne the brunt of war. Spite of the efforts of party leaders, Southern whigs dared not support the measure, and Northern democrats showed a growing unwillingness to oppose it. Sectionalism was rampant, and the union seemed imperiled. But the North did not yield. It had definitely concluded that no more slave states should be admitted to the union. If this plan were followed, the power of the South would soon be broken, and slavery in the South itself would eventually be hampered by irritating and disastrous limitations. The proviso was again before congress in 1847, and again defeated through the opposition of the senate, where the South still maintained its hold.

The Wilmot
Proviso.

While the country was awakening to this controversy, the election of 1848 drew near. The whigs nominated General Taylor, staking their all on a military hero. He had no political experience, but the good sense and kindliness which had led his soldiers to call him "Old Rough and Ready" recommended him to popular favor. He was a war hero neglected by the democratic administration, and the people showed their disposition to right his wrongs. He was a Southerner and a slaveholder, which gave him strength in the South, and it was believed his war record would carry him through in the North. For vice-president Millard Fillmore, of New York, was named. The whig convention tabled a resolution to adopt the Wilmot proviso.

Election of
1848, —
Taylor
Nominated.

The democratic party was handicapped by an internal conflict in the important state of New York. One faction was called barnburners. It favored reforms and got its name from a story of a Dutch farmer who burned his barn to destroy the rats in it. Silas Wright was at the head of the group, but he had the support of Van Buren, William Cullen Bryant, editor of the *New York Evening Post*, and many other liberal minded men. The other group, called hunkers, were more practical men, and were supported by the Tammany society. Their leader was William L. Marcy, and they got their name because they were supposed to hunger, or "hunker," for office. The two factions hated one another so much that Polk was bound to have trouble. In the beginning of his administration he offered to take a barnburner into his cabinet, but the men selected declined, and he made Marcy secretary of war. The

Barnburners
and
Hunkers.

followed trouble over the patronage, widening the breach until in 1848 nothing could bring the two factions to act together, and the result was two sets of delegates to the national nominating convention, which assembled at Baltimore, May 22, 1848.

Aside from the New York wrangle, the meeting was harmonious. Recognizing the Wilmot proviso as a dangerous subject, the leaders kept it in the background, and a resolution in its behalf was tabled by a large majority. Several persons were suggested as candidates, but Lewis Cass, of Michigan, led from the first ballot and secured the nomination on the fourth. He had been in Jackson's cabinet, and was a man of ability and a popular leader in the West. With a candidate who pleased the West and a platform which pleased the South success seemed assured. The hope was defeated by the New York factions, each of which had been allowed to cast half of the state's vote. Each refused this settlement, but the hunkers pledged themselves to support Cass, while the other faction protested against the tabling of the Wilmot proviso and repudiated Cass.

Cass Nominated.

Returning from the convention, the barnburners called a state convention at Utica and nominated Van Buren for the presidency on a platform which demanded the adoption of the Wilmot proviso. Then followed a movement to consolidate all who opposed the extension of slavery. In November, 1847, the liberty party had nominated Hale of New Hampshire, while a radical offshoot of that party, the liberty league, in June, 1848, nominated Gerrit Smith. Moreover, many democrats and whigs were disappointed because their respective conventions had avoided the slavery issue. To unite all these elements a convention was called at Buffalo, August 9, which founded the free soil party, two of whose demands were that the territories be devoted to freedom and that the public lands be distributed free to actual settlers. This done, Van Buren was made the free soil candidate for president and Charles Francis Adams, of Massachusetts, the candidate for vice-president. Hale withdrew, and the liberty party and the barnburner organization was merged into the free soil party. In the election which followed

Free Soil Party Organized.

The Election Results.

the New York situation was the deciding factor. Taylor carried the state with 218,000 votes against 120,000 for Van Buren and 114,000 for Cass; and this meant a whig victory. Had the barnburners supported Cass, he would probably have carried the state. He had 127 electoral votes and Taylor had 163.

Although both democrats and whigs avoided in their platforms the question of slavery in the territories, the issue would not down. It

Oregon made a Territory.

was now more urgent than ever, because a government must be established in Oregon and because gold having been discovered in California the country was filling up with an adventurous population. The issue was strongly drawn in May, 1848, when Polk sent congress an urgent request for a

territorial government for Oregon. A bill was framed which approved the laws already adopted by the temporary government there. Calhoun objected because, as he said, congress had no power to exclude slavery from any territory. The antislavery men, on the other hand, demanded specific restrictions. There was a long debate, the upshot of which was a compromise bill applying the principles of the Northwest Ordinance to Oregon and creating the territories of California and New Mexico without power to pass on slavery, either for or against it. The house tabled the bill, and finally, after much bitterness, the provisions of the bill in relation to Oregon were passed as a separate act. Thus Oregon became a territory without slavery, but California and New Mexico must wait.

The next session of congress was a short one. The house passed a bill to organize the territory of California without slavery, but the senate refused to concur. Various other propositions on the same subject were made, but none were acceptable. In this session, as in the former, Polk urged that the whole question be settled by extending the Missouri compromise to the Pacific, and some favored the idea. Probably the South would have accepted it, but the North was aroused and was determined to check the spread of slavery, so that Polk's suggestion was not adopted. While this subject was being discussed, Northern members brought in a bill to forbid the slave trade in the District of Columbia. It passed the house, but was reconsidered and tabled. The Southern members were aroused, and replied by asking for a committee to prepare a more effective fugitive slave law. The request was not granted, but it served to call the attention of the country to a concrete grievance of the South. The Southern congressmen in an address described the growth of discrimination, and soon afterwards the southern legislatures passed resolutions of similar nature. Northern legislatures replied by demanding the exclusion of slavery from the territories.

Futile Session of Congress, 1848-1849.

On March 4, 1849, congress adjourned after three months of bitter debate, in which no progress was made toward removing the sectional differences. Threats of disunion were freely uttered by Southerners, and before adjournment they organized a committee which sent forth an address on the position of the South. It reviewed the rise of opposition to slavery, arraigned the aggressive spirit of the North on the question, declared the South was denied a fair share of the territory it had done so much to conquer in the recent war, and called on all Southern people to stand as a unit in resistance of the treatment it received. The address was warmly commended in the slave states by both whigs and democrats. In the North there was also much excitement, and many legislatures there passed resolutions for the prohibition of the slave trade in the District of Columbia.

Threats of Disunion.

THE COMPROMISE OF 1850

When the next congress met, December 3, 1849, affairs were no nearer a settlement. California, tired of awaiting the action of congress, had set up an irregular state government with the tacit approval of President Taylor, and was asking for statehood, while New Mexico suffered many inconveniences through the lack of a regular government. Something must be done, but no one could say what. Behind all was the ominous and growing movement for disunion. Cool-headed men, business interests, and conservatives generally recognized the necessity of compromise; and party managers, alarmed at the way negro slavery interfered with older political alignments, wished to find some road to harmony. The issue was fast destroying the whig party in the South, and it threatened to undermine the democracy in the North.

Three suggestions of compromise came into the minds of the leaders. One was the extension of the Missouri line to the Pacific. We have

**The Long-
ing for
Harmony.** seen that this was opposed by the antislavery North. The second was to refer the question to the territories.

**Popular
Sovereignty.** It was first made in 1847, when the Wilmot proviso was being discussed; and Cass in the same year adopted it in a letter to a Tennessee supporter. It meant that congress should do nothing about slavery in a territory, allowing slaveholders and non-slaveholders to settle there as they chose, and that the people of the territory should decide the question for themselves when the territory became a state. This doctrine, so consonant with the theory of state rights, would probably have been accepted by the South in 1848. Brought up later by Douglas, who named it "popular sovereignty," it played an important part in the conflict over Kansas and Nebraska. The suggestion did not please the antislavery men, who meant that slavery must be given no opportunity in the territories.

The third suggestion came from Clay. For nearly eight years he had been in retirement, and was now sent back to the senate because

**Clay's
Suggestion.** his friends thought he could do something to save the union. At heart he favored the Wilmot proviso, and since

California and New Mexico evidently wished to save themselves from slavery, he thought they ought to be gratified. Looking over the field he prepared a plan of compromise which gave something to each side. He thought all moderate men would unite to pass it in order to remove the slavery question definitely from the field of national politics. It appealed to his imagination that "the Great Compromiser," as he was called, who had done good services in the crises of 1820 and 1833 should finish his career with another compromise, greater in its significance than either of the other two.

January 29, 1850, he introduced a series of resolutions providing for: 1. The admission of California as a free state; 2. The creation of the territories of New Mexico and Utah without restriction as to slavery; 3. The assumption of the debt of Texas contracted before annexation and the relinquishment of her claim to a large part of eastern New Mexico; 4. The prohibition of the slave trade in the District of Columbia with the refusal to prohibit slavery there without the consent of Maryland; 5. The more effectual return of fugitive slaves to their masters; and 6. The assertion that congress could not forbid the interstate slave trade.

His Resolutions.

A week later Clay made a two days' speech in defense of his resolutions. The nation had come to the point of dividing, he said, and it was time for each side to make concessions. The South was defending its interests, the North was contending for a sentiment; and it was easier to relax sentiment than interest. The first and fourth resolution would favor the

Clay's Compromise Speech.

North, and on these the South must be content to give way. The others favored the South, and he pleaded that the North would be reasonable and yield on these. His speech was filled with protestations of loyalty to the union of the fathers, a union which he and every other old man present had seen born and develop through the preceding sixty years. He spoke with wonderful effect to an audience which filled every available foot of space in the senate chamber.

On March 4 Calhoun tottered into the capitol to speak to the resolutions. He had come from a sick-bed, and could only sit and watch the senators while his words were read by a friend. He too was born before the constitution was written, but his speech was no plea for concession. He had long been rallying the South against the growing power of the North, and this last appeal was a message of warning. The union, he said, began with an equal distribution of power between

Calhoun's Speech, — the South Outdistanced.

the North and the South, but at the end of sixty years the equilibrium was destroyed. The census about to be taken would show a vast preponderance of population in the North, and this was not due to natural causes, but to three lines of policy followed by the federal government. The first was the Northwest ordinance and the Missouri compromise, by which the South was excluded from many of the territories; the second was the protective tariff; and the third was the growth of consolidation by which the power of the federal government had come into the hands of the North. For a long time there was a complete equilibrium in the senate, but of late the character of Delaware was become neutral, giving the North 28 and the South 26 members of the senate. At present there were two Northern territories, Minnesota and Oregon, and no Southern territories, in a formative process. Add to this the proposition of the North for the exclusion of the South from California, New Mexico, and Utah, and the

prospect was that there would be five more states added to the power of the North. Could there be any doubt whither this situation would lead?

About 1835, he continued, began the antislavery agitation, proclaiming as its purpose the destruction of slavery, an achievement which would overturn the social system of the South.

The Growth of Disunion. At first ignored by the two great parties, it had grown until whigs and democrats were afraid to oppose it, and its latest demand was the exclusion of slavery from the territories. Would it ever be weaker than now? Was it not evident that if something were not done to check its progress the South must choose between abolition and secession? The evidences that disunion is growing are seen in the churches. The Methodists and Baptists are already divided on the question of slavery, the bonds of the Presbyterian church have begun to yield, and only the Episcopalians, of the four great Protestant bodies, are not affected by the great dissension. The same tendency is seen in the two great parties. Cord after cord has broken, and if the agitation goes on, not a bond will remain to bind together the two great sections of the country. This is disunion.

Calhoun then came to his remedy for this aggravated situation. He proposed an amendment to the constitution guaranteeing the South an equal position in the territories, a fair execution of the fugitive slave act, and a cessation of antislavery agitation.

Calhoun's Remedy. Would the North accept this? She would if she loved the union as she professed. It was not a gift in the possession of the South, the weaker section. "If you who represent the stronger portion," he said to the Northern senators, "cannot agree to settle them [the points mentioned] on the broad principles of justice and duty, say so; and let the states we both represent agree to separate and part in peace. If you are unwilling we should part in peace, tell us so, and we shall know what to do, when you reduce the question to submission or resistance. If you remain silent you will compel us to infer by your acts what you intend."

This speech was the last warning of the Southern Nestor, and four weeks later he was dead. There are flaws in the argument, but he stated clearly the situation of the South. It had played a losing game in the race for progress, it was now face to face with the inevitable, and it must submit to the will of the North and allow slavery to be put in a way to be extinguished, or it must separate from the North and establish a government of its own. Compromise was entirely without Calhoun's ken. He realized that it was only a palliative and pleaded calmly for Northern conciliation in a saddened eloquence which would have been better expended if it had been used to reconcile his own people to the inevitable progress of civilization.

Significance of Calhoun's Speech.

March 7 Webster rose to speak. He too had seen the union pass from its birth through a period of doubt to a splendid maturity. He grew up to manhood when patriotism was a passion, the best efforts of his life had been given to establish the ideals of union, and he was dismayed at the prospect which Calhoun held up so firmly. Moreover, Webster, like many other cooler Northerners, had no enthusiasm for abolition. He did not believe slavery as undesirable as disunion, and he now threw his whole soul into the task of calming the Northern mind, charging the abolitionists with excessive severity, and pleading that the South be not driven into the last ditch. Conservative Northerners approved the speech, but the verdict of the antislavery men was far otherwise. One compared him with Benedict Arnold, another exclaimed: "Webster is a fallen star! Lucifer descending from heaven!" and he was freely charged with bidding for the Southern whig support for the presidency. He undoubtedly had his ambitions, but he would hardly have risked his standing at home if he had not felt that duty impelled him. The avalanche of criticism under which he was buried shows how much the North was aroused against slavery.

Webster's
Speech,
March 7.

Clay's resolutions were debated, with some intermissions, for three months before bills embodying their principles were introduced. One was called "the Omnibus Bill," because it contained his recommendations in regard to California, New Mexico, Utah, and Texas; another prohibited the slave trade in the District of Columbia, and still another provided a better fugitive slave law. As the debate proceeded, the "Omnibus Bill" was broken up into three measures, each of which, with the two other propositions, was adopted through the efforts of Clay. Thus the North gained the admission of California as a free state and the prohibition of the slave trade in the national capital. The South had a distinct gain in the new fugitive slave law, which gave to the federal courts the execution of the law, and Texas was relieved of her debt incurred in the struggle to win and maintain her independence. In the creation of New Mexico and Utah as territories the North lost to the extent that the Wilmot proviso was not applied, but the net gain was bound to be hers as one of the territories was north of the Missouri line and the other could not hope soon to be a state.

The Com-
promise
Adopted.

June 3, while the compromise was being debated, a Southern convention met in Nashville, nine states being represented. The delegates from South Carolina and Mississippi were for extreme measures, but cooler heads restrained them, and the convention contented itself with demanding the extension of the line 36° 30' to the Pacific. For all Calhoun's deliberate gloom the Southern people were not yet ready to secede. But the convention had an important influence on the action of congress. The extreme Northerners declared it a mere threat, and believed that

The Nash-
ville Con-
vention.

the talk of secession was gasconade. In the light of later events we know that disunion had taken a strong hold in the South, although it had not yet been accepted by the great mass of people there.

July 9 President Taylor died. Although not experienced in politics, he had made a good executive. He had a soldier's love of duty and a leaning toward the enforcement of authority which reminds one of Jackson. Talk of secession aroused his opposition, and he was not favorable to compromise. Fillmore, his successor, was conservative by nature and gave active support to Clay's plans. The great compromise having passed, he sought to enforce it, and wished it to be, as it was intended, a final settlement of sectional dissensions. His administration was void of other important events.

July 5, 1850, was ratified the Clayton-Bulwer treaty, referring to the construction of an Isthmian canal. Hopes of such a waterway had long been entertained in Central America, but the interest of the United States in it sprang chiefly from their acquisition of their Pacific coast. In 1846 a treaty was made with New Granada, looking to a canal at the Isthmus of Panama. Soon afterwards a railway was begun at this point, but no canal construction was attempted. At the same time Great Britain was moving to get possession of the Nicaraguan route. She had acquired the eastern, and was making efforts to get the western, terminus. Nicaragua feared that these steps would lead to the most serious results, and sought to play the United States against England. Our general opposition to an increase of British influence in Central America was sufficient to arouse interest. American capital was also negotiating for a canal charter, and in 1849 a treaty was negotiated with Nicaragua, but not ratified, by which we got a concession for a canal and agreed to guarantee the integrity of Nicaragua. Then followed complications with Great Britain, the result of which, 1850, was the treaty which bears the names of the American secretary of state and the British minister in Washington, Clayton and Bulwer. It pledged each nation to maintain the neutrality of any interoceanic canal which either should construct at any point in Central America, agreed to admit other nations to the benefits of the treaty, and promised that neither power should extend its possessions in that region.

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CHAPTER XXII

SOCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT, 1815-1861

GROWTH OF POPULATION AND THE RESULTS

DURING the years 1815-1860 the westward movement of population continued the most noticeable feature of our domestic affairs. In the former year the Atlantic states had about 5,800,000 inhabitants, in 1860 they had 15,895,971, while the region lying westward had increased from 1,500,000 in 1815 to 15,484,350 in 1860. Had the old feeling of opposition between the East and the West persisted, the latter section would in 1860 have been nearly in the supremacy. That it did not persist was due to two causes. 1. The democratic party, founded as an expression of the will of the rural classes, had a strong hold in all parts of the country. It was a truly national bond. 2. The rise of the slavery question introduced a new kind of sectionalism, the North against the South. By this newer alignment the North was very powerful. Including the free West, it had in 1860 a population of 20,309,960, while the South had 11,133,361.

**A New Kind
of Sectional-
ism.**

In a new country the birth rate is high, and to this must be attributed the greater part of the rapid growth in numbers. But another important fact was immigration, which increased swiftly after the war of 1812. The growth of manufactures and the development of the West created a great demand for labor, while disturbances and suffering in Europe gave an impetus for emigration to a land where wages were high and homes awaited those who would have them. The records of immigration, kept from 1820, show that from that year to 1860, inclusive, 5,055,938 aliens, including travelers, arrived in the United States, most of them coming from three countries. Ireland, afflicted with famine and many other ills, led with 1,880,943, Germany came next with 1,545,508, and England was third with 744,285. France, Switzerland, and the Netherlands sent considerable numbers; but the nations from which we have lately received most of our immigrants then sent few. For the entire period, only 16,776 came from Italy, Russia, and Poland.

**Immigra-
tion.**

The immigrant avoided the states in which slavery was the prevalent form of labor. He could not compete with it in wages, and it made it difficult for him to become a proprietor of his own enterprises. In 1860 the foreign-born population was 4,136,175, and

of this the fifteen slave states had 471,000, more than half of whom were in the border states of Missouri and Maryland.

**Immigrants
Avoid the
South.**

It was said at the time that white labor could not thrive in the South. The experience of the last half century shows that the opinion was erroneous. It seems evident that but

for the presence of slavery the South would have the share of immigration to which its fertile soil and agreeable climate entitled it.

The immigrant was rarely a pioneer. The hard task of exploring the wilderness and pushing the Indian westward was assumed by the natives, while the less adventurous European was content

**Location of
the Immi-
grants.**

to arrive when towns were being planted and farming lands were being taken up. Thus, in the seven territories in existence in 1860, with a total population of 220,197,

there were only 35,476 foreign-born persons, while in the five states of the old Northwest, with a total population of 6,926,884, there were 1,197,736 foreign-born persons. The rapid growth of manufactures in the East absorbed a large portion of the newcomers. In the six great manufacturing states, New York, Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, New Jersey, Connecticut, and Rhode Island, with a total population in 1860 of 9,324,818, there were 1,930,139 persons of foreign birth. Thus we see that in eleven states, constituting the older agricultural West and the manufacturing East, were concentrated 75.6 per cent of the immigrant population.

Most immigrants were good laborers, and a few were able to purchase farms. Some were diseased, and it was known that parishes in Europe had sent their paupers. By 1830 public opinion,

**Opposition
to Immi-
grants' Vot-
ing.**

which was all for immigration in 1815, began to change, and demands were heard for discrimination among the incoming multitude. The Irish caused special alarm. They were hot-tempered and clannish, clung to the cities, and

soon fell into the hands of designing politicians. As they were generally Catholics, a solid Irish vote caused alarm to those who feared the American doctrine of strict separation of church and state might be weakened. As a result, much was said about denying to the immigrants the right both to vote and hold office, but neither of the great political parties was willing to espouse such a principle.

Finally the advocates for reform effected a distinct organization, calling themselves Native Americans. They appeared chiefly in the

**The Native
Americans.**

cities, and nominated candidates for city office. In Boston in 1837 a riot grew out of the excited feeling of the "Natives" and the Irish. In the same year the Native American Association was created, demanding of congress the repeal of the naturalization laws. Throughout the succeeding years there was much ferment. City after city fell into the hands of the Native Americans; and in the summer of 1844 there was prolonged rioting in Philadelphia, occasioned by a protest of the Catholics against the use of the

Protestant Bible in the public schools. The matter became a campaign issue, the democrats espousing the cause of the naturalized citizens, and denouncing the spirit of persecution. The victory of Polk did not discourage the Native Americans, and in 1847 they held a national convention and indorsed Taylor for president. Violence, which had never been approved by the leaders, was now abandoned, and the organization seemed losing its influence. But the impulse persisted, and in 1850 was founded the Order of the Star Spangled Banner, which proved the germ of the Know Nothing movement (see page 493). Voting by newly arrived immigrants, which was the chief complaint of nativism, has been allowed to this day most liberally by the states, who have jurisdiction of the suffrage.

Vast changes in the national domain occurred between 1815 and 1860. A schoolboy in the former year would learn that Florida was Spanish and that our southwestern border was Texas and New Mexico. Our claim to Oregon was so indefinite that it hardly counted at that time in the popular mind. By 1860 our western boundary was the Pacific, and 444,053 Americans were settled on the coast. Here already were two states — California, admitted in 1850, and Oregon, a state in 1859 — and one territory, Washington, set off in 1853. In 1815 no state but Louisiana existed beyond the Mississippi. We have seen how Missouri was admitted in 1820, balancing the free state of Maine. The process continued steadily as the settlement of the territories proceeded. In 1836 Michigan and Arkansas were admitted, in 1845 Texas and Florida came in, followed by the two free states of Iowa in 1846 and Wisconsin in 1848, and in 1858 Minnesota was admitted. Thus by 1860 a belt of states extended the whole length of the Mississippi on the west. Beyond it to the confines of Washington, Oregon, and California was a great area embracing the territories of Kansas, Nebraska, Utah, and New Mexico, destined within a short time to be divided into several territories. The only part of the national domain not organized into territories in 1860 was the portion of the two Dakotas lying between Minnesota and the Missouri, a region in which the powerful Sioux tribes had their homes.

**New States
and Terri-
tories.**

THE INFLUENCE OF GREAT INVENTIONS

In 1815 the United States had already begun to use power machinery in industry. The first effects were seen in New England, every stream of which had water power. Manufactures now took the place of commerce as the chief form of industry, and the seat of wealth was no longer confined to the seaports. The immigrants furnished an operative class and the towns grew rapidly; while the farmers, drawn more and more away to the West, left agriculture in a languishing state.

**Manu-
factures
and the
Growth of
Towns.**

In the Middle states towns grew as readily as in New England, but the greater fertility of the soil sustained the prosperity of agriculture, spite of the drain of men to the Western lands.

For all this rich life transportation was an essential. It was needed to carry merchandise to the interior, to bring farm products to the

seaboard, and to bind the remote regions to the seacoast. **Navigation and Canals.** Steamboats, canals, and railroads all served this purpose.

The first were especially useful on the rivers of the interior. In these initial days of Western development, when every promoter could call up a vision of wealth, the papers were full of schemes to establish navigation companies. Many of the plans proved failures, others had short careers and gave place at last to railroads, and some were established successfully.

In 1828 canals were much in vogue in the West and in the seaboard states. New York was reaping great advantages from the Erie canal,

Railroads. then three years completed. Pennsylvania had just

inaugurated a system of roads and canals which would deliver a vast amount of the Western traffic to Philadelphia, and the Potomac people were planning to construct a canal parallel to the river, whence by easy roads they could reach the tributaries of the Ohio. If these routes were opened, Baltimore's thriving trade would be turned aside and her glory would be gone. In desperation she thought of a railroad, and July 4, 1828, the first stroke was made on the Baltimore and Ohio line. The success of the undertaking led to many other similar enterprises, North, South, and West. Sometimes the state built the railroad and operated it, but more frequently it was built by a chartered company and received aid from the state either in bonds given in exchange for stock, or in land donated. By 1840 the railroad had demonstrated its superiority over the canal and was in general use. Most of the roads were short, built to connect important towns or cities, and the era of consolidation did not appear until just before the civil war (see page 733). It was not until 1853 that Chicago had an all-rail line of travel to the seacoast. The development of railroads gave great importance to the great business corporation, whose shares became a medium of investment and speculation. Now arose also the necessity of making laws defining the relation of railroads to the public. They could no longer be looked upon as mere private enterprises, since they were vitally connected with the welfare of the communities through which they ran. Out of this relation arose, chiefly after the civil war, a great conflict between capital and the public.

While railroads largely superseded steamboats on the small streams, they did not soon replace them on the great rivers. On the Mississippi the boats were especially numerous and luxurious. They vied with one another in speed and comfort, and the trip from St. Louis to New Orleans was long remembered by the traveler who took it on

one of these fine craft. For many years it was said that a steamboat could never cross the Atlantic because she could not carry the necessary fuel; but the *Savannah* disproved this in 1819, going with auxiliary steam power, and the *Sirius* and *Great Western*, going entirely by steam, in 1838. In 1840 the Cunard line began to operate steam packets regularly between New York and Liverpool. Other steamships were soon crossing the ocean, but for many years the fast and graceful clippers of the day continued to be the favorite means of passing over the Atlantic.

**Steamboats
on River
and Ocean.**

Many other inventions of this period contributed to the progress of the country. In 1844 Morse invented the electric telegraph, which he did by combining in a practical way several discoveries of scientists who preceded him. As a means of bringing one part of the country into close business and social relations with another part, it was hardly less important than the railroad. In 1834 McCormick invented the reaper, building, also, on many principles discovered by men who preceded him. It was vastly improved in 1845-1847, and found a ready place in the agricultural life of the country. It revolutionized industry in the West, where the fertile lands were well adapted to wheat-raising. With the reaper to harvest the grain and the railroads to take it to the seaports, the West became in a short time a granary for many parts of Europe. In 1846 Elias Howe patented his sewing machine, after many years of struggle against poverty and illness. It was destined to revolutionize the clothing-making industry and to lighten the labor of housewives in all parts of the world. These important inventions, with many others of less importance, testified to the versatility and strength of the inventive faculty in the United States, and gave the American people a prominent place among the progressive industrial nations. They were accompanied by a quick-witted adaptation of the great inventions of other countries, which powerfully stimulated the development of business and general comfort.

**The Tele-
graph, the
Reaper, and
the Sewing
Machine.**

THE INDIANS

In 1815 Indian tribes lived east of the Mississippi in the extreme Northwest, in Tennessee and the region south of it, and in Florida, which was still in the hands of Spain. The advance of the whites gradually pushed them back in the lake region, and they gave up their lands in a series of treaties which by 1830 left them only the prairies south of Lake Michigan and the lands between that lake and the Mississippi. In the southern parts lived the Sacs and Foxes, who in 1804 ceded their lands between the Illinois and the Wisconsin, retaining permission to occupy and hunt on them until they were sold to the whites. During the war of 1812

**East of the
Mississippi.**

some of the Sacs crossed the Mississippi, but the remainder continued in the valley of the Rock river. By 1830 the surrounding country was filling with settlers who looked longingly at the fine Indian lands. Then followed a deed which, from its frequent recurrence in similar situations, may be pronounced the normal way of beginning an Indian war. Late in the year, while the men were hunting, white intruders broke up their village, drove the women and children to the forest, and established themselves in the fertile corn land at the mouth of Rock river, the site of the present town of Rock Island. When the hunters returned they took up arms under the leadership of Black Hawk and retook their village. Troops were called out, but hostilities seemed avoided when Black Hawk moved his people across the Mississippi after promising never to return. In the following year, however, he was back in the tribal lands, committing depredations against the whites. He was now pursued by a force of regulars and militia, driven into Wisconsin, and captured after a severe battle at Bad Axe. The Black Hawk war was the last Indian struggle on the northwestern frontier until the gold hunters began to invade the Rocky Mountain region more than thirty years later.

This affair in Illinois must have been a striking object lesson to the Georgia Indians, who, as we have seen (page 400), were in the same year, 1832, at the height of their contention with the state authorities. In 1830, congress, following the suggestion of the president, offered to give lands beyond the Mississippi to such eastern Indians as would remove thither. But the Indians refused to move, and appealed to the supreme court, relying on their treaty rights. The verdict was in their favor, but through President Jackson's failure to execute it they profited nothing by it; and Georgia proceeded to establish her civil authority in the region over which the Indian law had extended. She also began to sell their hunting lands and threatened to take their farms and homes. What she did for the Cherokees and Creeks within her borders, Mississippi was ready to do for the Chickasaws and Choctaws within her limits.

Under such conditions, the Indians could do nothing but yield. The Creeks sold their lands to the federal government in 1832, the Chickasaws and Choctaws in 1833, and the Cherokees in 1835. A few members of the last-named tribe refused to abide by the sale and were removed by force. For all the land these Indians sold the federal government promised liberal annuities, or agreed to sell the relinquished lands and hold the proceeds in trust for the Indians. It also paid the cost of removal and donated new lands in the West. In 1834 congress established Indian territory in the fertile valley of the Arkansas. More accurately speaking, it was a series of reservations,

Black Hawk War.

The Situation of the Georgia Indians.

Removal Accomplished.

on each of which a nation was placed with the assurance that it would never be moved and that no white man should settle within its border without a license. Each nation was to have its own council and make and execute its own laws; and assistance was given to enable the Indians to contend with the worst difficulties of life in a new environment. There was no regular territorial government, and no hope of statehood was held out. A large part of the Indian territory was left unassigned in order that the Northwestern tribes might be induced to settle on it. As this expectation was not realized, these unsettled lands were many years later opened to settlement by the whites and became organized as Oklahoma territory.

Indian
Territory.

In one other quarter occurred trouble with the Indians. In Florida lived the Seminoles. Many fugitive slaves had settled among and intermarried with them, and it was considered desirable to remove this tribe, also, to the West. In 1833 they were induced to make a treaty for that purpose, and the next year an agent was sent to execute it. This aroused the resident fugitive slaves, who foresaw that they would be returned to bondage. They joined with the less submissive Indians and made up a party who defied the government under the lead of Osceola, an able half-breed whose father was a white man named Powell. His wife was the daughter of a negress, an escaped slave, and in 1835 she was seized when on a friendly visit to Fort King. Osceola protested and was arrested. Feigning submission, he was released, only to make secret plans for resistance. In November, 1835, he put himself at the head of the discontented ones, drove the friendly chiefs into the

The Semi-
nole War.

Osceola.

forts of the white men, retired into the swamps, and made himself a source of terror to the settlements. Troops were now hurried to Florida, but Osceola, fighting with great energy and bravery, drove them back to the forts and held at his mercy all the open country south of St. Augustine. Reënforcements were called for, but these had little better success. The years 1836 and 1837 witnessed many encounters in which the Indians, having fought as long as they dared, fled at last to the swamps, into which they could not be followed. In 1837 the Seminoles agreed to go West if allowed to take with them "their negroes, their *bona fide* property." Many of them assembled at Tampa, and transports were ready to take them to New Orleans, when white men appeared to claim the fugitive slaves. Resistance was immediately renewed, and the struggle went on again more bitterly than ever. Later in the year Osceola was seized at a conference under a flag of truce and sent to Fort Moultrie, at Charleston, where he died in January, 1838. In the following December Colonel Zachary Taylor defeated the Indians in an important battle in Okechobee Swamp, but he was not able to follow the survivors into the recesses of the swamp, and so the war dragged on until the last remnant of re-

sistance yielded and the Seminoles finally consented to remove in 1842. Even then a few remained in the everglades of southern Florida, where their descendants are still found. Since the surrender of the fugitive slaves was the chief question at stake, this long and expensive struggle aroused strong criticism from the antislavery men of the North, who denounced the affair as a slaveholders' war.

By this time nearly 125,000 Indians had been induced to cross the Mississippi, either to Indian territory or to the unorganized region of the Northwest. Many small bands remained near their old homes, mere fragments of the older tribes and shorn of all power to resist the advance of the white man's civilization. For the western tribes the reservation system was now well developed. It meant that the government would keep the Indians quiet by distributing rations and blankets, establishing agencies for distribution, regulating the traders who came to monopolize the profitable Indian trade, and restricting as much as possible the sale of spirits to the savages. For these purposes the government spent liberally, and as the reservations were remotely located the system offered rare opportunity for fraud through the collusion of traders, agents, and the contractors who furnished supplies. The system, moreover, lessened the Indian's sense of self-dependence, and offered him little inducement to acquire habits of thrift and industry. It tended to pauperize his spirit and to give him a contempt for the white man's ideals. At this time the lavish expenditure of money on Indian education had not begun.

The Reservation System.

SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE SOUTH

The lands of the South are of three kinds: 1. Mountainous, extending as far southward as northern Georgia, fertile in itself but heavily timbered and inaccessible. The small valleys between the ridges, popularly known as "coves," fell into the hands of poor men who drifted in from the lowland, and the society that resulted was provincial and unenterprising, but essentially bold and self-sufficient. Here and there was a small town, but the country was generally covered with forest broken at intervals by small clearings. Very few of the inhabitants were slaveholders, and in 1860 they were mostly for the union.

1. The Mountain Region.

2. The Piedmont region, adjacent to the mountains and not adapted to cotton cultivation. The inhabitants were generally small-farmers and owned few slaves, many of them none at all. The lands along the infrequent rivers were fertile, and supported large plantations stocked by slaves. But most of the people were poor. Some tobacco was raised, but the isolation of the region made it difficult to market the crop. This was a food-producing section, and most of the large planters in it were rich be-

2. The Piedmont Region.

cause their slaves were fruitful. From 1825 to 1860 there was a steady emigration of the small farmers to the new states of the Northwest.

3. The Atlantic and Gulf coast region, together with the level plains on each side of the Mississippi, was the favored part of the South. All this area produced cotton except the parts lying in Maryland, Virginia, and Kentucky. Throughout its entire extent were settled the large planters, rich through the labor of the slaves and possessed of an influence which gave them control in all matters social and political. A few planters owned as many as a thousand slaves, many owned more than two hundred, but far the larger number owned less than one hundred. The richest planters were men of culture, had handsome estates, and had established an aristocracy which was intended to resemble that of the English country gentry; but the smaller planters were hard-working men who superintended their own farms and gave personal care to the welfare of their own slaves. In 1860 there were 384,000 slaveholders in the South. As these were generally heads of families, and as there were 9,000,000 white people, or about 1,750,000 families, it seems safe to say that four-fifths of the heads of families were not slaveholders. But the other fifth were the men of influence, as men of wealth and intelligence are ever the men of influence.

3. The
Coast
Region.

The non-slaveholders were mostly small farmers; and as one of the social classes they were a large part of the population. They were hard-working men, but as the planters bought the best land whenever it was on the market, and as hired labor was scarce, there was little opportunity for them to better their condition. As the schools were very bad they could not educate their children beyond the rudiments of reading and writing. To the visitors from other parts of the world they seemed unintelligent and miserable, but they were neither. They were as keen-witted, honest, and courageous a body of yeomanry as lived in their day; and in the civil war they made excellent soldiers. The term "poor whites" has been applied to this class in a peculiar sense. The South had no more shiftless and lazy men than other communities, and the great mass of small landowners ought not to be designated by such a term. The industry and resourcefulness with which these people restored their fortunes when the abolition of slavery had given them opportunity, shows that they were of the genuine American stock, and were sound in mind and morals.

The Non-
Slave-
holders.

During the period from 1815 to 1860 slavery concentrated itself in the South. Gradual emancipation reduced the bondsmen in New England from 3763 in 1790 until there were none in 1850. In the Middle States there were 45,210 in 1790 and 1816 in 1860. Of the latter number 1798 were in Delaware, where the number was gradually falling from 8887 in 1790. In the Old Northwest, where a few slaves existed

Disappear-
ance of
Slavery in
the North.

before the famous Ordinance of 1787, and where others were brought in as servants bound for life, the number decreased from 1107 in 1820 until there were none in 1850. In the South, however, there was an increase from 648,651 in 1790 to 3,951,944 in 1860; and this latter number was almost evenly divided between the region reported in the census of 1790 and that not reported until after 1790.

**Changes in
Southern
Slave Pop-
ulation.**

In the South itself the slaves tended to move to the cotton-growing states. In Maryland there was decrease of 16 per cent from 1830 to 1860, in Virginia the increase was only 4 per cent in the same period, and in North Carolina it was 35 per cent. In Georgia and the Gulf states during the same period the increase was 276 per cent. The increase in the Far South was not merely due to cotton, but to the general prosperity of the farmers in those states. There was, also, a steady development in Kentucky and Missouri in the same period, where farming was profitable without cotton, the increase being 36 per cent in the former and 397 per cent in the latter.

Much was said about the cruelty of masters towards slaves. It is hard to separate this question from the feeling engendered by the

**Treatment
of the
Slaves.**

bitter discussion of the antislavery and the proslavery parties. Slavery is always a hard institution, and the negro, being unenlightened and submissive by nature, invited severe treatment to induce him to labor hard and refrain from evil conduct. Whipping was used freely, because the masters felt it was the punishment most effective with him. Some masters were benevolent, some were severe and careless of the interests of their slaves, but the typical master considered his slave from the standpoint of efficiency, and fed and clothed him, restrained him from the enervating vices, cared for him in sickness, and afforded him religious instruction with the object of making him a sound, moral, and docile laborer. He did not promote his intellectual development or his sense of self-dependence, since such a course would make the slave wish for freedom. The iron law of slavery was that nothing should be afforded the slave which would weaken the hold of slavery as an institution. The antislavery agitation in the North, by arousing the feeling of the masters, led them to revise the slave codes, and laws now appeared on Southern statute books forbidding slaves to be taught to read and write, prohibiting their assemblage without the presence of a white man, establishing patrols to keep them from traveling the roads without written permission, and restricting them in many other ways.

The first three decades of the century constitute the mildest stage of American slavery. At that time the negro had made a real advance in rudimentary civilization over African barbarism, and the harsher reaction of 1830-1860 had not begun. During this intermediate period there were indications that an ameliorating process had

begun. The best Southern opinion openly regretted slavery, manumission was encouraged in the press and on the platform, negroes were taught to read the Bible, and a superior class was forming within the race. In most of the Southern states we hear of negro ministers who preached to congregations of whites and blacks, and in one state at least — North Carolina — was a negro schoolmaster who fitted for the university the sons of the leading white people. Whatever hope was in this softening of slavery into a milder form of service was destroyed by the resentment of the whites against Northern interference. There had always been in the South men who believed a rigid regimen of slaves was necessary, but they were overruled by the more benevolent element. Utilizing the popular resentment against the agitation, they now became the majority, overrode the party of milder measures, and so captured the minds of the rising generation that by 1860 there remained hardly anything of the gentler measures but the fact that slaves were members of the white churches and listened to sermons by white ministers.

How Pro-slavery Grew in the South.

Nothing could better show how slavery divided the country than to observe how it divided the churches. The Methodist church was essentially a popular organization in the South, as in the North. Its polity provided for bishops who went on circuit to hold the church conferences in all parts of the union. Its earliest efforts in the South embraced work for the slaves, and about 1800 a large part of its members were colored. Soon after this a controversy arose between the Northern and Southern wings over the ownership of slaves by ministers. In 1816 it was decided that ministers should not own slaves in any state in which slaves could be legally emancipated. For many years afterwards peace existed in the church, but the rise of the abolition movement was strongly reflected in the Northern portion of the church, which was the larger part. In 1832 Rev. James O. Andrew, of Georgia, was elected a bishop, one of the recommendations being that he was a Southern man who did not own slaves. In January, 1844, he married a woman who owned slaves, and in the following May the general conference of the church resolved that he should "desist from the exercise of his office so long as the impediment remains." The vote was the occasion of a long and warm debate, in which the Southern members freely predicted that it would end in the disruption of the church. It was carried almost entirely on sectional grounds. Immediately the Southerners took steps to form a Southern Methodist church, and a plan looking to amicable division was adopted. In formal resolutions the Southerners declared that if they had submitted to the censure of their bishop, the position of the church in the South would have been damaged; and in other resolutions the Northern members declared that if they had tolerated a bishop tainted with

Slavery Divides the Churches.

slaveholding, the church would have lost strength in the North, all of which shows how deeply this large portion of the population had become divided on the question of slavery.

The division of the Methodists into two bodies attracted the attention of the country. Clay, in deprecating it, said: "I will not say that such a separation would necessarily produce a dissolution of the political union of these states; but the example would be fraught with imminent danger, and, in coöperation with other causes unfortunately existing, its tendency on the stability of the confederacy would be perilous and alarming." The effect was seen immediately in the Baptist churches, which though congregational in polity, were united in a general convention. The board of missions had ruled that slaveholders would not be appointed missionaries, and in 1845 the Southern conventions began to withdraw, setting up in the same year the Southern Baptist convention. The Presbyterian and Protestant Episcopal churches remained undivided. McCormick, the inventor of the reaper, used to say that the Presbyterian church and the democratic party, to both of which he belonged, were "the two hoops which hold the union together." But in May, 1861, the assembly of the former body adopted a resolution offered by Dr. Gardiner Spring, of New York, its most eminent member, pledging the church to support the union, and the result was the Southern presbyteries withdrew their allegiance, and in August, 1861, met and founded the "Presbyterian Church of the Confederate States of America." The Protestant Episcopal church took nearly the same attitude. The Southern dioceses, after some preliminary steps, met in October, 1861, and organized the Protestant Episcopal Church of the Confederate States of America. The Northern branch of the church did not recognize the division, and in its convention during the war continued to call the names of the absent bishops. With the downfall of the confederacy the Southern branch was abandoned and the Southern dioceses were again represented in the conventions of the Protestant Episcopal Church of America. The separate organization of the other churches continued after the war, for the spirit of division had become too deep in them to permit early reunion.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF DEMOCRACY IN STATE AND NATION

All of the thirteen states of revolutionary days incorporated in their constitutions some of the British ideals of colonial days. For example, none of the states provided for absolute manhood suffrage. Four states, New Hampshire, Pennsylvania, Delaware, and South Carolina, were willing to allow the suffrage to all taxpayers; but all the others had some property requirement for voters who chose one or both branches of the assemblies. Some of the states required that the officials should be

**Suffrage in
the Original
States.**

property holders, others, distrusting popular elections, provided that governor, chief executive officers, and judges should be chosen by the assemblies. Much as these restrictions may seem out of place, they left the suffrage more liberal in the United States than in most other countries.

Soon after the adoption of the national constitution the spirit of democracy began to make itself felt, and state after state modified some of the restrictive features of its constitution. In this the action of the new states, always more democratic than the old, was very influential. Vermont showed the way by establishing manhood suffrage in her first constitution, and Kentucky soon afterwards did the same. Ohio, admitted in 1803, enfranchised taxpayers, but after her each state adopted manhood suffrage and elected the governor by popular vote. Along with this came demands for reforms in the old states. Delaware, Maryland, and New Jersey had yielded to the reformers by the end of 1810, and other old states were deeply agitated over the matter. The reformers were called Jacobins, and much was declaimed about the dangers lurking in wild and demagogic theories. In Connecticut, where the charter of colonial days was now the constitution, the oligarchy was very powerful. Seven men, the majority of the council, had in their hands the control of the state. In 1818, after a long struggle, was adopted a new constitution, far more liberal than the old, although it still lacked something of real democracy and equality.

Extending
the
Suffrage.

The wave of reform next reached New York, where conditions were astonishingly bad. Only freeholders and renters of tenements could vote, and by this means more than 50,000 leaseholders were excluded from the ballot. A council of appointment, consisting of five members, named more than 15,000 officials in all parts of the state, and had become as flagrant a political machine as ever existed in this land. There was also a council of revision, the governor and supreme judges among its members, which had vetoed so many laws that it had virtually made itself a third house of the assembly. Against this system arose such a clamor that the defenders of the old condition were overwhelmed, and a constitutional convention met in 1821. It quickly swept away the councils of appointment and revision, and a hard fight followed to abolish the last vestige of property qualification. No opposition was made so far as the choice of governor and members of the house went; but the conservatives rallied when it came to choice of senators. Much was said about the sacredness of property, the incompetence of the propertyless class, and the horrors of the French revolution. The best leader on this side was Chancellor Kent, who added to his lawyer's instinct for conservatism a splendid mind and a weighty reputation. Against him the chief leader was Martin Van Buren, just elected a federal senator. His plea for no property qualification was effective.

The Reform
in New
York.

and thus the reform program, with some finishing strokes in 1826, was completed in New York. In Massachusetts, in 1820, a constitutional convention abolished the property basis for voters but retained it for senators.

In Virginia the privileged class was fortified behind property qualifications and an allotment of legislative seats by which the small slaveholding counties of the East outvoted the large and populous counties of the West. Large numbers of the men of the latter section became so discouraged through the long futile fight for equality that they moved away to the Northwest, where privilege was unknown. At last the eyes of the Easterners were opened, and a convention was called for 1829. The results of its deliberation was an extension of the suffrage, but a moderate property basis was retained. There was, also, a reallotment of seats in the assembly, but it was so made that the slaveholding East retained control. In 1850, however, manhood suffrage was secured. Slavery was a strong support of privilege, and where it existed the march of democracy was slow. In 1835 North Carolina made important amendments to her constitution, one of them being the popular election of the governor, but the property qualification was not touched. In a nine years' struggle, 1848 to 1857, it was, however, carried through, and equal suffrage was established. The property basis was abandoned by Delaware in 1831, by Mississippi in 1832, by Georgia in 1833 and 1835, and by Tennessee in 1834. During this period of constitutional change many other reforms were made by the states, one of the most important being that religious tests for voting or holding office should be given up, and in many states popular election of judges was adopted.

It has often been said that Jackson established democracy, but it would be more accurate to say that from 1820 there was a great popular movement toward democracy, and that he became its exponent. He did much to guide it, but it existed before he was a presidential candidate, and his successes were based upon its power. He furnished a rallying point for the new movement, and his bold attacks on the older political leaders broke their rule and called into national and state offices men who were in sympathy with the democratic spirit of the day.

The state which held most tenaciously to the old system was Rhode Island. Her constitution was the old colonial charter, liberal in its time, but it limited the franchise to freeholders. The rise of manufactures introduced a large operative class who were not property holders. Then followed a contest to change the old system, but the property owners of the cities in alliance with the landowners of the country were too strong for the operative class. Yet the demand for reform would not down. It found an active and persistent leader in Thomas W. Dorr, who announced that the people had an

**Reform in
Virginia.**

**Jackson and
the Demo-
cratic Re-
form.**

**The
Struggle in
Rhode Is-
land —
Thomas W.
Dorr.**

inalienable right to participate in government. The "log-cabin" campaign of 1840, which was a popular movement, stimulated them to most vigorous agitation. Great mass-meetings and parades occurred in Providence, Newport, and elsewhere, and the plainest hints of violence were given. The legislature finally ordered a convention, but it was to be chosen by the existing voters, and the disfranchised party would not accept it. They accordingly called a convention of their own, which prepared a constitution and submitted it to the people. It received 13,944 votes in an election held in the closing days of 1841. This instrument was called the "People's Constitution." The strong following of Dorr now alarmed the old party, who, in the convention ordered by the legislature, prepared a constitution known as the "Free-men's Constitution." When this came before the people it received 8013 affirmative, and 8689 negative, votes, and was declared lost. The most important difference between the two instruments was that the former provided for white manhood suffrage and the latter required one year's residence for landowners, two years for natives who were not landowners, and three years after naturalization for foreign-born citizens.

Since their own constitution had more votes than that of their rivals, the Dorr party now announced that their scheme was law, and ordered an election for governor and legislature. The existing legislature pronounced such a step illegal, the governor issued a proclamation against it, and he called on President Tyler for aid against threatened rebellion.

Dorr's Appeal to Force.

Tyler replied that he could do nothing until violence had begun. Thus the election was held, Dorr was selected for governor, an assembly was chosen, and May 3, 1842, the People's Government went through the forms of an inauguration. For two weeks Dorr essayed the part of governor, while his assembly made "laws" for the state of Rhode Island. Outside of the state the whigs generally flouted him, but the democrats gave him much support, and great meetings in sympathy with his struggle for liberal suffrage were held in Philadelphia and New York. May 18 came a conflict between Dorr and the rival governor. The latter was about to arm the members of his party when Dorr marched on the arsenal with cannon, but was kept from actual violence because the pieces would not fire. His action frightened away the courage of most of his supporters, who deserted him in shoals, and he fled with a handful of companions to Woonsocket, followed by whig shouts of derision. In the following summer he returned to Rhode Island and fortified himself in the northwestern part of the state. The militia were sent against him, but his followers fled again. Many were arrested, but he escaped. Returning a year later he was arrested, tried for treason, and sentenced to jail for life. He did not serve the term. His followers had made so plain an exhibition of strength that the conservatives relented and called a con-

vention which adopted a liberal constitution, and in 1845 Dorr was set at liberty. To his efforts, right or wrong, the new constitution was chiefly due. The victory of democracy in Rhode Island wiped out the last considerable vestige of landed privilege. Traces did, indeed, remain in a few states, but they were eventually removed from the constitutions, the last of them by the new constitutions established in the South in reconstruction days.

THE PROGRESS OF EDUCATION

While liberal suffrage advanced in the old states, educational reform, equally democratic, was also in full course of development.

Origin of the Educa- tional Movement.

Schools were early established in every colony, but usually on a private basis, and frequently under church supervision. The ability to read the Bible was essential in general religious instruction, and the spread of intelligence was bound up with sound morals, so it was natural that the churches as promoters of moral ideals should have felt themselves responsible for the people's attitude toward education. But where government was intrusted to the competent, as was the case professedly out of New England, there was little feeling that every man must be educated by the government in order that he might properly exercise his function of citizenship.

It is hard to say whether the educational impulse in early New England was chiefly religious or political. The two functions were closely related, and we may well say they acted jointly. Massachusetts took the lead, passing in 1647 an act which has been called "the mother of all our school laws." It ordered each town of fifty families to support an elementary school, and each of a hundred families to support a grammar school under penalty of fine. The teachers were to be appointed and paid by the people and were to teach all children who came to them. It was not always enforced, especially as regards grammar schools, but it remained an ideal throughout the colonial period, and in 1789 a comprehensive act was passed, the terms of which show how far public education was developed. The towns were divided into districts, with a school in each supported by the public; towns of 200 families were to have grammar schools. Teachers were to be college graduates or to have certificates of attainments from "learned ministers," and the selectmen were to see that the schools were well taught and that the children attended. This act was in force with little amendment for nearly fifty years.

In 1837 Massachusetts created a state board of education, and Horace Mann was appointed its secretary. This was one of the remarkable educational reforms in the century. The old district school no longer served the wants of the community. Incompetent teachers

Schools in Massa- chusetts.

had been appointed by officials interested in local politics, there were no trained superintendents of teachers, and the amount of money spent on education was proportionally small. Within the past half century the state had grown rich. Horace Mann realized that the old district system was insufficient, and assumed the task of making it modern. He was in office twelve years, and when he retired trained superintendents of schools existed in the towns, appropriations were liberal, normal schools had been established, the school term was lengthened to six months, and many other progressive features were added to the system. He succeeded because of his earnestness and capability. He traveled and spoke much, and wherever he went he left his impress on others. It was largely through his efforts for the schools that a revival of town libraries spread throughout the state. His achievement was truly statesmanlike. He found the school system of Massachusetts large, well meant, and rather formless: he gave it that cohesion and energy which in the political phase of society makes the state a living thing.

Work of
Horace
Mann.

The Middle states had many schools from the earliest colonial periods, but the impulse was religious or individual, rarely public. The Dutch made a good beginning in New York, but there was decline of interest with the conquest of the province by the British. It was not until after the revolution that the state seems to have realized its duty in public education; and then we find land granted in the western counties and assistance voted to educate poor children in the schools already established in the eastern parts of the state. Throughout the years 1815 and 1860 these states were gradually perfecting school systems, many laws being necessary before a satisfactory result was obtained. It was not until 1849 that the New York system was well established. The same result was achieved for Pennsylvania in a law of 1854; for New Jersey it did not come until 1867, and for Delaware not until 1875.

Schools in
the Middle
States.

Efforts to establish public schools were made in the South early in the nineteenth century. They resulted in "free schools," poorly taught for short periods, and designed only for the poor. The children of the well-to-do went to private schools, which were numerous. Among the older Southern states the best "free school" system was probably in North Carolina, which was the most democratic of the Southern states. Little more interest was shown in the newer states of the Gulf region. Texas, however, made liberal land grants to her school system, and Tennessee and Florida received lands for the same purpose from the federal government. It was not until after the civil war that the former slave states established an efficient public school system.

Public
Schools in
the South.

While public education thus slowly won its way in the Middle and Southern states, it secured and maintained a more vigorous position in the Middle West. Three causes are to be noted: 1. The generous gifts of land by the national government; 2. The wide diffusion of New Englanders in this region; and 3. The conviction of the Westerners that schools attracted desirable immigrants. The lands given by the federal authority for education went to the states, which determined their use, some going to the common public schools, some to academies, and some to state universities, which dated from the early days of settlement. State aid was supplemented by funds derived from local taxes and state laws provided the administrative machinery.

Public Schools in the West.

Preceding the rise of the public common school came a movement for academies. This type of school abounded among the English dissenters of the eighteenth century. Its curriculum covered from three to five years, and embraced Latin, Greek, philosophy, with a smattering of Hebrew, science, and sometimes theology. It fell in readily with the condition of the non-conformists who had no standing in the universities and were not found in the great public schools. It held a place between preparatory school and university, and was pronounced superficial by those who held to the old classical schools.

The Academy.

It is not strange that this kind of school was easily established in America, where dissenters were in the majority and where the thorough ideals of European instruction had not yet taken deep hold. Sometimes an academy grew out of the efforts of a devoted and generous family, as Phillips Academy, at Andover, Massachusetts, founded in 1778. High-grade academies existed in most of the states and served excellently in preparing boys for college. But with the beginning of the nineteenth century came an era of rosy dreams of future developments. Most extreme in the West and South, it was nevertheless well defined in the North, and one of its results was an abundant crop of academies. This sporadic growth stood for much real interest, and spite of the failures many useful institutions survived. In 1850 there were 6085 academies in the United States, and they had 263,096 pupils.

The Era of Academies in the United States.

During the years 1820 to 1860 as many as 174 colleges and universities were founded in the United States, 80 of which were in the North Central, and 52 in the Southern, states. Many of them were founded by churches, and many others represented the ambition of new communities with anticipations of future growth and culture. The law of the survival of the fittest has brought to an early grave a great number of these institutions, but others have survived and reached positions of wide usefulness. Not all were wisely founded, but who shall decry the earnest hope that gave them their beginning!

Many Colleges Founded.

It was in this period that the state university took form. The older ideal of a college or university in America was a place at which men were fitted for the ministry, law, or another learned profession. Its studies were strictly arranged in groups, a thing long traditional in Europe. The students were from the upper class of society, and there was generally some kind of ecclesiastical oversight. Two tendencies, one domestic and one foreign, operated against this idea about 1800. One was the prevalence of philosophic doubt in the first generation after the revolution. At the same time the French educational system was reorganized on a rationalistic basis, and the university of Berlin was established under the guidance of Fichte. Such wonderfully important movements at home and in Europe could not fail to have a corresponding phase in American education.

**The State
University.**

The process was first seen in the founding of state universities in North Carolina, Tennessee, Georgia, and South Carolina, and in the reorganization of the University of Pennsylvania on a state basis, all of which occurred between 1779 and 1815. At this time the movement took a more definite shape at the hands of Jefferson, equally devoted to democracy and liberal thought. He gave much of his later life to the task of remodeling higher education in Virginia. He first wished to remake William and Mary College on the secular plan, but failing in that turned to the task of founding a new institution. In 1818 the legislature approved, and in 1825 the University of Virginia opened its doors. Jefferson was head of the commission which prepared its plan, head of its first board of visitors, and his colleagues allowed him to have his way in all that pertained to the university. It began with an elective system, and opened its doors without examinations to all who came, rejecting after trial those who showed themselves unprepared for its classes. All this was a part of the author's plan for a thoroughly democratic institution.

**Jefferson
and the
University
of Virginia.**

The influence of the University of Virginia was strong in the newer states of the West and Southwest. It extended, however, more to the form and democratic spirit of the university than to the method of instruction. In regard to the latter, the New England influence has been strong, at least in the West. The complete separation of the university from church control gave rise to the charge that Jefferson's university was hostile to religion. A warm controversy sprang up in Virginia, and has appeared in most other states where the state university has been introduced. As a result, the churches founded institutions of their own for the education of their own youth. The controversy has not disappeared in many states to this day.

**Western
State
Universities.**

During the period of Western and Southwestern expansion the older institutions of the Northeast developed hardly as much as might have

been expected. Largely devoted to preparing men for the professions, most of their students came from the leisure class in the North and South. The condition is well shown in the history of Harvard College, the oldest of them all. In 1836, its two hundredth anniversary year, there were 233 students in the college proper, and in 1856 there were 382. But the law and medical schools were well attended, having in the latter year 231 students, with 57 in the Lawrence Scientific School, which was founded in 1848. The Divinity School had in 1856 only 22 students. It seems unquestionable that the establishment of new colleges and universities during this period operated to lessen the numbers who would otherwise have gone to the older institutions. The rapid growth of the Eastern seats of learning, with which the present generation is so familiar, came after the civil war.

Progress in
Northeast-
ern Col-
leges.

The spread of intelligence brought about a movement to reform manners. Attention was especially directed to the misuse of spirituous liquors, which early in the century were generally used by all classes. Total abstinence societies began to be formed about 1824, and in five years more than a thousand had been organized. Zealous preachers of temperance went into every part of the country, with the result that many people were enlisted in the movement. In 1830 the temperance organizations began to be known as Washington societies. After years of agitation the movement began to work for the prohibition of the sale and manufacture of spirituous liquors. By 1850 several states were in active commotion over the question. Only one of them, however, carried the demand to success. Through the leadership of Neal Dow, Maine, by several laws culminating in 1851, committed herself to prohibition.

The Tem-
perance
Movement.

GOLD IN CALIFORNIA

January 24, 1848, yellow particles were observed in the sand on the exposed bottom of a mill race on the American river. Workmen washed out a portion of the earth and secured three ounces of gold dust, and investigation showed gold along the whole length of the river. The secret was kept for a few weeks and then spread throughout California. In May a Mormon walked along the San Francisco streets with a bottle of gold dust in his hand shouting: "Gold! Gold! Gold from the American river!" Previous reports of the discovery had attracted little interest, but the sight of the yellow metal was electrical on the population of the town. At the end of a month hardly an able-bodied man remained there. Ships anchoring in the harbor were left without crews, the two newspapers suspended because typesetters had fled, and the streets were lined with closed shops.

The Dis-
covery.

Late in the autumn the news reached the East, where it spread like wildfire. Companies of adventurers were formed, ships were hastily bought, and by the end of the year every important Atlantic seaport had sent out its fleet for the "Land of Gold." When spring came, the western frontier was filled with great caravans waiting for good weather to begin a long and dangerous journey to the same destination. More than 20,000 persons set out by this route with their cattle and provisions, and encountered much hardship before they arrived on the Western coast as winter closed in. How many arrived this year is difficult to say, but in 1850 the population of California was 92,597, which was more than that of either Delaware or Florida. San Francisco became a city of rude huts and tents, filled with speculators and travelers hurrying to the mines. A town meeting fixed the price of gold dust at sixteen dollars an ounce, and it became the money of the coast. Wages became exorbitant, a carpenter getting sixteen, and an unskilled laborer ten, dollars a day. Gamblers and worse men abounded, and violence was frequent. But the majority of the immigrants were average Americans, strong in the instinct of self-government, and the result showed that they were not willing to allow the unruly element to dominate the country. The only authority established by law was military, and it could not be exercised in the many camps and towns that sprang up wherever there was gold. Nor could it well exercise the ordinary functions of courts in the protection of life and property. Appeals for a settled government were sent to congress, but the slavery question arose there, and for a while nothing could be done (see page 453).

The first move for self-government was expressed in miners' committees or mass-meetings, which dealt with disorders and settled disputes. This suggested a wider organization; and in September, 1849, at the call of General Riley, the *de facto* civil governor, a convention assembled at Monterey and made a constitution excluding slavery, establishing laws of property, fixing the bounds of California as at present, and providing a full state government. Before the year ended a governor, a legislature two representatives in congress, and two senators had been duly chosen. The state officers immediately entered on their duties and the legislature took up the task of lawmaking, but the senators and representatives, who repaired to Washington, were kept waiting until the compromise of 1850 was completed; and it was not until September 9 of that year that California at last became a state.

**A Govern-
ment Es-
tablished.**

Nor did statehood bring good order at once. So deeply was the old habit of lawlessness implanted that the state officials could not easily secure control of the situation. Robberies, murders, and other outrages abounded, and the people, turning aside from the slow process of law, openly expressed their contempt for lawyers and judges, and

frequently took into their own hands the task of repressing crime and disposing of criminals. The presence of many persons of Spanish-American birth stimulated this spirit of violence. They were suspected, hated, and mistreated. Sometimes they deserved nothing good, sometimes they were innocent of evil-doing. Originally the miners were generally men of average peacefulness, but the excitement of the day, the tendency to heavy drinking and quarreling, overcame good impulses, and the years following the settlement of the state were a period of chaos, out of which the best men could see no better road to good order than vigilance committees, which too often expressed the mere rage of the mob. But as the communities became settled, and as capital became fixed in mining, real estate, and commerce, the conservative element triumphed. The turbulent class went on to the newer mines in the distant mountains, leaving peace behind them. By 1858 the area of order embraced most of the state.

**Lawless-
ness Yields
Slowly.**

**Vigilance
Committees.**

THE PANIC OF 1857

The discovery of gold in California and elsewhere in the West together with the rapid increase of the money supply promoted the spirit of speculation. Railroads were built through sparsely settled regions from which for a time it was impossible to get enough revenue to pay dividends. Manufactures were stimulated, and increased their output beyond reasonable demands. To support this vast volume of business the banks lent freely, straining their own resources to the utmost. In fact, it was one of those "boom" periods with which our industrial history is filled, the inevitable end of which is reaction. It was facilitated by the loose state-banking system, under which the banks, eager for profits, assumed impossible burdens in order to lend at high rates to railroads, manufacturers, and speculators of every kind.

**A Wave of
Prosperity.**

**The Panic
of 1857.**

In 1857 the bubble could expand no further. Speculators could not sell their lands and bonds at a profit. The Western banks from which they had borrowed began to fail, and this communicated the shock to the Eastern banks from which the Western banks had secured funds, and a general panic reigned. Generally speaking, the banks of Baltimore, Philadelphia, and New York closed their doors, and those of New England suspended specie payment. With a few exceptions, those of the West failed completely. Thousands of depositors were ruined, and legitimate business was at a standstill. Factories closed, labor was out of employment, the prices of agricultural products dropped, and fourteen railroads failed completely.

The West suffered most; for at this time the Crimean war was ended, and a large area was thrown open to wheat cultivation, on account of

which the price of that commodity fell from \$2 to 75 cents a bushel, entailing ruin to producers and all who depended on them. The South, on the other hand, felt the panic less heavily; for its staple, cotton, was still in demand at former prices. The Southerners, observing their advantage, felt more confidence than ever in their assertion, "Cotton is King."

Area of
Panic.

So far as the banks were concerned, the spasm was of short duration. By the spring of 1858 most of them had resumed specie payment, and were cautiously lending money to the traders and manufacturers who were still carrying on business. But this year and that which followed were years of "hard times," and it was not until 1860 that industry was again in a normal condition. This panic, like all the others in our history, was only a readjustment of temporarily inflated business. Beneath its swirling current was the firm surface of immense economic resources.

Recovery
from the
Panic.

Probably the most permanent result was the unexpected impulse it gave to protection. Just before the crash the tariff had been lowered because of the unusually large sums derived from the great volume of imports. But with slackening business came a reduction of imports, and with that a deficit in the national treasury. Notes were issued and bonds sold in the hope that the want would be temporary. But through the years of "hard times" importations continued reduced and the minds of men began to turn toward higher duties. Suffering manufacturers seized the moment to ask for greater protection, and the two forces combined to secure the Morrill Tariff, which failed to pass the senate in 1860, but became law early in 1861 after several Southern senators had withdrawn. It restored most of the rates of 1846 and made others higher.

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CHAPTER XXIII

EVENTS LEADING TO THE CIVIL WAR, 1850-1860

OVERTHROWING THE COMPROMISE OF 1850

CONSERVATIVE men North and South wished the compromise of 1850 to be final. Politicians, business men, and conservatives generally hoped it would remove the slavery question from politics and introduce an era of harmony. In April, 1852, the house of representatives adopted a resolution to that effect by a vote of 103 to 74, and the democratic convention of the same year enthusiastically resolved to accept the compromise as final and to resist any attempt to renew the slavery agitation. In the whig convention a similar resolution was adopted, with 66 dissenting votes, all of which came from the North, and were from men who supported Scott as party leader.

Finality of
the Com-
promise.

The democrats had much trouble to name a candidate. For forty-eight ballots fortune leaned in turn to Cass, the defeated candidate of 1848, to Buchanan, of Pennsylvania, to Marcy, of New York, and to Stephen A. Douglas, a brilliant senator from Illinois who had just completed his thirty-ninth year and for whom his admirers predicted the highest honors. On the thirty-fifth ballot Franklin Pierce, of New Hampshire, was brought forward by Virginia as a "dark horse," and on the forty-ninth he received the nomination, William R. King, of Alabama, being named for vice-president. The whigs also had their difficulties, but General Winfield Scott won on the fifty-third ballot, taking the honors from Webster and Fillmore, through a combination of the Southern whigs with the Northern wing of the party under Seward, who led a large group of men opposed to the fugitive slave law, a part of the great compromise. William A. Graham, of North Carolina, was nominated for the vice-presidency. The free soil party nominated John P. Hale, of New Hampshire, and denied the finality of the compromise.

Nomina-
tions.

The only important issue in the campaign that followed was keeping the compromise. Scott was pledged to it, but he was supported by those who would be glad to see it overthrown. Pierce, it was not doubted, was sincerely for it, while Hale repudiated it altogether. The results showed how much it was desired by the people. The democratic candidates received 254 electoral votes, the whigs had 42, carrying Massachusetts, Vermont, Kentucky, and Tennessee, and the free soilers had none. Hale had only half as

The
Election.

many votes as Van Buren got in 1848, and this was taken to show that the cause of political abolition was declining.

Pierce took office amid the plaudits of the citizens. He was a handsome man and knew how to conciliate his opponents. Could he

**Pierce's
Cabinet.**

not perpetuate the spirit of compromise, if any man could?

Yet his cabinet appointments aroused apprehensions.

Dix, of New York, who was a free soiler in 1848, was denied a position after it had been offered him, and the reason for the change of intention was his unpopularity with the South. Jefferson Davis, of Mississippi, was made secretary of war, and Caleb Cushing, of Massachusetts, a warm friend of Davis, became attorney-general. Moreover, the inaugural address hinted pretty plainly at the acquisition of Cuba, a thing much desired by the slaveholders. It was not long before whisperers began to say that the administration was under Southern domination.

This seemed ominous for the spirit of compromise, but a still more threatening thing was the hostility of many Northern people to the

**Opposition
to the New
Fugitive
Slave Law.**

execution of the fugitive slave law. In the two and a half years since the law passed nearly every fugitive arrested in the North had been taken by a mob from the hands of the federal marshal and spirited away to freedom. In Syracuse, New York, Gerrit Smith and the Rev. Samuel J.

May led a mob of respectable men who forcibly rescued a negro, Jerry McHenry, from the hands of an assembled court and smuggled him into Canada; and they were not punished. These affairs, which occurred before the election of 1852, aroused the moderates North and South and went far to secure the large democratic majority of that year. They were, however, not forgotten, and the extremists of both sides predicted freely that the fugitive slave law, which the South considered its only gain in the great compromise, could not be enforced.

But it was slavery in the territories, and not the rendition of fugitives, that kindled anew the slumbering fires of strife. The unorganized

**Origin of the
Nebraska
Question.**

Nebraska country west of Missouri and Iowa became important as soon as the Oregon question came up; and the migration to California and the plans proposed for a railroad to the Pacific gave it added interest. Attempts to

have it made a territory had been defeated by the slavery men, because under the Missouri compromise it would be free. The Missourians themselves, though much desiring that the territory be erected, would not demand it as a home of freedom. Senator Atchison, leading the slavery party in that state, declared that he would "see Nebraska sunk in hell before he would vote for it as a free soil territory"; and he helped defeat a Nebraska bill in 1853. In the summer of that year his seat in the senate was being contested, and his opponents boldly charged him with neglecting the interests of Missouri. To make Nebraska slave, it was said, he was sacrificing the oppor-

tunity to have St. Louis the terminus of the Pacific railroad and excluding Missourians from the rich lands to the west. It was a hard blow, and he met it by a change of front. He would never see Nebraska free soil, he now said, but he would vote to make it a territory on condition that the people who settled there could decide for themselves the question of slavery or freedom. This, it was pointed out, was what had been done for Utah and New Mexico in 1850. The discussion in Missouri was warm throughout the summer of 1853, and just before congress met in December, it was taken up by the democratic papers of the East. The antislavery men could hardly believe what they read when they saw a prediction that a bill would be introduced in congress to create Nebraska territory under the plan just described. They did not take the prophecy seriously, and pointed out that the proposed step repealed the compromise of 1820 and overthrew the harmony established in 1850.

Events showed they were mistaken. In December, 1853, an Iowa senator introduced a bill to create Nebraska territory. It went to the committee on territories, S. A. Douglas, chairman. January 5 it came from committee, Atchison's slavery proposition engrafted on it. The change was made with the consent of Douglas, whose motive is a matter of dispute.

**The Kansas-
Nebraska
Act, 1854.**

He favored a new territory in the region through which the proposed Pacific road would run, and he may have adopted Atchison's idea because he saw it was the only way to get the support of the Southerners. On the other hand, he wished to be president, and as his opponents charged, he may have merely sought Southern support to that end. He was a self-made man, with some crudeness of manner, spite of his great forensic ability, and more than once had been made to realize that he was not popular with the Southern members. He now showed them how much he could serve them. Holding together in a solid phalanx all who wished the railroad built, those who desired the territory for its own sake, those faithful friends who wished to see him advanced to the presidency, and above all the willing Southerners, he forced his bill through both houses and made it a law. Before it passed it underwent an important amendment. Two territories, instead of one, were now provided for, it being a return to the old parallelism by which was preserved the balance of free and slave states. Kansas, the more southern of the two, it was expected, would be settled by slaveholders, and Nebraska by non-slaveholders. A clause in the bill when finally passed specifically repealed the Missouri compromise.

Douglas expected a hard fight from the antislavery men, but he had arguments to meet them. The bill, he said, was the only practicable way to get the territory created, and the North need not be alarmed, since slavery could not live in the region concerned. If one spoke of violation of the compromise of 1850 the reply was that the bill did not violate, but only confirmed, the

**Its Sig-
nificance.**

compromise; for did it not apply to Kansas and Nebraska exactly the principle applied to Utah and New Mexico? For all this, it was as plain as a barn door that the bill was a defeat for the antislavery party, that it opened to slavery territory which the compromise of 1820 dedicated to freedom, and that the proslavery party won a victory which would give slavery its share in the unsettled Northwest, unless natural conditions proved too hard for it. Though Douglas carried his measure through congress, a great wave of protest was aroused out of congress, and from 1854 all thought of the finality of the compromise of 1850 was abandoned.

Douglas called his doctrine "popular sovereignty," since it announced the right of the people in the territory to settle the vexed question for themselves. His enemies with a tinge of contempt called it "squatter sovereignty," a term which immediately had an extensive use. The most striking early effect of his move was that some Northern democrats would not vote for his bill, or support him afterwards. They held together, and were known as "Anti-Nebraska" democrats.

It is evident that a new spirit ruled in the country in 1854. Four years earlier the old men, led by Clay and Webster, loving the union and lamenting the tendency of the young men toward radicalism, united and carried a compromise over the heads of the radicals. In 1852 died both Clay and Webster — Calhoun had died in 1850. Thus in 1854 the militant younger men were in control on each side. The most conspicuous Northern leaders were: Seward, of New York, an able politician and a man of influence because he could carry the most important state in the union; Chase and Wade, of Ohio, both strong debaters; and Sumner, of Massachusetts, who was a fervid orator and a biting foe to the slave power. In the South Jefferson Davis, of Mississippi, a cool-headed and logical debater, was most eminent, and by his followers was pronounced the heir of Calhoun's leadership. He was a member of Pierce's cabinet, but returned to the senate in 1857. Toombs, of Georgia, warm and audacious in manner, but conservative in ideas, was an able second to Davis. Neither of these men in 1854 would advocate secession, but they were ready to accept it if necessary to save the South from an antislavery majority in the North. Another group of Southerners, the most prominent of whom were Yancey, of Alabama, and Rhett, of South Carolina, were avowed secessionists. Among Northern democrats the leaders were Douglas, now bitterly disliked because of the Kansas-Nebraska act, and Buchanan, of Pennsylvania, an old man trained under the Jackson régime, whose best asset was that he was minister to England in 1854, and so was not forced to vote for or against Douglas's celebrated bill.

The Kansas-Nebraska bill opened a new strife between these two

**"Popular
Sovereignty."**

**New Men
in Control,
North and
South.**

contending sides, which by regular steps led straight to the civil war. The chief events in this progress are the following: 1. The struggle to settle Kansas; 2. The organization of the republican party; 3. The Dred Scott decision; 4. The Lincoln-Douglas debates of 1858; 5. The John Brown raid; and 6. The election of Lincoln in 1860. It is now necessary to take up these events in order.

Consequences of the Kansas-Nebraska Act.

THE STRUGGLE FOR KANSAS

At first most people expected Kansas to become the home of slavery, and Missourians began to move into its fertile valleys as soon as it was a territory. The antislavery men were not willing that this should be accomplished without opposition. Eli Thayer, of Massachusetts, organized the "Emigrant Aid Society" to assist New Englanders to settle in the territory. When its protégés began to arrive, an angry cry arose from the settlers from Missouri. The wealthy North, it was said, was pouring in colonists to organize the country so as to exclude slavery, and appeals were made for Southerners to help settle Kansas. The response was ready in Missouri, and on election day, 1855, more than 5000 men rode from that state and cast votes in the choice of members of the first territorial legislature. Governor Reeder, of Kansas, appointed by Pierce, who was known to favor the Southerners, did not approve the proceedings, but he did nothing to check them. The result was that the new legislature met, declared some of the delegates chosen from the districts of the New Englanders illegally elected, and made a code of laws in support of slave property. This they did on the theory that popular sovereignty meant that slavery should not be discriminated against until the territory itself determined whether or not it should be established.

Northern and Southern Immigrants.

The First Legislature.

By this time immigration from New England was large, and the free state party felt strong enough to defy their antagonists. They found a leader in Dr. Charles Robinson, who had lived in California long enough to know how to deal with the chaos now in Kansas. All the Missourians had done was pronounced illegal, and plans were made to organize an irregular government, adopt a constitution, and ask for admission to the union. Thus assembled the Topeka convention, chosen entirely by the party of freedom. The other side pronounced it extra-legal, gave it no countenance, and declared their sheriff and legislature the only legal authority in the territory under the governor, who was appointed by Pierce and in sympathy with the slavery men. Fortunately, the two parties had settled in different districts, and each legislature, though claiming jurisdiction over all Kansas, was content to exercise authority

Two Governments Appeal.

merely over its own district. The Missourians, in their hasty entrance to the territory, took the rich lands along the Missouri on whose banks they planted the towns of Atchison, Leavenworth, and Kickapoo. But the New Englanders, with a better sense of future development, settled along the Kansas river, and thus their towns, Lawrence, Topeka, Lecompton, and Ossawatimie, penetrated nearly a hundred miles into the territory.

Early in 1856 the Kansas situation was before congress. Both contending governments were tainted with illegality, and if the federal government had carried out the true spirit of Douglas's popular sovereignty theory, both would have been overthrown, and new elections held. Unhappily, the country was deeply aroused and divided in sentiment, and both the president and congress were no more disposed to act calmly than the Kansas settlers. Pierce, a democrat, naturally followed his party, the larger part of which were Southerners. He issued a proclamation against lawless men in Kansas, and authorized the governor, now Shannon, to use federal troops if necessary.

To preserve order in Kansas was only a temporary remedy for the chaos there. A more permanent remedy was suggested by Pierce in a recommendation that it be admitted to the union as soon as sufficiently populous; and in March, 1856, Douglas, in the senate, introduced a bill to authorize the Kansas legislature to call a convention to prepare a constitution for admission to the union when the population of the territory should be 93,420. Such a convention would undoubtedly

be under the influence of the Missourians, and the proposition was bitterly opposed by the opposite side, who demanded that Kansas be admitted under the Topeka constitution. Then came one of the most exciting debates in the history of congress. Douglas and many Southerners spoke on one side, Seward, Collamer, Hale, and Sumner on the other. The speech of

Sumner was very bitter. He was a man of the highest purposes and the deepest feelings; he hated slavery, and thought its supporters entitled to no consideration. He was now highly wrought up by recent events, and prepared a speech on "The Crime against Kansas," into which he put as much denunciation as his intense soul could utter. He himself called his speech "the most thorough philippic ever uttered in a legislative body." Into it he brought some biting personalities, attacking especially Douglas and Senator Butler, of South Carolina. The former replied in words equally biting, but the latter was avenged by his nephew, Brooks, who represented a South Carolina district. Two days after the speech was made Sumner was leaning over his desk writing, the senate having adjourned.

Brooks approached, uttered a few words of reproach, and fell to beating Sumner over head and shoulders until bystanders interfered. The

**Attitude of
the East.**

**Statehood
as a
Remedy for
the Con-
fusion.**

**Warm
Kansas
Debate.**

**Sumner
Assaulted.**

attack left the senator with injuries from which he did not recover before 1860.

When Sumner finished his extraordinary speech, Cass, the Nestor of the senate, broke the painful silence of that body by saying: "I have listened with equal regret and surprise to the speech of the honorable senator from Massachusetts. Such a speech, the most un-American and unpatriotic that ever grated on the ears of the members of this high body, I hope never to hear again here or elsewhere." These words might have represented the judgment of posterity concerning Sumner's utterances, had not Brooks's violent retaliation taken off their edge. In the days when one gentleman caned another, he sought to overwhelm him by the indignity rather than by the severity of the affair; but Brooks attacked most savagely, breaking his cane and finishing the chastisement with the butt. His achievement found many defenders in the South, and he might have finished his days, had he so wished, in belaboring abolitionists with the many canes he received from admiring Southerners. In the North his deed and the approval of it in the South elicited the deepest horror. It did more to arouse the average man against the South than any speech Sumner ever made. Meanwhile, all this trouble accomplished nothing for Kansas. Congress could not agree on a plan, and the territory continued to be the prey of faction.

Effects of
the Incident.

These struggles came to a head in Kansas the day before Sumner was injured. A proslavery grand jury had indicted several of the antislavery leaders, and a posse under a federal marshal marched to Lawrence and made the arrests. They destroyed, on the ground it was a nuisance, a large stone hotel built there, probably with the purpose of having it serve as a fort in case of need. The posse contained many lawless men under slight restraint, and there was much drinking and plundering. The newspaper offices were looted, stores were sacked, and the house of the governor under the Topeka constitution was destroyed. While Brooks's violence filled every mind, news of this occurrence reached the East and but added to the excitement.

Violence at
Lawrence.

To one free-state Kansan it seemed to call for vengeance. John Brown, of Ossawatimie, hated slavery to the verge of insanity, and he believed himself ordained by providence to redress the wrong of his party, five of whom had been slain. With seven followers he entered the settlements of the slavery party on Pottawatamie Creek, took five men from three homes, and left their bodies by the roadside lifeless and mutilated. "God is my judge," exclaimed he, "the people of Kansas will yet justify my course." Approve it they could not, but it was the signal for the outbreak of a guerrilla struggle in which nearly two hundred lives were sacrificed. This state of affairs was largely due to the lax rule of Governor Shannon, who gave ill disguised sympathy to the

John
Brown's Re-
taliation.

slave party. Its effect on the presidential canvass then in progress in the states was so great that Pierce was forced to send another governor. Geary, who arrived on the scene September 9, won the respect of both sides and eventually restored order. He resigned March 4, 1857, feeling that he was not supported by the president.

Buchanan, who became president on the same day, was anxious to have affairs settled in the territory. His party's platform had de-

**Governor
Walker's
Attempt to
Restore
Order.**

clared for a just application of popular sovereignty in Kansas, and he wished to redeem the pledge. After much persuasion he induced Robert J. Walker, a Mississippi democrat and a man of ability and fairness, to accept the governorship. During the past two years many Northern men had moved to the scene of conflict, and Walker realized

that they were by far the majority of the population. He gave up hope of saving Kansas for slavery, and tried to save it for his party. Elections to a constitutional convention were announced, and he urged all free state people to vote in them, promising that the constitution to be prepared should be submitted to the people for approval. The appeal was futile. Of the 18,000 voters thought to be in the territory only 2200 took part in the election, most of them proslavery. Had his advice been taken, much trouble would have been avoided.

When the Southern politicians in Washington learned that their friends controlled the convention, which met at Lecompton in Sep-

**The Le-
compton
Constitu-
tion.**

tember, 1857, they acted quickly. Agents went to Kansas, and a scheme was arranged by which the minority might control. The constitution as a whole was not to be submitted to the people, but only the clause in reference to slavery. The vote was to be "the constitution with

slavery" or "the constitution without slavery." If the latter prevailed, the slaves already in Kansas, not more than 200, would not be liberated. The vote on the constitution was to be taken by officers appointed directly by the convention. These unusual details suggested dark designs, and Walker denounced them openly and set out for Washington to protest to the president himself. He found that Buchanan was committed to the Southerners.

The country was beginning to forget Kansas, but this turn of affairs caused it to remember. Most of all, Douglas was alarmed and outraged. He had risked much of his own popularity for the South, and he could not but feel that he was betrayed.

**Opposed by
Douglas.**

Telling the president plainly that he should oppose the

scheme, he went into the senate to make a bold speech against the constitution made at Lecompton. "If Kansas wants a slave-state constitution," he said, "she has a right to it; if she wants a free-state constitution, she has a right to it. It is none of my business which way the slavery clause is decided. I care not whether it is voted up or down." He got little for his trouble; the South turned against him,

and the republicans could only see that he was seeking to secure in 1858 his reelection to the senate. His action defeated the bill to admit Kansas with the Lecompton constitution; for though it passed the senate the Douglas democrats in the house cast the deciding votes against it. But the English bill, a faint-hearted compromise, was finally passed. It offered Kansas a gift of land if it became a state, ordered an impartial election on the question of receiving the gift, and authorized the president to admit the state by proclamation if the vote was in the affirmative. The Kansas free-state party considered the bill a proffered bribe and rejected it by a vote of 11,300 to 1788. From this time, August, 1858, the struggle in Kansas dropped into the background, the territorial government was in authority, and it was not until 1861, after some of the Southern states had seceded, that difficulties disappeared with the acquisition of statehood.

The English Bill.

Douglas, like many other politicians, cared little for either slavery or abolition, but wished to remove from the political field an annoying question, and he thought his popular sovereignty theory would accomplish his aim. He believed that other Northerners like himself, with the help of the South, could keep the question in the background, spite of the antislavery Northerners, whom he rightly believed in the minority. But the South would not play his game. It believed itself entitled to Kansas, and was angered when the North tried to fill the territory with settlers. It met this move, which it believed perfidious, with fraud and violence, which deepened at each step. It was too unfair a proceeding to be permitted by the nation, and was not in keeping with the former conduct of its authors. It was the last desperate hope to preserve the equilibrium of states, and its failure left Southerners the choice between submission to the limitation of the slave power and withdrawal from the union.

Position of the South.

PARTY AND THE ELECTION OF 1856

The whig party suffered much by the compromise of 1850. If it repudiated the agreement, its southern wing would be wrecked; to accept it sacrificed the good will of many earnest antislavery whigs. It was freely said that the party would never win another victory. Although it had a strong position in Massachusetts, New York, and other states, and managed to preserve its national organization, its fate was sealed.

Death Blow of Whig Party.

For a time it was thought it would yield place to the know-nothing party. This was a secret political organization with the same principles as those of the Native Americans. When one of its members was asked any question about it he was instructed to give a formal answer, "I don't know," and from this came the name. As the Irish Catholics were usually

Know-Nothing Party.

democrats, the organization naturally drew largely from the whigs, and as it had the open denunciation of Douglas and other leading democrats it felt drawn to those who opposed the Kansas-Nebraska bill. By judicious combination and much work it polled in 1854 one-fourth of the entire vote of New York, two-fifths of that of Pennsylvania, and nearly two-thirds of that of Massachusetts. In the last-named state it elected the governor and other general officers and controlled the legislature. This silent machine, without canvassers or other outward evidence of activity, but sweeping so much before it, struck terror to the old party leaders. Late in 1854 it decided to require all its members to take oath to support the union, and the decision drew many anti-Nebraska men to its ranks, as well as a large number of union men in the South, mostly old whigs. In the spring

of 1855 it carried Connecticut, New Hampshire, and Rhode Island, and freely boasted it had 1,000,000 enrolled voters. It now abandoned secrecy, hitherto its greatest weakness. The light of day showed that it was chiefly the old whig party under another name, and from that moment disappeared all hope of building up out of it a great union party. In 1856 it lost its antislavery wing when it refused to demand the restoration of the Missouri compromise. In this year its candidate, Fillmore, carried only one state, Maryland.

Meanwhile, the republican party had been organized on the basis of open opposition to slavery extension. While congress debated the

Republican Party Founded. Kansas-Nebraska bill, 1854, many mass meetings were held to protest against the measure, and one of them at Ripon, Wisconsin, March 20, went beyond the others by recommending a new party to fight slavery extension.

July 6 a convention of all who would coöperate to resist "the encroachments of slavery" met at Jackson, Michigan, nominated a state ticket, and called on the other free states to do the same. The sources of its strength, and the proportion of its distribution, are shown in the fact that three of the nominees were former free soil men, five old whigs, and two anti-Nebraska democrats. Wisconsin followed Michigan's example, while Vermont, Indiana, and Ohio nominated anti-Nebraska tickets. The movement prevailed in Ohio by a majority of 75,000. It was, however, forestalled in the great Eastern states by the rise of know-nothingism. But the check was temporary, and in 1855 its eastward march was resumed.

Whig leaders in the East watched the rise of the republican party with keen interest, and this was especially true of Seward, leading whig and opponent of slavery extension in congress. His

Seward and New York. own party was disintegrating: should he follow the exodus and unite with the republicans to build up a great sectional organization? His answer was most important; for he controlled, with the aid of his astute friend, Thurlow Weed, the action of his

party in the most important state in the union. He hesitated for months, but by the autumn of 1855 his mind was made up. Plans were made to unite the whigs and republicans, and each party met in convention at Syracuse in September. To one of his friends who asked which convention an opponent of slavery ought to attend, Seward replied that it made little difference; for although the delegates would go in through two doors they would come out at one. The whigs had hardly assembled before they resolved to join the republican party, and the leaders, followed by all but a small remnant, marched to the republican convention and took seats in good fellowship. In Massachusetts similar results were secured by means less spectacular. Slavery had already divided the whig party in this state, its opponents being called "Conscience Whigs," and the conservatives "Cotton Whigs," and the former now generally became republicans. By the end of 1855 the republican party was established throughout the free states.

Massachusetts.

In the South a like movement toward sectionalism was in progress. Here the whole Kansas incident was considered an act of bad faith toward the South, and the whigs could not defend their Northern brethren from the charge of participating in it. So rapidly did the party fall away that its leaders became utterly discouraged, and the most ambitious of them went over to the democrats, henceforth the Southern sectional party.

Decline of Whig Party in the South.

Two republican conventions were held in 1856. One was at Pittsburgh, February 22, to organize the party nationally. It was cheered by the news that the seceding know-nothings would join them. After adopting a platform demanding the exclusion of slavery from the territories and the admission of Kansas to the union it called a nominating convention in Philadelphia for June 17. Pending that date there was much discussion of candidates. At first most republicans looked to Seward, the ablest politician in the party; but as the spring advanced they began to think that the signs of the time pointed to a victory if the right man were nominated. Then arose a feeling against Seward. He had made many enemies, particularly among the know-nothings, and it was generally said that a man who could win should be taken. The argument prevailed, and John C. Frémont, prominent because of his career in California in 1846, was nominated. Seward, who did not believe the party could win at that time, was content to wait for future honors.

Frémont Nominated.

The democratic convention met at Cincinnati June 2. Since the Kansas policy was to be the chief issue it was to be expected that Pierce or Douglas would be nominated. But so great was Northern resentment of that policy that the delegates dared not name a man prominently responsible for it. Thus they took Buchanan, who had been minister to England and was not

Buchanan Nominated.

connected with anything that had been done in America during the past three years. He was acceptable to the South, which he had never opposed, and he appealed to Northern conservatives of all parties, who thought the republican position on slavery a kind of radicalism. The whigs held a convention and indorsed Fillmore, whom the regular know-nothings had previously nominated.

The chief issue of the campaign was Kansas, "Bleeding Kansas," as the republicans called it. It was an unwelcome issue to the democrats

Campaign of 1856. in the North, who tried to supplant it by the question of union. Did any one think the South, said they, would submit to be ruled by a president and congress elected entirely by the free states? Toombs, speaking for his section, said that the election of Frémont would be the end of the union. In fact, Frémont and "black republicanism" were so hateful to the South that it was hardly safe for a man to espouse them. A professor in the university of North Carolina who said he would vote for this ticket if it were offered him was set upon by the press, and when he wrote a moderate article in reply, the trustees of the university asked him to resign his professorship. For the South there was but one ticket, and it was in the North the battle was to be fought. Conservative whigs in this section realized that the real contest was between Buchanan and Frémont, and many of them preferred the former. The republicans, on the other hand, had with them the majority of the ministers, college professors, and literary men of the North. The religious press worked for them. It was a moral issue, and appealed strongly to the young men. As the campaign progressed it became evident that Pennsylvania was the most critical state. All eyes centered on it, and the democrats gave a cry of joy when in a state election in October they carried it by less than 3000 votes. This presaged success in the national election in November; and the hope was realized when counting the returns of that day's battle gave Buchanan 174 electoral votes, Frémont 114, and Fillmore 8. It was a narrow escape for the democrats, for in most of their northern states the majorities were small. The republicans had done exceedingly well for a party which had never before taken part in a national campaign. The historian cannot but reflect that the Kansas Nebraska bill which Atchison forced on Douglas in 1854 and which Douglas carried through congress by his brilliant leadership was become a most expensive experiment for the slaveholding power.

In this campaign an important part was played by Mrs. Harriet Beecher Stowe's novel, "Uncle Tom's Cabin," published in book form in 1852, as a protest against the execution of the fugitive slave law. It had an immense circulation, and was translated into many languages. It was a most earnest protest of a sensitive soul against slavery, and it was difficult for one to read it without feeling an impulse to do something to destroy the

"Uncle
Tom's
Cabin."

system. The Southern people resented its pictures of slavery and slaveholders. In fact, the condition was not as bad as it was portrayed, but it was bad enough to cry for reform.

THE DRED SCOTT DECISION

From the time the Wilmot proviso was before the public, suggestions of the power of the supreme court to pass upon the status of slavery in the territories were heard. When by the compromise of 1850 New Mexico and Utah were created as territories without restriction as to slavery, it was understood that if a question arose in connection with slavery in their borders it was to be referred to this tribunal. In every debate over Kansas the constitutionality of the Missouri compromise was freely challenged by the South. The logical tendency was to bring the dispute sooner or later before the highest court in the land. This tribunal had declared against many laws: Why should it not relieve the intensity of feeling in the country and decide once for all the controversy which threatened the existence of the union? Beyond this was another question: Would its decision be accepted as final by the losing side?

Appeal to
the Supreme
Court.

Dred Scott was the slave of an army surgeon residing in Missouri who took the slave into Illinois and Minnesota, and returned after more than two years' residence in free territory. Shortly afterwards the master died, and Dred sued for his freedom. The case first came up in Missouri courts, which had jurisdiction; but while it was in progress he was sold to a citizen of New York, who hired him out in Missouri. He then brought suit in the federal courts. He claimed to be a citizen of Missouri, and on that ground contended that his case came within federal jurisdiction, since the federal courts may try cases between citizens of different states. He also claimed that when his master took him voluntarily into the land of freedom the shackles of slavery fell off, and that his return to a slave state could not be construed as reënslavement. He insisted that the Missouri compromise, a federal law, protected him in this contention. The two points before the courts, therefore, were: was Dred Scott a citizen of Missouri, and did the Missouri compromise protect him? The defense denied the first contention, and asserted the compromise was unconstitutional.

Dred Scott.

The case was first argued in the supreme court early in 1856. Seven of the justices were democrats, and of these five were Southerners. One was a republican, and another, Curtis, was a whig. At first the case attracted little attention outside of the court, but after a while it became known that it involved the Missouri compromise, and the public, especially the Southerners, began to take notice. In view of this the court had it reargued in December, 1856, every point being taken up most carefully. Even

The Dred
Scott Case.

then the court hesitated. Should it merely settle the status of Dred Scott and his family, or should it by passing on the two fundamental points raised exert its power in the very center of the great sectional controversy? To do the former would avoid the unpleasant task of making an enemy of either Northern or Southern faction; but it would also lay the court open to the charge of cowardice. "What," it would be asked, "was a court for but to settle disputed constitutional points?" Some pressure was brought on the court by outsiders to get them to take up a broad attitude, chiefly by the Southerners, who felt that the majority of the justices leaned their way. They succeeded, and March 6, 1857, when the decision was announced, was an important day in the great antislavery struggle. It showed that the court was on the Southern side.

Each member of the court read an opinion, all of the Southern justices and one Northerner, Grier, a democrat, agreeing materially.

Taney's Opinion. The opinion of Chief Justice Taney was taken as that of the majority. It dealt with two important points: was a negro a citizen of the United States? and was the Missouri compromise law constitutional? In regard to the former, Taney asserted that federal and state citizenship were not identical, that Scott's citizenship was to be determined by the law in force in the state of his residence, and that since Missouri did not recognize him as a citizen he could not be considered a citizen of the United States. As to the rights of the citizens of one state resident in another, Taney held that such rights were only maintained during temporary residence, and that the constitution did not intend to take away in this respect the right of a state to decide so vital a point as what classes of persons should be admitted to state citizenship. As to the Missouri compromise, the court felt impelled to pass on its constitutionality; for if it were valid, Dred Scott became free by his residence in Minnesota, and if he was free there it was assuming a great deal to say that his undisputed return to Missouri would bring reëslavement. Taney accepted the Southern view on this point. The claim that congress could legislate for the territories was disposed of by holding that the words were restricted to the territory actually owned by the federal government in 1787, and not to the Louisiana purchase. The constitution, he further held, recognized the existence of property in slaves, it gave no part of the government the right to destroy such property, and an act of congress claiming to exercise such a right was unwarranted.

Judge Curtis, supported by McLean, the republican justice, took the contrary view in a well written opinion. Free negroes, he said, were citizens of North Carolina and several Northern states in 1789, and voted there, and he held that any citizen of a state is a citizen of the United States, and was such in 1789. If this was true, Taney's first point, relating to citizenship, was demolished. As to his second point, Curtis was equally successful.

Curtis's Opinion.

Congress, he pointed out, was given power "to make all needful rules and regulations concerning the territory of the United States." Taney held that this did not apply to territory acquired after the constitution was adopted, but Curtis disputed the point with a great deal of strength of argument. If congress had such power, it might forbid the entrance of slaves into a territory, and in doing so it did not violate the clause which forbade it to deprive a citizen of property without due process of law.

It was the fate of these two lines of reasoning that one enunciated the view for which one side had long contended, and the other that for which the other side had been equally earnest. One was supported by the justices who favored the democratic party, and the other by those who leaned toward the other parties. Perhaps it was impossible that honorable judges should have been uninfluenced by the storm of discussion amid which they had lived during the past decade. The democrats, North and South, exulted that they had the majority of the court with them and flouted the opinion of Curtis. The opponents of slavery in the North found Curtis entirely convincing, and denounced the majority of the court as subservient to the slave power. The upshot was that the attempt of the court to intervene in the great sectional conflict was a total failure. We may consider it a certainty that when the court gives an opinion adverse to the previously formed view of a majority of the American people, its decision will be futile and its influence will be lessened. The status of slavery in the territories was, in fact, no longer a judicial matter. It had become a political issue, and it was not wise for the court to undertake to settle it.

Futility of a
Judicial
Decision.

The administration party was not surprised by the outburst of indignation which met the Dred Scott decision, but they thought it would soon blow over. There followed, however, the attempt to admit Kansas with the Lecompton constitution (see page 492), and this added to rather than lessened the excitement. Meanwhile there came the midsummer panic of 1857, which occasioned great distress in the business world. The democratic secretary of the treasury, Howell Cobb, of Georgia, showed little ability to retrieve the treasury from its consequent embarrassments; and when the manufacturers of the North asked for higher tariff rates to protect their prostrate business, the Southern senators objected. The result was, therefore, a diminished respect of the powerful business element for the party in power.

Democrats
Lose
Strength.

THE LINCOLN-DOUGLAS DEBATES

Early in 1858 the worst of the panic was over, the Lecompton scheme was defeated, and there was a breathing spell in which the politicians had time to think of the presidential election of 1860. To the

shrewdest men it seemed that fortune favored Douglas. Much of the enthusiasm of 1856 had subsided. The Kansas-Nebraska law

**Douglas's
Position
Early in
1858.**

did not seem quite so bad now that it was evident that popular sovereignty did not mean the establishment of slavery in a territory. Douglas's opposition to the Lecompton constitution had brought him the good will of many conservative republicans, who could not fail to acknowledge his genius, and it was even whispered in some quarters that Northern democrats and republicans might unite to make him president. Douglas could not have had expectations of this nature, but he took no pains to check them on the part of others. Two years of peace, it was believed, would go far to remove the sectional strife, and if Douglas could be supported in 1860 by the South, the Northern democrats, and the conservative republicans, what might he not expect to do? True, he was unpopular in the South, where his Lecompton votes were pronounced acts of treachery, but he was a most facile man, and no one who knew him doubted that he would find means of restoring himself to Southern favor before the critical time arrived. We are now to see how his prospects were blighted by Abraham Lincoln.

Douglas's term in the senate expired in 1859, and his party in state convention in 1858 nominated him to succeed himself. The republicans named Lincoln as his opponent, and a series of joint debates was arranged between the two candidates. No other public discussion in our history has been more important. It not only sealed the political fate of one presidential candidate, and established another in the road to the presidency, but it educated the North to the true nature of the problem before it and convinced the South that secession was the only way to escape the ultimate extinction of slavery.

In the beginning of his campaign Lincoln attacked boldly. The time had come, he thought, to announce frankly that the war on slavery was uncompromising, and he did it, in accepting his party's nomination, in simple words which will never fade from our history. "A house divided against itself cannot stand," he said; "I believe this government cannot endure permanently half slave and half free. I do not expect the union to be dissolved — I do not expect the house to fall — but I do expect it will cease to be divided. It will become all one thing or all the other. Either the opponents of slavery will arrest the further spread of it, and place it where the public mind shall rest in the belief that it is in the course of ultimate extinction, or its advocates will push it forward till it shall become alike lawful in all the states, old as well as new — North as well as South." Hitherto republican campaigners were content to attack the slave power for its aggression in Kansas, and they feared to lay the axe to the root,

**The
"House-
Divided"
Speech.**

lest conservatives, whigs and democrats, be driven off. They trembled when Lincoln assumed a bolder front, and one of them was heard to call his "house-divided" announcement "a fool utterance." But Lincoln was in earnest, and he could not bring out the best in him unless he spoke in all sincerity. Douglas in the course of the debates made much of this advanced utterance, pronouncing it the froth of abolition ravings; but his opponent stood by it manfully, explaining it in a spirit of far-sighted statesmanship which convinced more men than it repelled. It was probably the most convincing point of his argument.

Lincoln saw in the joint debate an opportunity to make Douglas unacceptable to the South, and for that purpose asked him this question in the discussion at Freeport, "Can the people of a United States territory, in any lawful way, against the wish of any citizen of the United States, exclude slavery from its limits prior to the formation of a state constitution?" The reply of Douglas became known as his Freeport doctrine. Slavery, he said, could not exist in a territory without local police regulations to protect it, and these could only be made by the local legislature, which would oppose slavery if the people who elected the legislators were opposed to it. "Hence, no matter what the decision of the supreme court may be on that abstract question, still the right of the people to make a slave territory or a free territory is perfect and complete under the Nebraska bill." This utterance saved its author in his senatorial contest. When Lincoln was urged to drive him from this position, he refused, saying he was looking for higher game than the senatorship. He foresaw better than the other republicans that it would kill Douglas in the South; for it was the negation of all the slaveholders saw in the Dred Scott decision. The Freeport doctrine was known and discussed far and wide. It was read most attentively by the men of the South. From this time, Judge Douglas, try as you may, you will never again induce the Southern friends of slavery to think you their safe champion and defender!

And yet we must not too easily blame Douglas. He was in the difficult position of Calhoun in 1828 and Van Buren in 1844; he must give up the support of his own state or that of the section opposite to his own. He chose, as they, to preserve the good will of his state, realizing that here was his first element of safety. He was one of the ablest Americans then living, and he loved the union. He sought to preserve it by saving the great democratic party as the last and strongest national bond then in existence. He won his senatorship, but all he hoped for in behalf of union was lost.

Lincoln also showed himself a great American. Was it not great to defeat the great Douglas? His powerful logic, which forced the

How
Lincoln
Destroyed
Douglas.

Douglas's
Dilemma.

issue down to the narrow point of slavery or no slavery in the territories, and his courage and sincerity, which cast aside the last remnant of temporizing and made it clear that the contest waged was nothing less than a war to put slavery in a way of ultimate extinction,—these were his weapons. No man before that day, or afterwards, wielded them more brilliantly. He had the advantage of his opponent in this, that he appealed to a more populous and homogeneous section, the rich and prosperous North. It was a North ready to be convinced that slavery should be reduced to a minority power, and his splendid strokes convinced it.

The congressional elections of 1858 showed how fast the tide ran for the republicans. Two years earlier the elections resulted in a house containing 131 democrats, 92 republicans, and 14 know-nothings. In 1858 they gave 109 republicans, 86 democrats, 13 anti-Lecompton democrats, and 22 know-nothings. In the senate the democrats still held a majority, having in the congress then chosen 38 members to 25 republicans and 2 know-nothings. But they had lost one senator, and it was evident that the trend of events would soon array against them every free state senator. As the short session of 1858-1859 ran by with no other achievement than angry debate over a democratic proposition to buy Cuba, the Southerners came to realize how completely they were defeated, and even their conservative leaders began to say in sober earnest that the election of a "black republican" president would justify secession.

THE JOHN BROWN RAID

Before the succeeding congress assembled came the attempt of John Brown at Harper's Ferry. The farther we get away from the excitement of 1859 the more we are disposed to consider this extraordinary man the victim of mental delusions. He hated slavery fervently, and despised those who talked of constitutional methods. "Without the shedding of blood, there is no remission of sin," he said time and again to those who discussed the subject with him. In the confusion of the day no steps were taken against him for killing five men in Kansas in 1856, and early in 1858 we find him in New York secretly planning another bloody deed. He attended an antislavery convention in Boston as a spectator, and turned away, saying: "These men are all talk; what we need is action — action!" Assembling some of the prominent leaders, he unfolded his own scheme. It was to collect a band of devoted armed followers, seize and fortify a position in the mountains of Virginia or Maryland, and from it make raids into the farming communities to liberate slaves. As he succeeded, he said, friends from the North would join him, his power

**Lincoln's
Service.**

**Republicans
Gain the
House.**

**His Idea of
the Contest
against
Slavery.**

His Plan.

would grow, and soon he would make slavery insecure throughout Virginia. This was nothing less than to raise insurrection, but Brown and the academic leaders of abolitionism were so carried away by the wrongs done to enslaved negroes that they considered it only just retaliation; and money was promised to enable him to launch his enterprise. News of the project came to Seward and Senator Wilson, of Massachusetts, and they forbade Brown to use the arms which had been collected to defend the free state men in Kansas. By this time suspicions were generally aroused, and to allay them he went to Kansas, where his name was a terror to the proslavery men. After lying idle a short time he made a raid into Missouri, rescued eleven slaves, and escaped with them through Kansas, Nebraska, Iowa, Illinois, and Michigan to the soil of Canada. The country was aroused, and the incident served to draw attention from Brown's projected operations in Virginia.

In the spring of 1859 he was back in New England, soliciting funds. Some of the most prominent abolitionists would have nothing to do with him, but others gave money, something more than \$4500 first and last, and June 30 he arrived at Harper's Ferry, Virginia, thirty miles south of the Pennsylvania line. Leasing a farm, he spent the next ten weeks in carting arms from Chambersburg, Pennsylvania, and in collecting the twenty-one followers with whom he proposed to put his dangerous scheme into execution. October 16, with eighteen of these men, he seized the United States arsenal in Harper's Ferry, captured thirty or more of the citizens, whom he held as prisoners, cut the telegraph wires, and for twenty-four hours held his own against the citizens and near-by militia companies which hurried to the scene. It was not until dawn of the 18th that he was captured by a detachment of marines commanded by Colonel Robert E. Lee, assisted by Lieutenant J. E. B. Stuart. John Brown himself, with four of his men were taken prisoners, seven escaped, and ten were slain, two of them being sons of the leader. The prisoners were sent to the county jail at Charlestown to await trial. A grand jury on October 25 found true bills, and after a fair trial Brown was sentenced to hang on December 2.

Had John Brown been killed in the eventful night when he was taken prisoner, the raid would have gone down to history as a foolish deed prompted by an unbalanced mind. But the firm and calm bearing he displayed at his trial and during the month between conviction and execution touched the hearts of even his jailers. In the North he became a martyr to the antislavery party. On his trial and afterwards he declared that he came merely to rescue slaves, and the abolitionists could see no harm in such a purpose. As a matter of fact, he came with a thousand pikes to place in the hands of slaves and a large number of rifles and revolvers. It was not strictly true that he did merely what conductors

Seizes
Harper's
Ferry.

Bearing as
a Prisoner.

of the Underground Railway did. But the antislavery portion of the North, in the excitement of the moment, did not stop to inquire into niceties. To them a man of firm heart had risked life to overthrow slavery and was now facing a hangman's death without a tremor.

December 2, 1859, the verdict of the court was executed, the prisoner dying with fortitude. As the death group marched to the gallows

Executed. it was surrounded by a strong body of militia, and fifteen hundred troops formed a hollow square around the scaffold.

Many hints had been given that Brown's Northern friends had planned a rescue, and this display of force was precautionary. It elicited much derision at the time, but later researches have shown that some of the abolitionists were eager to attempt a rescue and were deterred only by their inability to raise the necessary funds.

The influence of the incident in the North is hard to estimate. It undoubtedly aroused the antislavery party to a high pitch. John

Significance of John Brown. Brown died for his conviction, and he did it willingly and with dignity. But Northern conservatives did not change their views because of the rash attempt of an enthusiast who did not hesitate to take the sword to redress what he

believed the wrongs of the negroes. It was to them a sufficient evidence of the impracticability of the scheme that it found no response among the slaves of Harper's Ferry and the surrounding region. The effects on the South, however, were very definite. Up to this time the ideas of the secessionists had not been taken very seriously by the southern voters. Much had been said about the intention of the abolitionists to come into the South, set the slaves against their masters, and forcibly overthrow the institution which was at the bottom of society; but the union leaders there had always met it successfully by saying this was but the imagining of men unnecessarily alarmed. Here, however, was a concrete instance which the secessionists declared proved all they had predicted; and the enthusiasm shown in the North for John Brown seemed to the masses to confirm all that was said. Harper's Ferry gave a strong blow to union sentiment in the South.

THE ELECTION OF 1860

We are now arrived at the culmination of the harsh struggle which followed the passage of the Kansas-Nebraska act. The disorders in

Election of Speaker, 1859. Kansas, the Dred Scott decision, and the John Brown raid divided the people of the North and South beyond possible conciliation. The prelude of the great struggle came when the house elected in 1858 met in December,

1859, and sought to choose a speaker. John Sherman, of Ohio, had most of the republican votes, but lacked several of an election. A Missouri member introduced a resolution that no man should be speaker who had indorsed Helper's "Impending Crisis of the South."

This book, by one from the small farmer class in North Carolina, was a severe indictment of slavery from the standpoint of the non-slaveholders of the South and called on them to support the republican party in order to liberate themselves from the leadership of the slaveholders. Its language was bitter, but its doctrine might well cause to tremble the men who held the upper hand in the slave states; for it was as plain as day that if the non-slaveholding Southerners were organized against slavery its doom was written. In 1859 the book was brought out as a campaign document with a recommendation by prominent republicans, among them Sherman and Grow, both candidates for speaker. The resolutions against "The Impending Crisis" precipitated a bitter discussion of the whole slavery situation, threats of secession were freely made, and more than once members were at the point of personal violence on the floor of the house. It was not until February 1 that the contest ended with the election of Pennington, a conservative republican of New Jersey. In these strenuous days the Southern members freely said that the election in the coming autumn of a "Black Republican" president would bring dissolution of the union, and the violent state of feeling in the South indicated that the utterance was not an idle threat. Such was the spirit in which the country came to the election of 1860.

**Helper's
Book.**

When this incident occurred the selection of delegates to the national nominating conventions was imminent. Douglas was now at the head of the Northern democracy. His opposition to the aggressive program of the republicans won for him the hatred of the antislavery men. It pleased the democrats in the free states and it was thought it would win the votes of many old whigs, supporters of Fillmore in 1856.

**Douglas
and the
South-
erners.**

But Douglas would not go as far as most Southerners wished. Their views were expressed in a series of resolutions introduced into the senate by Jefferson Davis, February 2, 1860, demanding that congress guarantee slave property in the territories. As the day approached for the meeting of the convention it became clear that these resolutions were the Southern ultimatum, made as much to force the Northern democrats to show their position as to consolidate the South in support of secession, if secession should be deemed necessary. Douglas parried the thrust, and was told pointedly that he could not get the Southern vote unless he accepted the ultimatum. He dared not yield, for no Northern state would tolerate forcing slavery into a territory against the wishes of the inhabitants.

The convention met at Charleston, South Carolina, April 23. The extreme Southerners, "fire-eaters" they were called by their opponents, held a caucus and indorsed the Davis resolutions, while the Northern delegates decided to stand by Douglas. The platform committee reported in favor of the former. It was composed of one member from each state, and was

**The Fac-
tions at
Charleston.**

thus in Southern control. A minority report held to the Douglas position and accepted the Dred Scott decision. Yancey, the most polished orator among the Southerners, spoke for his section. Reviewing the origin and progress of the great controversy, he came at last to describe the crisis before the country. Slavery, he said, was right: its existence was bound up with the prosperity of the South: and yet with the growth of the great Northwest the South had become a minority and was threatened with ruin through the proposed action of the republicans. The democrats of the North had not met the issue squarely. Accepting the proposition of the abolitionists that slavery was wrong, they had sought to palliate: they had asked the North to withhold their hands against the South because the wrong was not of Northern doing. This attitude Yancey regretted. Had the Northern democrats frankly declared that slavery was not a wrong, the abolitionists would long ago have been silenced, and harmony would now reign in the country.

**Yancey's
Speech.**

Yancey's speech was not a new note in the South. Many times he had said the same thing, only to have it rejected as the counsel of an extremist. But in 1860 the Southern temper had changed. His bold words now received the tumultuous approval of his section, and the Northern democrats were made to see how grave was the situation. Pugh, of Ohio, a friend of Douglas, spoke in their behalf. He thanked God, he said, that a brave man had at last spoken and the full demands of slaveholders were made known; but the ultimatum was an impossibility, and he declared with the utmost plainness that it would not be accepted. Next, the convention took up the platform. By a vote of 165 to 138 the Douglas position was adopted, the first time in years that the plea of the South on this question had been ignored in a democratic convention. Then rose the chairman of the Alabama delegation with a serious and fixed countenance. According to the instruction of the party in his state, he said, Alabama must withdraw from the convention. As he and his colleagues walked out they were followed by the delegates from seven other States, — South Carolina, Mississippi, Louisiana, Florida, Texas, Arkansas, and Georgia. North Carolina, Virginia, Tennessee, Kentucky, and Maryland were less radical than the Gulf states, and remained with the convention, although their delegates sympathized in the main with those who withdrew.

After balloting three days the diminished Charleston convention could not get a two-thirds majority for any candidate, and adjourned, to meet again in Baltimore, June 18. When it reassembled it nominated Douglas for president and Herschel V. Johnson, of Georgia, for vice-president. The seceders at Charleston effected an organization, adopted the Southern platform, and adjourned to meet in Richmond, Virginia, on June 10. On

**Two
Tickets.**

that day they again adjourned, this time to Baltimore, June 28, where they finally named J. C. Breckenridge, of Kentucky, for president and Joseph Lane, of Oregon, for vice-president. Thus came to inglorious failure the attempt, inaugurated by Clay in 1850 and renewed and fought for by Douglas from 1854 to 1860, to remove slavery from national politics.

Let us now turn to the republicans. After the defeat of Frémont in 1856 Seward was generally accepted as the leader of his party, and few doubted that he would be its candidate for president in 1860. Opposition existed at isolated points, but it was Seward's
Position. expected that he would be able to overcome it. The most patent danger was in New York, where Horace Greeley, editor of the *New York Tribune*, was at the head of a devoted band of abolitionists who considered him untrustworthy. Shrewd observers thought Greeley's chief grievance was that he was not consulted in the affairs of the party, and they were not surprised when in the spring of 1859 Seward dined with him at the Astor House, and the papers announced that a reconciliation had taken place. Simon Cameron, who controlled the party in Pennsylvania, was also in opposition, but Seward made a trip to Philadelphia, and the report went out that he had conciliated Cameron also. Seward himself thought he had now arranged things to his satisfaction, and seized the opportunity to make a journey to the Holy Land. While he was gone occurred the John Brown raid and the subsequent wrangle over the election of speaker; and on every hand Seward was proclaimed as the man who had planted the seed from which came the plant of insurrection. L. Q. C. Lamar expressed the Southern view in addressing the republicans of the house in these words: "I was on the floor of the senate when your great leader, William H. Seward, announced that startling program of antislavery sentiment and action against the South, . . . and, Sir, in his exultation he exclaimed — for I heard him myself — that he hoped to see the day when there would not be the footprint of a single slave upon this continent. And when he uttered this atrocious sentiment, his form seemed to dilate, his pale, thin face, furrowed by the lines of thought and evil passion, kindled with malignant triumph, and his eye glowed and glared upon Southern senators as though the fires of hell were burning in his heart!" In the midst of this commotion Seward returned. In 1850, in opposing Clay's compromise, he had declared that "a higher law" than the constitution demanded the extinction of slavery; and in 1858 he had said in a speech long remembered that the North was engaged in an "irrepressible conflict" which must make the nation all slave or all free. These two utterances made him seem to the South the very head of all their woes, and he sought to lessen their fears and reassure moderate Northerners in a mild speech which he delivered February 29. The compromising disposition it betokened was to reappear many times in his career.

There were several other candidates, Abraham Lincoln, whom the Illinois convention indorsed on May 9, 1860, Bates, of Missouri, Cameron, of Pennsylvania, no longer in accord with Seward, and seeking his own advantage in the prospect of making a combination with another candidate, and three Ohioans, Wade, Chase, and McLean, no one of whom was likely to be selected. Seward was believed to be stronger than any of these men, but all of them opposed him strongly and were willing to combine to defeat his nomination. Lincoln, whom events were soon to make so famous, had, before the convention met on May 16, the support of Indiana, Illinois, and Iowa, and a few other delegates, but he was little known east of the Alleghanies. *Harper's Weekly* was the only New York journal which considered him a possibility, and it placed his name last in a list of eleven.

Making a platform occupied the first and second days of the convention, and nominations were set for the third. Early indications pointed to Seward's success, and his opponents made preparations for a rapid concentration on Lincoln, whom they found to be the most feasible candidate. Cabinet positions seem to have been promised to the other candidates in order to secure this coöperation, although Lincoln, who was not present, knew nothing of the offers. On the first ballot the vote was 123½ for Seward, 102 for Lincoln, 50½ for Cameron, 49 for Chase, 48 for Bates, and 42 for other men. Two hundred and thirty-three were necessary for a choice. On the second ballot Lincoln gained 79 and Seward 11. On the third, the Illinois candidate received 235½, and was nominated. Seward was defeated partly because it was thought unadvisable to nominate a man who had so many enemies, and partly because of the personal hostility of men who disliked him. Greeley, whose reconciliation was short-lived, was present, and worked hard against him. When Lincoln made up his cabinet in the succeeding March, four of the six members were men who had been candidates before the Chicago convention. Hannibal Hamlin, of Maine, was nominated for the vice-presidency.

May 9 all that was left of the whig and know-nothing parties assembled in convention and nominated John Bell, of Tennessee, for president and Edward Everett, of Massachusetts, for vice-president. They called themselves the constitutional union party, and appealed to those who decried party rancor and sectionalism to help them save the country.

No one thought either Douglas, Breckinridge, or Bell could carry the country. The best their followers could hope for was to throw the election into the house. Everywhere they attacked the republicans and declared that Lincoln's election meant the disruption of the union. This argument the republicans derided. It was, said Lowell, "the old Mumbo-Jumbo" con-

**Other
Candidates.**

**Lincoln
Nominated.**

**Bell and
Everett.**

**Lincoln
Elected.**

jured up to frighten old women and stock speculators. Seward, who canvassed actively in behalf of his successful rival, said: "I do not doubt but that these Southern statesmen and politicians think they are going to dissolve the union, but I think they are going to do no such 'thing.'" This assurance, reiterated in many forms, allayed the fears of the mass of voters in the free states, so that they were nowise prepared for the events the succeeding winter witnessed. In October Pennsylvania and Indiana elected republican governors, premonitions of the result in November, when Lincoln came triumphantly through with every elector from the free states except three of New Jersey's seven. He had in all 180 votes to 72 for Breckinridge, 39 for Bell, and 12 for Douglas. The popular vote was Lincoln 1,857,610, Douglas 1,291,574, Breckinridge 850,082, and Bell 646,124. Lincoln, therefore, received 930,170 votes less than his combined opponents. In each house of congress, also, the republicans were in a minority against the combined opposition.

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For party history see: Theodore C. Smith, *The Liberty and Free Soil Parties in the Northwest* (1897); Curtis, *The Republican Party*, 2 vols. (1904); Fite, *Presidential Election of 1860* (1911); Macy, *Political Parties, 1846-1860* (1900); *Ibid.*, *Party Organization and Party Machinery* (1904). Rhodes, *History of the United States*, 7 vols. (1892-1906), contains much party history carefully prepared from original sources. See also the biographies of leading men, especially Lincoln, Douglas, Buchanan, Jefferson Davis, and Seward.

On the Dred Scott decision see: *U. S. Supreme Court Reports* 19 Howard, (1857), the official decision; it was widely reprinted at the time; Hurd, *Law of Freedom and Bondage*, 2 vols. (1858-1862), reviews with much learning the legal status of slavery; Tyler, *Memoir of Taney* (revised ed., 1872); Biddle, *Constitutional Development as Influenced by Taney* (in Rogers, *Constitutional History as Seen in the Development of Law*, 1889); Curtis, *Constitutional History of the United States*, 2 vols. (1896); and Corwin, *The Dred Scott Decision in the Light of Contemporary Legal Doctrines* (*Am. Hist. Review*, 1911).

On the John Brown Raid much has been written, but most of it is partisan. A full bibliography is in Villard, *John Brown, A Biography* (1910), the best of Brown's biographies. See also *The Report of the Senate Committee to Investigate the Late Invasion* (the "Mason Report"), 36 Cong. 1st ses. Rept. Com. No. 278.

For Independent Reading

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CHAPTER XXIV

THE OUTBREAK OF THE CIVIL WAR

WAR OR PEACE?

ALTHOUGH the Gulf states furnished the ablest leaders of the South in the critical situation of 1860, South Carolina, the home of Calhoun and nullification, was fully abreast with the secession movement. In this respect she was ahead of Virginia, which was not a cotton state, and whose ancient Southern leadership was now little more than a name. The Carolina legislature still elected presidential electors, and was in session when the telegraph flashed the news that Lincoln was to be president. It immediately called a convention to consider the state's relation to the union. Thus it happened that a convention at Columbia on December 20, 1860, declared in solemn manner the dissolution of "the union now subsisting between South Carolina and the other states, under the name of the 'United States of America.'"

South
Carolina
Secedes.

Now appeared in all other Southern states two parties, secessionists, mainly Breckenridge democrats, and union men. The former were the stronger in the Gulf states, where the rank prosperity of the preceding half century had produced a vehement and overconfident civilization. In these states the union had not the same force as in the northern tier of Southern states, and it was natural that the first victories of secession should be won here. The arguments that prevailed were the evident danger to slavery from a republican administration and the assertion that the South could make better terms out of the union than in it. It cannot be doubted, however, that most of the secessionists hoped for a permanent separation, thinking this the only safe way of preserving Southern institutions. By February 4 secession was declared in six states, South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, and Florida, and on that day a convention at Montgomery, Alabama, established a provisional constitution for "The Confederate States of America," chose Jefferson Davis its president and Alexander H. Stephens its vice-president, and invited the other slave states to join it. Texas at this time had submitted secession to the people, who ratified it on the 23d. With these seven states in repudiation of the union the movement for secession halted for a time.

The Gulf
States
Follow.

The "Con-
federate
States of
America."

Meanwhile, all eyes turned to President Buchanan, a state rights man, a democrat, and long in declared sympathy with the South.

Buchanan's Attitude. Three members of his cabinet, Cass, Black, and Holt, urged him to send troops to hold the forts in the South. Three others, Cobb, Thompson, and Floyd, all Southerners, believed in secession as a right and exercised a strong influence over the president. They told him, and it was probably true, that to reënforce the Southern forts would alarm the South and drive the other Southern states into secession. For a time they had their way, with the result that Cass resigned from the cabinet. The president's annual message showed that he was at heart with the Southerners. It argued against the right of secession, declared that he would act strictly on the defensive, and made it clear that the aggression of the South would not be disturbed as long as the existing administration was in office. At the same time the New York *Tribune*, and abolitionists generally, were asserting plainly that the North could not conquer the South and that the South, if it so wished, should be allowed to "depart in peace." From this situation the secessionists took much comfort. It seemed that the stars were for them.

These bright hopes dissolved at last before the problem of the disposal of the eight forts in the seceding states. Six of them were without garrisons, and were easily occupied by the secessionists. **Forts in the South.** The other two were Pickens, at Pensacola, and Sumter, at Charleston. In Sumter was Major Anderson with 84 men all told, and he showed such a spirited desire to protect the place that the sympathy of the North was aroused for the first time in many weeks of irresolution and delay. South Carolina, however, was arming her citizens, and during the rest of Buchanan's administration each side lay on its arms, neither wishing to strike the blow which would precipitate war.

One half-hearted attempt was made to reënforce Major Anderson. January 5, 1861, the *Star of the West*, a merchant vessel, sailed from New York with supplies and 204 men and officers for Sumter. Although efforts at secrecy were made, her departure was known at once in Charleston, and she was received on her arrival with a fire by the confederate batteries at the harbor entrance. Anderson could have silenced the batteries from Sumter, but he had not been informed of her departure, and hesitated to open fire. The result was that after coming within a mile and a half of the fort without receiving aid from that quarter she turned back to New York. This effort having failed, the policy of inaction went on until the coming of the new administration. Meanwhile, Fort Pickens, with a garrison of 48 men, remained in federal hands.

The anxiety to avoid an overt act of force was largely due to a desire that a compromise should be prepared by which the South would

consent to abide in the union. This hope was reflected in congress, which created a senate committee to report a plan of compromise. Five of the thirteen members were republicans, two were from the cotton states, three were from border slave states, and three were Northern democrats. They were among the best men in public life, were desirous of peace, and showed their seriousness by agreeing in the beginning that they would accept no scheme which a majority of the republican members would not support. Many resolutions were referred to them, the most notable being a set known as "the Crittenden Compromise." It suggested a constitutional amendment excluding slavery from all territory north of the parallel $36^{\circ} 30'$, and establishing it with federal protection in all territory south of that line. Against this proposition the republicans were a unit. It was their principle, and they said so frankly, to agree to nothing which would admit slavery into another territory. For this reason the proposition failed. The senators from the cotton states voted against it as a matter of form, but it is known they would have accepted it if their republican colleagues had done the same. Other suggestions of compromise were made, but none came as near acceptance as Crittenden's. Here, as in the preceding political campaign, the antislavery and the proslavery forces had come to the irreconcilable stage of the "irrepressible conflict," and the committee of thirteen could only report on December 28 its inability to come to an agreement. We shall see later what part Lincoln took in bringing the republican committeemen to their determination to yield nothing.

Efforts to
preserve
Peace.

But Crittenden did not despair. He was the successor of Clay, as a Kentucky senator, and he worked hard for compromise. January 3, 1861, he asked the senate to order the sense of the people to be taken on the resolutions which had been rejected in committee, and Douglas supported him in a masterly speech. Could the vote have been taken, many republicans would undoubtedly have voted for it. All the Northern democrats and the Bell and Everett men would have gone the same way, so that it would have carried the North. In all the slave states which had not seceded the result must have been the same; and before this overwhelming approval the republicans in congress must have given way. But the proposal never came to a vote in the senate. The republican senators delayed its consideration so long that the cotton states seceded, and then it was not thought worth while to press the matter further. That the compromise, if adopted, would have brought harmony temporarily seems true, but it is doubtful if it would have solved the problem permanently. Lincoln opposed it on the ground that it would have been followed by attempts on the part of the South to acquire territory in Cuba and Mexico, and that the old threats of disunion would have recurred if the North had objected to such expansion of the proslavery interest.

Crittenden
would Ap-
peal to the
People.

One other effort at compromise was to be made. February 4, at the call of Virginia, delegates from 22 states assembled in Washington to hold a peace convention. Ex-president Tyler, a Virginia delegate, presided, and the debates were secret. **The Peace Convention.** Threshing over the old straw, they at last advised a constitutional amendment somewhat less favorable to the South than Crittenden's. It was opposed by Virginia and other Southern states. As no one thought it would either satisfy the slave states still in the union or conciliate those which had seceded, the recommendations came to inglorious defeat in the senate. Thus ended the period of hesitation and doubt between the election and the inauguration of Lincoln. Buchanan, indecisive by nature, brought up to believe in the theory of state rights, bound to the South by long years of political and personal association, and unwilling to shoulder the responsibilities of a situation which his enemies had created, came at last to the end of his term without an actual resort to force. His successor, whose election had precipitated the crisis, must decide what the future would bring forth.

LINCOLN AND SECESSION

The actuality of secession alarmed the business interests and conservative men of the North; and many republicans, who flouted the threat of secession in the preceding November, now felt **Seward's Position.** they had gone too far. Such persons turned to Seward, whom they considered the real republican leader. They thought Lincoln inexperienced, and were pleased when it was said that Seward would be secretary of state. Thus, powerful influences worked to make the senator from New York think that he alone could save the country. He was not an idealist, and he seems to have concluded that he must invent some plan by which the South would be conciliated and the seceding states brought back.

But Lincoln had a firm conviction about the situation. He would not accept the Crittenden compromise or retreat from any position occupied during the campaign. To do so, he said, would **Lincoln's Firmness.** be an abandonment of principle, would not satisfy the slave power, and would destroy the republican party. He gave no intimation of yielding on the main question, the exclusion of slavery in the territories; but he said clearly that he would not interfere with it in the states in which it existed. This did not satisfy the proslavery men. They believed that once the free states gained ascendancy in the senate progressive restrictions of slavery would follow. They knew, also, that at no moment could secession be so well carried in the South as at the present, when the popular terror at a republican administration was greater than it would ever be again. If a Southern confederacy was to be attempted, now was the best time to launch it.

All the country, North as well as South, awaited anxiously the advent of March 4. Would the inaugural address announce conciliation or would it defy secession? To those who heard it delivered it seemed to do neither. It began with an assurance that slavery in the South was safe, and that fugitive slaves ought to be restored to their masters, and it asserted that the union was perpetual and secession impossible. There was, also, much benevolent argument against the wisdom of secession. Lincoln's strongest trait, perhaps, was his loving-kindness, and he seems to have meant to envelop his opponents in it so that he might win back to the union all who were not past the reach of reason. As to the forts and customhouses he said they must be held by the government, but he promised he would not needlessly irritate the Southern people by sending strangers into their communities to fill the various federal offices. This tone of remonstrance and evident reluctance to use force was interpreted by the secessionist as a sign of weakness.

The
Inaugural
Address.

March 5 Lincoln was shown a letter from Major Anderson, in Fort Sumter, saying that his provisions would be exhausted in a few weeks and that the confederate works around Sumter were so strong that 20,000 men would be required to maintain the post. Two of the cabinet wished to hold and strengthen the place, Blair unconditionally and Chase if it could be done without civil war. The others were for withdrawal, Seward taking the lead. He would avoid war, leave the seceding states to think over their position, and use the slave states still in the union as an influence to bring the wanderers back. Lincoln withheld his decision, but sent confidential messengers to South Carolina, who reported that there was no union sentiment in the state worth speaking about. Anderson himself favored evacuation, and General Scott, head of the army, held the same view.

Fort
Sumter.

Meanwhile, three agents of the confederate government were in Washington to negotiate for the recognition of independence, the surrender of the forts, and an adjustment of monetary losses to the federal government through the surrender of federal property in the South. Opinions were exchanged between them and Seward, who saw them at least once. With his policy of conciliation in view he suggested they delay an attack on Sumter, and they agreed on condition that the existing status in Charleston be not disturbed. They were not officially received, but on being assured through a third party that Sumter would be evacuated, they decided to remain in Washington. Their withdrawal would have been followed by an attack on Sumter. They waited until the end of March, and when at that time they saw no evidences of evacuation, they began to be uneasy. Rumors reached them of an expedition to succor the forts. To their remonstrances Seward said, through an

Confeder-
ate Agents
in Wash-
ington.

intermediary, "Faith as to Sumter fully kept; wait and see." Next day, April 8, ships for the relief of Sumter began their journey from New York and the confederate commissioners broke off their negotiations.

Seward had not intentionally deceived the confederates. All he did was in pursuance of his policy of delay. His assurances as to Sumter were given on his own responsibility. They failed because at this time Lincoln had come to a decision that the authority of the union must be asserted at all hazards. It was he who gave the order to succor the fort, overriding Seward's scheming and teaching him and the country that Lincoln was a real president. Had the secretary had his way a shifty policy would have been followed, the confederacy would have been established, probably beyond the possibility of overthrow, and the union sentiment of the North would have been so dissipated that war would have become an impossibility. In this sense the civil war was Lincoln's war, and the preservation of the union was Lincoln's act.

When the confederate president knew that provisions were coming to Sumter he held a long and anxious cabinet meeting. To fire on Sumter would precipitate war and unite the North in defense of union. The cooler advisers felt that the hope of secession lay in avoiding war. Lincoln said he would only land supplies and not men if the fort was not attacked. The more hot-headed advisers thought that the possession of a federal fort in the limits of the newly established confederacy was not to be tolerated. This view prevailed, and the order was given to reduce the works. More than 5000 troops lay in the strong batteries around the place waiting for the order to fire. Anderson offered to surrender in three days if not provisioned or overruled by his government. From the confederate standpoint the offer should have been accepted, but rash counsels prevailed, and just before dawn on April 12 a solitary mortar gave the signal for the attack. The bombardment which followed lasted 34 hours, at the end of which time Anderson surrendered and marched out with the honors of war. Not a man on either side was killed, but the fort was badly wrecked from a fire which destroyed the barracks and exploded some of the magazines. The confederates expressed their admiration for the heroic defenders in loud cheers; and Anderson saluted his flag with fifty guns before he transferred his men to the relief ships which had arrived during the bombardment but were unable to reach Sumter. About this time Fort Pickens was reënforced, and it was held throughout the war.

**Lincoln
Overrules
Seward.**

**The Attack
on Sumter.**

PREPARATIONS FOR WAR

Firing on the flag dispelled the last doubts of the North. Stephen A. Douglas issued an appeal for his friends to rally to the defense of

the union. Bell and Everett whigs were equally loyal, and within a month the whole North was holding mass meetings in which thousands of speakers aroused the men to take up arms. April 15 Lincoln called for 75,000 volunteers, and three weeks later for 42,000 more. He also ordered the enlistment of 23,000 additional regulars and the increase of the navy by 18,000 men.

**Lincoln's
Call to
Arms.**

To these demands the response was more than adequate, and by July 1, he had an available force of 310,000. April 19 he declared the southern ports blockaded. The ships of the navy were widely dispersed by direction of Buchanan's secretary of the navy, but orders were sent to hasten their return, and every effort was made to purchase and arm other ships to make the blockade effective. In this way, though with much confusion, the machinery of government was set going by the master hand in the great process of war.

**The
Blockade.**

In the South, meanwhile, was a similar state of activity. President Jefferson Davis was a West Point graduate; he had rendered distinguished service in the Mexican war, and no one doubted his energy and earnestness. He called for 100,000 volunteers, and hastened the preparations for war. The attack on Sumter showed the slave states still in the union that they must fight for or against the confederacy, and four of them quickly joined the seven which had already seceded. They were: Arkansas, May 4; Virginia, May 17; North Carolina, May 20; and Tennessee, June 24. Strong Southern feeling existed in Maryland, Kentucky, and Missouri, and for a long time they hung in the balance, while Lincoln used his utmost tact to save them for the

**Arming in
the South.**

union. If the war were fought to destroy slavery, they would go with the South, but if slavery were not threatened, they would not secede. Lincoln was very tactful by nature, and succeeded in calming the apprehensions of the border state slaveholders. Time worked in his behalf; for as the seriousness of the struggle became apparent, secession became less popular in these states. Thus the crisis passed peaceably in Kentucky and Maryland. But Missouri was temporarily in convulsions. Jackson, the secessionist governor, refused to furnish troops at the call of the president and made preparations to carry the state over to the side of the South. Friends of the union, however, led by F. P. Blair, Jr., raised four regiments, which were ac-

**The Border
States.**

Missouri.

cepted by the federal authorities and placed under the command of General Lyon. Then followed four months of commotion, during which the people flocked to Lyon's standard and enabled him to seize the city of St. Louis and call a state convention which declared against secession and deposed the governor. Thus the danger passed in the third of the border states; but from each many volunteers joined the confederate armies. At Gettysburg an important part of the field was contested between two bodies of Maryland troops, one in blue and the other in gray.

Let us consider for a moment the relative strength of the two sides in the war about to begin. In population the North was greatly superior. Her 22,000,000 inhabitants confronted 9,000,000 in the South, 3,500,000 of whom were blacks. But the blacks were a factor in the war, although they did not count man for man with the whites. They remained on the farms and produced the supplies for the army. Counting two of them as worth one white man in their contribution to the struggle, the numerical force of the North was to that of the South as twenty-two to seven. The South realized this inferiority in population, but expected to overcome it by what she considered the superior fighting ability of her soldiers. An arithmetic published in the South during the war stated the problems in terms like these: "If one confederate soldier can whip seven federal soldiers, how many federal soldiers can nine confederate soldiers whip?"

In the beginning of the war the Southerners seemed to fight better than their opponents. They were used to outdoor life, they were fighting on their own soil, resisting what they considered an "invasion," and they were well acquainted with the country in which they operated. Moreover, they drew the minor officers from the planter class, men accustomed to command and trained to exercise influence over their poorer neighbors, who now made up the privates. Thus the Southern volunteers took up the soldier's life more readily than their opponents, and the Southern army was more quickly drilled into veterans. The union troops awoke slowly to their task; it took a long time to develop efficient lower officers, but at last all was achieved, and then it was not possible to discover any notable difference in the fighting ability of the two armies, the capacity of the generals and the numbers being equal.

In material resources the North had a great advantage. Her people had all the facilities for manufacturing arms, ammunition, comfortable clothing, and the other necessary supplies. Besides this, the markets of the world remained open to her during the struggle. The South had no manufactures and very few trained mechanics, her supplies were cut off by the blockade, and, spite of strenuous efforts to make what was needed, her troops suffered greatly through lack of clothing, medicines, and the munitions of war. In the beginning she derived much benefit from arms taken in the forts she seized, and in Harper's Ferry; but this, as Rhodes points out, only gave her about the part of the national supply of arms which she felt rightfully belonged to her as a part of the old government.

THE BULL RUN CAMPAIGN

July 4 Congress met in extra session. Lincoln reported what had been done to meet the emergency and asked for approval. The

response was all he desired. He was authorized to raise the army to 500,000 men, to borrow \$200,000,000, and to issue \$50,000,000 in treasury notes. The tariff was raised as much as it was thought the industry of the country would stand, and other taxes were levied. Four months earlier the country seemed to prefer disunion to war, but through the tactful measures of the president all doubts were now dispelled, and a war policy was approved in the house with only five dissenting votes.

The Extra Session of Congress, July 4.

By this time 30,000 men under General McDowell were assembled south of Alexandria, while 22,000 more under General Patterson were at Martinsburg, in the northern end of the Shenandoah valley.

Opposing each force was a confederate army. One of 23,000 under Beauregard was at Manassas, and another of 9000 under Joseph E. Johnston was at Winchester, in the valley. The whole North rang with a demand for an advance on Richmond, since the secession of Virginia the confederate capital, and Lincoln ordered McDowell to make such a movement. He also ordered Patterson to keep Johnston engaged so that the troops of the latter should not join Beauregard at the critical movement. July 18 the armies of McDowell and Beauregard came into proximity with one another some miles northwest of Manassas. The confederates were drawn up behind Bull Run, their left holding the stone bridge by which the road from Alexandria crossed the stream and their right extending toward Manassas. Beauregard appealed to his government for reinforcements, and Johnston was ordered to join him. Obeying instantly, he moved toward Patterson to deceive him, which proved an easy task ; for that officer most unaccountably moved his whole army northward until it was 22 miles from Winchester. Johnston then turned backward, and at noon, July 20, joined Beauregard with 6000 men, leaving most of the rest of his army, 2300, to approach as fast as they could.

An Advance on Richmond.

Meanwhile, McDowell made an excellent plan of battle. All his force was in position on July 20, and the attack was fixed for the next morning. While the main army rested on Bull Run in readiness to cross, Hunter's division was ordered up the stream to turn the enemy's left. The movement was executed very successfully. At ten o'clock, while Beauregard expected an advance across the stream, Hunter's regiments suddenly struck his right, forced it back with hard fighting until the fords and the stone bridge were uncovered, and by noon the whole union army, pouring across the stream, threw itself on the confederates, who by much exertion were brought into line to hold a small plateau just east of the bridge, known as the Henry plateau. At this point the battle raged fiercely. Thomas J. Jackson, commanding a confederate brigade, held it so firmly that General Bee, another confederate, exclaimed: "Look at Jackson!

Position of the Confederates.

McDowell's Excellent Attack.

Defence of the Henry Plateau.

There he stands like a stone wall!" and thus originated the name "Stonewall Jackson." But Jackson's firmness was overcome; his men were driven from the plateau by the federals, whom McDowell brought up with great rapidity. The confederates rallied and retook the place, but were themselves driven off by their opponents. At three o'clock it seemed they would not return, and McDowell believed the field was his. At this moment Kirby Smith with a large force of

**Arrival of
Kirby
Smith.**

fresh confederate troops arrived, joined their repulsed brethren, and reopened the battle. It was the remnant of Johnston's valley army, 2300 strong, who had hastened to the field, guided by the firing of cannon. Through the tired union ranks, exhausted by five hours of fighting on a hot summer day, ran the murmur, "Johnston's army has come," and panic was created. Seasoned troops would have held the ground or retreated in order. The new levies under McDowell did neither. They quickly fell back to the stone bridge — crossed it, and at nightfall were retreating in

**"A Con-
fused Mob."**

a confused mass to Washington. No efforts of the officers could stay them, and before morning the routed army was, as McDowell said, "a confused mob, utterly demoralized."

The battle was well planned and well fought until three o'clock, but the untrained soldiers could not stand the shock of a repulse. Their terror was unfounded; for the confederates, themselves exhausted and off their guard, did not pursue. Had they followed promptly, they might have occupied the capital with little resistance. The union loss

Results.

was 1584 killed and wounded and 1312 captured; the confederates lost 1982 killed, wounded, and missing. The defeat at Bull Run nerved the North to renewed efforts; it gave the South greater confidence in ultimate success. Both sides realized the need of long and patient drill in order to make soldiers out of the volunteers.

Meantime important developments occurred in the western counties of Virginia. The people of this region were generally non-slaveholders.

**The West-
ern Coun-
ties of
Virginia.**

For a long time they had been at odds with the people east of the mountains, claiming that the latter, led by the slaveholders, ruled the state, built railroads, and filled the offices in the interest of the East. The Westerners opposed secession and began to denounce it in mass meetings as soon as the convention at Richmond declared for the confederacy. Soon after hostilities began, they were in arms for the union, and, joining with a federal army under McClellan, drove out in a series of small battles the forces which the confederates sent to hold this region. Then was carried through a movement for a new state. The federal constitution provides that a state shall not be divided without its consent, and with this in view a convention at Wheeling, May 13, representing 26 counties, declared that by secession all the Virginia officials had forfeited their offices; and it called on the people to select a convention to

reestablish a lawful government. The result was that June 11, 1861, delegates from 40 counties met in convention, took the oath of loyalty to the union, declared themselves the convention of "restored Virginia," and having purged the state of treason ordered an election of a governor and other officials over all Virginia. Accordingly, F. H. Peirpoint was chosen governor, and a newly elected legislature filled the places vacant by the withdrawal of the recent senators. The appointees were given seats in the senate.

**"Restored
Virginia."**

August 6 the convention reassembled to take up the question of a new state. It was ordered that a popular vote be taken on the subject, with the result that the proposition prevailed by a vote of 18,408 to 781. Then a constitution was framed for the proposed "State of West Virginia," the 39 western counties. It said nothing about slavery, but in the election the people expressed in an unofficial vote an overwhelming opinion against the institution, and thenceforth they were assured of the support of congress. The next thing was to get the consent of Virginia. To that end Peirpoint's "restored" legislature met, and went through the form of sanctioning the division of the "Old Dominion." Then the application went to congress, which duly declared that Virginia having consented to the act of division, the state of West Virginia was admitted to the union. The act of admission was approved by Lincoln, December 31, 1861. The proceedings were most irregular, but it was a time when the rules of peace were not strictly considered. The people of Virginia have ever considered the rending of their commonwealth an unconstitutional and malevolent action.

**New State
Movement.**

By cutting off from his government the western counties, Peirpoint's "restored" Virginia was limited to the counties around Alexandria, Fortress Monroe, and Norfolk — places all held by union arms. Over these he kept up the formality of an administration until the end of the war, living safely within the union lines at Alexandria. His "state" was a farce, but Lincoln wished it kept alive in the hope that it would furnish the nucleus for reconstructing Virginia when her resistance should have been overcome (see page 601).

**The Alexan-
drian Gov-
ernment.**

RELATIONS WITH GREAT BRITAIN

From the beginning Europe took much interest in the war. As England was most intimately related with the contestants, France and other European powers let it be known they would follow her lead. Her ruling classes, chiefly the landed gentry, merchants, and manufacturers, felt much friendliness for the South, some of them because the South was supposed to be aristocratic, and others because the South, having no factories of her own, was expected to purchase freely of England. The confederates

**Feeling for
the South.**

understood this feeling and hoped for much from it. They, also, thought that since the English cotton factories depended on them for raw material, English ships would come to America, break the Southern blockade, and establish an outlet for the great Southern staple as well as an inlet for the supplies which were so much needed. To prevent this became the chief item of the foreign policy of Lincoln's government; and for this purpose he discovered a most excellent agent in

**Charles
Francis
Adams.**

Charles Francis Adams, son of John Quincy Adams, whom he sent to London as minister. Adams was persistent and fearless, and spite of the evident unfriendliness of

Palmerston, the prime minister, and Earl Russell, the foreign secretary, he succeeded in preventing by his vigilant protest many acts of assistance to the South. He found his chief support in the fact that the confederacy fought to preserve slavery. John Bright, Richard Cobden, and W. E. Forster, champions of any reform that

**Feeling for
the North.**

made for social betterment, worked mightily to arouse the middle classes in favor of the union. Their influence was great, and the ministers did not dare antagonize this sentiment in order to open a market for the merchants and manufacturers.

Three incidents arose over which the two nations nearly came to a rupture of friendship.

1. The recognition of the confederacy as a belligerent. As soon as the government was organized at Montgomery, confederate agents in

**Status of
Belligerency
allowed to
Confeder-
ates.**

London began to ask for the recognition of confederate independence. The request was not granted, but the queen issued, May 13, 1861, a proclamation of neutrality in which each side was given the rights of belligerency within British jurisdiction. Adams landed in England the day the proclamation was issued, and the action of the ministry

was considered discourteously precipitate. It also violated Lincoln's theory that the confederacy had not the status of a power, but represented only a group of insurgents. The confederates too were disappointed; but consoled themselves with the reflection that belligerency gave their privateers a standing in foreign ports, and they hoped that future successes would compel the recognition of independence.

2. For a time the union papers were full of recrimination for England, and November 8, 1861, the feeling burst forth when the American

**The Trent
Affair.**

ship, *San Jacinto*, Captain Wilkes, seized Mason and Slidell on the British mailship, *Trent*. These two confederates were bound for Europe, one to represent his

government at London and the other at Paris. They had escaped through the blockade to Havana and there taken the British steamer, *Trent*, for Southampton. The seizure was on the high seas, and was by force. News of it put the North into a delirium of joy, Wilkes was hero wherever he went, and congress and the secretary of the navy extended him their thanks. Lincoln and only one member of the

cabinet, Postmaster-general Blair, regretted the occurrence. They foresaw that Great Britain would demand a disclaimer, and believed that in the excited state of the public mind war might occur. They promptly informed England that Wilkes had acted without instructions, and awaited her further procedure.

In all Britain was great indignation, for the flag had been violated at sea. A large fleet was assembled, and 8000 troops were sent to Canada, embarking, it is said, to the tune, "I wish I were in Dixie." The government prepared an offensive demand for the surrender of the confederates. The Prince Consort, then suffering from a fatal illness, saw the dispatch, and suggested softer expressions, by which it was possible for the American government to accept the demands. Mason and Slidell were released, but no apology was made.

In a long reply Seward stated the American position. Had Wilkes seized the *Trent* and sent her before an admiralty court he would have been within his right. As it was, he had exercised the right of search, something the American government had ever opposed. Thus ended the *Trent* affair at the very close of 1861.

Mason and
Slidell Sur-
render.

3. The other irritating incident was fitting out cruisers for the confederacy, certainly a violation of the neutrality England had so hurriedly announced. In March, 1862, the *Florida*, built at Liverpool, was allowed to depart for Nassau, in the Bahamas, where she was libeled for violation of neutrality. But a court ordered her release, and she sailed on a career of destruction as a confederate ship.

The Con-
federate
Ships,
Florida.

Meanwhile, a more powerful ship was being built at the same place — evidently for the same purpose. June 23 our minister, Adams, asked for an inquiry to see if she ought to be held. A superficial investigation was made by the Liverpool authorities, who were in sympathy with the South and who reported that no evidence was found that the ship was destined for that country. Still Adams persisted, securing undoubted evidence, which was referred to Sir John Harding, Queen's Advocate. Harding was on the verge of a mental collapse, and the papers lay unopened by him for five days before they came to other hands, and were so reported that the order to detain the ship was given on July 29. But the step was too long deferred; for on the same morning the steamer got out to sea for a trial trip and did not come back. She went to the Azores, where she took on her armor and a confederate crew and began her momentous career as the commerce destroyer, *Alabama*. Ten years later an arbitration court at Geneva declared that England had not used due diligence in enforcing neutrality in regard to these two ships. Early in 1863 it became known that three other powerful ships were under construction at Liverpool, but the government prevented their departure. The *Florida* and the *Alabama*, with some smaller ships,

The
Alabama.

constituted the confederate navy. They were not able to meet the ships of the union, and contented themselves with destroying unarmed merchantmen, of which during the course of the war they took 285, at a total loss of about \$15,000,000.

These three incidents, so full of possible misfortune for those who struggled to preserve the union, thus ended favorably to the North.

The South found herself disappointed in her hope of foreign aid, and the war settled down to a long-drawn out assault of one section against the other. The point on which the decision of England and France turned was slavery.

Spite of all that the Southerners said, the real question was the perpetuity of slavery, and the world abroad was not prepared to support the side which upheld it.

**The Results
favor the
North.**

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CHAPTER XXV

THE WESTERN CAMPAIGNS

A BIFURCATED INVASION

THE task of the North was to enter Southern territory, suppress resistance, and restore the authority of the union: that of the confederacy was to resist conquest. The Northern invasion was a bifurcated movement, one part operating on the east and the other on the west of the Appalachian mountains. It was hoped that each would roll back the confederate resistance and, by uniting below the southern end of the mountain system, give the finishing stroke to the confederacy somewhere in northern Georgia. As it fell out, the union advance was checked by Lee's army in the East, but it was steadily successful in the West. The Mississippi river and all of Tennessee were gradually secured, and by the middle of 1864 northern Georgia was occupied by a strong and victorious army. The western division had done its allotted task, and now turned northward to help the Eastern troops complete the capture of Richmond. The present chapter will describe as a whole the Western movements and the succeeding chapter will deal with the operations in the East.

THREE PRELIMINARY OPERATIONS, 1861

The conquest of the West began properly in 1862, but in 1861 there were three important preliminary episodes: 1. While the people of western Virginia were busy creating a new state a union army under General McClellan drove back the confederate forces which came from the east to maintain the Virginia authority. In several sharp engagements McClellan's fame was established, and he was called to Washington to command a greater army. In the western counties he was succeeded by Rosecrans, who had Robert E. Lee for an opponent. Lee's force was inadequate, and was forced over the mountains, and it was not until he had won his brilliant victories in the campaign around Richmond in the following year that the Southern people forgot his present ill fortune. 2. The success of the unionists in preventing secession in Missouri (see page 517) was followed by a determined confederate effort to retake the state by arms. At first it seemed successful, and the federal General Lyon was killed. But he was avenged by General

Pope, who with a strong force drove the confederate army out of Missouri. Late in 1861 Halleck was given command on both sides of the Mississippi, with headquarters at St. Louis. He well understood the art of war, but proved slow in execution. Under him, however, served several brilliant generals, and affairs in his department progressed favorably. 3. The confederates wished to make the Ohio river their line of defense, although they had not troops enough to hold Kentucky. But in September, 1861, General Grant, then acting under Frémont, defeated this plan by seizing Paducah and Cairo. The result was that the enemy established his lines from the Mississippi at Island No. 10, New Madrid, and Columbus, thence eastward to Forts Henry on the Tennessee and Donelson on the Cumberland, and after that at Bowling Green, Kentucky, a place nearly due north of Nashville, with which it was connected by sixty miles of railroad. To the eastward a small force occupied central and eastern Kentucky, where union sentiment was strong; but a federal force drove it back in January, 1862. By these three preliminary movements the border states of Missouri and Kentucky, which Lincoln's tact had kept from secession, and the new state of West Virginia, were saved from the confederate arms. From that time the fiercest field of western operations was Tennessee.

3. Holding
the Ohio.

GRANT'S CAMPAIGN ON THE TENNESSEE, 1862

Late in January Grant formed a plan to cut the confederate line at Forts Henry and Donelson, only eleven miles apart. Receiving permission from Halleck he moved up the Tennessee with 17,000 men and seven gunboats. The confederates did not allow themselves to be surrounded, and surrendered the place after most of its defenders had withdrawn to Fort Donelson (February 6), which Grant lost no time in attacking. He sent his gunboats back to the Ohio and up the Cumberland, while he marched overland to Donelson. Here the first attack of the boats was repulsed, and they retired for repairs. Then Grant threw his force around the fort on the land side and was in a position to starve or storm it. For such a fate the occupants would not wait. At dawn on February 15 they attacked and drove back the union right, so that for a few hours the road was open. Grant was four miles away, and rode hurriedly to the danger point. Learning that the knapsacks of the captured confederates were filled with food, he divined that an escape was intended, and ordered an assault along all his line. It was delivered with great spirit, the confederate defenses were penetrated, and retreat was made impossible. During the night the generals in the fort, Floyd, Pillow, and Buckner, decided that surrender was necessary. Floyd had been Buchanan's secretary of war, and feared to be taken prisoner. He handed over the command

Fort Henry
Captured.

Surrender
of Fort
Donelson.

and escaped across the river in a skiff under cover of darkness. Two small steamboats arrived at dawn, and on them Pillow and some troops escaped. A body of cavalry under Forrest, who was soon to be a noted leader of light-horse troops, escaped along the river bank. The rest of the confederates, nearly 15,000, were surrendered by Buckner. In this action the union army numbered 27,000.

The situation in Tennessee now shifted rapidly. Albert Sidney Johnston, in chief command of the confederates, hurriedly withdrew the force from Bowling Green to Nashville, and Buell, who had been watching it, followed leisurely. If he and Grant united their armies, the story of Fort Donelson would be repeated at the state capital. Johnston was too wise to be caught in a trap, and continued to retreat, spite of the censure of the Southern press. He finally halted at Corinth, Mississippi, important because it commanded the railroad from Chattanooga to Memphis. While he collected supplies and reinforcements his opponents leisurely overran western Tennessee.


March 17 Grant, following the Tennessee river, arrived at Savannah with 45,000 men. Buell, with 35,000, was approaching from the northeast, and the plan was that the two forces should unite and crush Johnston, who had only 40,000. Grant thought his opponents could not take the offensive, and carelessly placed five divisions at Pittsburg Landing, on the west side of the river, twenty-three miles from Corinth, holding Lew Wallace's division at Crump's Landing, five miles north of that point. He failed to intrench, though ordered to do so by Halleck, and had his headquarters at Savannah, eight miles north of his main force and on the opposite side of the river. He was daily expecting Buell, who, in fact, reached Savannah April 5, where he was allowed to halt.

Johnston was an able general, and was anxious to fight before Buell came up. Moving out of Corinth, he fell on the union force in the early morning of April 6. Grant heard the firing, and hastened to the scene by boat. To his surprise, he found a heavy battle in progress, and his men fighting for their lives. He ordered Wallace and Buell to come up, and calmly watched the fray. Throughout the whole day the fighting continued, the federals being driven back, and Shiloh Church, the key of the field, was taken by Johnston, who, fighting with great courage, was struck in the leg as he led a regiment into a hazardous charge. He had previously ordered his surgeon to attend to the wounded elsewhere, and bled to death before aid could be found. His death discouraged his men, who, however, at nightfall held the ground the union force occupied in the morning and had forced their foe to take protection under the fire of the union gunboats. In the night Grant received 20,000 fresh troops from Wallace and Buell, and next morning renewed

**Johnston
Falls back
to Corinth.**

**Grant's
Confident
Approach.**

**The Battle
of Shiloh.**





the battle. After eight hours of fighting on this day, the confederates withdrew to Corinth. The total union loss was 10,000 killed, wounded, and captured. The total confederate loss was 10,700. **The Result.** Johnston fought to crush his opponent and to drive him from his advanced position in the heart of the confederate southwest, and since that object was not achieved, the battle of Shiloh, as it is called, was a confederate defeat. Halleck now came to Pittsburg Landing in person, and after raising the army to 100,000 men, moved cautiously on Corinth. When he was ready to besiege it, the confederates withdrew and allowed him to have it without endangering their safety.

The campaign on the Tennessee river left exposed the confederate posts on the upper Mississippi. Columbus was abandoned, New Madrid and Island No. 10 were invested and taken by Pope in March and April with more than 7000 prisoners. Gunboats then passed down the river, and June 5 and 6, a week after Corinth was taken, Fort Pillow and Memphis were in union hands. Meanwhile, a naval expedition under Farragut, aided by Porter, had appeared in the lower Mississippi. After futilely bombarding the forts on the river for five days, Farragut with great daring ran past them safely, and April 25 New Orleans fell into his hands, receiving a garrison of 2500 men under Benjamin F. Butler. The forts then surrendered to Porter. **Success on the Mississippi.**

CONFEDERATE COUNTER-MOVEMENT IN TENNESSEE AND KENTUCKY

After the capture of Corinth, Halleck remained inactive, while the confederates recruited their armies and prepared another movement. They placed Bragg, with 35,000 men, in Chattanooga, the key of southeastern Tennessee, and Buell was ordered to operate against him. This union general collected his force at Murfreesboro, 35 miles southeast of Nashville, protecting the latter place from Bragg. Before he could move farther Bragg left Chattanooga, August 28, and dividing his army turned Buell's left and marched into Kentucky. Lexington was seized, and Louisville and Cincinnati were in a paroxysm of terror lest they should be taken before succor arrived. Buell meantime gave up all thought of Chattanooga, and hurried back to Louisville. Bragg was ahead of him, and probably could have taken the city, but he became discouraged when the Kentuckians did not join him, as he expected, and allowed his opponent to reach the goal. Buell thus recruited his force to 58,000 and turned backward to face his foe. Seven days later, October 8, the two armies fought at Perryville, 65 miles southeast of Louisville. Neither side was entirely concentrated, but after fighting until dark Bragg withdrew his force and reached Chattanooga safely. At Perryville he lost **Bragg's March on Louisville.** **Battle of Perryville.**

3400 men, and his opponent 4200. Buell was ordered to follow Bragg and hold east Tennessee, but he thought he could not support his men so far from his base and took position at Nashville. For doing so he was removed from command and Rosecrans took his place.

The new general was ordered "to take and hold east Tennessee," but like Buell he refused to attempt it. He remained in Nashville

**Battle of
Stone's
River, or
Murfrees-
boro.**

for weeks, and Bragg quietly came back to Murfreesboro, where he intrenched. Finally, on December 26, 1862, Rosecrans moved on his opponent, and on the 31st a great battle was fought at Stone's river, three miles from Murfreesboro, by which name the action is sometimes known. Each general proposed to attack the other's right; but Bragg moved at dawn, while the union attack was ordered for 7 A.M. The confederate onset led by Hardee drove back the union right, which was only saved by the immovable center under Thomas. After a hard day's fight darkness closed the struggle. Rosecrans seemed beaten, but would not retreat. January 2, Bragg renewed the attack, but was beaten off and retired to Chattanooga. The casualties were a union loss of 13,000 out of a total force of 43,000, and a confederate loss of 10,000 out of 38,000. The southerners carried off 28 captured guns and claimed the victory; but they had failed to drive away Rosecrans and to rescue Tennessee from union control. The net result of the war in the West for 1862 was that all of Kentucky and western and central Tennessee as well as a large part of the Mississippi river were wrenched from the confederacy.

VICKSBURG CAPTURED

After losing Memphis and New Orleans the confederates fortified Vicksburg most carefully; for it was the one strong position left them

**Importance
of Vicksburg.**

on the river. If it were taken, the trans-Mississippi region would be cut off, the importation of light supplies through Mexico would be made difficult, and a fertile source of food for the armies would be lost. For the same reasons that the South wished to hold it the North wished to take it.

In the summer of 1862 Halleck was called to Washington to aid the president in the chief command of the army, and Grant was left in command of the great army at Corinth. For weeks he remained inactive, and the confederates, taking heart, tried to retake Corinth, but were easily beaten off. For this delay he was bitterly criticized by the press. His incaution at Shiloh was recalled, and rumor ran that all his dilatoriness was due to the intemperate use of liquor. But Lincoln stood faithfully by Grant.

This confidence was justified by a double expedition against Vicksburg, which got under way late in 1862. Sherman with 30,000 men and a fleet of gunboats was sent down the river from Memphis,

while Grant, with the same number, started forward along the railroad for Jackson, Mississippi, whence he would approach Vicksburg from the east. The advance of the land column was soon checked when the confederates cut its communications at Holly Springs. Sherman's force reached Vicksburg and attempted to land on the high ground north of the town. Here the Yazoo bottoms must be crossed in the face of a destructive fire, and Sherman withdrew after satisfying himself that Vicksburg could not be taken from the north.

**First
Attempt to
take Vicks-
burg.**

Then Grant determined to land south of it and approach by the high ground between the river and Jackson. His first idea was to cut a canal through a bend of the river on the west bank in order to take his supply ships past the confederate batteries. After weeks of digging, a March freshet destroyed the canal, and Grant determined to run the batteries. It seemed a hazardous thing, but was made by the supply boats in the night and with slight loss. The army marched down the west bank and was set across the river by the boats several miles below Vicksburg, and April 30, 1863, Grand Gulf was captured. The confederates had not supposed a federal army would begin its operations in this quarter, and the place was weakly defended.

**Second Ex-
pedition.**

Two hundred miles south of Vicksburg was Port Gibson, above which the union gunboats could not go. Banks had been ordered to take the place and open the way for a fleet supporting Grant's army; but his advance was delayed and Grant learned that he could expect no aid from the southward at the same time that he heard that confederate troops were concentrating on Jackson, Mississippi. His position was uncomfortable. If Pemberton's 40,000 men in Vicksburg were joined by the 15,000 J. E. Johnston was leading up by way of Jackson, the 43,000 men at Grand Gulf would fare badly. In the face of this difficulty, Grant's action was admirable. Abandoning his base, he quickly seized Jackson before Johnston could reach it, thus placing all his force between the divided enemy. Pemberton was a cautious general, and remained a few days in his stronghold, although ordered out by Johnston. Then he changed his mind, and moved out with about 30,000 men. Johnston had turned northward, hoping to get into Vicksburg. Pemberton should have gone in the same direction to meet him, but with a strange fatality he turned southward to cut Grant's communications with Grand Gulf. He soon learned that the union commander had abandoned his base and was living on the country. Then he tried to get back to the North, but Grant was in between. Johnston realized that he could not unite with Pemberton, and was forced to leave the latter to his fate. Then Pemberton stood still for battle, first at Champion Hill and then at the crossing of the Big Black river. In each action he

**Grant's
Brilliant
Strategy.**

**Pemberton
Besieged.**

was defeated, and May 18 he retired within his intrenchments at Vicksburg. Grant followed and established his lines of siege from the high banks of the Yazoo to the Mississippi below Vicksburg. He thus came again into communication with the union fleet, and supplies were now landed and reënforcements were sent from the North, so that he soon had 75,000 men, enough to finish Pemberton and beat off any army which could be sent to raise the siege.

The confederates returned to Vicksburg much discouraged, but they repelled

Vicksburg Taken.

firmly two assaults on their position. Then the problem became one of starving out the defend-

ers. While the siege cannon and mortars played continually, and the sappers and miners brought Grant's lines ever nearer to those of the confederates, the work of King Hunger went on. The confederate authorities needed every available man to hold back Rosecrans at Chattanooga, and reluctantly left Vicksburg to its fate. In June the rations began to fail. On the 28th the soldiers were on the point of widespread desertion and themselves suggested surrender. July 3 Pemberton asked for an interview with Grant, and next morning the articles of surrender were signed. The confederates were liberated on parole, 29,491 in all. They gave up 170 cannon and 50,000 small arms. This event, coming the day after the

The Mississippi Opened.

battle of Gettysburg, made the national holiday a day of rejoicing. It was followed by the fall of Port Hudson, and union gunboats now held the entire course of the great river. These operations placed Grant beyond the cavil of his critics, and the nation generally recognized in him its greatest general.



THE CAMPAIGN FOR CHATTANOOGA

While Grant moved against Vicksburg, Rosecrans with an army of 70,000 remained in Nashville, his eye on Bragg, who was charged with

the defense of Chattanooga. Unwilling to begin one important campaign while another was in progress, he remained inactive until Grant's success was assured. Meanwhile, Bragg advanced to Shelbyville. But late in June Rosecrans took the field, and flanking cleverly forced him back into Chattanooga without a battle. The place was very strong. It lies on the east bank of the Tennessee, a bold stream, and is surrounded by mountain ridges. To the south the country is quite rough. It is more practicable to the north, and Bragg thought his opponent would approach from that direction. The idea seemed supported by the fact that Burnside had just moved with a strong column from Kentucky into East Tennessee, and was at Knoxville in a position to move southward in coöperation with the expected flanking movement across the river. As Burnside did not move at once, Bragg concluded an attack was not imminent. He thus allowed himself to be surprised in another quarter.

Advance of
Rosecrans.

Rosecrans determined to approach by the south. It was a hazardous movement, but it was unexpected by Bragg, and it threatened the communications with Atlanta. The union commander did not know the country beyond the river, and was floundering about for more than a week in the disconnected valleys, his right and left wings sometimes nearly three days march from his center. Had Bragg been alert, he must now have beaten his opponent in detail. But he dallied too long, and when on September 18 he offered battle at Chickamauga Creek, twelve miles south of Chattanooga, Rosecrans was concentrated before him. It was a period of inactivity in the Virginia campaigning, both sides resting after Gettysburg; and Longstreet had been sent to aid Bragg, who was also reënforced by Buckner's army, which Burnside had driven southward from Kentucky. The confederates were thus in superior numbers, having about 66,000 to their opponents' 58,000. In making the detour to reach their opponents they had so moved that Rosecrans was between them and Chattanooga.

Bragg's Lost
Opportunity.

Behind the union position was Rossville Gap, penetrated by the road into Chattanooga. Bragg wished to seize this pass and isolate his opponents. Withholding his own left, he struck hard against the federal left, where Thomas commanded. This brave commander stood firm, but the rest of the line was weakened to send him reënforcements. At noon, September 20, by mistake, a division was moved from the union center. Longstreet, just opposite and waiting the word to charge, saw the movement and sent eight brigades through the breach. They crushed the union center, threw the left into confusion, and threatened Thomas on the right. Both parts of the line retreated in great disorder. Rosecrans tried in vain to rally his men, but could only follow them through Rossville Gap into Chattanooga. He thought the day lost,

Battle of
Chickamauga.

and sent orders to Thomas to protect the rear as well as he could. But Thomas was not beaten. Surrounded on three sides, he repelled charge after charge until night came, and then withdrew to the Gap, where he took a strong position and held Bragg in check until ordered to join the rest of the army in Chattanooga. This important engagement was fought on September 19 and 20. It resulted in the loss of 19,500 killed, wounded, and captured on the confederate side, and 16,000 on the union side. Thomas's heroic fight saved the union army from a complete rout and won for him the title of "The Rock of Chickamauga."

After the battle of the 20th the federal forces kept within Chattanooga, Bragg following and fortifying himself on Missionary Ridge and Lookout Mountain, east and south of the town. As

**Rosecrans
Besieged.**

Lookout Mountain commanded the railroad, Rosecrans could not bring his supplies by railroad farther than Bridgeport, whence they must be carried by wagons over wretched roads around the great bend of the river, a distance of sixty miles. A month later the army faced starvation or retreat. Lincoln was alarmed and took vigorous steps. Sixteen thousand men under Hooker were sent from Virginia, and Sherman with many more was ordered up from Vicksburg. Thomas was placed in command of the army, succeeding Rosecrans, whom the situation seemed to demoralize; and Grant was put in command of all the West but New Orleans, and

**Arrival of
Grant.**

ordered to Chattanooga. October 23 he arrived and immediately took steps to open the railroad between Bridgeport and the army. Throwing Hooker across the river, the road from Bridgeport was seized in a safe place four miles from Chattanooga. A new road was then constructed by Brown's Ferry, which was operated without molestation, and the danger of starvation was averted.

The next task was to drive Bragg away from the height above the town, and Grant decided to make the attempt as soon as Sherman arrived. The confederate line extended from the northern end of Missionary Ridge along the crest to Rossville Gap, thence across the valley of Chattanooga river to Lookout Mountain. Bragg thought it very strong, and not anticipating an early attack weakened it by withdrawing Longstreet from its center to strike Burnside at Knoxville. He thought Longstreet would return before his services were needed at Chattanooga. He underestimated the energy of Grant, and Longstreet was far away when on November 24, Sherman having arrived, the battle began.

Grant's plan was to turn the confederate right on the extremity of Missionary Ridge, and for this purpose he selected Sherman.

**Lookout
Mountain.**

While this movement was being made he proposed to keep the enemy in position with a strong feint by Thomas in the center and Hooker on the union right. November 24, Sherman

crossed the Tennessee in the early dawn, and drove the confederates some distance along the top of the ridge they defended. At the same time Thomas approached nearer to the base of the Ridge at the center, and Hooker, starting to skirt Lookout Mountain, changed his course, carried its steep slope, and finally placed the union flag on the top of the tall peak which adorns its crest. This spectacular achievement, though not very difficult, greatly heartened the soldiers. On the morning of the 25th the confederates were still in strong position on Missionary Ridge, and Sherman took up again the work of clearing it by hard fighting. To aid him, Grant directed Thomas to advance and take the works on the lower slopes. The order was executed, but the soldiers found themselves exposed to a hot fire from the crest of the Ridge. Without orders, and even against orders, they started for the top, 400 feet above them. Grant, watching the battle, exclaimed, "By whose orders is this?" "By their own, I fancy," replied Thomas at his elbow. But the line went steadily forward. At the crest was a brief struggle and then victory. Thirty guns were taken, and Bragg hastily withdrew to Ringgold. The confederate loss in killed, wounded, and captured was 6500, and that of the federals, 5500. Hooker's engagement high up on Lookout was called "the Battle above the Clouds."

Meanwhile, Longstreet had begun operations against Burnside at Knoxville. To his surprise he found the inhabitants loyal to the union. He made no headway, and after the battle of Chattanooga returned to Virginia. Thus all Tennessee was safely restored to the union, and a victorious army held the key to Atlanta and the Georgia uplands.

THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST ATLANTA

After Chattanooga, both armies were exhausted and went into winter quarters, the confederates at Dalton, Georgia, and the federals in the city they had taken. Bragg was removed from command. He had been severely criticized in the South, and only Jefferson Davis's warm friendship had kept him so long in a position he clearly was not able to fill.

**Bragg Re-
placed by
Johnston.**

His successor, Joseph E. Johnston, was able and vigilant in defense, but he was curt to his superiors, and early in the war aroused the ill-will of Davis. Grant once said he feared Johnston more than any other general he faced. The confederate general began his campaign of 1864 with 53,000 men, but was soon reënforced until he had 75,000. The hope of the southwest was in the defense of Atlanta.

February 29, 1864, congress revived the rank of lieutenant general, and the position was given to Grant, who thus became commander under Lincoln of all the union troops in the field. He immediately assumed the direction of operations in Virginia. The force in Chattanooga, 99,000 strong, thus went to Sherman. Under

him served Thomas, commanding Rosecrans's old army, McPherson with the troops which Sherman had brought from Vicksburg, and Schofield with the forces which formerly operated at Knoxville. The material in each army was excellent. Political appointees had been weeded out, tried officers of all ranks had come into responsible position, and the soldiers, seasoned by two years of hard fighting, were veterans of the best quality. The hilly country over which they must operate abounded in good defensive positions, which Johnston knew how to utilize.

**Sherman
and his
Army.**

Its Task.

The critical feature was the railroad from Chattanooga to Atlanta — serving as a means of communication for each army. As Johnston fell back he destroyed it, but Sherman had efficient engineers who repaired bridges and tracks so rapidly that the confederate rear guard usually could hear the whistle of the locomotive which accompanied the federal advance.

It was Sherman's habit to take the initiative, and early in May he appeared before Dalton. Finding the confederates strongly placed, he moved around their left and threatened so much the railroad at Resaca that they hastily fell back to that position, while he gained twelve of the 120 miles between Dalton and Atlanta. Again Johnston offered battle in

**Progress by
Flanking
Movements.**

strong intrenchments, but Sherman was too wise to accept it. He waited a few days, and once more flanked by the left, only to be again confronted by Johnston in a strong position. This kind of campaign continued until, at the end of June, Johnston was strongly fortified at Kenesaw Mountain, 25 miles from Atlanta. At this point Sherman abandoned caution and determined to accept battle. Selecting what he thought the weakest point in Johnston's line he delivered a power-

**Kenesaw
Mountain.**

ful assault with the hope of breaking through. But the confederates held firm, and the attack was repelled with a loss of 3000 federals and only 800 confederates. Thomas, whose steadiness frequently tempered the impetuosity of Sherman, was asked if he thought the assault should be repeated. He replied that "one or two more such assaults would use up this army"; and he added that he did not favor "butting against breastworks twelve feet thick and strongly abatised." His advice was taken, another flank movement was made, and Sherman on July 9 reached the north bank of the Chattahoochee, his opponent retiring in good order to the south bank. At this place the union troops were within six miles of Atlanta. During this campaign of two months, although no great battle had been fought, there had been continuous skirmishing and two or three sharp affairs, with the result that the union loss was 16,800 and that of the confederates 14,500.

**On the
Chatta-
hoochee.**

In falling back on Atlanta, Johnston merely did as Lee was then doing before Grant from the Wilderness to Cold Harbor. If he


fought less, it was because Sherman advanced more cautiously than Grant. But Southern opinion was not equally considerate of the two leaders, and Johnston was severely criticized. July 17 he was replaced by General J. B. Hood, a man who would fight. Sherman crossed the Chattahoochee, the same day, and rejoiced when he knew he had a new opponent. He believed there would be fighting, and thought his numerical superiority would give him the victory. Within eleven days Hood fought and lost three battles, — Peach Tree Creek, July 20; Atlanta, July 22; and Ezra Church, July 28. His total loss was 10,841 and Sherman's was 9719. But for all this, Atlanta was not taken. Then Sherman

Hood in
Command.

threw his columns out to the west and south, enveloping the city and threatening its communications with the South and East. This movement required a month, during which the North began to despair of his success. It was, said the doubtful ones, but a repetition of Grant's costly campaign, and after it a siege, the result of which no one could foretell. But Hood did not allow himself to be besieged.

September 2 he evacuated Atlanta, and next day it was occupied by the union forces. The news occasioned great joy in the North, for it was the first decided success of a year of hard fighting and heavy sacrifice. By the very exultation of his

Atlanta
Captured
September
3, 1864.



friends, Sherman could see how necessary it was that he should retain what he had captured.

But his situation was not altogether safe: he was in the midst of a hostile country, and his line of communication was a single railroad held by strong garrisons, but liable to be cut by a large and efficient column. Hood realized this situation and tried to utilize it. He first moved westward and fell on Allatoona, a railroad station 45 miles north of Atlanta. It was firmly held, and the attack was beaten off. Had it succeeded, Sherman must have recovered Allatoona or suffered serious consequences. Then Hood made a detour still farther westward,

Hood
Threatens
Sherman's
Base.

going as far as Decatur, Alabama, on the Tennessee river. The place was 110 miles south of Nashville, with which it was connected by rail. Here he halted, hoping that the union leader would become frightened and hasten back to Nashville.

But Sherman was not alarmed. Thomas was sent to Nashville with the veterans who had served under Buell and Rosecrans, and

**The Task
of Thomas.**

reinforcements were hurried to him from various quarters until he had nearly 60,000 men, quite enough to beat off the attack of Hood, who had only 54,000. As long as Hood was near the Chattanooga railroad, Sherman followed him; but when the confederate commander's plan was revealed by his crossing of the Tennessee, October 20, Sherman ceased to follow and concentrated at Atlanta a well-seasoned army of 60,000 men. He had for weeks been asking his superiors for permission to strike for the seacoast, and Grant now reluctantly consented. Nothing could show better the exhaustion of the South than the possibility that its

**Sherman's
Bold Plan.**

opponents could divide their western army into two columns, each of which was larger than the total force the confederacy could muster in that region. Sherman had before him no opposition worthy of the name, and he felt confident that Thomas could deal with any force Hood could gather.

Let us first follow the movements of Hood. He was a good fighter, but he had lost Atlanta, and his soldiers, regretting the removal of

**Battle of
Franklin,
November
30.**

Johnston, were not in good spirits. Delayed for three weeks in southern Tennessee to collect supplies he could not move until November 21, which gave his opponents time to prepare for him. Across his path was Schofield with 29,000 men, instructed to retard his advance and fall back. The confederate commander should have surrounded this force, but, although he sought it most vigorously, he lost his opportunity through the carelessness of a subordinate. Schofield was hard pressed when he arrived, November 30, at Franklin, on the Harpeth river, to find the bridge partly wrecked and his trains in great danger. He intrenched hastily, and while the bridge was being repaired Hood arrived and assaulted with great ardor. Each side fought most desperately from four o'clock in the afternoon until dark, but the union line held firm, and by morning Schofield was across the river and proceeded unmolested to Nashville, 20 miles away. He had lost 2326 men, while his opponents, who fought recklessly and without cover of breastworks, lost 6000. Hood followed more leisurely, and took position on the hills south of the city, his army reduced by fighting and marching to 23,207. It was the last hope of the confederacy in Tennessee, and its chances seemed slender in the presence of the union force of more than 50,000.

Thomas was deliberate by nature and would not fight until ready. As he remained inactive day after day the country, and even Lincoln

himself, became impatient, lest Hood should escape. But Grant, who once said that if Thomas came to a furrow he would stop to intrench, showed most concern. All his telegrams did not bring on a battle, and December 9 he ordered Thomas to hand over the command to Schofield, but on consideration the order was suspended. At last Thomas was ready, and December 15 he moved on the enemy, driving him back about four miles by hard fighting. The battle was renewed on the 16th, the confederates standing at bay for a life and death struggle. All their valor was unavailing. Surrounded and broken, they had no chance, and at last fled southward in whatever formation they could maintain. December 27, when they crossed the Tennessee river, they numbered less than 15,000 infantrymen. Many had been killed, many others were captured, and some had gone home under the impression that the war was over. Nine thousand of the survivors were later sent to North Carolina under Joseph E. Johnston to oppose Sherman. But from this time the task of the western army was accomplished. Mobile and a few posts held out, but nowhere could the Northern arms be resisted between the Ohio and the Gulf.

The Battle
of Nashville.

SHERMAN'S MARCH THROUGH GEORGIA AND THE CAROLINAS

November 15 Sherman began from Atlanta his celebrated march to the sea, burning before he started the machine shops in Atlanta and destroying the railroad to Chattanooga. The telegraph wires were cut, and for nearly a month his government only knew of his movements from the newspapers of the confederacy. His army marched along parallel roads covering a zone sixty miles wide. It had supplies for twenty-five days and was ordered to "forage liberally." In describing his purpose before he set out Sherman himself said he would "make Georgia howl." In his report of his movements he said: "I estimate the damage done to the state of Georgia and its military resources at \$100,000,000 at least \$20,000,000 of which has inured to our advantage and the remainder is simply waste and destruction." The misery thus inflicted on the non-combatants was as great as it was unnecessary. December 10 he was before Savannah, having accomplished his progress of 360 miles without serious opposition. Hardee, who was holding the town with 15,000 men, would not allow himself to be besieged and withdrew on December 20.

From
Atlanta to
Savannah.

The military results of Sherman's bold step were very important. It encouraged the North and discouraged the South, showing both sides plainly that the war was near an end. It cut off supplies from Richmond and reduced the area of the confederacy to the Carolinas and a part of Virginia. But all these results might have been secured without the wanton destruction that

Results.

was inflicted on the country. The people of Georgia and South Carolina were to remain Americans, and good policy, as well as humane warfare, demanded that they should not be so dealt with that the national flag should be remembered as a symbol of calamity.

Sherman remained in Savannah from December 20 until February 1, and then started northward, his march impeded by storms and wretched roads. No opposition could be made by Hardee, and pillaging was more severe than in Georgia. South Carolina's initiative in secession made her especially disliked by the federal army, officers and privates, and there was slight effort to restrain them. "The whole army," wrote Sherman to Halleck, "is burning with an insatiable desire to wreak vengeance upon South Carolina. I almost tremble at her fate but feel that she deserves all that seems in store for her." He gave orders against plundering private dwellings, but they were not well enforced.

From Savannah to Columbia.

Reaching Columbia, the capital, he found in the streets the smouldering remains of cotton. The soldiers of the advance guard obtained liquor, broke from the control of their officers, and during the entire night the streets were a scene of riot. Bands carrying torches marched through the streets firing the houses. In the morning a town which had sheltered 8000 inhabitants was in ruins. A heated controversy arose over the question, "Who fired Columbia?" One side claimed the fire started from the cotton fired by the retreating confederates, and it is possible some buildings might have been thus destroyed; for a strong wind sprang up in the evening and fanned the smouldering cotton into flame. But it seems undoubted that most of the damage was the result of the action of the uncontrolled soldiery, many of whose officers appear to have been little inclined to restrain them. It was the culmination of that bitter feeling which the entire army had shown up to this point, and which a more magnanimous commander would have restrained in the beginning. To the people of the North the devastation of this army was very pleasing. Even Phillips Brooks exclaimed: "Hurrah for Columbia! Isn't Sherman a gem?"

The occupation of Columbia forced Hardee to evacuate Charleston. He hastened to North Carolina in order to place his army before that of the conqueror. March 11, Sherman reached Fayetteville, where he destroyed an arsenal, but spared the town.

Sherman in North Carolina.

In fact, he made efforts to limit the pillaging in this state, and the inhabitants, although sorely distressed by soldiers and "bummers," fared better than those of South Carolina and Georgia. By this time Joseph E. Johnston had been placed in command of the confederate troops in the Carolinas. Gathering all the soldiers he could he stood before Sherman on March 16 at Averasborough, thirty miles north of Fayetteville. Beaten back, he made another stand three days later at Bentonville, but the result was the same, although

for a few hours it seemed that he might throw into confusion the union left, which marched incautiously. Proceeding thence Sherman came, March 23, to Goldsboro, 160 miles south of Richmond, against which Grant was about to complete his operations. Two days earlier Schofield had arrived at Goldsboro with 20,000 men, coming by way of Wilmington, which had been taken in January, and Newbern, which had been in union hands since 1862. But Sherman was not needed before Richmond. After a two weeks' halt at Goldsboro he learned that Lee was retreating toward the mountains and turned westward in order to intercept him. Before him Johnston slowly withdrew to Raleigh and then to Greensboro, where, as we shall see, he at last gave up the contest in April.

**Halt at
Goldsboro.**

Thus ended in triumph the work of the Western army. Some of its contests were drawn battles, but none resulted in retrograde movements. From Forts Henry and Donelson to Shiloh and thence to Corinth, in withstanding Bragg at Perryville and Murfreesboro, in the operations against Vicksburg, Chickamauga, Chattanooga, and Atlanta, in all these important movements there was steady and hard-won success. How well the confederates used their inferior resources is shown in the long series of losses they inflicted on the victors. They were exhausted, and collapsed utterly before the vast power that was brought against them.

THE WAR BEYOND THE MISSISSIPPI

While Grant, Sherman, and their assistants made the grand three years' movement through Kentucky, Tennessee, and Georgia to the sea, severe campaigning occurred west of the Mississippi. Texas saw but little fighting, attempts of the confederates to secure New Mexico came to naught, and western Louisiana was too much isolated by the fall of New Orleans in May, 1862, to become a scene of serious opposition to the union cause. But in Missouri and Arkansas the case was otherwise. When the union men in the former of these two states flocked to Lyon's standard and enabled him to save St. Louis to the union, the secessionists assembled under General Sterling Price, disputing all that Lyon did and precipitating a state of civil war.

**Missouri
and
Arkansas.**

Both leaders showed resourcefulness, but Lyon had the initial advantage. He moved rapidly, and at Booneville, on June 17, dispersed the confederate force. It soon reassembled in larger numbers, and at Carthage beat off an attack by Sigel, one of Lyon's lieutenants. Price was now reinforced by troops from Arkansas, so that his army was 10,000 strong. His opponent had only 6000, but risked battle at Wilson's Creek, August 10, 1861. The result was union defeat, Lyon being killed. His army was forced back into northern Missouri, and

**Confederates Ex-
pelled from
Missouri.**

there came a pause while both sides recruited. Frémont, who now commanded the union forces in Missouri, soon had 40,000 men, but as he was about to attack he was removed, and Hunter, his successor, gave up the plan of offensive movements. Soon Hunter was removed, and Halleck, who succeeded him, sent forward a force under Curtis, before whom Price retired into Arkansas. Van Dorn was now placed in command on the confederate side and met Curtis in a decisive battle at Pea Ridge, Arkansas, March 7 and 8, 1862. Although the confederates brought 16,200 men against 10,500, they were beaten, and withdrew from the field. The confederates in Tennessee were now hard pressed and the force under Van Dorn was so weakened that Arkansas was at the mercy of Curtis, who gradually extended his area of authority until at the end of 1862 most of the state was in union hands. Schofield superseded him in 1863, but although he had 50,000 men he could not complete the task assigned him.

The center of confederate power here was the Red River valley, which the confederates held with 25,000 men under Kirby Smith and "Dick" Taylor, his lieutenant. Along the river were great stores of cotton which the federals wished to seize. In 1863 Banks at New Orleans was ordered to move on this region, but he refused because of the low stage of water in the river. Early next year he got under way, with a land force of 27,000 men and a fleet of gunboats under Commodore Porter. His objective was Shreveport, at which place he was to be met by 15,000 men from Arkansas. His progress was slow, the country being very difficult. At Sabine Cross Roads, April 8, when in two days' march of Shreveport, he was repulsed by Taylor and was glad to escape with a loss of several of his gunboats. The net result of the expedition was to deprive Sherman of a valuable body of troops for the operations against Johnston between Chattanooga and Atlanta. Kirby Smith continued to hold the country around Shreveport until the end of the war. He surrendered at Baton Rouge, May 26, 1865, his force being 17,686.

One other western campaign remains to be noticed. In September, 1864, General Price marched into Missouri from Arkansas with 15,000 men. The war had reached such a stage in the West that large movements were not to be undertaken by the confederates, but they had enough troops to make destructive raids, like those of Forrest and Morgan on the east bank of the Mississippi. Price's objective was St. Louis, which he approached rapidly. Finding its defenses too strong to carry he turned off to Jefferson City. By this time the union forces in the state were concentrating rapidly. Price must fight them at several places, and moved so swiftly and fought so vigorously that he was not surrounded. But he failed to inflict serious injury on his opponents and was glad to escape to Arkansas after four weeks of

**The Red
River Ex-
pedition.**

**Price's
Raid into
Missouri,
1864.**

campaigning. He carried with him most of the guerrillas, who had infested the state up to that time, and thenceforth Missouri was free from confederate troops.

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CHAPTER XXVI

THE WAR IN THE EAST, 1862-1865

McCLELLAN'S PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN

THE most striking feature of the story of the union armies in the East is the efforts to find a successful general. From the beginning of the war until March, 1864, six commanders were tried and rejected. Then the task was confided to Grant, whose successes at Vicksburg and Chattanooga indicated that he was the long-sought leader. Under his direction the struggle was conducted to its close. The confederates, however, were as fortunate in this respect as the federals were unfortunate. Their first leader, Joseph E. Johnston, was an excellent commander; and when he was incapacitated, his successor was Robert E. Lee, the equal of any American soldier.

The Com-
manders.

The first of the union commanders was McDowell, who fought a well-planned battle at Bull Run and lost it because of no fault of his own. But failure damaged his prestige with the army, and he was followed, July 27, 1861, by McClellan, fresh from victories in West Virginia (see page 526). McClellan was a man of good address, and soon had the devotion of his soldiers. His unusual ability as an organizer quickly improved the efficiency of the army. But he displayed some unfortunate personal qualities. He overestimated the strength of his opponents; he was sensitive of interference by others; he quarreled with General Winfield Scott, until October 31, 1861, the commander of the army, and McClellan's superior; and he openly criticized the war department for political appointments. On the other hand, it must be remembered that McClellan was a good general, and his irritation at the meddlesomeness of the politicians was natural. In politics he was a democrat, and the open hostility of Stanton, the secretary of war, was supposed to arise from an unwillingness to enhance the popularity of one who might in the future be a formidable presidential candidate. The McClellan controversy is still a matter of dispute.

McClellan.

By the end of October, 138,000 men were under arms near Washington, and public opinion demanded an advance, but McClellan was not ready. October 21, at Ball's Bluff, 2000 men, who had been incautiously thrown across the Potomac, were surrounded and half of them lost. One of the slain was Colonel Baker, of California, an officer of much promise, whose death

His
Tardiness.

was deeply regretted. The blow caused profound sorrow in the North, but McClellan did nothing to retrieve it. The weather was fine through November and most of December, but still he kept his camp. Then he fell ill of typhoid fever and was prostrate until the middle of January. Finally Lincoln, who was generally patient with McClellan, issued an order for an advance by all the armies, East and West, on February 22. The order was impracticable and was ignored.

But McClellan's plan was made. He proposed to take the army to Fortress Monroe, and from that point to reach Richmond up the "Peninsula," between the James and York rivers. By this plan he would have support from the navy and maintain his communications by water. To the objection that he would thus leave Washington exposed, he replied that Washington was safe as long as his army kept the confederates busy near their own capital. Lincoln did not wholly approve the plan, but consented to it on condition that enough troops be left at Washington to secure it from danger. After McClellan was well on his way, he learned that McDowell with 40,000 men, on whom he had counted, was to be retained on the Potomac. He complained bitterly, but Lincoln held that the retention of McDowell was in keeping with his agreement.

Early in April McClellan had 100,000 men at Fortress Monroe and began to advance cautiously. The confederates made a show of opposition at Yorktown, stretching a thin line across the Peninsula, at that place thirteen miles wide. It could have been carried easily, but McClellan thought it required siege operations. He brought up his heavy guns, constructed intrenchments, and after a month's delay was ready to open fire when the enemy quietly left their position. At Williamsburg they fought a rear-guard action in which they lost 1570 men to their opponents' 1866. But they still retreated, and were closely followed. The fleet with the supply ships passing up the York seized White House Landing, twenty miles from Richmond, and made it a base of supplies for the army, which was thrown out to the Chickahominy, ten miles from the city. This was the situation on May 16.

The federal advance into the interior made Norfolk unsafe for the confederates, and they evacuated it, destroying the ram *Virginia* (*Merrimac*), which they could not remove. This left the federal fleet without opposition in these waters, and it ascended the James to Drury's Bluff, six miles from Richmond. Here it encountered strong batteries, beyond which it did not go. A coöperating land force could have taken this position, but McClellan was on the York, which allowed him to keep his army between the confederates and Washington.

Meanwhile, the confederates clung to Richmond, and Lincoln, losing his fears for Washington's safety, ordered McDowell to Fredericksburg, and thence to the aid of McClellan. Six days later, May 24, the order

**McClellan's
Plan.**

**His
Advance to
the Chicka-
hominy.**

**James River
Opened.**

was reversed on account of unexpected developments in the Shenandoah valley. This region furnishes a safe approach to Harper's Ferry, sixty miles from the capital and seventy-five from Baltimore. Stonewall Jackson was in its lower part with 17,000 men, watched by Banks with 19,000 near Strasburg, and Frémont, with 15,000 in the mountains to the westward — all within easy distance. Besides these, there were

**Jackson's
Diversion
in the
Valley.**

7000 men at Harper's Ferry. Milroy, under Frémont, stood with 3500 men at McDowell, 25 miles west of Staunton, so that if Jackson advanced on Banks, Milroy might close in on his rear.

The approach of McClellan to Richmond made it advisable for Jackson to create a diversion, so as to draw off McDowell, and he began a brilliant campaign which well illustrates what an inferior force, when well handled, may do in conflict with a divided opposition. First he fell unexpectedly on Milroy and defeated him, and pursuing him northward threw Frémont into such terror that he was not a factor in the situation for several days. Then returning to the valley, he moved swiftly on Banks at Strasburg, whose force had just been weakened by sending 10,000 men under Shields to help McDowell in his movement to the aid of McClellan. Jackson was nearly on Banks before his approach was known. The latter was too weak to fight, and hastened northward, the confederates in hot pursuit. At Winchester, May 25, they overtook Banks, charged him at dawn, and sent his force beaten and demoralized toward the Potomac, which the fugitives crossed the next day, Jackson stopping at Harper's Ferry. This unexpected movement created consternation in Washington, which, the authorities thought, was Jackson's objective. It was on this account that McDowell was ordered to turn away from Fredericksburg. Lincoln hoped to throw him into the valley south of Jackson's position, to bring Frémont from the west into the same position, and thus surround and capture Jackson. Orders to this effect were given; but

**Plan
to Trap
Jackson.**

Jackson knew his danger and began a retreat as rapid as his advance. He barely slipped into Strasburg before Shields and Frémont reached them from opposite directions, and, when they tried to follow him down the valley, hurled them back in two sharp battles. In a month's campaign he had captured many prisoners and vast supply trains, which he safely sent off from Port Republic, and he had drawn McDowell so far westward that he was worth nothing to McClellan, who must fight Johnston unaided.

But McClellan was not in danger. He had nearly 120,000 men, and his pickets were in sight of Richmond, within which Johnston could muster but 63,000. The union army was in five corps, two of which under Keyes and Heintzelman were south of the Chickahominy, then swollen by rains, and the others under Porter, Sumner, and Franklin were north of it to protect the railroad to White

House Landing and to touch hands with McDowell, who was expected up to May 24. Johnston saw his opportunity and fell on the two

**The Battle
of Seven
Pines,
May 31.**

isolated corps of Keyes and Heintzelman on May 31 at Seven Pines, or Fair Oaks. He fought hard and drove back his opponents, but they were not crushed, and late in the day Sumner crossed the river and saved the battle ere dark. Next day other troops were thrown over, and the

united army drove back the confederates to their position in the beginning of the action. At sunset on the 31st, Johnston was severely

**Lee in
Command.**

wounded, and June 1 Robert E. Lee succeeded him. Two roads ran from this region into the city, and across them he began to throw up breastworks, behind which his army

was placed. Rain for two weeks made the ground impossible for artillery, and Lee was thus able to finish his defenses before they could be assailed.

McClellan has been criticized for not assaulting, but he had another plan of battle. He was strong in artillery and proposed to plant

**Siege
Approaches
Planned.**

it advantageously and force the confederate lines by approaching in siege fashion, — a slow but sure method for a superior force. Davis and Lee both admitted that it would be successful. Not daring to await such an attack,

they planned a movement around the federal right. Jackson, still in the Shenandoah valley, was to elude McDowell, and march to the north of McClellan's lines, while Lee, coming out of his

**Confederate
Plan of
Attack.**

intrenchments, would join Jackson at the right moment, cut McClellan's communications, and surround and capture him, or send him in confusion back to the York river. The

danger in this was that Jackson's coöperation might be ill-timed or that McClellan might penetrate Lee's lines when they were weakened and occupy Richmond. Lee knew both his lieutenant and his foe. He did not believe the former would fail him, nor that the latter had enough enterprise to strike for Richmond at the critical moment. In both conclusions his judgment proved good.

Jackson cleverly got out of the valley and, marching with that rapidity which won for his men the name of "foot cavalry," was

**Mechanics-
ville, June
26.**

north of Richmond on June 26. Here Porter's corps, about 25,000 strong, protected the federal right at Mechanicsville, the only federal troops north of the Chickahominy. At this moment Lee ordered out A. P. Hill's,

Longstreet's, and D. H. Hill's divisions to unite with Jackson and crush Porter. The former moved at the appointed hour and fought

**Gaines's
Mill,
June 27.**

a vigorous battle at Mechanicsville, June 26; but Jackson was half a day late and Hill's attack was beaten back.

In the night the four confederate lieutenants united their forces and faced Porter with 55,000 men. The latter was badly placed, and by the orders of his superior fell back to Gaines's

Mill, where he received and checked the first confederate charge about noon of the 27th. All through the afternoon he fought desperately, but at sunset his lines were broken by a general assault and his defeated corps, numbering with reinforcements 31,000, was forced off the field and sought safety south of the river. During this day McClellan had over 60,000 men south of the river, between Lee and Richmond, in which were only 25,000 defenders. He might well have overcome this force and taken the city, but his overcautious mind thought at least 100,000 confederates were in Richmond, and he thought this was proved by the fact that Lee did not hesitate to leave the place for operations against Porter.

McClellan's
Lost
Opportunity.

The capture of the north bank of the Chickahominy placed Lee across the communications of the federal army. He believed the federals would either fight their way back or retreat down the peninsula to Fortress Monroe. On the morning of the 28th clouds of dust to the east seemed to show they had taken the latter course, and he made arrangements to follow. It was not until next morning that he learned he was mistaken. McClellan had determined to shift his base to the James and was rapidly executing that movement, much benefited by the twenty-four hours' start Lee unwittingly gave him. He was followed with haste on the 29th, but held his own in a hard fight at Savage's Station, and again on the 30th in a still harder encounter at Frayser's Farm, or Glendale. July 1 he was on the bank of the James, marching southeastward to Harrison's Landing, where the anchorage was good. He took a strong position at Malvern Hill, overlooking the river, and for a moment the confederates hesitated to attack. But Lee believed he had defeated most of the federal army at Gaines's Mill, and thought his opponents so demoralized that they could not make a successful resistance. He ordered the assault, and his forces were received with well-directed artillery and infantry fire and defeated with heavy loss. It is conceded that the battle of Malvern Hill was an error on the part of the confederate commander, due to his underestimation of the strength and condition of the federals.

His Change
of Base.

Savage's
Station and
Frayser's
Farm, June
29 and 30.

Malvern
Hill, July 1.

The Seven Days' Battles, June 26 to July 1, comprised five engagements in which McClellan lost 15,849 and Lee 20,135. The result was a union defeat in the sense that Richmond was not taken. But McClellan at Harrison's Landing was only twenty miles from Richmond, and had a safe base of operations. His army, though exhausted and dispirited, was not demoralized, and might have taken the offensive again after a short period of rest. He himself had no thought of giving up and called for reinforcements. But the confidence of the government in the general was undermined,

Results.

reënforcements were not sent, and after ten days of hesitation it was determined to recall him to Washington and move his army to northern Virginia. The controversy that arose over his treatment is historic. Personally he was arrogant, and his letters to Lincoln were

**The
McClellan
Controversy.** full of bitter reproaches. The president's replies are always in the kindest terms, and it cannot be doubted that he supported his unpopular general as long as the country at large would have it. But spite of his faults, McClellan was a safe campaigner of the deliberate kind, and if he had been given his way, he would probably have hung on at Richmond until he stormed it into surrender. It is in his favor that the city finally fell before a nine months' siege in which Grant approached from practically the same quarter that McClellan selected in the beginning of the war.


POPE AND SECOND BULL RUN

July 11, ten days after Malvern Hill, Halleck was recalled from St. Louis and made commander of all the union armies with headquarters in Washington. For the success in the West his subordinates were chiefly responsible, but this was not as clear then as later. He became, in fact, military associate with the president and the secretary of war, who, since January, 1862, was the strong-willed Stanton. The armies of Frémont, Banks, and McDowell were consolidated, in all 43,000 men, and Pope, victor at Island No. 10, was placed in command. He was an aggressive general, but incautious. He issued a proclamation to his new army containing these words, and others of similar import: "I have come to you from the West, where we have always seen the backs of our enemies; from an army whose business it has been to seek the adversary and to beat him when he was found. . . . I presume that I have been called here to pursue the same system." This overconfident spirit offended the officers and privates, who were sensitive about their recent defeats. In an unlucky moment he said, by common report, that his headquarters would be in the saddle, a phrase which set his soldiers laughing at his expense. Early in July he mobilized his army in front of Washington and turned its face southward along the line of railroad that ran to Manassas, arriving undisturbed at Culpeper. He was much under the influence of Stanton and other radical politicians whose interference frequently created difficulties for Lincoln and the generals.

At Culpeper, Pope threatened Gordonsville, where the railroad from the north crosses another from Staunton going eastward. To protect it Lee sent forward Jackson with nearly 24,000 men, who reached Gordonsville and turned northward, while Banks, followed at an interval by Sigel with Frémont's old army, was hurrying

SCENE OF OPERATIONS IN THE EAST

Scale of Miles
0 25 50



southward. August 8, Jackson struck Banks, whose force was only 8000, at Cedar Mountain. The federal troops remembered the valley campaign and fought desperately, but they were outnumbered two to one and were forced back on Sigel late in the afternoon. Then Jackson halted for the arrival of Lee, who, at last satisfied that McClellan's army was withdrawing from Harrison's Landing, was moving rapidly on Gordonsville. McClellan's men were then marching overland to Yorktown and Fortress Monroe to embark for Acquia Creek, on the Potomac, whence they would undoubtedly be sent to strengthen Pope; but as this movement would require two weeks Lee hoped by a quick concentration to crush Pope before reënforcements reached Culpeper. But Pope displayed unexpected caution. From a captured dispatch he learned Lee's plan and fell back behind the Rappahannock and was 35 miles from Acquia Creek, where troops were already landing. There was much confusion in high circles in Washington, but Pope was ordered to hold the Rappahannock at every hazard, and it was believed that a forward movement would follow a federal concentration.

**Jackson
Meets
Banks at
Cedar
Mountain.**

All this came to naught through a brilliant movement, probably conceived by Stonewall Jackson. It was, in brief, to send Jackson with 25,000 men well around Pope's right to cut the railroad by which the union supplies came up. Pope, it might be expected, would fall back and fight Jackson, who must manage to beat him off for a short time, while Lee, making a still wider detour to the west, would come up as Pope fought, take position by Jackson's side, and complete the work of federal demoralization. It was a hazardous measure, but Lee felt he could risk something in the presence of a general so unwary as Pope. The result showed that his confidence was well founded. In fact, the plan worked better than was anticipated; for Jackson was able to elude his enemy until Lee was actually at hand.

**Confederate
Plan of
Attack.**

The start was made August 25, and twenty-five miles were covered that day in safety. Pope heard that a large body of troops was marching on his right and should have occupied the passes in that direction, but he thought the confederate army was moving into the Shenandoah valley by Fort Royal, and neglected to protect his rear. Eight miles north of the Rappahan-

**Jackson
Reaches
Pope's Rear.**

nock a range of hills, the Bull Run mountains, runs away northward, broken sixteen miles west of Manassas by Thoroughfare Gap. Passing beyond these hills, which screened his movements, Jackson halted before the Gap on the night of the 26th, and next morning passed through it, moving rapidly eastward. In the late afternoon he reached Bristoe Station, cut the telegraph lines, broke the railroad track, and sending a portion of his force to Manassas destroyed a vast depot of federal supplies after appropriating all his troops

could consume or carry with them. In this process he spent all of the 27th, throwing out detachments north and south to save his main force from surprise.

About 8 o'clock on the 26th, Pope learned the confederates were in his rear. He did not think they were divided, but thought they could not have gone further than Warrenton and that the demonstration at Bristoe was only a feint. He gave orders, therefore, to concentrate at Warrenton, where he expected to offer battle. But riding to Bristoe late in the day he discovered that Jackson was resting at Manassas and gave sharp orders for a concentration at that point. McDowell had divined the true situation and occupied the approaches to Thoroughfare Gap, by which Lee must come up. If he had held them, the force at Manassas must have been isolated and badly handled. But he obeyed orders, and on the 28th withdrew just as Longstreet, commanding the other half of Lee's army, approached it from the west. He moved toward Manassas, where Pope arrived at noon of the same day. To the surprise of Pope his prey had gone in the night. No one knew just where, but it was said he went to the northeast. Pope supposed the confederates were trying to reach Alexandria and gave orders to move northward. Jackson's departure to the northeast was only a feint. He soon doubled back toward Thoroughfare

**Pope's
Hasty Retrograde
Movement.**

**Jackson
Opens
Battle.**

Gap and took a strong position on the heights of Groveton, two miles west of the old Bull Run battlefield. He concealed his force as well as he could through the night and next forenoon, August 29, and awaited news from Longstreet. On the same morning the supporting column cleared the Gap, and Jackson, hearing the good news, revealed his position and opened fire on union columns moving along the roads toward the north. Longstreet, hearing the guns, hurried his steps, and arriving at noon found his friend warmly engaged, the union brigades coming up rapidly and forming line of battle as they arrived. Longstreet placed himself on Jackson's right, before which Porter's corps had taken position. Pope was determined to fight a battle, and ordered Porter to turn Jackson's right; but Porter, finding masses of infantry before him, refused to sacrifice his men, and reported the situation. Pope paid no attention to this information, for he still thought Longstreet beyond the Bull Run mountains. He therefore assaulted Jackson's center, and renewed his orders to Porter to turn the confederate left. Again Porter refused to attack, action for which he was cashiered and removed from command, only to be completely exonerated by congress after many years of discussion. At nightfall the confederates were still in position, the union assaults in the center had been beaten off, and Pope's army was dispirited.

But the general, who six weeks earlier had talked so confidently of victory, could not make up his mind to fall back as he should have

done. He remained in his tracks, and on the morning of the 30th resumed the battle. Moving Porter from the left he sent him against Lee's center. This gallant officer, stung by criticisms of the previous day, now showed the greatest bravery; but his best efforts were in vain. Then Lee took the offensive, charging the federals persistently, forcing them back to the Henry House, on the battlefield of the preceding year — where by a desperate stand the confederates were held at bay until the demoralized federals had crossed Bull Run and blown up the famous old bridge behind them. The army marched on toward Washington, Lee sent Jackson in a pursuit which ended on September 1, when the pursuers were barely defeated at Chantilly, where gallant Phil Kearny lost his life. In this campaign Pope lost 14,000 out of 80,000 men and Lee lost 9000 out of 54,000.

Second
Battle of
Manassas.

Thus ended Pope's campaign. In the flood of unpopularity which came upon him the country forgot his good qualities. He was as hard a fighter as Hood, who impetuously wore himself out fighting Sherman and Thomas. But, like Hood, he was arrayed against very able generals. He was deceived by Jackson's remarkably rapid march and by Lee's audacious tactics. He lost his self-control when he found himself cut off from his base and gave orders in utter distraction; but when once the enemy's position was revealed he turned and fought bravely. It is due him, also, to say that he was much hampered by his superiors. Halleck assumed to direct his movements, kept him in ignorance of the plans of campaign being made in Washington, and left him ignorant of the movements of reinforcement which had been promised. But the disaster at second Bull Run destroyed Pope's influence over his army, and his removal became a necessity.

Pope as a
Commander.

THE CAMPAIGN OF ANTIETAM

Lee was not strong enough to besiege Washington, and foresaw that to wait at Manassas would invite a federal countermove, before which he must fall back with a loss of prestige. He concluded to proceed at once into Maryland, hoping the people there would join his army in numbers. His plan was to march to Hagerstown, where he would force a battle with the union army, and beating it to threaten Harrisburg and probably Baltimore. As it was just at this time that Kirby Smith and Bragg were operating successfully in Kentucky (see page 529) it was hoped that such an impression might be made on European opinion that recognition of the confederacy would follow. September 4, less than a week after Pope's crushing defeat, his advance under Jackson crossed the Potomac twenty-five miles above Washington, and by the 7th the rest of his army was in Maryland. Reënforced by the

Lee
Invades
Maryland.

troops he had left in Richmond he had hardly 60,000 men. September 6, Jackson reached Frederick, where the now repudiated Barbara-Frietchie incident was said to have occurred. To his surprise the farmers drove off their cattle and would not sell their grain. Then Lee decided to open a line of supplies through the Shenandoah valley, at the entrance of which was Harper's Ferry with a garrison of 12,500 men. To remove this obstacle he sent Jackson on the 10th, with orders to complete his task and rejoin his commander as quickly as possible. To divide his army thus in the presence of the enemy was ordinarily bad generalship; but he knew his opponents were slow and he believed no harmful results would follow. Jackson's march was swift, as usual, and on the 14th he occupied the hills which encircle the place, and the garrison, with many valuable stores, was surrendered without a battle.

**Harper's
Ferry
Captured.**

But let us return to the army of Pope, marching on September 5 hopelessly back to Washington. Near the city the vanguard was met by McClellan with orders to take command. In a moment the spirit of the soldiers changed, and shouts of joy welcomed him as he rode past the regiments. Pope was assigned to other duties in Washington. The same day orders were given to enter Maryland and follow Lee, but it was not until the 10th that McClellan had reorganized the army, and the 12th before he reached Frederick, through which the confederates had passed a few days earlier. Here he was handed, at 6 p.m. on the 13th, an order from Lee to D. H. Hill, recently found by a private, which revealed the plans of the confederate commander. It showed him that his opponent's army was divided, and he decided to place himself between its two parts. Twelve miles west of him were the South mountains, with two gaps in them, beyond which the roads connecting the two confederate forces were no more than eight miles

**McClellan
in Com-
mand.**

**His Slow
Approach
to Lee.**

away. Had he marched in the night he might have occupied these passes, but he waited until daylight, and when he reached them found they were held by the confederates. By hard fighting the gaps were both carried on the 14th, but the loss was severe. By this time Lee had learned the fate of the lost order and was falling back from Hagerstown. He stopped at Sharpsburg, threw up intrenchments in a strong position with Antietam creek on his front, and waited Jackson, who on the morning of the 15th received the surrender of Harper's Ferry and immediately set out to rejoin Lee, fifteen miles away. From Lee's position to the South mountains was only nine miles, and McClellan easily covered them by noon of the 15th. If he had fought in the afternoon he would have had half the confederate force at his mercy; but he chose to wait while his army recuperated. Next morning Jackson's men were coming up rapidly, but the last divisions did not

arrive until the following morning, the 17th. Yet McClellan was idle on the 16th. Nothing could better show how little he was capable of seizing upon a favorable situation.

There was skirmishing late on the 16th, but it was not until dawn of the 17th that the battle was opened. Three corps, Hooker's, Mansfield's, and Sumner's, had approached Lee's left on the 16th, showing him where to expect attack. He drew back his lines and strengthened the point threatened. In the early morning Hooker came up most vigorously.

**Battle of
Antietam,
September
17, 1862.**

As he struggled for the high ground in front of him, Mansfield came up and joined in the battle. But the latter officer was killed, Hooker was severely wounded, and soon afterwards their corps fell back out of the deadly fire. Then Sumner advanced on the same position unsupported. He received the concentrated fire of Lee's left wing, and was so cut up that he had to withdraw with severe loss. Thus by one o'clock the fighting on Lee's left ended in a repulse. It was immediately renewed on his right, where Burnside's men pressed against lines which had been weakened to meet the charge on the left. They carried the battle before them and seemed about to seize the high ground which commanded this part of the field when A. P. Hill's division of Jackson's corps rushed up, completing an eighteen-mile march from Harper's Ferry. Without orders from Lee they fell on the advancing union line and drove it back with bloody effect to its original position. Then night came, and the battle of Antietam was over. Lee's army of 60,000 had repelled the attack with a loss of 11,000 killed and wounded. McClellan with 87,000 lost 12,400.

Next morning each army was in position, but McClellan did not renew the battle. Lee's advance into Maryland was checked, and nothing was left but to recross the Potomac, which was only two miles behind his position. This he did on the 19th without interference from his unaggressive adversary. September 17 was the bloodiest single day in the war.

**Results
of the
Battle.**

The union soldiers fought splendidly, and justified the confidence of their commander. The nation received the news with joy; for although the confederacy was not destroyed, the union army's prestige was reestablished and the North was relieved from invasion. McClellan's failure to impede the confederate retreat again brought his serious failing into prominence, and for this he was removed, the command going, November 5, to Burnside.

THE BATTLE OF FREDERICKSBURG

Burnside did not wish to lead the army, but the appointment came as an order, and he obeyed it. The whole situation demanded a move on Richmond. Indeed, it was for not moving that McClellan was displaced. Two railroads ran from the Potomac southward; one from

Washington by way of Manassas, through a rolling country in which the rivers are narrow, the other from Acquia Creek through Fredericksburg to Richmond, crossing rivers comparatively broad. Along the former both McDowell in 1861 and Pope in 1862 had operated. If the country was more practicable than that to the eastward, it gave a longer approach to Richmond. Burnside, weighing all advantages and disadvantages, concluded to move by Acquia Creek and Fredericksburg, and Lincoln, after some hesitation, accepted the plan. Lee was then at Culpeper with Longstreet, and Jackson was far away in the valley. Burnside ordered pontoons, and eluding Lee moved quickly to the Rappahannock opposite Fredericksburg, hoping to cross the river and hold the heights south of it before Lee could arrive. But his pontoons were not ready promptly, and when they arrived Longstreet held the southern heights and Jackson was coming up rapidly. Burnside had 113,000 and Lee, with Jackson at hand, had 78,000 men.

The ground adjoining the river on the south is a plain from a mile to a mile and a half wide, covered by Burnside's guns on the north bank. Behind it rise hills, on the crest of which Lee took position. His left was held by Longstreet and his right by Jackson, who arrived there on the 12th and was not well intrenched on the day of the battle. Burnside divided his force into three grand divisions under Hooker, Franklin, and Sumner. The first remained in reserve on the north bank, but the second and third he threw across the river on the 12th, where they remained safely on the plain. Franklin confronted Jackson, and Sumner, protected by the streets of Fredericksburg, was before Longstreet. Burnside by this time showed that the problem on his mind overwhelmed him. He displayed little decision, and his lieutenants were full of misgivings. Early on the 13th Franklin received an order which might mean to carry the works before him or to make a reconnaissance in force. The former was Burnside's intention, but Franklin in some doubt sent forward Meade's division, and some time later supported it with Gibbons's division. The former went forward with great courage, found a weak point, and penetrated Jackson's line, but he was not well supported, and was driven back with heavy loss by the confederate commander. With this, fighting ceased on this wing.

In the town Sumner had been held in restraint, but now came on to assault Longstreet. It was a murderous task; for here the confederate position was exceedingly strong. Its center was Marye's Heights, well defended at the top by artillery and at the bottom by an infantry line behind a stone wall. Across the plain by which it was reached was

Burnside in Command.

His Plan of Advance.

Battle of Fredericksburg, December 13, 1862.

On the Union Right.

On the Union Left, Marye's Heights.

an old canal, which would impede a charge, and the whole plain was so well covered that a confederate engineer remarked that it would be impossible for a chicken to live on it, once the confederate guns opened fire. Sumner's brigades, however, were thrown six times across this deadly spot, each time recoiling with enormous loss. Hooker, who had come over the river, rode hastily back to Burnside, on the north bank, to urge that the assault cease, but the general would not relent until 8000 of his men lay on the fatal slopes. The total loss in that day's fighting was 12,653 federals and 5377 confederates. December 15, under cover of night and a violent storm, the union army withdrew to the north bank. Grief and despair reigned in army and nation. Burnside himself was crushed, some of his highest officers were at open feud with him, and he asked for their dismissal or the acceptance of his own resignation. January 26 he was removed, and the command went to Hooker, chief of Burnside's critics.

**Hooker in
Command.**

THE BATTLE OF CHANCELLORSVILLE

Hooker was a good fighter, and the soldiers liked him. His appointment to command them restored the broken spirits of the men, and by April they were anxious to meet their foes. Recruiting had brought the numbers up to 130,000, while Lee in Fredericksburg had only 60,000. April 27, Hooker broke up his camp opposite Lee, sending three corps thirty miles up the river. Here they crossed and turning eastward on its right bank approached Chancellorsville, nine miles from Fredericksburg. On the 30th another corps crossed the river and joined the other three, so that Hooker by clever marching was in good position beyond the river with 40,000 men and on Lee's left flank. While this was going on, Sedgwick with 20,000 men had crossed the Rappahannock south of Lee's position and threatened his rear. May 1, Hooker moved a short distance toward the enemy, but when he suddenly met them coming toward him, eager for battle, his confidence forsook him, and he fell back to Chancellorsville against the advice of his generals. Here he selected a position with his back to the river, near a ford, and awaited attack. Since he far outnumbered Lee, it would have been better to have made the attack. Part of his line lay in the "Wilderness," a region covered with small trees and chaparral and difficult for marching troops. His officers and soldiers were disgusted that he so quickly relinquished a promising offensive and accepted a careful defensive. May 2, Lee was before him ready to attack, spite of his numerical inferiority. Jackson is said to have suggested the plan of battle which was adopted. While the confederate line

**Hooker's
Excellent
Initiative.**

**Abandons
the
Offensive.**

**Battle of
Chancellors-
ville, May
2, 3, and 4,
1863.**

made feint after feint along the union front, he made a detour of fifteen miles, until at five o'clock in the afternoon he fell unexpectedly on Hooker's extreme right, routing Howard's corps and badly demoralizing the corps next to it. Then darkness closed down, and it seemed that the coming of dawn would witness a renewed and successful fight by the terrible Jackson. But his end was at hand. In the twilight he rode past his own sentinels to reconnoiter in the enemy's rear. Half an hour later a group of horsemen galloped back

**Death of
Jackson.**

on the sentinels and received a volley, after which a voice out of the dark called: "Boys, don't fire again: you have hit General Jackson!" They carried him through lines of his own awe-stricken men to a hospital, and May 10 he died. Had he been at Gettysburg, as Lee truly said, the story of the battle would have been different.

May 3 the battle was renewed, and by 10 o'clock the field belonged to the confederates. Hooker, dazed by the effects of a cannon ball,

**The Victory
Completed.**

which struck a column against which he leaned, drew back toward the river. Sedgwick now approached behind Lee, after driving off Early with 9000 men, whom Lee left at Fredericksburg. Lee believed Hooker was past active resistance, and turned his back on him to crush Sedgwick. He found him on the river's edge, five miles from the camp of his superior commander, and pressed him so disastrously on the 4th that Sedgwick crossed to the north bank during the night. Then Lee turned again on Hooker's 80,000, who stood not to fight, although they would have done it with a better general, but withdrew to the north bank by the morning of the 6th. Through three days of fighting at Chancellorsville the losses were 17,287 on the union side and 12,463 on the confederate side. It was the last great confederate victory.


THE GETTYSBURG CAMPAIGN

Lee's motives in invading the North were three: 1. He wished to transfer the war to enemy's territory. 2. It was becoming evident that Vicksburg would fall, and he wished to counteract its effect by a victory of his own equally decisive, *i.e.* by taking Harrisburg, Philadelphia, Baltimore, or even Washington. 3. He knew the North was tiring of the war, that the terms of enlistment of her soldiers were expiring, and he thought a great defeat now would tend to make her accept peace on the basis of Southern independence. Calling to him Longstreet's corps, which was

**Lee's
Motives.**

His Plan.

not in the battle of Chancellorsville, he had nearly 80,000 men, while his antagonist could hardly muster more until the new levies could be assembled. The rest of his army was in two corps: Jackson's old corps, now commanded by Ewell, and another commanded by A. P. Hill. To Ewell was given the van, and he



started June 10 for the Shenandoah valley, which he easily cleared of union troops. June 15 he began to cross the Potomac, whence he moved to Hagerstown, Maryland. A few days' march behind him went Hill, and after him Longstreet, so that by June 26 the three corps were across the Potomac. So well did Lee's cavalry screen his movements that these initial stages of his campaign were accomplished without revealing his intentions to Hooker. But in the last days of June its leader, Jeb Stuart, made one of his daring raids, passing between Washington and the federal army into Pennsylvania. He reached York after Early had left it, went on to Carlisle, to find Ewell was not there, and only arrived at Gettysburg on July 2, his horses so exhausted that they were not fit for service. At Hanover, on his march, Stuart had a sharp battle with the federal horse, an arm which Hooker had brought to a high state of efficiency. His absence from Lee's immediate front gave the federal commander an opportunity to observe the confederate movements, and the result was a more rapid union concentration than Lee had expected.

**The
Confederate
Cavalry.**

Meanwhile, Ewell marched rapidly toward Harrisburg. June 27, he reached Carlisle and sent Early's division eastward to York, which was forced to pay a contribution. Early tried to seize the Columbia bridge over the Susquehanna, so as to approach the state capital from the east; but a retreating militia regiment had the forethought to burn the bridge, and this point marked the limit of Early's eastern advance. At the same time Ewell, halting at Carlisle, prepared to attack Harrisburg with his main force. His cavalry, in fact, reached the Susquehanna opposite the town, but on June 29, Lee, who with Longstreet and Hill had reached Chambersburg, ordered him back with all his corps, and the Pennsylvania capital was no longer in danger.

**Ewell's
Advance on
Harrisburg.**

Lee's order to Ewell was due to an unexpectedly rapid concentration of the union army. Hooker, who was at cross purposes with Halleck, was forced to remain in Virginia as long as Lee was there. When at last he crossed the Potomac to Frederick, he had been so hampered by his superiors that the union columns were widely separated. In despair of getting them together, he proposed to resign. The offer was accepted, and thus it happened that on June 27 General Meade was placed in command. He was an able general, of the McClellan school, and he could get on with Halleck. He hastened northward to place himself between Lee and Baltimore, entering Pennsylvania June 30. Lee was at Chambersburg when he learned he was being pursued, Hill and Longstreet with him. The former he sent to Gettysburg at once, and ordered the latter to follow, while Ewell was directed to move from his advanced position to the same place. This convinced Meade, then at Taneytown,

**Meade in
Command.**

**Concentrat-
ing on
Gettysburg.**

Maryland, that Lee sought a battle, and he selected the ground he would take at Pipe Creek, just south of the Maryland line — about 13 miles from Gettysburg. To delay Lee, he sent Reynolds forward to Gettysburg with three corps, expecting they would fall back as they were pressed. Ahead of them marched Buford's cavalry, which arrived at Gettysburg June 30, in the night.

Three roads from the south and southeast converge on Gettysburg, from Emmitsburg, Taneytown, and Baltimore. Along them on the morning of July 1 marched the union troops from six to thirty miles away. Of the several roads on the west and north, one leads from Chambersburg, and along it were marching Hill and Longstreet, while another approaches from Carlisle, and along it came Ewell. Just south of the town in the sharp angle between the Emmitsburg and Taneytown roads is a hill on whose top was the town cemetery. The ground rises to it gently, and from its southern edge a ridge runs away for a mile or more, beyond which is a small hill, Little Round Top, and a much larger one, Round Top. East of the cemetery is a slight depression, beyond which is another elevation, Culp's Hill. Taken as a whole it offers an ideal battlefield for an army fighting on the defensive. Its gentle slope gives good play for artillery. Stone walls and bowlders on its crest furnish cover for the infantry, its outward curve makes its interior lines short and easy, and the hills at either extremity protect it against flanking movements.

Past this strong position rode Buford when he entered the town, Reynolds's infantry a few miles behind him. He well knew the confederates were approaching, and early in the morning moved out on the roads by which they marched. Across the Chambersburg pike, three-quarters of a mile from Gettysburg, he posted his men on a wooded height known as Seminary Ridge. At nine o'clock Hill's van came in sight, halted, formed a line of battle, and opened fire. Every moment the line grew stronger, and about eleven Buford was about to be driven back when Reynolds's force arrived and the fight continued, brigades on each side being thrown into the battle line as fast as they arrived. Just before noon Reynolds was killed. His men were discouraged, but held their position until 3 o'clock, when Ewell's corps was coming up from the north. They formed on Hill's left and enveloped the union right so that it fell back, lest it be surrounded. Hill now advanced and held Seminary Ridge, while Ewell pushed his line through Gettysburg to the town's southern limits, five hundred yards from the cemetery on the hill. This quiet spot was the scene of much confusion as the union columns reached it. Cannon were not in position for defense, and the men were too tired to make a spirited stand. If Ewell had advanced with his relatively fresh troops, he must have carried the hill and forced

**The
Battlefield.**

**The Battle
Opened,
July 1.**

**Ewell's
Lost Op-
portunity.**

the union troops to concentrate at Pipe's Creek. But Ewell let the opportunity go, and Hancock, who had just arrived to take Reynolds's place, recognizing the strength of the position, intrenched as rapidly as possible, placed his guns in position, and sent messengers urging Meade to bring up all the troops. By dark they were arriving rapidly, and at one o'clock in the morning Meade arrived and confirmed Hancock's decision to fight at Gettysburg. By dawn Cemetery Ridge was well defended.

By this time Lee's army was at Gettysburg, or in easy distance. Hill lay on Seminary Ridge, stretching away to the southward. Ewell was on Hill's left, his own left going as far east as Culp's Hill, and Longstreet, who at nightfall of the 1st was on the Chambersburg Pike in Hill's rear, was ordered to

**Longstreet's
Attack,
July 2.**

move at dawn as quietly as possible to Hill's right and seize Little Round Top, from which batteries, as Lee saw, could sweep the whole union line. Had the order been given to a Stonewall Jackson, it would probably have been executed; but Longstreet did not favor forcing the battle and wished to flank Meade out of his strong position. He did not get his force into position until the afternoon, and when he charged against the hill it had been occupied by a federal force, and the assault was driven back. But just north of the hill Longstreet encountered Sickles's corps, thrown out beyond the ridge, and against it he delivered a severe battle. Meade sent division after division to stem the tide, and by six o'clock the attack here was repelled, although Sickles, severely wounded, was driven back to the top of the ridge. During the afternoon, but later, Ewell made an attack on Meade's right. At Culp's Hill he

**Ewell's
Attack,
July 2.**

carried all before him, and when his advance was stopped by darkness, his troops were within dangerous proximity to the union rear. That night Meade held a council of war. He had been pushed back on both wings, and the losses were heavy; but it was decided to stand another day and fight the battle to a finish. To Gibbon, commanding the union center, Meade remarked: "Your turn will come to-morrow. To-day he has struck the flanks. Next, it will be the center."

July 3, the attack came, most dramatically. Early in the morning there was severe fighting around Culp's Hill, but the federal lines held.

The rest of the forenoon the two lines lay quietly on their arms, a mile or more apart. At 1 o'clock came the sharp crack of two rifled cannon, the signal for a cannonade from the confederate guns: 80 union cannon, all that

**The Attack
on the
Center,
July 3.**

would bear on the scene, opened in reply, and for an hour and a half the heavens reverberated in a mighty symphony. At 2.30 P.M. the federals ceased firing, because their ammunition was running low. Their adversaries then slackened fire, and the word was passed to the infantry to charge the union center where Hancock

commanded. Pickett's division, numbering 5400, stood in front of Cemetery Ridge, a mile away, with orders to penetrate the opposing line, supported by 10,000 men from Hill's corps. Stuart's cavalry was made ready to follow and cut up the federals when they should be pressed back. Longstreet was Pickett's superior. He said that no 15,000 men could take the position, but his orders were explicit, and he directed the advance. The charging column started as steadily as on parade. For a quarter of a mile it was protected by a little swale; but as it reached the crest the union guns reopened with deadly effect. At 600 yards came canister, making great gaps in the advancing column, which did not waver. At closer range the guns were silent, and thick ranks of infantry, hitherto lying down behind the batteries, rose, advanced before the guns, and poured a withering fire into the fast diminishing column. But its approach was not halted until it struck the union infantry, carried them back beyond their own guns, where a new line met and checked it. For a brief space, some said twenty minutes, but no man could count the minutes in such a time, it held its advance; but Hancock, still fighting though severely wounded, threw out regiments to take it in flank, and the assailants were either shot, captured, or driven back across the deadly plain by which they approached. Hancock said: "I have never seen a more formidable attack." Lee's army was badly shattered,

**Lee
Returns to
Virginia.**

and he prepared to receive the countercharge he thought would surely come. But Meade's plans were defensive, and the confederates were allowed to remain undisturbed in their lines. All night and all the next day they remained in camp, and on July 5 they withdrew to the south, Meade making no serious effort to strike them ere they crossed the Potomac on July 13. The losses in the three days' fight, killed, wounded, and captured, were 23,003 federals and 20,451 confederates.

The battle of Gettysburg was a very hazardous undertaking from Lee's standpoint. With an army of 70,000 he invaded enemy's terri-

**Lee's Gen-
eralship.**

tory and fought an aggressive engagement against an intrenched and well-placed army of 93,500. His attack could only be justified on the ground that his opponents were much worse fighters than his own men. Ordinarily he was cautious, but he had beaten his opponents so often that he had come to underestimate them. Pope's, Burnside's, and Hooker's campaigns failed because of bad generalship, not because of an incapable soldiery. Lee assumed in his invasion that the leadership of Hooker would continue. In Meade a better type of commander opposed him, and at a time when the confederate general undertook a more serious task than ever before. Meade was not a brilliant general, but he showed no serious faults at Gettysburg, and he had in his great battle the confidence of his army, officers and privates, as well as the entire support of the war department, advantages not enjoyed by either Pope, Burnside, or Hooker.

FROM THE WILDERNESS TO PETERSBURG

After Gettysburg, the two armies remained inactive in Virginia. There was some maneuvering by which Lee managed to keep Meade in northern Virginia, but neither general risked a battle during the autumn. It was in this autumn that Bragg was being forced out of Chattanooga by Rosecrans and Grant, an operation which demanded the best efforts of each government. In March, 1864, Grant, as we have seen (page 535), was made lieutenant general and took command of all the union armies. Meade was left in actual command of his army, but Grant joined it and directed its movements. During the winter it lay north of the Rapidan on the railroad that ran through Manassas, Lee's army just south of the same river. Grant had 122,000 men well drilled and amply equipped; his adversary had about half as many, and they lacked many of the necessities of war.

Grant's
Preparations.

May 3, Grant moved forward by his left, crossing the Rapidan into the dense thicket known as the Wilderness. Lee was very vigilant, and May 5 confronted the federals in this tangle of undergrowth, whose roads he knew well. Grant's plan was to go ahead by sheer hard fighting, and he threw his men on Lee's lines without hesitation. In such a place his superiority in artillery was of little use, and the two days' fighting was a severe contest of infantry against infantry (May 5 and 6). The result was a check for each army; for, the battle ended, each force stood in its tracks. Grant had thought Lee would fall back. Disappointed in this, he determined to flank still further to the enemy's right, and May 8 reached Spottsylvania Court House, twelve miles to the southeast. His movement was observed by Lee, whom he found across the road well intrenched. Should it be an attack or a flanking movement? Grant chose the former. Time after time he assaulted or skirmished, thinking to break the lines by sheer weight of superior numbers. At every point he was repulsed. May 12, the fighting and losses were heaviest; for on this day the union loss was 8500. At last the commander gave up his attempt to break through, and flanked again by the left. From May 5 to 21, his total loss was 34,000. It was at Spottsylvania that he wrote the dispatch in which he said: "I propose to fight it out on this line, if it takes all summer."

The
Wilderness,
May 5 and 6.

Spottsylvania Court
House,
May 8-21.

May 23, Grant reached the North Anna, only to find Lee on its south bank so well fortified that even Grant did not assail. The result was another flank march to the east, Lee always anticipating the maneuver. By this means the two armies reached by May 28 the ground McClellan occupied in May, 1862. June 2, after heavy skirmishing, they faced one another at Cold Harbor, six miles from the fortifications of

Cold Harbor,
June 3,
1864.

Richmond. Grant wished to crush the confederate army before it entered these defenses, and gave orders for an attack all along the line. It was delivered at dawn, June 3, in a grand assault by 80,000 men. Officers and privates were confident it would fail, but they did not flinch. No troops could withstand the heavy fire they encountered, and in twenty-two minutes the assault failed with a loss of 7000. Hancock's corps alone lost 3000. The space between the lines was covered with the dead and wounded, but Grant would not ask for a truce to remove them, and for four days they were neglected. The confederate loss was about 600. For his indifference to human life at Cold Harbor, Grant was severely criticized. He himself later declared the assault an error. The result convinced him that Lee was not to be crushed in battle, and he moved for the James river in order to lay siege to Richmond. From the Rapidan to the James his total loss was 54,929. Lee lost about 19,000.

THE END OF THE WAR

June 14, Grant crossed the James at City Point. At Bermuda Hundred, five miles to the west, Butler with a strong force lay inactive.

Two months earlier he had moved up the James, with 30,000 men, to take Petersburg, commanding Richmond from the south. But so soon as he left his base at City Point, Beauregard, commanding the confederates, had threatened his communications, beaten off his assault on the Richmond defenses at Drury's Bluff, and "bottled him up."

To him came Grant on June 14 with orders to attack Petersburg at once. Butler did not move promptly, and next day Smith, leading Grant's advance corps, was ordered to take the city, then very weakly defended. He advanced, took the outworks, but halted. Had he gone forward that night, he might have succeeded. But next day troops were sent to oppose him, and all hope of surprising Petersburg was lost. June 18, Lee, at last convinced that his enemy was south of the river, moved his army to Petersburg.

Grant wasted 10,000 lives in trying to carry it by assault, and then settled down to siege operations.

July 30 a great mine was sprung under the confederate works, and for a moment an open road existed into the rear of their

position; but here also was mismanagement. The troops which ought to have poured through hesitated — probably through fault of their division commander, and the confederates, rallying, were able to drive back with great slaughter the assaulting column. This bloody affair of "the Crater" cost Grant 4000 lives without any compensating advantage.

These misfortunes created great distress throughout the North. Grant, it was whispered, was drinking again, and all his costly sacri-

fice of men, at this time 75,000 since he crossed the Rapidan, had not given him the confederate capital. But his work was not lost. Lee had been greatly weakened, and his exhausted government was not able to send him reënforcements. Throughout the autumn and winter the union army worked steadily with pick and spade, and every week it became more and more evident that ultimate success was certain.

**Depression
and Hope
in the
North.**

July 1, while the siege progressed, Lee sent Early with 17,000 men to drive the federal forces from the Shenandoah valley and to threaten Washington. The confederates moved rapidly, driving Sigel's weak opposition before them. They crossed the Potomac and turned eastward. At the Monocacy Lew Wallace delayed them a day with a weak force, but they put him to flight, and July 11, in the afternoon, were at the doors of the national capital. Had Early continued his advance the place might have been taken, but he delayed until morning and was repulsed by troops which had arrived during the night from Grant's army. Early then fell back, and by good management escaped his pursuers to Strasburg, Virginia. Four days later he again moved north, defeating a union force at Kernstown and sending a column into Pennsylvania, where Chambersburg was burned because it did not pay a contribution. This action was not justifiable.

To drive Early from the Valley, Grant now sent Sheridan with 40,000 infantry and 15,000 cavalry. Lee also sent reënforcements before which Sheridan retired to the Potomac. But Lee was in dire need at Petersburg, and withdrew the succor he had sent. Sheridan then assumed the offensive with twice his opponents' strength. In two battles — Winchester, September 19, and Fisher's Hill, September 22 — he drove his opponent far southward with severe loss on both sides. Then Sheridan, with Grant's permission, adopted a policy of devastation. Barns, mills, and even residences were burned, grain, cattle, horse, and agricultural implements were taken or destroyed, and the rich valley was left so denuded of supplies that, as Sheridan said, "a crow flying over the country would need to carry his rations." It was the very frenzy of war, and was defended on the ground that it made it impossible for a confederate army in the future to operate by this way against Washington.

**Sheridan
Devastates
the Valley.**

In the South a sharp cry for vengeance arose, and Lee again sent reënforcements to Early, who took the offensive. Following the federals, he came upon them at Cedar Creek, October 19, when their commander was absent. The attack at dawn on front and flank was a surprise, and seemed a complete success. Only the sixth corps stood firm, but it fell back four miles trying to rally the fugitives as it went. Had Early concentrated his force on this splendid body, he might have had complete success. Sheridan slept the preceding night at Winchester, twenty miles from

**Battle of
Cedar
Creek.**

his army. Riding leisurely southward in the morning he learned of the situation at front and rode rapidly to the scene. At noon he was at the head of the sixth corps, had rallied the fugitives, and was marching confidently against Early, who believed himself the victor. Though taken unawares, the confederates fought courageously, but were swept off the field by the superior numbers of the union forces. At nightfall they were in flight before Sheridan's cavalry, and they were never again a menace to Washington.

The first weeks of 1865 saw the confederacy in imminent danger of collapse. Hood was crushed in Tennessee, Early was driven from the Valley, federal cavalry rode at will throughout all of Virginia north of the James, and Sherman marched without opposition through the Carolinas. Lee's army in Richmond, poorly fed and clothed, was no more than 50,000 men, and Johnston, who sought to check Sherman, had only 37,000. Southern defeat was so clearly inevitable that it was believed the confederate government must accept peace if it was offered. Under these conditions private individuals secured a meeting of commissioners on each side at Hampton Roads, February 3, 1865. Lincoln attended on the part of the North. He offered to end the war if the South would accept emancipation and submit to the authority of the union. He also promised to ask congress to pay the slaveholders for the slaves, but he frankly said he could not promise that congress would accept the suggestion.

The negotiation failed because Jefferson Davis insisted that the independence of the South should be the basis of any agreement. Had he been less blindly persistent, an armistice might have been arranged, during which Lincoln could have brought congress to some form of compromise by which much of the turmoil of reconstruction days would have been avoided.

As spring approached, Grant before Petersburg threw his left out to reach the Petersburg and Lynchburg railroad, one of the two lines by which supplies were carried into Richmond. To oppose him, Lee must extend his own line, which by reason of his inferior numbers became very thin. April 1, Sheridan was sent against the extreme confederate right at Five Forks and won a success. It was nine at night when Grant heard the result, and he immediately ordered an assault at dawn along his entire front. This also resulted favorably, the confederate works being penetrated at two points. April 3, he proposed to press his advantage and throw his left still farther around Petersburg. Threatened thus with a complete envelopment, Lee decided to evacuate Petersburg during the night and concentrate his troops, scattered around Richmond, on the southwest of the city, so as to escape along the line of railroad to Danville. To this end he gave Davis notice at 10.40 A.M., on the

**Hampton
Roads
Conference,
February 3,
1865.**

**Richmond
Taken.**

2d, in order that the confederate officials might escape from the doomed city. April 3, his army was marching along four roads which converged at Amelia Court House on the Danville railroad, thirty-five miles from Richmond. He hoped in this way to join Johnston, who, then near Raleigh, North Carolina, was ordered to Greensboro, fifty miles south of Danville.

Grant sent troops to hold the evacuated city, but lost not a moment in jubilation. His object was to bag the quarry before a junction with the North Carolina force could be effected. He marched by every road available, often fighting when Lee threw out a force to protect the confederate rear. In the morning of

Lee
Overtaken.

the 4th, Lee reached Amelia Court House, where he expected supplies. None were at hand, and he lost a precious day collecting them. On the 5th, Sheridan with the cavalry seized the railroad to Danville, which caused the confederates to turn towards Lynchburg. On short rations, dispirited, and sick, they were deserting in squads. Sheridan followed rapidly, and during the evening of April 8 got in front of Lee at Appomattox Court House. At the same time, a large body of infantry under Ord, by marching throughout the night, also got around and took position behind Sheridan. Next morning, the 9th, Lee ordered his weary troops to disperse the cavalry and march toward Lynchburg. As they moved out Sheridan drew off his troopers and revealed Ord's solid formation, an obstacle the confederates could not overcome. It was the end of the chase.

Lee now raised a white flag and met Grant at the McLean house in Appomattox village. He wore a handsome gray uniform and a splendid sword, and was in striking contrast with the victor, who was dressed in "a rough traveling suit" with the straps of a lieutenant general. After some friendly conversation Lee inquired on what terms surrender would be received. Then Grant wrote out the conditions, which were accepted. Officers and men were to be paroled and not to fight again until exchanged, in consideration of which they were not to be disturbed by the federal government so long as they observed the law. Officers were to retain their side arms, their horses, when they owned them, and their private baggage. Lee, after a moment's hesitation, said that many of his cavalymen and artillerists owned their horses, and Grant agreed that they might keep them "for the spring plowing." By these terms Lee did not have to surrender his sword, a generous courtesy on Grant's part which endeared him to Southern people. A touching farewell of Lee to his own soldiers, reduced by his march and desertion to 26,765, completed the tragic event. The broken host in gray returned to their homes, and their commander rode back to Richmond. Grant's soldiers marched back to the James river, and the northern part of the nation broke into pæans of joy that the bitter struggle was over.

The
Surrender,
April 9, 1865.

Lincoln was at City Point when Richmond was evacuated. On the 9th he returned to Washington, deeply concerned with the work of restoration. To one who said that Jefferson Davis must be hanged, he replied, "Judge not, that ye be not judged." On the 14th he met his cabinet and discussed a policy of reconstruction. "I hope there will be no persecution," he said, "no bloody work after the war is over. No one need expect me to take any part in hanging or killing those men, even the worst of them. . . . We must extinguish our resentments if we expect harmony and union." That evening he attended the theater with his family. While the play progressed, John Wilkes Booth, an actor who foolishly thought he was redressing the wrongs of the South, gained access to the president's box, fatally wounded him with a pistol shot, and escaped with a broken leg, by leaping to the stage, whence he passed to the street and rode rapidly away into Maryland. He managed to escape to Virginia, where he was tracked to his lair and shot at bay in a burning barn. One of his accomplices wounded Seward seriously in his house. Four conspirators were hanged, including Mrs. Surratt, who was probably innocent, and several others were imprisoned.

Lincoln lived until 7.22 A.M. on the 15th. His death was a poignant blow to the nation. In the darkest hours of the war he had never wavered in hope and effort; in a thousand trying events he had shown good sense and persistent good will; in many a personal attack he had borne himself with patience and self-forgetful fortitude; and in every phase of the war he had been the chief support of union. He was great in all the great phases of public leadership, but greatest of all in that overspreading consciousness that all the people, white men and black men, Northern men and Southern men, were within the bounds of his responsibility and protection.

When Lee surrendered, Sherman was at Goldsboro, North Carolina, and Johnston was near Raleigh, fifty miles to the west. Hearing that Lee marched for Danville, the latter had turned toward Greensboro, where he stood when he heard the news from Appomattox. To him came Jefferson Davis, fleeing southward. The confederate president wished the general to march to the mountains and carry on the war. Johnston objected, saying the soldiers desired peace, and it was agreed that he should ask for terms of surrender. April 17 and 18 he met Sherman at Durham, North Carolina, where an armistice was agreed to pending the reference of certain terms of peace to the president. These terms embraced the recognition by the president of the governments of the states then in condition of resistance, the reestablishment of the federal courts in the South, and the parole of officers and privates of all the confederate armies still in existence. Sherman consented to these terms because

Lincoln
Assassinated,
April 14,
1865.

Lincoln's
Greatness.

Surrender of
Johnston.

he thought it would be difficult to bag Johnston and because his army did not relish another campaign in the region through which it had recently fought. But he had exceeded his instructions, and his terms were disapproved by the government in Washington because they dealt with civil affairs. Then Johnston accepted the terms offered Lee by Grant, April 26, and disbanded his army, numbering 37,047. May 4, General Taylor surrendered all the troops in Alabama and Mississippi, and May 26, Kirby Smith surrendered his department west of the Mississippi river. The total number of confederates who thus laid down their arms, in these momentous two months, was 174,223. May 10, Jefferson Davis was captured in southern Georgia and sent prisoner to Fortress Monroe. Alexander Stephens and other high confederate officers were also made prisoners; but all were eventually released.

Resistance
Abandoned.

FEDERAL NAVAL OPERATIONS

The work of the navy during the civil war resolved itself into three spheres of activity: (1) the blockade, (2) coöperation with the army in land operations on the coast, and on the rivers, and (3) chasing down and destroying the small number of commerce destroyers the confederacy was able to place on the sea.

The blockade was proclaimed May 19, 1861, and a dozen ships were at once sent to the most important harbors in the South. By purchasing merchant ships, and even tugs, and building new ships, this number grew steadily until three hundred were on the blockading line at the end of the war. They were divided into four squadrons, the North Atlantic, from Fortress Monroe to Cape Fear; the South Atlantic, including the coasts of South Carolina, Georgia, and Eastern Florida; the East Gulf, including the coasts of Western Florida, Alabama, Mississippi, and a part of Louisiana; and the West Gulf, from the mouth of the Mississippi to the Rio Grande. Life on the blockaders was monotonous. There were days and nights of watching, the ships lying a few miles off the harbor during the day and closing in to anchor during the night, like sentinels on each side of the harbor's entrance. Occasionally, usually in the night, a luckless blockade runner was seized as she tried to dart through the opening. Sometimes she stole through so cautiously as to elude the blockaders, and sometimes she was forced on the shallows and burned by her crew in order to avoid capture. The blockaders did not dare follow her under the guns of the confederate forts which usually commanded the interior channels.

The
Blockade.

Early in 1862 the South undertook to break the blockade by constructing heavy ironclads. The first undertaken was named the *Virginia*, though history remembers her as the *Merrimac*, the name she bore as a merchantman before the war began. Her super-

structure was removed and a roof of railroad rails took its place with heavy guns beneath the roof. March 8, 1862, this dangerous craft steamed out of Norfolk harbor and destroyed three federal frigates off Newport News. Next day she reappeared to complete her work of ruin. She encountered a strange-looking ironclad craft, a hulk level with the water and supporting a revolving turret within which were powerful guns. It was the *Monitor*, designed by Ericsson and appropriately described as "a raft with a cheese-box on it." A fierce encounter followed, at the end of which the Southern ship retired in a damaged condition. She did not resume the attempt to raise the blockade. The conflict proved the efficiency of ironclad ships and opened a new era in naval construction. The American government built many monitors before the war ended.

**The
Monitor
and Mer-
rillac.**

The most important movements of the navy in coöperation with the army against harbors and on the rivers were as follows: 1. The attack on Roanoke Island, August 29, 1861. The navy seized Hatteras and Ocracoke inlets, in North Carolina, giving the North command of the entrance to Pamlico and Albemarle sounds. In the following January an expedition under General Burnside took Roanoke island, lying between these sounds, and afterwards Newbern and Plymouth on the mainland were occupied. The first intention was by this approach to move into the interior of North Carolina and cut off supplies for Richmond, but on consideration the project was given up as impossible. The expedition was serviceable because it effectually blockaded this part of the coast.

**In Eastern
North
Carolina.**

2. Operations against Charleston, November 7, 1861. Port Royal, South Carolina, was taken, giving the South Atlantic squadron an excellent base. Immediately afterwards the sea islands were seized. From Port Royal in the following April, an expedition took Fort Pulaski, commanding the mouth of the Savannah river. As the smaller harbors fell easy prey, it happened that by midsummer of 1862 all the Atlantic coast was under federal control, except Wilmington, N. C., and Charleston. Against the latter a strong fleet of newly constructed monitors was sent in April, 1863. It sailed boldly into the harbor, but retired with much loss from the fire of Forts Sumter and Moultrie with the aid of other shore batteries. In July the attack was renewed, an army now landing and moving against the defenses on Morris Island, south of the harbor, while the fleet at close range attacked the works on the island. Before the line of advance was Battery Wagner — often called "Fort Wagner," a work strongly placed and well defended. Two unsuccessful assaults were made on it, in the second of which fell Colonel Robert G. Shaw at the head of his negro regiment. After a seven days' bombardment from the fleet, Fort Sumter was in ruins, although a small infantry force remained in it until the evacuation of

**In South
Carolina
Waters.**

Charleston, February 17, 1865. By regular approaches Battery Wagner was at last taken and Morris Island was in federal hands; a useless achievement, for the harbor was supposed to be mined and no further attempt was made against the place for a year and a half.

Besides the capture of New Orleans, 1862, the most notable naval achievement in the gulf region was seizing Mobile bay in 1864. The place was an important outlet for blockade runners and was well defended by Fort Morgan and several vessels, among them the powerful ram, *Tennessee*. August 5, Farragut, with eighteen ships, four of them monitors, ran past the fort and batteries and engaged the fleet within the bay. The *Tennessee* became the target of the union fleet. Ship after ship struck her armored sides, desirous of sinking her. She withstood their blows, but having a weak engine, could not be brought effectively against her opponents. Finally her steering gear was disabled and she surrendered. The rest of the confederate ships retired or were destroyed, and the fort capitulated when 5000 troops had been landed. The city of Mobile was not taken until the following spring.

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On naval history of the civil war see first of all: *Official Records of the Union and Confederate Navies*, 22 vols. (1894-1908). See also Maclay, *History of the United States Navy*, 3 vols. (ed. 1898-1901); Scharf, *History of the Confederate States Navy* (1894); Porter, *Naval History of the Civil War* (1886); Semmes, *Service Afloat* (1887), relates to the *Alabama*; Wilson, *Iron-Clads in Action* (1897); Bennett, *The Monitor and the Navy under Steam* (1900); Wilkinson, *Narrative of a Blockade Runner* (1877); and Mahan, *Farragut* (1892).

For Independent Reading

Rhodes, *History of the United States*, vols. III-V (1900-1906), the best general history of the war, and it is readable. Other suggested works are: Porter, *Campaigning with Grant* (1897); Walker, *W. S. Hancock* (1894); Eggleston, *A Rebel's Recollections* (1905); Dana, *Recollections of the Civil War* (1898); Wise, *The End of an Era* (1899); Schaff, *The Sunset of the Confederacy* (1912); Bradford, *Lee the American* (1912); Stiles, *Four Years under Marse Robert* (1903); and Bennett, *The Monitor and the Navy under Steam* (1900).

CHAPTER XXVII

CIVIL AFFAIRS DURING THE WAR

ENLISTING TROOPS, NORTH AND SOUTH

THE first soldiers enlisted on each side were volunteers, furnished by the states in response to calls made by the respective presidents. They came freely in a period of great enthusiasm, and were of the best quality. But ardor eventually cools, and by the end of 1862 volunteering in the North was nearly at an end. In the South it ceased to be considerable at an earlier date. By this time the federal congress realized how serious a struggle was being waged, and used its power to enforce military service. The result was a law ordering a draft of all men liable for military duty. Enrollment districts were created, and drafts were held by officers duly appointed. A man drafted might furnish a substitute or be exempt on payment of \$300.

The act was attacked by the democrats as unconstitutional, and it undoubtedly contravened the principles of state rights to which they were bred. Although it was generally enforced, the criticism of the democrats found much support with the people who were unable to secure substitutes or purchase exemption. In New York the Eastside population broke into riots. The people were largely foreign-born, and recognized an ancient grievance in forced military service. On the second day of the draft, July 13, 1863, they broke up the drawings and, joined by habitual thieves, looted stores until they ruled in the city from Union Square to Central Park. Negroes were beaten and hanged to lamp posts, well-to-do citizens were robbed, and the police were powerless. The city had been stripped of soldiers to oppose Lee at Gettysburg, but at last on July 14 an armed force of more than 3000 policemen, marines, and citizens were able to check the depredations. Next day troops began to arrive, and by the 16th the mob was under control, after 1000 persons had been killed or wounded and private property worth \$1,500,000 had been destroyed. Investigation showed that the allotments of the democratic enrollment districts were excessive, and when the error was corrected the draft proceeded quietly. News that the chief Northern city was resisting the draft

**Creating
Armies.**

**Draft
Riots in
New York.**

gave the confederates a passing hope that the North would not support the war.

After July, 1863, the people accepted the draft as a military necessity, but it was very unpopular. Out of 470,942 persons drawn in two drafts in 1864, July 18 and December 19, those failing to report were 94,636. To stimulate enlistment, **"Bounty-Jumping."** large bounties were offered, not only by the federal government, but by the state and county authorities. In New York City in 1864 these aggregated \$677. The regular pay of a private was \$16 a month. Two evils now appeared, "bounty-jumping" and the activities of substitute brokers. The latter fixed the scale of payments for substitutes, and often were able to prevent the acceptance of a man as a substitute who did not have their services. They were in close association with "bounty-jumpers," men who deserted as soon as the bounty was received and enlisted elsewhere under other names. A case was discovered in which a man had "jumped" the bounty thirty-two times. Serious charges were made in many places involving the integrity of officers and physicians who conducted enlistments. The system was undoubtedly badly administered; but there was little disposition to look closely into it as long as it furnished men for the defense of union. The early enlistments were the pick of Northern manhood, and to the last there was excellent material in the new men; but as the months passed, the proportion of newly arrived foreigners and shirkers increased. This gave rise to the charge that the armies were recruited from European mercenaries. When the war ended there were 1,052,038 men in the army.

In 1863, after the emancipation policy was adopted, negro troops began to be enlisted. Among the prisoners captured in New Orleans, May, 1862, was a colored regiment organized by the confederates. This was an example which the antislavery **Negro Troops.** element of the republican party in the North thought worthy of imitation. Lincoln, with the opinion of the border states in mind, opposed such a step; but the confiscation act of the summer of 1862 gave him authority to use such troops for the defense of the union. In the final emancipation proclamation he announced that negro volunteers would be accepted. The first regiment of them was the 54th Massachusetts, led by Colonel Robert Gould Shaw, socially and intellectually eminent in Boston. Many persons had predicted that negroes would not fight, but the result proved the contrary. Though generally used for garrison duty, they exhibited marked courage in some severe emergencies. At Fort Wagner Shaw's regiment charged most bravely and suffered severe loss. Grant, and many others in a position to know, declared that the negro troops fought well. At the end of the war 183,000 had been enlisted.

The confederate congress enacted May 1, 1863, that white officers commanding negro soldiers should when captured be treated as

persons inciting blacks to insurrection, but there is no evidence that the threat was carried into execution. Negro soldiers when captured were sometimes killed by their captors, but such cases as occurred were due to the feelings of the privates and not by order of the confederate authorities. The most notable case was at the capture of Fort Pillow by Forrest, April 12, 1864; but investigation showed this was without orders of Forrest, who offered to receive the negroes as prisoners of war when he demanded the surrender of the fort. His demand was refused, and as no flag of surrender was raised, his storming party slew its defenders, white and black, who fought desperately, until Forrest himself arrived on the scene and stopped the slaughter. When negro prisoners were identified as escaped slaves they were returned to their masters. The confederacy was unwilling to exchange negro prisoners, and on that ground all exchanges stopped for a while; but from this attitude the confederates retreated early in 1864, only proposing to retain those who were known to be fugitive slaves. At this time Grant was determined to send no prisoners back to swell the ranks of the Southern armies, and no exchanges of any kind occurred until January, 1865, when the confederacy was in its last gasps.

**Negro
Soldiers
as War
Prisoners.**


FEDERAL FINANCES

Providing funds for war expenses was a mammoth task. When congress met in extra session, July 4, 1861, the national debt was considered large at \$76,000,000. The people, therefore, were startled when they knew that the legislature had authorized a loan of \$250,000,000 in bonds and interest-bearing notes. Additional taxes were laid by which it was expected that a total revenue of \$75,000,000 would be raised. Two features of the plan were a tax of three per cent on incomes over \$800, and a direct tax. It was believed that these taxes were as heavy as the country would stand. The execution of the financial laws fell on Chase, who proved himself an able secretary of the treasury.

**Measures
of 1861.**

But expenses were enormous, and when congress met again, December 2, there was a deficit of \$143,000,000. The war had sorely distressed business, bonds were selling slowly, specie had been drawn out of the country, and December 30 the banks suspended specie payment, compelling the government to follow their example. Something must be done quickly or the war could not go on. The result was the law generally known as the Legal Tender Act of February 25, 1862, providing for: 1. The issue of \$100,000,000 in treasury notes, which, as well as the \$50,000,000 authorized in July, 1861, were to be legal tender for all dues except the payment of import duties; and 2. The issue of an additional loan of \$500,000,000 in six per cent 5-20 bonds,

**The Legal
Tender Act
of February
25, 1862.**



interest payable in coin. There was much opposition to the legal tender feature of the bill, and Secretary Chase hesitated long before accepting it. It was passed because it was pronounced absolutely necessary in the crisis at hand. At the same time another bill was carried through congress to raise import duties and lay other taxes. It was so comprehensive that it has been called "an act which taxed everything." A proposition to create a national banking system was deferred to another date. By the measures here adopted it was expected that the funds would be obtained to defray the war expenses for a year. The expenditures were then \$2,000,000 a day.

At the beginning of 1863 the treasury was again empty, and clamor arose for more legal tender. Congress yielded to the extent of authorizing \$100,000,000, a measure which Lincoln regretfully approved. It also authorized a loan of \$900,000,000. February 25 it took a more important step in passing a national banking act, by which it was designed to charter banks under national authority with the privilege of issuing money secured by national bonds. The act as passed proved inadequate, and was amended from time to time. The plan which resulted may be summarized as follows: 1. The comptroller of the currency, an official now first provided for, should supervise this system. 2. Each bank before beginning business must deposit national bonds equal to one-third of its paid-in capital, but the interest on these bonds was to go to the bank depositing them. 3. It would receive from the comptroller bank notes in amount equal to ninety per cent of the market value of the deposited bonds, and when signed by the officers of the bank these notes were to be receivable for all dues to the United States except imports. 4. The capital stock of a national bank was not to be less than \$50,000. 5. A national bank must keep a cash reserve equal to 15 per cent of its circulation, but one-half of this might be left with certain specified central banks, whose reserves, it was ordered, must be 25 per cent of the circulation, and 6. Shareholders were made responsible for the debts of the bank above their stock held to an amount equal to the par value of their stock. In 1865 an act was passed to tax at 10 per cent, after July 1, 1866, the circulation of state banks. This law impelled state banks to change to national banks, with the result that 1634 of the latter existed on July 1, 1866. The national banks made a market for government bonds, and drove out of circulation the currency of the state banks.

Spite of the measures of 1863 the revenues proved insufficient, and in 1864 import duties, excise, and most internal taxes were raised as high as the country would stand. An additional loan of \$400,000,000 was authorized, and authority was given to extend the amount of legal tender to \$450,000,000. As a matter of fact, it reached during the year the sum of \$431,000,000, and went only a million higher in the following year.

**The
National
Banking
Act, 1863.**

**State of the
Currency.**

The increase of national bank notes served partly to satisfy the demand for treasury notes. The legal tender notes, popularly called "greenbacks" ceased to circulate at par with specie as soon as they were issued. Gold rose until, June 30, 1864, it sold for 250, and when Early was before Washington, July 11, it reached 285, the highest price during the war. As prices of commodities were expressed in legal tender they rose proportionally with gold. Throughout the summer of 1864 a paper dollar was worth about forty cents in gold. One result was to drive fractional specie out of circulation. "Shin-plasters," small private notes from 5 to 50 cents in value, took its place, but these were eventually forbidden, and for a time postage stamps were used. Their disadvantage was soon evident, and the government issued fractional paper currency on its own account.

Early in the war the national bonds ceased to sell, although the interest was 7.3 per cent. The plan of sale was to award the

**Bonds at
Popular
Subscription.**

bonds at a fixed rate to associated bankers in installments of about \$50,000,000, the banks selling at home and abroad at what profit they could make. In 1863 Secretary Chase adopted a new method. Selecting a great banking firm as his agent, Jay Cooke and Company, he offered the bonds to the public in popular denominations. It was an appeal to the patriotism of the nation, and was fully justified by the results.

Two confiscation acts were passed by congress, partly to get revenue and partly to punish the confederates. The first, August 6, 1861, authorized the confiscation of property used in aid of the confederacy, and the liberation of slaves employed on fortifications or in other warlike labor. The

**Two Con-
fiscation
Acts.**

second, July 17, 1862, was more drastic. It fixed death as the punishment for treason, but allowed the courts to substitute fine and imprisonment, and it decreed that the slaves of all who supported the Southern cause should be free. It further provided for the confiscation of the property of six classes of persons who supported the confederacy, including the higher officials, who were believed to be especially responsible for the war. Another provision was to authorize the enlistment of negroes in the union armies. This second act was urged especially by the radical opponents of slavery, and Lincoln would not sign it until congress adopted explanatory resolutions, one of which provided that it was not to be used to extend the taint of treason to the issue of confederates. So far as its confiscatory features were concerned, it was very sparingly used during the war, partly because Lincoln opposed severe measures, and partly because the jurisdiction of federal courts did not in reality extend to the vast majority of the Southerners, who were within the confederate lines. At the end of the war, when federal courts were reestablished in the South, a policy of conciliation prevailed, and confiscation was not put into operation.

THE PROGRESS OF EMANCIPATION

Early in the war the extreme republicans began to urge that measures be taken to destroy slavery. The large majority of voters in the border states, as well as many persons in the free states, opposed this policy, and Lincoln discountenanced it because he felt that the only means of success was to make the war solely for the preservation of the union.

Demands
of the
Radicals.

His influence prevailed, and the day after Bull Run, congress passed, with only nine dissenting votes in the two houses, resolutions declaring that the North did not mean to interfere with slavery, but only sought to perpetuate the union. From this position president and congress, under pressure of public opinion, were to recede in a little more than twelve months.

When Virginia seceded, May 23, General Butler commanded at Fortress Monroe. To him came many fugitive slaves, whose owners demanded their surrender. The request was refused by Butler on the ground that having worked on confederate fortifications they were "contraband of war." His position was not legal, but he was supported by Northern opinion, and the government did not overrule him. The first confiscation act, August 6, 1861, gave freedom to slaves working on confederate fortifications and engaged in military operations, but it did not mention ordinary fugitives, who came to Butler in great numbers. The secretary of war was asked to define the status of the second class. He replied that they should be received into the service of the United States and employed as seemed best, and added that when the war was over congress would, no doubt, "provide a just compensation to loyal masters." Butler was also ordered to refrain from interference with the slaves of peaceful citizens and not to encourage them to leave their masters. Nor should he prevent their voluntary return unless the public good seemed to demand it. Such instructions left wide discretion to the generals commanding in regions which could be reached by fugitives. Some of them were less inclined to antislavery views than Butler, and surrendered fugitives freely. Others gave little help to such masters as came to look for their runaway slaves.

"Contra-
bands."

Of those who were most hostile to slavery was General Frémont, presidential candidate in 1856. He was popular with the extreme republicans, through whose influence he was called home from Europe to command the army in Missouri. Arriving at New York early in July, 1861, he loitered three weeks in the East, conferring with political friends before he repaired to St. Louis, where he was greatly needed. His incompetence was soon evident from the manner in which he yielded himself to a group of contractors who surrounded and flat-

tered him for their selfish ends. Soon followed military reverses, and public opinion rose high against him. To regain his popularity he issued his remarkable order of August 30, 1861, directing the confiscation of the property of all who had taken arms against the union, offering freedom to their slaves, and creating a "bureau of abolition" to supervise the execution of the order. His action aroused enthusiasm among the radical opponents of slavery, but alarmed the unionists of Kentucky, then trembling in the balance. Lincoln first knew of the order from the newspapers, and suggested to the author that it be modified. The advice was rejected with scant courtesy, and Lincoln coolly directed that the order be modified in conformity with the first confiscation act. After some further manifestations of his incompetence, Frémont was removed, and General Hunter succeeded to the command. The affair aroused the anger of the radicals, who sharply criticized the president for his part in it.

Yet Lincoln wished to abolish slavery if it could be done in a proper way, and was already moving for emancipation with compensation in the slave states still loyal. In March, 1862, he suggested such action to congress, and thought an average of \$400 might be given for each slave in Maryland, Kentucky, Missouri, Delaware, and the District of Columbia, incurring a total expense of \$173,000,000, which was less than the cost of the war for 87 days. The suggestion pleased neither congress nor the people of the states concerned, and no action was taken on it. But April 16 a bill was passed for the emancipation with compensation of the slaves in the District of Columbia.

The second confiscation act, July 17, 1862, gave freedom to the slaves of persons resisting the union, forbade their surrender, and authorized their "colonization" on the abandoned lands of the confederates. As the law would not be obeyed in the seceding states, little more was expected from it than that it might serve to free fugitives who reached the union lines. Lincoln, and many others, considered it of doubtful constitutionality, and he gave it a mild interpretation. For this, also, he received the censure of the radicals.

May 9, 1862, General Hunter, commanding the recovered territory around Beaufort, South Carolina, issued an order declaring free all the slaves in South Carolina, Georgia, and Florida. He acted on his own authority, but had the approval of Chase and the other radicals. Lincoln reversed the order at once. But he sought to break the blow by calling on the loyal slave states to accept gradual emancipation with compensation. In reply, the congressmen from the border states signed an address suggesting that congress should act first in the matter. July 14 the president laid the matter before congress, which did nothing. By this he was convinced

Emancipation with Compensation.

Second Confiscation Act and the Slaves.

Hunter's Order.

Compensation Abandoned.

that nothing was to be hoped from emancipation through compensation, and he turned to other means.

July 22 he read to his cabinet a tentative emancipation proclamation to apply to the seceding states, justifying his proposed action on the ground of military necessity. Blair alone of the cabinet objected, as he thought the proclamation would endanger the autumn elections. Seward suggested that the announcement ought to wait until the army won a victory, otherwise the proclamation would be construed as "the government stretching forth its hands to Ethiopia," a confession of weakness. This view prevailed, and the matter was laid aside for a favorable opportunity.

The
Tentative
Emancipa-
tion Pro-
clamation.

The action of the cabinet was secret, and the radical opponents of slavery, ignorant of what was going on, continued their strictures on the president. August 20, Horace Greeley, editor of the New York *Tribune*, summed up this view in an editorial entitled, "The Prayer of Twenty Millions." He

Greeley's
"Prayer."

reproached the president for being influenced by "certain fossil politicians" from the border states, for repudiating Frémont's and Hunter's orders and enforcing an order of Halleck to exclude fugitive slaves from the union camps, and for failing to execute the provisions of the second confiscation act touching slavery. Although this "Prayer" was addressed to Lincoln, he saw it first in the newspapers. He wrote and published in the same medium a reply which could not fail to crush his critics in the minds of the impartial people of the country. "As to the policy," he said, "I 'seem to be pursuing,' as you say, I have not meant to leave anyone in doubt. I would save the Union. I would save it the shortest way under the Constitution. The sooner the national authority can be restored, the nearer the Union will be 'the Union as it was.' If there be those who would not save the Union unless they could at the same time save slavery, I do not agree with them. If there be those who would not save the Union unless they could at the same time destroy slavery, I do not agree with them. My paramount object in this struggle is to save the Union, and is not either to save or destroy slavery. If I could save the Union without freeing any slave, I would do it; and if I could save it by freeing all the slaves, I would do it; and if I could save it by freeing some and leaving others alone, I would also do that. What I do about slavery and the colored race, I do because I believe it helps to save the Union; and what I forbear, I forbear because I do not believe it would help to save the Union. I shall do less whenever I believe what I am doing hurts the cause, and I shall do more whenever I shall believe doing more will help the cause. I shall try to correct errors when shown to be errors, and I shall adopt new views so fast as they shall appear to be true views." This letter was widely read and had a great influence on public opinion.

Lincoln's
Reply.

September 17 Lee's invasion of Maryland was checked at Antietam, and Lincoln on the 23d issued the celebrated preliminary emancipation proclamation. It announced that the slaves would be declared free in all states resisting the union on January 1, 1863. It also spoke of compensation for the slaves of loyal states. It was a warning to the South, but it only elicited jeers from that section, and January 1 a final proclamation appeared declaring slavery abolished by military authority in all the South except Tennessee and the parts of Louisiana and Virginia then held by union arms. The proclamation satisfied for a time the radicals of the North and strengthened the cause of the union in Europe, by showing that the war was fought to put an end to slavery. Even the border states could not complain, for they were not affected, and it was evident that ample time had been given the secessionists to escape emancipation by submitting to the union. The proclamation had no basis in the law of civil affairs, as Lincoln well knew, but he believed it was within his authority as commander-in-chief of the army and navy.

In the annual message, December 1, 1863, Lincoln returned to the subject of compensated emancipation for the border states, and a bill of that nature to apply to Missouri passed the house and had a conditional approval in the senate. But it was opposed by the democrats, mostly border state men, who thought the South would not be conquered, and, as some republicans gave it a very lukewarm support, the measure finally failed in the short session. When congress met again, the cause of the North was more promising on the battlefield, and congress was less inclined to concede anything to slaveholders. They were now concerned with an amendment abolishing slavery outright.

Reflection showed that Lincoln's proclamation was of doubtful constitutionality. Moreover, it abolished slavery at best in only about half of the territory in which the institution existed, and it did not prevent the future reestablishment of bondage by a state. To meet these difficulties, a thirteenth amendment was introduced in congress, March 28, 1864. It passed the senate, but failed to get the necessary two-thirds majority in the house. January 31, 1865, it came up again in the house and passed by the necessary majority. With its ratification by three-fourths of the states, it became a part of the organic law of the land, December 18, 1865. Before it was ratified, slavery had been abolished by state amendment in Arkansas, January, 1864; Louisiana, September, 1864; Maryland, October, 1864; Tennessee, February, 1865; and Missouri, June, 1865. February 5, 1865, after the thirteenth amendment had passed, Lincoln submitted to his cabinet the draft of a message proposing to pay to the slave states \$400,000,000 in bonds on considera-

tion that the war cease by April 1. The cabinet thought such a measure could not pass congress, and the matter was dropped. Thus did Lincoln, whose sympathy for the South never failed, make his last effort to save for the slaveholders some portion of their property which the progress of the age was going to take away.

POLITICAL PARTIES DURING THE CIVIL WAR

During the war the Northern voters became divided into four classes. 1. The regular republicans. They followed Lincoln in a mild opposition to slavery, and put the preservation of the union above all else. 2. The radical republicans, also strong unionists, but in favor of an extreme anti-slavery policy, and disposed to deal harshly with the South after the war ended. 3. The war democrats, protesting their faith in democratic principles, but opposed to secession, and loyal to the union at the polls and on the battlefield. They were not well organized as a group, but in some cases were of great importance because they coöperated with the Lincoln republicans in important local elections. 4. The regular democrats, outwardly professing devotion to the union, but criticizing the conduct of the war and undermining as much as they could the national support of it. Many of the leaders of this group were party men who wished to keep their organization intact, and whose most evident means of reaching their end was to criticize the party in power in whatever way offered. The first, second, and third groups usually acted together on the all-important issue of the war; the fourth, always a minority in congress, made vigorous attacks on their opponents, but were unable to modify the course of events. To many people their efforts seemed little less than treason to the union.

**Four
Groups.**

The first notable political contest after 1860 was in 1862. It was a year of military reverses. McClellan did not take Richmond, and Pope was beaten in Virginia. Grant's campaign from Fort Henry to Corinth was a steady success, and Lee was forced back from Maryland after Antietam, but after each campaign came a period of inactivity. The war was begun to crush the confederacy, and the people were discouraged because this object seemed indefinitely distant. And so the democrats — calling themselves conservatives — pronounced the war a costly failure. The emancipation proclamation they also criticized. It was arraigned as a violation of the constitution and as evidence that the war was not waged to preserve the union but to destroy slavery. Out of these two lines of argument was evolved the battle cry: The constitution as it is and the union as it was!

**The War
Policy
Criticized.**

Other arguments were found which did good service. Military

arrests began to be made as soon as the war began: they became more numerous when campaign speakers fell to discussing the war in candid terms. Stanton, who generally ordered the arrests, was

**Elections
of 1862.**

charged with doing so in order to suppress political discussion. In Ohio several men highly esteemed were thus thrown into prison, and the political effect was great. The vast expenditures for military supplies led to jobbery and corruption on a large scale, as investigation committees in Washington clearly showed, and out of this the democrats made capital. Moreover, there was a natural reaction from the buoyant war feeling of 1861. The result was seen in the elections of 1862. New York, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Ohio, Illinois, Indiana, and Wisconsin chose anti-administration state officials, and the house of representatives, which in 1861 had 42 democrats against 106 republicans and 28 union men, had, two years later, 75 democrats against 102 republicans and 9 "border state men." Since the democrats were opposed to the existing method of conducting the war, this meant that their policy had gained materially in the house of representatives.

Within Lincoln's own party there was abundant trouble. The radicals though him unequal to the presidency. Men of dignity

**Attack on
Lincoln.**

themselves, they could not tolerate his lack of informality, carelessness in dress, and lack of method in business. They thought him under the influence of Seward, who was avowedly a conservative. Finally a caucus of republican senators in December, 1862, resolved that the president ought to dismiss those members of the cabinet who interfered with the successful conduct of the war. The blow was aimed at Seward, who offered his resignation forthwith. In a joint meeting of the rest of the cabinet and a committee of the senators, Lincoln cleverly forced Chase, who was probably at the bottom of the discontent, to resign also. That done, he refused to accept either resignation, and was able to continue with a two-sided administration. Chase and the radicals were forced to abate their opposition, but events showed that it was not extinguished.

Meanwhile, "Copperheads" appeared. The epithet was applied by their enemies to all democrats; but it should properly be given only

**Copper-
heads.**

to those extreme opponents of the war who went so far as to seem by their agitation to give aid to the South. The name came from the habit of wearing as a badge a button cut out of a copper cent, on which was the head of the Goddess of Liberty. The movement began late in 1862. It was accompanied with violent speech-making, and one of its most active leaders was Clement L. Vallandigham, of Ohio, bold of speech and sharp of tongue.

Arguments were not wanting to reach men bred in the school of state rights. Congress had passed laws giving the president control

over the sword and purse of the nation; slavery was annulled by a mere word; and hundreds of persons were in prison without civil trial through military arrest, charged with no other offense than words spoken against the government. The war was a republican war; it would not have begun but for the election of Lincoln, and it was now carried on, said the agitators, to preserve the political power of the republicans. In the winter of 1862-63, Napoleon III offered to mediate between the North and the South. Lincoln's refusal to accept the offer was declared evidence that the war was fought to subjugate a portion of the American people.

**Arguments
of Copper-
heads.**

After his defeat at Fredericksburg, Burnside became commander of the department of the Ohio, where copperheads were most outspoken. With a soldier's impatience of defiance, he issued an order, April 13, 1863, in which he said, "the habit of declaring sympathy for the enemy will not be allowed. . . ." Vallandigham was then a candidate for the nomination for governor of Ohio, and was making caustic speeches against the republicans. He considered Burnside's order a challenge, and accepted it. May 1 he made one of his customary speeches, although he knew he was watched. Four days later he was arrested and sent before a military commission which acted without forms of law. He was pronounced guilty of "declaring disloyal sentiments" in order to weaken the power of the government against its enemies, and the sentence was confinement until the end of the war. Approved by Burnside, it went at length to Lincoln, who commuted the penalty to banishment to the confederacy. The prisoner was sent through the union lines in Virginia, and reached Richmond. He was received coldly by Jefferson Davis, and escaping through the blockade, arrived safely in Canada, from which secure retreat he directed his campaign in Ohio. Now a martyr in the eyes of his friends, he was nominated for governor, and the immense public meetings which the democrats held seemed to indicate certain triumph at the polls. The union party was alarmed, and nominated Brough, a war democrat, to oppose him. The election came in October, with the result that Brough was chosen governor with a majority of 101,099. Probably the victories at Gettysburg and Vicksburg, by showing that the war was not a failure, were the chief cause of the unionist success. At the same time, other states were carried by the friends of Lincoln with large majorities, among them New York, Pennsylvania, Illinois, and Indiana. These favorable results encouraged the republicans, and the support of the war did not weaken.

**Arrest of
Vallandi-
gham.**

This difficulty was hardly passed before the radicals began to show that they wished to defeat the nomination of Lincoln for president in 1864. They united on Chase who, spite of the fact that he was in the cabinet, showed that he desired the proffered honor. They

formed a committee with Senator Pomeroy, of Kansas, for chairman, and early in 1864 it sent out a circular in behalf of Chase. February 25, however, Chase's hopes fell when Ohio, his own state, declared for Lincoln. He withdrew his countenance of the movement, but the radicals continued their opposition, their candidate now being Frémont.

**The
Pomeroy
Circular,
1864.**

The convention of the national union, or the republican party, met June 7. Four days earlier, Grant's bloody campaign against Lee came to a halt in the costly sacrifice of life at Cold Harbor, and Richmond was still in confederate hands. At the same time, Sherman, after many days of skirmishing and one fierce battle at Kenesaw Mountain, was still outside of Atlanta. To the North, it was the same old story of slaughter, expense, and defeat; and the democratic press denounced bitterly a president whose policy resulted only in such losses. But the convention was true to Lincoln and nominated him unanimously. For vice-president, it named Andrew Johnson, military governor of Tennessee. Lincoln is said to have been responsible for the choice. There was a strong feeling that a Southern man should be on the ticket, in order to give it a non-sectional character. Lincoln, in his characteristic way, said his own nomination came because the convention thought "it was not best to swap horses while crossing the river." Now followed weeks of utter gloom in the North. Unless the confederacy could be crushed before the election, said Greeley, the union party would be defeated. Prominent men declared that Lincoln ought to withdraw, or be set aside for a stronger candidate. The president himself thought his reelection doubtful, and wrote a memorandum for his own use to the effect that if defeated he would cooperate with his successor-elect to "save the union between the election and the inauguration, as he will have secured his election on such grounds that he cannot possibly save it afterwards."

The successor he had in mind was General McClellan, whom the democrats nominated at Chicago in August. He was the strongest candidate they could have selected, and he would surely be popular with the soldiers and the masses of the people. The platform demanded the cessation of bloodshed and the calling of a convention to restore peace "on the basis of the federal union of the states." The stoutest hearted unionists feared the result of a political campaign on this issue. Their apprehensions were relieved when, on September 3, Sherman entered Atlanta, and thus proved that, in one of its most important movements, the war was not a failure. It was an argument the democrats could not answer; and cheered by it the union men took up the campaign with such spirit that Lincoln, in November, was successful by 212 electoral votes to McClellan's 21.

**Election
of 1864.**

It is a noteworthy thing that in the remarkable days of the civil war the man elected president in 1864 by a vote so sweeping was, at the same time, at variance with a majority of each house of congress on the most important civil question then before the public, *i.e.* the reconstruction of the Southern states. Throughout this last winter of war the two factions subordinated their quarrel to the task of conquering the South; but no one doubted that, this accomplished, a great struggle would occur between the president and the radicals to determine who should dominate in reconstruction. From this conflict Lincoln was saved by Booth's wicked deed.

Lincoln and Congress.

THE WAR POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT

The constitution provides that congress shall have power to declare war and suppress insurrections. The war of 1812 began with a declaration by congress. The Mexican war began with a declaration by Polk that Mexico had begun war by sending troops into the territory of the United States. To many people it seemed at the time a dangerous thing to allow the president to determine, when another nation had begun war, since to do so was tantamount to giving him the power to declare war. In 1861 the situation was even more urgent. That congress, called to meet in July, would recognize the existence of insurrection, was not doubted. To meet the active war measures of the confederacy, prompt action on the part of the union was necessary. Should Lincoln wait for the authority of acts of congress? He was too practical a man for such a course, and boldly decided to assume that he had necessary powers, and trust that congress would by its approval legalize what he had done. He accordingly called for troops, organized armies, and proclaimed a blockade of Southern ports. In doing so he established a precedent for similar situations, if such should arise in the future.

The Right to Declare War.

A more doubtful matter was connected with the suspension of the writ of *habeas corpus*. On this subject the constitution only says, "The writ of *habeas corpus* shall not be suspended, unless when in cases of rebellion or invasion the public safety may require it." But the constitution did not say whether the president or congress should suspend the writ. Here again the necessity for immediate action was apparent.

Suspending the Writ of Habeas Corpus.

Maryland was full of Southern sentiment, the legislature was called to meet to consider the situation, and it was believed that a majority of its members would favor secession. If the state joined the confederacy, Washington would be isolated and the cause of union would be severely injured. Lincoln again assumed responsibility. He ordered the military authorities to arrest the members of the legis-

lature who seemed to be plotting treason, and to hold them prisoners without benefit of *habeas corpus*. From their prisons they appealed to Taney, chief justice, who readily decided that they had committed no crime against the civil law. But they were not released, and there was no power in the courts to force the executive to adopt Taney's construction of the constitution. This action also became a precedent under which, we may believe, it will be held that in a future emergency the president may suspend the writ if he thinks the public safety demands it. In this, as in all other cases, he is subject to impeachment for exercising his power without a due sense of responsibility. As Professor Dunning well says, it made the president a temporary dictator.

Military arrests, however, were not confined to Maryland. In all parts of the North men were imprisoned on the charge of aiding the South. September 24, 1862, Lincoln issued a proclamation for the arrest of persons discouraging enlistment or resisting the draft. They were to be tried by military courts, and to prevent the interference of civil officers they

**Many
Military
Arrests.**

were to be denied the privileges of *habeas corpus*. This step was defended on the ground of military necessity. It placed for the time being the life and liberty of citizens in the hands of the president to an extent that was never contemplated in the much decried alien and sedition laws of 1798. Under it, numerous arrests were made, and the victims were frequently kept in duress without trial. So great was the popular disapproval that congress, March 3, 1863, attempted to regulate the matter. It gave the president the authority to suspend the writ, ordered that persons then in prison should be discharged

**Habeas
Corpus Act
of 1863.**

unless they were indicted by a grand jury, and that in the future no arrested one should be held longer than twenty days unless so indicted. The natural consequence was to take such cases out of the hands of the military courts and leave them with the federal courts. Spite of this act military arrests of civilians continued to the end of the war, though not in as large numbers as formerly. The civil courts were not able to assert their authority against commanders of the army and were forced to submit. It was not until 1866 that they found an opportunity to declare themselves in the decision of the case *ex parte Milligan* (see page 612). Although the supreme court here asserted the supremacy of the civil arm in districts not immediately subject to military authority, it is difficult to see how its contention could be enforced if the country should again have to encounter a situation like that of the civil war.

THE SOUTHERN PROBLEM AND SOUTHERN EFFORTS

It is regrettable that this work is not large enough to embrace a description of the civil war from the southern side. Nothing in American

history is finer than the ability and devotion with which the confederacy, once it was organized, met its difficulties and utilized its scant resources to beat off the armies that were thrown upon it. Here it is only possible to mention the most prominent facts and to show how they affected the struggle.

The confederate constitution was the old constitution modified to remedy what the South thought were bad interpretations of the old instrument. Internal improvements and protective tariffs were forbidden, slavery was guaranteed in territories, a confederate official serving solely within a state might be impeached by a two-thirds vote of each house of the legislature within that state, and a two-thirds vote of each house was made necessary for admitting a new state into the confederacy, the vote in the senate being by states. In these particulars, each of which suggests old points of dispute, it was attempted to guard the rights of the state against the central authority. Several other features are noteworthy. In order to make it easy to modify the constitution in keeping with the changing needs of the country, a new convention must be called when demanded by three states. Another feature took from the state the right to enfranchise foreigners who had not been naturalized, and still another made the president's term of office six years with ineligibility for reelection. Cabinet members were to appear and speak in congress on matters pertaining to their departments, but they could not vote; and no money was to be appropriated without a two-thirds vote except the sums specified in annual estimates by the departments. Several of these latter features had no reference to the sectional controversy, but were considered improvements warranted by experience.

**Confederate
Constitution.**

The Montgomery government was provisional and was to exist for one year only. By autumn the permanent constitution was adopted, and elections were held for presidential electors and members of congress. In the former Jefferson Davis was elected president for six years, and February 22, 1862, he was inaugurated in a downpour of rain which caused the superstitious to tremble for the fate of the new government. In fact, trouble soon appeared. Davis was a man of strong will and little tact. He was a West Point graduate, and took effective control of the war policy. He dominated a cabinet and congress hardly equal to the great work thrown upon them. His plan to withhold cotton from Europe in the first year of the war, when the blockade was not very efficient, was condemned by many planters. His military appointments were supposed to be due to favoritism; it was said that he showed too strong a preference for Virginians, and some of the states claimed that he overrode states' rights in executing the conscription laws and the laws to impress horses and supplies for the army. Before the end of the war the discontented class was large, and one heard in many quarters that it was "a rich man's war and a poor man's fight." But in most respects Davis had his way; and it is

doubtful if any other Southerner then in public life could have filled his difficult position so well. The chief objection to him as president is that he was too stout-hearted, and that he allowed the war to continue too long after it was an evident failure. In the light of later events it would have been better if in the autumn of 1864 he had relaxed his stubborn purpose to resist until death, sacrificing his own ideas for what he should have known was the interest of his people.

As the hope of success retreated, a peace party began to appear, most of its members being those who had clung longest to the union in 1861. Davis and the whole confederate government opposed it strongly, the writ of *habeas corpus* was suspended, and every effort was made to keep alive the loyalty of all the people. In North Carolina and Georgia the peace movement was strongest, and even Stephens, the vice-president, was known to look upon it with favor. The elections of 1864 were awaited as a test of the matter, but they resulted in victory for the friends of resistance, and the two states held on to the cause, though it was evidently desperate.

Turning from internal affairs in the South, let us consider foreign relations. Although selling bonds and buying supplies and ships concerned confederate agents in Europe, they gave most attention to efforts to secure the recognition of their government. The decision of England in May, 1861, to give the South only the status of belligerency was disappointing, but hopes ran strong that confederate military success would be followed by recognition. Time showed that this was a vain expectation. The campaigns of Bull Run, the Peninsula, and second Manassas were confederate victories, and though Antietam was a practical reverse, Fredericksburg was a decisive victory, and spite of them no signs of recognition appeared. In fact, England steadily refused to recognize the confederate representative, Mason, and he reported that regard for the dignity of his government demand that he be recalled. He was, however, instructed to remain at his post in the hope that he might influence public opinion. He spent money freely for newspaper articles, and a newspaper was established in London presenting to the British public facts and arguments favorable to the South. By this time England was trying hard to produce cotton in her colonies and succeeding, although the quality of the cotton thus secured was below that produced in the South. The British people were strongly opposed to slavery, and Adams, the American minister, lost no opportunity to show them to what extent the cause of the South was connected with the prolongation of the institution. It is not too much to say that slavery alone stood in the way of European recognition of the confederacy. After the battle of Gettysburg and the fall of Vicksburg, recognition became impossible, and Mason withdrew from London to Paris, remaining in Europe until the end of the war, with little to do.

The Peace Movement.

Confederate Foreign Affairs.

Meanwhile, it seemed for a time that better success would come from negotiations with France. Napoleon III wished to revive the French colonial empire, and Mexico seemed to offer a favorable field of action. In order to collect some debts which this improvident country had failed to pay, a joint French, British, and Spanish expedition occupied it in 1861-1862. Mexico now came to terms in regard to the debts, and England and Spain withdrew. But the French troops remained, and Napoleon, by taking sides with one of the two political factions then in the country, soon made himself lord of the country. Setting aside all pretext, he boldly began to inaugurate his colonial scheme. He expected no embarrassment on account of our Monroe doctrine; for the United States government had its hands full at home. On the contrary, he was disposed to make a friend of the confederacy. He caused the confederates to believe that early recognition was inevitable, and said he only awaited England's initiative. Early in 1862 he said he was ready to open the blockade of New Orleans, but the place was taken by Farragut, and the plan became impossible. Late in the same year he suggested joint intervention by himself, England, and Spain, with an armistice of six months to arrange for a permanent peace. The proposition was rejected by England and brought forth a firm protest from the United States, with the result that it accomplished nothing for the confederacy. But France did not cease to countenance the confederacy. Napoleon even sanctioned the building of heavy corvettes of the *Alabama* type provided they could go to sea without their destinations becoming known. Work on the ships was begun, but the American minister learned of it and protested to the emperor, who forthwith revoked the permission he had given. The ships, six in all, were completed, but Gettysburg had then been fought, and it was impossible to get permission for their departure unless they were sold to a neutral power of recognized standing. One of them was sold fictitiously to Denmark, got to sea, where her name was changed to the *Stonewall*, but it was not done until January, 1865, and although the vessel reached Havana, it was too late to be of service to the confederacy. The action of France in refusing permission for the ships to depart came just at the time the British authorities took similar action in regard to the confederate rams built in English waters (see page 523), and the fate of the much desired confederate navy was thus sealed. Cut off from activity on the sea, the confederacy could not raise the blockade, and the war was left to be fought out on land. Of the ships which the South managed to get armed and on the sea, the most notable were the *Alabama*, *Florida*, *Sumter*, *Shenandoah*, *Tallahassee*, and *Georgia*.

France in
Mexico.

France and
the Con-
federacy.

The Southern army was first raised by volunteering, as in the North; but although enthusiasm was abundant in 1861, it soon was inadequate for the demands of the hour, and in April, 1862, a conscription

act was passed, making all males between the ages of 18 and 35 liable to military duty. Five months later the limits were made 18 and 45, and before the end of the war boys as young as 16 years were made liable to service. The confederate historians place the aggregate number of troops in their armies at 600,000 to 700,000. The northern authorities contend that this is too small, and think about 1,000,000 the right number. Unfortunately, the confederate records were lost, and the dispute cannot be decided. The white population of the confederacy was only 5,500,000, which, by the accepted method of estimating the available military class as one-fifth of the population, would give 1,100,000 of military age. It is hardly to be expected that nearly all of these were drawn into the army. In the North the men of military age were about 4,400,000, of which about 2,500,000 went into the army.

The conscription laws of the South produced the same evils as in the North. Substitutes were allowed, and substitute brokers appeared. The men thus furnished were considered inefficient soldiers, and deserted freely. Men of this class, as well as those who evaded service, frequently fled to the woods and became the scourge of peaceful communities. In the last months of the war there was much complaint on this score. As the Southern armies were reduced in

Enforcing
Conscription. numbers, surgeons went everywhere, examining the men not in the armies, and taking all who could be of any use as soldiers. In this way the confederate government brought out a very large proportion of the men capable of fighting in its behalf. By Christmas, 1864, it was estimated by the authorities that there were 100,000 deserters in the South.

The financial resources of the confederacy were also severely taxed. The strictness of the blockade reduced import duties to an inconsiderable basis, and the chief source of funds was loans and internal taxes. The former consisted of bonds and treasury notes, issued both by states and the confederacy. Specie was chiefly sent abroad to pay for public supplies, and the rapidly depreciating paper money sank in value until it was only received at enormous reduction. Even towns, counties, insurance companies, and mining companies issued their promises to pay. Before the end of the war the notes of the confederacy alone were more than \$1,000,000,000. Produce loans were resorted to, *i.e.* bonds were given in exchange for cotton, tobacco, and turpentine, which might be sent abroad on blockade runners, or which, stored against the day of victory, might serve as security for loans floated in Europe. Finally, a tithe of agricultural products was required for the support of the armies. The slaves, although not used as soldiers, furnished by their labor the food which supported the armies. When the confederacy collapsed the South contained enough food supplies to support the struggle for a much longer period.

Confederate
Finances.

Before the war the South had very few manufactures, and though strenuous efforts were now made to repair the deficiency, the lack of machinery and trained operatives presented insurmountable difficulties. Shoes, clothing, paper, hats, and a thousand other articles were very hard to obtain. The blockade kept out foreign supplies, and the small amount that got through on the swift blockade runners sold at exorbitant prices. Coffee and tea became almost unknown, and many substitutes were invented. For sugar, sorghum was used. Medicines were also obtained with difficulty, especially quinine, which was much needed on account of the prevalent malaria. Spite of such privations the spirits of the people were good; for there was always confidence that victory would soon come and that the rigorous blockade would be raised.

**Manu-
factures.**

Railroads could not be repaired, and were not able to carry supplies from the rich fields of the Gulf states to the army in Virginia. Manufactured articles such as there were could not be distributed to the people on the farms. Machine shops, which might have worked for the repair of railroads, ran to their full capacity on material of war. In despair the government offered aid to the railroads, but there were not in the South the necessary iron mills to produce the means of keeping up or extending railroad service. There were rich beds of iron ore in the South, but in the devotion of the people to agriculture they had been unworked, and it was impossible to develop them under pressure of war.

Railroads.

Before 1861 a favorite secession argument was "Cotton is King!" and it did much for the cause of secession. In substance it was that Europe and the manufacturing North were so dependent on Southern cotton that war was very improbable, and if it did come, so much suffering would occur in England that she would interfere to end the struggle. It is true that the business interests of the North deprecated war, but they were swept away by the rising of patriotic fervor which followed the attack on Sumter, and from that time this part of the cotton kingdom paid no attention to the "King." In England there was much suffering, the small supply of cotton that went out through the blockade counting for nothing in the situation. But the people of England disliked slavery too much to take its part, and endured financial loss until slavery could be wiped out of its last important stronghold. Under these conditions, cotton, which early in 1861 brought 14 cents a pound in Liverpool, sold at the end of the war for 50 cents in the same place. Great quantities of it accumulated in the South, spite of the efforts of the confederate congress to induce the planters to raise food products only. In 1861 appeals were made to the planters by the government to burn their cotton lest it be sent abroad and relieve the scarcity, and 1,000,000 bales are said to have been thus destroyed. When New Orleans fell, the federal authorities offered to allow cotton from the

**The Part
Played by
Cotton.**

interior to pass out, but very little appeared for that purpose. By the end of 1862 the confederate authorities changed their opinion and sought to send cotton out through the blockade in order to get supplies. But at this time the blockade was too rigid to allow a considerable exportation. Trade between the lines was ordinarily forbidden, but when west Tennessee was occupied a demoralizing trade sprang up which the strictest orders did not prevent. Cotton was given in exchange for salt, clothing, and even military supplies, and there were many complaints that officers of the posts shared the profits. General Butler, who commanded at New Orleans from May to December, 1862, and at Norfolk in 1864, was generally believed to have reaped handsome reward by conniving at a trade in which cotton exchanged for salt and other supplies at 15 cents a pound sold in the North for 60 cents.

One of the most exciting phases of the war in the South was blockade running. The low price of cotton within the confederacy, and the high price without, made it a practice as profitable as adventurous. A ship which could make two or three trips successfully netted a handsome return to her owners if she were captured afterwards. For the service, vessels of great speed were used. They were low, rakish-looking craft, painted as nearly the color of the water as possible, and were usually manned by foreigners, who, if captured, were not prisoners of war. Coming back, they managed to reach the bar of the home port at high tide on a dark night and tried to steal unobserved between the sentinel ships that guarded the entrance. If discovered, they tried to dart between the blockaders, and sometimes succeeded by reason of their speed. Blockade runners were usually required to carry a portion of their incoming cargoes for the account of the confederate government. Nassau and Havana were the favorite ports to which they ran, and Wilmington, North Carolina, and Charleston the best ports from which to escape. The former is protected by shoals stretching far out to sea, which made the work of the blockaders difficult. It remained open until Fort Fisher, which guarded the entrance, was taken, January 16, 1865.

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CHAPTER XXVIII

RECONSTRUCTION — THE NATIONAL SIDE

TWO POSSIBLE METHODS OF RECONSTRUCTION

THE constitution did not provide a way to restore government in a conquered state, and the men of 1865 must use ingenuity and find one. Congress thought restoration a part of the law-making function and wished to act the part of restorer. The president felt that it was within his authority as commander-in-chief of the army and navy. He could establish military law, and he could say on what conditions he would withdraw it. But he did not presume to create reconstruction. His theory was that it was an outgrowth of a latent power in the state which sprang into active life when he withdrew the military force which held it back. In the nature of the case, the president could act first. He thus began actual reconstruction, but in 1867 congress took it out of his hands, overthrew all he had done, and established a reconstruction of its own. Thus we have presidential and congressional reconstruction.

**Presidential
and Con-
gressional
Reconstruc-
tion.**

The point of difference lay in the amount of confidence which could be reposed in the South to accept emancipation and allow the freedmen complete civil rights. The president would trust the Southerners. Let the union take some fundamental guarantees, exclude for a time the leading secessionists from a share in government, and leave the future to the calm sense and honor of the South. Congress thought this was not enough. It feared that when the oversight of freedmen was remanded to the states, local laws would be passed undoing much of the good accomplished by the war. It demanded laws and constitutional amendments limiting state action and protecting the rights of the freedmen. Its program developed as it gained control of the situation, and it finally announced a definite demand for enfranchisement as the only sure means by which the ex-slave could defend himself against the Southern white men. Several important laws and two constitutional amendments expressed this program. Their enactment marked the triumph of congress over the president.

**The
Difference
between
Them.**

In the long debates by which congress came to its decision were

announced five theories of the *status* of the Southern states. 1. The Southerners themselves believed that the states existed with unimpaired vitality, and that they only needed to accept the national authority and elect senators and representatives in order to resume their former places in the union. This was consistent with the ancient theory of state rights.

Status of the
Southern
States.

2. The presidential theory held that the states were still existent, but were incapable of normal action because their officers were insurgents. It announced that when the president pardoned these officials the old *status* returned, and the people could form a government, act for the state, and resume representation in congress. In each of these theories was the idea that a state is indestructible. 3. Sumner believed that a state resisting the union committed treason, forfeited its constitutional rights, and destroyed itself as effectively as if it committed suicide. If the state no longer existed, the people living in what had been its borders were entirely under the national authority, and congress might dictate the terms on which the state could be restored. Sumner was supported by many able men, and his theory was in line with the doctrine of strong nationality to which the war gave a decided impulse. 4. Thaddeus Stevens, able leader of the house of representatives, and more severe toward the South than Senator Sumner, believed also that the states as such had ceased to exist; but he considered them conquered provinces, as truly as if the war had been against a foreign power. They were, therefore, entirely in the hands of the conqueror, and congress might do what it would with the people and the territory concerned. Stevens thought the South, having rejected the constitution, had no right to claim its protection. He was known to favor drastic measures before completing the work of reconstruction. 5. As men considered these views, they found objections in each. To allow easy restoration of the states, as was implied in the first and second, would imperil the fruits of the war. On the other hand, to recognize the state-suicide or the conquered-provinces theory implied a relinquishment of the powers of states, and a strengthening of the national power to which a large part of congress would not consent. In this dilemma the men of the day found another course of action which was believed to avoid each disadvantage. The compromise, not entirely consistent, was expressed in the forfeited-rights theory. It held that secession did not destroy the states or even take them out of the union, but that it deprived them of some of their normal rights. They were in a state of suspended animation, and congress was to determine the terms of restoration. The theory differed chiefly from Sumner's by insisting that the states still existed, but with power and rights suspended, and from the presidential theory, by leaving the task of reconstruction entirely to congress. It took many months of debating to bring this theory to its predominance.

LINCOLN'S PLAN OF RECONSTRUCTION

By the end of 1862 parts of Tennessee, Arkansas, and Louisiana were recovered from the confederacy and taken at once under the direction of the generals who conquered them. Order was preserved by the commanders of military posts and by local officers appointed by the commanding generals. But this was not the proper function of an officer commanding in the field, and Lincoln created military governors with powers derived from himself as commander-in-chief. They appointed local officers, established courts, and supervised the police function in their respective jurisdictions. They could be removed by the president, and were considered but a temporary makeshift. Lincoln disliked military government as much as the people, and desired to make it yield as quickly as possible to a government which rested on the consent of the governed. Peirpoint's rump government at Alexandria served for the parts of Virginia held by the union, and relieved Lincoln of the necessity of establishing military government in that state.

December 8, 1863, Lincoln announced his plan in a "Proclamation of Amnesty and Reconstruction." He offered pardon to all but certain excepted citizens of the South, if they would swear loyalty to the union and accept the recent laws and proclamations respecting slavery. The persons excluded from pardon were former confederate civil and diplomatic officers, men who resigned federal judgeships, positions in the army or navy of the union, or seats in congress in order to serve the confederacy, officers above the rank of colonel in the army and lieutenant in the navy of the confederacy, and persons who refused to treat as prisoners of war captured colored troops and their white officers. He hoped that the mass of whites in the recovered areas would take the oath, and he thought it wise to neutralize, for the time being, the influence of their former leaders by excluding them from participation in the work of reorganization. The proclamation also announced that when a number of citizens of a state equal to one-tenth of the vote of that state in 1860 had taken the prescribed oath, they might establish a civil government, and presidential support would be given to its measures to regulate the life of the freedmen, provided emancipation was recognized. Finally, it was specifically stated that the president had no authority over the readmission of senators and representatives to the national congress.

In this proclamation Lincoln spoke in general terms and with his usual caution; but his intention is seen specifically in the plan he immediately put into operation in Louisiana, where thirteen parishes, including New Orleans, were in union hands. In August, 1862, he appointed General Shepley military governor of the state, and in

December, before the proclamation appeared, two districts elected congressmen who were allowed seats in the house, although the radicals there opposed the step because they thought it should wait until a general plan of reconstruction was adopted by congress. Lincoln ignored the radicals, and after the proclamation was issued, encouraged General Banks, commanding in Louisiana, to order an election for state officials on February 22, 1864. This done, a state convention was called to adapt the Louisiana constitution to new conditions. Three parties now appeared: one was conservatively Southern and declared that slavery continued spite of the emancipation proclamation of 1863; another was Northern in feeling and thought that slavery still existed, but should be abolished by state action; a third, including the practical men generally, thought slavery no longer existent. In the February elections, the third party cast more votes than the other two combined. It chose Michael Hahn governor, with other civil officers, but the second party protested the election as under military influence, and won the support of the radicals in congress, so that the senators, and representatives chosen with Hahn were not seated when they appeared in Washington. But the third party proceeded with its program. The convention met in April and revised the constitution by abolishing slavery, providing for public education without distinction of race, and granting equal civil *status* to all male citizens. This constitution was submitted to the people and adopted by a vote of 6836 to 1556. Lincoln supported Hahn; but radicals, in close touch with the Northern group in Louisiana, opposed all that was done, declaring especially for negro suffrage. Lincoln did not favor so extreme a step. "I barely suggest, for your private consideration," he wrote to Governor Hahn, "whether some of the colored people may not be let in — as, for instance, the very intelligent, and especially those who have fought gallantly in our ranks. They would probably help, in some trying time to come, to keep the jewel of liberty within the family of freedom." When negro suffrage became a most serious question, the war president was dead, but there is no reason to believe that he ever changed the opinion he expressed on it in 1864. In the same year, Arkansas established a reconstructed government like that of Louisiana, and Tennessee did the same in the winter of 1864-1865; but congress refused to seat the members chosen from either state. In 1862 a military governor was appointed over the small strip recovered in the east of North Carolina, but the process of reconquest was stayed, and no attempt was made to establish civil government in that state until the war ended.

Lincoln's plan aroused enthusiasm in the North, where there was little popular desire to punish the South. Then the radical leaders became alarmed and bethought themselves to check the tide of opinion which set for him. They thought him too mild toward the South;

Reconstruction in Louisiana - - 1863-1864.

Other States.

some of them favored negro suffrage, and they were shrewd enough to utilize the jealousy congress felt for its privilege as the part of the government which ought to decide upon reconstruction.

The Wade-Davis Bill.

The house of representatives was under their control, and in December, 1863, appointed a committee, Henry Winter Davis, of Maryland, chairman, to report a plan of reconstruction. The bill he introduced was carried through the house. It was amended in the senate and passed there chiefly through the efforts of Wade, of Ohio. For this reason it was called the Wade-Davis bill, after its two most notable authors. It provided that provisional governors administer the affairs of the recovered Southern states until the war ended, and that civil government should then be reestablished, when half of the male white citizens took an oath of loyalty to the union. The work of restoration should be done by a state convention, for which no man should vote and in which no man should have a seat who had held state or central office under the confederacy, or voluntarily fought against the union. This state convention must amend the constitution so as to provide: (1) that confederate officials, except in offices merely administrative and in military rank below colonel, should not vote for, or be, governors or members of legislatures; (2) that slavery be forever prohibited; and (3) that all debts incurred in behalf of the confederacy should be repudiated. When this constitution had been ratified by the people, the state was to be allowed representation in congress. The Wade-Davis bill passed July 2, 1864, two days before congress adjourned.

Although the bill was milder than the plan later carried out by congress, it was too severe for Lincoln, and it received a "pocket veto."

A "Pocket Veto."

He said, referring to repeated declarations made early in the war: "I do not see how any of us can now deny or contradict what we have always said, that congress has no constitutional power over slavery in the states." He issued a proclamation in which he said he would not bind himself to only one form of reconstruction, but that if any state presented itself for restoration under the plan in the Wade-Davis bill, it would have his support. This angered the radicals, who published an ill-tempered manifesto charging the president with a design to "hold the electoral votes of the rebel states at the dictation of his personal ambition." The war was then drawing to an end, and the problems of reconstructions were by common consent deferred until they could be taken up with an assurance of final settlement.

"Twenty-Second Joint Rule."

The president and congress were now clearly at odds, and the latter showed their distrust by passing a resolution that the electoral votes of the states restored under Lincoln's plan should not be counted. They also passed the "Twenty-second Joint Rule," by which the consent of each house was necessary to count the disputed electoral vote of a state.

It gave the radicals a strong grip on the presidential elections, and remained in force until 1876, when it was dropped because the democrats controlled the house. Lincoln was too wise to oppose these resolutions openly. He realized that a contest awaited him in which he would need all powers of tact and persuasion. Ere the encounter began he was dead.

One of his last victories was the approval of the thirteenth amendment by congress, February 1, 1865. It was accepted by three-fourths of the states and formally proclaimed December 18, 1865.

It read: "1. Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction. 2. Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation." The debate on the amendment in congress shows that "involuntary servitude" was meant to include any partially free condition, as serfdom or peonage. The term "any place subject to their jurisdiction" was adopted in preference to the term "United States," lest the latter be held to mean only the states within the union. The second clause caused much anxiety. As adopted, it was supposed to give congress ample power to overrule any obstruction of the states.

The
Thirteenth
Amendment.

JOHNSON'S PLAN OF RECONSTRUCTION

The man who took up the task which tried Lincoln was also humbly born and self-educated. A tailor by trade, he lacked the advantage most of our self-made leaders have had, of a long training in some conservative and intellectual profession. His power was won in the mountain counties of Tennessee, where he appealed to passions rather than judgment. He voiced boldly and ably the non-slaveholder's sense of inequality at the hands of the planter and his hope in the union as the salvation of the South from aristocratic domination. Lincoln admired his courage, and made him in 1862 military governor of Tennessee, a position in which a man of decision and inflexible will was needed. Lincoln also urged him for vice-presidential candidate in 1864, because he wanted a Southern man on the ticket. He was a democrat before the war, and still believed in state sovereignty. He became a republican because he loved the union, and was now, the union no longer in danger, inclined to revert to his old position. He was frequently intoxicated, and in that condition was liable to make maudlin speeches in which were mingled abuse of his opponents and glorification of himself. These lapses occurred most frequently in the first year of his presidency. Later, in the stress of conflict, he manifested more self-control, and waged his battle cautiously and with clearness of mind. But his opponents were shrewd and unrelenting. His indiscretions were de-

Andrew
Johnson.

scribed in the press and on the stump, and in the excitement of the moment he was presented to the world as a vulgar man gone mad.

Johnson took the oath of office on April 15. He retained Lincoln's cabinet, in which were two factions, one headed by Stanton, secretary

**Johnson,
Stanton, and
Seward.**

of war, and in sympathy with the radicals, and the other in favor of Lincoln's milder policy. In this second group Seward, secretary of state, was now greatest, but, wounded when Lincoln was shot, it was not until May 19 that he was able to attend cabinet meetings. At first the president acted with Stanton, who stimulated his natural resentment against the ruling class in the South. He talked much about making treason odious, and he offered large rewards for the arrest of Jefferson Davis and other confederates on the ground that they took part in the conspiracy to kill Lincoln. The radicals even urged the capture and punishment of Lee and other paroled generals, on the ground that paroles were ineffective at the end of the state of war. At this, General Grant, who granted Lee's parole, intervened with so strong a negative that the project was relinquished. Its violence reacted against Stanton, and the opportune reappearance of Seward caused pacific ideas to prevail. By June 1, Johnson's policy was essentially that of Lincoln.

Johnson's plan appeared in his amnesty proclamation, May 29, 1865. All former confederates, except those specifically excluded,

**Johnson's
Amnesty.**

were to be pardoned upon taking an oath of loyalty. The exceptions included confederate, civil, and diplomatic officers, military officers above colonels, naval officers above lieutenants, confederate governors, persons who had resigned high federal office to serve the confederacy, and persons who owned taxable property worth \$20,000, or more. But the persons excepted could be pardoned by the president. It was in excluding the last class that Johnson's amnesty differed essentially from Lincoln's. In another proclamation of the same date, W. W. Holden was appointed provisional governor of North Carolina and directed to order an election of delegates for a constitutional convention. Johnson's decision on the suffrage was an important point, and Stanton had tried hard to get it extended to all freemen, meaning whites and blacks. But Seward prevailed, and the proclamation offered the franchise to

**North
Carolina Re-
constructed.**

those who could have voted before secession and who had received amnesty. Negro suffrage at that time had not been demanded in any vote of congress, not even in the Wade-Davis bill; and it was denied in every Northern state except New York, Vermont, New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Maine, and Rhode Island. The North Carolina proclamations became a precedent, and in six weeks similar documents were issued for South Carolina, Georgia, Florida, Alabama, Mississippi, and Texas. The Southerners had waited anxiously while their fate was debated in Washington. Rumors of confiscation, of negro enfranchisement,

and other hardships had filled them with dread. They now recovered their spirits and even assumed that the North dared not trample under foot the rights of a sovereign state. They accepted Johnson's terms, and, when congress met in December, the seven states were in active process of reconstruction. Johnson did not disturb Lincoln's plans in Louisiana, Arkansas, Tennessee, and Virginia, and it seemed, therefore, that restoration would soon be accomplished in the entire South.

Lincoln and Johnson doubtless thought the exclusion of prominent Southerners would be temporary. It would neutralize the influence of former secessionists and fill the conventions and assemblies with men over whom the administration could have some influence; and when the first steps in reconstruction were taken, the leaders might be gradually readmitted to civil rights. But the excluded persons did not lose influence. They were the South's natural leaders, now more loved because they seemed martyrs, and, hampered as they were, they continued to devise the policies of the people. Their sense of injustice gave a tone of defiance to their counsel, and this when it was most important that they be enlisted for the cause of reconciliation.

Result of
Exclusion.

By the end of October, 1865, six of the states under Johnson's plan had held their conventions, and the other, Texas, acted in the spring of 1866. They all annulled secession and declared slavery abolished forever; and all but South Carolina repudiated the state debts contracted in aid of the confederacy. These steps were taken by the advice of the president, who declared that they were necessary to satisfy the North. Soon after the conventions adjourned, the state legislatures met. To them came the thirteenth amendment for ratification. Johnson again interposed, and at his solicitation it was approved by every Southern state but Mississippi.

Progress
of States
under
Johnson's
Plan.

AFFAIRS IN THE SOUTH

The South did not relish what it did, but it acted in good faith. It believed restoration complete and took up the regulation of the lives of the freedmen with the feeling that there would be, and could be, no further interference. The control of the blacks had ever given them anxiety; and the black code of slavery times was designed to restrict the actions of these people. It was, however, adjusted to slavery, and it seemed to the Southern legislators of 1865 that it must be revised to suit the régime of emancipation. The negroes were as illiterate and as little civilized as before the war, and they were now under less control. Undoubtedly the legislators exaggerated the negro's liability to make trouble. He has never shown a violent disposition. But the South had lived under the black terror for generations, and felt the power of

The South
and the
Freedmen.

it still in the untried problem of 1865. Thus it was that the legislatures felt it necessary to prepare new black codes. The conviction did not grow out of a feeling of hostility to the blacks, but out of a deep-rooted view of social life.

Before the war the law provided in most states that no slave should travel without written permission, or have firearms, or trade in the night-time, or give evidence against a white man, or hold property of certain kinds, or reply in kind to a white man's abuse. He was not tried in the same court with a white man, nor did his life and liberty have the same safeguards. In short, the *ante-bellum* Southerner was satisfied that the negro should have a lower *status* than the white man.

The first state legislature to meet under Johnson's plan was that of Mississippi. It assembled in November, 1865, and quickly made a new black code. In this state feeling was rather extreme, and the legislators, ignorant of the effect in the North, made such regulations as comported with their ideas of the *status* of the freedmen. The blacks were to have the right to own personal property, to sue and be sued, to contract legal marriage with their own race, but not to intermarry with whites, and to be witnesses when one party in a case was colored. All these things were impossible under the old code, and they seemed to most Southerners notable concessions. They were balanced by restrictions which showed how greatly freedom was to be limited; for it was also provided that a freedman might not own land, nor could he lease it outside of towns, that he must have a license naming his home and employment, that his labor contracts for a term more than a month should be in writing, that if he violated a labor contract he lost unpaid wages, and that he should not have firearms unless licensed or in the federal military service. It was also provided that if he was adjudged to have no lawful employment, he was a vagrant and subject to fine. The same punishment was given him for other offenses, as trespass, rioting, seditious speeches, insulting gestures, preaching without license from a church, and selling intoxicating liquors. If he could not pay a fine thus imposed, he should be handed over to labor for the white man, who would pay the amount and take him to work for the shortest time. Minor orphans and children whose parents did not support them were ordered to be bound out to a white man until of age, and the officer who ordered the bond should fix the age of the child, if it was doubtful.

These laws did not conflict with the thirteenth amendment, which prohibited involuntary servitude only when not inflicted for crime. They created a large scope for crime. The provisions for vagrancy and apprenticeship were much like the older laws of Mississippi on the same subjects; and the Southerners thought them absolutely necessary in bringing into orderly relations a mass of crude and disorganized people. Other Southern

**The Old
Black Code.**

**The New
Black Code.**

**Effects of
the New
Black Code.**

legislatures followed the example of Mississippi, though none of them went quite so far in repression. They were either not so severe in their ideas, or were disposed to be cautious because of the criticism the Mississippi laws aroused in the North. But the new code, taken all together, created the impression outside the South that the states, once the problem was entirely in their hands, would impose a condition of part freedom on the former slaves. The radicals, in congress and out, made much capital of it, and insisted that it showed that presidential reconstruction did not safeguard the fruits of military victory.

Meanwhile, the Southerners thought they had ocular demonstration of the unwise meddling of the North in Southern social conditions. March 3, 1865, congress created in the war department "a bureau of refugees, freedmen, and abandoned lands," commonly called the freedmen's bureau. It was to assume a relation of guardianship over the freedman, hitherto dependent on his master, to direct his first steps in self-support, to furnish supplies, to supervise his education and his contracts to labor, to incite him to good habits, and to protect him against over-reaching white men, if such should be encountered. The bureau had a commissioner at the head, an assistant commissioner for each state, and a large number of local agents, most of them Northern men. It had large powers in the settlement of disputes between blacks and whites, and the latter, accustomed to manage their own affairs, considered it an intrusive organization, and a symbol of their humiliation. Most of the bureau officials were practical men, although some were enthusiastic friends of the negro race and had too much confidence in the effect of freedom on it. But they were at the best in a trying situation, and became much disliked in the South.

The blacks themselves had little concept of the duties and obligations of their new condition. By most evidence they worked well during the spring and summer of 1865. By autumn they seemed to be more restless. The freedmen's bureau bill provided that the abandoned and confiscated lands of Southerners should be distributed among them at not more than forty acres to each adult male. As it was doubtful if the confiscation act of 1862 would pass the courts, very little land had been acquired by the government, although much was occupied in some districts. The distribution was thus delayed, but the negroes knew it was contemplated, came to look upon it as an act of justice, and in some unexplained way believed that the donation would be made at the end of 1865, as a great Christmas gift from the national government. At this time the South was full of enthusiastic men and women who as missionaries and teachers sought to uplift the dull minds and souls which slavery had enthralled. The situation was complex, but it was an epoch of violent readjustment, and it was not to be expected

**The
Freedmen's
Bureau.**

**"Forty
Acres and
a Mule."**

that it should have passed smoothly. The negro himself leaned hard on the friends from the North, caught at the prospect of "forty acres and a mule," and, as Christmas approached, refused to contract for farm labor during the coming year. The white employers were resentful. They believed that the Northern men in the South were disorganizing conditions there, and the events which followed — the hot debates in Congress and the violent language of the radicals — were not likely to remove the Southerner's suspicions. Thus it happened that the blacks and whites, who even in the darkest days of war lived harmoniously side by side, came to be antagonistic and united in opposition to one another.

JOHNSON'S HOPES

During most of 1865 Johnson's reconstruction was popular. The North was not vindictive, and the people wanted peace. Business men desired the prosperity of the South, an important purchaser of all the products of the North. In the summer and autumn many conventions indorsed the work of the president. His first annual message was praised both for its good sense and its literary excellence. We now know that George Bancroft, the historian, was responsible for the latter; but Johnson himself, with Seward and other advisers, was the author of the former. It declared for peace. Let the two races in the South be left to themselves, let not the process of reform be unduly hastened, and "it may prove that they [the negroes] will receive the kindest usage from some of those on whom they have hitherto most closely depended."

Johnson and his advisers thought of a new republican party, and under existing conditions it was not an impossibility. In ten years the republicans had outlived two great issues, resistance to slavery and disunion, and must now find another. Johnson believed the moderate men predominated in the nation. Most of the Northerners who in 1860 supported Douglas, Breckenridge, and Bell, and probably a third of those who supported Lincoln believed in the indestructibility of the states, that is to say, about 65 per cent of the total vote of the non-seceding states. If these could be brought into one moderate movement, they could carry the country; and if the South were restored, it would only increase the strength of the moderates. It was a well-conceived plan, and under a different leader might have been realized. Those who carefully read the message of 1865 and saw the popularity it aroused in the country were of a mind that Johnson might succeed.

All this alarmed the radicals. December 4, Thaddeus Stevens, by getting a two-thirds vote in the house excluded the representatives from the newly reconstructed states, thus giving notice that presidential reconstruction was opposed by the house. He next moved a

**Johnson's
Popularity.**

**A Moderate
Republican
Party.**

joint committee on reconstruction, nine members from the house and six from the senate, and the motion passed by a vote of 133 to 36 in the lower, and 33 to 11 in the upper, body. These resolutions were so written that what was done, rested on the unquestioned right of the houses to pass upon the election of their own members. But the committee proceeded to consider a plan of reconstruction which it would report before it took up the specific question for which it was named, the seating of the Southerners. Stevens, now master of the house, was chairman of the house portion of the committee. He was bitter, able, and vindictive. He became the most influential of the radicals. Fessenden, chairman of the senate portion, was somewhat milder in feeling, but he too was opposed to presidential reconstruction.

**The First
Efforts
of the
Radicals.**

But the first move came in the senate. January 5, 1866, the judiciary committee, through its chairman, Lyman Trumbull, of Illinois, reported the freedmen's bureau bill of 1866. Trumbull was an old friend of Lincoln, and in most of the controversy that followed was on the conservative side. His bill enlarged the powers of the bureau, and continued it until congress ordered otherwise. It also provided that when a state by its laws discriminated against the blacks the president should extend military law over such a state and the bureau officials should execute it. This was a reply to the enactment of the new black codes. It was not to apply to states which had not seceded, and it was to be inoperative after a Southern state had been reconstructed. To those who held the older theory of the state it seemed violent invasion of a state's constitutional rights. The law passed the senate by a vote of 37 to 10, and the house by 136 to 33. Johnson vetoed it at once. His reasons pleased his friends, who thought the bill a dangerous attack on the state. Some of the senators were apparently convinced by his arguments, and when the bill came up again in the senate it failed, by a vote of 30 to 18, to pass over the veto.

**Freedmen's
Bureau Bill
of 1866.**

Johnson probably thought the country would rally to him, but he was disappointed. He was attacked bitterly in congress and out. He was pronounced a democrat, and a Southern sympathizer, and it was pointed out that his friends in congress were only democrats and half-hearted republicans. He was unmercifully condemned for a speech on February 22, in which, carried away by the shouts of noisy admirers, he forgot the dignity of his office, and charged Stevens, Sumner, and Wendell Phillips with trying to destroy the principles of the government. His language and bearing were coarse, and the disgust they occasioned obscured the constitutional argument he made with ability. In the light of after events, it seems that if he had accepted the freedman's bureau bill, he would have drawn to his side the more conservative of his opponents and reduced the power of the radicals into safe bounds.

**The Tide
against
Johnson.**

When the senate judiciary committee reported the freedmen's bureau bill it also reported a civil rights bill, declaring citizens all persons born in the United States, except Indians not taxed and foreign subjects. It guaranteed equal rights to such citizens, and reserved cases under this law to the federal courts. This bill did undoubtedly contravene the older idea that citizenship belonged to the state, but it was believed by its friends to be justified under the clause in the thirteenth amendment giving congress the power to enforce the abolition of slavery. Some of Johnson's wisest friends, foreseeing the impending struggle with congress, urged him to save himself by accepting the bill; but when it came to him in March he vetoed it on the ground that it was a stride toward concentration and would "resuscitate the spirit of rebellion." Congress passed the bill over the veto. From that time Johnson was beaten.

Both of these bills came from the senate and were milder than the known policy of the house radicals. In each branch of the legislature were moderate republicans who at first opposed the radical policies. They were the decisive factor in the situation. If they went for the president he would triumph. They would probably have stood by him if he had accepted the bills. But his vetoes showed him uncompromisingly for the states, and the moderates would not trust him; for although they opposed concentration, they believed that to surrender the situation to state control would defeat justice in the South and establish the new black code.

The debate on these two bills was bitter, and contained much about Southern outrages, or violence visited by the Southern whites on negroes and loyal white men. There was, in fact, much disorder in the South. The whites there believed that they had rights as citizens of indestructible states; and they resented the purpose of the radicals as revealed in congress. They were irritated by the proposition to try cases dealing with negroes before officials of the freedmen's bureau and to commit a hundred offenses concerning the rights of the freedmen to federal courts. Their impatience expressed itself in open conflict with those, whites and blacks, who defended the new régime. Negroes had been whipped freely before the war for insubordination; it was not unnatural that those blacks who now seemed too aggressive or committed violence should receive the same treatment. Besides, there were daring spirits who took pleasure in punishing men whom they believed inimical to Southern society. Moreover, there were many posts of union troops in the South to preserve order, and their method of doing it sometimes excited retaliation by young Southerners. Particularly, if the post was held by negro troops the result was likely to be conflict. Possibly the acts of violence resulting from all these causes were no more numerous than were to be expected in such chaotic conditions; but each instance was exploited in the North for political

effect. Repeated in the papers, they showed to the satisfaction of most men that the South was still rebellious and should not control the rights and liberty of the former slaves. The outrages were exaggerated in the Northern press: in most parts of the South and at most times life was quiet and there was safety for the people.

THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT

No one in Washington in the spring of 1866 thought that the enactment of the freedmen's bureau and the civil rights bills would satisfy all parties. The house, in the hands of the radicals, with Stevens at the head, would spend all its strength to carry out a policy of severe reconstruction. But the senate was less united. In fact, it contained four factions. One, a rather large one, was as radical as Stevens; another was radical, but temperately so; another was composed of moderate republicans who had followed Lincoln, and another of democrats who were openly for the South. The fourth group was the only one that Johnson could count on. The third was friendly in the beginning of the year, and probably would have continued so if he had accepted the two bills just mentioned. It was currently said that he promised to approve the civil rights bill, and his subsequent veto of it was considered an act of bad faith which further alienated the men of the third group. With all the senate republicans united it was possible to carry a bill over the president's veto.

**The Senti-
ment in
Congress.**

The radicals were conscious of their power and jubilant over the prospect of success. Their first move was an amendment giving constitutional vigor to the main features of the civil rights bill. But in its first form the fourteenth amendment dealt with negro suffrage alone. It did not seem fair that the South, the old three-fifths apportionment being now obsolete, should have full benefit of its colored population while it excluded them from the polls. So it was proposed to exclude negroes from the basis of representation in those states in which they might not vote. As this would be a loss of representation in such states, it was hoped that it would impel them to concede the franchise to the freedmen. In this form the amendment passed the house by a vote of 120 to 32, but it failed in the senate. Five extreme radicals, Sumner among them, voted against it because it did not authorize negro suffrage outright.

**Fourteenth
Amendment
— First
Form.**

This was before the veto of the civil rights bill. Nearly two months later the amendment came before congress in a new form. The provision regarding suffrage was retained, and three features of the vetoed bill were added: 1. "All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the states wherein they reside." 2. No state should abridge the rights

**Second
Form.**

of such citizens. 3. No state should "deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law" or deny equal protection of the laws. It also excluded from federal or state office until pardoned by congress persons who, having held high federal or state office, later supported the confederacy. It guaranteed the payment of the national war debt, and ordered that no state should pay the confederate debt or pay for the loss of the slaves through emancipation. It was so sweeping a program of reconstruction that the extreme radicals would not oppose it. Sumner and three of his five colleagues in the senate who voted against the first form now gave it their votes, and it passed both houses by the necessary two-thirds vote. It only remained to be approved by three-fourths of the states.

No one could doubt that the Northern states would ratify; but the Southern states were more than a fourth of the 27 states then in the union and could defeat the amendment. Would they accept or reject? Most republicans were ready to forget all if those states, chastened by adversity, approved the amendment. In view of what came later, they would have done well to bow the head to the yoke and submit to necessity. But the fires of controversy had filled them with defiance, and one by one in the autumn of 1866 and in the winter following they repudiated the amendment. Their legislatures under the Johnson plan were full of ex-confederates, who took it as an indignity to disfranchise their former comrades, repudiate the confederate debt, and accept a lower rank in congress. They were in despair, and felt that if they must be humiliated, it might better come through the force of the conqueror than by their own consent. Posterity has some admiration for their spirit, but the Northern people were only inclined to think them stiff-necked and unreasonable.

The situation pleased the extreme radicals, who felt that the North must now come to a policy of severity. The autumn elections seemed to support them, since the senate was now republican by 42 to 11 votes and the house by 143 to 49. Stevens and Sumner, who thought that the negro could only be protected by having the ballot, were ready to demand negro suffrage, and believed the country would indorse such a demand. Garfield, in the house, summed up their feeling in a remarkable speech. Congress, he said, had been generous: it might, had it so desired, have hanged "every rebel traitor in the South for their bloody conspiracy," or confiscated their property; but through generosity it had withheld its hand. Its offer to receive the Southern states into the union with no other restriction than the fourteenth amendment had been flung back into its face, and "it is now our turn to act. They would not coöperate with us in rebuilding what they destroyed. We must remove the rubbish and rebuild from the bottom." By the rubbish, he meant the existing governments under Johnson's plan. The

Rejected
by the
South.

The
Radicals in
Control.

Southerners believed that by holding out courageously they could block the amendment forever, since it could not be adopted without their consent. By rebuilding the government in their states from the bottom, Garfield meant that the negroes themselves must be allowed to vote, that they would thus gain control of the Southern states, and that the amendment could then be ratified. This favorite program of the extreme radicals was now to be carried into effect.

THE RECONSTRUCTION ACTS OF 1867

The first concern of the radicals was to abolish the governments Johnson had set up in the Southern states, and to substitute others which conformed to the radical theory. Stevens had ever advocated such a course and introduced a bill to that effect in the first session of the existing congress. Moderate views, however, had prevailed and his bill was not pressed. He now, January 3, 1867, called it up, and spite of the opposition of the liberals, it was referred to the joint committee on reconstruction, which reported it a month later with some modifications. It abolished existing southern governments and created military rule in the South to continue during the pleasure of congress. The house passed it, but the senate moderates opposed it so strongly that compromise was necessary. The bill as it passed the house provided that the military governors be appointed by the general of the army — General Grant. The moderate senators did not like to ignore the president's constitutional power as commander-in-chief, they thought he ought to appoint the military governors, and they wished the bill to specify the time at which the scheme should cease to operate. They had their way, and the measure in its final form passed both houses, was vetoed by Johnson, and passed over his veto, March 2, 1867. Sumner, always the champion of negro suffrage, desired that the bill specify that the state constitutions to be adopted under the proposed scheme should enfranchise the freedmen, and his demand was granted. The act of March 2 was the first of three which together embodied the congressional plan of reconstruction.

Preparing
a Radical
Bill.

Its chief features were: 1. The South was to be divided into five military districts as follows: (a) Virginia, (b) the Carolinas, (c) Georgia, Florida, and Alabama, (d) Mississippi and Louisiana, and (e) Texas and Arkansas. Tennessee was not in this arrangement, for in 1866 it accepted the fourteenth amendment and was recognized as in full fellowship.

The Act of
March 2,
1867.

2. Over each military district there was to be a military governor appointed by the president with the consent of the senate. 3. This governor must preserve order in his district, and he might continue local civil officers there or supplant them by military tribunals as he

saw fit. 4. A constitutional convention should be called in each state, the delegates being chosen by all citizens, regardless of race or color, except those disfranchised for rebellion or for felony at common law. 5. When the revised constitution, which must accept the franchise provided in this act, was approved by those who voted for the members of the convention and was accepted by congress, and when the legislature under it had adopted the fourteenth amendment and the said amendment had become a part of the federal constitution, such a state should be readmitted into the union and military government should cease.

The day after this act was passed congress adjourned. Its last care was to call an extra session of the succeeding congress, the fortieth, to meet on March 4. It had taken the situation into its own hands so effectually that even this function was taken from the president. The new congress was more opposed to Johnson than its predecessor, and carried on the task of reconstruction with eagerness. The act of March 2 merely enacted a plan; a new law, that of March 23, provided machinery for putting the plan into effect. It provided for a registration of voters and for holding the elections of delegates to the conventions. It also provided that a constitution to be accepted must have the approval of a majority of the registered voters. This was done to meet an objection of the other side that the proposed proceedings in the South would be only minority legislation. Johnson vetoed this act and congress overrode the veto. Johnson's opposition now ceased. He considered it his duty to enforce the law and appointed the five military governors provided for, all generals of prominence; and they ordered registrations of voters and called for elections as the laws directed.

The radicals thought their work well done, but the Southerners, with the aid of Stanbery, the attorney-general, found a weak point in it. The law allowed all to register who did not voluntarily serve the confederacy. Did the registration officers have authority to determine that an applicant had fought voluntarily or involuntarily? The question was referred to Washington, and Stanbery decided that the officers had no discretion and must register all who offered. Under this interpretation of the law the Southerners would register in large numbers and probably defeat the objects of congressional reconstruction. The radicals were alarmed. Secretary of War Stanton, their chief reliance in the cabinet, was in entire opposition to the president, and wrote a new law which congress passed over Johnson's veto July 19, 1867. It was the third reconstruction act of the radicals. It gave the registration officials the specific authority Stanbery had not found in the first acts, and in other ways made it impossible to evade the will of the congressional majority. In these three laws congressional reconstruction received its legal basis and became inevitable.

Act of
March 23.

The Act of
July 19,
1867.

Although Johnson kept within the letter of the law and obeyed it when it was clear, he was not trusted and was much disliked. Congress expressed its feeling by fixing the times of its own reassembling, and in allowing many contemptuous utterances on the floors of the two houses. He gave great offense in the summer of 1866 in several speeches in what was known as his "swinging-around-the-circle" tour in the West. He was said to have been intoxicated when he spoke at Cleveland, where the jibes from the crowd irritated him until he broke into a series of angry and rude retorts. It was probably the most undignified exhibition a president of the United States ever made of himself. It gave an argument to his enemies, who redoubled their abuse and aroused such contempt for him in the country that they felt able to treat him in the most disdainful manner without fear of popular reproof. They pronounced him a traitor, and talked openly of impeaching him. They desired to take out of his hands the execution of their program.

Feeling
against
Johnson.

They had wished to take from him the appointment of the military governors, but the moderates in the senate blocked them in that. Then they passed over his veto the tenure-of-office act, March 2, 1867. Secretary Stanton, they thought, was necessary to their plans. He was bold, resourceful, and defiant of Johnson. If he should be dismissed from the war department, where he had a wide supervision over the new military districts, and a man of Johnson's way of thinking should take his place, much might be lost in the execution of the reconstruction laws. By the act now passed, federal employees confirmed by the senate should hold office until their successors were duly appointed, but cabinet members should remain in office during the term of the president who named them and for one month thereafter. It also directed that if the president removed a cabinet officer during the recess of congress, he should report the case to the senate within twenty days after it convened, and the senate might order the reinstatement of the officer in question. Such a removal could, therefore, only be a suspension. The constitution is not specific on this point, but in 1867 it had been held for a long time that it gave the president the power to dismiss a cabinet officer, and Jackson and others had exercised the right. Johnson and his advisers, therefore, disputed the constitutionality of the tenure-of-office act and were prepared to test it in the courts when the opportunity came.

Tenure-of-
Office Act.

AN APPEAL TO THE SUPREME COURT

Not only Johnson but many others opposed to the plans of the radicals turned their eyes to the supreme court, finding in it the last hope of checking the course of the innovators. They saw in all that

was done an exaltation of military authority and a dangerous menace to liberty. If the court did not save them, they thought, who would?

The first appeal was in the case known as *ex parte* Milligan, decided in 1866, and here the verdict was for the conservatives. It gave

Ex parte
Milligan.

them much satisfaction, although the case did not bear directly on the reconstruction controversy. In 1864 Milligan and two others were convicted by a military commission of giving aid to the enemy, and the sentence was death. Lincoln would not confirm the sentence, and when peace came, the men were in prison. They contended that military law ceased to operate with the end of hostilities, secured a writ of *habeas corpus*, and were released. The supreme court held that neither the president nor congress could declare martial law or try civilians by military tribunals in places where the civil courts were open. The decision would seem to check the tendency of the radicals to do what they would under the guise of military law. Two other decisions encouraged the conservatives. In Missouri, a state law forbade licenses in various professions to be issued to former confederates. In *Cummings v. Missouri* the supreme court held that the statute was *ex post facto*. In Arkansas it was attempted to deprive confederates of license to practice law in the federal courts, but the supreme court held in *ex parte* Garland that this also was *ex post facto*. These three decisions came in December, 1866, and January, 1867, when the radicals were beginning to urge their plan on congress. Some of the more timid ones faltered, but Stevens treated the decisions with contempt. It seemed that he would attack the court as readily as he opposed the president: his attitude gave courage to his followers, and the acts of March 2 and 23, establishing military government were passed and carried into effect. The country soon had opportunity to see what the courts would do about them.

The state of Mississippi in April, 1867, applied for an injunction to restrain the president from executing the recent laws. If it thought

Mississippi
vs. Johnson.

that because he was opposed to their passage he would contest their execution they were mistaken. He considered the acts good law and executed them as he thought they were to be understood. Stanbery, the attorney-general, resisted the injunction as counsel for his superior, arguing that the president could be tried only by a court of impeachment, and urging that the matter was really political and that the courts ought not to interfere. The decision supported his contention and the injunction was denied. So clear had been the attitude of the court in the preceding winter and so open the defiance of the radicals that the South could not rest with this decision. They brought another case, this time taking care to eliminate the president from

Georgia vs.
Stanton.

it. Georgia now took the initiative, applying for a similar injunction, but against Secretary Stanton. This also was denied, the court hold-

ing that a writ which might not issue against the president might not issue against his agent, a member of his cabinet.

These two decisions showed how unwilling the court was to take part in the fierce controversy then waging. A third made their attitude still clearer. McCardle, a Mississippi editor, gave offense to the new military government and was arrested. *Ex parte* McCardle. The civil rights act of 1866 provided that the supreme court might issue writs of *habeas corpus*; and McCardle took advantage of it to get his liberty. It seemed plain that by the decision in *ex parte* Milligan, which declared that military law should not exist in time of peace, he must be released. His opponents alleged no jurisdiction, but the plea was overruled. The radicals were alarmed, and hastily carried a law through congress to withdraw from the court the right to issue a writ of *habeas corpus*. The court was relieved from what was evidently a painful situation. It declared that it now had no jurisdiction, and in a high-sounding declaration that it declined ungranted jurisdiction it gave notice that it was not inclined to interfere with the program of the lawmakers. Thus passed the hope that radical reconstruction might be stayed by the supreme court. Stevens was supreme, military government in the South was doing the work expected of it, and he proceeded to the last phase of his plan, the impeachment of the president — a thing he seemed to desire as much for vengeance as to terrify the country and overawe the last vestige of opposition.

THE IMPEACHMENT OF PRESIDENT JOHNSON

In January, 1867, the house ordered its judiciary committee to see if evidence could be found to support impeachment. The committee made an investigation and reported no such evidence had been secured, but advised that further efforts be made. *First Efforts to Impeach Johnson.* March 7 a new congress was in extra session and gave similar instructions to its own committee. Four months later there was another report, also against impeachment. But the committee was instructed to continue its labors, and in the autumn it reported for impeachment by a vote of five to four. Three thousand pages of evidence relating to all kinds of acts of the president were submitted to the house, which, on consideration, seemed insufficient, and by a vote of 180 to 57 the house declined to arraign the president, who, according to the constitution, is impeachable for "treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors." No one alleged treason or bribery in Johnson's case, but the extreme radicals thought he had committed "high crimes and misdemeanors" in opposing congress. Moderate republicans were inclined to hold that the term did not apply to actions in their nature political, but to those which were felonies or which broke specific laws; of such actions Johnson

was innocent. In an impeachment trial the senators, who sit as judges, are not bound by the ordinary rules of evidence. They hear testimony and argument and decide as they think best. Under such conditions and in view of the strong political feelings of the day, it was not to be expected that the trial, if ordered, would be free from bias. But conviction required a two-thirds vote, the democrats would oppose it, and a few moderate republicans would do the same unless the case was clearly made out. The state of public opinion must also be considered. The nation was not willing to degrade a president, not even Johnson, for actions he thought politically wise. They would demand some overt act, and impeachment in default of it might fail in the senate and react against the republican party in the elections now approaching. The desired incident came in the winter of 1867-1868.

In August, 1867, Johnson suspended Stanton from the secretaryship of war and put General Grant in his place. December 12 he reported the matter to the senate as the tenure-of-office act required. The senate after much discussion disapproved the suspension, Grant retired, and Stanton resumed his duties. Johnson thought the act unconstitutional which shackled him, but, while he obeyed it, he was careful to say nothing admitting its legality. Stanton was in constant communication with the congressional radicals, and Johnson regarded his presence at cabinet meetings as intolerable. The president wished Grant to refuse to retire, which would force an appeal to the courts and get a ruling on the tenure-of-office act. Grant hesitated: he was friendly to Johnson, but wished to avoid a conflict with the strong war secretary. Finally, the president asked him at least to resign office a few days before the senate should come to its decision, so that a man might be appointed who would oppose Stanton. The president and five cabinet members asserted that the general gave the promise, but he as confidently denied it, and the nature of the misunderstanding was not explained. An angry quarrel began which would have been avoided if Johnson had been tactful; for he could not afford at this juncture to lose the good will of so powerful a man as the victor over Lee.

The president thought the dignity of his office as well as his own self-respect demanded that he should not yield; and he resolved to proceed directly. He afterwards claimed that his sole object was to test the objectionable law in the courts. February 21, five weeks after resuming his duties, Stanton was dismissed by an executive order, and Adjutant General Lorenzo Thomas was directed to take charge of the war department. Thomas promptly called on Stanton to vacate the office and allowed the latter a day to close up his affairs in it. But next morning, before he could proceed farther, he was arrested for violating the tenure-of-office act. He employed counsel, who prepared to take the affair before the courts,

Stanton
Suspended.

Stanton
Removed.

and the president was overjoyed to see the case assume the form he had long desired. But he was to be disappointed; for almost at once Thomas was released from custody, and with such haste that it was evident his opponents repented arresting him. He was not a man to oppose the strong-willed Stanton, no one wanted an armed struggle with the war department, and here this phase of the controversy rested, Stanton still exercising his functions.

Meanwhile, the case went to another tribunal. As soon as he was dismissed, Stanton informed his friends in the house. They saw in it the long-sought overt act on which to base impeachment.

After a continuous two-days' session they resolved by a party vote that "Andrew Johnson, President of the United States, be impeached of high crimes and misdemeanors in office." Feeling ran high, and in the house radicals and moderate republicans joined to press the charges to the utmost. There was hardly a man among them who doubted that their enemy was at last delivered into their hands. March 4, 1868, seven managers chosen by the house appeared before the senate with eleven specific charges on which they demanded that the president be tried. Next day the senate sat as a court of impeachment, Chief Justice Chase in the chair. Ten days were allowed the defendant to prepare his case, while the house appointed a committee of seven to conduct the prosecution. Its most conspicuous members were Benjamin F. Butler, George S. Boutwell, and Thaddeus Stevens, all better known as politicians than as constitutional lawyers. Johnson had the advantage of drawing his attorneys from the best men in the country. His array of counsel was most distinguished and embraced such men as Stanbery, the attorney-general, who was familiar with the controversy in all its stages, Justice Curtis, formerly of the supreme court, and William M. Evarts, head of the New York bar.

The indictment held in substance that Johnson committed "high crimes and misdemeanors," (1) in dismissing Stanton contrary to the tenure-of-office act, (2) in declaring that certain laws were unconstitutional, (3) in maliciously criticizing congress in the "swinging-around-the-circle" speeches of 1866, and

**The
Charges.**

(4) in opposing congressional reconstruction generally. Only the first of these, which was the substance of the first eight actually presented, related to late action by the president. The third was suggested by Butler, who thought it might appeal to the feelings of some senators who had scruples in regard to the first. The fourth, known as the "omnibus article," was suggested by Stevens in somewhat the same spirit. There were fifty-four senators, and it was, therefore, necessary to get thirty-six votes to secure conviction. The twelve democrats could be counted for

The Jury.

acquittal, an equal number of republicans were as certain to be for conviction, and the rest were disposed to hear the evidence and argu-

ments before making up their minds. If seven of these were for Johnson he was secure.

This interesting question soon came up: Shall the senate act as a judicial or a political body? If the former, it was necessary to submit evidence which would have weight in a court of justice; if the latter, it was only necessary to convince the senators that Johnson should be removed. The prosecutors took the latter view, and Butler and Stevens defended it with much shrewdness. They continually addressed Chase as "Mr. President," while the opposing counsel addressed him as "Mr. Chief Justice." He, with the instincts of a jurist, leaned to the view that the senate was a court, and passed on evidence as though he were sitting on the bench. But he submitted his opinions to the senate, which, by a mere majority vote, usually overruled them.

Johnson's strongest points were that he removed Stanton to test the tenure-of-office act, that he thought the act unconstitutional, and that holding this view it was his privilege and duty to proceed so that the point at issue should be decided in court. He offered to show that the whole cabinet, Stanton included, thought the act unconstitutional when enacted. Chase would admit this evidence, but the senate overruled him. The defense also urged that the removal of the secretary did not violate that act, which provided that a cabinet member should hold office during the term of the president who appointed him and for one month thereafter. Stanton was appointed by Lincoln and was not protected by the act. These points were brought out so ably by Curtis that it was soon evident that if Johnson were convicted it would be on political grounds.

Cautious republicans now became alarmed lest conviction on political grounds react on the party. Additional strength was given to the point by the reflection that Wade, president of the senate, was next in line for the succession. He was a bitter partisan whom reasonable men did not wish to see in power. As the trial proceeded passions cooled, both in and out of Washington. Johnson observed the tendency, and in the nick of time, April 23, nominated General Schofield secretary of war. The nominee had the confidence of the nation, and the selection of such a man broke the force of the argument of the radicals that a creature of the president was about to be placed over the important interests within the department of war. The effect was good, and as the argument proceeded — from April 22 to May 11 — the nation came to understand the president better. The press modified its tone, and the opinion gained ground that Johnson should be allowed to fill out the rest of his term.

May 16 the senate was ready to vote. The prosecution was alarmed for the result and decided to take the first vote on the eleventh,

or last, specification. It contained most of the vigor of the others, and they thought it offered the best chance of success. The roll was called in breathless expectancy. A few senators had concealed their intentions so well that the response of each was awaited most anxiously. Four republicans, Trumbull, Fessenden, Grimes, and Henderson, were known to be for acquittal, and three others with the twelve democrats would prevent conviction. One of these was secured when Fowler, of Tennessee, voted for acquittal. Another was found when Ross, of Kansas, gave the same response. Van Winkle, of West Virginia, made the third. The hearts of the radicals sank when he deserted them, and they realized they were defeated. Johnson had 19 votes and his opponents 35, and he retained his office by one vote. The radicals adjourned the senate for ten days, while they ransacked heaven and earth to show that improper influences had been used on the senators who were for acquittal. They sought particularly to shake the determination of Ross, but without avail. When the senate convened again and took up the first and second articles, he remained firm, and the entire prosecution was defeated. Stanton yielded to the inevitable, and Schofield took possession of the war department without opposition.

The
Decision.

The will of the radicals was at last checked. They had overthrown presidential reconstruction, shackled the president in regard to the appointing power, and made negro suffrage an actuality. But they had become too confident of their power. Their last act smacked too much of personal animosity to have the support of the nation. When they talked of saving in the South the fruits of war, they found a ready response, but when their demands seemed to mean the establishment of a congressional oligarchy in control of the national executive, they failed. The verdict of the senate marked a return to normal conditions. As Professor Dunning remarks, it also showed that the presidential element in our system will maintain its equal rank with the legislative power.

Significance
of the
Verdict.

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CHAPTER XXIX

RECONSTRUCTION — THE SOUTHERN SIDE

SOCIAL CONDITIONS IN THE SOUTH

THE Southern people accepted military defeat as well as could be expected. If at that point there had been nothing to do but forget the surrender and resume the habits of peace, restoration would have been simple, as after other civil wars in history. But the people found themselves subjected to social and political changes which they could not approve, and were thrust into a controversy more bitter than the first. They believed sincerely in the inferiority of the negro and thought it quite enough to admit him to the elementary phases of citizenship. They could not understand clearly the demand that he have equal *status* with the whites, and it took them a long time to realize that the North would really make the demand. They also believed in state rights; they thought it impossible that a state's constitution should be modified by any force outside of itself; and they considered as wicked and unconstitutional the proposition that congress could dictate what a state constitution should contain. Early in the dawn of peace they had little bitterness for their conquerors, and the first steps of reconstruction under Johnson increased their good feeling. But the rising influence of the radicals in 1866 and 1867 brought rage and finally despair. The results of this violent social and political readjustment were strife, a loss of national feeling, and delay in the process of reunion. Whether or not, in view of these results, the North or the negro, whom it sought to help, gained or lost is a problem still open for discussion.

**The
Southern
Attitude.**

The North was surprised at the resistance of the Southerner. They thought he would yield to the fourteenth amendment, and were surprised as each act of force a little harder than the preceding act found him still unyielding. He had, in fact, suffered so much already that he did not feel keenly the loss of other rights or comforts. The war itself reduced his living to a dependence on the simple products of his farm, and he was accustomed to do without the comforts of prosperity. It exhausted the railroads, factories, and fields, and its failure swept away banks, insurance companies, and every other institution which lent money to the com-

**Economic
Ruin.**

munity. With production and credit paralyzed, and labor disorganized through emancipation, what worse calamity need be feared in industrial activities?

The same question might be asked in regard to social conditions. Elsewhere slavery has usually been abolished with compensation, or allowed to shift into some half-free form out of which comes ultimate freedom. In the South it was abolished suddenly, without compensation, and at a time when industry, from other causes, was prostrate. The English stock has usually adopted reforms gradually and by compromise. The change in the South from 1865 to 1870 through the changed condition of the negro was the most violent reform that has occurred in a similar period in any part of the world under British institutions.

It was supposed that the imposition of military rule would break the spirit of the Southerner, but he took it almost nonchalantly. In 1865 most men in the South had been confederate soldiers and were used to military law, and after the war the country was full of garrisons. They were, therefore, neither shocked nor frightened when military governors took charge in 1867. In fact, the recurrence of local outbreaks in retaliation on unpopular officers shows that the Southerners were willing to use force themselves. It is, from all these considerations, evident that by 1867 the white men in the South were becoming desperate. They felt that their opponents had done the worst — that nothing remained to be done but to take their lives, which not even the North would dare do. Out of this desperation grew the conviction that violence, fraud, and any other expedient was justifiable to overcome the plot of the radicals. Out of it grew, also, a white "Solid South" and fierce contempt for every political ideal which was called "Republican."

In 1865 the average negro in the South valued freedom because it gave him the simplest privileges of freemen. He did not desire to vote, and he did not understand the hopes of the many missionaries and teachers from the North who with much heroism tried to elevate him. At first he was submissive to the whites with that docile self-effacement which has generally characterized the African. When his new friends tried to kindle his ambition his self-assertion became obtrusive. The southern whites thought he was spoiled by Northerners. The points of view of the two sections in regard to his development were irreconcilable; but as the months passed he became continually less willing to trust his former masters and more inclined to follow new friends. When allowed to vote in 1867 he was as clay in the hands of the latter.

In the seceding states, exclusive of South Carolina, Breckenridge, the secessionist, had 436,771 votes in 1860, Douglas, anti-secessionist democrat, had 72,084, and Bell, representing the old whig party, had 345,919. Loyalty to the South induced most of these men to

**Social
Reversal.**

**Southern
Desperation.**

**The Negro
as a
Citizen.**

support the confederacy, but, the war ended, it was not to be expected that they would all act together. The Douglas and Bell men were for the union in 1860, and they were nearly half of the Southern voters. They might be conceived still to be mostly for union under the old conditions. It was not unreasonable to suppose that at least a small portion of the Breckenridge men would be of the same opinion.

If, therefore, party lines in the South were to be drawn for and against a policy of resistance to the North, it seemed that here was the basis of a successful movement to unite the reasonable men in that section in a party which would accept the issues of the war and attempt to reconstruct Southern life on the lines pointed out in the emancipation proclamation and the president's reconstruction policy. Such was Johnson's dream, but it was futile. As the purpose of the radical congress to impose negro suffrage on the South became apparent, the Southerners of all groups united in solid opposition. Whigs, Douglas democrats, and former secessionists forgot their ancient grudges and fought side by side under the new name of "Conservatives."

Meanwhile, a southern republican party began to form out of three groups. One was Northern men recently arrived in the South.

Some of these were former soldiers, whose campaign experiences had first opened their eyes to the opportunities of a rich country; others came outright, believing that industry would feel a new impulse under a régime of freedom; while still others were earnest men who wished to help the freedmen. Most of them were poor, bringing all their possessions in their hands, and the South in derision called them "Carpet-baggers." Some of them were men of fine character, and would have been an acquisition to the social life of any community in normal conditions. Others were mere adventurers. The conservative Southern whites made no distinction between the good and the bad, but poured equal scorn on all. A second element of the Southern republican party was native Southerners. A few men of prominence, mostly those who loved the old flag throughout the war, now went into the party which stood for union; but most of this group were persons who felt aggrieved at the rule of the old planter class. They were generally small farmers, men of little social or intellectual eminence, and they were apt to be viewed with disdain by the more capable portion of the whites. They accepted the program of the radicals in congress, and from them received much consideration as "truly loyal" persons who endured wrongs in behalf of the union. Among them appeared a number of leaders of their own class, men of sharp tongues and shrewd political capacity, who stimulated the hopes of their followers by criticizing the old ruling classes, and who endured placidly the odium of those classes, even though it extended to social ostracism. Such leaders were regarded as traitors to the

The
Southern
"Con-
servatives."

"Carpet-
Baggers"
and "Scal-
awags."

South, and received from their opponents the name "Scalawags." It was a term of doubtful origin, but it implied the essence of bitter contempt and opposition.

Still a third element which went into the Southern republican party was the negroes. Johnson wished, as Lincoln before him, that the intelligent and property-holding blacks should be allowed to vote, but he could accomplish nothing in that line with the state governments restored under his plan. When, however, the blacks were allowed to vote under the laws of March 2 and 23 and July 19, 1867, they went almost solidly for the republicans. They were the largest portion of the party, and their enfranchisement brought forth at once a number of negro leaders who must be given office or they would not coöperate. They were usually satisfied with minor places, but not always. Sometimes they were on the state tickets, and they were even sent to congress as representatives and senators. Most of the negro politicians were mulattoes, but sometimes they were of unmixed African stock. The best of them had little education, but a fair amount of common sense and integrity, while the majority did not comprehend the duties of their offices and took their elevation to power as an opportunity to secure small personal glory and emolument. They quickly fell into the hands of abler white schemers, and in legislatures and elsewhere facilitated the excesses of bad government without realizing that they brought dishonor to their party and their communities. As these three groups became welded in the republican party in the South the influence of the more upright "carpet-baggers," Southern whites, and negro politicians was minimized, and the will of the worst leaders became predominant. To the Southern whites it seemed that the acme of bad government had come. The excesses committed were beyond anything the people of the United States have seen elsewhere in their borders, and went far to justify the illegal methods by which the conservative whites at last were able to redeem themselves from a reign of fraud, ignorance, and incompetence.

CONGRESSIONAL RECONSTRUCTION IN OPERATION

It was in March, 1867, that Johnson appointed the military governors created in the act of March 2. General Schofield was in charge of the first district (Virginia), General Sickles was over the second (North and South Carolina), General Pope ruled the third (Georgia, Alabama, and Florida), General Ord commanded the fourth (Mississippi and Arkansas), and General Sheridan had the fifth (Louisiana and Texas). In his district each had supreme power under the president and the constitution and laws of Congress. They desired to continue in power the existing state officials, but promptly removed such as obstructed the

**The Negro
as a Re-
publican.**

**The
Military
Governors.**

registration of the negroes. When it was proposed to remove all the local officials, Schofield checked the plan by saying the South did not contain enough "loyal" whites to fill the vacancies which would thus be created. In 1868, as the process of reconstruction neared completion, removals were more frequent. A notable case was that of Governor Jenkins, of Georgia, who was dismissed for refusing to allow payment of the expenses of the constitutional convention. Governor Humphreys, of Mississippi, was removed also for opposing reconstruction.

Civil
Officers
Continued.

Likewise, the body of existing laws were continued, unless they conflicted with the reconstruction acts. But military tribunals were freely created for various kinds of crimes. They were supported by soldiers who supplanted sheriffs and constables in making arrests and executing military decisions. Some of the military governors admitted negroes to the jury, a radical innovation in civil government. Much depended on the personality of the military governor. He was strict or lenient as he leaned toward or away from the ideals of the radicals. Sickles, Ord, and Sheridan were of the former tendency. The course of General Sheridan brought protests from Southerners and moderate men in the North. He was severe in arresting persons charged with violence and was tactless as an administrator. The fifth district under his charge seemed turning to despair, and in November, 1867, he was succeeded by General Hancock, who changed his policy. The radicals in congress arraigned Johnson for removing Sheridan, asserting that he gave the district over to lawlessness. The men who lived in the district denied the allegation. Everywhere in the South there was more individual violence than in normal times.

Old Laws
Continued
in Part.

It was the time when negro suffrage was being put into operation in the face of the dissent of most of the white people. It is not surprising if they expressed their opposition by strenuous words or deeds; and it was to be expected that persons wanted for such actions had free aid of their neighbors in escaping. But there was no serious violence. There were, at the period, only 19,320 federal troops in the South, and they were enough to preserve order. They were distributed in 134 posts in the ten states. Leaving out of consideration the large, unsettled part of Texas, this was one post for 4500 square miles. A well-manned constabulary for such a region would be as large.

Was the
South
Lawless?

Within the realm of politics the Southerners were keen to get any possible advantage from the system devised by their opponents. Their first maneuver came at the registration, where each applicant must swear he had not voluntarily served the confederacy. They had their own interpretation of the word "voluntarily," and a Southern jury must sit in a trial for perjury. Spite of the law of July 19 making registration officers judges

The Regis-
tration.

of applications to register, a large portion of the whites got their names on the lists. The blacks were also freely registered. By October 1, 1867, the registration was complete. In Virginia, North Carolina, Georgia, and Texas the registered whites were more numerous, although in Georgia the excess was small. Now appeared the object of the large registration. The law said that a constitution to be ratified must have a majority of the registered vote. The plan of the whites was to swell the list as much as possible and to defeat ratification at last by refusing to go to the polls. This plan surprised the radicals in Washington but it did not benefit the South, for when one state, Alabama, showed that the trick could be done, congress amended the existing laws so as to allow a constitution to be ratified by a majority of the votes cast.

The *personnel* of the constitutional conventions was respectable, although most of them had negro members, that of South Carolina having 63 out of a total of 97. There were usually competent white men, Southern and Northern born, to direct the proceedings, and the influence of the military governors was exerted for good. The shrewd instigators of fraud who dominated later events had not yet come into power. The resulting constitutions accepted negro suffrage, as the reconstruction laws required. Six of them placed temporary restrictions on the suffrage of former confederates. Most of them provided for public schools and adopted new features in the machinery of government which experience has proved valuable.

By spring, 1868, most of the states had held their conventions, and were preparing to take the sense of the people. At this time the republicans in congress were alarmed lest, as recent elections seemed to show, the country was turning to the democrats. They felt that the Southern states with the negroes enfranchised would be republican in 1868 and might be necessary in the presidential election. But the plan of the Southern whites to defeat the constitutions stared them in the face. The radicals in the house hurriedly passed the bill to allow ratification by the majority of the votes cast, thus depriving congressional reconstruction of the last pretext that it was the free action of the people of the states. It was a bitter pill for the moderate republican senators, who had systematically contended that a state's will should be respected. They delayed the bill until the news came from Alabama. Here the registration was about 170,000, and the vote was 70,812 for, and 1005 against, ratification. The senate hesitated no longer: the bill passed and congressional reconstruction was saved. The election which had been held in Alabama was now pronounced sufficient, and that state, with North and South Carolina, Georgia, Florida, Arkansas, and Louisiana, all of which had ratified their constitutions, were received into the union. Three states remained

**Conventions
and Con-
stitutions.**

**Ratification
of Con-
stitutions.**

unreconstructed, Texas, Mississippi, and Virginia. The constitutions framed in the two last disfranchised former confederates, and for this reason Virginia delayed ratification, while Mississippi rejected it outright. The situation appealed to the sympathies of Grant, who became president March 4, 1869, and in April he suggested that the two states vote on their constitutions with separate votes on disfranchisement. Congress agreed, and the constitutions without disfranchisement were promptly ratified. In 1870 the three states were received into full fellowship and the union was again complete. As a state was restored, its military governor was replaced by a governor chosen under the new constitution, and he, with a legislature similarly selected, took control of the state's affairs. The federal troops, however, were not withdrawn for some time.

With negro suffrage in force, most of the states became radical, but in Georgia the conservatives got control of the legislature, although the governor was a radical. They showed a poor sense of caution by acting at once against their enemies. They expelled the 27 negro members of their body on the ground that while negro suffrage was legal the constitution did not grant blacks the right to hold office, and they gave the seats to the white opponents of the evicted ones. Such a step could not fail to bring down on Georgia all the wrath of the Northern radicals. Congress promptly declined to admit the two Georgia senators just chosen, and after some months of hesitation restored military rule with General Terry for governor. He acted vigorously, expelling 24 democrats from the legislature on the ground that they were disfranchised by the fourteenth amendment. He filled their places with republicans, and the excluded negro members were restored. Georgia, thus disciplined, was admitted again into the union, July 15, 1870. The rash action of the conservatives had no other result than to convince the North that the South would evade reconstruction whenever they could.

**Military
Government
Reëstab-
lished in
Georgia.**

August 11, 1868, when his plans were coming into full realization, died Thaddeus Stevens in his 77th year. Bitter hater and hard fighter as he was, he received equal hatred and hostility from his foes. Neither his public nor private conduct was exempt from attack. But all agree that he was a great parliamentary leader, and that he controlled history-making events in one of the great crises of our history. He had, also, his ideals, although they sometimes seemed obscured by the smoke of battle; and one of them was confidence in the capacity of the negro race. By his own direction he was buried in an humble cemetery at Lancaster, Pennsylvania, with an inscription above him which read: "I repose in this quiet and secluded spot, not from any natural preference for solitude, but, finding other cemeteries limited as to race by charter rules, I have chosen this, that I might illustrate in my

**Death of
Stevens.**

death the principles which I advocated through a long life, Equality of Man before his Creator." This spirit filled his reconstruction policy.

Negro suffrage was now adopted in the South, but the methods of adoption were such as to throw some doubt on its constitutionality.

The Fifteenth Amendment. But, that aside, it was evident that once the present crisis was past and the whites again in control in the South, negro suffrage would be stricken from the state constitutions. To prevent this, congress resorted to a fifteenth amendment, and such a step was, in fact, necessary to save what had been done. As passed by congress February 27, 1869, it read: "The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any state on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude." It was accepted by the states, and promulgated March 30, 1870. In the debate on the amendment some members of congress desired to insert education and property holding after the term "previous condition of servitude," but they were not heeded. Senator Morton, speaking for the disappointed ones, predicted that the day would come when the South would disfranchise the negro by imposing educational and property qualifications.

The radicals had now done all they could to carry out their plan. They had throttled the mass of Southern whites, established negro suffrage through military force, and adopted two constitutional amendments to make fast what had been gained.

The Radical Plan on Trial. There was nothing left but to turn over the Southern states to the incompetents they chose to call "truly loyal" and see if they could build up peace and prosperity in the land of desolation. The task seems now unreasonable enough, but the men of 1869 contemplated it without apparent concern.

The failure of the plan was due to: 1. the growing weariness of Northern people of the eternal "Southern problem." Their enthusiasm had its limits, and they began to feel sympathy for the victims of congressional theorizers. They also lost some of their interest in the elevation of the negro; 2. The prevalence of fraud and incompetency of the new governments in the South; 3. The increasing confidence of the South that it could manage the situation in its own way; 4. The deterioration of the Southern republican party itself by which the more respectable carpet-baggers and Southern whites were forced to give way to corrupt men; and 5. The rise of the Ku Klux Klan, a secret and violent organization which struck at the activity of the negroes and their white leaders and paralyzed their worst efforts, while it gave courage to the whites and showed them how to neutralize negro suffrage.

Why it Failed.

THE KU KLUX KLAN

The Southerners contended that the Klan was organized to counteract the Union League, a secret organization which gave the negro solidarity and, it was claimed, encouraged him to commit acts of violence. The league originated in the North in 1862 to support the cause of union when democrats were attacking the war policy of the republicans. It was secret, and its members swore to vote for none but union men for office. It did good service until the end of the war, when it was mostly abandoned, but survived in some places chiefly as local social organizations. Late in the war it was extended to the South among union men there, who were generally whites. With the coming of peace negro members began to be admitted. At first they were but few, but they increased in numbers as negro suffrage became more probable. The conservative white members now withdrew, and the organization became a mass of blacks controlled by white men. Its influence was probably never great, but the whites, always alarmed at anything which might lead to an insurrection of the blacks, looked upon it with horror. There were many evidences of self-assertion by the negroes. Houses and barns were burned, men were waylaid, and other evidences showed a new spirit in a people long noted for their submissiveness. Friends of the blacks asserted that the whites practiced numerous outrages upon the freedmen. It is hard to place the responsibility where it belongs, but it is well to remember that violence begets violence, and that social chaos was great in 1867. Whether justified or not, the whites regarded the organization of blacks into the Union League as inimical to good order and security.

The Union
League in
the South.

Several organizations are known under the general term Ku Klux Klan; the "Knights of the White Camelia," chiefly in the Gulf states, "Constitutional Union Guards," "Pale Faces," the "White Brotherhood," the "Council of Safety," and the "Association of '76," as well as the Klan proper. They were alike in purpose, organization, and methods, and the last only will be described. It originated in Pulaski, Tennessee, where some young men had a mirth-making circle which held its ludicrous initiations in an abandoned house. The name "Ku Klux" came from the Greek *Kuklos*, circle, and "Klan" was added for alliteration. The Pulaski negroes were frightened by lights and the sounds of laughter in a house they thought haunted, and the members, observing the fact, sought to heighten the effect by circulating the story that the house was visited by the ghosts of dead confederates who were concerned at the turbulence of their former slaves. Then they had a mounted parade, each horse with muffled hoofs so that he walked noiselessly over the ground and horse and rider fantastically disguised. The houses of aggressive negroes were visited, but the

Origin of
the Ku
Klux Klan.

object at this time was only to frighten the occupants. It was well accomplished for a while, and many other communities organized Klans. The mirth-making purpose now disappeared, and serious men took the direction. The negroes soon knew the visitors were not ghosts, although the disguises were so excellent that none but the initiated knew who wore them. Absolute secrecy, obedience, and loyalty were required of members. The Pulaski movement spread rapidly and far. It was, it seems, the precursor of the other organizations named. As ghostly fear no longer had weight with the persons visited, whipping, tar and feathers, and even maiming was resorted to. It was the aim of the Klan to punish no one without deliberation and a formal decision by the Klan under the direction of a sober leader; but there were many turbulent members, and violence and cruelty were not always restrained. Negroes were whipped freely before emancipation, and the community felt that unmanageable blacks might still be whipped in moderation. White men who had influence with the blacks were visited, sometimes tarred and feathered, and sometimes ordered to leave the neighborhood. The Ku Klux claimed these were visited because they incited the blacks to outrages; but as the visited ones were generally republicans and active in politics it was plausibly alleged that they were dealt with for political reasons.

The Pulaski movement began in 1866. It had reached remote regions when the reconstruction acts of 1867 were passed. The

**Reorganized
in 1867.**

Southerners saw in the movement a means of opposing the iron hand laid on them. Their most prominent leaders took it up, and a secret meeting in Nashville, in April, 1867, brought it under a strongly concentrated system, held together by implicit military obedience. Thus was established the "Invisible Empire," presided over by the Grand Wizard and his ten Genii. Each state became a "Realm" under a Grand Dragon and his eight

Officers.

Hydras, each congressional district a "Dominion" under a Grand Titan and his six Furies, and each local group was a "Den" under a Grand Cyclops and his two Nighthawks. It was the Den that did the actual work for which the "Invisible Empire" existed. It assembled ordinarily in the woods and at night—its members swore to march when summoned "at any time of the moon." It decided whom it would punish, but was enjoined to visit no man

Methods.

without first giving him warning to change his conduct. The notices affected an illiterate style for the sake of disguise. They were usually posted in the night, and were of a nature to strike terror to the recipient. One never knew the members, and dared not criticize the things done lest he be speaking to a member and himself incur vengeance. One never knew how many members of a jury to try a Ku Klux case belonged to the Klan. Its visitations became more severe in time, and death was sometimes executed against a person

especially obnoxious to the Klan. Its silent, swift, and thorough methods brought a subdued calm to the negroes and their white leaders, and relieved the apprehension of the rest of the people.

Spite of its formal centralization, the real power of the Klan was with the Den, the local unit; and the Dens easily fell into excesses. They were composed of venturesome persons, generally young men, drawn from all classes in the community. If the Cyclops had strong character and was judicious he might restrain harsh conduct. If he himself was rash or weak-willed, the violent members were apt to prevail. If such members got control in a Den, the moderate men would withdraw. Symptoms like these did not appear at first, and throughout 1867 and 1868 the organization met the purpose of its founders. But by the beginning of 1869 rashness was evidently increasing, and the men at the head of the organization ordered the dissolution of the "Invisible Empire." Their order was not effective. Everywhere members withdrew, glad to escape without being considered traitors, but the Dens did not dissolve. They remained more than ever in the hands of the rasher element. The more thoughtful Southerners now began to fear lest the deeds of the Klan bring a federal army down on them.

Weakness
of the Klan.

The elections of 1870 naturally occasioned much excitement, and probably increased the activity of the Ku Klux. Stories of outrages were widely published in the North, and April 20, 1871, congress passed the Ku Klux act. It authorized the president to suspend the writ of *habeas corpus* in order to deal with secret conspiracies, and it enlarged the power of the federal courts. At the same time a committee of congress was appointed to investigate "affairs in the late insurrectionary states." Subcommittees visited the South, took a mass of evidence, and published it in twelve volumes. The full ventilation of the situation worked good results North and South. It brought home to the Ku Klux members the danger of interference from the North, and supported so powerfully those who wished to dissolve the Klan that the organization was now generally abandoned.

Congress
Interferes.

Besides its immediate effect in restraining the blacks and lending courage to the whites, the Ku Klux Klan showed how the whites could control the future. Its weakness was that by employing violence it might bring in federal troops. It was soon seen that violence was unnecessary. The negro is docile by nature and easily frightened; and for all his childish love of political campaigning he was not devoted to the exercise of the franchise. Open demonstrations, threats delivered personally, and many other forms of intimidation which fell short of violence would serve well enough to keep him from the polls, and involve no conflict with federal authority. This lesson, so evident in the experience of the Ku Klux, was well learned and boldly followed

Achieve-
ment of the
Klan.

after 1870. Its exact methods were left to the ingenuity of individual managers, with the one condition that whatever was done must stop short of bodily harm. Bands of mounted men with rifles attended political speakings, both democratic and republican, observed the utterances of speakers, spread consternation among the negroes, and boasted openly that the South was a "white man's country." They frequently had the sympathy of the federal garrisons, whose duty was to repress disorder. They usually convinced the negroes that it was wise to eschew political activity.

The republican leaders complained that these demonstrations broke the ability of those leaders to bring out the colored vote. They well knew the object of their opponents, but could meet the emergency in no other way than to call on the president for troops. When union soldiers surrounded the polls the negroes would vote, and not otherwise. Soldiers could not be sent to every voting precinct. Whenever they were sent, the democrats charged that they were the means of enforcing fraud, and they challenged the government to show what violence had been committed to warrant their use. They denounced the Ku Klux act of 1871 and federal election laws which congress enacted to enable the troops to be called out, as cumulative evidence of the tendency of the republicans to destroy self-government and to perpetuate military rule. In the execution of its Southern policy the government felt also that it was necessary to control the election machinery through boards to register the voters, count the votes, and canvass the returns. All this machinery fell naturally into the hands of the dominant party, usually the republicans. Whoever exercised it, their opponents pronounced the returns fraudulent. In the cataclysm of political institutions the spirit of legality had forsaken the people, and it is probable that each party committed fraud as opportunity offered. In former times the South had been proud of its freedom from political corruption, but its respectable people now considered anything justifiable in order to meet a condition they found tyrannical and intolerable.

TRIUMPH OF THE SOUTHERN DEMOCRATS

The Southern tactics were sufficient against anything but a vast army of occupation, and the South believed the North would not take up that task lightly. The democrats were the men of property, courage, and intelligence. The republicans had organized a party of which none of these qualities could be expected. They were in power, not of their own capacity, but through extraneous force. Moreover, it was notorious that they used power to enrich themselves and levied burdensome taxes which must fall on the whites in order to support

**Connected
with
Politics.**

**Weakness
of the
Southern
Republicans.**

schemes of plunder. They were incompetent as a party, they threw aside in the haste for gain the respect of the community, and they could not hope to maintain their power when the North grew tired of sending troops to support them. During the years 1871 to 1877 they lost state after state, and passed out of authority completely discredited.

Their most notable early defeat was in Georgia. Governor Bullock, a republican, was, on investigation, pronounced honest by a democratic jury, but the republican legislature committed many extravagances. In 1870 the democrats carried the legislature, and there was talk of impeachment. The governor dared not trust himself in the hands of his enemies, and resigned and left the state. During the two years of his administration the state's debt rose from six to eighteen millions and credit fell so low that bonds were no longer salable. In January, 1872, the democrats chose a successor to Bullock and the republican régime was definitely over. The triumph of the democracy was largely due to the efforts of B. H. Hill, formerly a whig, but now forced into the solid white man's party by the changed issues of the day.

In the North Carolina legislature corruption had, probably, its strongest footing. A ring was organized under the direction of carpet-baggers and scalawags which is said to have collected ten per cent commission on all money appropriated. Railroads were incorporated or extended through the liberal issue of state bonds until the public debt was increased by \$27,000,000, and the taxes became four times as heavy as in 1860. The state house, formerly the scene of intelligent discussion, was filled by a crowd of white and black nonentities. Men formerly slaves now had eight dollars a day as legislators, and did the will of the ringsters who raised them to the seventh heaven of delight by means of champagne dinners and many small pilferings. Every conceivable opportunity was made to yield money, and even the appointment of West Point cadets was for sale. The situation aroused the united effort of the whites in 1870, and a democratic assembly was the result.

The governor was W. W. Holden, whom Johnson made provisional governor in 1865 and who was chosen under radical rule in 1868. He was not concerned in the frauds practiced in the legislature, but he gave mortal offense in another way. There was some disorder, and in 1870 a prominent republican politician was brutally murdered, probably by the Ku Klux. As it was impossible to punish the murderers in the courts, Holden, who under a recent state law had suspended the writ of *habeas corpus*, proclaimed martial law in two counties, called in federal troops, and arrested nearly a hundred prominent citizens, most of whom could not have been present at the murder. They were taken on the charge of plotting against the peace of the state.

In Georgia.

In North
Carolina.

Holden's
Appeal to
Martial
Law.

They were held in defiance of the state courts, but released by a federal judge who granted a writ of *habeas corpus* under the fourteenth amendment. Holden submitted to the federal courts. The incident added to his unpopularity, and the assembly chosen in the same year was democratic by nearly two-thirds majority. It met full of resentment, impeached the governor, and in March, 1871, removed him from office. He was not convicted for fraud, but for the military arrest of citizens. The reconstruction bonds were repudiated by the legislature and still remain unpaid.

Virginia escaped the fate of her neighbors through her delay in ratifying her constitution and through the large majority of the white population. The people were aroused by the corruption south of them, and in the first election under the restoration, 1869, chose a conservative governor, Gilbert C. Walker. One other state, Tennessee, was carried by the conservatives in 1870. It fell under republican control after the enfranchisement of the negroes, but a short experience with incompetency brought it back to the democracy. Texas accomplished its redemption in 1872.

In the five states mentioned were more whites than blacks, and the triumph of the former was comparatively easy. It was otherwise in the Black Belt. Alabama did not reach its depth of corruption until 1874. In that year the public debt had risen from seven to nearly thirty-three millions, and the whites were aroused to action. They used the ordinary means of neutralizing the negro vote, but were careful to stop short of actual violence. Grant sent a small

body of troops, but the people worked cautiously and vigorously. They were encouraged by the knowledge that Arkansas and Mississippi were also moving. The result was that all three accomplished their ends, although the last-named succeeded only in 1875. The struggle in Mississippi was fierce, and many negroes were killed. Grant, when appealed to, refused to send troops, saying, "The whole public are tired out with these annual autumnal outbreaks in the South." The elections of 1874 had gone strongly democratic throughout the North, and Grant was not the only man in his party who saw in it disapproval of the party's Southern policy. Left to themselves, the Mississippians took courage. Never before in this Southern struggle was intimidation so well organized or carried so far. Bands of armed men marched everywhere, saying openly that they would kill the negroes if that was necessary, in order to show that Mississippi was a "white man's country." Their work was well done, for though the republicans had a normal majority of 20,000 the democrats in 1875 carried the election by 30,000, had a large majority in the legislature, and controlled most of the counties. The election itself, however, was

Virginia,
Tennessee,
and Texas,
1870.

Alabama,
Arkansas,
and Mis-
sissippi,
1874-1875.

"The Mis-
sissippi
Plan."

held without the least violence. "The Mississippi Plan" was a term used after this to denote the general Southern method of dealing with the negro vote. When the presidential election of 1876 came, only three Southern states, South Carolina, Louisiana, and Florida remained in republican control. In this year each struggled sternly for liberation, and in each the result was disputed. The democrats had the whole white population with them, and would take the government, they claimed, if federal troops did not oppose them. Hayes, for reasons discussed later in this book (see page 694), withdrew the troops, and thus in 1877 republican rule disappeared in the South.

South
Carolina,
Louisiana,
and Florida.

NATIONAL RECONSTRUCTION UNDER GRANT

When Stevens died in 1868, his leadership on Southern matters fell to Benjamin F. Butler, who lacked the singleness of purpose of his predecessor. He was wholly for the party organization, and won personal influence over Grant. He valued the South for the republican votes it would cast in congress, and wished to perpetuate the party control there. He had many followers in Washington, but other republicans, among them the more liberal minded men, like senators Schurz and Trumbull, realized the incompetence of the negro and were no longer willing to force bad government on the South in order to maintain negro suffrage. Still a third class believed the negro was voting badly, but they thought using the ballot educative and wished the process continued. The second group soon split with Butler, but he usually had the support of the third, and the republican majority until 1875 was so great that he had his way in the house. In the senate, his views were voiced by O. P. Morton, of Indiana, abler than Butler, but altogether a partisan. Sumner should be placed in the third group. He was sincere but theoretical, and until his death in 1874, lost no opportunity to urge measures in behalf of the freedmen. Grant was usually mild toward the South, but he loved order, and Butler won him with the tales of Southern outrages. He could never see a politician's tricks. The result of all this was that the president and the majority in congress combined to pass several coercive acts to execute the radical plan of reconstruction.

Sentiment
in Wash-
ington.

Grant's
Attitude.

The first of these, the *enforcement act of 1870*, was passed to enforce the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments. It forbade a state to abridge suffrage on the ground of race, color, or servitude and it asserted the power of the federal government to correct such abridgment if it occurred. It added to the radical interest in the bill that the machinery of enforcement was like that of the fugitive slave act of 1850. In 1875 the supreme court declared the essential features of the act

Enforce-
ment Act
of 1870.

unconstitutional on the ground that the fourteenth amendment merely restricted the states in passing certain laws, and that it did not take from the state the function of protecting the rights of individuals. The second was the *Ku Klux act of 1871*, giving the president power to suspend the writ of *habeas corpus* and to enter a state to suppress disorder. In 1882 the supreme court rendered null the essential parts of this act also. A third was the *civil rights act of 1875*, to secure to negroes equal privileges in hotels, theaters, railway carriages, and other public utilities. Sumner, who died a year before it passed, had it much at heart and wished to include churches, schools, and cemeteries; but congress would not go that far, although the passage of the act at this time was undoubtedly secured as a kind of tribute to his faithfulness. This law was also declared unconstitutional, 1883, the ground being that it dealt with social and not civil rights. A fourth bill failed of enactment, 1874. It was a *force bill*, and proposed to give the president for two years the power to suspend *habeas corpus* in Alabama, Louisiana, Arkansas, and Mississippi, in order to enforce the war amendments. It passed the house, but failed in the senate. In these four acts the radical majority under Butler and Morton sought to give their theories of reconstruction a vigorous application at the expense of the authority of the state. They were checked because the court believed the state's authority was guaranteed by the federal constitution.

They fared better in their desire to control the elections. In 1871 a *second enforcement act* was passed. It placed elections of representatives under federal control, gave federal judges power to appoint supervisors under certain conditions, and authorized the United States marshals to appoint enough deputies to insure order at the polls. It was to be enforced in any state when demanded by a specified number of citizens. It was designed for the South, but was resorted to in large Northern cities where the democrats were strong by reason of immigrant voters. The democrats succeeded in repealing the vital part of the law during Hayes's administration; and most of the rest was rescinded in 1894, with parts of the *first enforcement act* (1870).

The severity of these acts aroused protests in the North. The liberal republican movement of 1871 threatened to disrupt the party, and one of their grievances was the Southern policy adopted. Grant and Butler felt the trend of public opinion and sought to neutralize it by an act of grace to former confederates who by the fourteenth amendment were excluded from office until pardoned by a two-thirds vote of each house. It is true that since 1868 congress had removed the disabilities of 4600 persons individually, but about 160,000 were still excluded. The annual message of 1871 recommended general amnesty to all except the most prominent confederates. A bill was introduced

**Control of
Elections.**

**The
Amnesty
Act.**

to that end, but it was opposed by Sumner unless his civil rights bill was incorporated as an amendment. The senate hesitated, but in May, 1872, voted down the amendment, and the bill passed both houses and became law. It was estimated that the persons in the classes still excluded were not more than 500. Many of these were later restored by special act, and in 1898 a general amnesty law included all who were still unpardoned. The act of 1872 undoubtedly benefited the Southern democrats, but it softened animosity on both sides. Two years later a chivalrous act from the other side gave additional impulse to good feeling. March 11, 1874, Charles Sumner died. He was long the champion of negro suffrage and an extreme radical; yet he was honest and fair-minded with Southern men personally. A month after his death Lamar, of Mississippi, delivered in the house a eulogy which gave full justice to Sumner as a man, and expressed the loftiest desire for a united country. He was a good orator, imaginative and emotional, and he was in earnest. He carried the house with him; and both the North and South felt drawn together when his speech was published. The amnesty act and Lamar's burning eloquence were the dawn of the day of reconciliation.

Lamar's
Eulogy on
Sumner.

INTERPRETING THE WAR AMENDMENTS

We have seen that during Johnson's administration the supreme court hesitated to decide whether congress or the state had the right to supervise reconstruction, in the cases of *Mississippi v. Johnson*, *Georgia v. Stanton*, and *ex parte McCardle* (page 611). Its reticence was undoubtedly due to an unwillingness to interfere in the quarrel between the legislature and the executive. After the thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth amendments were adopted, the court could no longer hesitate to give its views. There was little controversy over the thirteenth amendment, which abolished slavery and involuntary servitude, or over the fifteenth, which conferred the suffrage, or over the second, third, fourth, and fifth sections of the fourteenth, which dealt respectively with apportionment, disfranchisement of former confederates, the validity of the confederate debt, and the power to enforce the amendment. But the first section demanded much interpretation. It ran:

National
Citizenship.

"All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."

The reconstruction era was a period of centralization, and it seems certain that many who approved this amendment thought it

took under national authority most of the negro's "rights and immunities." In that view it was a long stride toward nationalism. Such persons were, therefore, hardly prepared for several decisions which gave it restricted application and saved large areas of state autonomy.

The first decision interpreting the amendments, was given in the slaughter-house cases, 1873. A chartered Louisiana company had the exclusive right to kill and dress live stock in New Orleans, and other butchers in the city must use its plant, paying fees not greater than a specified maximum. An

Slaughter-house Cases.

attempt to annul the charter was lost in the state courts and appeal was taken to the federal supreme court, where it was urged that the slaughter-house company was unlawful because it infringed the long-established rights of the independents to their labor and their property.

The reply of the court to this was avowedly explicit. It pointed out (1) the amendment recognized two kinds of citizenship, state and federal, and the privileges under each were distinct, (2) the state was prohibited from infringing the privileges of federal, but not those of its own, citizenship, (3) the

The Decision.

privileges under state citizenship were wide before the passage of the amendment, they remained with the state except so far as by this amendment they were transferred to the nation, and it was not intended to "constitute this court a perpetual censor upon all legislation of the states, on the civil rights of their own citizens," and (4) the regulation of slaughter-houses was a state privilege and subject to state control. The court would not now define privileges under federal citizenship, but among them were such as grew out of the very nature of the federal government, such as were specifically granted in the constitution, and the right of exemption from slavery. The amendment, said the court in this and many other decisions, must be interpreted by the occasion out of which it arose. It was passed to protect the freedmen from well-known state laws denying equal privileges to them as a class: it was corrective of this wrong rather than creative of rights anew. This was essentially true of that clause forbidding a state to deny equality: "We doubt very much," ran the decision, "whether any action of a state not directed by way of discrimination against the negroes as a class, or on account of their race, will ever be held to come within the purview of this provision. It is so clearly a provision for that race and that emergency, that a strong case would be necessary for its application to any other."

Opponents of the prevalent tendencies to concentration found much satisfaction in this clear limitation of the most far-reaching phase of the reconstruction lawmaking. Under other conditions it might have been given a meaning much more hostile to state autonomy. Theories of nationalism grew out of the earnest struggle against the state's right to control the status of the freedmen. The occasion for their use

Centralization Checked.

being past, many people who had tolerated them now hoped they would be forgotten. To them there was something of the charm of other days when the court plainly approved the wisdom of preserving the states "with powers for domestic and local government, including the regulation of civil rights, the rights of person and property." And when the court expressed its purpose to hold "with a steady and an even hand the balance between state and federal power," it seemed that the long course of federal aggression on the power of the states had at last come to a turning point. In this sense the decision in the slaughter-house cases deserves to rank in importance with the constitutional decisions of John Marshall.

It had another bearing too significant in the future to be ignored here. It was argued that the New Orleans slaughter-house company was a monopoly and against the spirit of the English law. The doctrine was rejected. "Whenever a Legislature," said the court, "has the right to accomplish a certain result, and that result is best attained by means of a corporation, it has the right to create such a corporation and to endow it with the powers necessary to effect the desired and lawful purpose."

Seven years later the supreme court gave another important interpretation of the first clause of the fourteenth amendment in three decisions on the negro's right to serve on juries. This was a political right, necessary to insure to a negro defendant a trial by his peers. It depended on the clause forbidding a state to deny equality before the law. In three cases it was held by the court that if a state in its law excluded negroes from the jury, it violated the amendment, if a state law admitted negroes to jury duty, but the officers who made up the list refused after application to place the names of colored people on the lists, then also the amendment was violated, for the officer was constructively the state which he represented. But if the state law admitted negroes to the jury and a negro prisoner were convicted by a white jury, no protest being made before the jury lists were made out, the convicted negro was not the object of discrimination by a state, and the amendment was not violated. Exclusion from juries was one of the objectionable features of the new black code of 1865-1866, to remedy which the fourteenth amendment was enacted; and the court now gave its formal notice that this remedy must be enforced.

**The Negro's
Rights on
Jury, etc.**

The civil rights cases (1883) were more conspicuous than these others, because they overset a law long debated in congress before enactment; but they were simpler from a legal standpoint. The act of 1875 in two important sections guaranteed to negroes the right to entertainment in inns, admission to theaters, and equal privileges in public conveyances. Several cases came before the court at once, and the decision was made to

**Civil Rights
Cases.**

apply to all. The petitioners—they were all colored people—urged that the statute of 1875 was violated. The decision recalled the words of the fourteenth amendment that “no state shall abridge the privileges of a citizen of the United States. Now no state action was alleged in the cases before the court or contemplated in the act of 1875. Moreover, it was clear that before the war amendments were made, congress had no authority over the rights of private individuals in inns, etc.; and since such a right was not conferred in these amendments, it was not conferred at all. The civil rights act was, therefore, void in the clauses concerned.

But the court would not say that these sections of the act were inoperative in the District of Columbia and in the territories; and it intimated that by its control over commerce congress might have the right to regulate the accommodations of negroes in interstate travel. Section 4 of the act, which guaranteed negroes the right to serve on juries, was about the only feature which survived this decision.

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CHAPTER XXX

PARTY HISTORY, 1865-1877

POLITICAL CONDITIONS AFTER THE WAR

HAVING outlived the platform on which it was founded, the republican party in 1865 must get new issues. Radical reconstruction furnished one and it proved very powerful, although in its nature it was temporary. More permanent was an alliance the party made with the business interests. The war debt was a republican heritage. It was an instrument of victory binding on the victors, and any suggestion of impairment had their opposition. The democracy, the party of conservatism in the fifties, now found itself supplanted by its opponents who, as tariff and currency assumed more importance, became the party of large capital, the friend of the commercial class, and the reliance of protected manufacturers. Much of this was due to the peculiar weakness of the democrats. They were discredited through opposition to the conduct of the war, and their defense of state rights impelled them to resist radical reconstruction. They were a broken remnant of a former army, without capable leaders, and embittered by years of the most caustic criticism. They fought as they could against the Southern policy of the republicans; but they recognized the handicap it gave them, and willingly adopted other issues. Thus it happened that they espoused in the West financial doctrines the men of Jackson's time would have scorned, and in every section resolved themselves into a party of expediency. The loss of the South was a heavy blow. To build up a great party out of such conditions as confronted the democrats was difficult, and required time.

The confusion incident to party reorganization is shown in the four conventions which met in 1866. The first (Philadelphia, August 14) supported Johnson and was controlled by Seward and others of the presidential group. Its supporters called themselves national republicans, and delegates came from the moderate men North and South, to show that both sections would unite in a policy of reconciliation. The impression was good at first, but soon after it adjourned came Johnson's "swinging-around-the-circle" speeches, which with his growing unpopularity made success impossible. The second convention was called by Johnson's opponents to offset the first. It met in Philadelphia,

September 3, and was composed of Southern loyalists and a few Northern men. Its address urged the country to remember the loyal men in the South who suffered through the policy of Johnson. The third (Cleveland, September 17) was called by Johnson's friends. It was composed chiefly of former soldiers and sailors, and sought to rally these classes to the administration. The fourth (Pittsburgh, September 25) was a great radical gathering, and indorsed the work of congress. All of these conventions were planned as demonstrations to influence the congressional elections.

The result showed how little Johnson was supported in the country. Throughout the North the radicals controlled the party organization and secured a stronger hold than ever in the house. **The Result.** Delaware, Maryland, and Kentucky were carried by the democrats, but the two other borderstates, West Virginia and Missouri, were republican. The senate now had 42 republicans and 11 democrats, and the house 143 republicans and 49 democrats. Thus vanished Johnson's hope of a national conservative party committed to his plan of reconstruction.

One incident tempered somewhat the violence of sectionalism. In May, 1865, Jefferson Davis, president of the confederacy, was captured and imprisoned in Fortress Monroe. He was put into irons by order of the officer in charge, General **Jefferson Davis in Prison.** N. A. Miles. This needless severity aroused great indignation in the South, and the secretary of war ordered the manacles removed four days after they were placed on the prisoner. But Davis remained in prison for two years. He was much disliked in the North, but by May, 1867, sentiment relented, and he was taken before a federal judge on a writ of *habeas corpus*. He had been detained for treason, but the judge declared this bailable, and he was released on a bond of \$100,000, Horace Greeley and other prominent Northern men becoming sureties. His release gave pleasure to the South. The confederate president was not popular with his own people during the war, but his imprisonment, which he bore with dignity and fortitude, brought him their affectionate esteem. In 1869 the case against him was discontinued, and he returned to Mississippi, where he lived in retirement until his death in 1889.

THE ELECTION OF 1868

The local elections in 1867 brought anxiety to the republicans. The democrats carried New York and Pennsylvania, and in Ohio they reduced a large adverse majority to only 3000 while they defeated a negro suffrage amendment by 50,000. **Grant Nominated.** This result, seven months after the adoption of congressional reconstruction, argued badly for the party in 1868. Fortunately, safety was at hand in the person of a presidential candidate.

May 20, a national republican convention nominated General Grant for president and Schuyler Colfax for vice-president. Grant was not a politician, and his early sympathy was democratic; but his quarrel with Johnson in 1867 threw him into the arms of the radicals. His speech of acceptance struck a popular note in the expression, "Let us have peace."

In the democratic convention, New York, July 4, were two prominent candidates, both from Ohio. One was George H. Pendleton, representative from the Cincinnati district, cultured and well connected, and nicknamed "Gentleman George." The other was Chief Justice Chase, who had a following among those who opposed Pendleton's financial views. These views, known as the "Ohio Idea," may be summed up as follows: The national bonds were payable in "dollars," although the interest was to be paid in gold. About \$1,600,000,000 was in five-twenty bonds, and might, therefore, soon begin to be redeemed. Pendleton desired to pay them in "greenbacks," or legal tender, then much depreciated. This would mean large issues of notes, but they would pay no interest, thus effecting a saving to the government, and the resulting inflation would please the debtor class, then large in Ohio and the states west of it. The year 1867 brought a panic, and at such a time inflation was apt to be popular. To pay the debt in gold, or to refund it in gold bonds, said Pendleton, was to favor the Eastern capitalists at the expense of the taxpayers, and he won many of the latter by his battle-cry: "The same currency for the bondholder and the plowholder!" The response was so strong in the West that the republicans there dared not oppose it openly.

The Pendleton men wrote the platform of 1868, demanding (1) the payment in currency of bonds not specifically payable in specie, (2) taxation of national bonds, and (3) opposition to radical reconstruction. The platform required a mere majority vote, but to nominate a candidate a two-thirds vote was necessary. The New York delegates led the Eastern sentiment for conservative finance, and for two days no nominations were made. Pendleton led on the first ballot and had 156½ out of 317 votes on the second. Two-thirds he could not get. Finally, on the twenty-second ballot there was a stampede to Horatio Seymour, of New York, chairman of the convention. He protested he would not run, but the vote was unanimous, and he accepted. For vice-president, Frank P. Blair, Jr., of Missouri, was selected. Nine days earlier he had said in a letter immediately made public that the carpet-bag régime in the South should be dispersed by the president with armed force. His nomination under the circumstances was indiscreet, and the republicans pointed to it to support their argument that the democrats contemplated violence. However wisely the party may have acted, it had no chance against Grant. He had

214 to Seymour's 80 electoral votes and a plurality in the popular vote of over 300,000.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS UNDER JOHNSON

If Johnson's domestic policy was full of disaster, his foreign policy was on the whole successful. Although negotiations with England were muddled through the incapacity of Reverdy Johnson (page 670), affairs in Mexico were arranged with brilliant results for our prestige, and in the purchase of Alaska we acquired at a fair price a most valuable territory. In these matters the chief credit belongs to Seward, although it should be remembered that the secretary had the constant support of his superior.

In 1861, Napoleon III, under pretext of protecting European creditors, sent an army to Mexico and found means to get a complaisant Assembly of Notables to establish an empire with Maximilian, brother of the Austrian ruler for emperor. The act violated the spirit of the Monroe doctrine, but the United States, pressed to the limit by the civil war, could only protest. The American people felt the affront very deeply and demanded, with the coming of peace, the expulsion of the French army from Mexico. Grant was of the same opinion, and sent Sheridan with 52,000 troops to the Rio Grande. Napoleon was not inclined to be forced, and war seemed possible. It was Seward's task to get what we wanted without fighting for it. He restrained American indignation on one hand, and by careful negotiations led up to a firm demand upon the French emperor on the other. He succeeded so well that April 5, 1866, Napoleon ordered his generals in Mexico to make ready for withdrawal within a year and a half, because the troops were needed in Europe. Maximilian was in dismay. He had been promised five years' support: if he were now abandoned, he would be crushed by the natives who held him for a usurper. His touching appeals to Paris worked nothing. France did not care for the Mexican scheme, and the emperor dared not incur the expense of a war for it. It was by bringing this situation home to the French government that Seward had his way. Left to his own resources, the young Maximilian disdained to flee, and awaited his fate at the hands of the infuriated Mexicans. They proclaimed a republic, reoccupied the country, took him a prisoner, tried him by court-martial, and shot him on June 19, 1867.

**The French
in Mexico.**

**Alaska
Purchased.**

Seward's success in this incident was clouded somewhat by sympathy for the unhappy Maximilian. In the purchase of Alaska there was no such untoward feature. Russian America, with an area of 577,390 square miles, had 10,000 white inhabitants and many Indians in 1867. Its fur trade was valuable, and fisheries on the southern coast were capable of rich develop-

ment. Russia found it too remote to govern well, and fearing it might be seized by England, her minister was authorized to suggest to Seward that she would sell it. The suggestion was quickly accepted, and in one evening's interview the details were settled. The price was to be \$7,000,000, with \$200,000 to quiet the claims of the Russian American Company. The Russian minister suggested that the treaty be prepared next day, but Seward exclaimed, "Why wait till to-morrow, Mr. Stoeckl? Let us make the treaty to-night!" Then clerks were summoned, Sumner, chairman of the senate committee on foreign affairs, was called in, and at four o'clock in the morning the treaty was signed. It went at once to the senate, where it created much surprise; but Sumner carried its adoption. In the house there was more delay. The members needed time to realize why \$7,000,000 should be paid for a frozen wilderness in the remote northwest. The treaty was ratified, and on October 11, 1867, Alaska was handed over. The purchase was not popular when made, but time showed its benefits.

GRANT'S POLITICAL MISTAKES

Grant's inauguration occasioned general joy, both because of his popularity and because the turmoil of the Johnson period was over.

Grant's Cabinet. But thoughtful men wondered if a military training fitted him for politics, and his first acts intensified their doubts. He chose his cabinet of his own judgment, as a military man might be expected to do, and two of them, E. R. Hoar, attorney-general, and J. D. Cox, secretary of the interior, were excellent selections. The others had not generally been considered eligible. Washburne, a man of respectable capacity, became secretary of state, but resigned immediately to go to Paris as minister. He was succeeded by Hamilton Fish, of New York, who was also well chosen. For secretary of the treasury, an officer of the greatest importance at that time, Grant nominated A. T. Stewart, a rich merchant of New York. The nomination caused consternation, but a law was discovered which forbade a merchant to hold the office. Grant wished the law repealed, but congress refused, and he appointed George S. Boutwell, of Massachusetts, a safe but not a brilliant, financier. John A. Rawlins became secretary of war, A. E. Borie secretary of the navy, and A. J. Creswell postmaster-general. Fish hesitated to enter such a cabinet, but yielded to the requests of his friends. He had influence with Grant, whose intentions were good, and hoped to save him from manipulation by the politicians. He, Hoar, and Cox made the best wing of the cabinet, but spite of their efforts, Butler and his friends acquired predominant influence. Grant was strong-willed and not easily moved. He smoked incessantly, was fond of horses, and gave to the White House some of the free atmosphere of the headquarters' tent. He was surrounded by men

who had his weaknesses without his virtues, and through their machinations the responsibilities of government were forgotten, and corruption invaded many places.

He was most criticized for his Southern policy. His attitude toward the South was originally lenient, but he yielded to Butler, who made him believe in the reality of Southern outrages. Grant was ultimately responsible for the armed support of the republican régime in the Southern states. He had no keen comprehension of the problems of good government, and in his Southern policy, as in other civil matters, he had a soldier's desire to be obeyed. His support of the party's program in the South alienated the feeling of many republicans. It was largely responsible for the liberal republican movement of 1872 and for the decisive democratic victory in 1874.

**His
Southern
Policy.**

He was not a year in office before he was in a needless quarrel with Sumner. He undertook without the knowledge of the cabinet to secure the annexation of Santo Domingo (page 671).

The senate would not accept a treaty to that effect, and Sumner, chairman of its foreign committee, was outspoken in opposition. In the senate he was safe from retaliation, but Grant struck at him elsewhere. Motley, minister to England and close personal friend of Sumner, had violated instructions from the state department. The case would ordinarily end with a reprimand, but the day after the Dominican treaty was rejected, Grant recalled Motley peremptorily. Sumner recognized the thrust at himself, and became very angry. Each contestant was outspoken and unyielding, and the newspapers were soon full of the bitter things they said. Sumner carried the attack into the senate when the administration senators replied in behalf of the president. Fish was drawn into the affair, and soon was not on speaking terms with the indignant senator from Massachusetts. The pertinacity of the latter clearly put him in the wrong, but men could not forget that the beginning of the quarrel was unnecessary.

**His
Quarrel
with
Sumner.**

The loss in the following year of two of the three first-rate men in the cabinet shows how much Grant was yielding to the spoilsmen. Attorney-General Hoar had much opposition from them, and offered to resign, but the offer was refused. He was surprised, therefore, to receive on June 15, 1870, without warning, the curtest possible request for his resignation. It then transpired that Grant, seeking votes for the Dominican treaty, had appealed to the Southern republican senators. They liked Sumner, who opposed the treaty, and would not vote for it unless they were given representation in the cabinet; and Hoar was removed in order to make a vacancy. Cox's elimination was not quite so summary. He offended the Butler machine by opposing the schemes of a powerful clique who wished to acquire

**Hoar
Dismissed.**

**Resignation
of Cox.**

mining lands in California and by introducing civil service reform into the department of the interior. Senators Cameron, of Pennsylvania, and Chandler, of Michigan, friends of jobbery in many forms, were particularly anxious for his removal. Cox also gave offense by attempting to reform the Indian service, which was in a wretched state through the corruption of the Indian agents. As the clamor against him became insistent, he thought to test his position by an offer to withdraw, October 3, 1870. Grant's acceptance was so prompt as to leave no doubt that he supported the spoilsmen. Fish alone in the cabinet was now in sympathy with the liberals, and his immunity was due to his great success in settling the Alabama claims.

It was not long after these events that Grant aroused the opposition of the civil service reformers. He favored their plans at first and sought to execute fairly the bill of 1871 empowering him to make rules for the selection of civil servants, and he made George William Curtis chairman of the commission which acted as an advisory body. Soon the reformers were in conflict with the machine politicians, and Grant, who was not an idealist, grew tired of the controversy which followed. Reformers criticized him for not aiding them, and Curtis resigned his chairmanship in disgust. They thought the president entirely with the spoilsmen, and most of them supported the liberal republican movement of 1872 and 1874. Their attitude confirmed his dislike for their leaders, and he said in 1879, "There is a good deal of cant about civil service reform."

More conspicuous was his connection with the "Black Friday" speculations of Jay Gould and James Fiske, Jr. These two men owned controlling interests in the Erie railroad, which they ran in the interest of their operations in its stock. The first was a shrewd manipulator and the second a gaudy adventurer. In 1869 Gould worked out the following scheme. He thought if gold, then at 132, could be put up to 145, Europe, buying grain for gold, would take much American wheat. This increased demand would mean a rise in wheat in the West, where the farmers would sell rapidly. Wheat would move to the coast, and the Erie, a grain-carrying road, would have larger freight receipts. The scheme seemed only to demand putting up the price of gold. There was but \$20,000,000 of the metal accessible in New York, and the schemers felt able to corner it and raise the price, since many men must have it continually to settle their business contracts. The one obstacle was the possibility that the secretary of the treasury, Boutwell, would sell gold for bonds when the price rose. He was doing this all the time and was accustomed to give a month's warning of the amount he would thus place in the market. Gould was audacious enough to undertake to induce the president to restrain the secretary from purchasing bonds for a time.

**Opposition
of Civil
Service
Reformers.**

**The
Gould-Fiske
Speculation.**

Grant had a brother-in-law, Corbin, in New York, who speculated in stocks, and through him Gould dined with Grant and got himself and Fisk seen at a theater in company with the president in order to impress the financial public. He also seized the opportunity to urge on Grant his view of the relation of gold to the price of grain. The latter received it with interest, for he had close at heart the welfare of the farmers. He at length was convinced, and advised Boutwell to stop selling gold. This was early in September, and Gould began at once to buy gold. In two days the price was 137. He bought large quantities for Corbin, and for others connected with the president, lending them the money to carry the transaction.

**Grant
Trapped.**

When gold was at 137, Grant went for several days to a place in western Pennsylvania inaccessible to railroads or telegraph. The moment seemed propitious, and Gould redoubled his efforts. Fisk, who was a bold buyer, now became active in the scheme and gold rose to 140. There was much suffering among those who needed gold; some of them by frantic efforts reached Grant and urged him to sell gold. Gould learned of it and realized that short reflection would induce Grant to comply. He determined, therefore, to sell his supply, bought in the campaign of the preceding days at a high figure. He ordered his agents to sell gold as they could, but not to sell to the brokers of Fisk, who now appeared as buying on his own account. While he thus sold, Fisk continued to put up the price, giving Gould's brokers opportunity to sell to persons who, in great fright, began to buy before the price became exorbitant. Gould began to sell on Thursday, September 23. At the close of the day the price was 144 and he still had much on hand. Friday morning Fisk began to bid it up madly. From 145 it rose to 150, then upward until at noon it was at 162. The exchange was in an uproar and Fisk was walking the floor, swearing he would carry the price to 200. Men began to fear he had the power to do so, and buying began again at 162. It had not gone far when news came that the government was selling gold. Instantly the price fell and the market closed at 135. Before the collapse came, Gould had sold all his holding at a good price, most of it to reliable men. Fisk, meantime, had bought heavily, but without paying cash. He went into bankruptcy and forfeited his contracts. But he continued Gould's partner and seemed still to prosper, which caused much wagging of heads. A few people thought Grant a beneficiary of the plot, but the charge was not believed by those who knew all the facts. His only error in the affair was his credulous goodness which made him an easy mark for Gould.

**"Black
Friday."**

THE PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN OF 1872

All these failings of Grant resulted in serious political opposition. Its first appearance was in Missouri, when Carl Schurz, senator from that state, headed a group of republicans who desired a more liberal Southern policy. They nominated B. Gratz Brown for governor and elected him with the aid of democrats. The movement grew stronger as the administration at Washington showed no improvement, and its leaders thought that a similar combination in 1872 might win the presidency. In a state meeting they called a national convention of liberal republicans, May 1, 1872. The call elicited a hearty response and had the approval of many prominent men and newspapers. The convention met as called. Its platform arraigned the administration on every disputed point, and on this all were agreed. But there was great difficulty over the tariff. The movement generally had favored a lowering of duties; but Greeley, of the New York *Tribune*, who was friendly in most things, declared his paper would oppose tariff reduction. It was thought to be worth a compromise to wrench so influential a journal from the old party, and so the platform, when adopted, declared that the tariff question could safely be left to the wisdom of congress.

Among the candidates before the convention were B. Gratz Brown, Charles Francis Adams, and Greeley himself. The strength of Greeley

**Greeley
Nominated.**

was large in New York, one of whose senators, Fenton, was opposed to Conkling, the other senator, on account of a squabble over the patronage. Fenton hoped to have a president with whom he had influence. Greeley, however, made poor headway, until Brown, angry at some alleged unfairness of the Adams men, withdrew in favor of the New Yorker and started a stampede in that direction. Schurz and other cool-headed men tried in vain to stem the tide, and Greeley was nominated on the sixth ballot. It was an unfortunate choice. Greeley had genius, honesty, and a large following; but he was eccentric, vain, and impractical. The candidate for vice-president was B. Gratz Brown. The regular

**Grant Re-
nominated.**

republicans on June 5 unanimously renominated Grant with Henry Wilson, of Massachusetts, for vice-president. The platform supported reconstruction and the protective tariff. July 9 the democrats in their convention accepted Greeley for their candidate. He had been their bitterest foe in days past, and to indorse him seemed to discard both dignity and principle.

**The
Democrats.**

The campaign was relentlessly personal. Grant's military services endeared him to the people. They knew his good qualities and thought little of his errors. His managers turned their attention to making Greeley look ridiculous. A protectionist leading the tariff

reformers, an opponent of civil service reform leading the civil service reformers, a man renowned for his sharp attacks on the democracy leading the democrats, the spectacle was unusual. His personal appearance aided this kind of warfare. Thomas Nast, brilliant and partisan, caricatured him relentlessly, and the people applauded. Greeley's vanity was only a childish weakness, and it might have been overlooked by his persecutors. He conducted his own campaign fairly, but the jibes at him cut him to the heart. To be depicted as a scarecrow, a despot, and an imbecile by turns was more than he could stand. He closed the campaign in sorrow. October 30, Mrs. Greeley died; November 5, he lost the election; and November 29, he himself was dead. This quick accumulation of misfortune softened most hearts, but the election results were still overwhelming. Grant had 272 electoral votes and Greeley 66. Only six states, Georgia, Kentucky, Maryland, Missouri, Tennessee, and Texas voted for the unhappy editor. Louisiana and Arkansas were in dispute, and all the others were for Grant. In the house the republican majority was raised from 35 to 105. Grant and the group whose errors were responsible for the liberal republican protest had a right to think they were endorsed by the people.

POLITICAL DECAY UNDER GRANT

In the scandals disclosed in Grant's second term he had no conscious profit. His own fault was that he knew not what transpired around him and trusted men whom a better judge of public men would have suspected. The misdoings themselves were rooted in the past. They were due to loose habits which crept into political affairs in war times and thrived in the turbulent days of reconstruction. Everywhere office-holding had its opportunity for profit, and a powerful lobby worked on the cupidity of the public servants. The glaring frauds in the Southern states were but the worst eruptions of a disease widely prevalent.

**Grant not
Responsible.**

During the campaign of 1872 rumors circulated that prominent republican congressmen were concerned in a railroad scandal. Denials came, and the incident was dismissed as campaign lie. After the election the rumors were revived, and Blaine, one of the accused, asked for an investigation. Two committees of investigation were, in fact, created, one by the house, known as the "Poland Committee," from its chairman, and one by the senate, known as the "Wilson Committee." From the facts they discovered we may gather the following story:

**The Crédit
Mobilier
Frauds.**

The Union Pacific railroad, completed in 1869, had received little cash from subscribing stockholders and paid for its construction in four kinds of securities. The first was its own bonds to the amount of \$27,000,000, secured by a first mortgage on the road. The second

was the United States bonds to a similar amount lent by congress with a second mortgage for the government's security. The third was

Their Origin.	land bonds issued by the road and secured by the large tracts of land congress had donated to the Union Pacific.
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The fourth was certificates of stock in the enterprise. To build the road a construction company known as the *Crédit Mobilier* was formed out of the chief stockholders. It paid out for construction less than \$50,000,000 and received securities worth in the market \$70,000,000, a profit, according to the report of the committee, of \$23,000,000. In 1868 it began to divide its earnings among its shareholders. Within that year each owner of a hundred-dollar share in the *Crédit Mobilier* received \$60 in cash, first mortgage bonds worth \$230 face value, and railroad stock worth \$515 face value. Later distributions added largely to these excessive profits. It meant that a group of men controlling the Union Pacific had found a way of transferring to themselves in the capacity of a construction company a large part of the road's securities and among them large issues of stock. The latter feature violated the charter, which required all the stock to be issued for cash. In 1867 an intimation of what was going on got abroad and a resolution was introduced in the house of representatives to investigate the affairs of the Union Pacific. Oakes Ames, a wealthy Massachusetts representative, was prominently concerned in the *Crédit Mobilier* and undertook to block the investigation. He got the construction company to place 243 of its shares at his disposal and sold them at par to leading congressmen, although they were worth double that amount in the market; and if the purchaser could not pay for the stock, Ames lent him the money. His scheme succeeded so well that he wrote his associates that they need not fear the proposed investigation. Most of his victims, however, repented their action and surrendered their stock when they saw what the deal meant. The charges could not be disproved, and the house, at the recommendation of the committee, censured Ames and Brooks, of New York. Schuyler Colfax, vice-president until March 4, 1873, was shown to be concerned in the affair. He could not well be impeached, as he was about to go out of office, but the disclosure wrecked his career. The senate committee recommended the expulsion of Patterson, of New Hampshire; but his term was about to expire, and the senators allowed him to go in peace. Among the acquitted ones were some of the most prominent men in congress. The situation revealed by the investigation made a deep impression on the nation.

The people were so excited that they were ready to see fraud in many things they had not formerly objected to. In such a light was viewed the "Salary Grab" act of March 3, 1873. As congress closed its labors, it increased the salaries of the president, vice-president, supreme court justices, speaker, senators, and representa-

tives. Members of congress had been getting \$5000 a year and were to have \$7500; and the law, following bad precedent, was to apply to the congress just ending. This retroactive feature produced a vehement popular protest. It was dubbed the "back pay steal"; and many members did not dare take the additional pay. The succeeding congress repealed the obnoxious law so far as it related to senators and representatives; but spite of the repeal, the act was responsible for many election disasters in the congressional contest of 1874.

The
"Salary
Grab."

In May, 1874, the ways and means committee of the house uncovered the Sanborn contracts. By a rather doubtful construction of law, John D. Sanborn, one of Butler's tools, was given a contract to collect some overdue internal revenue claims at a commission of 50 per cent. He recovered \$427,000 and got the stipulated reward of \$213,500. He swore he paid \$156,000 of this to his assistants, which meant, probably, that this amount served to hold together the Butler machine in Massachusetts. The contracts could not be repudiated, and Sanborn was not touched; but congress by a law made a repetition of the offense impossible. Richardson, secretary of the treasury, who had allowed the contracts, only escaped a vote of censure by resigning.

The
Sanborn
Contracts.

The campaign of 1874 came close on the heels of the Sanborn disclosure. No one thought the republicans would escape a rebuke, but few foresaw how overwhelming it would be. In the house then in existence were 195 republicans, 88 democrats, and 4 liberals. In the new house were 108 republicans, 168 democrats, and 14 liberals and independents. For the first time since 1860 the democratic party had the confidence of the country. In this year, also, Samuel J. Tilden, a lawyer of ability and a steady foe of political corruption, was elected democratic governor of New York. Among his supporters were many republicans who took this means of showing their disapproval of the conditions in their own party.

Elections
of 1874.

Their defeat sobered the republicans, but fraud was deep-rooted and two more scandals were yet to come to light. In 1874 Bristow succeeded the spoilsman, Richardson, as secretary of the treasury. He was a reformer and began to investigate the department. In 1875 he uncovered a bad situation in St. Louis. A group of distillers in that city, with the aid of McDonald, supervisor of internal revenue, had been able to defraud the government annually of a million dollars in whisky taxes. Bristow prosecuted the conspirators, and McDonald was sent to the penitentiary. He later published a book in which he said Grant shared the ring's profits. Only the president's reputation for integrity saved him now in the minds of the people. It was notorious that he had accepted expensive gifts and entertainment from Mc-

The
Whisky
Ring.

Donald, and it was proved that Babcock, his private secretary, was very intimate with the St. Louis criminals. When Babcock was put on trial, Grant voluntarily testified for him, and although the private secretary was acquitted, few people doubted his guilt. Grant retained him private secretary until the criticisms were so loud that he could keep him no longer. Dogged faithfulness to a friend was one of the president's good qualities; but in this case it led him astray.

This series of scandals ended with an investigation in 1876 which showed that secretary of war Belknap had connived at a bargain for the appointment of an Indian agent at Fort Sill. The incumbent, as it was proved, fearing removal, had agreed to pay his rival \$12,000 a year to withdraw. One-half this sum was sent annually to Mrs. Belknap, and after her death it was paid to her husband, the secretary of war. The evidence was plain and abundant, and a resolution to impeach Belknap passed the house unanimously. A few hours before it was voted on, the secretary tendered his resignation, which Grant immediately accepted. It cannot be doubted that he wished to save the erring official from punishment.

**The
Belknap
Scandal.**

THE ELECTION OF 1876

As another presidential election approached, the regular republicans thought of candidates. Those closest to Grant began to talk of a third term, counting on his immense popularity. He himself was sounded and said he would not be a candidate again unless it should seem to be his "imperative duty," which was generally interpreted as assent to the plan. The scheme received its death blow, however, when the house, in December, 1875, by a vote of 234 to 18, resolved that a departure from the custom long followed "would be unwise, unpatriotic, and fraught with perils to our free institutions"; 70 of the 88 republicans and all the democrats in the house voted for this resolution. Grant's particular supporters now divided between Conkling, of New York, and Morton, of Indiana, the latter securing most of the Southern delegates, from that time an unwholesome but important element in a republican national convention. Bristow's work for reform drew to him a following from the best portion of the party, and Blaine, whose abilities and personal popularity surpassed those of any other candidate, had a large following in the rank and file of the party. He was suspected of improper relations in regard to a railroad in Arkansas and his method of disposing of the "Mulligan letters" did not entirely remove the suspicion. As he was the strongest candidate, there was a disposition for the others to combine against him. Conkling, his personal enemy, was happy to promote such a move. There were several "favorite sons," among

**Republican
Candidates.**

them Governor R. B. Hayes, for whom the 44 votes of Ohio were instructed.

The convention met in Cincinnati, June 14. On the first ballot Blaine had 285 votes, Morton 125, Bristow 113, Conkling 99, Hayes 61, and other candidates 72. On each ballot until the fifth Blaine held his own and Hayes gained slowly, while Morton and Conkling lost. On the fifth Hayes held his own and the Blaine vote went to 308, only 70 less than was necessary for a choice. The danger of a stampede to him seems now to have impressed his opponents, and they quickly concentrated on Hayes, who on the sixth ballot had 384, and was nominated. It was well timed; for on this ballot Blaine had 351 votes and his friends were enthusiastic. William A. Wheeler, of New York, was nominated for vice-president. Blaine was defeated through the union for that purpose of the worst and best factions of the party, the extreme spoilsmen and the extreme reformers. Hayes pleased the latter because he was a man of excellent character, friendly to civil service reform and opposed to severe measures in the South; the spoilsmen accepted him to beat Blaine, whom they feared, and because they thought Hayes could be managed.

The Re-
publican
Convention.

The democrats turned to Samuel J. Tilden, who seemed a strong candidate when reform was the issue. He first became prominent through the energy with which he prosecuted the Tweed ring in 1871. In doing so he won the antagonism of Tammany; but that organization was so much discredited by Tweed that it could not do great harm in the campaign. In the states north of the Ohio the democrats had some strength. Here Allen, of Ohio, trained in the late Jacksonian school, and Hendricks, of Indiana, both prominent in the revival of 1874, were mentioned. General Hancock, of Pennsylvania, was also urged as a man popular with the soldiers. On the first ballot Tilden had 417 votes, only 70 less than two-thirds of the convention. Of his opponents Hendricks had 140, Hancock 75, and Allen 56. Tilden was evidently the man most likely to win, and on the second ballot he got 535 votes and was declared nominated. The democrats in general did not care for reforms. They were a party of opposition, trained through a long series of hardships to a policy of expediency. They did not relish the New York leadership, but submitted to secure party success. Thomas A. Hendricks was nominated for vice-president.

Tilden
nominated
by the
Democrats.

The two platforms contained many generalities, but the important issue was the record of the republicans. It was a damaging affair, and Blaine sought by a skillful ruse to shift it to the Southern issue. The house was debating a bill to grant amnesty to the remaining confederates under disabilities when he moved to exempt from its action the president of the confederacy. He

The Issues.

made in support of the motion a fiery speech charging Davis with responsibility for the suffering of union soldiers at Andersonville. It was a shrewd play; for it brought, as Blaine expected, a heated reply from the Southern members. Thus opened a sectional debate in which was obliterated much of the recently developed good will for the South. Thus the sectional controversy was made an issue in the campaign at a time when it had seemed to be receding. Blaine's maneuver displeased the liberals in his party and made them work hard to defeat his nomination, but it was reflected in the platform which indorsed the Southern policy of Grant. Another plank pledged the party to pay the national debt without discounting it. The democrats took a similar position on finance, but they arraigned the administration most severely for frauds and scandals, and pressed the argument home on a thousand stumps. Hayes, who was little known when nominated, came out well in his letter of acceptance. Reformers felt reassured when he said that he was against the spoils system and in favor of such a policy as would wipe out the distinction between North and South. His attitude and the hard work of his supporters kept the Northwest firm, but the democrats were strongly entrenched in New York, and held it spite of the lukewarm attitude of Tammany. In the South the democrats carried the

The Results. states in which the republican régime had been overthrown, but there were hard battles in the three states still in republican hands, South Carolina, Louisiana, and Florida. Each of these was fighting for redemption from republican rule, using methods by this time well known in the South. In each there were disputed returns, and the result of the national contest was dependent on the way they were received.

By midnight of election day most of the crowds who listened to the returns throughout the country went home assured that Tilden was elected. All the New York papers but the *Herald* and the *Times* said as much next morning, for he had New York, Indiana, and other doubtful states, and he was believed to have the "Solid South." The *Herald* and *Times* announced that the result was in doubt. It appeared later that Tilden had 184 undisputed votes and Hayes 165. South Carolina's, Louisiana's, and Florida's votes and one elector from Oregon were disputed. If Tilden got one of the twenty, he would be elected: if Hayes got all, he would be elected. Claiming these contested votes for Hayes, it is said, was the suggestion of a shrewd manager in the early morning of the day after election. It was seized eagerly by his associates, who urged the managers in the states concerned to relax no efforts in support of their contention. Great excitement prevailed. The democrats thought the republicans were trying to steal the presidency. The republicans replied that they only sought to have a fair count.

**Disputed
Returns.**

It is difficult to decide between the two sides. In South Carolina was much intimidation by the whites and much fraud by both parties. There was an election board which passed on disputed returns, and by rejecting votes which the democrats thought should be counted it gave certificates of election to republican presidential electors and to most of the republican candidates for state and county offices. In due time these electors met and voted for Hayes. The democrats ignored these proceedings and insisted that the board had acted unfairly. These electors, as well as Wade Hampton, their candidate for governor, had a majority of the votes certified by the election officers, and they claimed that these returns were not subject to revision. Their electors accordingly met, cast their vote for Tilden, and took steps to report the vote to the United States senate. The same situation existed in Florida, where there had been much confusion in voting. The returning board undertook to correct the returns from the counties and the result was a republican majority. The electors thus returned cast the vote of the state for Hayes, and the democratic electors met and voted for Tilden.

The
Returning
Boards in
South
Carolina;

In Florida;

The proceedings in these two states suggested partisanship; in Louisiana they went somewhat further. Here, also, was a returning board with power to canvass the returns. Legally it should have had five members, one a democrat, but the democratic member had resigned, and the others, all republicans, two white and two black, refused to choose a successor. The *personnel* of the board was bad. The president, in the words of General Sheridan, was "a political trickster and a dishonest man." These four men, all republicans, had in their hands the making of a president, and the eyes of the nation were on them. Twenty-five of the leading men of each party came to New Orleans to watch the count, and the board asked five from each group of "visiting statesmen" to be present at the hearing of evidence bearing on the disputed elections. The evidence taken, the four members of the board deliberated in secret. Decision after decision was for the republicans, and at the end of the deliberations what had been on the face of the returns a democratic majority of 6300 was a republican majority of 4600.

In Louisiana.

By the work of these returning boards Hayes got formal recognition for nineteen of the twenty votes necessary to elect him. The other vote was from Oregon. The state was republican by a majority of 1000; but one elector, a deputy postmaster, was ineligible because by the constitution a federal officer may not be chosen an elector. The governor, a democrat, gave the certificate to the democratic candidate with the largest vote, and it resulted that two returns came from Oregon.

The constitution provides that the president of the United States

senate shall open the votes from the states and count them in the presence of the two houses, and it says nothing about passing on disputed returns. No precedent, since the government began, had settled the point. The only case in point was in 1821, when there was doubt in regard to the vote of Missouri (page 374). But here the president of the senate only avoided the issue by announcing that if the vote of Missouri were counted, Monroe would have 231 votes, if not counted, 229, and in either case he was elected. In 1865, 1869, and 1873, the votes of the states not in the union were not counted, but this was on the ground that they were unreconstructed. In 1877 all the states were in the union. The experience of reconstruction days, however, seemed to establish the principle that congress, or the senate, had authority to pass on disputed returns.

The "twenty-second joint rule," passed in 1865, might have had a bearing on the question. It provided that one house could prevent the counting of a disputed electoral vote or votes. Early in 1876 the republican senate withdrew its consent to the rule, and it was held that a joint rule was repealed when one house withdrew its consent. Had this joint rule been in force in 1877 the democrats could have refused to recognize the Louisiana vote: that would have meant no election, and the decision, thrown into the democratic house, would have been for Tilden. The republicans congratulated themselves on the repeal of the rule, and the democrats had no way of rehabilitating it.

When congress met, the situation was threatening. Republicans and democrats took sides with such earnestness that people feared that a civil war might occur if some way was not found to settle the dispute. Each house appointed a committee to devise a plan. The democrats seemed to wish to have the election referred to the house, and the republicans seemed to be without a definite plan. But each side watched intently every move of the other. There was much discussion, and at last an electoral commission was suggested. Each house was to appoint five men from its own membership to whom would be added five justices of the supreme court approved by each side, in all, fifteen members of a commission which should pass on the disputed returns. Of the house representation on the commission three were democrats and two republicans, of the senate representation three were republicans and two democrats, and two of the justices, Clifford and Field, had democratic, and two others, Miller and Strong, had republican, leanings. So far, therefore, the commission had seven democrats and seven republicans, and everything would depend on the fifth justice. For this position it was thought, when the plan was devised, that Judge Davis would be named. He did not vote in the election of 1876, and he was called an independent. On the day the plan was submitted to congress

Davis by democratic votes was elected United States senator from Illinois, and was out of the question for the commission. At this late hour the democrats could hardly withdraw approval from their agreement, and another justice must be taken. The choice fell on Justice Bradley, of known republican leaning. Thus a commission was selected which, if it were influenced by partisan sympathy, would have eight republicans and seven democrats. It began its hearings on February 1.

The first returns taken up were from Florida. Evidence was taken, then came secret deliberations, then more evidence, and more deliberation, while the public awaited the result in the greatest suspense and anxiety. It was believed that the decision in regard to Florida would indicate the tone of those in the other cases. At last the verdict was given, Bradley casting the deciding vote. It announced that congress could not go behind the decision of a state, that the certificate must be accepted if the proper Florida authorities signed it. On this principle the commission gave Florida to Hayes. The same proceedings were taken in the Louisiana case, the commission refusing to hear evidence to show that the certificate approved by the republican governor was not founded in fact. By the same vote, eight to seven, Hayes got this state. In the Oregon and South Carolina cases the commission unanimously rejected the Tilden electors, thus giving the republicans all the disputed votes. The commission held, therefore, that if wrong had been done it was by the state authorities, and that the constitution and laws did not give congress power to correct it. The decision supported the theory of state rights, but the democrats thought it strange that their opponents, after invading at will, in their reconstruction policy, the function of states, should have appeared so solicitous to preserve the authority of the states in the matter then under consideration.

The decision caused disappointment to the supporters of Tilden, but the country at large was relieved that there would be no civil war. The South found special comfort in the prospect of regaining complete control of its own affairs. Before the verdict was given, friends of Hayes, probably without his direct assurance, made it certain that if elected he would withdraw the federal troops, without which the last vestige of carpet-bag government would fail. In view of the recognition of the state by the commission, he could hardly do otherwise. The result in South Carolina and Louisiana was soon evident. In the spring, not long after the inauguration, Hayes had a conference in Washington with Chamberlain and Hampton, the republican and democratic claimants for the governorship of the former of the two states, and made it plain what his policy would be; and not long afterwards he recalled the federal troops in the Southern states. Chamberlain had no support from the mass of whites, they would not pay taxes to republican officers, and the police would

The
Decision.

The With-
drawal of
Troops
from the
South.

South
Carolina.

not support his assertion of power. Hampton was their governor, the democratic legislature took possession of the statehouse, and Chamberlain withdrew from the field. The people hailed his departure as a token of the redemption of South Carolina from alien rule. The same thing occurred in Louisiana, where Packard, the republican, gave way to Nicholls, the democrat, and a democratic legislature was recognized by the people. In Florida an order of the state supreme court gave the democrats the governorship, and the republican claimant, without the support of federal troops, was forced to yield.

The losers by this process uttered imprecations on a president who, as they said, profited by their work to get into office, and deserted those who had the same right to power that he had to the electoral votes which made him president. But their charge was hardly fair. If the national government, acting through the executive, could pass on a state election in reference to the governorship, it could pass on it in reference to the choice of presidential electors; and if it could not pass on it in reference to electors — which was the verdict of the electoral commission — it could not pass on it in reference to the choice of governor. The key to the situation was our dual form of government, which now worked one way for the national side of the controversy and another way for the state's side. The republicans profited by its operation on one side and the democrats by its operation on the other, and the democrats lost in Washington while they gained in the South.

**The
Position of
Hayes.**

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CHAPTER XXXI

ECONOMIC AND DIPLOMATIC HISTORY, 1856-1877

FINANCIAL REORGANIZATION

THE end of the civil war saw confusion in national finances. The debt was nearly \$3,000,000,000, the interest on it was 6 per cent, taxes were high, and the currency was inflated by large issues of legal tender notes. The situation was abnormal, and was endured in war times because it was thought that antebellum conditions would be restored with the advent of peace. The experience of a few months showed how difficult this was. No one objected to paying the debt or to refunding it at lower interest, but since a large part of the taxes were high import duties, the protected interests were against their reduction, and since many people had adjusted their business to the high prices which resulted from inflation, a large class, particularly the debtors, resisted the policy of contraction, although it was evident that the difference in value between gold and the legal tender notes was an embarrassment to the large commercial and financial dealers. Thus the tariff and the currency became important political problems for the post-bellum statesmen.

At the head of the treasury department was Hugh McCulloch, a man of great ability. He was originally a successful banker in Indiana, who became comptroller of the currency in 1863, and was made secretary in 1865. He had a banker's instinct for the safe and careful management of obligations, and was specially interested in refunding the debt and restoring specie payment, which meant wiping out the difference between gold and legal tender. He had an able assistant in David A. Wells, special commissioner of the revenue. Wells was a trained economist, and devoted himself especially to adjusting the tariff to new conditions. He wished to make it yield a revenue adequate to the needs of government, but with the schedules so arranged that the consumer should pay the smallest tax consistent with the demands of the situation, and that the manufacturers of various protected articles should share fairly in the mild but progressive reductions of duties which he thought necessary. The two men worked together in the general plan of reform; but it was soon seen that they would have powerful opposition from the beneficiaries of the existing system. The debtor class, strong in the

West, where there was much borrowing to develop unworked resources, opposed a contraction of the stock of legal tender; and the protected manufacturers fought by every means in their power against lowering the high war duties under which they had great advantages in their business.

McCulloch's first concern was the debt. The government owed \$500,000,000 in unfunded obligations. He discharged it in 7-30 notes, which the creditors of the government took without hesitation. Then he took up the task of refunding the entire debt. In three years he got the holders of much of it, including the 7-30 notes of 1865, to exchange their holdings for new 5-20 bonds with interest at 6 per cent. The revenues continued to be large, and he used them to reduce the debt as rapidly as possible. By 1868 he had paid \$519,000,000 of it, although the issue of \$49,000,000 of bonds to pay for Alaska and to aid the Pacific railroads made the net decrease smaller than that amount. During the war, confidence in the nation's financial ability was severely strained, and some men prophesied the debt would never be paid. This sharp reduction in three years benefited the public credit and made easier later funding operations.

Refunding.

McCulloch's excellent financial showing was made in the face of an annual reduction of the high war taxes equal to \$140,000,000 in three years. He felt that the people had a right to relief, but he encountered such strong opposition that he dared not try to lower the tariff. He made his reforms in the other taxes, that is, in the internal revenue and the tax on incomes over \$1000. The protectionists were confident of their power and disposed to be aggressive. In 1866 they carried through the house a bill for still higher rates, but the senate did not pass it. At that time protection was not a party issue, and the republican senate looked on the demands of the manufacturers as unwise and selfish. It met them by passing a bill on principles suggested by Wells, in which he sought to replace in a logical way the haphazard war-time rates without lowering them in general. The protectionists were suspicious of reforms coming from Wells and defeated the bill in the house. In 1867 a strong combination of wool growers and manufacturers secured the passage in both houses of a wool and woollens act, with higher duties on those commodities. They claimed it was needed to save their industry from declining prices; but spite of the act prices still fell. Thus the only tariff legislation in Johnson's administration was this act raising rates.

Non-Pro-
tective
Taxes
Lowered.

Protection-
ists Aggres-
sive.

Wool and
Woollens
Act of 1867.

Defeated here, McCulloch had better success with his currency reforms, although in that quarter he could not do all he wished. In 1865 the legal tender outstanding amounted to \$433,000,000, and \$145 of it exchanged for \$100 in gold. He desired to secure parity

of the two by the resumption of specie payment; but he dared not attempt it until the amount of legal tender was greatly lessened. This currency, issued during the war, was at first considered temporary. It was thought the notes of the national banks

**Retiring
the Legal
Tender
Notes.**

would be the permanent paper currency and that they would expand as the needs of business demanded. McCulloch well knew that the people were generally unwilling to lessen the volume of money, but the commercial and financial interests were anxious for resumption, the country was prosperous, and in 1866 he got congress to authorize the retirement of \$10,000,000 of the legal tenders, or "greenbacks," within six months, and after that \$4,000,000 a month. A year later came the panic of 1867, prices of farm products fell, money became hard to borrow, and the impression gained ground that contracting the amount of legal tenders was partly responsible for the situation. There was undoubtedly much suffering, but McCulloch and the best financiers wished to go on with contraction at the moderate rate ordered by congress. The opposition was strong in the West, where the panic was severely felt. Observing that his plans benefited the capitalists of the East, they questioned his integrity, and sectional bitterness showed itself. Western republicans

**John
Sherman's
Position.**

and democrats from all quarters supported them, and John Sherman, of Ohio, a good student of finance and a wise politician, thought fit to support those opposed to further contraction. He believed that rather than endure the inconvenience which always accompanies contraction, it was better to wait until the expansion of business and population should go so far that the channels of trade would actively employ all the greenbacks then existing, with the result that the government could then support specie payment with a relatively small gold reserve. This would defer resumption several years, but the West was aroused, and the rapid growth of the supporters of Pendleton's "Ohio Idea" showed what measures an aroused people might demand, and Sherman's views were accepted by his party. February 4, 1868, congress by law ordered contraction to cease. McCulloch bowed to the inevitable. His efforts had brought the amount of outstanding legal tender down to \$356,000,000. He retired from office with the inauguration of Grant, disappointed in his chief purpose, to reëstablish specie payment, but leaving the finances otherwise in good condition.

Boutwell, secretary of the treasury in 1869-1873, desired resumption, but felt that the country would not support it, and worked for other reforms. He gave most thought to paying the

**Refunding
the Na-
tional Debt.**

national debt. The tariff yielded ample revenues, there was a surplus above expenses, and he used it to buy bonds for retirement. In his period of office the debt was reduced by \$368,000,000. His success strengthened the nation's credit and enabled him to reduce the interest, then 6 per cent on the 5-20's.

In 1870 he induced congress to authorize the refunding of \$200,000,000 at 5 per cent, \$300,000,000 at $4\frac{1}{2}$ per cent, and \$1,000,000,000 at 4 per cent, all the bonds to run at the pleasure of the government for ten, twenty, or thirty years. It was also provided that both principal and interest of these bonds should be paid in gold. The plan succeeded. The financiers took all the bonds offered, and the 5-20's were retired at the advantage of a large saving in the interest charge.

Boutwell, an Eastern man, was in sympathy with the protectionists. The majority of his party were of the same opinion, but the Western republicans in congress, whose constituencies had little interest in manufacturing, favored a reduction of the exist-

**The Tariff
Act of 1870.**

ing high duties. The democrats were also strong in the West, and they desired lower duties. But there were democratic districts in the East, particularly in Pennsylvania, New York, and New Jersey, which contained manufactures, and this made a group of democratic representatives who supported high duties. The tariff was still not strictly a party measure, although the tendency to make it so was becoming strong. The question came up in the first congress under Grant, since the existing revenue was in excess of the public necessity. A bill was, therefore, passed in 1870 which gave some relief to the taxpayers. The protectionists were on the defensive, and succeeded in throwing the burden of reduction on the non-protected objects of taxation. There was a slight reduction of duties on imports, and a considerable increase of the free list, and the rates were lowered on sugar, tea, and coffee. The internal taxes were lowered until the amount from that source was only \$54,000,000, and further decrease came by raising the exemption in the income tax from \$1000 to \$2000, with the additional provision that this tax be given up entirely at the end of 1871. The income tax was ever unpopular because of its inquisitorial character. The bill of 1870 showed that protection had a strong hold in congress.

THE LEGAL TENDER DECISIONS

The secretary did not disturb the currency compromise of 1868, but in 1870 the legal *status* of the greenbacks became a matter of great interest through the decision of the supreme court in the case of Hepburn *v.* Griswold. The constitutionality of the legal tender law of 1862 had been questioned from the time of its enactment and was involved in this case. The decision was written by Chase, secretary of the treasury in 1862, and now chief justice. It announced that the law impaired the obligation of contracts made before it was passed, and was confiscatory to the extent of the difference between the value of the dollars in which a debt was contracted and that of the dollars in which it was paid. Chase frankly admitted that he was in error in 1862, but said he thought at the former

**Hepburn *v.*
Griswold.**

date that the law was necessary to carry on the war. Four other justices supported his view in 1870, and three dissented. Justice

The Decision. Miller for the latter held that it is only the state, and not congress, that is forbidden to impair the obligation of a contract. He held that the letter of the constitution was not violated by the law, and as the military situation in 1862 was desperate without the law, the court ought if possible to uphold it, lest the nation should seem to repudiate an instrument so useful in perpetuating the existence of the union. Chase and the majority of the court, however, thought only of the logical interpretation of the constitution. That instrument, they said, certainly sought to forbid impairment of contracts, although only the states were mentioned. The court must think of the spirit of the constitution, and from that point of view neither congress nor the state should do the forbidden thing. It was a nice distinction, and seemed to reflect the known political sympathy of the justices. The country took it as a partisan decision. The regular republicans pronounced it a repudiation of Lincoln's war policy.

The court came to its decision in November, 1869, but did not hand it down, or announce it, until February 7, 1870. In the interval

The Appointment of Bradley and Strong. Grier, one of the majority, resigned. As there was a previous vacancy in the bench the president now had two appointments to make, and he sent the nominations to the senate on the very day the decision was announced. He named Bradley and Strong, both earnest party men, who had no sympathy for the position taken by Chase. A cry rose at once that Grant had "packed" the supreme court. He denied that he knew what the decision would be; and as the opinions of the court were usually guarded most strictly, it is difficult to suppose that any inkling of this decision had reached him when he made the nominations. He must, in fact, have taken republicans, and in the state of public feeling he would hardly have found two men who did not sympathize with the criticism most of the party hurled at the court.

Whatever was Grant's responsibility, the legal tender act was soon again before the court, in two cases, *Knox v. Lee* and *Parker v. Davis*,

The Opinion Reversed. both of which were already on the calendar when the first decision was made. The majority of the court, including the two new members, ordered them taken up and argued.

May 1, 1871, the former decision was reversed by a vote of five to four, Bradley and Strong and the former minority now making the majority. The decision was announced at once, but the opinions were not read until January 15, 1872.

INDUSTRIAL PROGRESS

The civil war was followed by a period of business activity. Manufactures prospered under the high war duties, there was much rail-

road building in the West, agricultural products still felt the effects of war prices, and capital found profitable employment in many forms of new development. In 1867 there was a sharp business reaction due to the London panic of 1866, but the depression was transitory. In general, the years 1865 to 1873 were replete with hope and development throughout the East, North, and West. It was only the South, blackened by ruin in its entire life, that did not feel the rebound of energy which accompanied the advent of peace.

The Effects
of Peace.

These eight years of prosperity showed most clearly in four fields of effort: 1. *Railroad Construction*. It was the period during which the first transcontinental railroad lines reached the Pacific coast; but the 1800 miles of such roads were but a trifle compared with the 30,000 miles of shorter lines built in every part of the country. This process prevailed, particularly in the upper Mississippi valley, whose development was stimulated by the high price of grain. 2. *Agricultural Expansion*. In 1867 the grain-growing area in the United States was 64,418,518 acres: in 1875, although the panic of 1873 had intervened, it was 86,287,648 acres, and the impetus acquired was so great that, spite of the prevailing hard times, it was over 100,000,000 acres in 1878. The yield of grain crops rose proportionately from 1,320,236,000 bushels in 1866 to 2,290,008,000 bushels in 1878. This increase in grain production was more than twice as great as the growth in population in the same period. 3. *The Increase in Capital*. This came from both domestic and foreign sources. The wide establishment of national banks, the issues of war bonds, and the expansion of the currency through the issue of the legal tenders furnished a vastly stronger basis of domestic credit, even if we make full allowance for the element of inflation in most American securities. The sale of public bonds and railroad securities in Europe, whither a large portion of these securities went as investments, was a notable feature of the financial life of the day. The industrial growth of the country is indicated by the increase in manufacturing capital which totaled \$1,009,000,000 in 1860, \$2,118,000,000 in 1870, and \$2,790,000,000 in 1880.

Four Fields
of Develop-
ment.

4. *Growth of Immigration*. The growth of industry is seen in the influx of laborers. In 1861 the immigrants arriving in the country were 112,702. During the war the incoming tide did not greatly increase, but after 1865 it grew rapidly. In 1868 the numbers were 326,000, in 1873 they were 460,000, and in 1879, a year of great prosperity, they were 789,000.

The culmination of this wave of prosperity was in the years 1871 and 1872. The people seemed to think the good times would never end. Land and bonds sold at high speculative prices, and many enterprises were immoderately expanded in the hope of still further gain. Con-

fidence in the possibilities of American enterprise has ever been great, but it frequently leads the community too far; and this happened in these wonderful years. The result was a collapse in 1873, and it began with the failure of a great banking house, whose name was synonymous with business reliability.

Jay Cooke and Co. had earned a good reputation during the war by marketing bonds for the government. The securities they sold proved a good investment with the rise in bonds after the war, and they had a large clientele among sober and thrifty investors. After the war they began to deal in railroad bonds. The Northern Pacific was then being built through a wide undeveloped area, and this firm undertook to finance it. They took its bonds in exchange for cash, expecting to sell them and take other bonds as construction proceeded. For some time the plan worked well, but always some bonds were left on their hands, and all their resources, with much of their credit, was embarked in Northern Pacific securities which were not sold. The road was well planned, but could not make money for some years. What Jay Cooke and Co. was doing for this enterprise other bankers were doing for others. Thus it happened that the capitalists by 1873 were stocked with vast quantities of bonds which the public could not buy. In May, 1873, there was a sharp local panic in Vienna. Europe, also, recovering from the Franco-Prussian war, had been speculating largely, and took the Austrian recession as a sign of danger. Her financiers became cautious and ceased to buy American bonds. The situation might seem to demand curtailment of railroad construction, but that was difficult, since material was ordered, and contracts and labor engaged for a long time ahead. Jay Cooke and Co. used their utmost effort to keep the Northern Pacific in funds, hoping all the time that a better market might enable them to dispose of their growing stock of securities.

On September 18, 1873, they had exhausted their last effort and announced that they were bankrupt. The news produced consternation. The firm's failure seemed to import the crumbling of the very foundations of credit. Leading stocks fell from twenty to thirty points in a day, and September 19 saw the failure of nineteen of the most reputable New York firms. The stock exchange rang with offers to sell stocks at ruinous prices, with no one to buy. On the twentieth the committee in charge stopped the demoralization by closing the exchange, and it remained closed for eight days. Money was so scarce that the clearing house issued clearing-house certificates to banks for 75 per cent of the amount of good securities, and received them in the settlement of balances. People who had money withdrew it from the banks to hoard until confidence was restored. This produced runs on the banks, and three failed on the twentieth. So strong was the tendency to hoard that

**Operations
of Jay Cooke
and Co.**

**Panic of
1873.**

the banks ceased to pay large checks but indorsed them "Good through the clearing house." By such efforts the terror was stayed, but it was not until the end of September that the public felt that the worst had passed.

In the early stage the panic reached only the speculators in stocks and bonds, but it soon spread to all branches of industry. The financiers could no longer furnish money, and railroad building was curtailed. Manufacturers of material found their orders countermanded, laborers in factories and on railroads were thrown out of employment, the general purchasing power of the community was lessened, manufactures of general merchandise must cut down production, and in the face of the resulting depression land and other speculation in ten thousand localities collapsed. The "hard times" were general and severe.

**A General
Panic.**

They were destined to last several years. The crisis happened just as the agriculture of the world entered a new stage of its progress. In 1866 Prussia and Austria were at war, and in 1870-1871 Germany conquered France. The intervening period and these years also were a period of unrest in industry in Europe, and production there was limited. As a consequence, we exported large quantities of grain at the high prices which survived the war. Wheat often brought \$2.50 a bushel during the war, in 1867 it reached \$2.85 in Chicago, and \$2.00 a bushel was for a long time a reasonable price. These high prices were the cause of a strong movement to the Western lands, a movement which once formed no hard times could quickly check. The return of peace in Europe threw vast energy into agriculture there. At the same time extension of railroads into the wheat-growing plains of Russia opened a large new area of production. In three years, 1875 to 1878, the world's wheat increased 262,000,000 bushels. The fall in price was startling. In 1872 it was \$1.38 a bushel in gold, in 1878 it reached 98 cents.

**Hard
Times Pro-
longed.**

As the land-hungry people of our West cut up county after county into homesteads in the face of this increasing general distress, the Western farmer settled down to financial misery. He was in debt for his land, or his improvements, and, each succeeding crop failing to lift the growing burden, his gloom but increased. In the middle years of the eighth decade, late in the ninth and early in the tenth he was in a stage approaching desperation, and the effects were seen in more than one plan for relief through governmental action. So long did wheat sell at about ninety cents a bushel, that experienced operators in the grain market said openly that the world would never again see "dollar wheat." They were unduly discouraged. The world's wheat supply had only run ahead of the demand, and in the United States the excess was marked. But in time the world's demand would increase relatively with the supply: then, and not sooner, would prosperity return permanently to the American wheat farmer.

RESUMPTION OF SPECIE PAYMENT

After the panic of 1873 many people came to see that the too rapid progress which preceded it was partly due to the inflated condition of the currency; and this strengthened the desire of business people to see legal tender redeemed in specie. It was noted, also, that at the intimation of hoarding the public preferred greenbacks to national banknotes, and this seemed to show that if resumption were attempted the legal tender notes would not be offered in large quantities for redemption. It was further evident that the increasing volume of business was absorbing the amount of these notes in the channels of trade, as was shown by the steady fall in the premium on gold, until January 1, 1874, it was 110. The conclusion of thoughtful men was that resumption was easier in 1874 than in McCulloch's day.

But the ruling hard times were a serious impediment. They gave rise to a widespread belief that the volume of money was inadequate and ought to be increased by congress. This sentiment was so strong that in the panic of 1873 the secretary was impelled to exchange for bonds \$26,000,000 of legal tender which McCulloch withdrew but did not destroy, thus raising the amount outstanding to \$382,000,000. The secretary would go no further of his own authority, and then congress took up the matter, passing, February 4, 1874, a bill to increase the outstanding amount by \$18,000,000. The house passed the bill by a large majority, so strong was inflation with its members; but the senate, more conservative, gave the bill a majority of only five. It was evident that the country was swinging back toward paper money. Under these circumstances Grant's veto of the bill was an act of heroism. It was denounced in the West as truckling to the Eastern capitalists, and it was an important cause of the republican defeat in the elections of the following autumn.

This stunning blow put the republican leaders to thinking. Hitherto bent chiefly on carrying their Southern policy, they had been inclined to pay respectful attention to the West; for it was easier to "wave the bloody shirt" there than in the East. But that issue was receding, finances and currency were becoming prominent, and they must decide whether they would depend on the inflationists or on the sound financial ideas prevalent among all classes in the East. They wisely chose the latter, losing strength in the West, no doubt, but hoping to make up the loss in the East. The party was to do essentially the same thing twenty years later with reference to another financial issue, the free coinage of silver. The result of the choice of 1874 was the resumption act of January, 1875, passed in the last

Resumption
becoming
less Diffi-
cult.

The
Popular
Demand for
more Legal
Tender.

New
Financial
Policy of
the Re-
publicans.

days of republican power. The East received it gladly, and pronounced it "the death-bed repentance of the republican party." The West denounced it; but the conditions were such that they could not repeal it in the succeeding congress. In fact, the West was yielding to the march of capitalistic industry in the transallegany region. As the states there ceased to be dominated by the agricultural classes they gave up the cause of inflation. This was shown when in 1875 Hayes was chosen governor of Ohio on a sound financial platform.

The resumption law of 1875 was championed by John Sherman, whose political insight showed him the shifting nature of the situation before him. It provided that the legal tender notes be retired as new national bank notes were issued until the greenbacks outstanding were \$300,000,000. This, it was thought, would reduce the issue of the latter to an amount which could be safely managed by the treasury. January 1, 1879, so the law ran, the secretary of the treasury should begin actually to redeem in specie. To get gold for that purpose and to maintain resumption he was to sell bonds for coin until he had \$100,000,000 of specie on hand. This specie was not to be a special reserve fund, but the law contemplated that it be left in the general fund in the treasury; and it was, therefore, liable to be drawn upon to defray the expenses of government. When in Cleveland's second term the revenues failed through the inadequacy of the McKinley tariff law to meet the large appropriations of 1890, this fund was seriously impaired to save the treasury from bankruptcy. It was then maintained that the law of 1875 authorized future and indefinite bond sales to maintain an adequate reserve to redeem the paper currency. Much controversy arose over that situation, but it did not trouble the men of 1875. The law they passed was a long step toward the restoration of sound financial conditions, and secured in 1879 the object for which it was enacted. It is generally conceded that had McCulloch's advice been taken, the same result might have been reached several years earlier.

**The Re-
sumption
Act of 1875.**

DIPLOMATIC AFFAIRS UNDER GRANT

The union emerged from the civil war with increased force at home and abroad. We were ourselves conscious of ability to play a larger part than formerly in international affairs. Our eyes were particularly directed to the states south of us, and there was observable an enthusiastic hope that our power would be increased in that quarter. Two questions remained to be settled at the end of the war; the removal of the French from Mexico and the adjustment of our claims on England for failure to enforce her neutrality obligations. Both problems were taken up in Johnson's administration, and the first was settled by excellent handling under Seward's direction.

**The Civil
War's In-
fluence on
our Diplo-
macy.**

The other went over to Grant's first term, and the glory of solving it fell to Fish, his secretary of state.

But Seward failed in the English negotiations, not so much on account of his own deficiencies as those of other men. Charles Francis Adams, minister throughout the war, remained in London after the return of peace; but he had been so persistent a fighter for American rights during the struggle that he was not the man to conduct the delicate negotiation the present problem demanded. His demands accomplished nothing, and in 1868 he was succeeded by Reverdy Johnson, of Maryland. His warm manners, so much in contrast with the correct and cool air of his predecessor, pleased the English, and he was received with a friendliness that convinced him he should succeed in his chief business. England on her part had been given opportunity to reflect on her position. Her covert aid to the confederates was chiefly from sentiment, and time brought reason into play. As the greatest trading power on the sea she was peculiarly interested in establishing rules to protect neutral commerce in time of war. If she herself should be engaged with an enemy, the United States, by following the course she had followed with regard to the confederacy, could let loose such a fleet of commerce-destroyers as her merchants would never forget. She was willing, therefore, to settle the claims, but she did not dream of paying what we asked. Most Englishmen of the day thought Americans shrewd, grasping, and given to swaggering, and they did not take seriously the amount of our demand.

Seward and Johnson both wished to settle the claims for the credit it would give the administration, and for this reason the radicals would willingly have the negotiations fail. Reverdy Johnson shared the anxiety of his superiors, and in trying to accomplish the task, his eagerness led him to bungle it sadly. He caught at the signs of complaisance in England, forgot all the rebuffs offered his predecessor, and revelled in acts of good will. He made many speeches to English audiences in the warmest tone of friendship, and went out of his way to show partiality for public men who had most espoused the confederate cause. This made a favorable impression on the British, but to Americans it seemed that he discredited Adams and threw away the national dignity. The radicals, desiring to weaken the administration at every possible point, made much of his failings. Johnson had his faults, no doubt, but it is also certain that the country was not disposed to be fair toward him.

The agreement this American minister made was known as the Johnson-Clarendon convention. It provided for a commission to select an arbiter to whom should be referred for settlement all the disputed claims on each side, the decision of the arbiter to be final. Two commissioners were to be named by each side, and if they could

not agree on the arbiter, he was to be chosen by lot. Probably a settlement like this would have been acceptable in the United States within a year after the end of the war; but what with the feeling aroused against Johnson and the national self-assurance from the success in the Mexican affair, the nation would not tolerate it in 1869. It was especially bad to submit our rights in the matter to the choice of an arbiter by lot. The convention was completed January 14, 1869, and went to the senate soon afterwards. It came up there April 13, when Andrew Johnson was no longer president, and was defeated by a vote of 54 to 1. Sumner alone spoke against it. As chairman of the senate's foreign committee he felt it his duty to sum up the case for the United States, and his speech was printed for the information of the people.

The
Johnson-
Clarendon
Convention.

Through his bold handling, our case against England became far-reaching. He demanded satisfaction, first for all the losses of Americans through England's recognition of belligerency for the confederacy, secondly for losses due to the activity of the *Alabama* and other ships which England's negligence suffered to take the sea, and thirdly for the expenses of prolonging the war through the hope of the South that England would assist her. From the first class, he said, the losses amounted to \$100,000,000, from the second to \$15,000,000, and from the third the inference was — although he would name no figure — a loss of \$2,000,000,000. Mr. Rhodes pronounces Sumner's claim “outrageous.” It is evident that Sumner himself did not expect England to pay the amounts specified, but stated them in this way so that England and the world might realize the vast wrong done us. But it was an unwise utterance. It raised too high the expectation of the American people, and if it were insisted upon by the government, it made impossible further negotiation by England. John Bright, one of our best friends in England, said that either Sumner was a fool or thought the English people were fools. No immediate action, however, followed the speech, and after a time the passions it raised were cooled by sober thought. It was for the skillful hand of Hamilton Fish, Grant's secretary of state, to reopen the question in a more reasonable spirit and carry it to successful solution. Before this could be done, Grant precipitated his ill-advised project to annex Santo Domingo.

Sumner's
Statement
of Our Case.

This negro republic, occupying the eastern part of the Island of Haiti, was threatened with revolution. Its ruler thought he would have a safe exit from difficulties he could hardly hope to surmount, if he sold his country to the United States, he himself to get most of the purchase price. Grant was approached, and saw in the scheme an excellent opportunity to acquire a valuable territory. The minions of

Grant's
Santo
Domingo
Treaty.

jobbery who surrounded him approved the scheme, and he sent one of them, Babcock, to Santo Domingo to investigate the proposition. Babcock was only an unofficial agent of the president, but he did not hesitate to act as if he were a commissioner with full powers. He returned with glowing accounts of the riches of the country, and with boxes of minerals and other products to substantiate his words. He brought, also, an informal treaty of annexation. At a succeeding cabinet meeting Grant submitted the treaty and displayed Babcock's collection of specimens. It was the first time the secretary of state or any of his colleagues were informed of the affair. The communication was received in silence and astonishment. Cox found his tongue long enough to ask if we wanted to annex Santo Domingo. There was then an embarrassing pause, which the president ended by taking up other business.

It was not like Grant to give up a thing to which he had once committed himself. He sent Babcock back to Santo Domingo with the necessary power, and in due time the treaty came to Washington in regular form and was sent to the senate for ratification. Grant exerted himself in its behalf. He saw Sumner, and evidently understood the chairman of the committee on foreign affairs to promise to favor it; but when it came from the committee it was reported adversely, and the chairman was one of its opponents. Grant was disappointed, and as the outspoken Sumner supported his opposition with a speech, a bitter quarrel resulted. The two-thirds majority necessary to ratification could not be obtained, and the project was defeated. In 1870 Grant sent it to congress again and asked for a joint resolution for annexation; but public opinion had now been aroused against it, and all he could get was a committee to visit Santo Domingo to investigate the situation there. The report favored annexation, but the senate did not act on the report. Grant was chagrined at his failure. His quarrel with Sumner progressed with increased vehemence, and the anger of the senator brought estrangement between him and Fish. At last in 1871 the president insisted that the senate's committee on foreign affairs should have a new head, and his influence was sufficient to secure his desire. Sumner was deeply disappointed. He had served long and faithfully in this important position, and his displacement in connection with his part in this particular incident brought him much sympathy.

Fish did not approve of the Santo Domingo treaty, but supported it through loyalty to his superior. In return he was allowed a free hand in negotiations with Great Britain, a far more important matter. He pressed that affair wisely and steadily, and England yielded so far that January 9, 1871, Sir John Rose arrived in Washington with authority to make a treaty to settle all matters of dispute between the two powers. These

**The Treaty
of Washing-
ton, 1871.**

were the Alabama claims, the rights in fishing on the banks of Newfoundland, and the exact boundary between the United States and British Columbia in the region of Puget Sound. An agreement known as the Treaty of Washington was now made in which it was provided that the first and third questions be determined by tribunals of arbitration, and the second by a joint commission. The treaty opened the way to a fair settlement of the *Alabama* claims by expressing formally England's regret for the escape of the "*Alabama* and other vessels," and for the losses they inflicted. It also adopted rules defining more strictly than formerly the obligations of a neutral in avoidance of succor to a belligerent; and it was evident that if the proposed tribunal of arbitration followed them, our own cause would be much strengthened. In accordance with this treaty the German emperor was selected to arbitrate the northwestern boundary, and soon rendered a satisfactory decision. The fisheries commission began deliberation, but encountered many difficulties, and the matter was not finally adjusted until 1877. The *Alabama* claims required more careful consideration.

The tribunal to arbitrate them embraced five members, to be chosen, one by England, one by the United States, and one each by the rulers of Italy, Brazil, and Switzerland. The men designated were Chief Justice Cockburn, of England, Charles Francis Adams, Count Sclopis, Vicomte d'Itajubà, and Jacques Staempfli. The two first were well known in their respective countries, and the three last were men of recognized learning and character. England's position on the sea made her fear to intrust her cause to representatives of rival commercial nations; and she felt that she was more likely to be treated fairly by citizens of such states as Italy, Brazil, and Switzerland. She was, in fact, in a difficult position; for if national feeling was to influence the tribunal, not even these small nations could be expected to tolerate principles which smacked of her assertion of superiority at sea.

The tribunal met for the first time December 15, 1871, at Geneva, but did not open the case until the following summer, at the same place. The American case was presented by J. C. Bancroft Davis, who was appointed for the purpose. His instructions were to demand damages for actual losses, but of his own authority he added demands for losses through the exclusion of American commerce from the seas and for the expenses of conducting the war after July 4, 1863. He argued that the confederacy would have collapsed at that date but for the countenance it had from England. He thus resurrected Sumner's sweeping claims of 1869 and took a position Fish had discreetly abandoned in negotiations previous to the treaty of Washington. His contention aroused the greatest indignation in England, and the people there with one voice demanded the dissolution of the tribunal.

The
Alabama
Tribunal.

Delibera-
tions begun
at Geneva.

Fish was alarmed, and interfered over the head of Davis, intimating that we would not insist on indirect damages. England was appeased, and the deliberations proceeded quietly when the tribunal excluded indirect claims from consideration. The Americans professed satisfaction at this decision, saying they only brought forward the excluded claims to have them passed upon definitively.

The question before the tribunal was now a concrete one: Did England exercise due diligence in regard to the escape of the *Alabama*, *Florida*, and other confederate cruisers? Argument and evidence was submitted, Adams and Cockburn each presenting the contention of his own country in an able manner. The decision thus rested with the arbiters representing the neutral powers. It came late in August, the neutral members unanimously accepting England's responsibility in the contention submitted and adjudging her to pay damages to the amount of \$15,500,000. The award occasioned great satisfaction in America: in England it was received with incredulity. The people there had not been informed as to the merits of the case: they only knew they had lost, and the amount of damages conceded seemed preposterous. It took some reflection to make the judgment acceptable, but it was at length approved by the ministry, and the money was paid. At that time Canada was full of unrest, and a revolt against Britain seemed a possibility. If such an event should come, it was evident that the United States, if they lost their *Alabama* case, would fit out many Alabamas for the benefit of the revolutionists. With the exception of the *Virginus* affair (see page 783) the rest of our diplomacy under Grant was uneventful.

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CHAPTER XXXII

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE FAR WEST

THE ROCKY MOUNTAIN REGION.

IN 1860 civilization had marked out for its own all the domain of the United States from the Atlantic to a line running with the western borders of Minnesota and Iowa, across the center of Nebraska and Kansas, along the western limits of Arkansas and across Texas at nearly its middle points. It had also established itself on the Pacific coast, holding in a thin line most of California and a great deal of the Columbia valley in Oregon and Washington; and there were a few settlements of Spanish origin in New Mexico. All the rest of the Far West, plain, mountain, and desert, was uninhabited by white men, save for the Mormon settlement in northern Utah and for some hardy fur traders who had founded stations among the Indians — chiefly in the upper Missouri valley. It was a vast region, a thousand miles from east to west, and nearly as much from north to south. Its rivers were not numerous, its rainfall was less than that of the central Mississippi valley, and it did not attract the agriculturalist as much as the region to the east. It was inhabited by powerful Indian tribes, suspicious of the encroachments of the whites, and capable, in case of necessity, of making a determined stand against invasion from either east or west. They had been driven before the advancing frontier for many decades, and as they saw a new rim of settlements planted on the Pacific border they realized that they were caught between two movements which threatened to close on them in final destruction. The years between 1860 and 1880 were destined to realize all their fears. Their game, their homes, their very tribal organization were to go step, by step, until at last their hunting grounds were theirs no more and they themselves were fain to accept American citizenship. It was the last struggle of barbarism and hard nature on the one hand against civilization and the will of the white man on the other; for this vast region, with its ramparts of stone, its stretches of alkali plain, and its area of stunted grass interlaced by river valleys, had riches which the world demanded, and which nature must at last give up.

The first notable invasion of the white man was made by the

hunters of gold and silver. The discovery of the former metal in California created the supposition that more could be found in the Rockies, and an army of prospectors explored the country. Though many left their bones in forgotten valleys, others found precious hordes, opened fields of industry, settled towns, and established regular roads of approach. They made the region a white man's country, rolled back the veil of mystery which hung over the Far West, and cleared the way for herdsmen and farmers who discovered the favored spots in which could be planted farm and hamlet.

**The Advent
of the
Miners.**

The first notable mining success in this region was in "the Washoe Country," then a portion of Utah. In 1859 a rich silver deposit was discovered high up on the side of Mount Davidson, 6000 feet above the sea. A throng of miners flocked thither at once, shafts were sunk, and much ore was extracted. The veins were rich, but "dipped" downward and made deep shafts necessary, and into these came water faster than the pump could draw it off. Then a wonderful engineering feat was performed. Sutro, an inventive genius, constructed a great tunnel to which his contemporaries gave his name. It came in from the side of the mountain 2000 feet before the opening of the mines, and by a network of branches carried the water in the flooded shafts into the plain at the foot of the mountain. The destruction of the mines was averted, the region continued to prosper, and out of the mining camps grew a definite community which took the name, Virginia City. It was a long way from Sacramento, the seat of authority, and the settlers desired a more regular government than California could give. In 1861 the people asked for a territorial form of government, and the request was granted. Three years later came other honors: congress admitted it into the union as the state of Nevada, chiefly because two more free-state members were desired in the senate. At that time the state was thought to have a bright future. But most of its area was hopelessly arid, and later growth was extremely slow. It is only in the most recent years that the growth of population has been enough to warrant the gift of statehood in 1864. Gold as well as silver was mined in the region of Virginia City, called sometimes the Comstock region, from the name of its chief lode, and the two metals taken out of the earth in the first twenty-five years were worth \$300,000,000.

**The Origin
of Nevada.**

Other mining ventures resulted in the founding of Colorado. In 1858 gold was discovered at Idaho Springs, 750 miles east of Virginia City and in the eastern spurs of the Rocky Mountains. A stream of adventurers soon turned thither, and the surrounding country was explored. Other finds resulted in the settlements at Boulder, Denver, and Leadville. At the last-named place the lead deposits in connection with silver yielded much the greater

Colorado.

profit. In 1861 congress created the territory of Colorado, to embrace these several communities, and in 1876 the territory became a state.

Six hundred miles to the northwest, on the eastern slope of the Rockies, in 1861, there was another rich discovery of gold. An immense number of miners went into the country, and many profitable mines were worked. From one, the Alder Gulch, they took in three years \$25,000,000 in gold. In the midst of this rich region grew up the town of Helena, at a place first called "Last Chance Gulch." The surrounding country yielded fast to the miners, and in 1864 it was organized into the territory of Montana. But it was far away in the northwest, and agriculture and grazing developed slowly. It was not until 1889 that it became a state.

The first gold mined was washed out of the earth in basins, or "cradles," and this was called placer mining. It was slow and wasteful, and was only possible when the dust was found in gravel. But much of the deposit was in quartz veins, and it was necessary to crush the stone and remove the metal by chemical process. Placer mining was practiced by individuals working singly or in small partnerships, and it required little capital. Quartz mining, however, required large enterprises. Companies were formed, machinery was installed, and the industry went into the stage of capitalistic production. The policy of the government toward the miners was very liberal. Mines were given to those who discovered or first claimed them on the same principle that homesteads were given free to farmers. A prospector might stake off any unclaimed surface and begin to dig. There were many such claims on every stream which seemed likely to yield gold, and the large majority were abandoned and lapsed. The country was wild, the miners were reckless, and the ownership of many claims was disputed. Most of the paying claims were eventually purchased by the mining companies. No part of the wealth taken from the earth was reserved by the government. No other nation has given away its rich gold and silver mines so recklessly.

Hundreds of the adventurers in this broad country failed to find the precious metals, and becoming discouraged settled down as farmers, herdsmen, or hunters where the locality pleased them.

Sometimes, also, members of the caravans that toiled westward to California lost heart and turned settlers.


As the mining country developed, such agricultural communities found a market for food and cattle. Thus came into existence the communities organized as Idaho Territory in 1863 and Wyoming Territory in 1868. The region of the old Spanish settlements was also explored by the searchers for gold. Thus New Mexico received a share of the immigration, although its stores of gold and silver were not so great as those in the

Montana.

**Mining
Conditions
and Laws.**

**Idaho and
Wyoming.**

**New Mexico
and
Arizona.**



regions to the northward; and under this impulse Arizona Territory was erected in 1863. Agriculture, however, promised little both here and in New Mexico.

In 1874 General Custer was in the Black Hills seeking the hostile Sioux. Among his followers were some who had been miners and who recognized traces of gold. Investigation showed a considerable quantity of the metal in the southwest corner of what is now South Dakota. The discovery attracted attention, and miners came to begin operations, but the region was so remote from railroads that little progress was made for ten years. It was the easternmost phase of the gold-seeking movement which did so much for the development of the Rocky mountain region.

Gold in
Dakota.

Meanwhile the eastern part of Dakota had been reached by the wave of agricultural settlers. The territory had been erected in 1861. Soon after the war, settlements were made along the upper Missouri valley. The land was the home of the fierce Sioux, who resented the approach of white men. But between the miners of the Black Hills and the farmers around Yankton they could have no chance of ultimate success. Their appeal to arms was unsuccessful (see page 683), and a series of treaties were forced from them by which from 1876 on they ceded their lands, which the government threw open to settlement. In 1887 the people were so numerous that they applied for statehood, agreeing to divide their country into two states, North and South Dakota. Their request was granted in 1889.

Utah alone of the Far West remains to be mentioned. The region from the Wasatch Mountains to California was spoken of in 1845 as the "Great American Desert." Much of it was entirely arid, and the rest partly so. In the northern part, west of the mountains, was the Great Salt Lake and west of that the Salt Lake Desert. To this region, shunned alike by travelers and trappers, came Brigham Young and some Mormons in 1847. Some of the party wished to settle in the fertile California valleys, but the leader ordered otherwise. He desired to escape the intrusion of his opponents, and he knew it could not be done in California. "If the Gentiles," he said, "will let us alone for ten years, I'll ask no odds of them." His band was only the advanced guard of his whole church, who followed soon afterwards, settling wherever an oasis promised fertile soil. They quickly learned that the earth was very rich when watered by irrigation. In less than ten years their grain fields and herds provided them with abundance. They learned how to conciliate the neighboring Indians, the fierce Utes, and from the name of that tribe came Utah, the name of the new settlement. In 1849 came the wagon trains bound to California, breaking into the Mormons' coveted isolation; but the caravans purchased supplies for the journey at good prices. Less than twenty years later came the Union Pacific railroad, and Utah was opened to the outside world. Now the "Gentiles," some of them apostates and

many more actual settlers, became a large part of the population, and between them and the strongly organized church of the settlers arose many a conflict. An active propaganda brought converts and settlers from many parts of the world. The powerful Mormon hierarchy directed everything, religious, economic, and social. Polygamy also helped in the rapid increase of the population, but it brought down the condemnation of the American people generally. Thus, the territory, organized in 1850, was denied statehood for many years. It was not until after the church denounced the practice in 1890 that congress began to think seriously of admitting Utah into the union.¹

THE TRANSCONTINENTAL RAILROADS

The growth of the Far West was dependent upon railroads. As soon as we acquired California men began to talk of a railroad to the Pacific, but nothing definite was done. The civil war brought home to the government the exposed position of that region, and the result was two acts, 1862 and 1864, authorizing the construction of a transcontinental line. It was to be in two railroads, the Union Pacific, from the frontier to a point near Salt Lake, in Utah, and the Central Pacific, from Sacramento to connect with the Union Pacific. In aid of each division the government lent its bonds at the rate of \$16,000 a mile for the part of the line that crossed the plains, \$32,000 a mile for the part in the hill country, and \$48,000 for the part in the mountains. The loan should be secured by a second mortgage on the property. Besides this, the roads were to have ten alternate sections on each side of the road within each mile of track and extending back twenty miles.

¹ The following table shows the development of the Far West from the earliest time to the present.

STATE	MADE A TERRITORY	MADE A STATE	POPULATION						
			1850	1860	1870	1880	1890	1900	1910
Utah . . .	1850	1896	11,380	40,273	86,786	143,963	207,905	270,749	373,351
Nevada . . .	1861	1864		6,857	42,491	62,266	45,761	42,335	81,875
Colorado . . .	1861	1876		34,277	39,864	194,327	412,198	539,700	799,024
Arizona . . .	1863	1912			9,658	40,440	59,620	122,931	204,354
Idaho . . .	1863	1890			14,999	32,610	84,385	161,772	325,594
Montana . . .	1864	1889			20,595	39,159	132,159	243,329	376,053
Wyoming . . .	1868	1890			9,118	20,789	60,705	92,531	154,145
New Mexico .	1850	1912	61,547	93,516	91,874	119,565	160,282	195,310	327,301
Dakota . . .		1861			14,181	135,177			
North Dakota		1889					190,983	319,146	577,056
South Dakota		1889					348,600	401,570	583,888

The selection of the eastern terminus was preceded by much controversy. In the Middle West St. Louis and Chicago were the commercial competitors, and each wished to be on the main line to the Pacific. The former suggested that the road begin at the western boundary of Kansas, connecting with a proposed road from Kansas City to this beginning, and as Kansas City was connected with St. Louis by another road this would make nearly an air-line communication from St. Louis to the junction in Utah. Chicago, on the other hand, was connected with the Missouri river by lines extended to Council Bluffs, Iowa, and desired the new road to start at Omaha, opposite their western end, to pass through the southern part of Nebraska and Wyoming straight to northern Utah. Each side presented its claims to congress. Chicago had the support of the lake states, New York, and New England, all in more or less direct communication with the northern route. St. Louis would ordinarily rely on the South for support, but the South was not represented in congress in 1862, and the result was Chicago won, spite of the fact that her route was the longer of the two by nearly the length of Nebraska. St. Louis's feelings were partially salved by a branch line to run from some place in Missouri to a junction point on the main line in southern Nebraska. It was because this compromise sought to unite the two plans that the road was called the Union Pacific. The Central Pacific was a California corporation, but congress gave it the same aid and privileges as the Union Pacific; and concessions were also made to the connecting branches in Nebraska and Kansas. The land granted in aid of these roads was a total of 33,000,000 acres, an area larger than the state of New York. The two main lines were completed in 1869.

Rivalry
between
St. Louis
and
Chicago.

The discussion of these plans brought suggestions for several other routes. One was for the Northern Pacific from St. Paul or some point on Lake Superior through Dakota, Montana, Idaho, and Washington to Puget Sound on the Columbia river. It was pointed out that it would pass through a more fertile region than the route through Utah and Nevada, and that it could be carried over the Rockies less expensively. The projectors were able to get a charter in 1864. Bonds were not lent, but the road received lands amounting to more than 40,000,000 acres. It was not until 1870 that work actually began, and this beginning was interrupted by the panic of 1873. The road was reorganized in 1875, and in 1883 it had reached the western slope of the Rocky Mountains, near Helena, Montana. It was not until ten years later that it completed a connection with Puget Sound.

The
Northern
Pacific.

In 1866 congress gave a charter to the Atlantic and Pacific, to begin in Missouri and run through New Mexico to the Colorado river, thence to the Pacific. It was authorized

Other Roads.

to connect with the Southern Pacific, already incorporated by the state of California. From the earliest consideration of a trans-continental line a southern route uniting the lower Mississippi with California through Texas and New Mexico had been urged, and Jefferson Davis, when secretary of war under Pierce, had given much effort to bring it into reality. But more important matters intervened, and during the war nobody urged a southern road to the Pacific. The return of peace brought a renewal of the plan, and the Atlantic and Pacific charter was a revival of the old idea, but with St. Louis instead of New Orleans for the eastern terminus. The proposition was not practicable, and the road as planned was not built. But the project was eventually combined with others, and the result was the Santa Fé system. Meanwhile the Southern Pacific, of its own accord, acquiring lines through Texas, came at last to the Gulf, thus completing the fifth line from the Mississippi valley to the Pacific. Still a sixth was to be constructed, the Great Northern, from Duluth, on Lake Superior, to Puget Sound.

These roads were vital forces in the settlement of the Far West. They were built at vast cost, and it was predicted they would never pay expenses, for they were mostly in advance of the settlement of the country they penetrated. The earliest invaders of the homes of the Indians, and troops were needed to protect the construction gangs. Most of the engineers and many of the laborers had served in the civil war. They carried rifles to their work, and many a time dropped pick and spade to beat off the savages. But the iron bands they laid at length united East and West and heralded the advent of cities, farms, and commonwealths.

Valuable as these roads were, it seems evident that the aid they received from the federal government was more liberal than was necessary. The bonds lent the Union and Central Pacific aggregated \$55,000,000. Long stretches of the former road were built for less than the bonds the company got. When the roads reached the level plains of Utah, each company rushed operations to get the largest possible part of the profit-paying mileage. Parallel roadbeds were actually constructed for miles, each company hoping to outstrip the other in laying the rails. The Central Pacific, in order to get the promised \$48,000 a mile for construction through the mountains, asserted boldly that the Sierras came to within the neighborhood of Sacramento, and by means of a specially prepared map induced President Lincoln to decide that they came within 24 miles of that town. Issuing charters and amending them gave rise to much lobbying, and the impression was created

that irregularities were practiced. The vast land grants especially seemed unwarranted. From 1850 to 1871 congress voted to railroads an acreage five times as large as that of Pennsylvania, to be actually granted as the roads were constructed. By 1902 less than two-thirds of this had been handed over to the roads. In 1890 it was enacted that lands reserved in fulfillment of promises to railroads not completed should be subject to other bestowal. Important political movements grew out of the popular dissatisfaction with these powerful agents in the industrial life of the Far West.

INDIAN WARS

The advent of the whites alarmed the Indian. He saw with increasing ill will the ordinary tokens of occupation. The wandering gold hunters were tolerated, unless they could be killed for their plunder, but after them came the mining towns. The caravans winding across the country were robbed, but there was not concerted war against them, for they always passed through. After these came the railroads, and who could doubt their permanency? Out of the Indian's fears came his hostility, manifesting itself in many acts of violence. Such acts led to reprisals by the whites, and thus was created a state of irritation which made war easy.

**The
Indians
Alarmed.**

The Indian's bitterest complaint was the destruction of game. The buffalo herds were his harvest fields, furnishing food and clothing, and through the sale of hides his chief source of ready money. He found them in numbers on the plains, and hunted yearly without visibly depleting the supply; and smaller game was abundant. When the white men appeared this vast food supply began to be exterminated. The gangs of railroad builders subsisted on it, which was to be expected. Then came those who slew for sport, and others, far more wasteful, who slew for hides. In three years, 1872-1874, the loss was 4,500,000, two-thirds for the hides. In 1868 vast herds of buffalo were seen from the windows of the Kansas Pacific railroad trains, and sometimes the engine must stop to allow them to cross the track. A few years later a traveler rarely saw a group of more than twenty. The government took no interest in this wanton waste of an important food supply, but to the Indian it meant suffering, and it aroused his sense of shame that his interests were ignored.

**Destruction
of the
Game.**

In 1850 the important Indian tribes east of the Rocky mountains were the Sioux, in what is now the Dakotas, the Cheyennes, in the valleys of the Yellowstone and North Platte, the Arapahoes, associated with the Cheyennes, the Crows, west of the Cheyennes and Arapahoes, and the Assiniboinis, north of the Cheyennes and extending into British America. These were

**Location of
the Tribes.**

chiefly in the great upper Missouri valley and blocked the ordinary routes to the Pacific. To insure their good will a treaty was made with them in 1851 at Fort Laramie. The senate did not ratify it, but the Indians thought it effective, and some features of it were executed. It secured peace for a time. South of these tribes, beyond the Arkansas, lived Comanches, Kiowas, and Apaches, with whom a treaty was made also, 1853. It allowed the whites to construct roads and pass peacefully along them, and promised the Indians an annuity of goods worth \$18,000. Thus the relations between whites and Indians were maintained on a peace footing through the sixth decade of the century.

The arrival of the gold hunters in the Montana region alarmed the southern Cheyennes, and trouble was feared. In 1861 a treaty was made by which these tribes, and the Arapahoes associated with them, accepted a reservation of 25,000 square miles in the southeastern part of Colorado, each tribe to have an annuity of \$30,000 for fifteen years. This was followed by three years of peace, which were at last broken by the following incident.

In April, 1864, a white man wholly unknown came to an American military camp within the reservation, saying Indians had taken his stock. Rumors of Indian depredations were continually being circulated, and the troops on the plains were usually willing to reply sharply. In this case a lieutenant and forty men were sent to disarm the alleged marauders. They met a band, some of whose horses were claimed by the complainant. The lieutenant ordered them to disarm; they resisted for a while, and rode away with their arms in their hands. They were said to be Cheyennes, and the military authorities thought they ought to be punished. Next month Major Downing with a body of troops was sent against the Cheyennes. He surrounded a sleeping village, killed 26, wounded 30, and burned lodges and other property. It was an event which might mark the beginning of war. But the Indians desired peace, and although there was desultory fighting during the summer, they sent a messenger to the military commander asking for an agreement. He referred it to the governor of the territory of Colorado and gave the Indians protection in the meantime. Relying on his word, about 500 Indians, men, women, and children, gathered at Fort Lyon, where they were attacked and slain most cruelly by a regiment of Colorado soldiers commanded by Colonel Chivington. Women were shot while praying for mercy, children had their brains dashed out, and men were tortured and mutilated. War now came in earnest, the southern Cheyennes and Arapahoes beginning a contest which 8000 troops could not end for a year. Finally in October, 1865, a treaty was made, by which the Indians were to have larger annuities and be moved to a place selected by the president. It

Treaties
Made.

War
with the
Southern
Cheyennes
and
Arapahoes.

Chivington's
Massacre.

satisfied neither party, but there was an interval of peace in Colorado and western Kansas.

Next year trouble began in the north of the Far Western plain. The most popular route to the Montana gold fields ran through the land of the Sioux, by way of the Powder river valley, a region full of buffalo. The passing caravans killed the game or frightened it away. The Sioux protested, but with no result. Then they learned that garrisons were about to be established on the route, and in December, 1866, went on the war-path, the northern Cheyennes helping them. The whites retaliated mercilessly. The superintendent of an express company ordered his guards to shoot any Indian on sight. General Hancock, commanding the troops, attacked and pursued whatever band he met. The Sioux were well mounted and numerous. For two years they cut off travelers, fell on unprotected posts, annoyed the railroad builders, and raided the settlement relentlessly. It was the theory of the army that the red men would never be quiet until they were thoroughly beaten; and Hancock pushed vigorously against a quick and active foe which always eluded him.

The Sioux
War of 1866-
1868.

Meanwhile, the Comanches and Apaches, in New Mexico and Arizona, showed signs of hostility. They had long scourged Mexico on both sides of the Rio Grand, and they willingly turned their hands against the new owners of the two territories. General Carleton commanded in this quarter and gave orders to hunt down the Indians, recognize no flag of truce, and clear the land for the whites. His severe policy tamed the wild Comanches and broke the spirit of the Apaches.

The Coman-
ches and
Apaches.

In the East this policy of extermination created sympathy for the objects of it, and congress appointed a commission to visit the tribes, establish a firm peace, and colonize the Indians in a suitable place in the Rocky mountains. The savages were generally tired of war, and treaties were made with the Apaches, Comanches, Kiowas, Cheyennes, and Arapahoes. But Red Cloud, chief of the warring Sioux, would attend no council unless the garrisons were withdrawn from the Powder river. After months of negotiation he was given what he asked, and in 1868 the frontier was pacific, and the commission took up the second part of its duty, to devise a means of securing permanent peace. It proposed to erect a new Indian territory in the western part of what is now South Dakota, but the dissension of its own members defeated an agreement. The civilian part approved the proposed territory and were at first in the majority, but the officers on the commission, General Sherman leading them, favored severity. At last one civilian changed to the other side, and the report of the commission recommended that the recent treaties be amended and that the Indian bureau be placed in the war department.

The Indian
Commission
of 1867-
1868.

The policy of conciliation was now checked, and the Indians again showed a bad spirit. At the same time, General Sheridan was put over the department of Missouri. None of that sympathy he showed for the freedmen in Louisiana now appeared in his attitude toward the Indians. The Cheyennes and Arapahoes had not received the annuities promised in the spring of 1868 by the recent treaty, nor had they been moved to a reservation, and meantime white settlers crowded into the Indian home. When General Sheridan visited the plains in 1868 they asked for a hearing, but he refused to meet them. He had heard and accepted many stories of their depredations, and was convinced they should be punished. In November, 1868, therefore, he marched against the Cheyennes and Arapahoes, then on the Washita, in the present state of Oklahoma. General Custer with a detachment surrounded a sleeping Cheyenne village and

**War
Renewed,
1868.**

**"Battle
of the
Washita."**

killed and captured nearly 300 men, women, and children. This stark way of dealing alarmed the Indians; the Kiowas and Comanches, weak nations, came in and submitted, but the Cheyennes and Arapahoes fled northward. They did not escape, however, for Sheridan pursued, forced them to submit, and thus crushed resistance in the South.

It was soon reopened in the North. A band of Piegans, a Blackfoot tribe in Montana, committed outrages and went to the British domain.

**Baker's
Massacre of
Piegans.**

They could not be punished, but Sheridan thought it would have a good effect to punish their kindred. The Montana authorities remonstrated lest the blow fall on the innocent. But the general had his way, and January 23, 1870, Colonel Baker, under Sheridan's orders, surprised a Piegan encampment not charged with wrongdoing and killed 33 men, 90 women, and 50 children, besides taking about 100 prisoners. That this action was needlessly barbarous cannot be doubted. It gave rise to a controversy between the military and Indian authorities. On one side it was charged that the Indian agents wished the Indians undisturbed because war interfered with the profits of the agents and the corrupt interests which fattened off the distribution of supplies.

**Effect of
Sheridan's
Course.**

It was also held that the conciliating policy of the civilians encouraged the savages to defiance. On the other side it was charged that the army was brutal, and that its avowed policy was extermination. It seems that there was truth in each contention. It is certain that Sheridan's energy broke the defiance of the tribes. The young braves ceased to go on raids, the bands confined themselves to the reservations and hunted buffaloes where they could be found, and those warriors who had gone to the British possessions remained there or came back and submitted. Sheridan's pacification bore fruit for many years.

THE SIOUX WAR OF 1876

By the treaty of 1868 the Sioux were to live in the west of what is now South Dakota. They were given hunting privileges in the region west of this reservation, and it was agreed that no white man should settle in, or pass through, this hunting range. Spite of the restriction, white prospectors appeared there. Here were the Black Hills, rich in gold, to which General Custer, in 1874, conducted an exploring expedition. The explorers reported that the country contained gold and valuable timber, and adventurers began at once to visit it. The Indians were dissatisfied, and protested in a meeting at the Red Cloud agency. They were assured that soldiers would remove the intruders. The miners were, indeed, warned to leave, and promised to go; but if they kept their word, they were soon back. They charged that the Indians stole their stock, which may have been the fact. The hunting range abounded in game, and some Sioux tribes spent most of their time there. They were less tractable than their brethren on the reservation, and felt strong enough to defy the government. They had a capable and independent-minded leader, Sitting Bull, who was daring enough to challenge the American troops in battle. The people of Montana looked longingly at the rich Black Hills, and hoped for an occasion to take them.

**Invasion of
the Black
Hills by
Whites.**

General Sheridan, apparently ignorant that the treaty of 1868 allowed the Sioux to hunt on the range, determined to punish the wanderers, and ordered all the Sioux to return to their reservation by January 31, 1876. To this the offenders replied that they were hunting buffalo and would return in the spring. This was defiance, and in February General Crook took the field. At the same time the Sioux on the reservation were ordered to give up their arms and ponies. This alarmed the young braves there, who escaped to the open country as they could, the war spirit hot in them. It was charged that the ponies and arms actually surrendered were never restored, and that the ponies were often sold by the authorities as low as \$5 each. The war which followed was fiercely fought by the Indians, probably on account of the superior ability of Sitting Bull.

**Sheridan's
Orders,
1876.**

Three columns of white troops were sent out, commanded respectively by Generals Crook, Terry, and Gibbon. Crook marched first, in a winter campaign. He encountered a band under Crazy Horse, burned their lodges and took their horses. But the horses were retaken and the cold weather forced the soldiers to return to camp. In the spring campaigning was resumed. The Sioux, aided by the northern Cheyennes, numbered five or six thousand. In June a portion of them fought a drawn battle with Crook, and then by a rapid movement

**Campaign
against the
Warlike
Sioux.**

united all their forces to attack Terry and Gibbon, who were also united. Terry, not knowing the size of the force threatening him, sent Custer with 600 cavalry to scatter and pursue it. He found the Indians commanded by Sitting Bull near the junction of the Big Horn and the Little Big Horn in southern Montana. They were

**Battle of the
Little Big
Horn.**

about to retreat when they observed the weakness of Custer's force and quickly prepared for battle. Concealing most of their forces in ravines, they displayed the rest on a ridge and awaited attack. Custer sent one portion of his command to strike their right, another to fall on their left, while he with 260 men charged their center. Before he reached the ridge the concealed host revealed itself and opened fire, and he was instantly battling for life. At few of the recent encounters when the whites surprised and wiped out sleeping villages had quarter been given, and in many cases women and children had been slain by the soldiers. This was done when Custer fell on the Cheyenne village at the battle of the Washita. It is not to be expected that the Indians should have shown less mercy now that Custer and his brave band rushed on the ridge filled with infuriated Cheyennes and Sioux. Not

**Death of
Custer.**

a soul survived of the 260 men who followed him up the ridge. The end probably came quickly, for only 52 of the Indians were killed before the rifles of the whites ceased to fire. The dead were mutilated — all but Custer, whose impressive figure and countenance won respect from his enemy. One mingles his admiration for the gallantry of the heroic Americans with his sympathy for the Indians, whom a hundred wrongs had nerved for the signal vengeance which chance threw into their hands.

But the battle of the Little Big Horn only prolonged the war, Sitting Bull remained at large, declaring he would fight until the claim to the Black Hills was allowed. In August, 1876, congress

**The Sioux
Commission,
1876.**

created the Sioux commission in the interest of peace. They visited the reservation and heard the Indian's story of his wrongs. It was a pathetic story. One chief said: "If you white men had a country which was very valuable, which had always belonged to your people, and which the Great Father had promised should be yours forever, and men of another race came to take it away by force, what would your people do? Would they fight?" Another said bitterly: "Tell your people that since the Great Father promised that we should never be removed we have been moved five times . . . I think you had better put the Indians on wheels and you can run them about wherever you wish." The commission reported that the wrongs of the Indians "were portrayed in colors so vivid and language so terse that admiration and surprise would have kept us silent, had not shame and humiliation done so." All the reservation Sioux were ready for peace. They gave up their hunting range in exchange for annuities. They were promised schools for

their children and supplies of food. And those who would remove to Indian territory were to have aid in moving and lands in severalty when they arrived. But the Sioux were opposed to removal and the point was not pressed.

Sitting Bull's bands did not join in this settlement, but fled to British America, suffering many hardships. In 1879 they agreed to return to the reservation if they were granted amnesty. They came back, men, women, and children, in great destitution, and Sitting Bull, defeated but proud, accepted the tame life of the reservation. In 1890 the Sioux were excited by the preaching of an Indian Messiah, and it was thought prudent to arrest the man most likely to encourage the movement. He resisted, and was slain with his son. Sitting Bull was the last great leader of his race, and his defeat meant that the Indian must bow his neck to the yoke of civilization.

We shall see something of the Indian's situation and his persistence — as well as something of the spirit in which the white men imposed the yoke—from the story of Dull Knife's Band, north Cheyennes. In 1877 they were taken to Indian territory. They had intermarried with the Sioux, and farming in the South was disagreeable to them. They asked permission to return, but it was the purpose of the government to force them into civilization, and the request was refused. Then they started northward to the number of 300. They were pursued, fought off the troops for 480 miles, and were taken prisoners in northern Nebraska. When told they would be sent southward they refused to go. They were imprisoned in a fort and left without food, water, blankets, or fire — although it was January — in hope of breaking their spirits. After five days they leaped through the windows of the prison, fired at the guard, and rushed toward the hills carrying their women and children with them. They were hunted into the hills and many of them killed before they would surrender. The soldiers would now have given them up through compassion, but General Crook ordered the chase continued. Fresh troops were sent out, and the fugitives were surrounded and forced to a last stand, fighting with desperation. When their ammunition was exhausted they struck with knives until there only remained a pile of motionless bodies. Out of the pile the soldiers took three squaws unhurt, five wounded squaws, and one wounded buck. These only survived of the 300 who began the journey. The incident shows how much the tribes of the Far West were demoralized by the army's policy. They had passed below the stage of strong tribal resistance. Twelve years of resistance had broken their power and reduced them to a series of weak and isolated groups, dependent on the bounty doled out at the agencies.

**The Case of
Dull Knife's
Band.**

A NEW INDIAN POLICY

The Sioux war and the report of the commission of 1876 called popular attention to the situation of the Indians, and much was said and written on the subject. In 1880 the Protestant Episcopal church urged congress to take steps to protect the rights of the red men. Other activities followed, and thus it came about that the government's Indian policy was at last remodeled. The purport of the reform was to break down the tribal system and to induce the Indians to become citizens. This process had been aided, though not intentionally so, in 1871, when congress ordered that in the future no tribe should be "recognized as an independent nation . . . with whom the United States may contract by treaty." This language was slightly inadequate, since Marshall held in 1831 that an Indian tribe was a "dependent nation"; but it indicated that the government felt strong enough to take the tribes directly in hand, and this was a step toward tribal dissolution.

The Dawes act, 1887, marked the culmination of the impulse for reform in an attempt to secure for the Indians ownership of land in severalty. Holdings had been allotted before this, but not by general law. It was now provided that allotments be made to such individuals as the president might designate, to be held in trust for twenty-five years, at the end of which time the holder was to have full title with the right to sell. When an Indian received such an allotment in trust he was to become a citizen, with full personal, property, and political rights. The lands were given in trust lest he sell them wastefully, and having the ballot was supposed to be educative. Experience showed some features of the Dawes act unwise. The Indian became discouraged on account of the long period he must wait before he had complete title, and this bore hard on the capable individuals. On the other hand, the majority of the men were not ready for citizenship, and showed it by their exercise of the suffrage. They fell into the hands of ringsters, who took them to the polls in herds and rewarded them for their votes with dinners. Moreover, as a citizen he had the right of a citizen to buy liquor, and the Dawes act, on that account, increased drunkenness. The law clearly needed amending.

This was done in the Burke act, 1906, which provided: (1) that an Indian should not become a citizen when he received land in trust, but only when he had full title; (2) that individuals should have full ownership of the land when the president thought them worthy of it; and (3) intoxicating liquors must not be given or sold to Indians not citizens. The law was not retroactive. Under it 8248 allotments in fee were made between 1906 and 1911, and the commissioner of Indian affairs reported that the

Public
Opinion
Changing.

No More
Indian
Treaties,
1871.

The Dawes
Act, 1887.

The Burke
Act, 1906.

tendency was for the Indians who got such lands to sell them, frequently to spend the money aimlessly. In 1911 there were under government supervision 122,780 unallotted Indians, 88,182 holding trust patents, and 76,023 holding patents in fee, a total of 296,320 Indians under government supervision. In that year the total number of Indians reported for the whole country, some of whom were not under supervision, was 322,715; and of these 28,315 lived east of the Mississippi.

Of late years the government has made extensive efforts to educate the Indians. This policy was inaugurated in 1830, when \$10,000 was appropriated for this purpose. But for many years the amount granted was small. In 1870 it was only \$100,000, but in 1911 it was \$3,757,495, which was expended on 39,800 pupils. For many years money was given to mission schools, many of which were conducted by Roman Catholics. This provoked controversy, with the result that in 1896 it was ordered that no more money be appropriated to church schools. In recent years there is a growing opinion that the large amount of money spent on the Indians has weakened them in several important respects.

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CHAPTER XXXIII

POLITICAL AND FINANCIAL READJUSTMENT, 1877-1881

HAYES AND HIS PARTY

WHEN President Hayes withdrew the troops from the South our history entered a new phase. The conflict against slavery came to a definite end and political and economic matters became paramount. Theoretical discussion became less important in congress and more time was given to propositions to reform government and to promote industry. Political leaders were now less conspicuous than formerly, parties became more machine-like, and captains of politics directed them in much the same spirit that captains of trade managed industry. The wide growth of corporations brought concentrated capital into intimate relation with lawmaking, it seemed to bring a lowering of morality of the law-makers, and this brought an increased watchfulness by the people to see that their rights were not sacrificed through the designs of heedless industrial agents. The great reform movements since 1877 have been connected with the civil service, the protection of industry, the regulation of railways, and the restraints of trusts: they have all been phases of a greater conflict in which the American democracy has been seeking to establish its control over every force within its domain.

**New
Political
Conditions.**

Rutherford B. Hayes, whose administration ushered in this era of striving, was esteemed by his friends a good man who would do no harm. He was quiet in deportment, reliable, religious, truthful, serious, and straightforward. He was one of those public men who are put forward to save the party when probity must undo the mischief that recklessness has worked. It was on this account he became governor of Ohio, and on this account he was called upon to redeem the folly of the politicians who surrounded Grant. In office he found himself confronted by the same graceless group. It was a surprise to them and to the country that he refused to be a nonentity and tried to improve the situation before him.

**President
Hayes.**

Hayes was a party man, but back of him were the independents. They grew out of the liberal republican organization of 1872. Defeated in that year, and without hope of setting the standards for democratic conduct, they remained a balance between the two other parties. William Cullen Bryant, Carl Schurz, and George William Curtis made excellent leaders, and the

**The Inde-
pendents.**

large number of literary men in the group who aided them gave the faction an influence beyond its voting strength. It had much sympathy for Tilden because of his opposition to Tammany and the New York canal ring, but looked at him askance in the presidential contest because he would not openly declare for civil service reform. Hayes supported that measure and had their approval in his long fight against the spoilsmen in his own party. They opposed the attempt to nominate Grant for a third term in 1880, and voted for Garfield, who defeated Grant in the nominating convention. Four years later they found a favored leader in Grover Cleveland, and were the deciding factor in his election. He did not always please them, but he retained their admiration until his retirement from public service. The success of civil service reform took away their best bond of life, but they reappeared in 1900 as a weakened force in opposition to the policy of expansion. The passing of the older leaders has obscured the activity of the movement, but it survives in a growing habit of independent voting.

In the make-up of the cabinet President Hayes paid due regard to the conditions before him. He avoided the factional quarrel between Conkling and Blaine and pleased New York by making Evarts, of that state, secretary of state. Over the treasury he placed John Sherman, of Ohio, who since 1859 had served either on the house committee of ways and means or the senate finance committee and was acquainted with the intimate history of the finances from the beginning of the civil war. Sherman opposed McCulloch's plans for redeeming the legal tenders but favored the resumption law of 1875 and supported Hayes's sound money canvass in Ohio. This did not quite take away the nervousness of the East at the appointment. It feared lest he should favor the payment of bonds in greenbacks. On the other hand, it was an advantage to have a secretary who understood the wishes of the West and had its confidence.

The other members of the cabinet were George W. McCrary, of Iowa, secretary of war; Richard W. Thompson, of Indiana, secretary of the navy; Charles Devens, of Massachusetts, attorney-general; David M. Key, of Tennessee, postmaster-general; and Carl Schurz, of Missouri, secretary of the interior. Schurz was a liberal republican in 1872, and Key was an ex-confederate soldier: their choice indicated Hayes's spirit of conciliation.

It also indicated the president's purpose to act for himself. Much to the disappointment of the party leaders he quickly took the Southern question into his own hands. He conferred in Washington with Chamberlain and Hampton, the rival claimants for the South Carolina governorship, and announced that he would withdraw the troops from the Columbia statehouse. He would not longer use them to protect one side in a state quarrel.

**Hayes and
the South.**

Chamberlain must rely on his own resources. As the whites were all for Hampton and his opponent dared not arm the negroes, the withdrawal of the troops left the democrats in power. He dealt with Louisiana in the same way. A commission he sent thither to investigate reported that the republican claimant was kept in office only by the use of troops: these were withdrawn, and Nicholls, the democrat, took the power of governor supported by a democratic legislature. Chamberlain was soon among the discontented ones, but in 1901 he said: "If the canvass of 1876 had resulted in the success of the republican party [in South Carolina] that party could not, for want of materials, even when aided by the democratic minority, have given a pure or competent administration." John Sherman expressed Hayes's view in saying: "The president is not made the judge of who is elected governor of a state, and an attempt to exercise such a power would be a plain act of usurpation."

Hayes's action was supported by his cabinet and by liberal-minded republicans; but it disappointed the group of politicians who dominated the party under Grant. Men like Morton, Simon Cameron, and Zach Chandler, the political heirs of Thad Stevens and Benjamin Butler, were chagrined at the abandonment of the Southern policy for which so much had been done. They expressed open contempt for the president and the independents and dubbed them "half-breeds." They themselves were called "stalwarts." The two names were freely used for the next three years, and the rivalry between the factions became bitter. The real bone of contention was power. "The men who saved the union should govern it," said Blaine. He had raised the Southern issue in 1876 and was disappointed at the quiet manner in which the president now ignored it. But as time passed, and public opinion came to Hayes, Blaine left the "stalwarts." He was probably much influenced by the support which they received from Conkling, his steady enemy.

"Half-breeds"
and
"Stalwarts."

COURSE OF THE DEMOCRATS

The democrats benefited by Hayes's Southern policy but loved him none the more on account of it. To them he was a usurper and a republican, and withdrawing the troops was an act of necessity, not of grace. They attempted two means of strengthening themselves before the country in anticipation of 1880.

Two Party
Measures.

The first was to investigate the election of 1876. The democratic house appointed a committee for this purpose, the majority reporting for Tilden and the minority for Hayes. The house could not unmake a president, but it hoped to uncover facts which would convince the country that Tilden was the victim of bad practices, and through

this means to secure his election next time as a vindication. Their hopes were defeated by the republican senate, whose committee on

**1. Investi-
gating the
Election of
1876.**

privileges and elections investigated one of the many charges that were made in reference to the election. In this case it was that democrats offered \$8000 for an electoral vote in Oregon. By a subpoena the committee got possession of 30,000 cipher telegrams sent by both parties in the contest. Before they were returned to the telegraph company the important republican dispatches were destroyed and copies were made of certain democratic dispatches, which were soon afterwards published in the New York *Tribune*. They contained corrupt propositions to Tilden. He showed satisfactorily that he countenanced none of them, that they were made unsought by him, and that they were not communicated to him. The calmer portion of the people were satisfied, but party prejudice was high, and the incident at least took the edge off the plan for Tilden's vindication.

A more successful matter was the attempt to repeal the federal election laws. By several enactments federal authority was extended

**2. Repeal of
Election
Laws.**

over elections, supervisors were appointed, federal judges and marshals took jurisdiction over cases concerning the right to vote, and troops might be used to execute their judgment. The system bore hard on the democrats in the South and in New York, where a supervisor named Davenport had arrested many persons, mostly democrats, because their naturalization papers were said to be irregular. The courts decided against Davenport, but he was not punished. The democrats could not remove him, since he was appointed by the president. They struck at the system instead, aiming first at the use of troops. If this were forbidden, the system would be crippled, since the federal court had no constabulary to give quick effect to its decrees. They did not control the senate and must do what they did in the house.

In 1877, in the last short session of Grant's administration, they amended the army appropriation bill by forbidding the use of troops at elections. The senate refused to concur, the house

**Successful
Filibuster.**

stood for its point, and the appropriation bill failed. In the succeeding June the army was without pay, and Hayes had to call an extra session in October to vote supplies. The democrats waived their power for the time and allowed money to be granted, but in the regular session, which came in December, they returned to their position. The army, they said, could be used constitutionally only "to execute the laws of the Union, to suppress insurrection, and repel invasion"; and its use at elections was unconstitutional and dangerous to liberty. They were unquestionably in accord with the early spirit of the government. They had popular support, and rather than again imperil the army appropriation bill the senate gave way. June 18, 1878, it was enacted that troops be

no longer used in elections. This success was in keeping with the president's liberal treatment of the South. It left that section still freer to manage its own affairs. It was, also, a step in check of centralization.

In 1878 the democrats elected all but four of the 106 Southern representatives, and the senate contained thirty men formerly connected with the confederacy. In this respect they profited by the recent removal of disability imposed on ex-confederates. The party controlled the senate by eight votes and had 148 in the house to 130 republicans and 15 greenbackers. They felt able to demand the repeal of the last features of the federal election laws. They again resorted to "riders," placing them on the appropriation bills to forbid the use of funds paying election supervisors or marshals who were concerned in elections. Hayes vetoed the bills, and the houses could not pass them over his veto. They then passed a bill repealing the election laws outright. It was vetoed, and congress could not carry it over the veto. The democrats hoped the people would approve their position in 1880, but other forces were in play which were to take the election of that year out of their hands.

Election
of 1878.

THE BLAND-ALLISON SILVER COINAGE LAW

While the republicans quarreled with Hayes over his Southern policy and received the democratic onslaught on the federal election laws, the country experienced the first of several waves of agitation for the free coinage of silver. The movement was connected with the hard times of the years after the panic of 1873, during which the prices of both grain and cotton fell to points lower than were known since the war. The West had borrowed money to develop its farming resources and the South to repair the waste of war. Both sections were against lenders in the East and opposed the redemption of the legal tenders. Accustomed to the chaotic Western and Southwestern ante-bellum bank notes and the depreciated war currency they now found a perfectly satisfactory money in the greenbacks, only slightly below par. They thought business would improve if there were more, and not less, of them. This feeling was strong in both parties in the West and South.

Debtors v.
Creditors.

Moderate inflationists remained in the old parties, but extreme men in 1875 began to secede, denouncing both organizations as being bound to the bondholders. They openly advocated fiat money; and in a national convention at Indianapolis in 1876 they nominated Peter Cooper of New York for president, declared for the repeal of the resumption act of 1875, demanded the issue of legal tender notes bearing interest at 3.65 per cent in which the maturing bonds should be paid, and pronounced the sale of gold bonds to foreigners an enslavement of the people to

The
Greenback
Party, 1876.

alien taskmasters. They also protested against selling bonds for silver for fractional currency as an action beneficial to the owners of silver mines but burdensome to the people. This allusion to the mine owners derives peculiar interest from the subsequent connection of that class with the free silver movement. The greenback party cast 81,737 votes in 1876, and of these 53,503 came from Indiana, Illinois, Iowa, Michigan, and Kansas. In this election they chose no member of congress.

The theories of the greenbackers were too extreme, and although they had a popular vote of 308,578 in 1880, the movement was never formidable. Its greatest impression was made in the congressional elections of 1878 when it cast a million votes and elected 15 members of the house. In 1884 it gave 173,370 votes for Benjamin F. Butler, their candidate for president. The moderate inflationists were far more numerous. They rejected fiat money and sought to increase the volume of the currency through free coinage of silver.

The silver movement has had three periods of agitation, one in the Bland-Allison bill of 1878, another in the Sherman silver law of 1890, and still another in the Bryan campaign of 1896. The first arose in the following manner:

**Origin
of Free
Coinage.**

A law of 1837 provided for the free and unlimited coinage of silver dollars containing $412\frac{1}{2}$ grains of standard silver. For many years thereafter very little silver was mined in the country, and from 1789 to 1873 barely \$8,000,000 was coined. At the latter date the bullion in a dollar was worth 102 cents, and none was offered for coinage. Probably for this reason in revising the coinage laws in an act of 1873 congress said nothing about coining standard silver dollars, although a trade dollar of heavier weight was ordered for use in the Orient. This aroused no interest at the time, and many congressmen asserted afterwards that it was done without their knowledge. But it was known to others, and there was no justification for those who later called it "the crime of 1873." In the same year Germany adopted the gold standard and began to sell her silver coins as bullion. In the same year, also, very rich silver mines were opened in Nevada. The price of silver began to fall. In 1874 the bullion in a dollar was for the first time in thirty years worth less than a hundred cents. The mine owners were disappointed when they learned of the recent legislation, pronounced it dark and sinister, and asked for remonetization. Their demand fitted in with the general Western desire for more money. From then until the collapse of the free silver movement they were important but designedly inconspicuous partners in the agitation.

Free coinage was popular in both parties in the South and West. It manifested itself in several bills in congress early in 1876. None of them passed, but the popularity of the cause impressed itself on

the representatives in the elections of that year, and it had a strong hold on the new congress. It found, in the house, also, a persistent and capable leader in Richard P. Bland, a democrat from Missouri. His earnest fight for silver won him the nickname of "Silver Dollar Dick." In the extra session of October, 1877, he introduced the "Bland Bill," proposing the free and unlimited coinage of silver dollars weighing $412\frac{1}{2}$ grains, at the ratio with gold of 15.62 to 1, silver bullion then selling at 90. Under the rule of the previous question the bill was forced through the house without debate by a vote of 164 to 34. The democrats supported it as a party measure, and Western republicans dared not oppose it. The republican senate feared to reject it outright, and offered a compromise which the house accepted thinking that it was the best they could do for silver. It was proposed by Allison, of Iowa, and omitted free and unlimited coinage, but ordered the secretary of the treasury to buy each month for coinage into silver dollars, exclusive of coinage already issued, from two to four million dollars of silver, provided the amount invested in silver at one time be not more than \$5,000,000. Bland yielded reluctantly, and gave notice he would continue the battle for free silver. If he could not get it, he said, he would favor issuing "paper money enough to stuff down the bondholders until they are sick." The act passed in 1878. Before Bland could renew the fight, revived prosperity withered his hopes, and his plan was laid away until a more favorable time.

The Bill
Passed.

RESUMPTION OF SPECIE PAYMENT

The act of 1875 to authorize resumption was passed by a group of repudiated representatives who had nothing to hope and nothing to fear from their constituents. It has been called a "death-bed repentance of the republican party." It was, in fact, better than existing political conditions warranted. The democrats denounced the law and carried a bill through the house to repeal it. But the senate blocked the attempt, and Secretary Sherman proceeded with his plans for resumption. Throughout a part of 1877 and all of 1878 he gradually sold bonds for gold until he had on hand \$114,000,000 of the precious stuff, \$95,500,000 of which came from bond sales. Meantime, the price of gold fell, and December 17, 1878, it was at par for the first time since 1861. The large banks aided the operation by abandoning "gold deposits." By getting the sub-treasury admitted to the New York clearing house Secretary Sherman was able to settle balances without the use of large quantities of gold. All this strengthened public confidence, and resumption was actually accomplished on New Year's day without the slightest difficulty.

Resumption
Accom-
plished.

To the general public the affair was eminently successful, but experienced observers saw that grave danger was still ahead. Could resumption be maintained? The year opened with business exceedingly bad. Immense foreign wheat crops had put the price so low that the large American crop of 1878 was marketed at ruinous prices. The market for cotton, iron, and nearly every other product was depressed. The low price of wheat in Europe made it seem certain that we should send little abroad throughout the winter and spring. Low prices abroad gave a check to business, and it was to be expected that some of the many American bonds recently bought there would be resold on this side. With light exports ruling we should likely have to send gold abroad to pay the balance of trade, and with this extra demand the stock of the precious coin in the channels of trade would be so depleted that inroads must surely be made on the government's hoard. To get this gold was easy enough: the country was full of legal tenders which must now be cashed as presented. Of course, no one would send these notes abroad in settlement of accounts. The secretary of the treasury knew this situation thoroughly, and week after week watched it with great anxiety. The spring passed safely, but in the second week in June, \$1,250,000, taken directly from the treasury vaults, was sent abroad. Was it the beginning of the long-expected disaster? Three months must pass before exports would again be large, and if during this period the same amount went out weekly, further bond sales alone could preserve resumption.

From this threatening situation we were saved by the luckiest possible event. A backward spring reduced the British crop prospects, wheat rose in price, and foreigners began to call for the large surplus we had carried over from the preceding harvest. The balance of trade turned in our favor, exchange fell, and our gold remained with us.

But this was not the whole story. Cold rains continued in the British Isles during the summer, blight appeared, and crops yielded less than half the usual quantity. On the continent similar but less distressful conditions lowered production to eighty-five per cent of that of normal years. While famine conditions thus threatened in Europe, America had unusually fine weather, an acreage in wheat 500,000 acres larger than in 1878, and a total harvest exceeding that of any preceding year. As Americans saw this vast supply coming to maturity they gave themselves up to the gloomiest thoughts. The first intimations of conditions abroad did not reassure them, for they felt their own surplus would more than overcome Europe's shortage. But the realization of the foreign calamity drove away their dismay. Prices rose forty cents a bushel in six weeks, and in September three and a half times as much wheat went to Europe as in the same month, 1878. This year

**Can it be
Maintained?**

**Crop
Failure
in Europe.**

**A Wonder
Year of
Prosperity.**

foreign production generally was bad, and Indian corn and American meat were also called for to a larger extent than before. As though Providence would give equal benefits to all parts of the country, there was this year a failure in the cotton crop of India, and American cotton rose in consequence. The completion of a pipe line from the Pennsylvania oil wells to the coast in the same year brought an increase of 2,000,000 barrels in petroleum exports. Far less of stimulus than that which came from these several fields of activity would have placed business generally in excellent condition. As it was, 1879 was a wonder year in our industrial history.

With hard times went political discontent. Inflation was no longer popular in the West and South, and specie payment was secure. Secretary Sherman saw his gold reserve grow from \$120,000,000 at the end of June to \$157,000,000 at the end of October. There was so much gold in the hands of our business men that they began to take it to the treasury to exchange it for legal tender notes, which were more convenient in handling. Moreover, the years 1880 and 1881 brought a continuation of prosperity. Europe still suffered from poor crops, while we had quantities of food to spare. It was not until 1883 that our fat years again gave place to lean ones.

Effects of
Prosperity.

THE ELECTION OF 1880

The return of prosperity made republican success in 1880 a probability, and each faction undertook to control the nomination. The stalwarts were determined to avoid a man like Hayes, the reformer. They had among themselves no one half so likely to be chosen as Grant, whom some of the leaders began to urge for a third term more than a year before the convention met. Under him the good old days would undoubtedly return, and a politician might call his soul his own. Grant was then leisurely traveling around the world, received with distinction in three continents, and the Americans saw in this a reflection of national honor which heightened their esteem for the hero. The movement to nominate him was skillfully managed by Conkling, General Logan, and J. Don. Cameron. Grant himself was pleased at the prospect of another term, and timed his arrival in America with reference to the plans of his friends. He landed at San Francisco, September 20, 1879, when most active preparations were being made for the coming nominations. After the splendid reception which a grateful people tendered him, he made a trip to Mexico and the countries south of it, procedure both dignified and prudent.

Grant
for Third
Term.

His opponents were not able to unite on one man. The reformers looked to Edmunds, of Vermont. John Sherman had strong support in the West and Blaine had a following among those Eastern

men who did not favor Grant, while other candidates had small followings. Blaine was the ablest of them all, but he was objectionable to the reformers because he was suspected of participation in the scandals under Grant, and his breach with Conkling was an additional embarrassment. However, they all opposed Grant bitterly, and were prepared to give up much to keep out of power the men who sought his election.

**Grant's
Opponents.**

The first test of their strength in the convention (Chicago, June 2, 1880) came when Conkling moved to apply the unit rule to state delegations. To adopt it would give the large states to Grant and, as it came out, that would have meant his nomination. The motion was lost; and on the first ballot Conkling's man got only 304 votes and after that no more than 313 of the 379 necessary to a nomination. Ballot after ballot showed little change, until on the thirty-sixth James A. Garfield, of Ohio, was nominated by a union of the Sherman and Blaine forces. In the interest of harmony Conkling was allowed to name the candidate for vice-president. He declared for Chester A. Arthur, whom Hayes removed from the New York customhouse when he decided to reform it. One who knew him well exclaimed, when he heard later of Arthur's elevation: "'Chet' Arthur President of the United States! Good God!" The nomination was bad in itself, but the third term movement was defeated, and that was the main point. Garfield was respected as an able and high-minded man, and the people were disposed to forgive the unfit vice-president on the ground that it was necessary to conciliate the stalwarts.

The democrats were at sea. Tilden was not available because of a certain suspicion that he did not quite clear his name from suspicion in connection with the former election, because he had the avowed opposition of Kelly, the leader of Tammany, and because he had recently experienced a physical collapse which rendered it improbable that he could fulfill the duties of president if elected. Several smaller men were spoken of, but none seemed so promising as General W. S. Hancock, a brave and handsome soldier, but as inexperienced in politics as Grant before 1868. He was nominated with W. H. English, of Indiana, for vice-president. The greenbackers nominated James B. Weaver, of Iowa, and the prohibitionists Neal Dow, of Maine.

**Democratic
Candidates.**

The campaign was full of personalities. Garfield was charged with participation in the *Crédit Mobilier* scandal but showed that the charge was unjust. Other moral obliquities were alleged against one candidate or the other. The democrats were arraigned for their policy of intimidation in the South. Probably the prosperity of the country was the most important argument on either side. It made for the republicans, who had 214 electoral votes to 155 for their opponents. A plurality of

**Garfield
Elected.**

less than 10,000 in the popular vote showed that the election was really very close. The republicans also carried the house of representatives, where they had 150 members to 131 democrats and 12 greenbackers. In the senate they had 37, the democrats a like number, and the balance was held by two independents, Davis, of Illinois, and Mahone, of Virginia.

In the election of 1880 Hayes took no part. He was out of step with his party, and awaited retirement with a quiet dignity which brought him much sympathy. His successor would have a better party following, but it was pleasant to reflect that he would not abandon the reforms for which Hayes steadily contended. The administration just closing was, in fact, an important period in which politics shifted from an old to a new basis. It marked the end of reconstruction and the beginning of an era in which the people showed a determination to control their own rulers, to eliminate abuse, and to make democracy a greater reality. Had he been a more practical statesman the break with the past could not have been so sharp, and the keynote of the future would not have been so clearly sounded.

Shifting
Political
Currents.

President Hayes gained much from the admirable bearing of his wife, who illustrated the highest qualities of American womanhood. Grant's free and easy ways introduced into the White House something of the atmosphere of the camp. Mrs. Hayes's sense of purity and simple comfort made it as clean as a New England manse. She considered it her home rather than an official residence. The politicians in Washington were aghast when she decided not to serve wine at the president's table. Secretary Evarts refused to attend, and the usual diplomatic dinners were suspended. The Temperance Women of America showed their admiration by placing her portrait in the executive mansion, and fair public opinion admired the manner in which she asserted her position in her own family.

Mrs. Hayes.

GARFIELD'S SHORT PRESIDENCY

The announcement of a cabinet brought trouble, chiefly of Conkling's making. Blaine, of Maine, was secretary of state, William Windom, of Minnesota, secretary of the treasury, Robert T. Lincoln, of Illinois, secretary of war, William H. Hunt, of Louisiana, secretary of the navy, Wayne MacVeagh, of Pennsylvania, attorney-general, Thomas L. James, of New York, postmaster-general, and Samuel J. Kirkwood, of Iowa, secretary of the interior. Conkling resented Blaine's prominence in the group, fearing his influence with Garfield was paramount, and considering the low rank of New York in the cabinet a token that his own influence was neutralized by his rival. He was slightly appeased when his supporter,

The Cabinet.

Levi P. Morton, was made minister to France, but this was overcome by the news that Robertson, an anti-Conkling man, was to be head of the New York customhouse. He now became an avowed opponent of the administration and published a letter showing that Garfield, whose inaugural address gave support to civil service reform, had in the preceding campaign countenanced campaign contributions from officeholders. He then took his quarrel to the senate, where the democrats and the republicans had equal numbers, with two independents who refused to vote on party matters. Two months passed in vain attempts to organize the body, when a truce was made to allow the confirmation of the president's nominations. Conkling was thought to have planned to have the senate adjourn as soon as his own friends were confirmed; and Garfield tried to block this by sending in first the nomination of Robertson. Its approval was the occasion of a great battle, in which the New York senator was defeated. Seeing failure before him, Conkling and his colleague, T. C. Platt, resigned their seats, hoping for an immediate reelection by the New York legislature. They lost their calculation. The legislature, tired of the strife, sent other men to Washington. Platt was a young man and eventually recovered his feet. Three years later he was at peace with Blaine; Conkling retired to private life. He had great mental and practical ability, but he was arrogant, intolerant, and uncompromising. Had he remained in the senate he would have made life uncomfortable for the president and the secretary of state.

Garfield yielded enough to the demand for reform to appoint as postmaster-general, James, who had applied the merit system in the New York post office. James soon began to investigate the contracts to carry the mail over the "star routes," as certain routes in parts of the West were called in the department. It appeared that Brady, second assistant postmaster-general under Hayes, and Senator Dorsey, of Arkansas, had conspired with mail contractors of this class to defraud the government through extravagant prices or the multiplication of useless services. Indictments were secured, and the trials became one of the great events of the year. The defendants were actively aided by many of the leading "machine" politicians of the republican party. Brady at last threatened to produce evidence against Garfield if the prosecution was not dropped. No relief coming, he published a letter from Garfield to "My dear Hubbell," chairman of the republican congressional campaign committee in 1880, condoning the habit of levying contributions for campaign purposes on the salaries of government employees. As this was one of the worst abuses of the spoils system, it discredited Garfield's open protestations of friendship for reform. The proof of fraud in the star-route cases seems overwhelming, but the important defendants managed to wriggle through

**Resignation
of Conkling.**

**The
Star-Route
Frauds.**

the clutches of the law. Public disgust was great, and the opinion was strengthened that the country needed a reformer.

Before this feeling went far the president, on July 2, 1881, was shot down in a Washington railway station. The assassin, Charles J. Guiteau, a disappointed office seeker, cried out that he was a "stalwart" and that Arthur would now be president. He was executed for the crime, but his mind was probably unbalanced by the bitterness of party strife in which he steeped it. The victim of his madness lingered through the summer between life and death, and died September 19. His fortitude and gentleness in suffering won all hearts, and in the shadow of the national sorrow political asperities softened. So sober a paper as the *Nation* showed the change in sentiment. In May it pronounced the letter to Hubbell "a painful surprise"; in September it said of the deceased, "He will always remain one of the saints of American story, without a spot on the whiteness of his garments."

Death of
Garfield.

When Arthur became president the Conkling quarrel was still in an active condition. He showed his interest in it by going to Albany in May to secure his patron's reelection to the United States senate. It was considered an unworthy thing for a vice-president to stoop to such work, and the prospect of Arthur's elevation alarmed many people. But the shock of the tragedy deeply impressed the vice-president. He dropped the rôle of the politician and revealed unsuspected dignity and good sense. Through the same sobering agency the people were prepared to accord him a fair trial in the high office he now assumed. At the end of three years he retired with the respect of the nation and the esteem of his party.

President
Arthur.

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CHAPTER XXXIV

POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC REFORM, 1881-1893

CIVIL SERVICE REFORM

THE most glaring political abuse of the day was the spoils system. Scandals occasionally appeared in the higher offices, but in the vast army of clerks and postmasters office was a reward for electioneering, and officeholders paid campaign contributions for fear of losing their appointments. As a result the service was filled with inefficient clerks, and the appeal to the voters was on the lowest level. The type of politician whom this system developed was apt to be defiant of public opinion. It was felt that the beginning of reform was the adoption of some sort of merit system in appointments. American sentiment was influenced by the progress of a similar movement in England, where in 1853 Charles E. Trevelyan and Sir Stafford H. Northcote reported a plan for reforming the civil service. They recommended a system of competitive examinations, but for some years various things united to prevent its adoption.

Condition of
the Civil
Service.

One of the Americans most in touch with British affairs was Charles Sumner. He was interested in the work of Trevelyan and Northcote, and in 1864 introduced a bill in the senate to apply competitive principles to appointments in America. The bill attracted much attention, but reconstruction soon engaged Sumner's attention, and he did not press the matter. It was taken up by Thomas Jenckes, a representative from Rhode Island. His first bill was lost, 1865; but he got a committee created to investigate the situation, and himself became the chairman. Its report, May 25, 1868, described the systems in force in England, France, Prussia, and China and contained a bill creating a competitive system. Congress paid no heed and Jenckes turned to the people, where he found supporters, prominent among them being Carl Schurz, William Cullen Bryant, and George William Curtis. Grant himself, a candidate for the presidency, declared for the reform. He redeemed his promise in his second annual message, and several bills were introduced, none of which could pass. The spoils system was too intimately grafted on the political life of the day to be abandoned by congress until a vast amount of public opinion was created on the subject.

First Efforts
in Congress.

The reformers were persistent, and late in the session, 1871, were able to attach a "rider" to the appropriation bill in which congress established what is known as the first civil service commission. It authorized the president to prescribe rules for admission to the civil service and to appoint a commission to inquire into the fitness of applicants; and it gave \$25,000 for the expenses of the same. The commission was named at once, with Curtis for chairman. It formulated rules for appointments, which Grant adopted and promulgated, April, 1872, for use in the departments in Washington and the federal offices in New York. Trouble now began. Individual congressmen urged the president to appoint their friends. In some cases he made bad selections, which disgusted the reformers, and finally Curtis resigned in despair. Grant had little patience with the situation; he gradually yielded to the arguments of practical advisers who declared reform an impossible dream, and when congress in 1873 refused to renew the appropriation he ceased to enforce the rules of 1872. The commission continued a formal existence with Dorman B. Eaton as chairman.

Hayes would have revived the energy of the commission if congress had given the necessary money, for the law of 1871 was unrepealed.

As it was, he tried to reform the New York customhouse. A committee appointed by him reported that one-fifth of the clerks there should be dismissed as unnecessary. Hayes followed the suggestion, removing the collector, Chester A. Arthur, a favorite of Conkling, because Arthur would not indorse the reforms. He also applied the merit system to the New York post office, placing at the head of it Thomas L. James, a reformer. Senator Conkling resented this policy. He thought the reform movement contained a great deal of cant, and once expressed his contempt in the following words uttered with a withering drawl, "When Doctor-r-r Ja-a-awson said that patr-r-riotism was the l-a-w-s-t r-r-refuge of a scoundr-r-rel, he ignor-r-red the enor-r-rmous possibilities of the word r-refa-awr-r-rm!" The house of representatives in something of the same spirit made Benjamin F. Butler chairman of its committee on civil service reform. Hayes realized the utter opposition of congress and dared not attempt to reform the departments, as he might have done under the law of 1871.

Meanwhile, the movement progressed outside of congress. Associations to promote it were formed in many cities, and in 1881 a national civil service league was organized. A mass of literature appeared in support of the movement, and among its defenders were leading men of thought. Garfield when candidate for the presidency gave open allegiance, and his election gave hope to the reformers. The accession of Arthur, Conkling's friend, and victim of Hayes's New York reforms, filled

**First Com-
mission,
1871.**

**Efforts of
Hayes.**

**Garfield's
and Arthur's
Attitudes.**

them with dread. They breathed easily when in his first annual message he discussed competitive examinations mildly, pointed out some defects, but said that he would execute such a plan fairly if congress adopted it. No law followed at that session, but when the elections of 1882 went against the republicans, they were willing to pass one. The fact that Garfield's assassin was a disappointed office seeker was an added motive for adopting the merit system.

The "Pendleton Act," 1883, took its name from George H. Pendleton, chairman of the senate committee on civil service reform, but it was written by Dorman B. Eaton. It created a classified service, to be organized by the president and to apply to clerks in the departments and in post offices and custom houses having over fifty employees. Examinations in keeping with the requirement should be given, and they were to determine appointments, and applicants should bring no other recommendation than as to residence and moral character. They were to be taken as nearly as possible from the states in proportion to population. The president might by his order include within the classified service employees not originally included, and strict measures were taken to abolish campaign contributions by employees. The president was to appoint a commission of three members to supervise the examinations, keep records, recommend clerks on the approved lists, investigate alleged violations of the law, and report annually to the president and congress.

**Pendleton
Act, 1883.**

Arthur, true to his promise, executed the law faithfully and placed Eaton at the head of the commission. In 1884 both parties indorsed it; and although its enforcement has sometimes been evaded, its expediency has generally been granted. Successive presidents have extended its scope. Cleveland's party came into power with an office-hunger created in a long period of exclusion, and he had much trouble to keep them from overturning the system. But he respected the classified service, and satisfied his supporters out of the unclassified offices. The reformers complained that he did not keep the spirit of the reform. Some of his appointments were undoubtedly bad, which brought other complaints. But Cleveland personally favored the law, and just before he went out of office brought the railway mail clerks under the civil service rules.

**Execution
under
Arthur and
Cleveland.**

The republicans, returning to power in 1889, were greatly incensed at the railway mail order. It was, they said, a trick to give immunity to recently appointed democrats. Harrison suspended the operations of the order, made many removals, and when it was at last operative, few railway clerks were democrats. Cleveland resisted the party pressure for removals as much as he could. In his entire term 20,000 occurred: under Harrison

**Under
Harrison.**

there were 35,850 dismissals within a little more than a year after his inauguration. Clarkson, controlling appointments in the post-office department, was so active that he was called "the headman." But Harrison enforced the rules within the classified service and brought within the rules a part of the Indian service, hitherto liable to peculiarly bad appointments. He did the same for the fish commission and the clerks of free-delivery post offices; but none of these steps were taken until the offices affected were generally filled by republicans.

Harrison appointed Theodore Roosevelt, of New York, to the civil service commission, and afterwards made him its chairman.

Roosevelt as Commissioner. This vigorous young reformer wished at first to be assistant secretary of state, but Secretary Blaine desired a milder spirited man for an assistant. Until then the commission had sought to obtain its objects without antagonizing congressmen. Membership on it was so inconspicuous that Roosevelt's friends advised him not to accept. He disregarded the advice and gave the civil service commission a new kind of force. There was no more hesitation in its actions: whoever criticized it was met by a rejoinder which took away his argument. Foolish assertions that the examinations were fantastical, that appointments went by favoritism, and that the commission was nerveless, were dispelled. Once when the press said that it was well known that only republicans could get office, Roosevelt took a striking means of refuting the charge. He called before him the Washington correspondents of the Southern newspapers, told them the South had not its full share of clerks, and asked them to induce more Southerners to take the examinations. He told them to say in their papers that politics would play no part in the appointments. The result was a large increase in appointments from the section indicated, and most of them went to democrats. The discomfited politicians ceased to call the civil service commission a nonentity.

His Dealing with Congressmen. Roosevelt's activity piqued congress, and in the committee-of-the-whole, where the yeas and nays were not taken, it cut down the appropriation for the commission. When the bill came up for final action, where the voters must go on record, the discontented ones would refuse to vote, and the appropriation would be restored. This happened several times. Once the opposition cut down the appropriation for examinations. Roosevelt omitted to hold them in the districts of the members who thought them unnecessary, much to the dissatisfaction of the constituencies concerned. He thus appealed to the people over the head of the representatives. As a result, he was little loved but much feared by the spoilsmen, but the people trusted him and admired his fearlessness.

Cleveland was not popular with his party in his second term, and

could ignore the democratic spoilsmen. Some of his appointments were made without due investigation, and he made others to force the repeal of the Sherman silver law; but he widely extended the classified service, adding 29,399 places by one order. His successor, President McKinley, had trouble to keep congress from revoking all such orders. Delay and reflection was secured by creating a senate committee appointed to investigate the subject. After a while it reported that the classified service should be reduced. It looked gloomy for the advocates of reform, but at just this moment war with Spain intervened and drew away the attention of the spoilsmen. The war created many new places, and this served partly to divert the attack on the classified service. The subject was taken up again in 1899, when the president removed 3693 places from the classified service and transferred 6414 from the oversight of the commission to that of the secretary of war. It was a questionable step, though defended on the ground that the places involved had to do with expert service or with confidential clerkships, and that in such cases competitive examinations ought not to apply. The reformers replied that even if this was true in principle, the number of positions involved in this instance was far too large. Since 1899 the classified service has been several times extended, last of all by President Taft, but the traces of the spoils system have not been removed from our public life. The agitation for national reform stimulated action in some states, notably New York, Massachusetts, Illinois, Wisconsin, Indiana, Louisiana, and Connecticut, where the reform system was wholly or partially adopted.

Cleveland's
Second
Term.

Under
McKinley.

BALLOT REFORM

Closely connected with civil service reform was the fight for better laws, which depended on state rather than federal action. The old ballot system was weak in that it was not secret, that the ballots were privately printed and capable of various forms of juggling for party interests, and that they were printed on various small slips confusing to the voter, and by this means profitable to the party tricksters. Abuses under this condition had existed from early times, but it was only the new reform spirit that resented and sought to remedy them. This was made easier by the rapid growth of the evil practices in the early eighties. The increasing prominence of the tariff in elections is supposed to have brought forth large campaign funds which might be used corruptly. It also went with an open manifestation of the manufacturer's desire to control the vote of his operatives. Agents of employers were known to hand ballots to employees and see them safely deposited in the boxes. Black-lists were sometimes kept by which refractory

Former
Conditions.

voters were dropped from the factory pay rolls. In the agitation of the day the amount of such an evil would naturally be exaggerated, but it cannot be doubted that it existed extensively.

Bribery also flourished. Both parties used it, and conservative people could see no way of abolishing it outright, while less sensitive people only smiled at it. There existed a purchasable vote which was as willing to sell itself as the purchaser was willing to buy. This abuse was most glaring in the election of 1888, and soon afterwards arose the movement for reform. It demanded the "Australian Ballot," the chief features of which were that the ballot be secret and officially printed in "blanket" form. The system originated in Australia, but it had been adopted in England. The movement in the United States had rapid success. The first step forward was when the New York legislature, 1888, passed a law of the desired kind, but the veto of Governor Hill robbed the state of the honor of leading in the reform. This distinction went to Massachusetts instead, which in the same year passed such a law and put it into operation in her election of 1889. The ice was now broken, and nine states followed in 1889, seven in 1890, and eighteen in 1891. Five of these laws were pronounced "poor" or "bad" by the reformers. They were later amended, and in 1909 thirty-nine of the forty-six states had blanket ballots, and of the others only four — Connecticut, North and South Carolina, and Georgia — used unofficial ballots. In the last three the voting is entirely public.

TARIFF REFORM

Most of the political reformers were also tariff reformers. The inequalities they saw in protection appealed to them in nearly the same way as the political evils. On the other hand, not all tariff reformers were political reformers. The large majority who favored a lower tariff acted from economic reasons, or because party loyalty demanded it. Among tariff reformers were at least two classes, those who would readjust the schedules slightly and conformably with the revenue needs of government, and those who were theoretical free-traders. Many of the political reformers belonged to this second class of tariff reformers.

Numerous new industries sprang up during the war, and under protection some made large, and others small, profits. The first class did not want the tariff reduction, and the second could not afford it. The mass of consumers, when they gave the matter serious thought, felt they were paying to support a system artificial in itself and badly adapted to revenue purposes. But it yielded large sums to the treasury, and these were needed to pay the war debt and aid in reëstablishing the public credit after the war.

**The Two
Kinds of
Reformers.**

**Two Sides
of the
Tariff.**

Existing taxes were of four kinds: internal revenue taxes, an income tax, duties on articles not produced in considerable quantities in the United States, and duties on articles largely produced here. Taken together, they were a burden, and it was inevitable that they should be lowered. The plan of reduction favored by the protectionists was to give relief from high taxes by lowering the internal revenue and the income tax. This went on so rapidly that by 1870 the former taxes were taken off nearly everything but liquor and tobacco, and public opinion insisted that these be taxed in the interest of good morals. At the same time it was arranged that the tax on incomes should disappear with the year 1871. Forced to give up something else, the protectionists now agreed that the duties should be lowered on the second class, as coffee, tea, and sugar; and in this they were usually successful. The reformers pointed out that by throwing the burden of the revenue on the protected schedules congress was fixing protection in our system, but the people were pleased to have any visible relaxation, and accepted free coffee and tea thankfully. This process was gradual, and was embodied in four tariff bills, as follows:

1. In 1867 the house of representatives passed a bill to raise duties. The senate was for reform, and substituted a bill by David A. Wells, special commissioner of the revenue and a trained economist. It lowered rates on most manufactured articles and to a larger extent on raw materials. It sought to make a wise readjustment and gradual reduction by which protected interests should suffer in the least possible degree. It was unacceptable to the house, and was not passed. But one feature of it, a higher rate on wool, was passed by a special bill in the same year. 2. In 1870 congress again took up the tariff in response to a popular demand for reform. The duties on several unprotected articles were lowered, but the only protected article reduced was iron ore, the rate on which was cut from nine to seven dollars a ton. On many other articles, as steel rails, marble, and nickel, the duty was raised. 3. In 1871 there was a surplus revenue of \$100,000,000. It was useful for paying the debt, but it called attention to the excessive taxes, and again congress was forced to take action. In anticipation of legislation the lobby became active. It was a fair opportunity for manipulation, and congress, apparently to avoid the liability of being overreached in the adjustment of individual rates, adopted the principle of horizontal reduction. Ten per cent was taken from existing rates on the important protected articles, that is, woollens, cottons, most metals, paper, glass, and leather, while tea and coffee were made free and considerable cuts were made on salt, coal, and some other articles not manufactured in the ordinary sense. The bill passed against the opposition of the manufacturers. 4. The panic of 1873 brought about a reduction of imports and lessened the revenues. The pro-

War Taxes.

Four Tariff Bills.

tectionists supported the need of high rates, and in 1875 the ten per cent taken off in 1872 was restored.

There was no disposition to meddle with the tariff during the four lean years that followed 1875, but with the advent of prosperity came abundant revenues, and in the eleven years from the beginning of 1880 to the end of 1890 the average surplus was \$103,900,000 a year. It went to pay the debt, \$1,105,000,000 worth being extinguished in this interval at a saving in interest of \$69,000,000 a year. It was a wonderful record, and no other nation has done as much, but the results brought serious complaints. The financiers said the surplus disarranged the course of trade, the national banks complained that they must pay ruinous prices for bonds to secure their bank notes, and the public complained, because for the government to buy bonds at high premium was extravagance. Surplus financiering, it was also pointed out, causes extravagant spending. In this, however, the danger was lessened by the fact that the democrats, ever inclined to economy, were generally in control of one or both houses of congress during the years of the surplus.

In 1882 the surplus was \$145,600,000, and four per cent bonds rose from 112 to 121. It was the year for congressional elections, and the tariff was an issue. There was a group of Eastern democrats, chiefly from Pennsylvania and New Jersey, who dared not favor reduction, but most of the party were for reform. Most of the Eastern republicans were against it, but a small group of Western republicans felt compelled to vote for it because of the feeling in their districts. In later years the alignment was more distinct, but in 1882 it was clear enough to show which was a high and which a low tariff organization. The democrats stood openly for lower duties, and when in the election they converted their minority of 19 in the house into a majority of 77, it was believed that the country indorsed them. Their opponents understood the warning, and in December, after the election, Arthur, supported by Folger, his secretary of the treasury, recommended a reform of the tariff.

Weary of "tinkering," desirous of avoiding the assaults of the lobby, and convinced of the iniquities of a horizontal reduction, congress, still republican, appointed a tariff commission. That a group of experts shall readjust the duties so as to lop off a given number of millions in order to reduce the revenue, and do it in such a way as to distress industry least is an attractive idea. But it is too much to expect that congress should surrender the tax-levying power to such a group. The tariff commission of 1882 was given the power to recommend reduction. This pleased the protectionists, for it tended to quiet the people, it postponed action, and it left the question finally in

**The
Surplus.**

**Popular
Sentiment
in 1882.**

**Tariff Com-
mission of
1882.**

congress, where they would have an opportunity to oppose it. The commission was ordered to suggest "a revision of the existing tariff upon a scale of justice to all interests." At the head of it the president, after receiving several declinations, placed John L. Hayes, secretary of the American Wool Manufacturers Association, an assurance that the tariff would be reformed by its friends. Yet the commission's report favored a reduction of about 20 per cent. The republican house, unwilling to concede this much, prepared a bill with smaller reductions, and slowly debated it, thinking it would not become law in the existing short session. The senate, with 37 democrats, 37 republicans, and 2 low tariff independents, prepared a bill, with still lower rates, attaching it as an amendment to an internal revenue bill then before it. Conferences between the two houses ensued, and the result was the tariff of 1883. The zeal that now possessed the republicans was due to the recent democratic success. If the coming congress made a tariff bill, it would be more extreme than one made by the existing session, whereas a bill passed now might so satisfy public sentiment that the republican president and senate would be safe in blocking the way to a bill in 1884. Under this impulse the tariff of 1883 was enacted. By some shrewd manipulation in conference several rates were made higher than was proposed originally in either house. Three men destined to be influential in future tariff legislation, Senator Aldrich and Representatives Thomas B. Reed and William McKinley, Jr., were prominent in connection with the bill; but the last-named refused to vote for it because the schedules were too low. He represented the Cleveland, Ohio, district, in which iron interests were very strong. Nineteen democrats, led by Samuel J. Randall, of Pennsylvania, most of them Eastern men, voted against the law. Their action indicated a party division which was to bring to naught many other democratic hopes of tariff reform.

**Tariff of
1883.**

In the next congress, 1884, the democrats undertook to redeem their promise by introducing the Morrison bill. It placed salt, lumber, and coal on the free list, and reduced other articles 20 per cent. It was thought a horizontal reduction would avoid juggling and preserve the existing ratio of advantage between various interests. Forty democrats joined Randall in helping the republicans to defeat the bill in the house, while only 4 republicans, three from Minnesota and one from New York, voted for it.

**Morrison
Bill.**

The bill of 1883 made little change in the surplus: that of 1884 would have lowered it \$30,000,000. In the latter year a temporary check of prosperity reduced the imports, and the surplus for the year 1885 fell to \$63,500,000. This tended to quiet the sentiment for tariff reform, but the feeling revived in 1887, when the surplus again reached \$100,000,000.

**Surplus
Lowered by
Hard Times.**

THE ELECTION OF 1884

The election year of 1884 found the republicans divided. Arthur's success as president gave him a claim, and persons who disliked some of the party tendencies favored him as a safe and respectable man without special defects. A larger portion of the party supported Blaine. He was always a strong leader, and the retirement of Conkling gave him an opportunity to unite the New York republicans in his support. He did it through the aid of Platt, who remarked with unexpected coyness that it was now Blaine's turn. There was, also, a group of reformers who supported Edmunds, of Vermont. Besides these, Logan, Sherman, and Hawley were "favorite sons" respectively of Illinois, Ohio, and Connecticut, each with a small following. The convention assembled at Chicago, June 3, 1884; and the air was tense with feeling in behalf of Blaine. It was evident that other candidates would have to fight hard for victory. On the first ballot he led with 334½ votes to 278 for Arthur, 93 for Edmunds, and 112½ scattering. On the second, Blaine gained, chiefly at the expense of the reformers; on the third he continued the progress, and on the fourth he was nominated. John A. Logan was made the candidate for the vice-presidency. The result was received harmoniously by all the factions, except the reformers, who, however, were not strong enough to make serious trouble at Chicago. Their supporters were less pacific, and took steps to oppose the nominee at the polls.

The eyes of the democrats were drawn, in the meantime, to a figure which had recently appeared above their horizon. Grover Cleveland, elected mayor of Buffalo in 1881, and governor of New York by a plurality of 192,000 in 1882, seemed their most promising man.

On the other hand, he was not popular with his party. He was new to the service, downright in his honesty, impartial, opposed to ordinary methods of party organizations, and too blunt to be liked by the politicians. Tammany, the most important organization within the party in New York, had strong intuitions against him. With some difficulty its leader, John Keily, was brought to favor his nomination, but he lived to regret it. Cleveland's best card was the probability that he could carry New York. The democratic tide showed recession in some elections in 1883, but it was likely that it would persist to a degree sufficient to decide the result nationally in 1884. It was also in Cleveland's favor that the independent republicans would largely favor him against Blaine. He was nominated on the second ballot, and Thomas A. Hendricks, of Indiana, was named for vice-president.

Republi-
cans Nomi-
nate
Blaine.

Cleveland
Nominated.

The campaign soon brought Blaine's record to the front. His name was associated with some of the irregular transactions of Grant's time, but he was not shown to be guilty. He was less lucky in regard to the "Mulligan Letters." In 1869 he sold to friends in Maine some bonds of the Little Rock and Fort Smith Railroad Company. It was a mushroom concern, and purchasers ordinarily got with their bonds equal amounts of preferred stock, common stock, and land bonds, four dollars in securities for each dollar of cash paid. In this case Blaine retained the land bonds himself. After a time the company fell into difficulties, the Maine purchasers began to repent their bargain, and Blaine feared lest the retention of the land bonds should become known and damage him politically. He exerted himself to the utmost and raised money enough to refund the purchase money, taking all the securities on his own hands. If these should fail, he would lose nearly all the property he had; and the market for them was bad. But he sold a large part of them to the Union Pacific and other railroad companies at prices considerably above the market. When this was known people asked why should the Union Pacific, a company continually affected by legislation, pay Speaker Blaine more than Fort Smith stock was worth. So much was said that Blaine in April, 1876, when he was a candidate for the presidential nomination, demanded an investigation. The house appointed a committee which sat late in May. Before it came James Mulligan, a former clerk of the Boston business firm from whom Blaine got the stock, a firm with whom he had much correspondence. Mulligan told the committee he had some letters from Blaine to the Boston house, and was directed to produce them next day. This filled Blaine with dismay. He sought Mulligan at his hotel and saw the letters in the presence of a third party, finally getting permission to have them over night on the promise he would return them next day. In the morning he refused to give them up, claiming Mulligan had them wrongfully; nor would he submit them to the committee. News of this got abroad, and his opponents, democrats and republicans, presented it in as bad light as possible. Blaine could not stand the pressure, and resolved to meet the charge in a most dramatic manner. He appeared in the house as an injured man whose private affairs were pried into by democratic opponents, some of whom were Southerners. He denounced the trick they played on him, declared he had a right to withhold the letters, but announced he would read them of his own will to show how little wrongdoing was in them. Interlarded with his own comment, and with a wonderful personal mastery of the audience, the letters were made to appear harmless. He finished the scene with a master stroke of acting. He knew a cablegram in his favor had been received by the democratic chairman of the investigating committee. It had not been announced; and Blaine finished

The
"Mulligan
Letters."

his speech by boldly walking down the aisle to the seat of the chairman and charging him with suppressing important evidence in behalf of the defendant. The chairman had no defense, quailed visibly, and the audience broke into an uproar of applause.

The enthusiasm of congress was transmitted to the press by the reporters, who were carried off their feet by the speech of Blaine, and the republicans throughout the country were satisfied.

**Political
Effect.**

But time brought reflection, and in the cold type of the *Congressional Record* the letters seemed to have something which was not explained. They probably prevented Blaine's nomination in 1876 and in 1880. The campaign of 1884 was hardly opened before these letters were brought out, and September 15 the papers contained other letters from Blaine to the same correspondent, not hitherto made public. Curtis, editor of *Harper's Weekly*, declared that they corroborated the first installment. As a whole, the Mulligan letters placed a blot on the name of a great man, which the defense uttered has not removed.

The campaign was noted for personalities. The republicans, writhing under the charges against their candidate, attacked the private reputation of Cleveland, charging him with grave sexual irregularities. The charge had some apparent foundation in his early life, but it was widely exaggerated and the offense was long since atoned for. An investigation showed how unfairly it was presented, and before this and before the frank attitude of Cleveland himself the matter was overlooked.

**Cleveland
Attacked.**

The reformers in the republican party were bitterly opposed to Blaine. At Chicago they supported Edmunds, giving him 93 votes on the first ballot and 41 on the last. Among them were Senator

**The
Reformers.**

Hoar, W. W. Phelps, Andrew D. White, and two young men, Theodore Roosevelt and Henry Cabot Lodge. As politicians they would not jeopardize their careers by repudiating the nomination, but there were other reformers unembarrassed with political expectations. Soon after the convention adjourned an address was issued by a committee of which George William Curtis was chairman, calling on independents to vote for Cleveland. It received vigorous response in many parts of the union. The public was impressed when it saw such men as Henry Ward Beecher, Carl Schurz, James Freeman Clarke, George William Curtis, and William Everett turning to the democratic party. The editor of the *New York Sun*, who had a keen dislike for reformers, dubbed them "Mugwumps," a word hitherto of doubtful meaning, probably of Indian origin. They had the support of several important newspapers and literary men.

As the canvass proceeded it was evident that New York would decide the battle. The state was filled with speakers, processions of various kinds addressed the candidates, and feeling was exceedingly

warm. A small incident at the end of the campaign probably had much influence on the result. One of the addresses to Blaine was made by Rev. S. D. Burchard, a New York minister and a warm Blaine supporter. He assured the candidate that he and his friends would not vote for the party of "Rum, Romanism, and Rebellion." Blaine in reply did not notice the thrust at the Catholics, and the democratic press loudly charged him with insulting that important portion of the voters. He tried to explain, but it was too late. The vote proved so close that this might have been the turning point.

Dr. Burchard.

When the count was made it was seen that Cleveland had 219 electoral votes. They came from the Solid South, Delaware, Indiana, Connecticut, New Jersey, and New York. Blaine had the rest, 182 electoral votes. In the popular vote the democratic plurality was only 23,000. In New York Cleveland had the lead by only 1149 votes. With such a narrow margin the issue in the state might have been determined by Dr. Burchard's remark, the opposition of the mugwumps, the hostility of the prohibitionists, or some slumbering Conkling defection. The *Nation* said: "The real force which defeated Blaine was Blaine himself. He had created during his twenty years of public life a public distrust too deep to be overcome by even the most formidable combination of political wiles, money, and treachery ever organized in this country."

Cleveland Elected.

CLEVELAND AND HIS PARTY

Outwardly the election of Cleveland was a break in party history; inwardly it was only an incident. A new party control was, indeed, established, but it did not have power in congress, and the deadlock of Hayes's administration continued. Cleveland had definite purposes in regard to tariff reform, but a republican senate blocked the way, and only routine affairs could be transacted in congress. In party history the first administration of Cleveland rescued the democracy from the condition of an opposition group and made it a definite and aggressive force. Mere opportunism ruled it in 1868, 1872, and 1880. In 1876 Tilden gave it a positive character, but this was adopted for temporary expediency, to take advantage of a situation which the folly of its opponents created. The nomination of Cleveland was much for the same reason, but once in power he imposed on his supporters a positive program, the first since 1856. His principles became democratic principles, and the American people fought for or against them for several years.

A Deadlock.

Cleveland and his Party.

Cleveland used his own judgment in selecting his cabinet. T. F. Bayard, of Delaware, was secretary of state, Daniel Manning, of New York, known hitherto for shrewd political management, became

secretary of the treasury, W. C. Endicott, of Massachusetts, secretary of war, W. C. Whitney, of New York, secretary of the navy,

His Cabinet. A. H. Garland, of Arkansas, attorney-general, W. F. Vilas,

of Wisconsin, postmaster-general, and L. Q. C. Lamar, of Mississippi, secretary of the interior. Bayard, Garland, and Lamar were experienced in national affairs, but they were Southerners, and by that fact were slightly handicapped. Not one of the four others had seen experience in Washington. Endicott's highest office hitherto was a judgeship, in which he acquitted himself well, and Vilas had served in his state's legislature and presided over the recent national nominating convention. At this time the democratic party had met its opponents in congress on equal terms for ten years. It is indicative of the unformed state of its Northern branch that not an experienced man of that wing was called to a cabinet position.

The president was pledged to support civil service reform. He was at once beset by a horde of office seekers, and his supporters in congress marshaled them. The recently established classified service was mostly kept intact, but removals for partisanship occurred freely in the unclassified service.

The Spoils-men. Vilas created dismay among the reformers by announcing such a policy for fourth-class postmasters. The Baltimore post office was under civil service rules, but the postmaster there made removals and filled the places with democrats, saying in reply to his critics, "I am sure my course in this respect has met the approval not only of democrats, but also of fair-minded republicans, and I shall not concern myself as to the views of Mugwumps." Henry Watterson defined offensive partisanship thus: "Officially every man is offensive who is not in sympathy with the party in power." In view of this feeling Cleveland did well to remove no more than two-thirds of the officials not under the civil service rules. He wished to avoid a split with his party and announced a policy of equalization which he observed in general. Many of the reformers believed he did the best he could, but others were displeased and forsook him.

As a reformer Cleveland, had no sympathy from two groups of democrats, a "machine" element somewhat like the "stalwarts" among the republicans, and the high tariff democrats of the East. Of the former, Senator Gorman was a prominent leader. He rose to power in Maryland by the ordinary methods of machine politics, and maintained himself through unusual ability. He was a silent, bland, clear-headed man, an astute leader, and an unyielding opponent. He and the men whom he represented had no taste for reform. Tammany Hall, controlling the party in New York City, was equally opposed to reform. Governor Hill, of New York, was in sympathy with Tammany and openly declared his objections to the administration. His election to the United States senate, in 1891, gave an able leader to the malcontents

Anti-Cleveland Democrats.

and a worthy assistant to Senator Gorman. Cleveland was also viewed unfavorably by the high tariff democrats. They were led by Randall of Pennsylvania and were strong in that state, New York, and New Jersey. Randall showed his antipathy to reform in 1886 by introducing into the house a bill to repeal the Pendleton act. The democrats dared not pass it, but it strengthened the mover with a certain section of the party.

TARIFF REFORM UNDER CLEVELAND

The democratic platform of 1884 reflected the divided opinion in the party. It merely promised tariff revision in the spirit of fairness and without injury to American industry. Cleveland, however, went further, and in his first annual message, December, 1885, suggested the adoption of a tariff for revenue only. A bill to that effect was introduced into the house, but thirty-five Randall democrats united with the republicans to prevent its consideration. In the autumn after congress adjourned, 1886, the democratic majority in the house was reduced from 40 to 12, and Morrison, leader of tariff reform, was among the rejected ones. Symptoms of panic appeared in the party, but they did not reach the president. In the message of 1886 he renewed his arguments for reduction. Congress paid no heed, and the short session passed without a tariff bill.

The situation within the party was now little less than war. Cleveland felt that he must win his fight by appealing to the country over the heads of the congressmen. His annual message of 1887 was entirely devoted to the tariff. He demanded a tariff for revenue and pointed out most forcibly the dangers of surplus financiering. He disclaimed the advocacy of free trade, which his opponents imputed to him, and said, in a phrase that was often repeated, "It is a condition that confronts us, not a theory."

**Tariff
Message of
1887.**

The message was followed by the Mills bill, 1888, in which the duties were to be reduced from an average of 47 per cent to an average of 40 per cent. It rejected horizontal reduction, embodied in the Morrison bill, and gradual reduction through the enlargement of the free list, embodied in the ill-fated bill of 1886, and took up the task of general revision, schedule by schedule. The president watched the bill closely as it went through the house by a majority of 13, and was believed to have secured its passage by threatening to veto bills for public buildings. It was not considered in the senate, where the republicans ruled and were preparing a bill expressive of their own ideas. Each bill was really a manifesto for use in the election then at hand.

**The Mills
Bill, 1888.**

THE ELECTION OF 1888

Cleveland Renominated. In 1887 Cleveland's chances for nomination were considered doubtful, and Hill, the leading anti-Cleveland man and favorite of the New York democracy, was much talked of. But Cleveland's course in the following winter and spring removed all this doubt. He gave his party its issue and was so evidently the logical candidate that even Hill said he should be nominated. He was chosen without opposition by the party convention at St. Louis, June 5, and Allen G. Thurman, of Ohio, was named for his running-mate. The platform was all Cleveland wished.

Harrison Nominated. This situation pleased the republicans, who believed that so many tariff democrats would join them that they must surely win. Their most likely candidate was Blaine, who had lost little of his popularity through the defeat of 1884. He was traveling in Europe in the first half of the year and would not say whether or not he desired the nomination. Either his health, or the fear of defeat, or an aversion to another campaign of personal abuse finally decided him, and he definitely declined at the very time the party convention met in Chicago, June 19. Several other candidates were before the convention. Blaine, in withdrawing, suggested Benjamin Harrison, of Indiana, and after three days of balloting he was selected, with Levi P. Morton, of New York, candidate for the vice-presidency. The platform was long, but its most important plank gave open allegiance to "the American system of protection" and — with a squint at the surplus — demanded liberal appropriations for the navy and pensions.

The Campaign of 1888. The campaign was noted for a freer use of money by both sides than hitherto. The democrats, spite of the Pendleton act, are believed to have received large contributions from the officeholders, as well as from other sources. The republicans could not appeal to this class, but they had a greater resource in the manufacturers. The solicitation of funds from such persons was popularly called "fat-frying." It was believed that votes were freely purchased. Probably both sides were guilty, but the greatest blame was laid at the door of the republicans. Dudley, treasurer of the republican fund, is known to have written to a lieutenant in Indiana, "Divide the floaters into blocks of five and put a trusted man with the necessary funds in charge of these five, and make him responsible that none get away, and that all vote our ticket."

New York was again the deciding state, and several causes united to make it favorable to Harrison. In the first place he had not the bitter enemies who opposed Blaine in 1884. Also, Tilden's friends in the state were discontented because they thought their leader had

received scant courtesy from the democratic administration. Some of the civil service reformers were disappointed in Cleveland's appointments. More important than all else was Tammany's open defection. It was charged that its devotees "traded" Cleveland votes to elect their champion, David B. Hill, governor of the state. The fact that he ran ahead of Cleveland at the polls by 14,491 votes and was elected seems to prove the charge. All these things, irrespective of the tariff question, would have accounted for the change from a democratic plurality of 1149 in 1884 to the Harrison plurality of 13,002 in 1888. The electoral vote was Harrison 233, and Cleveland 168, but in the popular vote the democrats had a plurality of 100,000.

Harrison
Elected.

THE REPUBLICAN PARTY IN A NEW STAGE

If the democrats showed a renewal of life the republicans showed even more plainly that they were entering on new conditions. The party was a more perfect machine and less under presidential authority than ever before. Moreover, the personnel was shifting. In it Sumner had no modern counterpart, Schurz and the liberals were in revolt and acting with the enemy, Garfield had no successor, and even Conkling, powerful through his intellect, could not be matched in an organization which surrendered itself to men like Senators Quay of Pennsylvania and Platt of New York. Bishop Potter characterized them as holding "the conception of the national government as a huge machine existing mainly for the purpose of rewarding partisan service." A group of new men of a better type existed in congress, McKinley and Thomas B. Reed being the most conspicuous examples, but they did not shake themselves loose from the control of the machine. Of the older group only Blaine and John Sherman remained; both were weakened in health, and were borne along by forces they could not control. Blaine became secretary of state in the new cabinet and lent it the prestige of his name. Windom, of Minnesota, a politician rather than a financier, became secretary of the treasury, Redfield Proctor, of Vermont, secretary of war, Benjamin F. Tracy, of New York, secretary of the navy, W. H. H. Miller, of Indiana, attorney-general, John Wanamaker, of Pennsylvania, postmaster-general, John W. Noble, of Missouri, secretary of the interior, and Jeremiah M. Rusk, of Wisconsin, secretary of agriculture. They proved themselves good heads of department, for all they were unknown to the country. Wanamaker's appointment occasioned much comment because it was known he had made a large contribution to the campaign funds, and public opinion persisted in thinking the office was Quay's reward for it. He had risen to prominence as a successful proprietor of a department store in Philadelphia.

New
Leaders.

The
Cabinet.

The republicans now controlled both branches of congress for the first time in eight years, and were determined to enact their party program. In the house obstruction had become a powerful weapon, and this must be broken down. A common method of defeating legislation was to consume time in dilatory motions. Another was for the minority to fail to answer a roll call when a few of the majority were absent and to raise the point of no quorum, which by the constitution must be a majority of the house. The republicans employed both methods freely when in the minority, but were now determined to abolish them. Thomas B. Reed, the new speaker, a blunt man who could not be confused, was just the man to carry out their wishes.

The session opened with much filibustering in the house. Finally on January 21, 1890, Reed refused to appoint tellers on a democratic motion to adjourn. The omission would have been a serious breach of duty had the motion been made in good faith, but it was plainly dilatory, and the house sustained him. He also announced he would entertain no such motions in the future. The democrats were angry, but they became still more enraged eight days later when he counted a quorum. When a motion was put there were 161 yeas, 2 nays, and 165 not voting, the last being democrats. The usual point of "No quorum voting" was made, when to the surprise of the minority Reed began calling the names of democrats before him and ordered the clerk to record them as present. A storm of protests arose in which mingled cries of "revolutionary," "unconstitutional," and "usurpation." Bland shouted in the face of the speaker, "You are not a tyrant to rule over this house or the members of this house in any such way, and I denounce you as the worst tyrant that ever presided over a deliberative body." Reed paid no heed to the storm, but continued calling the names of the democrats, remarking several times, "The chair must proceed in an orderly manner." The wrangle lasted a fortnight, and ended only when a rule was adopted to allow the speaker to count as present members he saw before him. This rule and another against dilatory motions were adopted by counting a quorum. Reed's proceedings caused much comment out of doors. Democrats generally pronounced him a "Czar," but as the atmosphere cleared, his position was indorsed by fair-minded people, and the democrats at the next session in organizing the house felt constrained to accept it, although they gave the rules committee and not the speaker the deciding function.

THE MCKINLEY TARIFF AND THE SURPLUS

The obstructionists muzzled, the majority turned to the double task outlined in the platform of 1888. There should be a new tariff con-

sonant with the aggressive school of protection, and the surplus should be reduced. Harrison expressed both ideas in his inaugural and in his first annual message, and congress willingly carried out his suggestion.

A Double Program.

While the house was closing its long debate on the Mills bill in the early autumn of 1888, the republican senate prepared a tariff bill of its own, a kind of manifesto of protection for effect in the election. In the following short session it passed the bill as a substitute for the Mills bill, and here the matter rested when the session ended in March. The bill supplied a working program for the next congress which, soon after convening, sent it to the ways and means committee, William McKinley, Jr., chairman. In a short time it came back with a few changes and was known as the McKinley bill. It easily passed the house and finally got through the senate after the "Silver Senators" were conciliated by the passage of the Sherman silver law. But the debates were long and the bill did not become law until October 1, five weeks before the congressional elections of 1890. The chief features were as follows:

The McKinley Tariff.

1. The duties on agricultural products were slightly raised to please the rural West; but raw sugar, yielding a total revenue of \$55,000,000, was put on the free list, and a bounty of two cents a pound for four years was offered to domestic sugar producers.

Its Features.

As the latter raised a small part of the amount consumed, there was in this schedule a net loss of revenue of a little less than \$50,000,000. A duty was placed on refined sugar to protect the American refiners.

2. The rates on bulky iron articles were little changed; in some cases they were actually lowered. This was because the seat of such manufacturing was now in the Pittsburg-Cleveland region, and freights from seaboard to that district gave a large amount of protection.

3. Less bulky articles, as woollens, cottons, and shoes, produced near the coast line, were given higher rates, often disguised by a complicated combination of specific and *ad valorem* duties. Some schedules were so high as to raise the suspicion that they were designed to exclude imports.

4. Through Blaine's efforts a system of reciprocity was adopted, intended to secure trade from South American states. While the bill was being considered, a Pan-American congress was in session in Washington under the special patronage of the secretary of state. He desired mutual concessions by which South American products would come to us freely in exchange for our flour and manufactured articles. Congress ignored him, for all his protesting and scolding, until when the bill was near its adoption the senate grafted on it a reciprocity clause. In its final form it provided that hides, molasses, tea, and coffee, as well as sugar, be free; but if the president thought a state producing these articles charged unfair

Reciprocity.

duties against us, he might impose duties on them at specified rates. In this form reciprocity was a club with which it was proposed to force our neighbors into concessions. Through it in 1892 we got reduction of duties in Cuba, Porto Rico, the Dominican Republic, Jamaica, Trinidad, Barbados, British Guiana, Salvador, Nicaragua, Honduras, Gautemala, and Brazil, and some slight reductions in Germany and France. Only Colombia, Venezuela, and Haiti were disciplined for refusing to make concessions.

In his first annual message Harrison suggested liberal appropriations for pensions, naval construction, and coast defenses, and the hint

**A Policy of
Generosity.**

was not lost on congress. The economies of the democrats were thrown aside, and much was heard about expenditures in keeping with the dignity of the nation. When the congress of 1891-1893 ended it had won the title of "the billion dollar congress." Reed expressed the feeling of his political friends in the retort, "This is a billion dollar country."

The most notable increase was for pensions. Both parties feared to antagonize the soldier vote, and certain politicians had learned the art of utilizing it by asking for grants in behalf of the soldiers which no one dared refuse. Most of these grants

**Pensions
Before 1890.**

were good. No one desired to be parsimonious with the men who saved the union; but there was danger that the process should run into extravagance. It might even become a means of debasing the elections. At first, relief was given to disabled soldiers and their dependent relatives. Under this plan there were 234,821 pensioners in 1875 receiving \$29,270,407 annually. Garfield declared this was probably the highest point to which pensions would rise; but in 1879 arrears were granted increasing the cost by \$25,000,000 a year; and by 1885 the cost of pensions was \$65,171,937. Besides this, each session of congress saw the enactment of many private pension bills, granting relief where the laws would not apply. Many such bills were worthy ones; but they were rarely inspected closely, and had come to be granted as favors to members through a "courtesy" analagous to "senatorial courtesy." The presidents formerly signed these bills as a matter of course, but Cleveland investigated them, and vetoed many which he thought involved fraud. At this time the republicans carried through congress a bill giving twelve dollars a month to each old soldier dependent on his own or another person's labor, and Cleveland vetoed this also. He was widely criticized as a foe to the veterans, and the republican platform of 1888 demanded "in the presence of an overflowing treasury" legislation to keep old soldiers from dependence on public or private charity.

Thus committed, the party did not hesitate to take up a more liberal pension policy. "Corporal" Tanner, accepted representative of the soldier vote, became commissioner of pensions, and was said to have

exclaimed, "God help the surplus revenue!" He passed claims freely, and even looked up persons, some of them rich men, whom he thought ought to be pensioned. He was so active that Harrison removed him within a year. The pension act which Cleveland vetoed now became law. As a result, the appropriation for this purpose rose from \$89,000,000 in 1889 to \$159,000,000 in 1893. It remained at nearly the latter amount until 1912, when by the Sherwood act, which neither party was willing to oppose, additional gifts were made, bringing up the annual expenditure to \$180,000,000. The act of 1890, like its successor of 1912, was of twofold purpose; it was intended to reduce the surplus and thus save protection, and to have influence on the elections. To carry it into operation the government has paid since its enactment over a billion and a quarter of dollars.

**Pension Bill
of 1890.**

The large sums voted for the navy occasioned more satisfaction. By 1880 wooden ships were discarded in European navies, but they continued the rule in the United States. Secretary of the Navy Hunt, a Southerner whom Garfield appointed, took up the task of improvement, and in 1883 two steel cruisers were ordered. Secretary Whitney, under Cleveland, continued to urge enlargement, and in 1888 he secured \$17,000,000 for that purpose. These plans were unrealized when Cleveland went out of office, but the liberal gifts under his successor increased the strength of the navy, so that in 1893 it contained 22 steel ships and had risen from twelfth to fifth place among the navies of the world.

**A New
Navy.**

THE TARIFF LEGISLATION OF 1892-1897

When congress met in 1889 the surplus was \$105,000,000. By abandoning the sugar duties and levying prohibitive duties in other schedules the revenue shrank nearly \$100,000,000. At the same time the republicans spent so largely that had some of the items not required a long time for completion there must have been an annual deficit. Seven months after the McKinley bill was passed the treasury ceased to buy bonds except to fulfill the requirements of the sinking fund. The next year even this went by default, and in 1892 came the first quarter's deficit in many years. It was a new experience to most of the people, and impressed them deeply. Harrison was alarmed, and made efforts to check the spirit of extravagance he had let loose. Tanner was sent off and granting pensions was curbed, but the swollen lists could not be reduced. Pressure on congressional committees tempered the appropriations of 1891, and a phenomenal wheat crop, 1891, resulted in large importations of merchandise which increased the revenues and saved the administration from serious embarrassment.

**The
McKinley
Act and
Finances.**

Outside of congress the tariff aroused opposition. Merchants raised their prices and attributed it to the McKinley bill. Abroad we were charged with raising a Chinese wall around our trade. Importations decreased, to the great loss of the merchants.

**Elections
of 1890.**

A month after the bill passed, when its unpopularity was highest, came the congressional elections. The result in the house was 235 democrats, 88 republicans, and 9 Farmers' Alliance candidates, a republican loss of 88 seats.

The popular dissatisfaction lasted for two years, and in 1892 Cleveland was elected president on the tariff issue (see page 753). He

**The Wilson
Bill, 1893.**

proposed a moderate reduction and readjustment to meet the large revenue needs which the permanent expenditures of the republicans fixed on the government. He had his way in the house, where William L. Wilson, of West Virginia, was chairman of the ways and means committee. He was a scholarly man, once a college professor, and always a student of finance. The bill he reported December 19, 1893, was the result of much labor, and its chief features were: 1. Free raw material, as lumber, wool, coal, and iron ore. This would to some extent recoup the manufactures for reduction of duties on manufactured products. 2. It reduced appreciably the duties on most factory-made articles, as silks, woollens, cottons, glass, and crockery. 3. To repair the deficiency in revenues which would thus ensue, it raised the internal revenue tax on liquors and laid a tax on incomes more than \$4000. The last feature was afterwards declared unconstitutional.

The house bill also provided for free sugar, raw and refined. This brought a protest from the American Sugar Refining Company, popularly called the sugar trust. Since freight was cheaper

**The Sugar
Schedule.**

on refined sugar and the cost of refining was greater in the United States, the proposition gave advantage to the foreign refiner; but the sugar trust was very unpopular, and the house was disposed to let it stand on its own legs. It found a friendlier spirit in the senate. In the first place, the Louisiana senators opposed free sugar unless the bounty of 1890 was continued. As the vote was close they were an important factor. The senate, therefore, placed 40 per cent duty *ad valorem* on raw sugar and added one-eighth of one cent a pound on refined. This was done after a long and doubtful debate in which the chances for the refiners' clause rose and fell day by day. Its adoption meant a yearly profit of probably \$20,000,000 for the sugar trust, whose stock rose and fell with chances for adoption. Finally, by the votes of a few senators under the leadership of Gorman and Brice, the duty was accepted. The press charged that senators speculated in this stock, whose value was so much affected by their votes. An investigation was ordered, but as the stockbrokers refused to testify it was impossible to obtain satisfactory light. Quay admitted having bought stock, but denied that this influenced his vote.

The affair left an indelible blot on the fame of the upper house. The senate thought the bill inadequate to the needs of the revenue, and raised many other schedules, robbing it of its distinctively low tariff features. The house accepted it unwillingly, and it went to the president with the duties at about the level of the bill of 1883. Cleveland felt the situation keenly: the bill undid the McKinley advances and did no more. It was a surrender of all he fought for in 1888, and involved, as he said plainly, party dishonor. He would not sign it, nor would he veto it, but left it to become law in ten days without presidential approval.

The Wilson-Gorman Act.

As a revenue measure the bill proved a failure. It did not escape from a system the protectionists had long ago saddled on the revenue system, of reducing duties on non-protected articles in order to maintain them on articles of domestic manufacture. The free list was witness of this. If the democrats had possessed the courage to lay fair duties on such articles and to rely on a reduction of the other schedules to give relief to the consumer, they would have made a bill more in keeping with true tariff reform. Probably that was the only way to meet the deficit which the McKinley law created.

Financial Failure of the Act.

The Wilson-Gorman bill was passed at an inopportune time. 1893 and 1894 were years of industrial depression. The deficit which the McKinley bill produced was not repaired by the new law.

To meet expenses the secretary of the treasury must use part of the gold reserve, and bonds were sold to support specie payment by the government. In the long struggle against business depression the democratic party lost public confidence. In 1894 its total majority of 83 was supplanted by a total republican majority of 136, and it ceased to be responsible for the national finances. In 1896 it dared not fight the conflict on the tariff issue. What other plans the old leaders might have had were not developed, for the silver men in the West and South set them aside, reorganized the party on a silver basis, took William J. Bryan for their chieftain, and moved to the battle in utter disregard of the wishes of the East. The republicans nominated McKinley, protection's champion, and defeated their opponents in a campaign in which silver and protection were both prominent issues. The failure of the existing law to provide ample revenue gave them opportunity to revise the tariff, and the result was the Dingley bill, of 1897. Its provisions were as follows:

A New Law Needed.

On woollens, cottons, silk, linens, glass, and crockery the rates varied little from the tariff of 1890, and the duty on raw wool was restored. On iron and steel products the lower rates of 1894 were retained. Wonderful developments in these lines had transferred the seat of manufacture to the Pittsburgh-Cleveland region, and the high freights on such products from the seaboard to this region gave it as much protection as was needed.

The Dingley Tariff Act.

The same was true of copper, which was left on the free list as in 1894. The duty on raw sugar was doubled and the differential of protection for the refiner was maintained.

The Dingley bill provided sufficient revenue, and through a period of twelve years after its passage tariff reform was quiescent. The attack of the Cleveland democracy showed that protection was very strongly fortified in our economic system. Capital and labor both felt themselves interested in perpetuating it. The progress of urban life, so largely dependent on factory labor and internal commerce, widened the basis of the movement. In the eighties the tariff reform sentiment of the West centered in the old Northwest. In the nineties this region was mostly for protection. After ten years of the Dingley bill a new area of reform was influential in the agricultural states beyond the Mississippi. Through coöperation with the South, always for tariff reform in the main, it began the agitation resulting in the Payne-Aldrich tariff of 1909 (see page 837).

**Subsidence
of Tariff
Agitation.**

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CHAPTER XXXV

GREAT INDUSTRIAL COMBINATIONS

COMBINATIONS AS HISTORICAL FACTORS

IN the Middle Ages a multitude of competing fiefs were gradually united in strong hands in obedience to the law of the survival of the fittest. Much suffering accompanied the process, and the immediate result was despotism, but gradually the enlarged units of government transformed despotism into a rule of nationality out of which eventually came self-governing states. The last phase could not have been attained if, in the beginning, the jangling fiefs had not been absorbed. The analogy between the early stages of this process and the recent development of industrial combinations has often been remarked. It is impossible to predict what the future will bring forth, but it would be singular if the process stops where it is and if out of the existing concentration of industrial forces there should not come a greater degree of popular control than has hitherto obtained.

The Prin-
ciple of
Combina-
tion.

Combination in industry appeared in America in the earliest stages of settlement. The forests were hardly cleared before the small farms began to be bought up by the successful settlers; and the New England cod fisheries were no more than fairly established before the small fishermen began to be replaced by large fishermen. In agriculture and in cod fishing the limit of profitable combination was soon reached. But in the era of great capitalistic enterprise, made possible by improved communications, larger markets, and abundant capital, the limits were wide. The world was amazed when great enterprises began to eat up small ones and establish monopolies. For railroads the unifying process began before the civil war, but for other kinds of industry it was a post-bellum affair.

Early Ap-
pearance in
America.

Before the coming of consolidation the competitive régime existed. Acting on the *laissez-faire* theory men felt that industry would thrive best if unregulated, and that the abuse of one man would be restrained by his opponent, each underbidding the other to the advantage of the patrons. When competitors had free access to the same large markets, competition became severe. There were price wars between merchants and manufacturers and rate wars between railroads, each cutting the throat of

The Com-
petitive
System.

the other if he could and saving his own in the best way possible. The competitive system was immoral and wasteful, and the public had to pay for it eventually.

Against this were placed the advantages of combination. Relief from underselling was most notable, and after it came better and less expensive direction, readier command of capital, ability to get cheaper raw material, and the advantage of a market monopoly. While these things benefited the combining interests, they were liable to be disadvantageous to the patrons, and out of this grew many efforts at restriction. The fields in which combination has gone furthest are railroads, great manufacturing enterprises or trusts, and banking consolidation. A parallel tendency, as many persons think, is labor organizations, whose purpose is to control labor as a commodity; to protect it against the employers, and to fix the wages which the employers must pay. The problems arising out of these four forms of combinations — railroads, trusts, banking systems, and labor unions — are fundamental in our recent history.

**Advantages
Claimed for
Combina-
tion.**

RAILROAD COMBINATIONS

Railroads came into existence in Great Britain about the time they were first used in the United States, but as the country was smaller than ours and more densely settled, the English development was more rapid. The processes of growth were, however, the same. First, there were many small lines, built to answer local demands and frequently to give competition between the same places. Most of them were constructed before 1850. Immediately began a process of absorption which lasted until 1870. Bankrupt roads were bought by richer lines, sometimes there was a merger by common consent, and sometimes a rival was purchased as the best means of ending its opposition. The people of England had relied on competition to protect them from unfair rates. They were alarmed at the advance of the process of amalgamation, and the statute books filled with laws and the court dockets with lawsuits to restrain it. Nothing availed, and they began to think they must revise from the foundation the theory of railroad management. Some persons believed state ownership the solution, but this was against the English spirit and made little headway. Finally the country came in 1873 to a solution which since then has been in practice with moderate satisfaction. It was decided to retain the great systems, consolidated under the operation of natural laws, and to establish a railroad commission with power to regulate rates, forbid evil practices, and enforce its decisions. It was expected that the commission would have much trouble to bring the railroads to obey its mandates. The result was otherwise. The removal of competition destroyed many of the

In England.

causes of the trouble, and the roads were as willing to operate their lines to the best advantage of the public as broad justice demanded. Thus the work of the commission was simplified. In the United States railroad development ran through the same three stages of progress, small roads, consolidated lines, and great systems under the supervision of a railroad commission. It has taken longer for the process to come to completion, but it is not too much to say that American railroads under the existing railroad commission have come to a state nearly like that of the roads in Great Britain.

In the
United
States.

Consolidation began in the United States about 1850. Eleven companies once owned the line from Albany to Buffalo, but by this time they were reduced to seven. By 1857 these were under one management, and a year later valuable tributary lines had been acquired. Thus was built up the main section of the New York Central system under the domination of Cornelius Vanderbilt. The completion of the Erie from New York to the lake in 1851 gave a rival system, one not made up of short lines, but built outright with much difficulty in financing. Another system was the Pennsylvania, which reached Pittsburg in 1852. It grew up under the direction of Thomas A. Scott, long its president, as daring and able in railroad management as the president of the Central. Still another great road from tidewater to the transmontane region was the Baltimore and Ohio, which reached the Ohio river in 1851. Meantime, there was much railroad building in the West. The Lake Shore and Michigan Southern connected Buffalo and Chicago, and the Rock Island, extending westward from Chicago, reached the Mississippi in 1854. Other lines joined Pittsburg and Chicago, and from the latter city and St. Louis radiated many roads which kept pace with the march of population into the waste places. Already there was great rivalry between St. Louis and Chicago for the distributing trade of the West. The former lost in importance, and the advantages of river transportation diminished with the increased reliance on railroads. Chicago competed keenly for the new lines of communication, and her position at the southern point of the lake system and between the mountains and the Mississippi gave her an advantage over other points. The line of communication was destined to be along parallels of latitude.

From
Coast to
Mountains.

The panic of 1857 arrested railroad development, and the civil war prolonged the relaxation of the process. It was not until the late sixties that it revived, and then the tide ran strong until the panic of 1873. Accompanying this revival was a desire for a further consolidation. It manifested itself in the unification with the Central, of the Hudson River road, from New York to Albany, and in the lease by the same line of the Lake Shore and Michigan Southern. Thus the Vanderbilt system was

From Coast
to Mid-Con-
tinent.

able to ship in bulk from Chicago to the seaboard. The Pennsylvania was not a whit behind its rival. In 1869 it leased the Pittsburg, Fort Wayne and Chicago, and got its own access to the gateway of Western trade. The same result was secured by the Baltimore and Ohio in 1874 by building an extension from the Ohio to Chicago; and the Grand Trunk in the same year was able to touch the Western traffic at Milwaukee. In 1882 two other lines were constructed to Chicago, the West Shore and the Nickel Plate. The Erie was not willing to lose the trade that might come to it, and achieved the same goal by building a connecting link. These, with the Pacific roads (see page 680), were the most important railroad developments of the time, but there were many others in various parts of the country. It was an era of rapid construction, especially in the newer parts of the country.

The rate wars which followed between these lines delighted the people of Chicago and other competing points. But the roads eventually found them expensive and sought to avoid them by coöperation. Such efforts first took shape in simple agreements to charge uniform rates. The most notable was arranged by Cornelius Vanderbilt between the five lines then running from Lake Michigan to the seaboard, but after his death in 1877 it was abandoned because it was difficult to get the roads to keep the agreement. The next expedient was pools, by which the roads undertook to pay their profits into the hands of a treasurer of the pool who would distribute them again in accordance with a previously accepted ratio. The pool, it was thought, removed all incentive to underselling. But the roads would not keep the terms of the contract, and pools were eventually abandoned. A general practice was secret rebates to special shippers. They were given on the theory that a large shipper should have a special rate. An unscrupulous bargainer might expect to get very low rates by playing one road against another. Still another practice was special rates for long hauls where there were competing lines. For example, a carload of freight could be sent from Pittsburg to Cincinnati and thence to Philadelphia through Pittsburg more cheaply than from Pittsburg to Philadelphia direct. Cincinnati had several lines to Philadelphia, and Pittsburg had only one. In the panic of 1873 two-fifths of the railroads of the country were in bankruptcy, and 450 went under the hammer, a process favorable to consolidation.

Railroad coöperation and discrimination between shippers and shipping points aroused popular opposition, particularly in the grain-growing Northwest, where the people were peculiarly dependent on the roads. Then arose a demand for state regulations to prevent discrimination and to check consolidation. It was like the English demand, and resulted in railroad commissions in many states. It was supported by a farmers' society, the Patrons of Husbandry, or "Granges," and the resulting legisla-

**Attempts at
Coöperation.**

**"Granger
Laws."**

tion is frequently called the "Granger laws." Illinois, Iowa, Minnesota, and Wisconsin were the scenes of their best success. The courts upheld the laws creating the railroad commissions, but said the rates must not be confiscatory. The first decisions seemed to imply that in the absence of federal law to regulate interstate traffic a state law on the subject would be binding. In 1886 this feature was changed by a federal decision in the Wabash case, reserving from state jurisdiction all cases concerning commerce between the states, whether a federal law on the matter existed or not.

Before this there existed a movement for a national railroad commission, and it was accelerated by the Wabash decision. The result was the interstate commerce act of 1887, which made some general regulations, and appointed a commission to supervise their execution. The rate-making power was not granted, but rebates, pools, discriminations, and the objectionable long hauls feature were forbidden. The commission might investigate violations of the law, but it had of itself no power to enforce its decisions, which might be appealed to the courts. When this feature of the law was passed on by the supreme court the powers of the commissioners were so limited that they retained little more than a right to make investigations preliminary to court hearings. Judge Thomas M. Cooley, of Michigan, was made head of the commission. It did much under his direction to gather statistics and investigate evils in management, but it had not the power to remedy the conditions it thought bad. Rebates and discriminations went on as before, with only a little more secrecy. In 1898 the report of the commissioners declared with hopeless frankness: "A large part of the business at the present time is transacted upon illegal rates. Indeed, so general has this rule become that in certain quarters the exaction of the published rate is the exception."

Interstate
Commerce
Act, 1887.

Meanwhile, there was an accumulation of popular wrath against the railroads. By supporting expensive lobbies in the national and state capitals, by using all the advantages of great wealth in defending cases in court, and by discriminating between shippers, they lost the confidence of many farmers and small business men. Manipulation by railroad directors in the interest of their own stock speculations, and even the wrecking of a road in order to buy it in again, were freely charged, and the charges served to heighten popular distrust. The contest became bitter, and such epithets as "soulless corporations" and "demagogery" were freely exchanged. Undoubtedly the charges on each side contained exaggerations. But the opponents of the roads were strong in state legislatures, and although some of their efforts to deal with the problem contained crude ideas of social justice, they carried forward the cause of efficient popular control of great economic factors.

TRUSTS

To consolidate manufactures was more difficult than to consolidate railroads, partly because of the large number of the former as compared with the latter, partly because railroads are generally natural monopolies, and partly because of the relative ease of enlisting capital in behalf of railroad enterprises. The advantages of combination were realized by manufacturers as early as 1870, when railroad consolidation was well on the way. But the impediments discouraged the boldest men from attempting it. Yet each year it became an easier matter, and this was from several causes: 1. In the three decades after the civil war there was a notable tendency for the particular branches of manufacturing to produce a larger output in a smaller number of plants. 2. This was made possible by abundant free capital. The civil war saw a great increase in bonds and currency and in profits derived from government contracts of one kind or another. Some of this vast amount went into agriculture, some into city real estate, some into trade, and some into railroads, but a large part of it remained ready for exploitation by the captains of industry. 3. Another cause was the extension of means of communication. Merchandise was not only delivered over larger areas, but traveling salesmen went everywhere. Consequently, the most efficient factories were able to secure the trade which otherwise would have gone to less favorably situated enterprises. 4. As this process advanced, the imagination of business men was stimulated, and they were eventually in a state of mind to be satisfied with nothing less than the entire market in their specific lines in a great nation.

It was for the Standard Oil Company, the second trust organized, to demonstrate that manufactures could be organized in monopolistic production. The task was made easier because it had to do with a product found in a narrow region and in wide demand throughout the world. In this respect it approached the condition of natural monopoly. The success of the attempt, however, depended most on the ability of John D. Rockefeller, its head, who had the rarest foresight, patience, will power, and sagacity in the selection of his assistants. He began to refine oil in Cleveland in 1865 at a time when the business with ordinary care yielded a profit of thirty per cent. In his hands it yielded more, and by 1870 his company was the largest in Cleveland, and he was revolving plans to make it the largest in the oil region.

His first move to that end came in 1872, when he united with twelve of the largest refiners in Pittsburg and the oil fields in forming the South Improvement Company. Its business was to ship oil, that is to say, to get special railroad rates for the oil it could market. It could deliver to any road it chose a large part of the oil business, and

Combina-
tion of
Manu-
factures:

The Pioneer
Trust.

neither the Pennsylvania, Erie, nor New York Central could hold out against it. The bargain it made shows the audacity of the men behind the company. It provided for a rebate on company oil, added the amount of the rebate to oil shipped by independents, and pledged the roads to pay over that amount to the company. Thus the combination was able to know just how much business its competitors did. The company promised the roads that every refiner outside of the company should have opportunity to share in the bargain. How they meant to carry it out is seen in what follows.

**South Im-
provement
Company.**

Rockefeller first got authority to enlarge his own capital stock. He then offered to buy out his rivals for cash or stock in the Standard Oil Company, of Cleveland. He told them plainly that to refuse would mean their destruction. Most of them refused to sell, then saw the railroad authorities and learned of the advantages given the combination, and finally agreed to Rockefeller's terms. Thus by three months' negotiation the Standard gained control of the Cleveland field and raised its daily capacity from 1500 to 10,000 barrels. It now produced over a fifth of the refined oil in the country. A furious "oil war" started as soon as the independents learned that freights would be raised at the dictation of the South Improvement Company. So fierce was the feeling throughout the oil region in western Pennsylvania and in Pittsburgh that the roads made a show of annulling the contract, and the legislature took away the charter of the company. Next was organized the National Refiners' Association, controlling four-fifths of the country's output. It was really a pool formed to limit production, and fix the price of crude petroleum and the market for refined oil. It operated a year, and was dissolved in 1873 because it was believed that some members did not live up to their agreements. It ended the second attempt of Rockefeller to monopolize the oil business.

**Company
Dissolved.**

He was not discouraged, but he abandoned the hopes of succeeding through coöperation. His success in the Cleveland field pointed out a better way, *i.e.* the establishment of ownership or direct control by the Standard. Then followed nine years of patient work for that end. It rested fundamentally on the surpassing success of the Standard as a manufacturer.

**Nine Years
of Expan-
sion.**

Waste was eliminated, by-products were utilized as never before, barrels were made in its own cooperage plants, and its own cars and docks at the seaboard showed how much it was disposed to cheapen its transportation bills. Meanwhile, rebates were always secured. But year after year the Standard got its hands on an increasing number of its competitors. Some it bought outright, some it induced to join forces, others it leased, and in every case it was careful that the acquisition should be kept secret. In 1882 this process was complete. The ideal of fifteen years was accomplished and the oil interests of the

country were united, and Rockefeller was at their head. It but remained to organize into a corporation the various properties so painfully brought into one circle. It was then that the trust was formally created.

The nine years of consolidation were nine years of warfare. All the tricks of the competitive régime were here produced, and on a vastly larger scale. Underselling was now resorted to with the surety of crushing the object aimed at, whereas in the régime of smaller traders it was always doubtful how it would result. The power of wealth was massed to crush him who dared oppose the combination. Promises were violated as freely as in the days when thirty salesmen stalked one buyer. And when the combination was successful it raised prices to the level of great profits, which, however, were not so high as in the days of many producers. The people have not yet decided whether or not the combination was economically successful, but they are agreed that it was relentlessly organized and that it is a natural monopoly.

In 1882 Rockefeller had secretly brought into his system thirty-nine important refiners, producing three-fourths of the oil of the country, and he proceeded to bring them into a unified control. First were organized four Standard Oil companies, one each in Ohio, New York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania, and they took over the property of the combination in the respective states. This feature of the plan was public, and existed by state charter. To get further union, a central organization was established. Nine directors of the Standard Oil Trust were appointed, Rockefeller at their head, and to them the holders of stock in the four companies surrendered their certificates, receiving in return certificates for similar amounts of stock in the trust. The trust directors could not sell the stock they took, but held it in trust for the owners, who, however, could not demand it back. The trust directors received into their hands all the profits of the constituent companies and paid them out to the holders of trust certificates. Other companies besides the four mentioned were taken into the trust on the same terms. Each constituent company retained ostensibly the management of its own business, but in fact it yielded to the suggestion of the central directors, who were chosen from the men prominent in the companies. The Standard Oil Trust was probably the most powerful business organization in the country, yet it existed without a charter, by private agreement, and was so secret that its existence was not known outside of Standard Oil circles until 1888.

Then followed an Ohio suit to annul the charter of the constituent company in that state: for Ohio law forbade a state corporation to surrender control to parties outside of the state. The suit was won, but the oil men got leniency by promising to dissolve the trust. They dallied about this for some years,

**Trust
Dissolved.**

but at last took refuge in a New Jersey charter. The capital stock of the constituent company for New Jersey was enlarged from \$10,000,000 to \$110,000,000, and the trust was dissolved, the whole property going to the great New Jersey corporation.

Long before Rockefeller proved that the manufacture of an article could be successfully monopolized, other men were establishing combinations on the trust plan. The movement became strong late in the eighties. Some enterprises were established on insecure bases, and in the panic of 1893 many were seriously crippled. Revived prosperity in 1898-1902 brought another wave of trust formation. One ambitious scheme was the International Marine Company. It took over at extravagant cash prices some of the leading transatlantic lines. Another was the United States Shipbuilding Company, which sold stocks and bonds on the false assertion that influential foreigners had bought them. The "millionaire's panic," as the stringency of 1903 was called, sent several of these ventures into bankruptcy. Those that survived profited by a period of legal restriction and by the experience of the years.

The organization of trusts presented an excellent opportunity for stock speculation. In most cases the plants of the combining companies represented only a part of the stock in the new concerns. The rest represented the increased earning capacity of the new enterprise, popularly known as "water." The owners of assimilated plants were paid in bonds, preferred and common stock of the trust, and in some cases in cash. To launch a trust required a certain amount of cash, and it was usually got from a banker in exchange for more than an equal amount of securities in the trust. Thus when such an enterprise began there were in the hands of the bankers and the former owners of the component companies a large amount of securities which it was desired to sell to the public. The occasion favored stock manipulation, and the public got the impression that the opportunity was accepted by many men inside the trust directorates. When in 1903 the press began to speak of the "undigested securities" of the newly organized enterprises, a certain prominent financier made the apt remark that they were "indigestible securities."

The organization of trusts elicited a great deal of opposition, not only from the small competitors who were forced out of business, but from a public which sympathized instinctively with the losers. This accumulating dislike was manifest in politics and occasioned the investigations of 1888. The facts then revealed were short of the truth; for it was sometimes impossible to inspect the books of the trusts, and some of the officials of these great companies refused to testify lest they incriminate themselves. But enough was discovered to show how relentless was the war on small competitors. The issue became so important in the election of

Other
Trusts.

Connected
with Stock
Speculation.

Opposition
to Trusts.

1888 that both political parties were impelled to take action. December 4, 1889, Senator Sherman introduced the measure now known as the Sherman Anti-Trust Law, which passed July 2, 1890, by a large non-partisan vote. It declared illegal all contracts to create monopolies in restraint of competition and made it a misdemeanor punishable by a \$5000 fine or a year's imprisonment to enter into such a contract. The law was of wide scope. It included logically any combination which tended to monopolize the output of the branch of industry to which it applied. It made no attempt to distinguish between good and bad combinations. It was felt that it was passed to satisfy a shallow popular demand, and for several years little disposition was shown to execute it. It was to be the basis of later efforts, but that is a part of another movement.

BANK CONSOLIDATION

The progress of trusts suggested the consolidation of banking interests, and in this Rockefeller took the lead. About 1890 he and other Standard Oil men acquired control of the National City Bank in New York and increased its capital stock until at last it was \$25,000,000, only \$10,000,000 less than that of the bank which Jackson destroyed in 1836. Then began a series of extensions. Sometimes another bank was bought outright, sometimes it merged with the National City Bank, and sometimes it was merely controlled by having the majority of its stock come into the hands of persons prominent in the affairs of that institution. About fifty powerful banks in various cities are said to have been drawn into this circle. The dozen of these in New York are organized in two groups, or "chains," containing, besides banks, trust companies and insurance companies. The two "chains" had in 1903 a combined capital of \$108,000,000, and combined deposits of \$474,000,000. Side by side with it grew up another great system headed by J. P. Morgan and Company, including three "chains" with capital in 1903 of \$97,000,000 and deposits of \$472,000,000. The two great systems controlled \$205,000,000 of the \$451,000,000 of banking capital in the city. So vast is their power that it is doubtful if any great business enterprise could be started successfully without their help. When the tendency to bank consolidation became apparent much was said about "the money trust," with power over every other trust. It was alleged that by contracting or expanding the bank reserves it could put up or down the prices of stocks as suited the interests of its speculating owners. Such a trust was pronounced the climax of all the movements toward combination. The passage of time has not brought the predicted evils, and it is certain that the concentration of banking capital has facilitated the support of the money market in

times of panic. In 1912 the Pujo committee, by order of congress, investigated the "money trust." After taking much testimony it was not able to say that such an organization exists; but it made evident a number of evils which have grown up in connection with the strong coöperation that exists among the great banking interests.

COMBINATIONS OF LABORERS

When agriculture was the chief American industry, most of the laborers were engaged in it. But the development of manufactures, mining, mechanical operations, trade, and transportation has been rapid and has tended to correct the preponderance of agricultural laborers. In 1870 our agriculturalists were 47.5 per cent of the persons engaged in gainful occupations, in 1880 they were 44.1 per cent, in 1890 they were 38.1 per cent, and in 1900 they were 35.3 per cent; while the non-agriculturalist classes just mentioned were 31.1 per cent in 1870, 32.4 per cent in 1880, 38.5 per cent in 1890, and 40.6 per cent in 1900. As this second group constitutes the laborers usually organized into unions, it will be seen how the significance of the labor problem grows with the relative increase of the non-agricultural laboring class.

**Numbers of
Employees.**

Local labor unions existed in the United States from the beginning of the nineteenth century. In 1850 the printers founded the first national union, and by 1860 twenty-five other trades were similarly organized. The civil war did not interrupt the process, and in 1866 a national labor union was established, chiefly to agitate for an eight-hour law for federal employees. It got its desire in 1869, but the act was long unenforced. In 1872 the national organization essayed more active political partisanship and fell into confusion. Laborers were not willing to give up political associations at the behest of the labor leaders.

**Early Labor
Unions.**

In 1869 Uriah S. Stephens, a Philadelphia garment cutter, established the Knights of Labor, a secret organization. It received members irrespective of trades and aimed to have a grand army of laborers, strong enough to force the world to respect their rights. The founder insisted on secrecy, but some of the members opposed him in this respect and won their battle in 1881. A leader in the new faction was Terence V. Powderly, twice elected mayor of Scranton, Pennsylvania, and destined to be for several years grand master of the Knights. He had real ability, and became in Cleveland's second administration head of the national immigration bureau. After 1881 the organization gained in membership. The ideal of a strong militant movement for labor pleased the workingmen, and local chapters were established in all parts of the country. These developments attracted much attention, particularly among the politicians, and great fears were entertained lest it should

**The Knights
of Labor.**

become a ruling force in politics. Under this impression its membership was greatly exaggerated. In 1886 rumor put it at 5,000,000, which was seven times the right number. The leaders of the Knights were themselves carried away at the prospect of great power, they countenanced the alarm of the outside world and worked zealously for the extension of membership. In 1886 they had thus taken

**A Violent
Element.**

in many men of radical ideas, some of them anarchists recently arrived in the country. The conservative element were able to stop the influx of such men by suspending the enlistment of members, but those already admitted urged a violent policy, stimulated the resentment of the rank and file of the order against capitalists, and carried into operation several ill-advised strikes. They led a movement for a general eight-hour day, and May 1, 1886, was set for the time at which labor would put it into force. When the employers generally refused to yield, a great many small and some large strikes followed. Much confusion existed, but the object of the strikers was not attained.

In April a great strike occurred on the railroads of the Gould system centering in St. Louis. It began when the Texas and Pacific, one of the roads in the system, discharged a foreman for cause at Fort Worth. The officials of the Knights ordered a strike because he was not reinstated on demand. It soon extended to the whole system, and the situation became critical in St. Louis. Here the Knights of Labor were under the influence of Martin Irons, a violent man who kept his supporters keyed up to a high pitch of excitement. The strikers resorted to violence and set at defiance the small detachment of federal troops sent to the city. Special constables sworn in for the occasion were not very effective, the mob spirit grew, railroad property was burned, factories were closed, and innocent persons were killed and wounded by the officers. After several weeks of disorder the strike failed, through the exhaustion of the strikers.

The other great strike was in Chicago, where freight handlers demanded an eight-hour day, and it finally involved 60,000 persons.

In the city were many desperate people, victims of wrong in every part of the world, and some of them were Knights of Labor. Two, professed anarchists, edited newspapers, the *Alarm*, by Parsons, and the *Arbeiter Zeitung*, by Spies.

Both papers incited the strikers to violence, Parsons going so far as to urge the use of dynamite to dispose of "rich loafers who live by the sweat of other people's brows." The authorities became alarmed, probably unnecessarily so, and on May 4 undertook to disperse an anarchists' meeting in Haymarket Square. A bomb from the crowd fell among the police, killing seven and wounding sixty. Many anarchists were arrested and tried for their lives. Seven were convicted, of whom four were hanged, one committed suicide in prison,

and two had sentence commuted to life imprisonment. The country generally was shocked at the appearance of anarchy in America and approved of the convictions, although the evidence was circumstantial. Friends of the prisoners claimed that guilt was not proved. Eight years later Governor Altgeld, in sympathy with the cause of labor, pardoned the two life prisoners. He believed their guilt was not established and that they were victims of popular excitement. His action was widely condemned.

The conservative Knights realized the discredit their order received from the violent element, and tried to remedy it. They did not succeed, and the result was large secessions from the organization. A rival movement was about to supplant it. In 1881 was formed a Federation of Trades and Labor Unions, the idea of which was that members of the same trades should organize in their respective interests. They were lost sight of in the rapid development of the Knights of Labor, but with the decline of that body after 1886 they came into greater prominence. They then reorganized as the American Federation of Labor, whose subsequent growth has been remarkable. In 1910 it reported a membership of 2,000,000, while the Knights of Labor in 1903 had dwindled to 40,000. The future of combined labor in the United States seems to lie with the federative rather than the integrated plan.

**American
Federation
of Labor.**

The revival of prosperity after 1886 brought relief from strikes, but the depression which followed the panic of 1893 saw their recurrence. There were many unemployed men, and much suffering existed in the winter of 1893-1894. In the following spring a small strike in the Pullman Car works at Chicago was the beginning of a great conflict. The company felt the influence of the hard times and undertook to reduce the wages of 4000 employees, members of the American Railway Union, a powerful and well managed organization. The union supported its members and demanded arbitration. The company declared that the question was one of fact, and that there was nothing to arbitrate. A strike followed, and the union ordered that no train should run which carried a Pullman car. The roads entering Chicago decided on joint opposition, and the union tied up successfully all the lines running from the city to the West. Crowds of strikers impeded the operation of trains, and groups of violent people, with whom the strikers alleged they had nothing to do, pillaged freight cars. Governor Altgeld, in sympathy with the strikers, refused to call out the militia on the ground that it was not needed. When property owners were in terror lest the lawless element get the upper hand, President Cleveland intervened, sending federal troops to guard the mail trains and secure the safety of interstate commerce. Altgeld protested, saying that the railroads could not run trains because they could not get men. The facts were otherwise. They had the necessary men, but the strikers prevented

**The Pull-
man Strike,
1894.**

their employment. Cleveland's action was undoubtedly an unusual extension of the power of the central government, but it was such a one as may occur again if the state authorities show an unwillingness to protect property. In this as in other strikes the public showed a growing impatience at having to pay the cost of strikes, and were disposed to demand that labor and capital should not go wantonly into so expensive a means of settling difficulties.

During the Pullman strike the railroads resorted to "blanket injunctions," issued against officers of the union and any other persons whatever. They forbade interference with railroad property, and with the use of it, and they were attached to cars, buildings, and anything else likely to be the object of interference. Eugene V. Debs, president of the American Railway Union, was sent to prison for six months for contempt of court because he ignored such an injunction. In the beginning the roads had much sympathy from the public, but the resort to injunctions alarmed many serious person. In issuing them, it was held, the courts usurped executive functions and lost sight of the original purpose of injunctions, which were merely remedial and not intended to afford a method of criminal procedure. In recent labor controversies, injunctions have not been so freely used.

Labor unions were once opposed by employers as strenuously as the general public formerly opposed trusts; but with the passage of time the opposition to each has become less bitter. This is possibly partly due to a conviction that each is inevitable. It seems also true that there is a more general recognition that each form of concentration has come to be recognized as useful in some ways. It is to be said, further, that of late both labor unions and trusts have come to realize to some extent their responsibility to the public. The opening of the twentieth century witnessed the beginning of a mighty political struggle for the public control of combinations of all kinds, a contest whose history must be reserved for another chapter.

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CHAPTER XXXVI

LAST PHASES OF THE SILVER MOVEMENT

THE BLAND LAW IN OPERATION

Small Silver Notes. THE \$2,000,000 in silver coined each month under the Bland law circulated readily in the West and South, where much of the business was done on credit and a small volume of money was sufficient for cash demands. In other parts of the country larger quantities of cash were needed, and the people demanded it in a less bulky form than silver dollars. Silver was, therefore, left in the banks, which sent it to the sub-treasuries, until in 1885 the accumulation in government vaults was \$100,000,000. To force this out the secretary resorted to strategy. He noticed that greenbacks of small denominations remained in the hands of the public longer than larger ones, and he resolved to try to keep in circulation small silver notes secured by the accumulated silver dollars. He first withheld small greenbacks until they were scarce in the channels of trade: then he asked congress to authorize the proposed small silver notes, and in 1886 the permission was reluctantly given. Two years later he had issued \$34,000,000 of these certificates and was withholding a like sum of greenbacks. Coin for these new notes was being stored in the treasury, but the real owners of it were the holders of the notes.

Silver Forced Out. The success of this experiment was helped by the shrinkage of the volume of bank notes through the rise in price of bonds. At existing prices banks preferred to sell the bond securing their circulation, and it happened that from 1886 to 1890 the currency was diminished by \$126,000,000 in bank notes, most of it in \$5 and \$10 denominations. At the same time, 1889-1893, came a wave of prosperity. Business demanded more money and was willing to take even the bulky silver. It resulted that whereas in the years 1878-1886 only \$150,000,000 in silver and silver certificates was put into circulation, in the next four years \$200,000,000 was put out successfully, and the silver in the vaults was reduced to \$20,000,000. Most men concluded that the readiness with which silver circulated showed it a satisfactory kind of money.

Meanwhile, the free silver movement was not dead. It revived with the reappearance of hard times in 1885 and a free coinage bill was brought into the house and lacked only 37 votes of passing.

The argument supporting it was simple: If times were hard, there should be more money; and since silver was considered good money by its friends, there ought to be more silver. It mattered nothing that silver bullion had fallen in value steadily since the passage of the Bland-Allison act and was now selling at 95 cents an ounce, the intrinsic value of a silver dollar being 80 cents. It must be remembered that although at this time silver sentiment was strongest in the democratic party, it also had a strong hold on the republicans, and neither party dared pronounce against it. Its supporters were a compact group, conscious of their strength and determined to lose no opportunity to win their battle.

Revived
Silver Sentiment.

The introduction of the McKinley tariff bill in 1889 gave them the desired opportunity. It was evident it could not pass the senate without the consent of the Far West. It gave ample protection to the manufacturer, wool grower, and sugar producers, but the silver senators found little in it for their constituents, and they let it be known that they would not vote for it unless something were done for silver. Secretary Windom, of Minnesota, had not the Eastern fear of silver and he was a good politician. In his annual report, 1889, he suggested that the government take all the silver bullion offered and make payment in silver notes. He thought not more than \$37,000,000 a year would be received. Others thought the amount would be much greater. It was evident that the silver men had the power to carry through a radical measure, and the conservatives prepared to make concessions.

Bargain
with the
Tariff Men.

In the house the latter brought in a bill to coin \$4,500,000 a month, and so little were the gold advocates prepared to dispute it that it passed the day after it came up for consideration. It went to the senate along with the tariff bill. The silver senators now controlled the situation; they substituted a free coinage bill, laid the tariff bill on the table, and awaited results. The situation was tense, for it was believed Harrison would veto a free silver bill, in which case the silver senators would defeat the tariff bill. The silver bill went to conference, where, by much address and largely through the efforts of Senator Sherman, a compromise was arranged. It provided that 4,500,000 ounces of silver be bought monthly and paid for in notes redeemable in gold or silver at the option of the government. The law contained the following clause: "It being the established policy of the United States to maintain the two metals on a parity with each other upon the present legal ratio, or such ratio as may be provided by law." These words were ambiguous. If they meant the government would keep gold and silver on a parity and pay gold for silver notes they implied a gold standard: if they meant the government would see that the two metals circulated on a parity in the nation, they implied bimetallism. Secretary Carlisle, three years later, gave the law the former interpretation,

Sherman
Silver Law,
1890.

much to the disappointment of the friends of silver, who insisted that he should pay out both metals in order to maintain parity. The silver purchase law of 1890 passed by a party vote. The democrats felt no obligation to support a law which fell short of free coinage, and the republicans, the Eastern men included, must obey the will of the silver senators.

The victory of the silver men was facilitated by the recent admission of four new states, North and South Dakota, Washington, and Montana. They had been hurriedly granted statehood in 1889 in the belief that they would add to the republican majority. The elections verified these expectations in all the states but Montana, which the democrats carried; but all their senators and representatives were silver men regardless of party. In 1890 the republicans, with the aid of some silver democrats in congress, admitted two more states, Idaho and Wyoming. They thought the currency issue would soon pass, while their gain in the senate would be permanent.

Utah, whose population of 207,905 well qualified her for statehood, also applied and was rejected on account of polygamy. A conflict had long existed between its Mormon and non-Mormon inhabitants, the nation sympathizing with the latter. In 1882 congress passed a law against polygamy, which was not enforced. In 1887 a sterner law authorized the confiscation of the property of the Mormon church if it resisted the laws of congress. The ecclesiastics now became alarmed. In 1890 President Woodruff, their highest official, renounced polygamy, and later in the year the church did the same. Non-Mormons doubted the sincerity of this action, and it was not until 1895 that congress would relent and admit Utah to the benefits and privileges of a state. It took its place among the free silver states, but at this time the conflict had ceased to be important in congress and was chiefly waged in presidential campaigns.

THE LAST YEARS OF HARRISON

The congressional session of 1889-1890 lasted until October, and ended in an ominous storm of protest which found its expression in the elections. The result was a republican defeat. The two years following were unfavorable for business, and the popular dissatisfaction survived until it overwhelmed Harrison in the election of 1892. Much of this was due to distrust of the republican organization, definitely in the hands of Quay and Platt. Against this condition Harrison, an upright man and a capable lawyer, was not able to contend. He had little power of mastering men, and the impression so widely current that he began his administration under the tutelage of the party organization was

Six New
States,
1889-1890.

Utah
refused
Admission.

Harrison's
Unpopu-
larity.

not far wrong. His appointment of John Wanamaker to a cabinet position smacked of Quay. Probably his most unwise action was the appointment of Clarkson first assistant postmaster-general, who wrote in glee, February, 1890: "I have changed 31,000 out of the 55,000 fourth-class postmasters and I expect to change 10,000 more before I finally quit. I expect before the end of the month to see five-sixths of the presidential postmasters changed. Then I can paraphrase old Simeon, and say, 'Let thy servant depart in peace.'" Harrison incurred further criticism because he appointed several of his family connections to office. He made few friends, and knew not how to seek popularity. His relation to "Old Tip," his grandfather, which was expected to be an advantage, proved to be an embarrassment. It seemed to suggest aristocracy, and was unmercifully lampooned by the cartoonists, who always depicted him as a small gentleman with a prominent forehead over which hung an immense "grandfather's hat."

Spite of this, it was evident as 1892 approached that Harrison was the logical republican candidate. He was responsibly associated with every measure for which the party had incurred criticism. If he were now thrown overboard, it would amount to a repudiation of the work of the party in congress. This view was accepted by most of the party, but Quay and Platt were of another mind. In the last two years of the administration Harrison showed signs of repudiating them. He dismissed "Corporal" Tanner and listened less kindly to the suggestions of the organization men. These leaders, therefore, looking for an opposition candidate, turned to Blaine, who, although a member of Harrison's cabinet, was not on cordial terms with him. He was physically weak and mentally exhausted. He had no relish for another campaign of abuse, and his family were as unwilling for him to be a candidate as he himself. Yet the scent of battle aroused the old war feeling, and it was with reluctance that he turned aside the advances of Quay. The public, speculating on his intentions, concluded he would not stand against Harrison as long as he was in the cabinet. Quay watched the situation with little comfort.

Harrison
and Blaine.

The nominating convention met at Minneapolis, June 7, 1892. Three days earlier Blaine resigned his secretaryship in the shortest possible note, leaving the public to guess whether he had tardily decided to seek the nomination or merely wished to discredit Harrison at a critical moment. If he meant the former he had waited too long. His action had no other effect than to throw the opponents of the president into confusion as they were about to go into battle. They did not recover command of the situation before their opponents carried Harrison to victory on the first ballot, with Whitelaw Reid, editor of the New York *Tribune*, candidate for the vice-presidency.

Harrison
Nominated.

Meantime, the democrats were about to assemble in convention at Chicago, and a resistless drift of opinion was again making Cleveland their leader. His defeat in 1888 was received by the Gorman and Hill faction with ill concealed satisfaction. He seemed utterly repudiated, and his opponents looked forward to an era of unopposed control. They ignored him as a party leader and spoke with affected sympathy of his unhappy indiscretion. He, however, paid little attention to their attitude, devoted himself to his profession, made some money, and contented himself with performing the duties of a citizen. As early as the end of 1890 the reactions against the McKinley tariff showed that the next campaign would be fought on the tariff issue, and at once Cleveland began to be considered the logical democratic leader.

**Position of
Cleveland.**

Gorman and Hill were appalled at the prospect, but almost immediately relief seemed to come. The silver issue was not removed

**His Letter
on Free
Coinage.**

from the arena by the Sherman purchase law. The free silver West was more active than ever, and the East in alarm was trying to develop antisilver sentiment. In accordance with that design the New York Reform Club held a meeting of business men in February, 1891, inviting Cleveland to be present. He did not attend, but sent a letter in which he said: "If we have developed an unexpected capacity for the assimilation of a largely increased volume of the currency, and even if we have demonstrated the usefulness of such an increase, these conditions fall far short of insuring us against disaster if, in the present situation, we enter upon the dangerous and reckless experiment of free, unlimited, and independent silver coinage." This lumbering sentence left no doubt of his position, and was quoted far and wide. It won applause from friends of gold and denunciation from silver men. The latter were strong in the democratic party, and it seemed that their opposition must prove the end of Cleveland's chances for the nomination. Again his opponents pronounced him dead, but the end of the year brought a change of view. Each party was hopelessly divided on silver, and neither could throw aside the tariff issue for any other fighting ground. The autumn elections in Ohio and in some other states showed democratic gains on that issue and the party dared not drop it. If Cleveland's plan of battle was used, he was the logical battle leader.

His opponents concentrated their strength on Hill, and Gorman, leader of the party caucus in Washington, gave full support. To carry this plan through it was necessary that the New York nominating convention should indorse it. The New Year's festivities were hardly over when Hill called a meeting of the state convention for February 22, 1892, thinking by this early meeting to control the election of the delegates. The Cleveland men refused to take part in the "Snap Convention." After

**Hill's Can-
didacy.**

a solid Hill delegation was chosen on February 22 the "Anti-Snappers" called a convention of their own and sent a protesting delegation to Chicago. It was evident that if Hill were the nominee, he would be defeated in his own state by the strong independent movement which his ill-advised action had aroused.

The democratic party in the West and South was in a transition stage. Discredited by its position in the civil war, it had difficulty in reestablishing its influence after the return of peace. Its first success in 1874 was won through the mistakes of its opponents, and this was true of most of its victories during the next decade and a half. In this period its leadership was timid, and its policies were devised with an idea of taking advantage of the mistakes of its opponents. Cleveland, as we have seen, stood for positive ideas; but they were the ideas of the East. Throughout the West and South the leaders were still men of expediency in national matters. By 1890 there had developed in these sections a party of young democrats, a second group who desired positive policies and disliked the leadership of Cleveland. Both groups favored free silver, but the older men were not willing to risk losing the support of the East, while the younger ones were tired of deferring to New York and its neighbors. In 1892 the young men were not quite willing to throw over the counsel of older leaders, and so when the older men decided that the old alliance should be maintained they submitted, but it was with misgivings. They eventually regretted their action, but in the campaign then upon them they subordinated their views to party welfare, recognized the tariff as the supreme issue, and united in support of Cleveland as party leader. The Eastern leaders did not appreciate how deep and earnest this movement was and how much it was likely to mar their plans in the future.

**The West-
ern and
Southern
Democrats.**

The democratic convention assembled at Chicago, June 21. Hill's friends worked hard for their candidate, and Bourke Cochran put him forward in an eloquent speech whose burden was that he could carry New York. On the tariff and on silver Hill was inconclusive, and his oft-quoted declaration, "I am a democrat," meant that he was a party man who would give the politicians their way. Against the well-recognized honesty of Cleveland he could make no headway, and on the first ballot the former president got the nomination by the two-thirds majority which the party habitually demands in such a case. For vice-president the convention endorsed Adlai E. Stevenson, of Illinois, who was in sympathy with the old-school democrats of the West.

**Cleveland
Nominated.**

While the aggressive element of the West and South was thus held in check in the democratic party, radicalism in these sections burst party bounds and launched a third party. For several years there had been much dissatisfaction among the farmers. Low prices of

cotton and grain had much to do with their conduct, and so this was added a belief that both the old parties were insincere in professing friendship for silver and for poor people generally. The movement began in organizations for the general social development of country people, but it soon became political. It was chiefly expressed in the Farmers' Alliance, which had two great branches, one in the South and one in the Northwest. Its leaders were sometimes men who had failed to maintain themselves in one of the old parties, but they were mostly young men of ability and devotion. They first went into active politics in 1890 when they carried the legislatures of Kansas and Nebraska and elected nine Farmers' Alliance members of congress and forced thirty-four others, democrats and republicans, to pledge themselves to carry out the ideas of the farmers' movement. In 1892 they called a great convention at Cincinnati, and with the coöperation of the labor unions organized the people's party. This meeting called a party convention in Omaha in the following July, at which General J. B. Weaver, green-back candidate in 1880, was nominated on a platform including free silver, public ownership of monopolies, postal savings banks, and an income tax. It did not hope to carry the presidency, but by uniting locally with democrats or republicans as the opportunity offered it made a strong impression on the campaign. It carried several state legislatures and sent five senators to Washington. It injured the republicans more than the democrats, for although it cut into the democratic vote in the South the large majorities there were safe against such losses, while the narrower margins of the republicans in the West were sometimes wiped out by populist defection. On the main issue of the campaign, the contest between Cleveland and Harrison, it had little effect.

Between these two men the campaign was a quiet one. It was marked by an unusual rising of educated men for Cleveland, now more than ever the hero of the reformers. College professors and theoretical free traders favored him and freely declared themselves for his election. They gave his side the appearance of radicalism, which his managers eventually found it necessary to deny, and they created hopes which, after his election, could not be realized. During the summer there was a labor disturbance at Homestead, near Pittsburg, where the employees of the Carnegie Steel Company went on strike because wages were reduced and the union was not recognized. Rioting began, and the employees fought to hold their places against strike breakers. Fearing the labor vote the governor would not call out the militia until conditions became alarming. It then took the entire citizen soldiery, 8000 strong, to restore order. The affair was widely discussed in the country; the Carnegie Company was a dominating factor in the steel industry, one of the best protected manufactures, and the feeling

The
People's
Party.

The Cam-
paign of
1892.

aroused against it on behalf of labor operated against the high tariff party. Cleveland's rugged personality also played a strong part in the election. He was in such striking contrast with Harrison, the man of quiet and even honesty, that he seemed to many people the only hero of the struggle. His success was generally conceded long before the election. He got 277 electoral votes, Harrison 145, and Weaver 22. The popular vote was Cleveland 5,556,543, Harrison 5,175,582, and Weaver 1,040,886. The democrats also carried both houses of congress. They were surprised at the magnitude of their own victory, and they might well have trembled, for it placed heavy obligations upon them.

CLEVELAND AND THE PANIC OF 1893

Cleveland could hardly be expected to call members of the Hill faction or Western silver men into this cabinet. He turned, therefore, as in 1885, to the South, the independents, and the less widely known of the Northern democrats. The composition of the cabinet was as follows: W. Q. Gresham, of Illinois, secretary of state, John G. Carlisle, of Kentucky, secretary of the treasury, Daniel S. Lamont, of New York, secretary of war, Hilary A. Herbert, of Alabama, secretary of the navy, Richard Olney, of Massachusetts, attorney-general, W. S. Bissell, of New York, postmaster-general, Hoke Smith, of Georgia, secretary of the interior, and J. S. Morton, who led the antisilver democrats of Nebraska, secretary of agriculture. Gresham had been a republican until 1891, and was appointed in recognition of the support of the independents. Taking him widened the breach between Cleveland and the Gorman-Hill faction. Lamont had been his private secretary in the first term and Bissell was an old law partner. Cleveland had not a broad range of ideas, nor was he widely acquainted with party leaders, and in each of his administrations he had as many personal friends in the cabinet as he dared.

The
Cabinet.

Financial difficulties met the administration at its very beginning. In January, 1893, the gold reserve was only \$108,000,000 and the steady demand to meet the European balance of trade was sure to send it lower before March 4. Moreover, it would be seven months before another cotton and grain crop went abroad, and meantime Europe, on account of the business depression, was selling American securities. There was likelihood that a long period of gold exportation would follow. The public was so accustomed to think that \$100,000,000 was the safety point for the reserve that it was felt that alarm would surely ensue if it went below, and there was danger that fears once aroused gold would be hoarded. Harrison realized all this but felt the problem was not his. He would be satisfied if the crisis did not come before March 4. To that end Foster, his secretary of the treasury, induced the New

The Panic
of 1893.

York banks, at the close of January, to exchange \$6,000,000 gold for legal tenders and when he surrendered office two months later the reserve was \$100,982,410. The new secretary, Carlisle, could think of no better plan than Foster's, and throughout the spring cajoled the banks into a surrender of coin. Meantime, money became very tight and there came a sudden check of the wave of speculation which for four years had followed the creation of trusts and the marketing of many highly inflated securities. The most notable collapse was the National Cordage Company, which paid a stock dividend of 100 per cent five months before suspension. Throughout the summer panic conditions prevailed, interior banks could not extend their loans, and there were over 400 bank failures, the large majority being in the West. In our financial history 1893 has as black a name as 1873.

The government feared that the public would lose confidence and hoard gold in the expectation that specie payment must be suspended; and this fear was promoted by the Sherman silver purchase law.

Under it the treasury issued nearly twice as much currency a month as under the Bland-Allison law, and it was not absorbed by the business of the country as formerly, first because of its increased volume, second because of less prosperous business conditions, and third because after the enactment of the McKinley tariff the surplus disappeared, bonds ceased to be purchased, and bank notes ceased to be retired. Increasing the currency beyond the necessities of business enlarged the volume of partially employed notes which might be used to draw gold out of the treasury.

The silver men thought the reserve might be protected by redeeming the silver certificates in silver, but this would undoubtedly depreciate such notes, then one-third of the currency, and give an impetus to gold hoarding. In April a rumor got abroad that the treasury would make such redemption: it caused serious disturbance in the money market, and both Cleveland and Carlisle hastened to declare publicly that they would give gold for the silver notes. They held that this was necessary to maintain the parity of the notes. Their opponents said it indicated how much the administration was under the heel of Wall Street speculators. April 17 the reserve passed below the \$100,000,000 figure and dwindled steadily as the exportation of gold continued. Meantime, the notes issued in exchange for stored silver bullion were nearly \$4,000,000 a month. It was more and more evident that the law of 1890 ought to be repealed. The mere hint of such a thing enraged those who fervently hoped for more money. Cleveland gave little heed to their violence. He was by temperament immovable before popular clamor, and he now waited until it was evident that conservative people realized the source of their danger; and June 30 he called an extra session of congress for August 7, 1893, to consider the currency.

Operation
of the
Sherman
Law

Maintaining
Parity.

Business distress was now acute. In June the New York clearing house issued certificates in lieu of money. In the same month the Erie railroad failed, and news came that India had demonetized silver. Bullion fell in one week from 75 to 61 cents an ounce. In August currency was at 3 per cent premium and banks would cash depositors' checks only for small amounts. While these conditions were severest, the extra session began. Cleveland spoke plainly in his message, and the house by a majority of 130, chiefly from the East and Middle West, passed a repealing bill in three weeks. In the senate the friends of silver were in the minority, but they filibustered in the hope of a compromise. The senate eschewed closure, and the debate dragged along through September and October. Continuous sessions were tried, but the lusty champions of silver displayed more endurance than their adversaries expected, Allen, of Nebraska, speaking fourteen hours without exhaustion. Finally on October 30 a vote was taken, and repeal was carried by a majority of 43 to 32.

Repeal of
the Sher-
man Law.

The Eastern papers were jubilant, and declared silver had "met its Waterloo." They were too confident. Bland announced in the house that the struggle would go on until free and unlimited coinage was established, and in the senate the silver senators, headed by Teller, of Colorado, passed into open opposition to their republican associates. The West and the South, distressed by the panic, were exceedingly bitter. The Sherman law had been to them in some sense a token of a compromising spirit in their relations with the rest of the country, and they considered its repeal an act of bad faith. Violent opponents charged that Cleveland secured it in the interest of the speculators and shared in the profits. There was not the slightest justification for the assertion.

Bitter Feel-
ing of the
West.

SELLING BONDS TO PROTECT THE SURPLUS

The repeal of the Sherman law only stopped the accumulation of danger. Business stagnation continued, revenues were still inadequate, and it was necessary to throw the silver notes back into circulation to meet the needs of government. The premium on currency in August brought a quantity of the metal to the country and the reserve went up to \$103,683,000; but under the drain of the time, it rapidly sank again, and October 19 it was only \$81,551,385, the lowest point since 1878. At the same time the monthly deficit of the revenue was \$7,000,000, and two months later the reserve was \$68,000,000. Up to this time there was little evidence of hoarding, and the mischief chiefly came from failure of revenue in connection with the redundant silver currency. But the public was showing signs of uneasiness, and Carlisle asked congress to allow him to borrow enough to tide over the deficiency of revenue.

A Waning
Reserve.

To the democratic congressmen this was but a cry from Wall Street, and they paid no heed.

The secretary then fell back on the resumption act of 1875, which specified that he should sell bonds to maintain specie payment. The day for which it was made was long past, but he held that it was in force until repealed, and January 17, 1894, he offered \$50,000,000 in 5 per cent bonds for gold. Loud protests from the silver faction greeted the announcement, but he ignored it. He was more concerned with the financial world, which sent in bids for only one-fifth of the amount offered. He went to New York, and with difficulty persuaded the banks to take the rest at $117\frac{1}{4}$, which was low for 5 per cents. Of the \$58,660,000 in gold received in the transaction \$24,000,000 had been taken from the treasury within a few days in exchange for notes. The net gain, \$34,660,000, restored the reserve to \$107,000,000 on March 6, 1894, when it began at once to fall again.

To the ordinary spring exportations of gold were now added other sources of distress. The corn crop of 1894 failed, and Europe's wheat crop was enormous, so that our exports were smaller than usual. At the same time the Wilson-Gorman bill disappointed its creators and gave a deficit, for which the failure of the income tax was not altogether responsible.

More than this, in the summer of 1894 Europe sold our securities briskly and demanded gold in payment. Thus it happened that when the reserve was depleted from that cause, and when it failed to get the usual reinforcement from the sale of the autumn crops abroad, it was, on account of the deficit, necessary to use some of the precious store in settlement of ordinary expenses of the government. By this means the reserve was \$52,000,000 on August 7 and in November another bond issue of \$50,000,000 was placed with a syndicate of bankers. Half of the gold received was at once drawn back in exchange for notes to take the place of that amount used in buying the bonds. Depletion continued, and by February, 1895, the reserve was \$41,000,000, and the head of the New York sub-treasury reported that he could maintain redemption hardly more than a day. The situation seemed desperate, with another period of spring gold exportation ahead. In every large city financiers were making ready for a depreciated currency, and funds were being retained for use in the emergency, when the news came that Cleveland had saved the situation.

Relief came through a contract with J. P. Morgan and Co. and the Belmont firm, who represented the Rothschilds, of Paris, by which they took \$62,000,000 thirty year four per cents at $104\frac{1}{2}$, or at par at three per cent if they were made payable in gold. The latter alternative needed the sanction of congress, but in that quarter it met a stern refusal. In the country at large the affair aroused much criticism. Four per

**Five Per
Cent Bonds.**

**Continued
Gold With-
drawals.**

**The Mor-
gan-Bel-
mont Agree-
ment.**

cents were selling about 111 and to place them now at 104½ seemed absurd. Eventually the transaction netted the bankers a profit of about thirteen points, more than seven millions. But Cleveland justified it because of two conditions in the contract. By one the bankers agreed to import half of the gold used in the purchase, and by the other to use their best endeavors to prevent the withdrawal of gold from the treasury during the pendency of the contract, a period of six months. By sharing the loan and the profits involved with the other New York banks they showed their ability to control the demands on the treasury and the foreign gold delivered was not immediately drawn out in what had come to be known as the "endless chain" process.

The effect of the contracts was to restore confidence. Commodity prices rose and stock speculation revived so rapidly that it overdid itself. In the end there was a sharp contraction which turned the balance of trade against us and led to renewed exportations of gold spite of the February agreement with the bankers. Cleveland now offered \$100,000,000 at four per cent to the highest bidder. Partly because of returning confidence and partly because of the great profit the bankers were believed to have made on the preceding transaction, there was a wide popular response. More than five times the amount offered was subscribed, and it was all placed at from 110½ to 120. After that time no more doubt was felt about the reserve.

**Confidence
Restored.**

The responsibility for the bond sales of 1895 must be shared by several agents. The law creating the reserve did not give it a special footing, but left it in the general fund so that it was liable to be drawn on for expenses when the ordinary revenue was inadequate. The McKinley tariff created just such an emergency, and the treasury paid back for expenses the notes received for gold, only to come back again in the "endless chain." The democratic congress was partly responsible because it failed to supply adequate revenue and because it championed silver so loudly that the feeling of apprehension was increased among the people. Finally, Cleveland and Carlisle were partly responsible because in the first place they showed hesitation, asking congress to declare specifically that bonds might be sold to maintain the reserve instead of assuming, as they did at last, that the power existed under the act of 1875. The whole incident is a painful episode in our history, but it came through a juxtaposition of confusing factors which will probably not come again for many years.

**Cause of
the Crisis.**

THE BRYAN CAMPAIGN FOR FREE SILVER, 1896

The events of 1895 destroyed the last shred of Cleveland's leadership. Silver men in the West and South and machine politicians in the East repudiated him, and the party was hopelessly divided. So fiercely was he denounced by democrats that the republicans no longer found it necessary to find fault with him. The profits of the Morgan-Belmont contract were supposed to be about \$7,000,000, and his enraged enemies would not believe he did not share them. No serious man who knew the situation entertained the suspicion.

Cleveland's
Unpopu-
larity.

The fall of Cleveland brought to supremacy the young democracy, silver through and through. They saw with satisfaction the republican tendency to espouse the gold standard and thought it would result in accessions from the silver republicans. They began their campaign with remarkable energy and devotion. March 4, 1895, they issued an address summoning all friends of silver to united action in the coming election. The call made a profound impression in the South and West, and the advocates of sound money, as the other side called themselves, sought to counteract it by calling a convention at Memphis, Tennessee. In June a silver convention in the same city declared enthusiastically for free and unlimited coinage of silver. To careful observers it was evident that the sound money convention represented the business men of the Southern and Western towns, while the silver convention represented the much more numerous farming and laboring classes. By the end of 1895 the silver movement was well organized and dominated the democratic party everywhere but in the East. The people of the East did not realize how powerful it had become.

Silver
Democrats
Organize.

At the nominating convention, Chicago, July 7, the silver men had entire control and took precaution lest the suspected Eastern leaders have the slightest opportunity to manipulate the convention. The national committee suggested Hill, of New York, for temporary chairman. The convention set him aside for Daniels, of Virginia, a trusted silver man. Platform committee, permanent chairman, credential committee, and every other test of strength went to them. The platform itself was all they wished, declaring for free and unlimited coinage of gold and silver at the ratio of sixteen to one. It was adopted by a vote of 628 to 301, and a motion to indorse Cleveland's administration was lost by a vote of 564 to 357.

Silver Men
in Control.

More important was the selection of a candidate. The silver forces wanted a man who would not compromise with the interests of the East, and suspected all men mentioned for the nomination, Blackburn, of Kentucky, McLean, of Ohio, and Boies, of Iowa, all old-school democrats with groups of supporters.

Looking for
a Leader.

They could not object on this score to Bland, of Missouri, who was also urged; but he was not a magnetic man, and for that reason they hesitated to support him. Another man who had friends was William Jennings Bryan, of Nebraska. In 1891 he appeared in congress, where he attracted attention as a prominent young democrat. He spoke well on the tariff and became identified with the free silver party. In the preliminary work of the campaign of 1896 he was a favorite with the West. In the struggle for the election of delegates from Nebraska to the convention he was defeated by J. Sterling Morton, Cleveland's secretary of agriculture, but he came to Chicago at the head of a contesting delegation which the convention promptly seated.

To most of the delegates Bryan was unknown when on July 9 he made a speech which sent the convention into raptures. The platform committee had just reported and the speakers were discussing it. First came Senator Tillman, of South Carolina, in full possession of his faculties and speaking for the silver men. He shouted, gesticulated, and filled the stifling air with abuse rather than argument. His friends were not in an exacting mood, but they could feel nothing but disappointment. Then rose Hill to speak for the East. He uttered short, logical sentences in an icy and hopeless manner. He was no orator, and the hostile audience barely tolerated him. Next came Governor Russell, of Massachusetts, and Vilas, of Wisconsin. Both spoke well for sound money, but the audience was in no mood to be pleased. Then rose Bryan. His words came slowly, distinctly, and with cutting force. Instantly the mass forgot its confusion, and the speech proceeded in profound stillness except for the outbursts of applause. Russell had used the term "business men" in the narrow sense common in the East. Bryan said: "You have made the definition of a business man too limited in its application. The man who is employed for wages is as much a business man as his employer. The attorney in a country town is as much a business man as the corporation counsel in a great metropolis. The merchant at the cross-roads store is as much a business man as the merchant of New York. The farmer who goes forth in the morning and toils all day — who begins in the spring and toils all summer — and who, by the application of brain and muscle to the natural resources of the country creates wealth, is as much a business man as the man who goes upon the board of trade and bets upon the price of grain. The miners who go down a thousand feet into the earth, or climb two thousand feet upon the cliffs, and bring forth from their hiding place the precious metals, to be poured into the channels of trade, are as much business men as the few financial magnates who, in a back room, corner the money of the world. We come to speak for this broader class of business men."

Bryan's
Convention
Speech.

These sentiments were the key of the Bryan movement. There had been much talk about protecting the manufacturers and safeguarding the financial interests. Nobody talked about the small business man, who had got the conviction that he was ignored. Bryan pleaded his cause in words small business men could understand. He knew little about finance, but much about human nature. His Chicago speech delighted every silver man in the convention. It brought forth a mad wave of approval, and on the first ballot he received 119 votes for the nomination against 235 for Bland, the most prominent of the silver men. He gained steadily on the second, third, and fourth ballots, and was nominated on the fifth by the necessary two-thirds majority. He was thirty-six years old, a young leader of the young democracy. Arthur Sewall, of Maine, a rich shipbuilder, was nominated for the vice-presidency.

Three weeks earlier, June 16, the republican convention met at St. Louis. The failure of the Wilson-Gorman law suggested the tariff for chief issue and McKinley for candidate. He was a straightforward, serious man, a good campaigner, a tactful and popular politician, and a friend of protection. He had a devoted supporter in Marcus A., or "Mark," Hanna, a rich Cleveland iron-master and politician. Early in the campaign Hanna determined that McKinley should be nominated, and set out to accomplish his purpose with businesslike thoroughness. He visited many parts of the country, and McKinley and protection was a persuasive argument when urged by the millionaire politician from the best protected city in the iron industry. The protected class generally acquiesced, and many mere politicians followed them. His quest for delegates was so successful that Hanna arrived at St. Louis with his pocket full of votes. He was accustomed to control whatever he touched, and his room now became the center of political activity. Men who had long been chief party counsellors came to it to know what was to be done.

One of the questions to be considered was the money plank in the platform. The drift of the democrats to silver produced among the republicans a similar movement toward gold. Hanna was personally for gold: the men to whom he appealed were for gold, but he dared not avow it too early lest it turn Western delegates from McKinley. Before the convention assembled he accepted a gold plank suggested by a group of Western business men, but he carefully concealed it. The Eastern men arrived keen for a declaration for the gold standard. When Hanna finally let it be known he was for gold, it seemed to the country that he accepted it reluctantly and to please the East; and this paved the way to a reconciliation of many Western republicans to the candidate. Thus Hanna steered his friend past the only serious

**Bryan
Nominated.**

**Mark
Hanna and
McKinley.**

**A Gold
Plank.**

**McKinley
Nominated.**

difficulty in his way and got him nominated on the first ballot with Garret A. Hobart, of New Jersey, for vice-president. At McKinley's request Hanna was appointed chairman of the campaign committee.

Adopting the gold plank caused the secession of the extreme silver republicans. As the vote was about to be taken Senator Teller, of Colorado, rose and delivered a touching appeal. He had been a republican from 1856 and had exerted much influence in the party. His motion for free coinage at sixteen to one was lost by a vote of 818 to 105. Then a hush fell on the vast assemblage, as with 33 others he left the hall in repudiation of the party. Among them were Senators Dubois, of Idaho, Cannon, of Utah, and Pettigrew, of South Dakota. From these three states and from Montana and Nevada came all the other seceders.

**Withdrawal
of the Silver
Republicans.**

Teller and his friends met in St. Louis, July 22, and organized the "National Silver Party," indorsing Bryan and Sewall. The people's party at the same place and time indorsed Bryan, but insisting on their own candidate for vice-president, selected Thomas E. Watson, of Georgia. The prohibitionists found themselves divided. One wing wanted to indorse silver and several other aggressive policies. It took the name "National" and nominated C. E. Bentley, of Nebraska, and J. H. Southgate, of North Carolina. The other, using the old name, nominated Joshua Levering, of Maryland, and Hale Johnson, of Illinois. The gold democrats also formed a separate party, designed to please those who would not break old party ties. It held a convention in Indianapolis and nominated General John M. Palmer, a union veteran, and General Simon B. Buckner, a confederate veteran. Spite of the many candidates it was well recognized that the real fight was between McKinley and Bryan.

**Other Nom-
inations.**

The republicans liked a dignified campaign. It was Hanna's idea for the candidate to remain at home and have delegation after delegation come to him in token of respect and confidence.

McKinley's replies would be printed far and wide, and would thus have great influence on the public. Bryan, on the other hand, went to the people, to as many as he could reach, in continuous railroad journeys during which he spoke many times a day to throngs at railroad stations or in public halls. The vast crowds that came to hear attested the popular interest. At first his opponents scoffed, thinking it unbecoming for a presidential candidate to "drum up" votes like a huckster seeking custom. But the earnestness and effectiveness of his speeches gave to his canvass the fervor of a crusade, and the scoffers were overwhelmed. The Bryan method of campaigning became thenceforth a regular feature of party activity. Each side spoke violently, the cultivated East vying with the plain-spoken West in attributing the worst motives to its opponents. Even so

**A Violent
Campaign.**

cultured a journal as the *Nation* could see in the silver men nothing but "a knot of silly, half-taught adventurers and anarchists."

The republicans began the campaign on the protection issue, which favored the collection of large campaign contributions. Hanna was supposed to have developed great skill in getting them from manufacturers, money lenders, and the great insurance companies. Pains were taken to convince the workmen also. Protection, they were told, meant "a full dinner pail." This argument also was very effective. While they talked about the tariff the republicans would have been pleased to leave silver in the background, had not Bryan's aggression made that impossible. As the campaign advanced they had to give the currency question more and more attention. When nominated, McKinley's record showed no hostility toward silver. He voted for the Sherman purchase law as the best thing that could be done for silver at the time. As the election approached, however, he gained courage to speak for gold, and at the end of the campaign he was emphatic in defending the money plank in his party's platform. Many of his party associates were going through the same transformation.

Bryan expected to lose New England, Pennsylvania, and perhaps New York and New Jersey, but he hoped that the workingmen and farmers of the Middle West would carry that section, which with the South and most of the distant West, would make a majority. He was really helping to array one section against another, and the result would depend on whether the line of division was placed at the Appalachian mountain system or at the Mississippi. Counting the ballots showed it was the latter. He lost every state north of the Potomac and east of the Mississippi. He also lost Iowa, Minnesota, California, Oregon, Kentucky, and West Virginia. Wherever manufacturing or commercial interests were strong, his support was weak. Two hundred and seventy-one electoral votes were republican and 176 were democratic.

In his Chicago speech Senator Tillman said: "We of the South have burned our bridges as far as the Northeastern democracy is concerned, as now organized. We have turned our faces to the West, asking our brethren of those states to unite with us in restoring the government, the liberty of our fathers, which our fathers left us." As describing existing tendencies his words were true, spite of the jeers which greeted them in some parts of the union. The young democracy was in rebellion against New York leadership, which had become an offense to them through Cleveland's tactless honesty and their own unmanageableness. They were much in earnest, and the defeat of 1896 did not discourage them. Their brilliant leader was unhorsed, but his sword was not broken and their organization was intact. It was many years before the Bryan movement was to relax its hold on the democratic party,

The Issues.

**McKinley
Elected.**

**Bryan not
Crushed.**

and this was because it was a real movement, and not merely the work of one man. Before Bryan appeared the army he was to direct was formed. He gave it leadership, and he could not have disbanded it in 1896 if he had so desired.

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CHAPTER XXXVII

A NEW PHASE OF AMERICAN DIPLOMACY

IMPORTANCE OF THE PACIFIC

THE Pacific shores and islands, for centuries given up to barbarism or to the quiet oriental culture, have recently become the scene of very interesting events. Barbarism has retreated, and the oriental is becoming a vigorous competitor of occidental peoples. The United States became concerned with this process of development soon after they acquired California. England, France, Germany, and Russia have also been interested in the same quarter; and so it has happened that in recent years the Pacific has been the theater of weighty diplomatic affairs. Commerce and territorial expansion have been the ruling motives of the diplomats. Our early policy of non-interference applied to the Old World, and was adopted through necessity. We could not hope to have weight in settling Europe's problems, nor was it expedient to become entangled in its politics. But in the Pacific it was otherwise. We had both territorial and commercial interests there, and it was wise to take in that ocean the position of a strong power so that other nations, civilized and uncivilized, should respect us. To maintain this position in the Pacific and to keep somewhat the same influence among the states south of us have been the chief objects of our *post-bellum* diplomacy.

The change came about slowly. Men of the old school clung through sentiment to the ideal of non-intervention, they were appalled by the expense of a navy great enough to maintain a leading position among the other American states and on the Pacific, they feared that a strong foreign policy would promote *militarism*, and it was pointed out that the constitution made no provision for the rule of dependencies. But the march of events was against them. The aggressive attitude of Blaine, secretary of state in 1881, and in 1889-1892, brought the new school into prominence, Cleveland's extension of the Monroe doctrine in the Venezuelan boundary incident of 1895 gave it a wide popular support, and Dewey's victory at Manila crowned it with the sanctity of national glory. Thus the old school lost control, and Americans came to feel at the close of the century that they must of necessity take up a new burden in the Western hemisphere and in the Orient.

THE SAMOAN INCIDENT, 1887-1889

The beginning of the change was in the negotiations relative to the Samoan islands, whose combined area is a little larger than that of Rhode Island. They are situated on the direct route from San Francisco to Sidney, Australia, 4700 miles from the former, 2000 from the latter, and 2600 south of Honolulu.

**Value of
Samoa.**

German traders established themselves there as early as 1854, and Americans and Englishmen did the same later. The natives were frequently at war among themselves, and in 1877 offered the islands to the United States. Conservatism was still dominant in our foreign policy, and the offer was refused. But we made a treaty (1878) by which we got a coaling station, Pago-Pago, and promised to protect Samoa, if we could, from the aggression of other nations. Next year Samoa made a similar treaty with England and a still more generous one with Germany.

**Origin of the
Controversy.**

This triple guaranty of integrity did not give peace to the islands; for Germany's more favorable terms, together with her recognized policy of aggression, led the two other nations to join issues against her. The quarrel reached a critical stage when a native claimant to the throne appeared with German support and began a war against the ruling house. Finally, April, 1886, three German warships arrived on the scene, saluted the German claimant, and seemed bent on establishing his power. The American consul, mindful of the treaty of 1878, proclaimed an American protectorate, and the British interests supported him.

The situation now demanded the intervention of diplomacy, and three commissioners, American, British, and German, respectively, went to the islands to investigate. They reported unanimously that the natives were incapable of ruling the islands and that a joint control of the three powers should be established. Then Bayard, American secretary of state, and

**Negotiations
by Secretary
Bayard.**

the British and German ministers in Washington, met (June, 1887) to dispose of the matter. It was singular that our first step in the stronger policy in the Pacific should have been taken by Bayard, ordinarily an exponent of the old school and a democrat. Samoa had little but geographical value to us and it had not that unless we proposed to extend our influence throughout the Pacific ocean. In the conference at Washington Germany proposed that foreign interests in Samoa be placed under a regent representing the nation having the strongest interest there. Had Bayard been for the old policy he would have accepted. But he held out for a joint regency in which we should have as much influence as either Britain or Germany, and the conference adjourned, the question remaining for the time *in statu quo*.

Before the diplomats reassembled, confusion was precipitated in Samoa by the German consul there. Throwing aside restraints he deposed the native king, set up his own favorite, and with the aid of four warships had his way for nearly a year. The followers of the old king at last began a counter-revolution with the sympathy of the Americans and British. In the war which followed the Germans took open part. One incident especially showed how much they felt themselves masters of the country. They sent the ship *Adler* to shell a village which supported the old ruler. As it leisurely took position to do its mission, the commander was astonished to see the American cruiser *Adams* anchor in the line of fire with guns and crew ready to reply. Leary, the commander of the *Adams*, an adventurous Irishman, was willing to bring on war to oppose the Germans; and the *Adler's* commander, not prepared to go that far, sailed back to Apia, where the German consul proclaimed martial law to apply to foreigners and natives.

Pretensions
of the
Germans in
Samoa.

The year 1889 opened with every prospect of war. All that happened in the Southern Pacific aroused warm interest in the United States, and the nation no longer thought of the value of the Samoan islands, but of the honor of the flag. Early in March, as Harrison assumed the presidency, the United States ship *Trenton* entered Apia harbor, where were anchored two other American, three German, and one British, men-of-war, all ready for action and likely to begin it at the slightest provocation. The threatened engagement was averted by a stupendous accident of nature. March 16 a great hurricane swept over the scene, tossing on the beach the shipping in the exposed roadway, and cooling the passions of the hour. Of the bristling warships only one survived, the British *Calliope*, which with the greatest difficulty managed to steam out to sea when the storm was highest.

Hurricane
at Apia.

Negotiations were now resumed, and April 29 a joint commission of the three powers met in Berlin under the presidency of Bismarck to consider the matter. Germany gave up her plans of absorption, and it was determined to continue the integrity of the islands with a joint protectorate under the three nations. But experience showed that such an arrangement was unsatisfactory, and in 1900, when our sphere of influence in the Pacific was more clearly outlined, a further decision was reached. It was now agreed that Great Britain should withdraw from the islands, that the United States should have the island of Tutuila, with the excellent harbor of Pago-Pago, and that the remainder of the group of islands should go to Germany. On this basis the Samoan question was at last settled.

Division of
the Islands.

THE FUR SEAL CONTROVERSY

While the Samoan incident drew public attention to the South Pacific another controversy had its seat in the north of the same ocean. By a construction of our right to Alaska, derived through Russian sources, we believed that the Bering sea was *mare clausum* and that we could control sealing there. Other nations protested our claim, especially England, whose Canadian sealers were numerous. After due notice of their rights the United States began to seize intruders in the sea, and March 2, 1889, congress prohibited the promiscuous killing of seals there. As most of the captured English ships were taken over three miles from land England demanded reparation for damages. The two nations seemed thus diametrically opposed on an important point; the press of each breathed defiance; and some imprudent despatches of Secretary Blaine added to the seriousness of the situation. But no one wished war over so small a matter, and after a period of reflection the matter was submitted to arbitration in 1892. The next year a tribunal met in Paris and decided: (a) that the Bering sea was not *mare clausum* and that we had no property rights in seals outside of the three-mile limits; (b) that we should pay damages arising from the seizure of ships contrary to this rule; and (c) that a series of regulations now made should govern seal fisheries in the future. Thus we lost on the first and second points, the essence of the controversy. It was due to the aggressive position taken by Blaine, who was apt to make wide claims in behalf of his own side. Neither he nor his associates were as well informed in the principles of international law as they should have been; or they would hardly have claimed that the position of the Aleutian islands, American property as they were, gave to the United States the great sea between those islands and the mainland of Alaska. The failure in this respect humiliated American pride, and taught us that we must be well informed and moderate in our assertions if we play the part of a great power in the world's diplomacy.

The American Claim.

Arbitration at Paris, 1892.

. THE MAFIA INCIDENT

This affair was, strictly speaking, a part of local history, and deserves no more mention in a general history than any other of many lawless outbreaks which have occurred in various parts of our country. But some of its victims were aliens, and it led, through that fact, to serious international consequences. Bad in its origin, it was conducted in its diplomatic stage with skill and tactfulness. In 1891 New Orleans had been the scene of many black-hand outrages, believed to have been due to the Mafia

Crime in New Orleans.

society, a well-known Italian organization. At length the chief of police, Hennessy, very active in hunting down the perpetrators, was murdered in a peculiarly brutal and defiant manner, and circumstances fixed the guilt on Italians. Nine of them were brought to trial, and the evidence against them was strong. But after a long and exciting trial six of the accused were acquitted and the jury disagreed as to the others. All the acquitted men were detained in prison on other charges. Public opinion was shocked. It was believed that bribery had been at work, and the prominent men of the city felt that

**Violence of
the Mob.**

a band of foreign cut-throats held the lives and property of respectable citizens at their disposal. March 15, 1891, while excitement was highest, a mass-meeting was called to protest. A vast crowd assembled, inflammatory speeches were made, and a determined mob, armed and without disguise, marched to the prison. They forced an entrance, hunted out the Italian prisoners, shot down eleven without mercy, and went to their homes without molestation. They made no demonstration against the jury and attorneys, who, if bribery had been practiced, must have been equally guilty with the prisoners. The whole city approved the lynching, and the participants, though well known, were not arrested.

The Italian people were highly outraged, and the government demanded that the lynchers be punished and indemnity be paid. The duality of our form of government, from which proceeds bad, as well as good, results, now came into prominence. The federal government alone could deal with Italy in the matter, but it could not deal with the New Orleans mob, which had not violated federal law. Secretary Blaine explained the situation to Baron Fava, Italian minister in Washington, while he urged the governor of Louisiana to bring the mob leaders to trial. He well knew the governor was not likely to comply. To Italy it seemed that we trifled with her offended dignity; Baron Fava made a warm protest, Blaine sent him a sharp reply, and the upshot was that Italy withdrew her representative from a government in which the lives of Italian subjects seemed to be held of slight value. But reflection brought moderation. Investigation showed that all but three of the victims at New Orleans were naturalized Americans, and congress voted \$25,000 to be divided among the families of the three. Italy considered this satisfactory reparation, and cordial relations were resumed a year after they were suspended.

RELATIONS WITH CHILE

To understand the Chilean incident of 1891 we must go back to 1886, when Balmaceda began a five-year term as president of the republic. He was a grasping man who wished to increase his private fortune at the expense of the public. He was supposed to have his eyes on

the government's nitrate beds and to expect to gain his object through a cabinet composed of his own creatures. Congress passed a vote of censure. Then the cabinet should have resigned, but he maintained them in office, and a fierce wrangle ensued between the executive and the legislature. He sought to collect taxes without authority, and in January, 1891, boldly proclaimed himself dictator. He had the army on his side, beat down opposition, dissolved congress, and elected another to his liking. For a moment he seemed entirely successful, but the Northern provinces broke from his grasp and began a war in which they slowly and steadily decreased his power. They won most of the navy, and blockaded and finally took all the long seacoast. August 7, 1891, they defeated the Balmeceidists, entered Santiago, the capital, and reigned supreme in the country. They were so much embittered that many of the defeated leaders killed themselves rather than be taken prisoners.

The Revolution in Chile.

This happened while Blaine was secretary of state. He was unpopular in Chile, because in 1881, when he was in Garfield's cabinet, he forbade that nation to make a treaty with Peru until certain American claims were settled. Chileans are very sensitive of their national honor, and they have good memories. When the war of 1891 began the United States supported the existing government. Their minister, Patrick Egan, an exiled Irish agitator and a political subordinate of Blaine, was notably warm for Balmeceida. The congressionalists believed that he was corrupted and that Blaine shared the guilt. In America the cause of the revolutionists was popular, and Blaine and Egan were sharply criticized. Blaine was especially denounced because he would not accord belligerent rights to the revolutionists even when the navy was in their hands.

At this stage came the affair of the *Itata*. In May the insurgents sent this ship to San Diego, California, for military supplies. This was not against the law of neutrality, but the ship was detained by a United States marshal, to the great disappointment of her own party and their American friends. Her commander would not brook the delay, and rashly sailed away after cutting his cables and overpowering the American officers in charge of the vessel. It was an act of defiance, and the whole American nation, irrespective of previous opinions, denounced it; and the cruiser *Charleston* was sent out to recapture the *Itata*, by force if necessary. The Chilean revolutionists were also aroused and sent the *Esmeralda*, equally strong as the *Charleston*, to protect the fugitive. For several days the *Esmeralda* and the *Charleston*, both ready for action, lay in the Mexican harbor of Acapulco, awaiting the *Itata*, whose appearance must have precipitated war. Fortunately her commander sailed straight for Chile. When she arrived the anger of the revolutionists had cooled and she was handed back to the American authori-

The *Itata*.

ties. The matter then went to an American court which ordered the *Itala* released on the ground that her detention was unwarranted. The affair left a bad impression of American feeling in the minds of the revolutionists.

It was heightened early in August by another apparent violation of neutrality. The insurgents were now prepared for their final blow. They sailed out of their northern provinces with a fleet of transports and landed an army at a point above Valparaiso, hoping to surprise Santiago by a quick overland march. Their movements were observed by the officer commanding the American squadron in Chilean waters, who repaired at once to Valparaiso and communicated the intelligence to Washington in cipher. He cautioned the subordinate who went ashore with the dispatch to say nothing of the movement of the insurgents; but the information got into circulation immediately, and the Valparaiso papers in repeating it said it was acquired from the Americans. No amount of denial could convince the revolutionists, now successful in their attack on their enemies, that the United States officer had not been in this respect the active friend of Balmece-da. Thus the new Chilean administration was embittered toward our government.

The leaders of the defeated party, not daring to surrender to the victors, took refuge in the foreign legations in Santiago, eighty in that of the United States, about the same number in that of Spain, and sixteen distributed among those of Brazil, Germany, France, and Great Britain. In six weeks all but twenty-one had been allowed to escape, fifteen of whom were under American protection; and these, persons of great prominence in the recent struggle, were much desired for punishment. The right of asylum in countries subject to frequent revolutions has long been recognized by civilized nations, but the United States had looked on it with disfavor, and their agents were instructed to extend it only temporarily to save life, and they were not to "harbor offenders against the laws from the pursuit of the legitimate agents of justice." Eagan seems to have gone beyond these instructions. The new government dared not violate the legations, but policed the surrounding areas most carefully, even to the very thresholds of the buildings. The situation was irritating, and lasted until in January, 1892, seven fugitives, all who had not escaped, were escorted to the seashore by the foreign ministers, and sent into safe exile aboard foreign warships.

By this series of events Chilean feeling against the United States became most vehement. The result was the attack on the sailors of the *Baltimore* by a Valparaiso mob, October 16, 1892. Captain Schley, in command, unwisely allowed 117 of his crew shore leave. Some of them went to the worst part of the city, visited saloons and

Information
of the In-
surgent
Movements.

Asylum
Extended to
Balme-
cedists.

dance halls, and fell to quarreling with the natives. Thus began a street battle of an hour's duration, in which two Americans were killed and nineteen wounded. The police passed through the crowd, ostensibly to disperse it, but the Americans present testified that they joined in the attack on the sailors. This the Chileans denied, and the point was not clearly determined in the investigations which followed, one at Mare Island and the other by Chile at Valparaiso.

The Baltimore at Valparaiso.

The outbreak caused indignation in America. The Chilean foreign minister, filled with the bitterness of recent events, seems to have regarded it complacently. At the end of ten days he had expressed no regret, and when his attention was courteously called to the fact he gave such an ill-natured reply that Minister Eagan was ordered to suspend intercourse.

Diplomatic Relations with Chile.

Two months later a new foreign minister was in office, and Chile appeared more reasonable. Her first step was to ask for the recall of Eagan as *persona non grata*. Blaine replied that when Chile apologized and made reparation for the riot of October 16, and withdrew the offensive note of the preceding foreign secretary, he would entertain the request for Eagan's recall. The reply to this note conceded all that was demanded, and deferred the recall of Eagan. Six months later Chile handed over \$75,000 for the victims of the riot. As the advent of Cleveland's administration had now disposed of Eagan, no other cause of irritation existed between the two powers. The Chilean incident arose through the conduct of an incompetent minister, but its permanent effect was to increase the prestige of the United States in South America, and to impress on our own citizens the significance of a broader foreign policy.

HAWAIIAN ANNEXATION

The Hawaiian islands, discovered probably at the close of the fifteenth century, did not arouse the interests of men until they were rediscovered late in the eighteenth. In 1788 two Boston ships visited them, then went to the northwest to buy furs from the natives, returned in the winter to dry and cure their furs, visited the Northwest for other skins the following season, and finally sold the entire cargo in Canton and returned to Boston with oriental stuffs, making a profit of 1000 per cent on the operations of the two years. Their adventure found many imitators, and by 1800 Honolulu was a base for the operation of many traders in the northern ocean. It had a group of white resident merchants and adventurers, American and European.

Early History.

In 1820 American missionaries arrived. The docile natives proved easy converts, and schools, knowledge of letters, and a simple native literature soon followed. The missionaries became advisers of the

kings, and used their influence for progress and good order. Foreigners were welcomed, and large sugar plantations were established successfully in this rich agricultural region. In 1843 England and France recognized the independence of Hawaii, and the United States did the same actually, but not formally, because of her old policy of avoiding entangling alliances. By this means the islands preserved their independence. After California was settled, Hawaii became more important through our growing interest in the Pacific and because it furnished food products to the new community.

Arrival of the Missionaries. In 1876 we made a treaty with the islands by which custom duties were mutually relinquished, and it was agreed that Hawaii should not pass into the power of any other foreign nation. It was followed by a wide extension of American industry there, and all this seemed to make annexation more probable.

The Treaty of 1876.

For many years the native kings, advised by the missionaries, ruled well. They gave the people written constitutions, each more liberal than its predecessor (1839, 1864, and 1887). The last came in the reign of Kalakaua (1873-1891), whose private morals were bad and who late in life yielded to designing white favorites until the chief business interests, largely American, combined to force him to grant reforms. They succeeded in overriding his weak will, and the result was the constitution of 1887, giving the suffrage to the whites and recognizing cabinet responsibility. Kalakaua resented it but was powerless, for the natives were worthless as soldiers. In 1891 he was succeeded by Liliuokalani, his sister. She hated the constitution of 1887, and, with more spirit than her brother, determined to overthrow it. To be independent of the legislature she established a lottery and an opium monopoly, and announced in 1893 that she would promulgate a new constitution. The news alarmed the whites, who believed she would deprive them of a voice in government and take the taxing power into her own hands. The wealthy natives had the same interest as the rich white men, and supported the armed protest which now appeared against the proposed change. It was evident that a fierce struggle was imminent, and the American minister landed marines to protect the legation. The natives took this to mean that the United States supported the protesting party, and when the queen called on her troops to defend her prerogative, they refused to fight. Her advisers, white adventurers for the most part, now urged her to abdicate. More spirited than they, she refused for a time, but finally complied when she realized that she stood entirely alone.

This affair occurred January 16, 1893. The revolutionists organized a provisional government having republican forms, with S. B. Dole president. It was recognized by the United States, England, Germany, and France, and it immediately appointed commissioners to

secure American annexation. For a time all went well in Hawaii. But annexation pleased only the Americans there. The other whites, and many natives, headed by the British contingent, began to prepare a counter-revolution. Dole knew their plans, and got Stevens, the American minister, to raise the American flag; and on February 1, 1893, marines from the *Boston* landed in Honolulu and patrolled the streets. Stevens acted on his own responsibility. He thought the moment critical, and did not dream that his countrymen would hesitate to accept the fine group of islands which fortune offered them.

**Raising the
American
Flag.**

President Harrison received the Hawaiian commissioners three weeks before the end of his administration, and a treaty was prepared and sent at once to the senate. It provided for annexation, with an annual pension of \$20,000 for the queen and a gift of \$150,000 for her daughter, the heir apparent to the throne, if they would accept the revolution. By this time public opinion was greatly aroused. Many people did not like the part the marines took in the revolution and many did not want distant territory at any price. To the latter the treaty was the beginning of a policy of expansion leading no one knew where, necessitating a great navy at an enormous expense, and elevating military ideals to the center of American policies. The opposition was strong enough to postpone ratification until the beginning of the new presidency. They were supported by the fact that President Cleveland was known to favor delay. One of his first steps after his inauguration was to withdraw the treaty from the senate and to send James H. Blount, special commissioner, to investigate the situation in Hawaii.

**A Treaty of
Annexation.**

In Honolulu, Blount began by ordering the American flag hauled down. Then he heard evidence from each side, and in July, 1893, reported that the revolution of the preceding January was accomplished chiefly through the connivance of the American minister and the overawing presence of the American marines. On this basis the president decided that it was our duty to abandon our pretension to supremacy and to express to the queen regret for the conduct of Minister Stevens. This he proceeded to carry out, inducing the queen, but with much difficulty, to promise amnesty to the revolutionists when she regained her power. Cleveland also wished to restore her to the throne by force, but congress would not go that far. May 31, 1894, it passed the Turpie resolution, refusing to interfere further in Hawaii. Liliuokalani was not able to effect her restoration in face of the revolutionists, and the Hawaiian republic continued to have authority in the islands until 1898. In 1895 there was a futile plot in her behalf, and she was arrested and forced to swear allegiance to the republic.

**Annexation
Defeated,
1893.**

The advent of the republicans to power with the election of McKin-

ley in 1896, brought up Hawaiian annexation again. A new treaty was prepared for the purpose and sent to the senate in 1897, but the opposition of the democrats prevented its acceptance by the necessary two-thirds majority. Its advocates then resorted to a joint resolution, as in the case of Texas. Before this measure came to a vote the Spanish war began, and Dewey's victory at Manila made Hawaii of vast importance. The resolution now passed the house by a vote of 209 to 91 and the senate by 42 to 21. It made Hawaii "a part of the territory of the United States," but forbade its Chinese inhabitants to come to continental United States, and left the islands outside of the customs limits. In 1900 another act created the territory of Hawaii, with the usual territorial government.

The creation of a Hawaiian territory is justified on the ground that it is destined to become a white man's country. From its first exploitation by Europeans the natives proved themselves unsatisfactory laborers, and contact with civilization has involved a decrease in their numbers. They were 130,313 in 1832, 44,088 in 1878, only 34,436 in 1890, and 29,834, in 1900. It seems probable that they will finally disappear. Their places have been taken by Portuguese, Chinese, Japanese, Koreans, and Spaniards from Malaga. Annexation terminated the importation of Chinese laborers. Then began the immigration of Japanese, but in 1906 Japan, desiring to turn her emigrants to Korea, made such restrictions that her own people ceased to go to Hawaii. The Chinese there show a disposition to intermarry with the natives, and are generally considered a desirable addition to the population. In 1908 they were estimated at 10.6 per cent of the entire population, while the Japanese were 40.2 per cent. At the same time the Teutonic element, including the native whites, were 12,000, or 7 per cent. By this it is seen that the whites constitute a rich and relatively small ruling class over a large body of dependents.

CHINESE IMMIGRATION

Chinese laborers began to come to California soon after 1849, and they were welcomed there at a time when laborers were exceedingly few. The Burlingame treaty, 1868, facilitated this by granting Chinese residents in America all the privileges of citizens of the most favored nation. White laborers, arriving in numbers after the completion of the trans-continental railroads, complained of the orientals, who worked long hours and at low wages. Many acts of violence ensued, and in 1871 San Francisco had a riot, in which 21 Chinamen were killed. The matter was brought into politics, and each party locally declared against unrestricted Chinese immigration. In 1877 a committee appointed by the United States senate investigated the situation and reported that

**Annexation
Accom-
plished,
1898.**

**Arrival of
Chinese
Laborers.**

the Burlingame treaty should be modified. Nothing was done, however, and in the same year began a series of outrages incited by Dennis Kearney, an agitator, the burden of whose song was that the Chinese must go. He found support among the lower classes, and for many months was a source of annoyance to the city authorities. The state legislature passed several restrictions for the orientals, limiting their rights of labor and residence, but the federal courts declared most of them unconstitutional. The matter then went to congress, which passed a bill restricting immigration, but Hayes vetoed it because it infringed the treaty and exposed to retaliation Americans resident in China. At the same time negotiations were opened by which China agreed that the influx of laborers might be mutually forbidden, but not that of students, travelers, teachers, or merchants. This made possible the act of 1882, by which laborers were denied admission to the country for ten years. The execution of the law was difficult. Laborers were smuggled in under pretense that they were of the excepted classes, and other legislation was necessary to make the exclusion law effective. In 1892 a new act, the Geary law, extended all these restrictions for ten years more. In 1902 it was ordered that they should be extended indefinitely. The undeveloped condition of China has led that nation to accept discriminations which a more powerful state would probably find insupportable.

**Exclusion
Accom-
plished.**

AMERICA AND JAPAN

The feeling against Chinese labor did not extend to the Japanese, partly because immigration from that quarter was not numerous, and partly from the part Perry took (1853) in opening the island kingdom to the world. Japan was a strong power, and progressed so rapidly in new ideas that in 1872 it sent a commission to Europe and America to get the powers to relinquish rights of extra-territoriality in Japan. The powers would not consent, and the commissioners went home to urge further progress in occidentalism. In the United States they encountered Joseph Hardy Neesima, who as a boy escaped out of Japan on a Boston ship and had been educated in Amherst College. He was a man of great capacity, and the commissioners called him back to his country to supervise the system of education. Many Japanese students now came to America for instruction, and American missionaries went in large numbers to Japan. In 1894-1895, Japan fought a successful war with China, demonstrating her predominance among the orientals. It was not possible to deny her all the rights of a first-class state. The concession she was denied in 1872 was granted in 1899, when extra-territorial courts were abolished within her borders, and her alliance was sought by the nations having strongest interests in the East.

**Early
Relations.**

**Work of
Neesima.**

Japan's rapid rise in fortune brought some embarrassment to the other nations concerned in the orient. The partition of China had long been a fixed idea in the world of diplomacy, but who could now believe this great new state would passively allow such a thing under her very nose? Developing Eastern trade had also been a favored hope of America and Europe, but Japan's industrial energy was as great as her military energy, and her geographical position as well as her cheap labor gave her an immense advantage in a competition in that field. Decidedly, the arrival of the nation at the state of a great power seriously disarranged the plans of other great states, and it created a feeling of fear and uncertainty among them. The United States felt the same apprehension, not because they cared about the division of China, but because they thought of the exposed position of the Philippines and feared to lose their expanding oriental trade. It must be confessed that Japan aided the growth of distrust partly by a natural but rather offensive national self-confidence, and partly because she had shown a willingness to use expedients not ordinarily considered fair dealing in international relations. Through these means disappeared the early American enthusiasm for Japan. A counterfeeling of mild distrust was created, also, in Japanese minds by Roosevelt's alleged favor to Russia in the treaty of Portsmouth.

The anti-Japanese feeling has been strongest on the Pacific coast, where the question, going beyond the general feeling just described, is part of the local opposition to orientals. In 1900 there were in this region 18,269 Japanese, which was only .007 per cent of the entire population, while there were three times as many Chinamen. But after that year immigration increased. In 1903 the arrivals were 6000, and the coast became alarmed. It thought that the "yellow peril" had appeared in a new form. Much was said to excite popular feeling, and in 1906 the San Francisco school board ordered that Japanese be taught in an "oriental school," and not, as before, in the regular schools. It was alleged in support of the order that the Japanese "school children" were really adults and should not be in schools with young white children.

The incident excited the people of Japan, who resented the discrimination. The opposition there denounced the Japanese government for tolerating what it pronounced an insult to the national honor, and there was danger that popular feeling would make war inevitable. The government at Tokio wished to avoid war, and urged President Roosevelt to execute the treaty by which Japanese citizens in the United States were guaranteed the rights of the most favored nation. The president wished to comply, but the dual nature of political authority in our system of government made it difficult to do so. He sent the

**Feeling
against
Japan.**

**California
restricts
Japanese.**

**The Adjust-
ment of
1907.**

secretary of the interior to investigate the California situation, who reported that there were only 93 Japanese in the San Francisco schools, very few of whom were over twenty years old. Suits were now ordered to enforce the rights of the Japanese pupils under the treaty, and the president's annual message announced a firm purpose to carry the affair through. In California opinion was defiant. A mob even insulted a group of Japanese scientists observing the effects of the San Francisco earthquake, although Japan's contribution of \$246,000 to relieve the suffering from that calamity was \$33,000 more than the amount received from all other foreign nations. The California state authorities were less rash, and an adjustment was made in 1907. Japan agreed to execute more strictly a law already enacted forbidding the emigration of laborers, and San Francisco agreed to admit to the schools Japanese children not over sixteen years of age. Since then an excitable press has found several occasions to raise a Japanese war scare, but calmer minds have been at the seats of authority in Tokio and Washington.

THE VENEZUELA BOUNDARY DISPUTE

Venezuela revolted from Spain in 1810 and established jurisdiction over the valley of the Orinoco. In 1814 England acquired British Guiana from Holland by a treaty which left the western limits undefined. Venezuela asked several times for joint action to settle the boundary, but the requests were not granted. In 1841, however, England sent Schomburgk, a surveyor, to run the line with such data as she had from Holland. He carried it far westward, and included 50,000 square miles that Venezuela claimed, practically extending British Guiana to the Orinoco. To Venezuela's protest Britain replied with an offer to leave the former a narrow strip on the east bank of the Orinoco, so that the mouth of that river should be entirely Venezuelan. The offer was not accepted, and for thirty-two years the controversy slept. Meanwhile many British subjects settled in the disputed area, some of them coming to prospect for gold which was discovered there. Venezuela, therefore, in 1876, again asked England to take steps to settle the boundary. No reply was vouchsafed until 1880, when England announced that she claimed through some Dutch treaties with the aborigines a large area west of the Schomburgk line. In this stage the controversy could not be compromised by the parties, and Venezuela asked England to submit to arbitration. The response was a negative, and though the request was several times repeated in the next six years no other reply was given. Finally, in 1886, England announced once for all that she would not recognize Venezuelan pretensions east of the Schomburgk line. Rupture of intercourse followed, and war might have begun had the parties been equally strong. In 1890 and

Origin of
the Dispute.

in 1893 Venezuela sought to reopen negotiations, but met with unyielding opposition. Her attitude, aside from a consideration of her right, was not such as she would have taken in dealing with a great power. A revolted Spanish province was apt to have indefinite limits, due to the large areas of unsettled territory, and it is by no means sure that Venezuela originally had title to the region in dispute. But to people who knew nothing of the merits of the case it seemed that the government at London used its strength to bully a weaker power and refused to arbitrate because its cause was weak.

In 1876 Venezuela asked the United States to aid her, alleging that she was otherwise powerless to prevent the apparent British aggressions. But President Grant would do no more than hint to England that we considered ourselves interested in the situation. Nothing resulted, and in 1887 (Cleveland now being president) the United States went further and offered its services to secure arbitration if agreeable to both parties. Venezuela had then just broken off intercourse, and England replied that the attitude of the South American state was such that arbitration was impossible, and the same answer was made when Harrison in 1890 made a similar request. All our protests to England had been made at the suggestion of Venezuela, who continually urged her defenceless position against a mighty nation and declared she would never have justice until the United States took action.

**Venezuela
Appeals to
the United
States.**

These appeals might well arouse American sympathy, but interference in the quarrel ought to be based on important interests at stake, and these, it was thought, were of two kinds:

**Our
Grounds for
Interference.**

1. Our prestige with the Spanish American states demanded that we give Venezuela the protection she needed. 2. The Monroe doctrine had some bearing on the case. Both reasons had weight with the American president, but the latter was placed most in prominence. As stated in 1823, the Monroe doctrine announced that a European state was not to plant colonies in South America or to oppress or control any of the states already established there. It was issued in our own interests, for we feared that if a great power were fixed in the continent south of us our own institutions would be imperiled. In this sense the doctrine was a dead letter in 1895. Practical men so regarded it, and the British ministry had no idea that it could be applied to the Venezuelan situation. But Cleveland thought otherwise. In some things he was a passionate idealist, and his sympathy, courage, and patriotism were now aroused. He construed the Monroe doctrine to mean that we were to protect a South or Central American state from wrongful actions by European powers. He did not say that Venezuela was injured by England, but he thought we were justified in demanding an investigation by arbitration in order to see if encroachments had been made. This

position was clearly stated in a despatch which Secretary Olney sent to London in July, 1895. The secretary was newly in office, and on that ground we may, perhaps, pardon him the use of language needlessly sharp.

Olney's demand rudely shocked the British foreign office. Lord Salisbury's delay in replying shows his opinion of what he undoubtedly thought a bit of American bluster, and it was not until November 26 that he sent his answer. It dealt chiefly with the Monroe doctrine, showing conclusively that it was created for a special occasion which was not like the situation then existing on the Orinoco. He argued at length that the United States had no rights of protection over Western states which other nations had not. In his eyes the Monroe doctrine in 1895 was only an historical fact, and if Cleveland had dropped the case at that stage it must have been taken as acquiescence in Salisbury's view. His persistence involved the assertion of a new doctrine, like that of 1823 in the fundamental fact that it aimed to save Venezuela from foreign aggression, but going further and assuming the exclusive right of protection which Lord Salisbury denied. It was a most important step, for without it the United States could not play the overweening rôle in the Western Hemisphere to which many recent actions seem to commit them.

Lord Salisbury's Position.

All this occurred within the field of diplomacy, and the public was ignorant of it. But December 17, two weeks after the annual message, the correspondence of Olney and Salisbury was sent to congress, with a message in which Cleveland stated his interpretation of the Monroe doctrine as it applied to the present case in words which left no doubt of his meaning. "The dispute," he said, "has reached such a stage as to make it now incumbent upon the United States to take measures to determine with sufficient certainty for its justification what is the true divisional line between the Republic of Venezuela and British Guiana," and he suggested an American boundary commission whose judgment we should enforce at any cost. In closing he sent a spirited appeal to the American people in these memorable words: "There is no calamity which a great nation can invite which equals that which follows a supine submission to wrong and injustice and the consequent loss of national self-respect and honor."

Cleveland's Venezuela Message, Dec. 17, 1895.

When this message was read in congress it was heard in awed silence, followed by an outburst of applause from democrats and republicans. Hitt, republican leader of the house, introduced a bill to create the proposed boundary commission, and in three days it was a law by a unanimous vote in each house. But outside of congress there was a short period of hesitation. Nobody in England or America had thought of a war between the two nations, and the people did not at once

Reception of the Message.

grasp its import. Some Londoners, taking the message jocosely, cabled, in allusion to experiences at the recent yacht races for the *America's* cup, "When our warships enter New York harbor, we hope that your excursion boats will not interfere with them." To which the recipients replied, "For your sake it is to be hoped that your warships are better than your yachts." A little reflection showed how serious was the situation, and a sharp fall in the prices of stocks indicated that the people of the two countries were alarmed.

Up to this point the British people knew nothing of the real nature of the controversy. They were ever friendly to arbitration and were

England
Accepts Ar-
bitration.

disappointed because their prime minister had overridden the appeals for it. Three hundred and fifty-four members of the house of commons, in order to rebuke his high action, sent a petition to President Cleveland that future disputes might be settled by friendly arbitration. Opinion out of parliament, at first aroused at what the people thought a national insult, slowly came around to the same position, and the ministry found itself repudiated on the point in question. This change of sentiment was reflected in the courtesy of the British reply when our Venezuelan commission asked for British charts to enable it to perform its functions. Finally, February 27, 1896, the United States ventured to suggest that the incident be discussed in Washington for settlement. The reply was favorable, and the case took a still more agreeable turn when a short time later England decided to appoint a commission to arbitrate all matters of dispute between herself and Venezuela, thus doing under the influence of an aroused British sentiment what the ministry had for years refused to consider.

Cleveland's Venezuelan commission took up its task in 1896. It sent Professors J. Franklin Jameson and George L. Burr to Europe to examine archives. Before its work was accomplished the British and American governments had appointed the arbitration board the former had agreed to accept, and the American commission suspended its work. The report of the board, in 1899, gave England most of the disputed area; but the region east of the mouth of the Orinoco, all the extensions west of the Schomburgk line, and some narrow strips east of it were awarded to Venezuela.

The Venezuelan incident calls attention particularly to the character of Cleveland. It seemed strange to some that a president, ordinarily a man of peace, who in March ordered the flag lowered in Honolulu should in the following December precipitate the Venezuelan war scare. Probably a strong sense of wrong done to a weak power by a great one was the underlying impulse in each case. In the one a queen was deprived of her throne; in the other a vast empire seemed to bully a helpless nation. Spite of the popular enthusiasm the message evoked, there were expressions of discontent. The speculative portion of the business world, just recovering from the depression of

1895, were disgusted when the prices of stocks tumbled, and pronounced the president a rash blunderer. Other persons said he wished to restore his waning political prestige; still others criticized his interpretation of the Monroe doctrine. He undoubtedly gave the doctrine a new interpretation, but it was, as we have seen, probably a necessary one. The announcement, also, of his position was brusque. But it was his habit to be outspoken, and tact was never his characteristic. The people loved him for his directness as they loved and trusted Jackson sixty years earlier for the same quality; and they approved his assertion of energy in diplomacy. It cannot be doubted that his action brought other powers to respect more than ever before our claims and responsibilities in the Western world, and prepared our own nation for the new international part it was to play in the succeeding administration.

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CHAPTER XXXVIII

THE WAR WITH SPAIN

SPAIN AND CUBA

THROUGHOUT the last half of the nineteenth century, Cuba and Porto Rico remained Spain's only American colonies. Both islands were rich in agricultural resources, and their export and import duties yielded large sums for her treasury. So much were they exploited that a party in Cuba was formed to strive for a greater degree of self-government. It had for leaders some of the men of wealth and influence in the island, but most of its membership were of the middle and lower classes, many of them men of negro blood. The majority of the wealthy and intelligent islanders had no sympathy for the liberal movement and no confidence in the ability of the liberals to govern the island, if independence should be gained. Thus in all the striving which filled this long period there were two parties, an aristocratic one in favor of Spain and a popular one in favor of independence.

In 1868 the latter began a war for freedom. Their most important leader was Queseda, a man of great devotion and much ability. He realized that his followers could not cope with the great army sent against them, and resorted to guerilla warfare. He divided his forces into small mounted bands, badly armed but strong in the predatory instinct, and sent them against whatever exposed position the enemy offered. They burned property, ravaged the crops, and took life relentlessly, making themselves terrors to all who did not support their cause. The Spanish army was strong in infantry and weak in cavalry, and it could only extend its garrisons in the infected districts and wait for time to wear out the revolutionists. By 1878 this was accomplished, and resistance ceased when concessions were promised. But the ten years' war left the country a waste.

It also led to unpleasant relations between the United States and Spain. An insurgent junta in New Orleans and in New York sent powerful aid to the revolt in the form of arms and supplies, and many Cubans escaping to our shores took oaths of American citizenship and returned to the island to serve under the revolutionists. This naturally enraged the Spanish governor of Cuba, but the orders he issued in opposition to it went beyond the bounds of international comity. Vessels taking

**Two Parties
in Cuba.**

**Ten Years'
War.**

**Aid from
the United
States.**

recruits and supplies to the insurgents, he declared, should be considered piratical, "and all persons captured in such vessels," he added, "without regard to their number, will be immediately executed." The United States protested against the decree, and it was withdrawn some time after it was promulgated. By international law a ship of the kind indicated might be seized for carrying contraband, or for smuggling, but it was not piratical, and foreigners engaged on it were not liable to death. The local Spanish officials resented the repeal of the order just mentioned, and they met the desperate methods of the insurgents with the most cruel decrees. The military commander in the island ordered the natives to remain on their premises on penalty of death, and threatened to burn unoccupied dwellings. In 1869 two native Americans, one a passenger and the other a sailor, were executed because they were on a captured vessel carrying recruits to the revolutionists. Although Spain took steps to prevent a recurrence of such an affair, it caused much resentment in America, where feeling favored the insurgents.

In 1873 the *Virginius*, a well-known filibustering ship, was taken on the high seas and carried into Santiago harbor. The crew of 52 and the 103 passengers, among whom were 8 American, several British, and one French subjects, were sent before a summary court martial, and within five days 53 of them, including the captain, an American citizen, were shot as pirates, spite of the protests of the American, British, and French consuls. The Spanish officer in command declared that he obeyed the orders of his superiors. The proceedings were not known in Madrid until it was too late to stop them. The ministry there, as soon as it knew of the capture, sent orders that no sentences be carried out without permission from that quarter. The despatch reached Havana in time to save some of the victims, but it was delayed between that point and Santiago. It seemed to the people of the United States that bloodthirsty subordinates in Cuba hurried on the processes of their courts and nullified a clemency they despised.

The affair brought the two nations to the verge of war. General Sickles, our minister in Madrid, seems to have desired to precipitate hostilities, and conducted the negotiations intrusted to him in such a way that a rupture was imminent. But Secretary Fish, his superior, at last realized that the matter should be withdrawn from the hands of Sickles and shifted the negotiations to Washington (see page 674). Spain declared that the *Virginius* was not an American ship and promised reparation in a month, if investigation showed the contrary. Meantime, she handed over the *Virginius* with the surviving persons taken on it. The vessel started for American ports, but foundered and sank in a storm off Hatteras. The investigation showed she had no right to carry the United States flag, and that her American registry was fraudulent.

The Case of
the *Virgin-*
ius.

War
Threatened.

Spain, therefore, did not salute our flag, as she had agreed to do if the finding had been otherwise; but in 1875 she contributed \$80,000 to be distributed among the relatives of the Americans shot at Santiago. This disposition of the incident did not satisfy

The Incident Long Remembered.

the majority of the American people. They recognized the animus in the proceedings at Santiago and repaid it with dislike. They were especially outraged when

Brigadier General Burriel, who gave the bloody orders at Santiago, was in 1875, after a short period of suspension, made a major general and given a high command in Spain.

While the war went on, the government at Washington several times urged Spain to make concessions to the revolting party in order to have peace. The reply was invariably the same:

Cuban Reforms Urged.

Spain was ready to give Cuba reforms, and would do so as soon as authority was respected, but honor forbade concessions to a rebellious province. Our protests were

based on commercial interests and humanity, and they embraced all the arguments which were marshaled into service in the negotiations preceding the war in 1898. We even talked of intervention, and took pains in 1875 to let our position be known to the leading European powers. Their attitude was hardly friendly to our proposition, and Fish hesitated to proceed further. What we might have done does not appear, for in 1877 the insurgent president was captured, and Campos, commanding the army, took the submission of the island after promising it a liberal government like that of Porto Rico. The offer embraced representation in the cortes at Madrid, self-government in local affairs, admission of Cubans to office, liberal suffrage, and the relinquishment of exploitation for the benefit of Spain. Since our own government had so persistently urged reforms like those now promised, we felt a peculiar interest in their realization.

Then followed a series of maneuvers which disgusted the men recently in arms. The Spanish party in Cuba was bitterly hostile to

Promised Reforms Withheld.

liberalism. They declared the former insurgents unfit to share in the government, and painted black pictures of disorder if Campos's promises were fully carried out.

Liberalism at that time had few friends at court, and the result was that the promises of 1878 were reduced, in the execution, to the lowest possible terms. The suffrage was so limited that the mass of Cubans could not vote, authority in the island fell into the hands of the Spanish party who controlled the revenues for their own benefit and that of the mother country, and who were, in fact, spite of their superior intelligence and wealth, a rapacious mercantile and landlord oligarchy. Against their activity few persons cared to protest openly. The middle class submitted, but the former followers of Quesada maintained their organization as a liberal party, and awaited an opportunity to strike. They felt that

a Spanish promise could no longer be trusted and that future fighting must be for independence.

In 1895 Cuban conditions were intolerable. The annual revenue was \$26,000,000, half of which went to pay the Spanish debt and a fourth to support the army and navy. Of the other fourth, much went to maintain the offices created in the island for the benefit of Spaniards, and only \$1,000,000 was given to education and public improvements. Spain had saddled on the revenues the entire debt incurred through the ten years' war, as well as that incurred in wars with Peru and Santo Domingo. Military trials and a strict censorship of the press which kept down protests against existing conditions gave the situation the air of the choicest medievalism. Finally, in February, 1895, the cortes in Madrid gave Cuba for its self-government a council, half the members to be appointed by the crown and half elected under the suffrage law existent in the island. It came as the tardy fulfillment of the promise of self-government made in 1878. The liberals realized that the last hope of satisfactory reform was gone, and took up arms under the leadership of Maximo Gomez.

**Revolt of
1895.**

Now reappeared guerrilla warfare in its worst form. Gomez ordered the people to furnish no supplies to the foes of the revolution and forbade the planters to grind cane under pain of death as traitors. Again buildings were burned, industry paralyzed, and laborers thrown out of employment and forced to join the insurgents whose foraging was their chief means of support. Spain threw a large army into Cuba, established numerous garrisons, and issued threatening proclamations; but the Cubans avoided open battle, content to cut up exposed detachments as opportunity offered, to reduce the country to a desert, and to dissolve their bands before encountering the columns sent to capture them.

**Methods of
the Cubans.**

Again Cuban juntos operated on American soil, supplies were forwarded, and adventurous Americans stole away to join the insurgents. American public opinion applauded the revolutionists, spite of President Cleveland's efforts to enforce neutrality: How well he succeeded is shown by the fact that 33 expeditions were stopped before they sailed, while of the 32 which evaded the authorities and landed in Cuba, only five were taken by the army of nearly 200,000 men which occupied the country. Many American citizens were captured among the Cubans. Some were native-born citizens, but many more were Cubans who had sought protection by taking out papers of American citizenship. Spain did not want war with our government, and was content for a time to send such captives out of the island, while Cleveland, recognizing the abuse of our naturalization laws, which he could not check, did not protest strongly against what was done. Gomez well knew the best chance of Cuban success was to bring the United States into the war.

**Cleveland
and Neu-
trality.**

During 1895 the commander-in-chief in Cuba was Campos, under whose pacific policy the revolt only grew stronger. The Spanish faction protested against his conduct of the war and he was removed early in 1896. He left Cuba, declaring that the concession of real autonomy was the only means of restoring order. Again he was met by the feeling that Spanish honor could not permit concessions until the insurgents laid down their arms.

General Weyler, who succeeded him, announced a policy of repression. In parts of the island the revolutionists kept the rural population terrorized and levied contributions of supplies on them. For these districts Weyler issued his order of reconcentration, compelling the inhabitants to remove to garrison towns and forbidding them to travel in the abandoned districts without written permission. It also enlarged the military law, increased the power of military tribunals, and gave notice that conviction for crimes subject to the death penalty would be followed by summary execution. Spain justified this edict as necessary to meet the devastation of the guerrillas, but it fell sorely on the innocent persons who had taken no part in the struggle and who suffered severely in the reconcentration camps to which they were confined with no means of earning a livelihood. Moreover, all the restrictions failed to accomplish the desired results, and the war went on with increasing horrors during the years 1896 and 1897.

AMERICAN INTERVENTION

The cause of Cuba was popular in the United States, and Cleveland's rigid neutrality disappointed a large portion of the people. Weyler's reconcentration edict brought this feeling to a head, and in April, 1896, congress passed resolutions recognizing the belligerency of the Cubans and offering the services of the government to secure the recognition of independence by Spain. The president is not bound by a resolution of congress on a matter of belligerency, and although this had only six negative votes in the senate and twenty-seven in the house, Cleveland clung to his policy of neutrality to the end of his administration. Meanwhile he urged Spain to concede reform, and was met with the usual declaration that no concessions would be made until the Cubans laid down their arms. In a message to congress, December 7, 1896, he discussed intervention in all its relations, and said in conclusion that when it was evident that Spanish authority could no longer be enforced in Cuba it would be our duty to intervene in behalf of humanity. This was ominous, and England, France, and Germany united in urging Spain to bring the Cuban struggle to a close by adopting reforms, but again the reply was a negative. Spite of all these things, Cleveland held to his course and was able to restrain

Policy of Campos.

Policy of Weyler.

Attitude of Congress.

Restrained by Cleveland.

the resentment of the people, which every day grew stronger. The business of the country was slowly recovering from the previous years of panic, and shuddered at the suggestion of war; and he was anxious to protect it. His successor, President McKinley, also supported the business interests and maintained neutrality during the spring, summer, and autumn of 1897; but he was not a man to defy congress, and the meeting of that body was awaited with interest by all who desired the success of the revolutionists.

There was a liberal party in Spain, and it continually demanded reforms in Cuba as a means of ending the war. The mass of Spaniards favored repression, but the logic of events was against them, and when the leading conservative in the ministry was assassinated on August 8 his colleagues were forced to resign, and there was a liberal ministry under Sagasta. His task was to establish autonomy in Cuba without arousing the apprehension of a sensitive nation. He assumed office October 14 and addressed himself at once to a scheme of Cuban autonomy. Weyer was recalled, General Blanco was placed in command in Cuba, reconcentration was abandoned, an elective assembly was announced, and other features of autonomy were adopted. President McKinley in his first annual message suggested that no action be taken by congress until it could be seen what effects would follow these concessions. A year earlier the American people would have allowed the new policy a fair trial; now they were so much aroused that they would hear of no further waiting. If they had no faith in promises from Madrid, if they thought loopholes would be discovered to evade real autonomy, Spain herself was to blame through her broken faith in the past. The Cubans also rejected autonomy. They could hardly be expected to accept it as long as the American people decried it. They talked loudly of resisting to the last extremity, but it cannot be doubted that they must have submitted had the United States been satisfied with the reforms which Sagasta with much honesty desired to effect. Autonomy thus was proved a failure, and only increased the embarrassment of Sagasta in Spain. Events drifted toward war throughout the winter of 1897-1898, and various incidents served to accelerate their progress.

Reforms
under
Sagasta.

The attitude of the United States was resented in Cuba, where the Spanish party became so bitter toward Americans that General Fitzhugh Lee, the consul, advised that a ship-of-war be sent to Havana. In accordance with the suggestion the battleship *Maine* arrived in the harbor January 25, 1898. She saluted the forts, and anchored at the place assigned her by the authorities. Her presence increased rather than allayed the anti-American feeling in the city.

The *Maine*
goes to
Havana.

A fortnight later a New York paper published a private letter from Señor de Lome, Spanish minister in Washington, describing autonomy

as a failure and McKinley as a "cheap politician" (*policastro*). It had been purloined and was published in the interest of the Cubans, and this was designed to embarrass the diplomatic relations of the two countries, then already greatly strained. The letter was genuine, and its author could only plead that it was not intended for publication and no notice should be taken of it. McKinley thought otherwise, and asked for de Lome's recall. The minister was allowed to resign, and Señor Polo y Bernabe took his place. The incident raised feeling still higher in the United States.

**De Lome's
Letter.**

Six days later, February 15, the *Maine* at her assigned anchorage was blown up with a loss of 2 officers and 258 men. The ship burst into flames, and in twenty minutes settled in thirty feet of water. Two explosions were heard at an appreciable interval. It was agreed that the second was caused by the ignition of the ship's magazines, but one theory held that the first was the report of a mine exploding and another that it was the explosion of the fixed ammunition in the ship due to lax management. The Spanish authorities expressed warmest sympathy for the loss and did what they could to save life in the accident. Captain Sigsbee, commander of the *Maine*, in his dispatch announcing the catastrophe, said; "Public opinion should be suspended until further proof." The people generally were stunned: they were prepared to believe anything of Spanish treachery, but they could not believe that Spain would do an act which could not fail to bring on a war which she was doing her best to avoid.

**The *Maine*
Destroyed.**

Two investigations were made, one by the United States, the other by Spain. The former, after a careful examination of the wreck by divers, concluded that the ship was destroyed by a mine which set off one of her magazines; but the investigators would not try to account for the firing of the mine. The outer shell of the hulk, with the steel ribs and keel, were bent upward in a gigantic dent, which seemed to indicate an external explosion. The other investigation, after a superficial examination of the hulk, reported that the accident was due to an internal explosion. Most Americans disregarded the Spanish report. They believed the *Maine* was destroyed by a mine set off either by some Spaniard on his own responsibility, or by a Cuban to bring on war, or by accident. When the wreck was uncovered in 1911 its condition corresponded with the reports of the American divers, and a new investigation supported the conclusion of 1898. President McKinley showed great forbearance while the investigation was proceeding, and sent the findings to the government at Madrid without demands. Neither he nor the calmer portion of the people felt that Spain ought to make reparation, but the disaster had raised American feeling to such a state of tension that nothing short of the widest concessions to Cuba could have averted war.

**Investiga-
tions of the
Accident.**

The president now returned to the negotiations with a surer grasp on the situation. He suggested an armistice to allow negotiations for peace through the friendly offices of the United States, protesting that the United States did not wish to acquire Cuba. Sagasta seems to have been willing to meet these suggestions, but he considered the vast wave of anti-American feeling in his country and wished to avoid the semblance of yielding to the Cubans. He replied that an armistice would be granted if the Cubans would ask for it, but that nothing definite should be done until the newly authorized Cuban parliament met on May 4. This was the situation on April 1, 1898. McKinley, realizing that his suggestions were refused, prepared a message to congress which he proposed to send on the sixth. That body was keen for war and only waited the word from the executive to make it a reality. April 5 the queen of Spain, at the request of the pope, offered a suspension of hostilities if the Cubans would accept it. The offer made no impression on the president, but he withheld his message to congress because the consul at Havana cabled that time was necessary to get Americans out of the city. April 10 the Spanish minister in Washington informed the president that the order for an armistice had been issued.

**McKinley
demands an
Armistice.**

Thus at the last moment, when our hand was raised to strike, our ultimatum was accepted. What should our president do? Behind him were the people whom nothing short of Cuban independence would now satisfy. Concessions at the last moment, they reasoned, would be evaded, as in the past, unless we took on ourselves the heavy task of supervising their execution. Moreover, we were quite sure, as a people, that we wanted the removal of the last vestige of Spanish power in the Western world, and we were not willing to forgo the opportunity to secure it. McKinley could have withstood this sentiment. By accepting the surrender of Spain he could have guided the situation until the colony of Cuba would have remained at last in a situation somewhat like that of Canada. By refusing to accept it he could secure Cuban independence. He chose the latter alternative. April 11 he sent a message to congress summarizing recent negotiations, barely communicating the Spanish note of the tenth, and asking authority to intervene, by force, if necessary, in order to establish peace and order in Cuba.

**The Die
cast by
McKinley.**

Congress acted promptly. April 19, the anniversary of the battle of Lexington, four resolutions were passed, the first three demanding the independence of Cuba and authorizing the use of force to execute the demand, and the fourth pledging the government to withdraw all authority from Cuba when independence was accomplished and a firm government established. The last resolution was received with derision in many parts of the world, but it was faithfully fulfilled in 1902. The day after the resolutions passed the Spanish minister in Washington asked for his passports;

**War
Declared.**

the next day, April 21, our own minister in Madrid, General Woodford, made the same request and left Spain; and on the 25th congress declared that war had existed since the 21st.

These developments were closely observed in Europe. France, Austria, and Italy naturally sympathized with Spain; and Germany, mindful, perhaps, of the Samoan affair, was also out of sympathy with the United States. The continental press teemed with grotesque criticisms of Americans. We were considered a nation of money getters, the cartoonists depicted us as swine, and our pretension to intervene in Cuba was pronounced a species of piracy. Our army was pronounced an armed mob, and our navy was made a subject of ridicule. German newspapers took the lead in this chorus. In Great Britain sentiment favored the United States. Every prominent London paper, except the *Saturday Review*, was cordial in its support. Persons connected with the British government later said that just before war was declared the German minister and other continental diplomats were about to give the United States notice of a purpose of joint intervention to save Spanish sovereignty and that their plan was defeated by Sir Julian Pauncefote, British ambassador. Germany denied this assertion and said that the plan for joint intervention came from Sir Julian and was disapproved by the German emperor. It is impossible to reconcile the two statements, but it is true that while both governments were formally friendly we had every reason to believe that Germany wished Spain's triumph and England desired ours.

European
Opinion on
the War.

THE WORK OF THE NAVY

As war became imminent Spain assembled her strongest ships of war at Cape Verde islands, and April 29 they left that place for America.

The Expedi-
tion of
Cervera.

They consisted of four armored cruisers and three torpedo-boat destroyers, commanded by Admiral Cervera. Our whole Atlantic seaboard was at once in a paroxysm of terror, but it breathed easier when it reflected that Cervera must touch at some Spanish port in Cuba or Porto Rico before he could ravage our coast. To reach such a point would require ten or more days, and it became the object of the American navy to strike him while still in West Indian waters. All our best ships, which for two weeks had been held in reserve to support the blockade we had established along the northern shore of Cuba, were now made ready to intercept the Spaniards. Before they could undertake the task assigned them the world was startled by an important event in another quarter.

When the war began our Pacific squadron was at Hong Kong under command of Commodore George Dewey. Through the efforts of Theodore Roosevelt, assistant secretary of the navy, the squadron was

in excellent condition for offense, and April 24 it was ordered to the Philippine islands to capture or destroy the Spanish fleet there assembled. Three days later Dewey set out with the *Olympia*, his flagship, the *Baltimore*, *Raleigh*, and *Boston*, protected cruisers of from 5800 to 3000 tons, the gunboats *Concord* and *Petrel*, the revenue cutter, *McCulloch*, and a collier and a supply ship, all in war coats of dull gray. At sea the crews were shown a bombastic Spanish proclamation describing the Americans as "all the social excrescences" of the earth. To this Dewey added the simple order: "The squadron is bound for Manila. Our orders are to capture or destroy the Spanish fleet." The announcement was received with cheers from the crews of all the ships.

Dewey
Ordered to
Manila.

During the night of the 30th Dewey reached the entrance of Manila Bay, in the middle of which stands the fortified rock, Corregidor. Without a moment's hesitation he started through, the *Olympia* in the lead. He was not expected, and the flagship was a mile beyond the rock when the fleet was discovered.

Battle of
Manila Bay.

Fire was opened without damage to the ships, and at dawn they were before Cavite, a strongly fortified place, five miles from the city. The Spanish fleet was observed drawn up under the guns of the arsenal, ready for action. The American commander was eager for battle. Forming his squadron in a crescent at 5500 yards range he turned to the commander of the *Olympia* and said quite calmly: "You may fire when you are ready, Gridley." Instantly the guns on both sides began their work, Dewey moving in closer as he observed that his range was too great. After an hour the Spaniards were suffering greatly and already crippled. Then Commodore Dewey, thinking of the comfort of his own men, withdrew to give the crew time for breakfast, after which he moved in and completed the work he had begun. At half past twelve the enemy ran up the white flag and surrendered their fleet and the arsenal at Cavite. A desultory fire continued from the city, but it ceased in the afternoon when the American commander gave notice that he would shell the city if another shot was fired at him. The Spaniards lost ten warships, a transport, and a water battery. They had 381 men killed and many more wounded. Of their ships only two were protected cruisers. They were inferior to the Americans in fighting ability, but the protection of their shore batteries was supposed to have overcome this disadvantage. They fought bravely, but their gunnery was bad, while that of their adversaries was extremely good. No American ship was seriously injured, and only one American was killed and seven wounded. Dewey was made Rear Admiral for his splendid victory, and March 2, 1899, congress made him an admiral.

It was natural that he should hold the bay he had taken; and when he cabled his government that he could take the city if he had the troops to occupy it, it was natural that troops should be sent. But

it was not until May 21 that they could be embarked at San Francisco, and June 30 that they reached Manila. Meanwhile, Dewey's position was critical. Soon after his victory foreign warships began to arrive, among them three British vessels commanded by Captain Chichester and five German ships commanded by Admiral von Diedrich. The latter officer seems to have known little of naval etiquette, and showed little respect for the blockade of the city which the American commodore had established. He of all the commanders present adopted an irritating course, sending his launches close in at night beyond the lines of patrol and dogging the American ships at whatever points they saw fit to inspect. Remonstrances did not restrain him, and he finally committed a clear breach of neutrality by landing supplies for the Spaniards. To this Dewey sent a pointed protest, closing with the words, "And say to Admiral von Diedrich that if he wants a fight he can have it now."


**Holding
Manila Bay.**

**Attitude of
von Died-
rich.** The German was in a rage, and asked Captain Chichester what he would do if a conflict occurred between the American and German squadrons. The Briton replied; "There are only two persons here who know what my instructions are. One of those persons is myself, and the other is — Admiral Dewey." Von Diedrich then realized that he was alone, and his attitude became more regular. He represented a new navy, without traditions of "sea manners," and was acting without instructions. But he showed the hostility his compatriots at that time generally felt toward the United States, and he nearly precipitated a war.

The first relieving expedition arrived at Manila on June 30 and contained 2500 men, a second arrived July 17 with 3500, a third on July 30 with 4600, and August 4 came the great monitor, *Monterey*, a floating fortress bristling with guns. As these forces were landed they occupied the captured forts, and August 13, under command of General Wesley Merritt, they were in position to occupy Manila, a work which they accomplished in a few hours, notwithstanding the spirited resistance of the garrison. Dewey's persistence at Manila committed us to our Philippine policy. Had he left the islands to Spain they would probably have gone to some other European power, or to Japan, and that, it seems, would have obviated the strong check we were able to interpose, a few years later, to the partition of China. Those who think that we should not have become involved in oriental diplomacy are inclined to blame Dewey for not leaving Manila after he had crushed the Spanish fleet, which was all his instructions ordered. But the responsibility was not his. He was in communication by cable with his government, and President McKinley and his cabinet not only failed to order him away, but devised the policy of occupation which followed his achievement.

**Relief for
Dewey.**





(The different Scales used show)



When the Cape Verde expedition sailed westward the American fleet on the Atlantic was in three squadrons. One under Commodore Howell patrolled our northern coasts, another, called the "Flying Squadron," remained at Hampton Roads under Commodore W. S. Schley, and a third, the main squadron, under Rear Admiral W. T. Sampson, was at Key West conducting the blockade. The announcement of Cervera's coming put the first and second of these divisions into motion. Schley was sent around the western end of Cuba to the southern coast, and Sampson operated along the northern coast as far as Porto Rico and in the channels east and west of Haiti, with scout-ships thrown far out. The Spaniard reached Martinique safely on May 11, and, learning that Sampson was looking for him, turned southward to the Dutch island of Curaçao, where he arrived on the 14th. He had supplies for the army and wished to reach Cienfuegos, in railroad communication with Havana. May 15 he started for that place with a small supply of coal, but changed his mind, and May 19 entered Santiago harbor, at the eastern end of Cuba. At that time the Flying Squadron had not passed the western end of the island, and Cervera, had he known it, might have reached the desired point without molestation. His engines were in need of repairs, and he intended after recoaling to get to sea and threaten the American cities to the northward. In the port coaling was slow, General Blanco, commanding in Cuba, wished him to help defend the island, and he thus remained until his last hope of escape vanished.

Cervera
Reaches
Santiago.

May 21 Schley arrived off Cienfuegos. The inner harbor was so concealed that he could not see what was in it, but hearing guns firing, and seeing columns of smoke rising, he concluded that Cervera was inside. As soon as the Spaniards reached Santiago the fact was reported to Washington. The news was not entirely credited, but it was sent to Sampson, then at Key West. He thought they must go to Cienfuegos, where they would be intercepted, and on the 20th ordered Schley to "hold your squadron off Cienfuegos." Next day he changed his mind and urged the latter to go to Santiago. Schley was right to exercise reasonable discretion, and as he thought the enemy before him he disregarded the instructions, saying, "I think I have them here almost to a certainty." But May 24 he established communications with the Cubans on shore, learned he was mistaken, and immediately proceeded to Santiago, where he arrived May 26. Here he saw no evidence of the hostile fleet, concluded it was not in the harbor, the inner part of which was hidden behind headlands, and started back to Key West to coal his ships, thinking the water too rough to coal from the collier accompanying him. In turning westward he disregarded positive orders from Sampson to blockade the harbor. He had gone only 40 miles when he received directions from the secretary of the navy to blockade Santiago, and turned back to that task.

Schley
Looking for
Cervera.

The subsequent criticisms of Schley's conduct embraced three charges. He was said to have delayed too long at Cienfuegos; but in that respect he replied that he acted within the discretion a high officer on detached service has a right to exercise, and he has a right to this defense. He was also blamed for the retrograde movement at Santiago. It seems certain that he did not try hard enough to learn whether or not the enemy were in the inner harbor and that he showed little resourcefulness in trying to coal at sea. The third criticism was that when he established the blockade he lay so far out to sea that the Spaniards might have escaped had they been enterprising. There is little doubt that this was true. At the approach of hostilities he outranked Sampson, who was a favorite with the naval authorities. Both men were brave officers, and bore honorable parts in the campaign which followed.

June 1 Sampson arrived and took command of the blockading fleet. He brought with him the powerful battleship *Oregon*, which had just completed, since March 19, the fourteen-thousand-mile trip from San Francisco around Cape Horn. Much fear had been felt for her safety when she reached the Caribbean Sea just as Cervera approached Cuba. May 9 she left Bahia, in Brazil; May 18 she was at Barbados; and six days later she was off the coast of Florida, joining Sampson at Key West as he was starting for Santiago. When asked if she could make thirteen knots, the captain signalled "Fourteen, if necessary." With the arrival of Sampson, the American fleet before Santiago included four first-class and one second-class battleships and two fast cruisers, besides two fast converted yachts able to meet torpedo-boat destroyers and several colliers and despatch boats. From the date of his coming the ships took station close inshore, with powerful searchlights at night bearing on the harbor mouth and always ready to fly at anything that attempted to escape.

The channel leading into the harbor is only 350 feet wide at one point, and Sampson directed that a collier be sunk so as to block exit, but the order was not executed when he arrived, and his first care was to make the attempt. Lieutenant Richmond P. Hobson was selected to carry in the *Merrimac*, warp her athwart the channel, and sink her by exploding torpedoes and opening her sea valves. The point selected was directly under the guns of Morro Castle, but hundreds of men were ready to volunteer for the task. Only seven were taken, and just before dawn of June 3 the vessel glided noiselessly toward the harbor, Hobson and his devoted crew clad only in woollen underwear and going, as all men thought, to certain death. Behind the collier trailed a catamaran raft and a lifeboat in which they hoped to escape if opportunity offered. At five hundred yards from the castle they received a shower of shot, but coolly kept on, cast anchors at the designated spot, and sank the ship undisturbed by the hot fire concentrated

upon them. But before the anchors caught the vessel was swung around by the current so that she did not settle across the channel, as was expected. In the operation the lifeboat was carried away, and Hobson and his crew, not hit by the Spanish shots, swam to the catamaran and concealed themselves under it until daylight, when they surrendered and were sent to Morro. They were well treated, and Admiral Cervera personally expressed admiration for their courage and informed Sampson of their safety. The incident resulted in failure, but the blockade continued with unrelenting vigor.

Throughout June the giant sentinels stood guard, five miles out during the day, from one to three miles off during the night. On the sixth Sampson bombarded the forts, but the reply was weak.

The Spanish guns were small and the ammunition was carefully husbanded. June 7 to 17, by means of hard fighting by the marines, the Americans seized Guantanamo Bay and held it for a naval base. From this point Lieutenant Victor Blue, of the navy, with Cuban guides made two trips to the hills behind Santiago, located the hostile fleet, and made valuable topographical observations. His achievement, like Hobson's, was much acclaimed by the people at home. These feats, important as accessories to other movements, but indecisive in a large sense, marked the limit of the power of the navy, unless Cervera should elect to take the sea. Sampson recognized the fact, and turned to the army, saying; "If 10,000 men were here, city and fleet would be ours within 48 hours. Every consideration demands immediate army movement. If delayed, city will be defended more strongly by guns taken from the fleet." He reported the enemy in and around the city at 12,500.

Progress of
the Block-
ade.

LAND OPERATIONS AGAINST SANTIAGO

When the war began the regular army was enlarged to 62,000 men and a call was issued for 125,000 volunteers. A few days later congress called for 75,000 additional volunteers and authorized three regiments of cavalry and ten regiments from the Gulf states, composed of men immune to yellow fever.

Army Or-
ganization.

The response was enthusiastic; and throughout May and June regiments were assembling at Chickamauga Park, in the salubrious southern highlands. In August 58,688 regulars and 216,029 volunteers were in service. One regiment of volunteer cavalry drew special attention. It was commanded by Colonel Leonard Wood, formerly an army surgeon, and Theodore Roosevelt, who resigned an assistant secretaryship of the navy to be its lieutenant colonel. Most of the men were from the Far West, cowboys, ranchmen, and Indians, but it also contained prominent athletes from the Eastern universities. It was popularly known as "The Rough Riders."

The regulars were assembled at Tampa, Florida, with an idea of attacking Havana; but the summons of Sampson took them to Santiago. June 14 two infantry divisions under Brigadier Generals Kent and Lawton, one cavalry division under Major General Joseph Wheeler, formerly of the confederate army, and four light and two heavy batteries of artillery, in all 16,887 men, set sail for the front, convoyed by a detachment of the navy. The "Rough Riders" served under Wheeler. The cavalry could not take their horses for want of transports, and the entire expedition lacked many necessary things. By some oversight only three ambulances were taken. The command was given to Major General Shafter, and on June 20 he arrived off Santiago, and two days later the disembarkment began.

Admiral Sampson overestimated the number of Spanish troops in Santiago. Their real number was 6500, distributed in the forts around the city with a large detachment thrown out to protect the water supply. General Linares, in command, was a competent officer, and the defenses were well placed, with strong protection from barbed-wire entanglements. His men were armed with magazine rifles using smokeless powder, while Shafter's men had black powder. The country around Santiago contained many troops placed as garrisons to hold back the insurgents, but through a strange kind of neglect they were not concentrated against the Americans.

Shafter began to land his troops at Daiquiri on the morning of June 22. Here the shore runs east and west, and a road, parallel to it for the most part, reaches Siboney, six miles to the west, Las Guasimas three miles farther on, and San Juan Hill, seven miles still farther, and enters the city a little over a mile beyond that elevation. Along this road the Americans must advance. By night-fall of the 22d, 6000 men had landed through the surf at Daiquiri, the garrison there retreating before them. Nine hundred and sixty-four of the disembarked were dismounted cavalry under Wheeler, five hundred of whom were "Rough Riders." It was intended that Brigadier General Lawton should lead the advance and the cavalry bring up the rear; but Major General Wheeler outranked Lawton, and as Shafter remained on the transports Wheeler assumed command on shore. He lost no time in idleness, but moved his men to Siboney, and on the morning of the 23d attacked the retreating Spanish detachment at Las Guasimas. It was posted on a hill overlooking a wooded valley through which the Americans approached by two roads. They were thus divided, as they came up, but deployed and formed line of battle. After an hour's fighting the Spaniards withdrew toward the city. They lost nine killed and twenty-seven wounded, while their opponents lost sixteen killed and fifty-two wounded. The skirmish was hardly over before Lawton's

**Departure of
Shafter for
Santiago.**

**Defenses of
Santiago.**

**Disembark-
ment.**

**Las Guasi-
mas.**

men rushed up from Siboney in order to get into the fight. From the crest of the captured hill Santiago could be seen, and the men were eager to go forward; but they were without supplies; and it was prudent to wait until the rest of the army and the stores could be landed. It was not until July 1 that the advance was resumed.

Linares prepared for the onset at San Juan Hill, just east of which runs San Juan river, a small stream. On the hill itself he placed his first line, with a body of men thrown out to Kettle Hill, a smaller elevation at its foot, both hills commanding the river. A second line was half a mile in the rear of the first, and a third was 400 yards behind that and nearly a mile from the city. The first line was manned by 521 men, the second by 411, and the third by 140. There were many men in other parts of the field, but only a few of them were brought up in time to take part in the defense of these lines.

Linares's
Lines of
Defense.



Three miles east of San Juan Hill the road crosses a small hill called El Poso, then falls into a thickly wooded valley which stretches away to San Juan river. Through this wood and parallel with the road runs a small tributary of the river, the road and river clearly discernible from San Juan Heights. Three miles north of El Poso, on the road from Santiago to Guantanamo, is El Caney, then a fortified village manned by 520 men. Shafter's plan was to send Lawton with 6500 men to seize this place and march at once down the road toward the city. When El Caney was taken the rest of the army under Wheeler and Brigadier General Kent was to move from their position behind El Poso, carry San Juan Hill, and the lines behind it, then unite with Lawton's advancing column, sweep away all further opposition, and enter Santiago. His army thought little of the fighting capacity of the Spaniards, and did

Shafter's
Plan of
Battle.

not understand the advantage they had from smokeless powder and improved rifles.

Lawton was confident he could carry El Caney, and promised to do it in two hours. He moved at dawn, July 1, but was delayed by wire entanglements and the difficulty of bringing up his guns, and it was not until 2 P.M. that he had enveloped the village on three sides and was ready to carry it. His charge was received bravely, the Spaniards defending each position to the last, stubbornly falling back from one blockhouse to another, and finally fighting from the houses in the village until they were, at five o'clock, forced to withdraw to the northwest. This long battle in the hot sun under distressing conditions cost the Spaniards 270 killed and wounded and 150 captured. Lawton lost 81 killed and 360 wounded, and the time spent in the movement precluded his cooperation with the main column on the Santiago road.

The other wing had not waited for him. At nine o'clock it crowded into the road and took its route to the ford beyond which it would form to carry the hill. There was much confusion, the progress was slow, and all was in view of the enemy on San Juan Hill who had the range of the road and the ford and delivered an annoying fire. By one o'clock this perilous march was ended, and the two brigades, 7573 in all, lay under what cover they could find 600 yards in front of the hill they were to charge. The men suffered continually, and were impatient to advance. For a short time no one seemed willing to order the charge. Finally the first cavalry brigade got permission to move; it was followed by the second, in which were the "Rough Riders" and the tenth regiment, colored, and the advance became general. The men rushed up the slope in little groups, paying slight attention to their officers, and firing as they went. At 1:30 P.M. they reached the crest, the defenders falling back into the second line of defense which commanded the position just relinquished.

The men on the hill were now in extreme danger. They were without food, exhausted, demoralized by the exertions of the day, and on the point of falling back, when General Wheeler, who was ill early in the day, arrived and took command. He found some intrenching tools left by the Spaniards and induced General Shafter to send up others, and the hill was soon safe from the fire of the enemy's second line. July 2 brought heavy rains, from which the men had no protection. The road to the coast was a sluice of mud along which only the most meager supplies could be brought. Gloom settled down on the army, and it was doubtful if it could be induced to penetrate the city in front of it. All through the day it exchanged shots with the enemy, and the continuous firing, with other suffering, discouraged the troops, most of whom were new recruits and had never before seen a battle.

**Lawton's
Attack on
El Caney.**

**Attack on
San Juan
Hill.**

**Holding San
Juan Hill.**

During the night of July 2 Shafter laid the situation before his division commanders. The nature of the discussion was not made public, but next day he sent a despatch to Washington saying that Santiago could not be taken with the force then on shore, and that it might be necessary to fall back to higher ground until reënforced. Meanwhile, he tried the effect of a stern demand on the Spanish commander, the suggestion, as it was currently reported, of General Wheeler. At noon on the 3d he sent a summons for surrender, threatening to bombard the city with his heavy guns in case of refusal. These pieces were not in position, but the enemy did not know it. General Toral, in command since the 1st, when Linares was wounded, began to parley. The demand was not granted, but the departure and destruction of Cervera's fleet on this day restored the spirit of the Americans. They extended their lines and had the city completely invested within a week. On the 10th they began a bombardment which had the effect of renewing the negotiations. The city was now in genuine distress; the fleet was destroyed, the water supply was cut off, and supplies were low. On the 17th Toral accepted terms and handed over most of eastern Cuba, the victors agreeing to transport to Spain the Spanish soldiers surrendered in it, 22,700 in number. The capitulation gave great relief to the American army, men and officers. There was much malarial fever and dysentery in the ranks and a few cases of yellow fever of a mild type. Another week of fighting might have thrown the entire force into panic.

**Surrender of
Santiago.**

THE DESTRUCTION OF THE SPANISH SQUADRON

Admiral Cervera saw himself bottled up in the harbor with great dismay. He opposed from the first the expedition to the West Indies and would have got away at the earliest moment, but coaling was slow and General Blanco feared that his army, already near the point of mutiny, would take it for abandonment by their country and break out in disorders, to subdue which must occasion the spilling of much blood. Thus was allowed to pass the first days of the blockade, when a successful sortie was most possible. The army in Cuba thought a second fleet would be sent to drive off Sampson's ships and then to unite with Cervera to sweep all opposition from the seas; but the higher officers, naval and military, knew how futile was this hope. The arrival of Shafter added to their discouragement, and some of the guns of the squadron were landed to strengthen the land defenses. Marines were also sent to the trenches, and Captain Bustamente, leading a detachment of 500, lost his life on July 1 in defending San Juan Hill. June 24 Cervera, by cable, had been placed under command of Blanco, who ordered him to aid in the defense of the city until surrender seemed inevitable and then to go out in the best manner possible.

**Position of
Cervera.**

This contingency was believed to have arrived on the evening of July 1, but the admiral hesitated on account of what he believed the useless loss of life. At dawn on the 2d he unwillingly directed his fires to be lighted and called his sailors on board. A few minutes later all his doubts were resolved by peremptory instructions from Havana to make the sortie. Blanco felt it would be a blot on Spanish honor to allow the ships to fall into the hands of the enemy without a blow.

All day Saturday, July 2, the steam rose in the gauges. Sunday morning it was at the highest point, and all the preparations were complete. Cervera gave the order of proceeding. Like

**Cervera's
Plans for
the Sortie.**

a brave officer he took the lead in the *Maria Teresa*, with the *Vizcaya*, *Colon*, and *Oquendo* following in order at intervals of 800 yards, all armored cruisers of the modern type. Behind them at 1000 yards came the torpedo-boat destroyers, the *Furor* and *Pluton*, the third destroyer which set out from the Cape Verde islands having fallen behind through disablement. He proposed to turn westward when outside, try to ram the *Brooklyn* on the west end of Sampson's line, draw the other American ships to him, and thus give the ships that came later an opportunity to break through and escape. Such tactics would mean the loss of the *Teresa*, but they might save the rest of the squadron. The start was made from the inner harbor at 9:15 A.M.

That morning the American ships were in a crescent, the ends three miles apart and two and a half miles respectively from the shore.

**Position of
the Ameri-
can Ships.**

Farthest west was the *Brooklyn*, Commodore Schley's flagship, a fast and powerful cruiser. Next to her was the *Texas*, a second-class battleship, then the *Iowa* and *Oregon*, first-class battleships, and on the eastern end of the crescent was the *Indiana*, also a first-class battleship. The *Gloucester*, a converted yacht, was midway between the *Indiana* and the shore, while the *Vixen*, another small ship, was a mile and a half west of the *Brooklyn*. The heavy battleship, *Massachusetts*, was coaling at Guantanamo, and the cruiser, *New York*, Admiral Sampson on board, was eight miles away, near Siboney, for a conference between the admiral and General Shafter. Cervera had thus by accident selected a moment favorable to his project; for two of the best ships in the blockade were off their stations, which, in view of Sampson's excellent tactics, was all the good luck of that nature the Spaniard could expect.

At 9:30 o'clock the *Teresa* was sighted going at full speed. Schley, in actual command, signalled, "Clear ship for action," and "Close up." Sampson soon saw what was happening, signalled the attack, and made all speed for the fray. Only the *Oregon* had full steam up, and for a few minutes the other ships were outstripped by the enemy. The *Teresa* made straight for the *Brooklyn*, which at 1400 yards turned eastward, made a great loop, and came back to the west in a course

parallel to the flying *Teresa*. By this time the other Spanish ships were outside. Instead of scattering, they followed their admiral along the shore, each engaged with the American ship which, sailing in a parallel course farther out at sea, happened to be nearest to her. Thus the action resolved itself into a series of magnificent duels between powerful ironclads, metal ringing on metal, while the cannon roared, the great engines throbbed, and the air was filled by the clouds of smoke which rushed from the overcharged boilers. The Spaniards' aim was bad, or their powder poor, for their shots went wild or fell short, while the American gunnery was excellent. It was more than the enemy could stand, and the explosion of shell after shell in his vessels showed that he was losing the fight. The *Teresa*, in the thickest of the battle, first showed signs of weakening. At 10:15 she ran for the beach six and a half miles from the harbor, a complete wreck. Five minutes later the *Oquendo*, in even worse condition, repeated the maneuver and settled in the sand half a mile west of the *Teresa*. The *Furor* and *Pluton*, last out of the harbor, were raked by the small guns of the American ships and engaged by the *Gloucester* at short range with great courage. They quickly succumbed and sank before they could reach the beach. The other Spanish ships, the *Vizcaya* and *Colon*, passed the first danger zone with a faint hope of escape. They were pursued by the *Brooklyn*, *Oregon*, *Texas*, and *Iowa*, whose rising fires ever increased their speed. At 11 o'clock the *Vizcaya*, shot-ridden and sinking, turned to the shore and ended her course twenty miles from Santiago. The *Iowa* and *Texas* halted to receive her surrender and rescue her drowning crew, while the *Brooklyn*, *Oregon*, and *New York*, which was now coming up, held on after the *Colon*, six miles in the lead. The pursuers held their fire and crowded on all possible steam. At 12:23 the *Brooklyn* and *Oregon* were in range and opened fire. At 1:15 the *Colon* gave up the struggle and ran toward the shore. She was nearly uninjured, but her crew opened her sea valves, and she sank before the victors could prevent it. Thus four hours after Cervera began his dash the last of his ships was destroyed, 323 of his crew were killed, 151 were wounded, and 1782 were prisoners, he himself being among the last-named and on board of the *Iowa*. Sampson lost one man killed and one wounded, and his ships were uninjured. He himself, because of his unlucky position at the beginning, was not in the fight, but pursued it as fast as his swift cruiser, the *New York*, could move, and came up in time to be present at the surrender of the *Colon*.

Santiago was hardly taken before rumors of peace negotiation were heard. One effect was to hasten the departure of an expedition against Porto Rico. The government desired to occupy the island in order to hold it as war indemnity, and all men agreed that if Spain gave up Cuba she should be forced to relinquish the last of her American colonies.

**Expedition
against
Porto Rico.**

Accordingly, General Miles set out on July 21, landed on the southern shore of the island, and occupied town after town, encountering the most perfunctory resistance. In two weeks the southern and western parts were taken, with an American loss of 3 killed and 40 wounded. The march of victory, to the disgust of the soldiers, was interrupted by the tidings that an armistice had been made on August 12.

REFLECTIONS ON THE WAR IN CUBA

In June, 1898, Spain had 106,000 troops in Cuba, of whom 36,000 were in Santiago province. General Blanco had distributed these to restrain the revolutionists, and did not concentrate them against the greater danger of the American invasion. **Error of Linares.** General Linares had 6500 at his disposal in and around Santiago, but on July 1 he put only about 1200 into the fights of El Caney and San Juan Hill. In the evening of that day he began concentration, and next morning had nearly 3000 men on his lines. Late on the 3d, Colonel Escario with 4000 fresh troops arrived from the region west of the city. In view of the hardly won victory on the 1st, it seems that the result might have been otherwise if this concentration had occurred earlier.

The destruction of Spain's naval power isolated her army in Cuba and made surrender inevitable. The American soldiers then began to feel sympathy for men who were so suddenly overtaken by misfortune, and fraternized with them in Santiago as soon as the capitulation was signed. Other acts of courtesy to the vanquished won the good will of the Spanish soldiers. **Acts of Humanity.** Captain Evans, of the *Iowa*, refused to take the proffered sword of Captain Eulate, of the *Vizcaya*, and Captain Phillips, of the *Texas*, would not let his men cheer over the defeat of a brave foe. A Spanish private soldier in a public letter which was published as the army embarked said to the Americans: "You fought us as men, face to face, with great courage, a quality we have not met with during the three years we have carried on this war against a people without a religion, without morals, without conscience, and of doubtful origin, who could not confront the enemy, but shot their noble victims from ambush and then immediately fled. . . . The descendants of the Congos and Guineas, mingled with the blood of unscrupulous Spaniards, and of traitors and adventurers — these people are not able to exercise or enjoy their liberty; for they will find it a burden to comply with the laws which govern civilized humanity."

Most American soldiers shared this opinion of the Cuban army, who did not aid in the battles fought in their behalf, but overran our commissaries, consumed supplies, and pilfered whatever arms or other valuables were left unguarded. To the American they were a rabble beneath his contempt. He did not take into consideration the

effects of the long struggle on the Cubans. The guerrilla warfare to which necessity reduced them bred the rudest habits and political ideas, and the opportunity for pillage attracted persons for whom a life of regular labor had little charm. But no one can deny to them endurance and patriotism. If their hatred of Spain approached the frenzy of barbarism, it was the natural product of a tyranny which had stamped out the better feelings of the heart.

The Cuban Soldiers.

The campaign brought home to Americans the problems of modern warfare. It was evident that the magazine rifle and smokless powder opened a new era in fighting battles. It took 6500 Americans three hours to carry El Caney, defended by less than 600 men with the modern arms; and at San Juan Hill the same result was evident. The lesson of this is that war is increasingly difficult and bloody and ought to be the less lightly undertaken. This unpleasant fact is somewhat balanced by the larger percentages of recoveries among the wounded. The new bullet makes a smoother wound than the old leaden ball. Thus healing is easier, and the improvement in surgery and hospital efficiency greatly increases the success of treatment on the battlefield. Of the 1000 Americans wounded at Santiago, less than one per cent died.

Lessons of Warfare.

Shafter's army suffered greatly through lack of foresight in assembling the necessary equipment, and the commissary was not adequate for the demands so suddenly made upon it. Complaint was made of the beef, and serious charges were preferred against those whose duty it was to purchase it. The wagon trains were not sufficient at first to transport the supplies from the landing point to the lines, and the medicines were inadequate. The men's spirits fell with the impression that they were the victims of incompetency. They were not acclimated to service in the tropics, the fatigues and hardships in the trenches overwhelmed them, and by the end of July seventy per cent of the army were suffering from malarial fever. In the language of the commander it was "an army of convalescents." August 3 the general officers assembled with his consent, prepared a statement of the conditions, and suggested that the troops be removed to Montauk Point, Long Island. Shafter concurred with this recommendation in a separate report on the same day. Next day the officers' statement was given to the press before it reached Washington. This "round robin," as it was popularly called, caused needless alarm throughout the country and sent a shock of terror to many a fireside. Giving it to the public so soon was a breach of discipline, the responsibility for which was not fixed on the perpetrator. August 4 the order for removal was given by the secretary of war, and by the end of the month all the troops were out of the island, their places being taken by the newly raised immune regiments. Montauk Point proved too

"An Army of Convalescents."

cool and bracing for the enfeebled men, and the process of recovery was slow. It was felt that it would have been better to transfer the regiments to the more moderate climate of the coasts of North Carolina or Virginia.

In the discouragement of the moment General Shafter was much criticized. He was physically a large man, over fifty years old, afflicted with the gout, and not active enough for the task assigned him. But he was a good soldier, resolute, sensible, and brave, and his plan of campaign was admirable. He did not deserve all the blame he got: part of it should be laid to men who threw newly recruited regiments into a most difficult operation; for adequate preparations could not be made in the time allowed. He was assigned to the expedition by General Miles, head of the army, under the impression that the campaign would be of minor importance. It was believed that the chief operations would be against Havana, and these Miles expected to lead himself.

A controversy arose between the friends of Admiral Sampson and those of Commodore Schley in reference to the conduct of the latter at Santiago. When Sampson steamed up as the *Colon* was sinking, Schley signaled congratulation and received the curt reply, "Report your Casualties." To the public this seemed ungenerous. Sampson's promotion was not generally approved in the first instance, and his conduct after the battle seemed to support the opinion that he was not only a pet of the bureaucracy but a heartless seeker of his own glory. Such a view did Sampson injustice. He was a good officer and had conducted the campaign well, but the public was in no mood to recognize it. When President McKinley, in distributing the rewards for the commanders of ships at Santiago, recommended that Sampson be advanced eight numbers and Schley six, the controversy became acute. The senate reflected the feeling in the country and deferred consideration. By this time feeling ran high on both sides, and so many charges were made against Schley that in 1901 he demanded an investigation. Admiral Dewey presided over the court of inquiry, whose verdict acquitted Schley of cowardice, which had been freely charged by his critics, but it found that he was vacillating and unenterprising before June 1, 1898. Dewey, in a separate opinion, declared that Schley was in command at the battle off Santiago and deserved the credit for the victory. President Roosevelt, reviewing the verdict, supported the finding of the majority of the court and declared that Sampson was technically in command in the battle, but that it was "a captain's fight." This disposal of the dispute did not satisfy the public, although McKinley's recommendations were finally accepted by the senate, and the controversy died slowly.

**General
Shafter.**

**The Samp-
son-Schley
Controversy.**

PEACE NEGOTIATIONS

The rapid course of events in Cuba and the Philippines awakened Spain from her habitual indecision, and July 18, the day after the surrender of Santiago, she asked France to open negotiations in her behalf. Accordingly, the French minister approached President McKinley and received a tentative statement of our terms. Several notes were exchanged, and August 12 a protocol was signed, Spain agreeing to evacuate Cuba immediately and to cede Porto Rico and one of the Ladrone islands as indemnity. The Philippines were to be left *in statu quo*, their disposition to be determined when a formal treaty was made by commissioners appointed to meet in Paris, October 1. The day after this protocol was signed, and before the news was carried to the Philippines, Manila was taken by the Americans.

**Protocol
Signed,
August 12.**

Opinions on holding the archipelago now developed rapidly. Many persons saw in the situation an opportunity and a duty to acquire the islands in order to convert the people and instill in them western ideals. Some thought acquisition would imply vast commercial possibilities. Still others, and these were probably the most numerous, thought chiefly of the national glory which, they believed, grew with the size of the domains over which the flag floated. Conservative men pointed out the perils expansion would introduce; the difficulties of governing remote territory and widely dissimilar races, the expensive enlargement of the navy which was sure to follow, the stimulus to militarism, and the danger from departing from our traditional policy of non-interference — all these were urged as reasons why we should not acquire the Philippines. They were entirely futile. So strong was opinion for acquisition that the president dared not resist. When the peace commissioners departed for Paris they were uninstructed on this important question; for he was awaiting the development of opinion. At the end of a month his mind was made up. We needed a foothold in the islands in order to protect our interests in the East; if we took one island for this purpose, complications would ensue with the owner of the others; and, therefore, we should have all or none. In this dilemma, the president decided to demand all as a purchase. Spain hesitated, but was not able to renew the war and was forced to yield. The price agreed on was \$20,000,000.

**McKinley
and the
Philippines.**

Much of Spain's large debt was secured by pledging Cuban revenues. Unless the holders of the debt agreed otherwise, the debt would go with the island. There was, therefore, some subtlety in the offer to transfer Cuba to the United States; for it could not be doubted that the bondholders would never release us willingly from the suretyship, if we once permitted it. Neither would they take the Cubans for security. When we refused

**Cuba and
the Spanish
Debt.**

to accept a transfer of the island to ourselves, Spain could do nothing but acquiesce and shoulder of her own strength the immense debt she had contracted in two wars to subdue the revolutionists. It was agreed that Spain should relinquish sovereignty in Cuba, that we should occupy it until we saw fit to hand it over to the Cubans, and that we should defray the expense of the occupation.

The other subjects of discussion were easily settled. Guam, in the Ladrone group, and Porto Rico were given up as indemnity, and each nation assumed the claims of its own citizens against the other. It was also stipulated that congress should regulate the civil and political status of the ceded territory, a provision of importance in later proceedings concerning our government of dependencies. This treaty found serious opposition in the senate on account of its Philippine clause. It committed us to expansion, and reversed the policy of a century. February 4, 1899, while it still hung in the balance, came the insurrection of the Filipinos. Some dissenting senators, feeling that we could not now withdraw from the islands, abandoned their objections, and the treaty was approved February 6.

**Other
Features of
the Treaty.**

SUBSEQUENT RELATIONS WITH CUBA

It was January 1, 1899, when under the protocol the Spanish flag in Havana gave place to the stars and stripes, and an American military government took up the task of restoring a devastated land to the ways of peace. Its first care was sanitation. Cuban towns, in the best days of the old régime, were badly drained and full of disease-breeding conditions : at the end of the war, they were more than ever wretched. American engineers gave themselves to the work of improvement, and in two years Cuba was clean and public works were established by which it might remain so. An American army surgeon, Major Walter Reed, proved that yellow fever is only transmitted by a mosquito, the deadly *stygomyia*. Further investigation has shown that other dreaded fevers peculiar to the tropics are transmitted by insects ; and by taking proper precaution it has thus been possible to make life as safe in those regions as in other parts of the world. Another service of the Americans was to establish a modern system of public education. Its need is shown by the fact that before that time two-thirds of the population could not read and write. But their greatest task was to organize government harmoniously. The old Spanish party had no confidence in the party of liberation, and without American supervision the two factions would probably have been at each other's throats. The situation was met by conferring the suffrage cautiously. All were allowed to vote who could read and write, or owned \$250 worth of property, or had served in the army of

**Restoring
Order in
Cuba.**

liberation. In June, 1900, municipal elections were held under this arrangement. They passed off quietly, and in September a general election was held for members of a constitutional convention, which met November 5. It adopted a republican form of government, embracing a congress of two houses, a president, and a supreme court.

The convention omitted from the constitution any reference to future relations with the United States, desiring to leave Cuban sovereignty unimpaired. But our government did not mean that Cuban affairs should fall into chaos and invite the intervention of foreign powers through lack of supervision. Congress, therefore, in 1901 delivered its ultimatum in the Platt amendment to the army appropriation bill. It directed the president to withdraw the army when the Cuban constitution provided: (1) that no foreign power should ever effect a lodgment in the island or establish control over it, (2) that Cuba should contract no debt for which the revenues were inadequate, (3) that the United States might intervene to preserve independence, order, and republican government, and to see that Cuba discharged her obligations to other nations, (4) that Cuba approve the acts of the military government in the island and continue the sanitary reforms there, and (5) that the United States retain the Isle of Pines and naval stations subject to future settlement. This condition was accepted by the Cuban constitutional convention. Later in the year, a general election was held, and May 20, 1902, a Cuban president, Thomas Estrada Palma, took the place of the American military governor. In the two years and a half of control the Cuban revenues were \$57,000,000, of which more than \$55,000,000 went for restoration, and the rest remained in the treasury.

**The Platt
Amendment.**

Lawlessness was deeply planted in the minds of the Cuban masses during the long resistance to Spain, and it disappeared slowly in the days of independence. The attempts of President Palma to enforce the law produced dissatisfaction, and his opponents, disputing his reelection in 1906, took up arms. President Roosevelt felt justified in intervening to restore order. He assigned the task of Secretary of War Taft, who assumed the office of military governor, displacing Palma, who yielded without protest. The arrival of a body of United States troops disposed of the insurrection and sobered the imagination of the people. Governor Taft returned to Washington after a few months, but his successor, Governor Magoon, ruled in the island until the end of the period of occupation in 1909. With his departure, a Cuban president was again installed, and peace has reigned to this day. It seems certain that the consciousness that disorders will be followed by intervention facilitates the development of self-government and good order.

**Reoccupa-
tion in 1906.**

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CHAPTER XXXIX

EXPANSION AND ITS PROBLEMS

THE PHILIPPINES AS AN AMERICAN COLONY

SEVERAL years before the United States became interested in the Philippines, rebellion began in the islands, and Spanish authority was reduced nearly to a nullity. Vast tracts of the best lands were in the hands of religious organizations, the members of which by the support of the crown monopolized municipal office. Their rule was heavy, and the natives formed an organization to obtain a larger degree of self-government.

**The Fili-
pinos and
the
Spaniards.**

They presented their grievances in 1896 and took up arms when the demands were refused. The rural districts quickly fell into their hands, the friars were killed, imprisoned, or driven to the protection of the garrison towns, and the whole archipelago except Manila and a few other large towns defied Spanish authority. The authorities could not subdue the revolutionists and resorted to cunning and bribery. When they made large promises of reform and offered to distribute \$1,000,000 among the leaders of the revolt, resistance was abandoned. The promised reforms were then forgotten by both parties to the bargain, and only part of the bribe was paid. When Dewey sailed for Manila, the disappointed leaders were in Singapore, and their chieftain, Aguinaldo, a man of much ability, opened negotiations with the Americans. Dewey received his overtures and brought

**Dewey and
Aguinaldo.**

him to Manila, where he was soon at the head of a strong force which overran the district around the city. He established a government, republican in form, and had the obedience of the natives generally. He was recognized by both General Anderson, commanding the first forces that came to the support of Dewey, and by the admiral himself. But by midsummer the American government was thinking of permanent occupation, and General Merritt was ordered to establish a provisional government without regard to that of Aguinaldo. The situation was delicate, but the natives desired to avoid a conflict. They were induced to allow the Americans to take unopposed possession of Manila when it surrendered on August 13, but they entered the place with their army and for a time occupied certain portions of it.

The Filipinos saw with concern the ripening purpose of the United

States to acquire the Philippines. They withdrew from the city to avoid conflicts between the soldiery of the two armies, but they kept sharp eyes on the negotiations at Paris. They also watched keenly the debate in the senate at Washington on ratifying the treaty with Spain, and February 4, two days before ratification, attacked Manila in a fierce night battle. Instantly the islands were in a flame. February 5, 6, and 10 the whole American force in the city was busy in beating off the assault, and succeeded in extending its lines beyond the suburbs. Aguinaldo could not withstand the attack. The Americans took town after town, but must hold with garrisons all they won. The rainy season, from May to the end of September, interrupted the conquest, but October saw it renewed with a stronger force. In two months the treasurer, secretary of the interior, and president of the Filipino congress were captured, but Aguinaldo eluded his pursuers, went into hiding, and directed resistance in isolated parts. After a year's fighting, 400 American posts held the population down, but there was no real submission by the natives.

Thus passed a year, no one knowing when the invisible leader would kindle another general outbreak. Finally, February 1, 1901, it was learned that he was at Palanan, in the inaccessible mountains of Isabella province. General Funston with four American officers and some friendly natives volunteered to capture him. Landing on a wild coast, they set out for his headquarters, nominally as a party of native soldiers who were taking five white prisoners to the leader. They gained access to his presence, overpowered his guard, and carried him a captive to the coast before resistance could be offered. He was held in prison for a time in Manila and finally sent into exile. The war did not cease for a year longer, but its central will was broken. The leaders who held out acted for themselves, and one after another were forced to surrender. The last resistance was overcome in April, 1902.

The first government under American control was military, but it was temporary. In 1899 a step toward a permanent system was taken, when a Philippine Commission was sent out with President Schurman of Cornell University at the head, and Admiral Dewey, General Otis, Charles Denby, and Professor Dean C. Worcester as the other members. It was given wide authority to study conditions in the islands and to adopt a policy which would lead to self-government as the natives showed political ability. To apply the fifteenth amendment to the situation was evidently absurd. A great many of the people were illiterate, and most of them were without rudimentary knowledge of civil life. They were in many tribes, spoke a variety of languages, and were

**Revolt of
the Fili-
pinos.**

**Aguinaldo
Captured.**

**The Philip-
pine Com-
mission.**

used to the authority of a strong superior. The report of the Schurman Commission brought out these facts and suggested that the Filipinos should not have self-government at once.

It was decided to follow the suggestion, and the commission was reorganized with William H. Taft, of Ohio, at the head. Here began an administrative career which for tact and skill in the management of delicate problems has rarely been equaled in American history. Local governments were established as seemed advisable, suffrage was granted to the most capable, and it was announced that a central civil government would be created as soon as a working local government was established. After a year and a half of this fundamental organization the promise was redeemed, and Taft became the first civil governor of the Philippines, retaining, however, his position as president of the commission. The other commissioners became a part of an executive council to which three natives were added, and four executive departments — the interior, commerce and police, finance and justice, and education — were created. The governor and council had supreme executive functions under the government at Washington. Thirty-five provinces were created, with administrative heads appointed by the governor. An appointive system was thus established as best suited to the needs of the people. At the same time, the beginning of suffrage appeared in municipalities. All were allowed to vote who could read and write English or Spanish, or who had held municipal office in the past, or owned real property worth \$250, or paid taxes to the amount of \$30 a year.

William H.
Taft.

Civil Gov-
ernment In-
stituted.

All this was done by the president of the United States through power conferred by congress. The system worked well, and July 1, 1902, congress enlarged the plan and made it permanent. A law now made the inhabitants "citizens of the Philippine Islands," with the rights of life, property, and liberty, except that of trial by jury. It directed a census to be taken, and decreed the organization, two years thereafter, of a Philippine legislative assembly of two houses, the lower to be elective, the upper to be the Philippine Commission. The total population was 7,600,000, and the system provided was to extend to those districts only whose inhabitants were Christians, about 7,000,000. The remainder were classed as wild tribes and continued under military rule. But the next year a special district was created for these people, including the Moros and Sulu islanders, with a distinct governor and council, and with no thought of a legislature. For the regular Philippine government the suffrage law already introduced was continued.

Philippine
Act of July
1, 1902.

The census contemplated in the act of July 1, 1902, was completed in 1905, and elections for an assembly were held in 1907, eight years after the American régime began. Of the 7,000,000 natives concerned

only 104,966 registered under the qualified suffrage law; and of these only 100,439 voted. They were divided into two parties. One, known as nationalists, complained that the existing government was too expensive and gave too many offices to Americans. They aimed at independence in the near future and appealed to the most fervidly patriotic class. The other party was called progressives and supported development under American authority. It laid itself open to the charge of selfishness in seeking offices, of betraying national interests, and of lack of courage; but it reflected the best interests of the islands. The nationalists

The Philippine Assembly.

Native Parties.

carried the elections and organized the lower house of the assembly, but showed an unexpected amount of self-control in the exercise of power. As a party measure they carried a resolution favoring independence, but wisely coöperated in many measures to develop agricultural, educational, and administrative conditions. Later assemblies have repeated the same story, and it seems that the political life of the islands has fallen into step with the steady evolution to be expected under such circumstances.

As in Cuba, American occupation has brought many improvements in sanitation, education, and public utilities, most of them paid for out of the island revenues. In 1906 the system of education embraced 3435 primary, 162 grammar, 36 high, and 22 technical, schools, employing in all 5400 native, and about 800 American, teachers, at a total cost of \$2,421,222.

Philippine Improvements.

The persistence of the American tariff against the islands restrained business progress. But Governor Taft's urgent requests for relief could not break the opposition of the tariff party in the American congress. It was not until he became president that he was able to do something. The Payne-Aldrich bill (1909) allowed the

Tariff.

free annual importation of 300,000 pounds of Philippine sugar, 150,000,000 cigars, 300,000 pounds of wrapper tobacco, 1,000,000 pounds of filler tobacco, and an unlimited amount of hemp.

From the Spanish régime came a controversy difficult to settle and likely to enter into politics in continental America. The friars formerly owned 400,000 acres of the best land in the country, letting it to tenants on long-term leases. Since the revolt of 1896 it had been out of their possession, and the occupants had come to look upon it as their own. The friars desired the new government to reinstate them in possession and appealed to the president of the United States. After some hesitation, no better way was seen to end the affair than to buy the claims of the friars and then to come to terms with the persons in possession. The purchase was accomplished in 1902, the pope acting as mediator in the negotiations and Governor Taft representing the American government. The lands were acquired for \$7,000,000.

Friar Lands.

AN AMERICAN COLONIAL POLICY

Creating civil government in the Philippines was really a new and radical step in our political experience, and it occasioned a serious debate over the right of congress under the constitution to define the status of dependencies. There was much that was plausible in the view that the constitution made no provision for such action. In 1787 no such a contingency seems to have occurred to the men who made that instrument, and the situation of 1899 was a new one. The men of the day must devise a means of meeting it. We had acquired dependencies and we could not choose but govern them.

**A New
Issue.**

As soon as the question came up for consideration it was asked, "Does the constitution follow the flag?" This meant: Did the newly acquired subjects become citizens of the United States, with the rights of the inhabitants of the territories? and in a particular sense, were they within the customs limits? President McKinley took a negative view. He relied on the powers granted to congress in the constitution to admit

**" Does the
Constitution
Follow the
Flag ? "**

new states and to "make all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory and other property belonging to the United States" (Art. IV, sect. 3). Jefferson exercised this power in the purchase of Louisiana, and in establishing civil government in it. In 1828 Chief Justice Marshall held that congress had the right to acquire territory, and it would be absurd to say that territory could be acquired but not governed. The purchase of Florida and Alaska was in exercise of this right. Congress in each of these cases established the government it thought best for these purchased territories; it might do the same thing in 1899, and it was not essential that the same form of government suited the new possessions that was conferred on the continental territory. The fact that the Philippines and Porto Rico were islands and inhabited by people whose political training was unlike ours seemed to justify a distinct kind of government. This line of reasoning found favor with the dominant party in congress and in the country, and it was the basis of the colonial system now devised. It was not followed in Hawaii, for in 1900 congress erected it into a territory, acting apparently on the theory that it was likely to become a white man's country and be admitted to the union.

Congress arrived at this decision slowly, and meanwhile the question of customs limits must be settled. By the Dingley act, then in force, the duties were to be levied on articles coming from "foreign countries." Were the Philippines and Porto Rico "foreign countries"? The protectionists answered in the affirmative, the president took the same view, and duties continued to be collected. Then the matter went to the courts.

**Application
of Tariff
Limits.**

In the case of *De Lima v. Bidwell*, in which suit was brought to recover duties collected on sugar imported from Porto Rico, the court held that the island was not a "foreign country" within the meaning of the tariff law, but it intimated that congress could determine the tariff relations of dependencies. In the "Fourteen-Diamond-Ring" case the same principle was followed for goods imported from the Philippines. These two cases fell under the Dingley act, but before they were decided congress took its position on the point at issue.

The Foraker Act. The Foraker act, April, 1900, established civil government in Porto Rico, but the feature of it which attracted most attention was the tariff relations of the island. President McKinley and a large part of the people wished the island products admitted free, but the beet and cane sugar growers rallied a strong opposition on the ground that yielding at this point was the beginning of defeat for the whole cause of protection. They were able to force a compromise by which Porto Rican goods paid a duty of 15 per cent until March 1, 1902. Another customs case, *Downes v. Bidwell*, now came before the court, and it was held that the Foraker act was constitutional. In the first cases congress had not spoken, and the dependencies were not considered foreign in the meaning of existing law: in the last case congress had declared its will and the court recognized its right to decide the question. We are, therefore, to conclude that the constitution does not follow the flag, but that congress determines how far it applies to dependencies.

Civil Government for Porto Rico. But little opposition was made in congress to the civil government which the Foraker act established for Porto Rico. There was to be a governor and an executive council appointed by the president with the consent of the senate, at least five of the councillors to be natives. Six councillors were to be heads of administrative departments, with power to appoint subordinates. There was to be an assembly of two houses, the upper to be the executive council and the lower to be elected by the people. A United States district court and a system of island courts were provided. This plan, it will be seen, resembles in its essential features the Philippine act of July 1, 1902, and it may be taken to indicate the spirit of our colonial system.

AN ISTHMIAN CANAL

Early Opinion. The United States became interested in an isthmian canal in 1846, the year they settled the Oregon boundary dispute. A treaty with New Granada (Colombia) in that year, ratified in 1848, granted a right of way across Panama on the same terms as New Granada reserved to herself, the United States guaranteeing neutrality of the route and the sovereignty of New Granada in the isthmus. An American company was organized to

build a railroad at once, and began work, but the road was not completed for several years. At the same time unavailing efforts were made to get Mexico to concede transit privileges across the Isthmus of Tehuantepec. We also showed our interest in such an enterprise by getting concessions for a canal through Nicaragua, but England, holding the Mosquito Coast, blocked the way at the eastern terminus. Some threatening negotiations over the subject resulted in the Clayton-Bulwer treaty (1850), by which we agreed that the two powers should jointly guarantee the neutrality of any canal they constructed across the isthmus, and that other nations should have a right to subscribe to the treaty if they chose. Later England claimed the Mosquito Coast as a dependency of British Honduras. Nicaragua objected and appealed to our government, and a controversy began which led to a long period of misunderstanding and much hard feeling between the two nations. The readiness with which we agreed to the Clayton-Bulwer treaty shows how little we cared in 1850 for an American-owned canal.

In 1869 the French completed the Suez canal, and its projector, de Lesseps, began to think of another such work in America. He favored the Panama route, and in 1878 Wyse, a French engineer, got a concession for a Panama canal, to be neutral in case of war, and the United States to share in the enterprise if they wished. A French company was formed with de Lesseps in control which took over Wyse's grant and opened a popular subscription for stock. \$120,000,000 was believed enough for the enterprise, and through the prestige of de Lesseps the amount was over-subscribed many times. Much of the sum paid in was wasted, and in 1882 bonds were issued for \$25,000,000 which sold at 87½, and \$60,000,000 more in 1883, which sold at 57. In the latter year digging began. Extravagance continued, and new loans were made at large discounts. In 1887 the tidewater canal, as originally planned, was abandoned for the lock type, thought to be less expensive. But this gave no relief; in 1889 the company could not meet its bills, and was dissolved by the courts. Those who undertook to rescue the enterprise and complete it found that \$180,000,000 more were needed, and as this sum could not be raised the project was considered hopeless.

**A French
Canal.**

On casting up accounts it was seen that bonds and stock had been issued to the nominal value of \$475,000,000, but at such discounts that they yielded only \$278,000,000. The total expenditure for construction proper was \$118,000,000 and for the purchase of the Panama railroad an additional \$19,000,000. The rest, \$141,000,000, went for interest on bonds, extravagant salaries, sums paid financiers and newspapers for their support, and expenditures to provide luxurious offices. An indignant public secured an investigation which showed widespread

**Financial
Extrava-
gance.**

corruption, in which the company's funds were used to bribe high public officials to grant favors in support of the company's credit and

to induce newspapers to advocate such concessions.

Bribery. Several persons were convicted of fraud, among them a son of de Lesseps, but the chief manipulators escaped by flight. The capitalists most largely interested in the company secured a reorganization with the hope of retrieving a part of what they had lost, but their appeals for stock subscriptions fell on deaf ears. They were in danger of losing their charter, but Colombia extended it until 1900 to give them full opportunity to get money. As that year approached the outlook was gloomy, for a French canal was clearly an impossibility. Then came the war of the United States against Spain, with the prospect of an American canal. At once the reorganized French company began to exert themselves to sell their charter and plant to the government at Washington.

Meanwhile, let us turn back to our own country, where alarm was felt lest de Lesseps's enterprise should give the French some national advantage in Central America. Opinion in the United States had now shifted to an American-owned canal. To meet this situation de Lesseps came to the United States in 1880, interviewing financiers and appearing before an investigating committee of congress. He asserted that his company would be controlled by the stockholders irrespective of national interest, and invited Americans to subscribe. He allayed suspicions for a time, but in uncovering the affairs of the company at a later day it was found that he resorted to a skillful distribution of shares of stock among financiers, editors, and even congressmen. For all this he sold only a moderate amount of stock, and the demand for an American canal was not lessened.

It found expression in plans for such a waterway through Nicaragua. It is true the Clayton-Bulwer treaty stood in the way, but by its terms it could be annulled by either side on six months' notice, and many persons insisted that such a step be taken, justifying themselves by England's questionable occupation of the Mosquito Coast. President Hayes did not go that far, but in a message to congress, 1880, advocating an American canal, he said that such a work would change our geographical conditions and become "virtually a part of our coast line." He continued, "No other great power would, under similar circumstances, fail to assert a rightful control over a work so closely and vitally affecting its interests and welfare." Congress, however, did nothing.

Blaine, secretary of state under Garfield, took a position equally vigorous. In a circular note to European powers he said that our interest in the French canal was superior to that of any other power but Colombia, and that in a war against ourselves or Colombia, whose sovereignty we guaranteed, we should

**De Lesseps
in the
United
States.**

**President
Hayes's Idea.**

**Blaine's
Attitude.**

no more allow the passage of a hostile ship than the transit of an army over one of our railroads to the Pacific. This strong utterance was received with polite silence abroad and with baffled wonderment at home. He also proposed to England a modification of the treaty of 1850, but met with a refusal that was barely courteous. Whatever plans he had were defeated by his retirement after the death of Garfield. Frelinghuysen, his successor, carried on negotiations with Great Britain with less aggression but without results, and Cleveland, more conciliatory still, allowed the matter to sleep. At the same time the growing embarrassments of the French company eased the alarms of Americans from that source.

But the Nicaraguan project was not forgotten. In 1884 a treaty permitting a canal with American capital was made with Nicaragua in return for a guarantee of the integrity of that state; but Cleveland withdrew it from the senate before it was ratified. Then a private "Maritime Canal Company of Nicaragua" was organized, and congress was asked for a charter. The administration hesitated, fearing international complications, but congress granted the request. Subscriptions came in slowly — the French company was then in its direst straits — and the Maritime company could do little more than improve the harbor at its eastern terminus. Next it appealed to congress to guarantee \$100,000,000 of its bonds. There was much discussion of the proposition in and out of legislative halls, and finally in 1895 it passed the senate, to be lost in the house. In 1898 the charter lapsed, but it was not doubted that Nicaragua would renew it, if the American government undertook to bring the enterprise to completion. This was the situation when the war against Spain ran its short and decisive course. It so much enhanced our interest in the Pacific that it could no longer be doubted that an isthmian canal was a necessity.

**The Mari-
time Com-
pany —
Nicaragua.**

It was also clear to a vast majority of Americans that the canal when built must be American, and that the Clayton-Bulwer treaty should no longer stand in the way. Negotiations were opened to that end, and in 1901, after one treaty had been rejected, the Hay-Pauncefote treaty was ratified in which the arrangement of 1850 was annulled. It said nothing about fortifications on the canal, and although neutrality was promised by the United States, no other power became a party to the pledge. A unilateral agreement leaves everything to the good faith of the nation making it.

**Clayton-
Bulwer
Treaty An-
nulled.**

THE CANAL AT PANAMA

It was believed that the French concession at Panama could be purchased by the United States, and a warm controversy now arose be-

tween those who favored that route and those who supported the Nicaragua route, the Maritime and the French companies each pushing its own interest vigorously, both in the press and by means of an able lobby. The transcontinental railroads also joined in the fight, trying to impede any action at all.

**The Route
Selected.**

Their position was so obviously selfish that they accomplished little. A commission of engineers, headed by Admiral Walker, was appointed to consider the two routes. It reported, November 16, 1901, that the Nicaraguan canal could be constructed for \$189,864,062 and the Panama canal for \$114,233,358, to which latter sum must be added the cost of the French plant, offered at \$109,142,500, but valued by the commission at a maximum of \$40,000,000. Its report ended by recommending the northern route. This final suggestion seems to have been made to bring the French company to terms, for when it offered to sell for \$40,000,000, the report was modified to favor the southern route. The matter then went to congress, which authorized the president by a vote practically unanimous to purchase the French rights if a legal title could be obtained. The bill also authorized the president to secure from Colombia, in which the state of Panama lay, a right of way at least six miles wide, and it provided for a commission to construct the canal.

Interest now centered at Bogotá. Secretary Hay negotiated a treaty with the Colombian *chargé d'affaires*, Herran, granting a ninety-nine years' lease, with right of renewal by the United States, of a canal zone six miles wide, in return for which we were to pay \$10,000,000 cash and \$250,000 annually. This agreement aroused dissatisfaction among Colombians. "Panama," as Professor Latané says, "was their greatest asset," and they had for many years built high hopes on its development. Besides, their constitution prohibited the alienation of territory by congress and the proposed lease was held to amount to alienation. The agreement, therefore, was rejected unanimously by the congress. President Roosevelt and many Americans believed the rejection was due to corrupt motives, and concluded that the Colombians desired to await the expiration of the French charter in 1904, when they could demand an exorbitant price. Colombia has ever denied that her motive was chiefly mercenary, but her point seems well taken that the amount offered was not in fair proportion to that paid later to the French company.

**Colombia
Objects.**

The turn events took caused much disquiet at Panama, whose inhabitants were dismayed at the prospect of having the canal go to Nicaragua. The state had long cherished opposition to the federal authority at Bogotá, charging that the latter exploited the state to get revenues for the federal government, until Panama was called "the milch cow of the confederation." Moreover, in 1885, Dr. Nuñez, by as high-handed methods as one could

**The Case for
Panama.**

imagine, had made himself dictator in Colombia and ruled the component states through a military oligarchy whose daring use of power in elections and elsewhere reduced republican forms of government to a farce. At the time, therefore, when Panama saw passing away her opportunity of realizing the dream of centuries, the construction of the canal which would make her the center of the trade routes of the New World, she was filled with resentment for ancient wrongs which struck at the root of her rights as a state. The new grievance did not create the spirit of revolt: it only ripened it.

Early in 1903 a revolutionary junta was organized in the town of Panama on the western side of the isthmus, at its head Señor Arango and Dr. Amador. Although they could count on the friendship of most of the Panamans, they were so weak that they could not succeed without the aid of the United States; but they believed that would be given, at least covertly, through our desire to get the canal route. They also needed money to raise troops and buy arms and ammunition. They hoped to get this from the Panama railroad, an American enterprise, which also had reason to desire that the canal be built in Panama. Dr. Amador went to New York to try to get funds at railroad headquarters; but his departure was known in Bogotá, and a hint that aid to the conspirators would lead to confiscation of the railroad charter destroyed that hope. One other powerful interest desired the canal dug at the isthmus, the French company. It so happened that as Dr. Amador was turned away from the railroad offices there arrived in New York the agent of the French company, Bunau-Varilla. He grasped the situation at once and agreed to furnish the desired funds if he was made the minister from the new state to Washington. Dr. Amador was overjoyed and readily promised what was asked. He then visited Washington, interviewed Secretary Hay, from whom he got no open encouragement, but left convinced that if a revolution were accomplished, President Roosevelt would recognize the *de facto* government. From Washington he returned to Panama, where it soon began to be whispered about that a revolution would occur on November 4, 1903. This rumor was reported to the United States by the American consul, and on November 2 the gunboat *Nashville* arrived at Colon. It came to protect American property, in view of the prospects of disturbances; but its presence gave courage to the timid ones, who saw in it a promise of the support of the United States.

When, as was believed, the blow was about to fall, that is to say, on November 3, there landed at Colon 450 Colombian soldiers commanded by four generals. The leaders proceeded at once to Panama, where the plot had its center, giving orders for the soldiers to follow. Three Colombian gunboats were off Panama to coöperate with the army, but the revolutionists

**Revolt
Planned.**

**Bunau-
Varilla to
the Rescue.**

**The Blow
Struck.**

expected them to support the revolt. Arrived at their destination, the generals with their staffs were made prisoners by the junto's army, now numbering about 100 men. Two of the gunboats declared for the same side, and the other steamed away after firing three shots, one of which killed a Chinaman, the only blood spilt in the revolution. Meanwhile, the force at Colon prepared to go to the defense of their leaders, but the railroad demanded money for transportation. The soldiers had no funds, but the officer in command threatened to seize the trains and go without delay. The company's officers sympathized with the revolt. By the treaty between the United States and Colombia, the former nation was bound to protect the free operation of the road, and the commander of the *Nashville* landed 50 marines to prevent the seizure of the railroad by the Colombians. He also announced that he would not allow the transportation of troops by either side, since that would precipitate a conflict and interfere with the free transit of the isthmus. Had the Colombian commander been enterprising and earnest, he would have found a means of getting to Panama, only 49 miles away. After two days in Colon, he embarked his troops on a mail ship and departed. It was reported that he received a bribe

Its Success. of \$8000 from the revolutionists, and that when his men discovered the fact, they despoiled him of the money and set him ashore at Kingston without funds. The captured generals were sent out of the country a few days later. By this time several American men-of-war were in the harbors of Colon and Panama. They came to protect property and keep transit open. But when they gave notice that, in compliance with orders from Washington, they would not allow troops to land within 50 miles of Panama, their presence took other significance. Colombia could not subdue the revolt without fighting the United States, and submitted to the inevitable with bitter feelings.

November 4, the junto held meetings, organized a republic of Panama, deposed the officers representing the Colombian authority, and installed a government of their own. Their proceedings

A Panama Republic.

were approved by a mass meeting in the town of Panama. November 6, the United States recognized the independence of the new republic, and on the same day Bunau-Varilla was appointed its first minister at Washington. All was done by cable, and he entered upon his duties with such despatch that by November 18 he had concluded the Hay-Bunau-Varilla convention, by which we guaranteed the integrity of Panama and received in full sovereignty a strip of land ten miles wide from sea to sea for the construction of a canal. For this concession we agreed to pay \$10,000,000 in cash and \$250,000 a year beginning in 1913.

Our share in these events was resented by Colombia, which had the support of most South American states. Friends of President Roosevelt justified his action on the ground that it was necessary to keep transit open and to protect property, but it is hard to treat such

ATLANTIC OCEAN

THE PANAMA CANAL

Excavating to be made by the U.S. Government

Excavations made by the French

Limon Bay

GATUN LOCKS

Bohio

Obispo

Culebra

PEDRO MIGUEL LOCKS

MIRAFLORES LOCKS

Panama

PACIFIC OCEAN


High Water 25 inches
Low Water 27 inches

Mean Ocean Level 0

Miles 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 Miles

Mean Ocean Level 0

High Water Level 10 ft.
Low Water Level 10 ft.



arguments seriously. In making the treaty, Colombia could not have intended to sign away her right to enforce order and sovereignty in her own borders. Keeping her from her own territory was nothing but a forceful act in contravention of her sovereignty. Her rejection of the Hay-Herran convention may have been due to unworthy motives, as the Americans suspected, but it did not give us a right to make our bargain in our own way at the mouth of cannon. If we must have had the Panama route, patience and fair dealing would have secured it; but it would have been better to pay extravagantly rather than create the impression at this stage in our Latin American relations that we would secure our ends by unfair means.

**American
Responsi-
bility.**

CANAL CONSTRUCTION

The first task of the canal commission was to make the scene of their future operations free from the diseases peculiar to the tropics. The discovery of the part played by the mosquito in transmitting yellow and other fevers now served a good purpose. By draining the breeding places of mosquitoes and screening the houses these diseases were reduced to a negligible factor. In five years only nineteen Americans died of yellow fever on the isthmus. A supply of pure water was also obtained, hospitals were built, houses were erected for the employees, and sanitary engineers made the towns along the route clean and wholesome. Much of the machinery received from the French proved useless, though some of their buildings and all of their excavation were serviceable.

Sanitation.

The question of a lock or sea-level canal now became important. It was referred to a group of engineers who reported that the sea-level type could be had in fifteen years for \$300,000,000 and a lock canal in ten to twelve years for \$200,000,000 to \$250,000,000. The latter type was adopted by the government, probably because of the shorter period of construction. The decision disappointed those who favored the opposite type, and for some years echoes of their misgivings were heard in the press and in scientific discussions.

**Sea-level or
Lock Canal.**

At the canal site the isthmus is 49 miles wide and runs nearly east and west. Near its center is the water divide, an elevation 8 miles wide and 290 feet above the sea at Culebra, its highest point. East of this ridge is a plain 30 miles wide, cut by the Chagres river running out of the hills east of Culebra and going northwestward along the line of the canal to the sea. West and south of the divide is a short river which reaches Panama across a plain 10 miles wide. The canal builder's task was to follow one river to the divide, cut through the ridge at Culebra, and parallel the other river to the ocean.

The Route.

In the work as constructed they secure this result as follows: The canal proceeds at sea-level for 8 miles to Gatun. Here an immense dam is placed across the valley of the Chagres a mile and a half long, 700 yards wide at the bottom and 100 feet at the top, really a cement-coated hill of rough stones. It will check the waters of the river and force them back over the plain so as to make a lake 22 miles long, to which the canal rises by locks. West of the lake across the divide the reliance is on excavation. This part of the canal, the Culebra cut, is of special interest because it sinks through layers of earth and loose stones, and the walls are subject to slides. West of the cut the canal descends by locks to the plain and crosses it at sea-level to the ocean. At the narrowest point, in the Culebra cut, it is 300 feet wide, but the width of the Gatun lake is so great that vessels can pass one another in it without difficulty. In 1909 severe slides in Culebra cut and the slipping of a part of the base of the Gatun dam caused a renewal of the agitation for a sea-level canal. President Taft visited the scene, consulted with the experts, and decided to proceed on the existing basis. January 1, 1911, 69.7 per cent of the excavation and 56.7 per cent of the Gatun dam had been completed, and it was believed that actual work would end by June 1, 1913. The excellent progress of recent years has been largely due to the efforts of Colonel George W. Goethals, chief engineer of the canal. To the end of the fiscal year of 1910-1911 the appropriations for the enterprise were \$248,000,000 and it was expected that the total cost would not exceed \$375,000,000.

The Canal.

Progress.

AMERICAN DIPLOMACY IN THE ORIENT

At the beginning of the present century the partition of China seemed imminent. Great Britain and Germany had ninety-nine year leases of important positions on the Shantung peninsula, south of the entrance of the gulf of Pechili, which leads to the capital of the empire. North of the entrance is the Manchurian peninsula which Russia held on a twenty-five year lease with absolute control in the meantime. The world thought these leases euphonious words for permanent occupation. China had no efficient navy or army, and regarded with dismay what seemed the jaws of a monster about to devour her. In 1899 England and Russia agreed that the former would not build railroads in China north of the Great Wall and the latter south of it, which seemed to be a bargain as to spheres of influence. France, at the same time, held recognized interests in Kwangchu bay, in southern China.

Partition of China Imminent.

Secretary Hay considered these events adverse to our trade interests and sent, September 6, 1899, protesting notes to London, Berlin, and St. Petersburg. He asked that an "open-door" policy be accepted

by all the great powers in regard to trade with China, and communicated what he had done to France, Italy, and Japan. The reply of England was favorable, but the other powers confined themselves to generalities. The incident called attention to the danger threatening the empire and aroused the keenest interest of China herself.

**Hay's First
Effort for
China.**

The Chinese government was supine, but the people were outraged. Their religion, patriotism, and business interests cried out against what they saw. Then arose the society of Boxers in the provinces of Shantung and Chili, nominally an athletic organization, but secretly pledged to exterminate the foreigners. Led by Prince Tuan, they became very numerous, won the support of many of the imperial troops, and by the middle of 1900 held all the country between Peking and the sea. The government was overwhelmed and June 10 placed Prince Tuan at the head of the foreign office. On the 19th the foreign ministers were ordered to leave the country, but they dared not trust themselves in the seething masses who held the roads to the coast. Baron von Ketteler, German ambassador, going through the streets of Peking to deliver a protest in the name of his government, was set on by a mob and killed by a soldier in uniform. Instantly came a furious demand for the blood of the foreigners in the city. All of the latter, ministers and others, with some native Christians, assembled at the British embassy and constructed fortifications. The Chinese government gave no relief. It was as helpless as the foreigners, and from June 20 until August 14 the embassy was in a state of siege.

**Work of the
Boxers.**

By the middle of June the powers had decided to rescue their ministers. On the 17th they took Taku at the head of the gulf of Pechili and 130 miles from the capital; and 20,000 troops, Japanese, Russian, British, American, and French, were in the place when they learned on July 9 of the death of the German ambassador. They were quickly in motion and five days later took the walled city of Tientsin, 40 miles from the coast. News now came that all the ministers in Peking were dead, and the column halted while the foreign powers prepared to send a great army for the severe chastisement of China. This thoroughly alarmed the Chinese government, which appealed to the United States, as a power not interested in seizing territory, to avert the threatened invasion. On the same day came assurances that the ministers were alive. This appeal came safely through the swarms of Boxers that filled the roads, and reached President McKinley on July 20. Instantly the force at Tientsin was in motion, and August 14 it occupied Peking, the imperial court fleeing into the interior.

**Foreign
Troops in
China.**

At first the situation seemed to hasten partition, for each nation concerned, including Germany, was likely to make strong demands which China could not resist. Secretary Hay, holding still to his

"open-door" policy, thought to avoid such a result by getting the powers to agree to joint occupation until reparation was arranged.

**Hay's
Second
Effort for
China.**

He shrewdly assumed that mutual jealousies which have predominated in many joint negotiations would prevent any one power from getting a share of the empire for itself. He got all the powers concerned to accept joint occupation. Then he got England and Germany to agree not to ask for territory, to oppose such a demand from the others, and to favor an "open-door" policy in commerce. The other powers now could only assent, Russia and France in a half-hearted way. At the final signature of this agreement the United States in a special clause stipulated that they did not guarantee the integrity of the foreign powers in China.

Joint diplomacy now proceeded. In December, 1900, it presented its demands to China, — indemnity for the losses sustained, and measures for the future security of foreigners. China hesitated a long time, but finally agreed to pay 450,000,000 taels — about \$333,000,000 — distributed among the powers in a specified manner. At every step Secretary Hay urged that China should not be reduced to the position of a weak power. He believed that the best solution of the Eastern problem was to maintain her integrity and give her an opportunity to modernize herself. Our share of the indemnity was \$24,000,000; but this exceeded the actual losses by \$13,000,000, and in 1907 the excess was handed back as an act of good will.

The United States now proceeded to try to get trade privileges in China and managed to have Antung and Mukden declared open ports.

**Russia in
Manchuria.**

But these towns were in Manchuria where Russia was seeking to establish her influence. Spite of treaty stipulations, by which she had agreed to evacuate the province by 1903, she held on to her advantage, returning evasive answers to Hay's representations. When we could do no more, the controversy was taken up by Japan, who had concessions in Manchuria which were violated by the Russian occupation. Still Russia did not yield, and Japan sent an ultimatum demanding concessions by January 16, 1904. It was not respected, and on February 10 began a short and brilliant war in which Japan surprised the world by her victories, so that by midsummer the great Slavic nation was ready to treat for peace. Until this time American sympathy was with Japan, and

**Russo-
Japanese
War.**

when President Roosevelt succeeded in bringing the two nations to treat for peace at Portsmouth, New Hampshire, on August 5, 1904, she expected American support. To her surprise the American president now seemed to favor her antagonist. Her finances were exhausted and she was forced to consent to the Russian retention of the northern half of Saghalien, all of which she had demanded for indemnity. Her representatives went home feeling that we were jealous of her rising power in the Pacific.

THE ALASKAN BOUNDARY

The Alaskan boundary controversy between the United States and Great Britain arose because of indefinite terms in the purchase treaty of 1867. The region involved was unsettled and no one then felt the need of an adjustment. But in 1897 gold was discovered in the upper Yukon valley, the Alaskan region was flooded with miners, disputes as to jurisdiction arose, and both sides sought arbitration. January 24, 1903, six arbiters, three Americans and three Englishmen, were appointed to settle the dispute. Of the latter, two were Canadians, who were expected to favor the British contention, but the third was Lord Alverstone, chief justice of England, in whose unbiased judgment the Americans had confidence. The tribunal met in London, September 3, 1903.

Origin.

The point at issue was the interpretation of the treaty made by Russia and England, in 1825, fixing the boundary between Alaska and the British possessions. It was therein provided that the line should begin at the south of Prince of Wales island, ascend northward with the Portland channel to the 50th parallel, then follow the summit of the mountains that were supposed to skirt the coast to longitude 141° west, and thence with this parallel to the Arctic ocean. But if the summits of the mountains were not ascertainable, the line was not to run more than ten marine leagues from the coast. Investigation showed that no mountains were where they had been thought to be and the coast was cut by deep indentations. Then arose this question: should the line pass across the indentations, leaving their heads to the east of it, or should it curve ten leagues eastward so as to leave the heads of the indentations to the westward. If the former view prevailed, Dyea, Juneau, and other ports from which started the roads to the Yukon would be left in British hands. There was no contention over the part of the line which followed longitude 141° to the Arctic ocean.

The Issue.

The Americans believed they had a strong case and supported it before the tribunal with a mass of maps and other evidence to show that in the treaty of 1825 it was Russia's intention to exclude England from the western shore above $54^{\circ} 40'$, and that the design was at last accepted by England. Lord Alverstone was satisfied with these arguments, and in all important votes sided with the Americans, leaving his two associates in a minority. They were both unconvinced and went home in disappointment. They and their countrymen felt that the interests of Canada had been sacrificed to promote the newly awakened harmony between the United States and Great Britain. The line run in accordance with the treaty was not so far eastward as we claimed, but it left Canada no point of access to the sea within the disputed region.

The Americans Win.

and gave us control of the routes to the Yukon. As to the goldfields, the richest of them are on the Canadian side of the line, on its northern stretch.

THE NEW MONROE DOCTRINE

Since the Venezuelan incident, 1895, events have tended still further to strengthen the new Monroe doctrine. Getting a foothold on the Isthmus of Panama brings the American influence into close relation with the states near that important point. The doctrine, which originally meant opposition to European control and was extended by Cleveland to the assumption of a degree of protection, has of late been extended into a species of moral guardianship by which we undertake to compel a Spanish-American state to fulfill its obligations and give Europeans no ground for interference. In this last stage the doctrine has become so vast a force in our external relations that it may well demand our most careful consideration lest we exercise it selfishly and without a due sense of the obligations it imposes on us to be just and generous. In 1899 the United States were represented at the first Hague conference, called to consider the peaceful settlement of international disputes. Their delegates joined in all that was done to promote the aims of the meeting, but in accepting the deliberation stated distinctly that their country did not give up the Monroe doctrine, for three-quarters of a century a cardinal feature of its foreign policy. This was notice of the most formal kind to all the world, and as no nation represented at the conference protested, it was assumed that all acquiesced in our claim.

Two years later the world saw it recognized in a specific manner by one of the most aggressive of the great nations. Germany had a grievance against Venezuela on account of unpaid public debts to German citizens. She prepared to use force, but before doing so informed the United States that she did not intend to acquire Venezuelan territory. No objection was made, and she established, in conjunction with Great Britain, who also had claims, a blockade of Venezuelan ports and seized Venezuelan gunboats. After this situation had lasted a year, the United States used their influence and induced Venezuela to settle with her adversaries. The claims were recognized in principle and referred to a commission for examination, the similar claims of other nations being included at the request of President Castro. The total amount thus demanded was 190,676,670 bolivars (\$38,000,000), and of these the commission pronounced as genuine claims amounting to 38,429,376 bolivars. It was a source of humiliation to us that of the 81,410,952 bolivars demanded by our own citizens only 2,313,711 were allowed. In connection with this affair President Roosevelt asserted that coercing an American state did not

violate the Monroe doctrine unless the acquisition of territory was contemplated.

In 1904 Santo Domingo was bankrupt and European creditor nations were thinking of interfering. Roosevelt could not object in view of his own former opinion, but he feared that the recurrence of interference would lead to difficulties. He met the situation by declaring that the United States were bound, in order to preserve the intent of the Monroe doctrine, to see that the small American states did not give cause for interference. He proposed, therefore, to take charge of the Dominican revenues and manage them until the financial embarrassments were discharged. The creditors desired such action, Santo Domingo requested it, and he sent to the senate a treaty embodying his purpose. It guaranteed the integrity of Santo Domingo, appointed a receiver of her revenues, and agreed to settle her obligations, domestic as well as foreign. This was a long step toward control; and the senate on that ground rejected the treaty. Then the Dominican republic signed a *modus vivendi* by which it placed its revenues in the hands of a receiver unofficially recommended by President Roosevelt. The senate was not able to prevent this, and as the arrangement was liable to bring complications, they decided to accept the *modus vivendi*. A revised treaty was signed, omitting the guarantee of territory, but providing for a receiver under American protection and stipulating that Santo Domingo should not increase her debt without American consent. This was in 1907, by which time a great improvement had already occurred in Dominican finances. The debt was now only \$17,000,000, and under economical management it has been steadily reduced. The incident passed without creating the dreaded precedent for territorial expansion; but it strengthened and gave sharper outlines to the policy of wise restraint of our southern neighbors, to which the Monroe doctrine seems to be tending.

President
Roosevelt
and Santo
Domingo.

The election of 1900 was a test of opinion on the war and expansion. The republicans renominated McKinley without opposition. Theodore Roosevelt, by the artifice of T. C. Platt, was made the candidate for the vice-presidency in order to remove him from New York politics. The democrats renominated Bryan, who relaxed his free silver demands on the ground that the discovery of gold in Alaska had produced an abundant supply of money. The campaign turned on expansion. McKinley was chosen by 292 to 155 electoral votes. It was evident that the people were satisfied at the prospect of playing a new rôle in world affairs. In such a progress the victor at the polls was to have no part. September 14, 1901, he died from the effect of a shot by a crazed anarchist whom he encountered at the Buffalo exposition.

Death of
McKinley.

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For Independent Reading

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CHAPTER XL

THE ADMINISTRATIONS OF ROOSEVELT AND TAFT

ROOSEVELT'S CORPORATION POLICY

PRESIDENT MCKINLEY died September 14, 1901. His successor retained the existing cabinet and announced that he would follow the policy of his predecessor. To observing men the promise seemed difficult of fulfillment. The two men were essentially unlike in personality and ideals. One was a man of gentle habits, a tactful politician who had achieved power because he had the faculty of binding up opposing interests. The other was aggressive by nature, a reformer who had forced his acceptance by party leaders because of his blunt way of winning the confidence of the people. McKinley, the protectionist and friend of Mark Hanna, had the confidence of the capitalists and the support of the party organization. Roosevelt, the reformer, although an avowed protectionist, had made a reputation as an opponent of party machines.

**Roosevelt
and
McKinley.**

There was, however, evidence that McKinley in his last days had come to a new position in regard to the tariff. In his last public speech, at Buffalo, September 5, he said: "The period of exclusiveness is past. The expansion of our trade and commerce is the pressing problem. Commercial wars are unprofitable. A policy of good-will and friendly trade relations will prevent reprisals. Reciprocity treaties are in harmony with the spirit of the times; measures of retaliation are not. If, perchance, some of our tariffs are no longer needed for revenue or to encourage and protect some of our industries at home, why should they not be employed to extend and promote our markets abroad?" This utterance was taken at the time to indicate the advent of a new era in the tariff. In what practical manner it would have been applied, the world never knew. Roosevelt was not a tariff reformer. In his messages to congress he made it plain that he upheld protection, although he gave a pale indorsement to reciprocity. He said it was a mistake to say the tariff was responsible for the trusts.

**McKinley's
Later
Policy.**

His first message showed that he considered the relation of the government to trusts the great question of the hour. He declared that corporations existed by permission of law, state or national, and demanded that they value their property honestly and deal fairly

by the public in marketing their stock. He thought they should be taken under federal control, and recommended the creation of a department of commerce and industry under which they should exercise

their functions. In this position he seemed to manifest political insight. Bryan, leading the democrats, had continually asked that trusts be destroyed: Roosevelt asked that they be legalized under restraint analogous to the supervision of railroads by the interstate commerce commission. If the corporations would accept this policy, the conservative opponents of trusts, it seemed, would be drawn into the republican party, and the democrats would be robbed of their most popular argument. The president's appeal to congress was futile. The proposed department was not created, and a bill which he urged for reciprocity with Cuba died a natural death in the senate after passing the house. Nor were the democrats keenly alive to their opportunity. They wasted time forcing an investigation of the conduct of the war in the Philippines, thinking it would furnish them good campaign material by showing that expansion had brought with it a train of military horrors. The autumn congressional elections left the republicans still in power, although their majority in the house was reduced from forty-five to thirty. Expansion was a dead issue and was thenceforth so recognized.

To the indifference of congress the president made a characteristic reply. He appealed to the people, thinking they would make it evident to congress what they desired done. Late in the summer of 1902 he made a speech-making tour through New England. Although it was announced as a non-political affair, much was said about the broad questions of citizenship, and it was evident from the earnest way in which his views on corporations were received that he had raised a popular issue. His frank and aggressive manner commended him to the people, who looked on him as their champion. An admirer once said of him in connection with this early stage of his contest: "Under the old régime the people got the impression that it was useless to fight against the influence of corporations and machine politics, but Roosevelt gave them back their hope, and made them think a fight was indeed worth while."

His position in regard to the anthracite coal strike of 1902 added to his popularity. From May until October the miners refused to work,

demanding higher wages. The people of the East were terrified at the prospect of a coal famine, and prices rose steadily. At last the president called together the mine-owners, the representatives of the miners, and the officials of the railroads carrying the coal to market, urging them to settle their difficulties. The owners resented his interference and charged him with failure to send troops to protect the mines from violence. Of this charge he was not guilty, since the governor of Pennsylvania had re-

**Roosevelt
and Trusts.**

**An Appeal
to the
People.**

**The Coal
Strike.**

fused to call for federal troops. The state officials smarted under the imputation of neglect of duty, and the whole Pennsylvania guard was called out for service in the mining district.

The situation now seemed desperate, and more radical people began to talk of seizing the mines and working them under government supervision. Then Roosevelt took a more positive tone.

He called to Washington representatives of the New York banks which financed the mines and railroads concerned, and induced them to use their influence to make the owners agree to arbitration. What he would have done had they still held out does not appear. The upshot was that the "coal trust," as the owners were called, yielded and a committee of arbitration was named by the president. The miners returned to work at the old wages and in the following spring were awarded ten per cent increase of wages, half of their original demands. The incident made Roosevelt popular and served to call attention to the fact that the country's supply of anthracite had fallen into the hands of a small number of men.

The Strike Settled.

The annual message of 1902 was strong for federal control of corporations. It attacked the system by which the corporations could take advantage of state charters, saying: "This country cannot afford to sit idle on the plea that under our peculiar system of government we are helpless in the presence of new conditions." The president was willing

Control of Corporations.

to strengthen the constitution if it was not strong enough to deal with the problem. His opponents replied that he was a radical and would overthrow the constitution. His own idea was that new conditions had arisen and that the people are always wise enough to make a government which provides for their wants. Congress gave little heed to his suggestions, but February 13, 1903, it passed the law to create a department of commerce and labor, which began at once collecting facts to show whether or not the trusts had sought to stifle competition in defiance of the Sherman anti-trust law.

The years 1901-1903 were a period of great prosperity. Business men had been so indifferent to the law of 1890 that they seemed to think it a dead letter. Many trusts were organized and large quantities of "watered" stock were issued. The most notable example was the United States Steel Corporation with \$1,018,000,000 capital and \$301,000,000 bonds. The rage for gigantic corporations was so great that the public could not buy the bonds, and in 1903 the speculative market collapsed so completely that steel common sold for less than 9 per cent of par. A shrewd observer remarked that the country was suffering from "indigestible securities." This collapse cooled for a time the country's aversion to trusts; for it was said that experience showed they could not exist profitably. But the return of confidence was early, the stocks rose in the market, and by adopting a more cautious policy they

Panic of 1903.

began to show the great earning power in concentration. The real point at issue was: Should this advantage accrue to the men who effected the combination or to the people?

The year 1904 was a presidential election year, and Roosevelt was very strong with the country. The opposition in his own party concentrated on Mark A. Hanna; but he was a millionaire, and no one believed he could be elected. When he died, February 15, 1904, all hope of naming any other conservative was abandoned, and Roosevelt was selected without opposition. Charles W. Fairbanks, of Indiana, was nominated for vice-president. The platform declared for a reasonable restriction of trusts and declared that the tariff should be reformed by its friends.

The prospects of the democrats were gloomy. Expansion, as an issue, had to be abandoned, there seemed to be little interest in the tariff, and Roosevelt had so emasculated their opposition to trusts that there was little left on which they could make a stand. The men of the East were full of bitter recriminations for Bryan, who had twice been defeated. All the party's calamities, they thought, came from trusting the "Western will-o'-the-wisp," and they demanded a return to "safe-and-sane" policies. Bryan himself realized his inability to succeed. He was still strong in the West and South, but his friends were willing to give an Eastern man an opportunity. Thus it happened that Judge Alton B. Parker, of New York, a man little known to the public, was nominated for president and Henry G. Davis, of West Virginia, for vice-president. The platform denounced trusts, demanded the enforcement of the Sherman law, arraigned the protective tariff, and indorsed several other minor reforms.

Then followed a whirlwind of speech-making by the republican candidate. Wherever he went, he was received with an enthusiasm which Parker, a man of solid worth and steady temperament, was not able to arouse. The latter made it very clear that he repudiated the free coinage of silver, an action which the Western democrats considered a direct insult to Bryan, and many of them are supposed to have shown their resentment at the polls. The election result was that Roosevelt carried every Northern and Western state and broke the traditional "solid South" by securing the vote of Missouri. The "safe-and-sane" man of the East had been defeated more decisively than Bryan in either of the previous canvasses.

ROOSEVELT'S SECOND TERM

His overwhelming election naturally gave Roosevelt confidence in his position, and he was not the man to use the advantage moderately. The house, strongly republican, felt the effects of his popularity and was inclined to support him in most of his measures. But the senate

contained many enemies, members of his own party, who wished to check what they considered his overreaching ambition. They had their opportunity when, late in 1904, he sent them treaties providing that future disputes between the United States and certain other powers might by agreements made with the powers concerned be referred to the Hague tribunal for settlement. Such agreements would be negotiated by the president, and to adopt the suggestion would greatly increase his power. The senators were in no mood to diminish their treaty-making power, and amended the project by inserting the word "treaties" instead of "agreements." The president dropped the projected reform. He was deeply offended, and wrote a stinging letter to the chairman of the senate foreign committee. The breach between him and his opponents was materially widened.

**Roosevelt
and the
Senate.**

The immediate reform on which the president had now set his heart was to enlarge the powers of the interstate commerce commission so that it might fix maximum rates, and deliver effective judgments on matters within its jurisdiction. Congress did not accept the suggestion. During the summer he made many speeches throughout the country, and in all of them spoke for railroad regulation. Much interest was manifested, and in his next annual message the subject was brought up with emphasis. The result was the Hepburn rate-bill, which after a long and bitter struggle became a law June 29, 1906. It forbade rebates, conferred rate-making power on the interstate commerce commission, and gave the commission power to specify the manner in which railroads should keep their accounts. The bill originally made final the decisions of the commission, but the senate insisted that there should be appeal to the courts. At this point affairs hung for a long time, but it was finally agreed that there should be a limited review by the courts. Roosevelt declared himself satisfied with the compromise.

**Hepburn
Rate-Bill.**

Two other laws which passed at this session through the president's efforts show how much the reforming temper influenced congress. One grew out of the report of a special committee to investigate the meat-packing houses. Alarming conditions were found to exist, and it was now provided that no meat should be shipped out of the state in which it was packed without rigorous government inspection. Another law prohibited adulteration, and required that all food sold in interstate commerce should have correct labels. The last law has been severely resisted by the manufacturers, but Presidents Roosevelt and Taft have uniformly supported its execution.

**Meat and
Other Food
Products.**

A law was also passed to prohibit corporations from contributing to campaign funds. It was partly the result of the tremendous upheaval of sentiment in 1905, when it was discovered that New York life in-

insurance companies had been making large campaign contributions. Chauncey M. Depew, senator from New York, admitted that he received a salary of \$20,000 as director of one of the companies, for which he rendered no considerable service. The other New York senator was largely interested in an express company, and used his influence to prevent the enactment of a parcels post law. Depew himself was prominently connected, and was identified with the business control of the New York Central Railroad. Both men were bitter opponents of Roosevelt.

Other hostile senators were less prominently identified with monied interests. Some of them were men of excellent character and ability, and they undoubtedly felt that they were fighting a radical movement which had in it much that was evil. If they could have sloughed off from their own cause certain men acting from self-interest, and if divesting themselves of their closest relations with capitalists they could have stood before the country as the representatives of conservative ideas, pure and simple, they would have had a strong support among the people. As it was, conservatism and the defense of corporations were identified in the popular mind. It seemed to many that the senate had ceased to be representative of the interests of all the people. Before the Roosevelt movement began there was a cynical feeling abroad that wealth would control the government, whatever the feeling of the masses. Roosevelt's fight against corporations was thus also a fight to break down the influence of a powerful party organization. It was a war against the bosses, both local and national. A few Western senators supported it outright, and the democrats helped for party reasons. One of the results was a demand for a constitutional amendment for the election of senators by the people, a measure which several times passed the house only to be lost in the senate itself.

Meanwhile, the president continued his campaign against the trusts. He was an excellent fighter, and he attacked with fervor. He was met with a storm of denunciation, which did not stop short of attacking his veracity. He was said to be drunk with the lust for power and to be afflicted with an inordinate opinion of his own importance. As usually happens with a popular leader, he was cordially hated by those he opposed, and blindly trusted by those who believed that he was, spite of his personal shortcomings, the only hope of the cause they felt so important. In this state of affairs, it was not possible to get important reforms through congress, but the popular opinion steadily grew in favor of reform. Gradually the leaders of the senate opposition began to be retired in favor of less hostile men, although those who were left showed no signs of yielding to the coming storm.

The approach of the year 1908, a presidential election year, was

watched anxiously by both factions. Roosevelt had announced that he would not accept reelection, and his opponents hoped to put into the presidency a man of less extreme views. He himself was concerned that his successor should be one who would not relax the combat he had carried forward. The man he favored was William H. Taft, formerly governor of the Philippines, and in 1908 secretary of war. He was known as an honest administrator, a man of excellent mental ability and fine personal character. He was a Roosevelt man, and had the entire confidence of the reformers. The opposing faction had no man who could command united support, and they resorted to the "favorite-son" expedient. Their total strength was not considerable, and with the president's support Taft was easily nominated for first place when the republican convention assembled at Chicago, June 16, 1908. James S. Sherman, of New York, in sympathy with the conservatives, was named for vice-president. On the trust question the platform was all that Roosevelt desired. It demanded that the law of 1890 should be amended to give the federal government greater control over corporations engaged in interstate trade. It also declared for a revision of the tariff in a special session of congress immediately after the inauguration of the next president. Possibly this measure was supported in some quarters by those who thought that bringing forward the tariff question would lessen the intensity of the struggle against trusts; but it was evident that there was a growing popular feeling that the tariff should be lowered.

**Taft
Nominated.**

Let us now turn to the democrats. The overwhelming defeat of Parker in 1904 disposed, for a time, of the idea that the old Cleveland alignment could be restored, and pointed to the recovery by Bryan of his former position in the party. The East still viewed him with disfavor, but the West and the South were loyal. His two defeats were undoubtedly a handicap, but if Bryanism was to control, who was a stronger leader than Bryan himself? His power was seen in the selection of Denver for the convention city, and when the convention was organized, July 7, his friends were in control. His opponents were so weak that he was nominated on the first ballot, with 888½ of the 994 votes cast. John W. Kern, of Indiana, was nominated for vice-president. The platform was long, but it announced the traditional Bryan policies.

**Bryan
Nominated.**

As formerly, there were several minor parties, each of which nominated candidates. The most significant was the socialist party, which named for its leaders Eugene V. Debs, of Indiana, and Benjamin Hanford, of New York. Here also came to its culmination the Hearst movement, which for several years had attracted much attention. It was originated by William R. Hearst, a wealthy owner of many newspapers. He first appeared as a democrat, and organized an "independence league" as his peculiar

**Other Can-
didates.**

weapon of attack on the party organization. He made himself feared, and in 1905 was nearly elected mayor of New York on an anti-Tammany ticket. In 1906 he was an independent candidate for governor of New York, but was defeated by Governor Hughes after an exciting campaign. In 1908 he cast off all semblance of democracy, organized the independence party, with Thomas L. Hisgen as the candidate.

The attitude of Roosevelt was sharp and bitter. January 31, 1908, he sent congress a special message which was nothing less than a manifesto intended, as it seems, to rally his supporters in view of the coming struggle. The Standard Oil Company had been indicted as a result of the investigations of the newly established department of commerce and labor. It was shown that it had received rebates from a railroad in Illinois, and the jury rendered an adverse verdict. Judge Landis imposed fines for the several specific violations alleged, amounting to more than \$29,000,000. It was believed to be an extreme punishment, and was set aside by the United States Circuit Court of Appeals, on the ground that it was excessive. But it showed that a great corporation could be brought to justice. In the message of January, 1908, the president referred to the matter in severe terms. The company, he said, had given out an ingenious and untruthful defense of its action. For his enemies he had, also, vehement words. He spoke bitterly of the representative of "wealth accumulated on a giant scale by all forms of iniquity, ranging from the oppression of wage workers to the unfair and unwholesome methods of crushing out competition, and to defrauding the public by stock-jobbing and the manipulating of securities." "Certain wealthy men of this stamp," he continued, "have banded together for a work of reaction. Their work is to overthrow and discredit all who honestly administer the law, to prevent any additional legislation which would check and restrain them." At this same time he professed to discriminate carefully between the rich men who obeyed and those who defied the law. During the campaign of 1908 Taft gave no evidence that he did not approve of this strong onslaught on the foes of the existing administration.

By this time Roosevelt had many opponents in the newspaper world. The great city dailies are ordinarily million-dollar enterprises, and are necessarily in close connection with the capitalists. It was, therefore, natural that they were among his opponents. On the other hand, the country press was largely sympathetic. The arguments of both sides were exaggerated. To many quiet persons it seemed that Roosevelt sought to arouse the poor against the rich, and they considered this beneath the dignity of a president of the United States. Many others looked upon him as the only hope of restoring the government to the people, and they tolerated his vigorous methods as the natural expressions of a strong-willed man.

In the beginning of the campaign both Taft and Bryan proposed to

Roosevelt
Defies his
Foes.

refrain from public speaking, but the people were so insistent that they gave up their design. During the last two months of the campaign both candidates spoke frequently and to large audiences. Bryan's reception was enthusiastic, but the spirit of Roosevelt was behind Taft, and he was elected triumphantly. The democrats carried all the Southern states except Missouri, together with Colorado, Nebraska, Nevada, and Oklahoma, a total of 162 votes. Taft carried the rest, 321 votes. Of the minor candidates, Debs, the socialist, had the largest popular vote, 420,890.

**The Election
of 1908.**

TAFT'S ADMINISTRATION

The last session of congress under Roosevelt was marked by a series of messages recommending measures in keeping with his advanced ideas, to all of which congress showed ill-disguised contempt. The country greeted his successor heartily. Although he was a Roosevelt man, he was of a mild disposition and it was thought he would be less irritating than his predecessor. March 15 congress met in extra session to consider the tariff, according to the recent republican platform. The country expected reform, and the house, under the leadership of Congressman Payne, quickly passed a bill making notable reductions. In the senate it encountered opposition from a group popularly called "stand-patters," led by Senator Aldrich, of Rhode Island, who were able to raise the rates of the Payne bill. A long wrangle followed when the bill went to a committee of conference. The result was uncertainty, and the business world ere long demanded that the politicians settle their contentions. Meanwhile there was much speculation about the action of the president. He was in constant consultation with Aldrich and other members of congress and sought to have the rates lowered. His efforts were unavailing, and the bill as it passed was an Aldrich victory. Many Western republican senators wished a more decided revision, and urged Taft to apply the veto. When he finally sent his approval they were disappointed, and charged him with going over to the standpatters. He was undoubtedly very unwilling to prolong the party breach Roosevelt had precipitated, and when he had once acted felt it his duty to stand by his decision. In September, a month after the bill became a law, he made a speech at Winona, Minnesota, in praise of the recent tariff bill, and this further irritated the Western men.

**The Payne-
Aldrich Law.**

The Payne-Aldrich law did, in fact, divide rather than unite the republican party. Taft said it was the best tariff law ever made by his party, but its reductions were very slight, and it made a large portion of the people think little could be hoped from the policy of revising the tariff by its friends. To have vetoed it, however, would have arrayed the majority of the party against the president and would not

have removed the uncertainty which the business community considered the worst phase of the situation. In signing it Taft thought he had taken the less of two evils, but he soon found that the insurgents, as the Western men now began to be called, were capable of severe hostility. They were not numerous, but by combining with the democrats they could make much trouble for the administration.

A significant feature of the bill was a tax of one per cent on the income of corporations whose net earnings exceeded \$5000. It was to yield a considerable revenue, but its greatest importance was that it recognized the principle that congress could tax the great corporations. Taft wished, also, to tax the incomes of individuals, but was restrained because the supreme court had decided that the income tax of 1894 was unconstitutional. He contented himself with suggesting that congress submit to the states an amendment permitting such a tax. Congress acquiesced, and in 1913 the desired amendment was accepted by the necessary number of states.

In August, 1909, Gifford Pinchot, head of the forestry bureau, department of the interior, attacked his superior, Secretary Ballinger, for opening for sale certain lands which had been withdrawn by Roosevelt. Ballinger was also charged with unduly favoring the rich Cunningham syndicate in regard to the patents of valuable coal lands in Alaska. After an investigation, Taft supported Ballinger. Pinchot was in sympathy with the insurgents, and was an old Roosevelt supporter. His friends took up the quarrel, which became so bitter that at Taft's suggestion an investigating committee was appointed. Before it reported, Pinchot wrote an outspoken letter, in which he condemned the secretary and was at once dismissed, January 7, 1910. The committee exonerated Ballinger by a partisan vote. Later investigations, however, resulted in canceling the Cunningham claims. The Ballinger-Pinchot controversy added to the discontent of the insurgents, and promoted the belief that President Taft was not a good judge of men.

In the spring of 1910 insurgency won its first notable victory, and at the same time broke the overweening power of the speaker. The authority of this officer rested on his right to appoint the house committees and on his membership on the rules committee, which by reporting new rules as exigency demanded controlled legislation. Reed, who filled the office from 1889 to 1891, and 1895-1899, had held these powers, but he was a broad-minded man and used them for the general good. Cannon, speaker from 1903-1911, was a clever and relentless exponent of the standpat doctrines, and was bent on perpetuating his control over legislation. Under him the speaker was chosen by a small number of kindred spirits who were rewarded by important committee assignments. To many protests against the system he replied that he was

**Corporation
Tax.**

**Ballinger
and Pinchot.**

**The Power
of the
Speaker.**

the servant of the house, which could remove him whenever it saw fit. In truth, he was responsible to a majority of the party caucus, and could only be removed when the caucus so decided or when a group of the majority party united with the minority party, in ordinary times an unlikely occurrence.

But 1910 was not an ordinary time. The insurgents, goaded by the speaker's attempts to punish them for their resistance, were willing to unite with the democrats to break the tyranny from which they suffered. March 19 they introduced a resolution to enlarge the rules committee from five to fifteen members and to leave their appointment to the house. Objection was made that the resolution was out of order. Cannon knew the insurgents expected the support of the democrats, and refused to pass on the point of order until he was sure of a majority. The session was prolonged through the night in fruitless wrangling, and then the house adjourned for a day. But the insurgents resisted all overtures, and when Cannon again faced the house he was defeated. He ruled that the insurgent motion was out of order, and was promptly reversed by his allied foes. A new rule was promptly adopted, eliminating the speaker from the rules committee, enlarging it to ten members, and providing that it be chosen by the house. In the moment of defeat the speaker announced that he would entertain a motion to vacate the chair. A democrat moved his dismissal, but enough insurgents voted in the negative to defeat the motion. Cannon was thus retained in the chair, but was shorn of his great power. The rule of the house "oligarchy" was broken, and in the future a mere majority, by amending the rules when it sees fit, can carry through the measures it desires. The next house was democratic. It maintained the advance gained in March, 1910, and further reduced the speaker's authority by leaving the selection of committees to the house itself, each party nominating a portion in caucus.

**Its Re-
duction.**

Meanwhile, the president urged several important measures on congress, some of which became laws. A commerce court was created with authority to pass upon cases investigated by the interstate commerce commission, postal saving banks were established, a law was passed requiring the publication of the campaign expenses of candidates for congress, and the powers of the interstate commerce commission were enlarged in a new railroad bill. The insurgents supported all these bills but the last, which they thought too lax. A measure recommended by Taft for the federal incorporation of interstate corporations was allowed to die in its early stages, the opposition being, apparently, on the part of the regulars. During the same year public interest was stimulated by a common outcry against high prices. There was an attempted boycott of the so-called "meat trust" and a futile prosecution of the National Meat Packing Company. The "interests," it was said, were intrenched

**Other
Measures.**

behind the political machines, and in many sections nominating primaries were demanded. Governor Hughes, of New York, a leader of the liberals, took up the fight against the machine in a campaign to secure an efficient primary law. Defeated by the regulars in the state legislature, he called the assembly back for an extra session, but even this expedient was unsuccessful.

In this condition of popular unrest the autumn elections were held, and the result was republican defeat. The democrats carried the house by a majority of sixty-seven, and elected governors in the usually republican states of New York, Ohio, New Jersey, Massachusetts, and Connecticut. It was a rebuke to the party of Cannon and Aldrich, and President Taft, who could not well repudiate his political friends, was involved in their disaster.

Let us now return to Roosevelt. March 23, 1909, he set out on an expedition to hunt big game in Africa. His actions were kept before

the country by a vigilant newspaper press, even while he was in the most inaccessible jungles of the Dark Continent.

March 21, 1910, he emerged from the jungles and reached Khartum, returning to the United States by way of Europe, where he was entertained by princes and statesmen. He arrived at New York in June and received a tremendous demonstration of welcome. His old friends were now prominent insurgents and urged him to enter politics in their behalf. Outwardly he expressed friendship for Taft, but he threw himself with energy into the campaign in New York. He was able to control the republican convention of the state, delivering a stinging defeat to the party organization under Barnes. His candidate for governor was Henry L. Stimson, who had risen into prominence by conducting an able prosecution of the Sugar Trust. But the defeated machine proved indifferent to Stimson, who was defeated by Dix, the democratic candidate. Roosevelt's enemies, among them the leading New York dailies, joyfully declared that he was eliminated as a political leader.

The elections in the West had not injured the standing of the insurgents, and they came to the capital when congress assembled in December as pleased as the democrats. Taft, though he felt the rebuke he had received, bore himself with dignity. His message suggested a suspension of plans to regulate corporations until the operation of laws already in force could be observed. He seems to have had in mind suits recently brought against several trusts, among them the Standard Oil and the American Tobacco companies. This suggestion was well received by business men, but the insurgents looked at it with suspicion.

January 26, 1911, the president sent congress the outline of a Canadian reciprocity treaty. It provided for lower duties or none at all on many food products and some manufactured articles, and in return it was expected that Canada would make similar concessions on Ameri-

can agricultural implements as well as on other commodities. The large portion of the public who favored lower rates hailed the treaty with pleasure. Some saw in it cheaper food products and others an entering wedge for general tariff reform. The insurgents opposed it on the ground that it sacrificed the grain-growing Northwest in behalf of the East. They could not prevent its passage in the house, but defeated it by diligent obstruction in the senate. Taft, however, called an extra session of the new congress, in which the democrats controlled the house and nearly controlled the senate.

**Canadian
Reciprocity.**

The situation was now unusual. A republican president was asking for a reduction of tariff rates under the guise of reciprocity and his only hope of success was the acquiescence of his opponents. But the situation was equally delicate for the democrats. On the wave of a popular upheaval all their hopes for 1912 depended on handling wisely the measures then in hand. If they angered the insurgents and drove them back to the regular republicans, their affairs would be confused in the upper house. In this dilemma they found an able leader in Oscar W. Underwood, of Alabama, chairman of the ways and means committee. His plan was to accept Canadian reciprocity, which his own majority could carry through the house and which would be passed through the senate by the democrats and the Taft republicans. To offset the displeasure of the insurgents he would pass other bills lowering rates on articles manufactured in the East, which the democrats and insurgents acting together could carry through the senate. It is true the latter bills might be vetoed by Taft, but that would only put the onus of blame on the regular republicans and give the democrats a fair ground of combat in the struggle of 1912.

**Plan of the
Democrats.**

The scheme was well conceived, and was carried through successfully. Canadian reciprocity was enacted, and close after it came a "farmers' free list bill," then a woollens bill, and a cotton schedule bill. All but the first were vetoed on the ground that they were not scientifically drawn. A tariff commission was a feature of the Payne-Aldrich act, and Taft announced that he awaited its report. The democrats replied that laying taxes was a high function of government confided by the constitution to congress with careful restrictions, and that it ought not to be left to the determination of a small number of men, however expert they were in finance.

**Tariff Bills
of 1911.**

When the extra session adjourned August 22, 1911, Taft seemed to be in a good position politically. His reciprocity measure was the greatest tariff concession a president had wrung from the party of protection. His friends felt that time would justify its wisdom, and wipe out the unpopularity that arose from the Payne-Aldrich law. September 21 all these hopes fell with the announcement that Canada had defeated reciprocity. The action

**Reciprocity
Rejected.**

was partly due to the growing influence of manufactures in Canada, and partly to the feeling that reciprocity would make the country dependent economically on the United States. The latter idea was unduly emphasized by the Canadian protectionists, who found support in careless utterances by the American speaker, Champ Clark, and even by President Taft himself.

The regulars received in 1911 another hard blow in the investigation of the charges that in 1910 Senator Lorimer, of Illinois, secured his seat through bribery. An investigation was conducted by the senate, which decided that, although money had been spent, about \$100,000, the beneficiary had not spent it, and should keep his seat. The verdict did not satisfy the people, who believed that an election secured by bribery should be vacated, even though the man elected had not furnished the money. The party organization in Illinois, with which Lorimer was closely identified, supported Taft, and this caused the president's opponents to say that he associated with the Illinois bribers. The charges against the senator were renewed and in 1912 his election was declared invalid.

In the spring of 1911 the suits brought in 1909 against the Standard Oil and American Tobacco companies were decided against the companies by the supreme court, and these two trusts were ordered to dissolve under a plan to be approved by the court. The parts out of which the companies were originally made up had lost their identity, and it was decided to divide each mammoth whole into certain companies, distributing the shares of stock as well as the property. This arrangement, it was thought, would secure a return of competition. Keen observers, however, realized that the resultant companies would be owned by persons who formerly owned the trusts and who had learned the advantages of coöperation. They prophesied that the plan would not secure effective competition. Their view seemed supported by the announcement that several other trusts in danger of prosecution were about to ask the courts to be allowed to dissolve under the same plan. Undoubtedly the trusts were suffering from the uncertainty of the situation before them and would gladly accept the proposed escape from it. Further confirmation of this view was seen when the stocks of the resultant oil and tobacco companies rose steadily in the market. Taft, who at first was inclined to accept the prescribed dissolution as a remedy for the existing trust problem, soon found that it added little to his standing as a public leader.

The most important work of congress in 1912 was the passage by democrats and progressives of several tariff bills which the president vetoed. They related to the sugar, steel, wool, chemical, and cotton schedules, and to the excise. A bill to continue the tariff board was defeated. Other bills passed and approved are mentioned below (see page 851). A bill to require newspapers to disclose their ownership in order that the public may know

**Legislation
in 1912.**

what interests have relations to their policies was introduced and was passed when it was incorporated in the post-office appropriation bill. A bill to repeal the commerce court was passed, but met a presidential veto. The court has become unpopular because by it the interstate commerce commission is denied full jurisdiction over matters which come before it. Provision to kill the court was introduced into the legislative, executive, and judicial appropriation bill, but this was vetoed on the ground that a rider should not be attached to such a bill. This appropriation bill was finally passed without the objectionable rider, and the commerce court was continued until after March 3, 1913; but no further funds were voted for the court. During the year an investigation was begun of the official conduct of District Judge Hanford, of Washington, but the judge resigned before it came to a hearing. Impeachment proceedings were instituted against Judge Archbald, of the commerce court, and he was convicted, the charge being that he accepted money from parties having cases before his court. In the short session, 1912-1913, an immigration bill passed congress but was vetoed because it provided a literacy test for naturalization.

THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION OF 1912

Three republicans played important parts in the campaign of 1912, Taft, Roosevelt, and Senator La Follette, of Wisconsin. The last mentioned, called by admirers "Battling Bob," came into prominence as an antagonist of the regular Wisconsin republicans led by Senator Spooner. By earnest appeals to the people he drove Spooner into retirement and established direct primaries and public control of railroads in his state. Securing a seat in the senate in 1906, he showed himself a tireless opponent of the Taft regulars, and in 1911 was considered a likely Western candidate for the presidential nomination. His views were too advanced for the East, and it was conceded that he would not take the prize away from Taft; but it was thought that if the latter were defeated at the polls, La Follette would be a man to be reckoned with in the future. **La Follette.**

The Eastern insurgents accepted his leadership with some hesitation, for they thought Roosevelt a stronger man. In 1911, they organized at Chicago a Progressive Republican League, outwardly in support of La Follette. Similar local organizations were also widely formed. All these were republican. Roosevelt was known to be in sympathy with the movement, and it was whispered that he might become the candidate of the league, displacing the Wisconsin leader. February 2, 1912, La Follette made a violent and rambling speech at a Philadelphia banquet. It was evident that a too strenuous canvass had overcome his physical strength, and his friends hurried him to a sanitarium. His collapse proved temporary, but the haste with which the Roosevelt

progressives accepted it as final suggested that they gladly took it as an opportunity to bring forth their favorite. They so utilized the interval of La Follette's eclipse that he could not recapture his lost position.

February 10 seven progressive governors with seventy other prominent progressives, representing twenty-four states, met to urge Roosevelt to become a candidate for the republican nomination. February 14 he replied that the selection of a candidate should be left to republicans in primaries and that he would abide such a decision. Under existing conditions this answer made him a candidate. Three days earlier, at Columbus, Ohio, he had made a speech which, widely published under the title "A Charter of Democracy," was his personal platform. It declared for the recall of judicial decisions, asserted that the courts should not make law, and indorsed the initiative and referendum, a short ballot, presidential primaries, and popular election of senators. His frank appearance in the arena brought down on him the attacks of Taft men and democrats. Immediately after his election in 1904 he had issued a statement that he should consider his coming administration a second term and would not accept another nomination. That statement was a source of much embarrassment before the campaign of 1912 ended.

The national republican convention was to meet at Chicago, June 18, and the two factions began a vigorous canvass to secure the delegates. As Taft had the support of the organization men generally, Roosevelt demanded primaries, and when the demand was opposed declared that his opponent was the champion of the bosses. In fact, the old Platt machine of New York, now led by Barnes, the old Quay machine of Pennsylvania, now led by Penrose, the Lorimer machine of Illinois, and other less prominent groups of party managers were for Taft; but, nevertheless, Roosevelt's accusation was unjust. Taft had ever stood for clean government, and could not rid of bosses the party which had made him its leader with the aid of Roosevelt himself.

Thirteen states employed primaries in one form or another, and Roosevelt carried nine, Taft two, and La Follette two. In Illinois and Ohio, Roosevelt had the popular indorsement, but the plan in use left the selection of delegates to conventions chosen in the old way, and the conventions named men not in sympathy with Roosevelt. Most of the states having no primaries selected Taft delegates. Wherever they felt themselves victims of wrongs the progressives named contesting delegations, some of them on very weak grounds. The Southern delegates, peculiarly under the influence of the officeholders, were generally for Taft. The contests first went before the national committee, controlled by the regulars, who made up the temporary roll of the con-

Roosevelt a Candidate.

Taft and the Bosses.

Selecting the Delegates.

vention. Out of 254 disputed seats 235 were awarded to Taft men. The regulars claimed the contests were insignificant, but the progressives asserted that Roosevelt was the victim of fraud. The states holding primaries had chosen 36 delegates for La Follette, 48 for Taft, and 278 for Roosevelt. This, it was said, indicated that the republican voters wanted Roosevelt and the machines wanted Taft. The temporary roll gave the latter a majority of about 20.

July 15 the progressive leader arrived in Chicago. Asked how he felt he replied, "Like a bull moose," from which phrase came the nickname, "bull-moose party." When the convention assembled Senator Root was selected for temporary chairman and made the keynote speech. A credentials committee was appointed which approved the decisions of the national committee in reference to contests. When the progressives questioned its report, they were defeated on a roll call. Roosevelt now advised his friends in the convention to refrain from further participation. On the first ballot for the nominee the result was Taft 561, Roosevelt 107, La Follette 41, scattering 19, and not voting 344. Taft was declared the nominee and James S. Sherman was made the candidate for the vice-presidency.

**Taft
Nominated.**

Republican dissensions had much interest for the democrats, who had their own conservatives and progressives. If Roosevelt had been the republican nominee, it would have been their interest to nominate a conservative, since many republicans would not vote for a progressive. Under such circumstances the conservative democrats might regain control of the party. At first this wing seemed inclined to unite on Governor Harmon, of Ohio, who satisfied the business men. He was not approved by the Western men, and when this was observed sentiment shifted to Underwood, who offered the prospect of uniting the South and East. He also was opposed by the Western men, of whom Bryan, though not now a candidate, was the most influential leader. Two other prominent aspirants appeared, Governor Wilson, of New Jersey, and Speaker Clark, of Missouri. Wilson was Southern born, a man of fine education, a reformer who had fought hard against the New Jersey machine, an eloquent speaker, and the champion of progressive ideas who, nevertheless, was likely to be more acceptable to the conservative East than an extreme reformer like Roosevelt. Clark was also a progressive, but he had risen to prominence as an organization man, and while he was popular as a campaign speaker, some persons feared that his close association with the regular politicians would take off the edge of his reforming zeal, once he was in office. Clark's friends, however, resented the idea that he was less a progressive than Wilson. Bryan did not at first commit himself as to the third and fourth candidate, but he was clear in his opposition to the first and second.

**Democratic
Candidates.**

When the convention met, Baltimore, June 25, each of these candidates had strong support without a majority. The conservatives were well organized, and August Belmont, a great New York banker, sat in his state's delegation, while Thomas F. Ryan, a successful Wall Street operator, sat in the Virginia delegation. It was soon evident that the conservatives feared Wilson most, and by agreeing with some of the Clark men they chose Alton B. Parker temporary chairman, against the protest of Bryan, to whom their action seemed the undoing of the work of years. They then offered him the permanent chairmanship, but he would not bind his hands by accepting, and the position went to Ollie James, one of his supporters, but without a reciprocal pledge by Bryan. The Eastern press had many times announced the elimination of Bryan from politics, and it again assured the public that he was cleverly outplayed in the game. But they burst into applause when, on June 29, he made a countermove whose boldness and sagacity have rarely been equaled in a party convention. Speaking as an individual delegate, he offered a resolution pledging the convention to nominate no man who was "the representative of or under obligation to" the great financial interests and demanding the withdrawal of Belmont and Ryan from the convention. Violent protests followed, but Bryan was not perturbed. He withdrew the latter part of his resolution when assured that the gentlemen named would withdraw of their own accord, and the first part was adopted by an overwhelming majority.

The convention proceeded to nominate candidates. On the first ballot Clark had 440½ votes, Wilson 324, Harmon 148, Underwood 117½, and other candidates 56. Balloting continued with the probability, as it seemed, that when at last the conservatives were convinced that neither the Clark nor the Wilson men would come to either Harmon or Underwood, they would throw the strength of these two men to Clark, which would give him such a lead that he would secure the two-thirds vote demanded for a nomination in a democratic convention. The New York delegation, voting under the unit rule and dominated by Murphy, the Tammany leader, was supposed to be directing this move, and Sullivan, leader of the Illinois organization, and Taggart, who occupied a similar relation to the Indiana delegation, were said to be coöperating with Murphy. If this plan succeeded, the effect of Bryan's resolution against capitalistic domination would be lost.

The Nebraskan watched these proceedings carefully. He was voting steadily for Clark, for whom his state's delegation was instructed, but his personal influence was thrown for Wilson. On the twelfth ballot the New York delegation changed from Harmon to Clark. While the fourteenth was being taken, Bryan read a statement saying that Nebraska indorsed Clark, thinking he was progressive and opposed to the policy for which

**Democratic
Convention.**

**Conserva-
tive Plans.**

**Bryan's
Achieve-
ment.**

New York stood. He closed by declaring he would no longer support New York's candidate, nor would he help nominate a man under obligations to "Morgan, Ryan, Belmont, or any other member of the privilege-seeking, favor-hunting class." This announcement angered the Clark men, but it found response among the Western and Southern delegates, who for sixteen years had battled against the class that Bryan arraigned. It checked the trend to Clark and was followed by a rise in Wilson's vote. The time was then near midnight, Saturday, June 29, and the convention adjourned to Monday. Clark, naturally much exasperated, issued a denial of the charges implied in Bryan's statement, and Bryan publicly announced that he did not doubt Clark's good intentions but distrusted the forces combining to secure his nomination. Many futile ballots were taken on Monday, July 1. It began to be feared that a deadlock was inevitable, and rumor said that Bryan would propose an adjournment with a referendum. Such a course would undoubtedly defeat the conservatives, and they relaxed their efforts. On the 46th ballot enough of them came to Wilson to secure his nomination. Thomas R. Marshall, of Indiana, was named for vice-president. The platform pledged the candidate, if elected, to one term only.

The day after the republican convention adjourned the Roosevelt forces in Chicago met in a mass-meeting, resolved to organize a new party, and appointed a committee to carry out their purposes. The result was a national convention at Chicago, August 5, 1912. Eighteen of its delegates were women, indicating the party's indorsement of woman's suffrage. There was much enthusiasm, and a touch of crusading zeal showed forth when the ten thousand delegates and their friends sang "The Battle Hymn of the Republic" and "Onward, Christian Soldiers." Roosevelt announced the principles of the party in a speech which won the admiration of friends and foes. He demanded that government be dependent on the will of the people, that machine politics be destroyed, that women be allowed to vote, that labor be given better wages and shorter hours of work, and that social justice be secured in all the relations of government. August 7 the ticket was selected, Roosevelt for president and Hiram W. Johnson, governor of California, for vice-president. The organization was called the "progressive party," and active efforts were made, before and after the convention, to perfect its state and local organizations.

Rarely has a campaign been fought so bitterly with such a slight difference of men and principles. In comparison with old-time leaders Taft, Wilson, and Roosevelt were all liberals, although they differed in degrees of liberalism. On the tariff re-
publicans and progressives stood practically together, demanding lower rates on a protective basis with a view of maintaining the higher wages of American workmen. The democrats re-

**A New
Party.**

**The Plat-
forms.**

pudiated protection and declared for a tariff for revenue only. Republicans and progressives would regulate the trusts, although the former wished to make the officials of the trusts criminally liable, while the latter asked that patents be robbed of their worst monopolistic features. The democrats opposed trusts generally, desired to regulate more effectively interstate public utilities, and to strengthen federal control of interstate commerce without weakening state control. The republicans ignored the initiative and referendum and declared against judicial recall, although they asked for an easier method than impeachment of removing bad judges. The progressives indorsed each of these three measures, and demanded a referendum for judicial decisions annulling state laws. All the parties supported conservation of natural resources, a parcels post, currency reform, and laws to prevent abuses in campaign contributions. The democrats and progressives indorsed the popular election of United States senators, a federal income tax, and the nomination of candidates in primaries. The progressives demanded woman's suffrage, an easier method of amending the constitution, registration of lobbyists, exclusion of federal officials from political activity, a department of labor, promotion of labor unions, and protection of the people from deceptive investment schemes.

The campaign abounded in bitter attacks on Roosevelt by democrats and republicans. La Follette, who felt keenly his own repudiation, declared he was the victim of treachery. He is supposed to have given aid to the democrats. Wilson himself denounced the progressive candidate as a tool of the steel trust and as a self-seeker. Roosevelt replied with emphasis, and made many speeches in the North, West, and South. In Milwaukee, October 14, he was shot by an insane man who imagined that Roosevelt was responsible for the murder of McKinley. A serious flesh wound was the result, but an excellent constitution well preserved by temperate habits enabled him to recover rapidly. Taft conducted a quiet campaign and made few speeches. There was little hope of his election, and many republicans probably voted for Wilson to make sure of Roosevelt's defeat.

The election occurred November 5, and of the 531 electoral votes Wilson received 435, Roosevelt 88, and Taft 8. For the last-named but two states voted, Utah and Vermont. Five declared for Roosevelt — Pennsylvania, Michigan, Minnesota, South Dakota, and Washington. In California the contest was close and 11 progressive and 2 democratic electors were chosen. The popular vote was 6,290,818 for Wilson, 4,123,206 for Roosevelt, 3,484,529 for Taft, 898,296 for Debs (socialist), 207,965 for Chafin (prohibitionist), and 29,071 for Reimer (socialist-labor). The democrats carried the house of representatives by a majority of 147 over republicans and progressive republicans.

LEGISLATIVE PROGRESS UNDER TAFT

The struggle for party supremacy under Taft ought not to divert our attention from the many reform measures which he helped to carry through congress. Never has the attention of the people been more vigorously directed to matters connected with the development of good government on a democratic basis. The most important resulting phases are connected with conservation, currency reform, and political investigations.

For a century the national government gave or sold its abundant natural resources on generous terms. This policy led to rapid development of the Western regions, but it afforded opportunities for overweening fortunes. Although timber and mineral claims were legally limited in size, speculators obtained large tracts collusively, and by the close of the century the country began to realize that a mistake had been made. The growing price of lumber, the waste of water power, and the danger that threatened through deforesting the watersheds caused alarm in the country. Roosevelt, generally willing to extend the federal power where the existing system of state relations seemed unable to deal with the situation, had his interest aroused and appointed a commission on conservation to report on the danger. It was evident to him that the national government should take natural resources under a more active control and see that they were used for the benefit of all the people. This policy did not please the people of the West, who naturally wished to see their waste places settled as rapidly as possible. Among them were influential interests who saw in the president's ideas a check on their plans for amassing wealth. By July 1, 1909, the president had issued orders withholding from settlement 194,000,000 acres, a great deal of it in the western mountains. In 1912 congress appropriated \$1,000,000, and \$2,000,000 a year thereafter, to purchase lands for forest reserves in the Appalachian and White mountains.

Conservation: 1. Forest Reserves.

Conservation also dealt with irrigation. Before 1900 private enterprises secured and developed the most obvious irrigation sites, leasing or selling water rights to the farmers concerned. Disputes frequently occurred between the water companies and their patrons, and it was evident that here was another outcropping of the problem of monopolies. Also the protection of rivers and lakes yielding irrigation waters was an important question. Finally, great irrigation plans were made which only the government can carry out. Out of this complex situation came the national irrigation policy. The control of the companies has not yet been settled, but the government has reserved from settlement many areas which supply water, and in 1902 congress advanced \$20,000,000 for this purpose, to be satisfied out of the proceeds of the sales of improved lands.

2. Irrigation.

Our chief known deposits of gold, silver, and copper have long since passed into private control, but the coal lands in the Far West have been recently reserved. The most notable instance of this nature refers to the Alaskan deposits, which are very valuable. In 1909 it became known that 33 adjacent claims for such lands of 160 acres each, made out in the names of distinct individuals, were likely to pass into the hands of a group of Colorado capitalists known as the Cunningham group. The claimants had paid the price fixed by law, \$10 an acre, but it was said that the lands were worth \$4,000,000. Secretary Ballinger was supposed to favor the claimants, and Pinchot's protest against them was one of the causes of the controversy with which the names of the two men were associated. As a result of the exposure the claims were eventually disallowed. One thousand other claims were pending, and after investigation by Secretary Fisher, Ballinger's successor, 750 of them were disallowed. The rest seem to have been filed in good faith, but they were held up, pending the adoption by congress of a fixed plan for the control of natural monopolies. The secretary favored government ownership with leases to corporations, and his plan had the support of ex-President Roosevelt, but at the close of 1912 no decision had been reached. This delay was received with dissatisfaction by the people of Alaska.

Recent years have made increasingly apparent the need of a more elastic currency. The Aldrich-Vreeland act, 1908, undertook to supply the need by allowing banks to issue additional notes on depositing approved state, county, or municipal bonds and by forming associations with joint responsibility to issue notes secured by commercial paper. The plan was not received favorably by the banks, although in 1910 a number of the proposed associations were formed under pressure of the secretary of the treasury. In the Aldrich-Vreeland act was a provision for a monetary commission, Senator Aldrich becoming chairman. It was to investigate actual conditions and to suggest a sound plan of reform. The first result was a series of reports on banking abroad and at home. An abundance of individual discussion seemed to show that the financial interests were opposed to a great central bank, although it was equally clear that there should be central control of note issues and reserves.

In January, 1911, Senator Aldrich, chairman of the monetary commission, reported the scheme known as the Aldrich currency plan. It proposed the federal incorporation of a "Reserve Association" with a capital of \$300,000,000 to be subscribed for by the national banks organized in fifteen districts, each district to be subdivided into local associations. The Reserve Association was to discount commercial paper for banks and to receive and disburse the national funds. It was not to lend money to individuals. When it was established the issue of money by national banks was to

3. Coal Lands.

Currency Reform.

The Aldrich Plan.

cease and the Reserve Association was to issue its own notes instead, subject to national taxation. The plan met a great deal of criticism, and in October, 1911, it was modified in some important particulars. The scheme found favor with the banks of the country, but was not received favorably by the people. It was evident that it was a privately owned central bank under a less unpopular name, and it was pointed out that by uniting all the banks and trust companies of the country in one organization it would deliver the banking function into the hands of a vast and powerful combination. If the public should at some future time wish to break the hold of this combination, the task would require an upheaval in the business world far more serious than that which accompanied the destruction of the second Bank of the United States.

The restless and suspicious attitude of the public toward corporations and their political influence resulted in several congressional investigations. Among them were authorized in 1910 investigations of the issue of railroad stocks and bonds, and employers' liability and workmen's compensation, and in 1912 an investigation of the so-called "money trust" and "shipping trust," and the increased cost of anthracite coal. These investigations caused much distress to business, especially the investigation aimed at the concentration of banking capital. In 1910 New Mexico and Arizona were given permission to frame constitutions and apply for statehood. A year later they presented themselves at the door of congress, but the latter had adopted the recall of judges and was refused admission. By a filibuster New Mexico's case was made to fall with that of Arizona. It was not until 1912 that both were admitted, the objectionable clause in the Arizona constitution being omitted.

Congres-
sional In-
vestigations.

Of other important acts passed in Taft's administration the following may be mentioned: a law to create a commerce court (1910); a law to establish postal saving banks (1910); a "white slave" act (1910); an act to require publicity for campaign contributions in federal elections (1910, amended and extended in 1911, and the amount of contributions limited); a canal act, providing for administration of the canal and the canal zone and remitting the tolls to American vessels engaged in coastwise trade (1912); a pension law adding \$25,000,000 annually to the appropriations (1912); a law to create a children's bureau in the department of commerce and labor (1912); an act to establish civil government in the territory of Alaska (1912); and a law creating a department of labor (1913). In 1912 a constitutional amendment for the popular election of senators was submitted to the states and ratified by them early in 1913. Such a reform had long been demanded by the states, but it was defeated by the senate itself. The passage of the amendment was due to the hard fight which under Roosevelt and Taft was directed against the obstructive power of the upper house of congress.

Other Acts.

The defeat of the republicans in 1912 and the return of the democrats to power seems to be a turning point in American party history. Out of eleven years of struggle with its inevitable uncertainty has come an advance in popular government and a checking of the influence of wealth and political machines. Whether or not popular control is safer and wiser than the old conservatism is a question over which the citizens of to-day are still divided. It is a question as old as our government, and its latter-day reappearance in a form adjusted to present conditions makes the existing political situation as interesting and important as the Jeffersonian crisis of 1800.

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CHAPTER XLI

POLITICAL MEASURES OF THE WILSON ADMINISTRATION

A NEW ADMINISTRATION

MARCH 4, 1913, ushered in a new president, a new party, and new principles. The democrats had been in opposition for sixteen years: they now found themselves in control of each house of **New Party** congress as well as the executive. In the house of repre- **Control.** sentatives they had 291 votes, the republicans, 124, the progressive republicans, 6, and the progressives, 13. In the senate they had 51 members to 44 republicans and 1 progressive. In assuming the honors they also took the responsibilities of government. Would a party so long in opposition be able to formulate and carry through a safe constructive policy? That it could do this was mainly due to the strong position of its leader. From the moment he entered office he became the head of his party. He transformed the democracy into a party of positive measures without producing noticeable disappointments within the organization.

One of the striking facts that now appeared was the prominence of Southern men in the new government, especially in congress. Through long service they were at the head of many im- **Influence of** portant committees. It was Mr. Champ Clark, of **Southerners.** Missouri, that the democrats elected speaker of the house of representatives, and of the ten most important committees of that body the chairmanships were held by Underwood, of Alabama, Ways and Means; Glass, of Virginia, Banking and Currency; Flood, of Virginia, Foreign Affairs; Adamson, of Georgia, Interstate and Foreign Commerce; Clayton, of Georgia, Judiciary; Lewis, of Maryland, Labor; Hay, of Virginia, Military Affairs; Padgett, of Tennessee, Naval Affairs; Moon, of Tennessee, Post Offices; and Fitzgerald, of New York, Appropriations — nine chairmanships out of ten. Of the whole number of house committees, 58 in all, Southern men held 40. In the senate the heads of the five leading committees were as follows: Foreign Relations, Bacon, of Georgia; Finance, Simmons, of North Carolina; Interstate Commerce, Newlands, of Nevada; Judiciary, Culbertson, of Texas; and Banking and Currency, Owen, of Oklahoma. Southern men were chairmen of 30 of the 73 senate committees. The South had been left out of political influence so long that it had come to feel that it was not an equal part of the Union. Forced now to act

for the whole nation its leaders were impelled to take the national point of view, and in doing so the whole section gained in national sentiment. In the crisis of 1917-1918 it was no less national than any other part of the union.

President Wilson took the lead and gave a consistent policy to a group of men who were inexperienced and divided into two factions. Wilson's Measure after measure was carried through congress without visible dissension. Never was a larger and more important program of legislation enacted in the same time as in the years 1913-1914. Much of the president's success, however, was achieved because the way had been prepared for him by others. Beginning ten years earlier President Roosevelt opened a long war against standpat policies, taking many hard blows from those whom he opposed. He accomplished little of what he tried to do; but he aroused public opinion. In 1912 he and his followers stood for radical reform, typified in the demand for the initiative, referendum, and recall. Taft, on the other hand, was supported by the extreme conservatives. Wilson and his party occupied a middle position. They set out to reduce the influence of the great industrial combinations without destroying them utterly. The radicals could not defeat such a program, and many of the conservatives accepted it because it was not as bad as they had feared. Thus President Wilson swept along with him a large portion of his opponents. It was significant that most of his important measures passed with a small opposing vote.

The members of the new cabinet were as follows: William J. Bryan, Secretary of State; William G. McAdoo, of New York, Secretary of the Treasury; Lindley M. Garrison, of New Jersey, Secretary of War; James C. McReynolds, of New York, Attorney-General; Albert S. Burleson, of Texas, Postmaster-General; Josephus Daniels, of North Carolina, Secretary of the Navy; Franklin K. Lane, of California, Secretary of the Interior; David F. Houston, of Missouri, Secretary of Agriculture; William C. Redfield, of New York, Secretary of Commerce; and William B. Wilson, of Pennsylvania, Secretary of Labor. Of all these men only three had experience which seemed to fit them for the work they were called to direct. McReynolds had been prominently connected with the prosecutions of trusts; Lane had been a civil service commissioner; and Wilson had been a high official of the United Mine Workers. The secretary of the navy was a country editor, the secretary of agriculture, a university president, and the secretary of commerce, a manufacturer of machinery who had served one term in congress inconspicuously. Only two had acquired considerable political experience: Mr. Burleson had long been a member of congress and had the confidence of many of the democratic leaders, and Mr. Bryan was the head of a powerful faction in the party. The secretary of state was very weak in inter-

national law and never showed that he grasped the foreign situation ; but he brought the president a powerful political support at a time when it was needed. It was his misfortune that he presided over the foreign office when it was beset with the most difficult foreign problems that had arisen in a hundred years. Mr. McAdoo, who later proved himself a successful head of finances, was then an untried man, whose chief success was in constructing a railroad tunnel under the Hudson River. In financing this enterprise he had shown ability in resisting the schemes of rival financiers. He was believed to be able to deal with the so-called "money trust," a valuable faculty at a time when financial matters would be uppermost.

When the election of 1912 occurred Wilson had served nearly two years as governor of New Jersey. Chosen as a reformer, he was trying to change the laws by which that state had become the refuge of the trusts. It was not until after the elections of 1912 that he had a majority in each house of the legislature. As soon as that body met he got his friends to introduce seven bills, popularly known as "the Seven Sisters," as his program of reform. They were brought forward on January 20, 1913, and pressed so vigorously that they received the governor's signature on February 19. Six days later Mr. Wilson sent in his resignation as governor, to take effect on March 1.

**Wilson's
New Jersey
Reforms.**

Three days after he retired from office in Trenton he stood before an immense assemblage in Washington to take the oath of office as president. The weather was fine, the people were sympathetic, and his excellent inaugural address was received with satisfaction. Announcing the conviction that the prosperity of recent times had led the country away from the original principles of government, he declared that it was necessary to turn back to effect a restoration. This should be done without sentimentalizing but in a reasonable spirit of justice for all. "We have made up our minds," he said in interpreting the recent election, "to square every process of our national life again with the standards we so proudly set up in the beginning and have always carried at our hearts. Our work is a work of restoration." The proposed subjects of reform were: the tariff, banking and currency, the power of trusts over industry ; and the promotion of social justice. He also declared that the government should use its power more vigorously to promote agriculture, obtain a better use of natural resources, and conserve better the life and happiness of the people who serve in the industrial system. To carry out such ideals he pledged himself and his party. In a spirit which won great approval he exclaimed : "Who shall live up to this great trust? Who dares fail to try? I summon all honest men, all patriotic, all forward-looking men, to my side! God help me, I will not fail them, if they will but counsel and sustain me."

**The In-
auguration.**

THE UNDERWOOD TARIFF

The attitude of the democrats on the tariff had been foreshadowed in the tariff bills of the preceding congress, prepared by the democratic house of representatives. Some of them had passed the **Two Im-
portant
Problems.** senate with the aid of the progressives, but they were vetoed by President Taft. On banking and currency the republicans had embodied their views in the report of the Aldrich Commission, views which the democrats rejected because they thought too much influence was given to what was called "the money trust." To take up these questions and such others as might arise President Wilson called congress in extra session for April 7, 1913.

On the second day of the extra session he appeared in person before the congress to make an address on the tariff. For more than a **Address to
Congress.** century presidents had communicated their views to congress in written messages. Wilson's return to the custom followed by Washington and John Adams met general approval. He was an excellent speaker, and his brief and concise explanations of his policies were better understood than the long and often dull messages of his predecessors.

Oscar B. Underwood was chairman of the ways and means committee in 1912 and was to hold the same position in 1913. He and **President
as Prime
Minister.** his committee spent much time before congress met on April 7 preparing a new tariff bill. They worked in constant consultation with the president. As party leader and as the only officer, except the vice-president, who is chosen by all the people, it is natural, under our system, that he should take a position somewhat like that of a European prime minister.

The Underwood tariff bill was defended as a tariff for revenue only. The rates were so arranged that the burdens would chiefly fall on **Underwood
Tariff.** luxuries with light taxes on the necessities of life. Many things made by trusts were placed on the free list. It was claimed that the rates in general were laid in such a way as to enable the manufacturer to overcome the advantage foreign competitors held through cheaper labor. The authors of the bill were unwilling to give higher protection. In 1912, the dutiable imports into the United States were valued at \$759,209,915, on which the duties amounted to \$304,597,035, or 40.12% of the value of the imports. It was estimated that under the new bill the dutiable imports would be worth \$798,596,000, and the duties would amount to \$266,701,000, or 29.6% of the whole. By this means of calculation the Underwood bill would lower the tariff by a decrease of 11.06 in the rates. To overcome a deficit of \$96,000,000 in the expected return from the import duties and other taxes an income tax was levied on individuals and a tax on the incomes of corporations. The Underwood bill passed the house without notable amendment. Two republicans and four

progressives joined 274 democrats in voting for it. Against it were 120 republicans, 14 progressives, and 5 democrats from Louisiana. The bill did not protect sugar as much as the Louisianians thought fair. In the senate the democrats did not have a majority large enough to carry the bill unchanged; but the alterations made did not seriously modify the bill in principle. One of the most important was a surtax on incomes above \$20,000 a year. As **Income Tax.** amended the bill passed the senate by a vote of 44 to 37, the two Louisiana senators in the negative and two progressives in the affirmative. It was signed by the president on October 3, 1913.

Actual experience revealed that the Underwood tariff needed re-adjustment in some of the rates. This led to the creation of a new tariff commission. Such a commission had been estab- **Tariff Com-**lished in Taft's administration, but it was composed of **mission.** persons who were "friends of the tariff," and the democrats refused to sanction the appropriation for its continuation. But in 1916 they created a bi-partisan Tariff Board to study the operation of the law and recommend such changes as were necessary to make it work with scientific efficiency. The Underwood Tariff was received with alarm by the manufacturers, especially by the sugar and woolen interests. Opportunity was not given to observe its full effects on business; for the world war began before it had been in operation more than a few months, and American manufacturers were not thrown into competition with foreign rivals under its operation.

While the Underwood bill was before the senate, reports circulated that a powerful lobby was trying to influence the action of that house. To defeat its object, President Wilson on May 26, 1913, **Tariff** issued his celebrated manifest on the lobby. "Wash- **Lobby.** ington has seldom seen," said he, "so numerous, so industrious, or so insidious a lobby. The newspapers are being filled with paid advertisements calculated to mislead not only the judgment of public men but also the public opinion of the country itself. There is every evidence that money without limit is being spent to sustain this lobby. . . . The government in all its branches ought to be relieved from this intolerable burden and this constant interruption to calm progress of debate."

The country was not surprised to learn that a lobby existed, since all our tariff making has been accompanied by such efforts. But never before had a president taken open notice of them. The **The In-** investigation that the senate ordered was watched with **vestigation.** interest. After it had progressed some time without decisive results the house also ordered an investigation, basing its action on statements reflecting on the conduct of the National Association of Manufacturers. The report of the committee of the house was exhaustive and led to the resignation of a member from Illinois. It was difficult to fix responsibility, but evidence submitted showed that tariff legis-

lation for the preceding thirty years had been accompanied with many discreditable practices. The investigation served to check the lobbyists for a time, and the consideration of the tariff bill proceeded in a manner nearly like that of other bills.

THE FEDERAL RESERVE BANKING ACT

The second great financial measure of 1913 was the act to give the country an elastic currency. To understand it we must look back **Old Bank-** at our early banking laws. In the beginning **ing System.** established a central bank, with branches in many cities, which furnished a large quantity of banknotes that were redeemable in coin and accepted readily at par. But this bank was unpopular because it was owned by a relatively small number of wealthy men and thus constituted a monopoly. Congress would not renew its charter and it ceased to exist in 1811. It was sadly missed during the War of 1812 and was rechartered in 1816 for twenty years. Again it became unpopular, and for the same reason, and again congress refused to renew the charter. From 1837 to 1862 the country got along with state banks, some of which were good and some bad. The state banks broke down during the Civil War, and congress adopted the national bank system, by which local banks took rational charters, issued notes secured by national bonds, and carried on their business under federal supervision. Under this system the country was conducting its affairs in 1913.

The national bank system was established to give the people a sound currency, and in that respect it was a success. Nobody could **"Elastic-** lose money by accepting national-bank notes, and this **ity."** was more than could be said of the old state-bank notes. In time it became evident that the national bank system lacked "elasticity." It is accepted as a principle of good banking that the banks should be able to issue notes freely when they are seriously needed, but at high rates of interest so that the borrowers will pay them back when the unusual demand is past, when they will be withdrawn from circulation. The nations of Europe obtain this result through central banks under some form of public control. A currency that thus expands and contracts as the demand changes is said to be "elastic." Under the national bank system the amount of currency was nearly stationary, and when there was a sudden demand for money, the lenders held out for high rates of interest, or refused to lend at all, so that debtors had to sell securities **Currency** at a sacrifice. The men who bought these securities **and Specu-** cheaply had only to hold them until prices rose to reap **lation.** large profits. It was said that a group of bankers had become very rich by following this practice; and it was charged that they used their control of the money supply to cut off loans and thus

create the panic which in turn enabled them to buy securities at low prices. This group of speculators was generally called the "money trust." Persons who understood the science of finance saw that the way to break their hold on the business of the country was to make the currency elastic, so the banks could issue new notes when needed. But it was also necessary that provision should be taken for the reasonable contraction of the currency when the crisis that called for expansion was past. To do this the currency must be under the control of men who acted for the interest of all the people, and not for the interest of a special class.

In 1908, while Roosevelt was President, congress created the National Monetary Commission, with Senator Aldrich as chairman. It made many investigations and finally submitted a re- **Aldrich** port in 1911, recommending the creation of a central re- **Report.** serve bank by national charter, with fifteen branches in as many districts. The stock of the bank was to be owned by the banks themselves, and the direction was left in the hands of the directors chosen by the corporation. The plan was not acceptable to the people at large. At that time a small number of bankers had built up so-called chains of banks in the principal cities, and it was believed that under the Aldrich plan this group of bankers would not only control the central organization but the fifteen district banks as well. It was believed, therefore, that the plan would only increase the influence of the "money trust." Senator Aldrich's suggestions pleased the banks, for they trusted the bankers and did not trust the government to select supervisors who had integrity and banking experience. The Monetary Commission amended its plan in 1912, but its main features remained the same. It was rejected by public opinion because it was believed to be as monopolistic as the old central bank. But the work of the commission was important; for it showed the people what the problem was that confronted them.

In the presidential campaign of 1912 the republicans and the democrats promised to reform the currency, and the new administration took office with definite ideas on the subject. In **The Glass** the preceding democratic house of representatives, in **Bill.** fact, the committee on banking and currency had made much progress in formulating a plan. As soon as the Underwood tariff bill was out of the way the house turned to this subject. June 23 President Wilson addressed the two houses of congress on currency reform and declared that there must be an adequate and elastic currency under government control. He had previously had many conferences with Senator Owen and Representative Glass, chairmen respectively of the senate and house committees on banking and currency, and a bill had been prepared which was introduced in each house on June 26.

The currency debate proved longer than the contest over the tariff,

but in the end the administration obtained most of what it asked for. It was in the senate that strongest objection was made. When the debate is analyzed it is seen that two groups of opinion **Bill Passed.** appeared. One represented those who distrusted large capitalists and wished to limit the power of the banks to control the proposed reserve bank. The other was composed of men who felt that the banks alone knew what kind of banking facilities the country should have, and this group wished to limit the power of the government in the matter. The position of President Wilson was between these two extremes. The bill was carried through the house without material change, but it was not passed in the senate until it was made a subject of action by the democratic caucus, thus becoming a strictly party matter. It was finally signed by the president on December 23, after the congress had passed into the regular session. On the final vote it received the support of 34 republicans and 11 progressives in the house and 3 republicans and 1 progressive in the senate, thus showing that it had lost something of its partisan character.

The Federal Reserve Bank is a bank of banks, individuals not being allowed to own stock. The country is divided into twelve **Features of the Act.** districts and the national banks in each district are required to form a district reserve bank with a capital of not less than \$4,000,000; and state banks and trust companies may join if they wish. In this district, or regional, bank they deposit reserve funds and from it they can borrow reserve bank funds on approved collateral. Above the regional banks is a Federal Reserve Board of seven members, of whom the secretary of the treasury and the comptroller of the currency are *ex officio* members, and the others are appointed by the president with the approval of the senate. It is the duty of the central board to supervise the conduct of the regional banks and to restrain them in general policies. When a business man finds the outlook serious and the local bank is unable to lend more money, he may arrange with his bank to deposit valid securities which the bank in turn may deposit with the regional bank and receive in exchange newly issued reserve notes, which are lent to the borrower. Thus the amount of currency expands when necessary, which gives it the required elasticity. When it has expanded as far as is safe, the central board has the power to raise the rate of interest, or otherwise to interfere, in order to put a check on borrowing. The Federal Reserve Bank was opened on November 16, 1914, when the business of the country was greatly disturbed by the war in Europe. It proved equal to the extraordinary demands made upon it.

LAWS RELATING TO GREAT CORPORATIONS

When President Wilson signed the Federal Reserve Act on December 23, 1913, he said: "We have slowly been coming to this

time which has now, happily, arrived when there is a common recognition of the things that it is undesirable should be done in business, and the things that it is desirable should be done," and he **Wilson and** added that the time had come to cease struggling over **Trusts.** the limitations under which business was conducted and adopt measures that would be just in themselves and establish what he called "the constitution of peace" in industry. The reform of the currency he considered a first step in that process, and the second was a series of measures designed to regulate the actions of trusts. This was a fundamental idea with the president, and he defended it at length in an address to congress on January 20, 1914.

In bringing it into effect five measures were introduced into congress as follows: (1) to create a commission to supervise the action of all persons or corporations engaged in interstate trade, **The "Five** except common carriers and banks, and to cooperate when **Brothers."** necessary with the attorney-general in prosecutions before the courts; (2) to prohibit interlocking directorates between certain great corporations, as railroads, banks, coal operators, and trust companies; (3) to amend the Sherman Anti-trust Act of 1890 by specifying a number of actions which should be unlawful; and (4) to further amend the same act by prohibiting rebates, price discrimination, and other acts of unfair competition. These four bills were prepared by the house judiciary committee, H. D. Clayton chairman, and were known as the four Clayton bills. A fifth was prepared by the house committee on interstate and foreign commerce, W. C. Adamson chairman, and gave the interstate commerce commission power to regulate the issue of railroad bonds and stock and the expenditure of funds arising from such issues. As the seven bills carried through the New Jersey legislature by Governor Wilson were called the "Seven Sisters," these five bills were called the "Five Brothers."

When they were laid before congress the president let it be known that he wished them discussed thoroughly. They involved such important matters that no other course was wise. For more than twenty years the country had been looking for a solution of the problems connected with the trusts, and there was a general desire to get the matter settled. Probably no other question since the civil war has been taken up and disposed of with a more thorough and reasonable effort for a solution that would do justice to all parties. In this discussion the five bills underwent marked changes. The second, third, and fourth, all dealing with trusts, were combined into one anti-trust bill, and by this means the program resolved itself into three bills, two of which were finally enacted into law.

The first, creating the Federal Trade Commission to regulate corporations, went back to Mr. Adamson's committee, which referred it to a subcommittee with Mr. Covington, of Maryland, as chairman. When it came back to the house it was, therefore, called the "Coving-

ton Bill." It passed this body without a division. In the senate it was amended and passed with a vote of 53 to 16, republican members casting 12 of the majority votes. It then went to a **Federal Trade Commission.** committee of conference, which adjusted the differences between the two houses, after which the bill passed without a division in the house and with only 5 adverse votes in the senate. The Federal Trade Commission thus created consists of three commissioners, not more than two of whom can belong to the same party, and all of whom are appointed by the president with the consent of the senate. The commission is given large powers of investigation over all corporations engaged in interstate trade, except common carriers and banks. But its powers are not mandatory over such corporations. When it concludes that wrong has been committed it can only present the facts to the officials of the department of justice and aid them in prosecuting in the courts. To give it full opportunity in the field assigned to it, the corporation commission in the department of commerce was abolished.

The second of the three final measures was passed into law as the Clayton Anti-trust Act, itself a result of merging the three original **Clayton Anti-Trust Act.** bills that looked to the stricter enforcement of the anti-trust act of 1890. The bill was largely in the hands of the extreme reformers. While the Federal Trade Commission is described as an effort to prevent the exercise of undue power by the trusts, the Clayton Anti-trust Act may be pronounced an effort to prescribe punishment for such an exercise of undue powers. It extended the act of 1890 by prohibiting many specific kinds of discrimination that tend to lessen competition, making it unlawful for one corporation to acquire control of another by purchasing its stock, and forbidding, except under certain specified conditions, the creation of interlocking directorates. It gave the Interstate Commerce Commission, the Federal Reserve Board, and the Federal Trade Commission the power to execute the law under the supervision of the courts. It also provided that labor organizations should not "be held or construed to be illegal combinations or conspiracies in restraint of trade." The house passed the law finally by a vote of 244 to 54 and the senate by a vote of 35 to 24. The large number of members in each house who did not vote shows how great a number were personally opposed to the measure but feared to vote against what they thought the people wanted. The president signed the bill on October 15, 1914. In a decision announced January 3, 1921, the federal supreme court held that this act does not legalize the secondary boycott, thus restricting the immunity of labor under the act in an important sense.

The other bill in the program of the majority related to the issue of the stocks and bonds of railroads and other common carriers. This project was embodied in the Rayburn Bill to allow the

Interstate Commerce Commission to pass upon all such securities before they were issued. The corporations concerned were required to make full statements of the reasons for making the **Railroad** issues and the purposes for which the funds to be derived **Securities**. from them were to be used, and such statements were to be made public. The object was to guard against watering stocks and to enable the investing public to know the value of the securities they were invited to purchase.

The Rayburn Bill met little opposition in the house, where it first appeared, although certain formal changes were made in it. It passed that house on June 5 by a vote of 325 to 12, the **Rayburn** minority being composed of 8 republicans and 4 demo- **Bill** crats. It then went to the senate, where it received the **Suspended**. approval of the committee on interstate and foreign commerce and seemed certain to pass by a decisive majority. But by this time the world war had begun and the condition of the investment market was so uncertain that it was thought to be unwise to ask the railroads to adopt at that time a new method of financing their loans. For this reason the president agreed to suspend further efforts to pass the bill until the war came to an end.

Thus came to an interruption President Wilson's plans for remodeling the laws concerning what was popularly known as "big business." Besides the tariff bill of 1913 and the federal reserve act, **Wilson's** each of which was a measure of first rank, he had carried **Achieve-** through two bills to regulate the great corporations and **ments**. had only failed to carry through the third because of events over which he had no control. It was also significant that he gained in popular support as he progressed. In the later discussions he drew largely from the votes of his political opponents. It seemed that he had found the means of disarming opposition and had introduced in reality that condition of industrial peace which he had set out to establish.

OUR CARIBBEAN POLICY

When Wilson became president his predecessors had set up a well-defined policy in relation to the states bordering on the Caribbean Sea. This policy grew out of Cleveland's and Roosevelt's **Our Policy**. interpretations of the Monroe Doctrine (pages 778, 826). It meant that the United States would protect the weaker states to the southward from aggression by European powers, and that they would also try to keep the Caribbean states from committing such wrongful acts as would warrant intervention by European states. Thus, while we held back the great foreign states, we sought to hold the small states up to their international duties.

The people of Latin America are excitable and can easily be stimulated to political revolution. On slight grounds a flashy adventurer

proclaims a new government, fights some skirmishes, and gets the government away from his rival, who probably took it in the same "No Business uncertain way only a short time before. In a few months of Ours." he faces his own enemies in arms, makes a fight to hold power, and goes the way of his fellow rulers. In this process of political turmoil the prize in view was generally the public revenues, which the winner collected as long as he could maintain his hold on government. This process went on continuously during the nineteenth century. Foreign states accepted it as an inevitable product of the Latin-American temperament. When trouble occurred, they landed armed men to protect the property and lives of their own citizens and later on recognized the leader who managed to get himself obeyed as head of the government. These foreign states assumed — and the United States accepted the idea — that they had nothing to do with the kind of misgovernment the Latin-Americans chose to have. They washed their hands of all the troubles of their turbulent neighbors.

This policy began to be changed with the outbreak of our Spanish war. In freeing Cuba we asserted that we had a right to prevent **The Cuban** misgovernment in a neighboring state. The war won, **Example.** we felt justified in creating the Platt Amendment (see page 807), enabling us to force Cuba to maintain good government in her own borders. We made good our claim in 1906, by taking over the government of Cuba for two years; and by threatening to interfere in 1911, 1912, and 1916 we accomplished our purpose without actual intervention. Under this supervision Cuba has had a quiet and orderly government of her own choice for 18 years, and in that period has gained much in orderly spirit and habits.

By a transference so easy that it was hardly noticed at the time, the spirit of our Cuban policy has begun to be applied to our relations **A Step** with other states bordering on the Caribbean Sea. In **Further.** such cases, however, the process was more difficult than in Cuba; for here no Platt Amendment gave us a right to interfere. All that was done had to be done through persuasion. When first taken up by President Roosevelt it encountered the opposition of most of our people, who thought it sheer sentiment to try to make better a people who evidently did not wish to be better. But tact prevailed and good leadership on the part of Presidents Roosevelt, Taft, and Wilson did a great deal. The financial confusion of some of the Caribbean states was great, and the aid of the United States was the only thing that would avert ruin.

The first Caribbean state for which the United States acted in this benevolent capacity was Santo Domingo, situated in the eastern **Santo** part of the island which Columbus called "Hispaniola," **Domingo.** now known as Haiti. Its proximity to Porto Rico gives us a peculiar interest in maintaining order within its boundaries.

Also, it would be very inconvenient to us if a strong foreign power occupied it on the ground that it did not fulfill its obligations. It was in 1905 that President Roosevelt, at the request of President Morales, made a treaty by which the United States agreed to take over the financial control of Santo Domingo. When the senate rejected this treaty Roosevelt carried out its essential terms under a *modus vivendi*. In 1907 the senate became convinced that the president was right and made a formal treaty in which was incorporated all he had demanded. From that time we have exercised a financial protectorate over this perturbed neighbor. United States agents have administered Dominican finances, which have increased in fruitfulness, and the Dominican debt has been placed in a way of extinction. The Dominicans have generally accepted our position in their boundaries, but sometimes there has been resistance, notably in 1916, when it became necessary to land troops to restore order in certain interior districts.

In the western part of the island exists the negro republic of Haiti, with conditions even more chaotic than Santo Domingo's. In 1914 it was hopelessly bankrupt and Germany and France demanded that they be permitted to collect the revenues **Haiti** for the benefit of the foreign creditors. Shortly afterwards the World War began and the threat of European intervention was forgotten. But Haitian conditions daily became worse, one revolution followed another, and United States troops were landed to protect property. Negotiations now began to establish American control over Haitian finances. One of the factions among the people protested and the protest became associated with the internal struggle, which burst forth again in 1915. Its bitterness and cruelty are illustrated in the murder by an agent of President Guillaume of 160 of his political enemies. This was excessive, even for Haiti; and the people rose in a rage, dragged their president from sanctuary in the French legation, and shot him without uniting on any particular successor. So bad was the situation that the United States landed marines at several places and assumed direction of internal affairs. Elections were held in which a president was chosen who favored the acceptance of United States influence. The announcement of the results of the election brought a new outbreak by those who opposed the submergence of complete nationality. However, the last resistance ended on October 1, 1915, and President Dartiguenave, supported by our marines, was obeyed throughout Haiti.

Before this time the conservative party had begun to negotiate for United States control of the finances. The result was a treaty, signed in Haiti on September 16 and in Washington on **Haitian** February 28, 1916, establishing a protectorate over that **Treaty** country and providing for American control over Haitian revenues. It created a native constabulary under United States officers, stipu-

lated that Haiti should never alienate territory to any foreign power, and promised that the United States would "lend an efficient aid" to preserve Haitian independence and peace and order. This treaty was more rigorous than the arrangement with Santo Domingo; and it shows that experience in that island had taught the government that control must be strong enough to be effective.

Establishing the influence of the United States along the northern rim of the Caribbean was completed by the purchase of the Danish Virgin Islands. These islands, St. Croix, St. Thomas, and St. John, lie east of Porto Rico, and although industrially poor they contain the excellent harbor of Charlotte Amalie, of vast importance to a great naval power. Denmark had long wished to sell them to the United States, and negotiation to that end made in 1867 had failed because our senate opposed a policy of expansion. The same proposition was made late in 1892 and again in 1896, but it was rejected by President Cleveland. It was renewed with better prospects in 1902 but failed of approval in the Danish parliament, probably through the opposition of Germany. Taken up again in 1916, when Germany was too busy in Europe to block the transaction, the sale was effected in a treaty which was ratified January 17, 1917. The United States gave up their claims to territory their citizens had discovered in Greenland and paid Denmark \$25,000,000 in cash. The total area of the Virgin Islands, as the purchase is now called, is 197 square miles, and in 1917 the population was 26,051, most of whom speak English.

Meanwhile a similar extension of influence went on in the countries west of the Caribbean, where lie the six states of Guatemala, Honduras, Salvador, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, and Panama, with a total area of 202,000 square miles and a population of about 5,500,000. By President Roosevelt's treaty with the newly established republic of Panama, 1903-1904, the United States guaranteed the independence of Panama and effectively took that state under protection. The other states were frequently at war with one another, and through our interest in the Panama Canal we wished their mutual relations to be more peaceful. To obtain this object President Roosevelt with President Diaz, of Mexico, assembled a conference in Washington at which Guatemala, Honduras, Salvador, Nicaragua, and Costa Rica, on December 20, 1907, signed treaties and conventions pledging themselves to live in peace with one another for ten years. To dispose of disputes among themselves they created a high court composed of one judge from each constituent state to sit in Cartago, Costa Rica, in a "temple of peace" erected with funds donated by Mr. Andrew Carnegie. Unfortunately the unstable temperament of the people soon overthrew this agreement; and the earthquake of 1917 destroyed the "temple of peace" at Cartago.

Meanwhile by slow steps a protectorate was created over one of these states. Nicaragua was suffering from a long period of misgovernment by its president, Zelaya, a typical Latin-American tyrant. In 1909 his subjects could stand him no longer and drove him from power. They then called on the United States to establish order in their chaotic affairs. President Taft accepted the invitation and made an agreement, May 6, 1911, like President Roosevelt's agreement with Santo Domingo, taking over the Nicaraguan custom houses, while bankers in the United States supplied money for restoring Nicaraguan finances. The senate, still holding to their old policy, refused to approve this treaty; but the president, turning to the example set him by his predecessor in office, established a *modus vivendi* and put his representative in charge of the Nicaraguan revenues. Late in his administration he renewed the treaty, but it was not considered by the senate. President Wilson followed the same course, in 1913, but again the senate vetoed the treaty. He renewed it in 1914 and after long delay it was accepted in 1916. By its terms the United States obtained a protectorate over Nicaragua in terms like those of the Platt Amendment for Cuba. The treaty also gave them a naval base in the Gulf of Fonseca, on the Pacific coast, the right to build an interoceanic canal in Nicaragua, and the possession of the Corn Islands, near the eastern end of such a canal route.

A Protectorate over Nicaragua.

The net result of our Caribbean policy is to give us virtual protectorates over Cuba, Santo Domingo, Haiti, Nicaragua, and Panama. Over Porto Rico and the Virgin Islands we gained absolute ownership. The intelligent coöperation planned for the isthmian states proved too ideal for the Latin-American temperament, but it was an attempt worthy of the benevolence that projected it. When the Caribbean policy of the United States took shape, certain foreign powers thought it but a piously coated program of aggrandizement. Experience has shown that it was designed in the interest of the Caribbean states themselves. It has been maintained without preferential business relations to the United States.

Caribbean Policy Reviewed.

DEALINGS WITH MEXICO

Under the rule of Porfirio Diaz foreign capital was drawn into Mexico so that the larger part of the rich mineral resources fell into the hands of foreigners. By this means railroads were built, mines were opened, and large oil fields were brought into production. Meanwhile the natives, with the exception of a favored minority, remained very poor. They saw with great concern the richest opportunities going to aliens. They believed they were going to be enslaved to the newcomers. Their fears and antipathy were especially aroused against the blunt and aggressive

Foreigners in Mexico.

Yankees, who came in increasing numbers. They believed that the influence of the north was about to overwhelm them, and they came to think that it was necessary to save Mexico from becoming an industrial dependency of the United States. To these people our Caribbean policy seemed to threaten the freedom of Mexico.

In 1910 Diaz was old and weaker than he had been. When he announced himself a candidate for an eighth term of the presidency **Revolution of Madero.** Francisco Madero came out against him. Diaz, following a custom he was better able to carry through in his younger days, attempted to brush him out of the way; but Madero took arms, promising to make constitutional reforms and distribute land to the peons. He won so much support that in May, 1911, Diaz gave up the fight and fled to Europe. Five months later Madero was elected president and immediately after his inauguration he was recognized as ruler by the United States and other foreign powers. Several bandit groups held out against him, his promised reforms were not forthcoming, no land was distributed among the peons, and he soon found himself surrounded by armed opponents.

Early in 1913 General Huerta, an able and unscrupulous plotter, united these opponents, seized the capital, imprisoned Madero, and **Huerta's Bloody Hands Rejected.** took the reins of government. Five days later, February 23, Madero and his vice-president were shot in the night while in the hands of Huerta's officers. There is little doubt that he was killed to promote the cause of Huerta, who eight days later took the oath of office as president of Mexico.

Before this time the nations had recognized any actual government that existed in Mexico, asking no question about the origin of its authority. President Wilson was not willing to follow **Bloody Hands Rejected.** that practice in the existing case. Believing that Huerta's hands were red with the blood of his displaced rival he would not take them in his, and he refused to recognize the new régime. He perhaps thought that by so doing he would arouse the Mexican people to a realization of the violent crime that had been done and thus induce them to rid themselves of a usurper whose methods rivaled those of the degenerate Roman emperors. The result showed that he miscalculated. The Mexicans were not shocked by Huerta's crime, but they raised a united cry against the president of a foreign state who would dare to say what kind of a man was fit to be president of Mexico. Then began a contest of endurance. Without recognition by the United States Huerta had great difficulty in borrowing money. The Maderistas found a leader in Venustiano Carranza and took up arms avowing the intention of reëstablishing constitutional rule. With him acted Francisco Villa, formerly a bandit leader, but now a professed adherent to the party of Carranza. So strong were these forces that Huerta lost control of the northern states of Mexico.

While President Wilson watched the progress of these affairs, doing what he could within the laws of neutrality to impede the success of Huerta, he came to realize that he was not supported by the ambassador to Mexico, a hold-over appointee of the Taft régime. The offending ambassador was recalled, and as a successor could not be appointed without recognizing Huerta, the position was left vacant at a time when it should have been filled by a strong man. To supply the deficiency the president sent a personal representative to the country, selecting for the purpose ex-Governor John Lind, of Minnesota, a man of good sense but unacquainted with the Mexican temperament. To Huerta were thus presented President Wilson's demands. They embraced a cessation of fighting in Mexico, general amnesty, an election free from presidential restraint, and a promise that Huerta would not be a candidate in the election. The demands were rejected with disdain and Wilson issued a warning for citizens of the United States to leave Mexico. In his address to congress, December 2, 1913, he described his policy as “watchful waiting.”

April 10, 1914, some United States bluejackets landed at Tampico to purchase gasoline, touching at a spot at which it was forbidden to land. Arrested and held two hours they were released by a superior officer, who apologized for the action of a subordinate who was ignorant of the treatment that should be accorded to foreign sailors. Admiral Mayo, commanding our forces in the harbor, had suffered much annoyance from the natives, and he considered the occasion proper to give them a lesson. Refusing to dispose of the incident with the apology of the Mexican official, the admiral demanded that the commanding officer in Tampico should deliver a formal apology, punish the officer who had made the arrest, and hoist and salute the stars and stripes, to which salute a reply would be made by the admiral's flagship. The salute was to be given by six P.M. of April 10. President Wilson was not previously consulted, but he supported the action of Admiral Mayo, although he extended the period of the ultimatum.

Now followed ten days of tense feeling. Huerta at first refused to salute the American flag. Then the North Atlantic fleet was ordered to the coast of Mexico and warning was given that we should seize Vera Cruz, Tampico, and other ports if our demands were refused. Thus threatened, Huerta offered to deliver the salute if it was returned simultaneously with the delivery in such a way as to express the equal standing of the two nations. The offer was refused. April 20 President Wilson asked congress for authority to use the armed forces in such a way as to make Huerta respect the rights and dignity of the United States. The request was granted with little opposition.

While war seemed most imminent news came that a German ship

loaded with 10,000 rifles, several machine guns, and 15,000,000 rounds of ammunition was approaching Vera Cruz. Under international law it was not possible to intercept the vessel. But Vera Cruz was seized on April 21, 1914, by a force of marines. The Mexicans offered sharp resistance for two days, losing 126 killed and 195 wounded to 8 marines killed and 25 wounded. For a few days it seemed as if war had begun, but as time passed it became evident that the president would be content with holding Vera Cruz and the situation became less alarming. April 27 the marines were withdrawn and troops took their place under the command of General Funston.

At this point Argentina, Brazil, and Chile, the "A. B. C. Powers," tendered their good offices to effect a settlement of the dispute. The offer was accepted and conferences were opened at Niagara Falls. After much negotiation it was agreed that a provisional government should be created in Mexico, under which a fair election was to be held, and the United States troops were to be withdrawn as soon as order was restored. Huerta resigned on July 15, 1914, and left Mexico. August 20 Carranza entered the capital of that country as conqueror. September 15 President Wilson ordered the withdrawal of the troops. He had not been able to make Huerta salute the stars and stripes, and he had failed in forcing the people of Mexico to accept that moral leadership that had been established over other Caribbean lands; but he had made Huerta, the usurper, give up the power he had bloodily seized. By calling the "A. B. C. Powers" into coöperation he had set a precedent for joint American responsibility in settling purely American disputes. It was even hinted that the Monroe Doctrine might be so modified that the protection hitherto claimed by the United States over American nations might in the future be exercised under the joint action of the leading states of North and South America. All these points were clear gains in dealing with affairs in Latin-America.

With the problem of Huerta solved there still remained the problem of Mexico. That country was torn with faction. Carranza was no sooner seated in power than he quarreled with Villa, who raised the flag of insurrection. For more than a year the worst forms of strife were enacted. Finally Villa gave up his efforts to expel his rival and on December 20, 1915, retired into the mountains of the northwest, where he continued the life of a bandit leader. His resentment against the United States was keen. March 9, 1916, he made a raid on Columbus, New Mexico, killing 9 civilians and 9 soldiers and seizing much property. March 15 General Pershing marched into Mexico at the head of 12,000 men to pursue and arrest the bandit and his followers. But the wily Villa had a fair start and was too well acquainted with the country to be trapped. In fact, while Pershing was at an advanced position in

Mexico one of Villa's bands crossed into Texas, fell on the town of Glen Springs on May 6, killed five men, and escaped to safety before they could be intercepted. June 22 one of Pershing's columns approached the Mexican town of Carrizal, intending to pass through it. They were fired on by Mexican troops drawn up before the place, and an engagement occurred in which we lost several officers and 20 men killed, with 17 taken prisoners. Again it seemed that war was at hand, but Carranza yielded, released the prisoners, and proposed that the whole affair be left to a joint commission. The offer was accepted and the commission was created and met at Atlantic City. It was charged with arranging the whole Mexican situation. After much discussion it reported a settlement by which Pershing was to be withdrawn and each country patrol its own side of the border, the United States adding a provision that they should have a right to cross the border when Mexico failed to keep order there. To the decision Carranza would not agree, and the joint commission was dissolved on January 15, 1917.

By this time the relations of the United States and Germany were such that it was not wise to be in a quarrel with Mexico. In fact there was reason to think that Germany had been trying **Pershing** to draw us into a war with Mexico, so that we should need **Withdrawn.** for our own purposes the munitions now being sold by our manufacturers to the *entente* allies. President Wilson's patience with Mexico was to some extent due to the conviction that we could not afford to begin a war on this side of the Atlantic until we were assured we should not be drawn into the war then being waged on the other side of it. January 28, 1917, three days before Germany announced that she would embark on ruthless submarine warfare, the president gave notice that he would withdraw the troops from Mexico, and on February 5 the last of them had recrossed the Rio Grande.

It remains to be seen to what extent the protest Wilson made against the Mexican idea of setting up government by assassination is going to improve the Mexican idea of good government. That it did not effect a speedy reformation in this respect does not argue that it was entirely futile. It did, in fact, create such a commotion in the minds of the Mexicans, and of the people in the rest of the world, that it may be assumed that it would not be so easy for another usurper to come into power as Huerta came in 1913. Wilson's methods of holding out were not satisfactory to many people in the United States. They were pronounced nerveless and timid. But with a toughness of purpose that was one of his notable characteristics he never lost sight of his main object. He wished to make the Mexicans realize that their methods of government should be improved, which was an ideal in keeping with the essence of the new Monroe Doctrine of Roosevelt, Taft, and Wilson.

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CHAPTER XLII

THE UNITED STATES AND THE WORLD WAR

TRYING TO PRESERVE NEUTRALITY, 1914-1917

IN modern times the nations of the world have much in common, and it was inevitable that a great event like the world war, involving the greatest powers of Europe, should have had profound effects upon the nations that took no direct part in the war. Of all the neutrals the United States was the largest, richest in raw materials and manufacturing capacity, and most able to supply to the belligerents the things needed in carrying on war. Although the president duly proclaimed a state of neutrality on August 4, four days after war began, it was impossible to keep a people composed of so many race elements neutral in their opinions. August 18 he issued another address in behalf of neutrality, in which he called upon ministers, teachers, and editors to use their influence in restraining partisan bitterness. These two appeals softened the public feeling for a time; but there were issues in the background that no ameliorating efforts could reach, and they worked steadily to draw us into the world's stream of tragic events.

One of the first of these issues was the well-planned efforts of the German government to create pro-German opinion in the United States. The war had hardly been begun before many trained Germans appeared in our country to urge the cause of Germany. At the head was Dr. Bernhard Dernburg, formerly a member of the imperial German cabinet, who gathered around him a group of Americans and German-Americans and organized an active propaganda. The large majority of our citizens looked on Germany and Austria as the aggressors in an unjustifiable war and resented the attempts to set up propaganda in our midst, subsidizing newspapers, and flooding the country with pamphlets. Dr. Dernburg's efforts benefited Germany little, and he left the country June 12, 1915, shortly after the *Lusitania* was destroyed by a German submarine. The storm of indignation created by that act was enough to convince the most zealous German that Teutonic propaganda was useless in the United States.

Some other acts of interference were less gentle. Early in 1915 it became known that officials of the Hamburg-American Steamship

Company were preparing to send out from our ports vessels loaded with coal and other supplies for German warships still at sea, thus **Violations of** making these ports bases for operations against Germany's **Neutrality.** enemies. It was also discovered that German diplomatic officials in the United States were issuing forged American passports to German reservists to enable them to return to Germany. A third kind of interference was disclosed when it was discovered that some of the incendiary fires in munition plants and on ships carrying supplies to the *Entente* allies were set by German agents. It was believed that only a small portion of the trouble actually done in this way was traced to the real creators of it. Investigation revealed that several German officials resident in the United States were connected with these affairs, and two of the most important were sent out of the country. It was a sorry page in German history and only succeeded in increasing the feeling against Germany.

When the war began Germany had vast quantities of munitions, prepared for just such an emergency as existed. Great Britain and **Sale of** France had not made such elaborate preparations, relying **Munitions.** on their right under international law to purchase military supplies in neutral countries. After a few months of actual fighting it became evident that the war would be long, and the question of munitions then became most important. By this time the vast reserves prepared by the kaiser were expended, and he became alarmed at the increasing supply his enemies received across the Atlantic. The German people were enraged because we sold munitions to their enemies and openly demanded that the United States should forbid the exportation of articles used in war. For us to acquiesce would be to act in behalf of Germany and in violation of international law; for to have forbidden our citizens to sell munitions at this time would have been to take from the *Entente* allies a privilege they had a right to expect under international law. Thus, if we had done what Germany demanded we should have committed an unneutral act.

Another difficulty lay in the rules enforced by Great Britain and France to control neutral trade with Germany and Austria. By **Restriction** the Declaration of London, 1909, certain rules were laid **on Ocean** down on this subject, in general of a liberal tendency. **Trade.** As they lessened the great power her naval superiority gave her Great Britain did not accept the Declaration. Nor did Germany accept it until August 3, 1914, two days after the war began. Both sides, therefore, were not acting under the Declaration, but under the less definite system that existed before it was made in 1909, and the result was a series of controversies, with claims for damages to our citizens, that grew in number daily and seemed certain to demand much negotiation after the war ended. The most important points involved related to the definition of contraband, the rules of blockade, and the interpretation of the right of continuous voyage.

By the old rules contraband was limited to articles destined for use in the army, or in its operations. Articles clearly destined for the non-combatant population were declared not contra- **Contraband** band. Other articles were declared conditional contra- **and** band, that is, contraband only when they were shown to **Blockades**. be for use in the armies. But in the war now being waged Great Britain practically wiped out the distinction between contraband and conditional contraband. She held — and France and Italy supported her — that, since all the people of Germany were engaged in the prosecution of the war or in working to support it, all supplies going into the country were liable to seizure. As to blockade, she gave up the old practice of keeping ships of war before ports that were declared blockaded, and took refuge in a “cordon blockade” which consisted in stationing ships and laying mines in the North Sea so as to command the approaches to Germany. She was able to mark out lanes through which neutral ships might pass to the northern neutral nations in Europe and to force all ships going to those nations to submit to inspection by British naval ships.

The right of continuous voyage came under discussion when it was observed soon after war began that the northern neutrals were importing much more heavily than before the war. As **Continuous** the weeks passed the practice increased. It was evident **Voyage**. that vast quantities of goods needed in Germany to carry on the war were going into that country by way of Holland, Denmark, Norway, and Sweden. If this practice was not checked the whole attempt to intercept trade with Germany would fail. Great Britain's action was drastic. She made strict estimates of the amount of imports the neutrals concerned needed to serve their own wants and limited the trade accordingly. In the negotiations that occurred over these three points the United States assumed to speak for the neutrals of the world. They were not able to get the *Entente* allies to budge from the position taken, and a great mass of claims was accumulated against the return of peace, when it was expected that they would have to be adjusted.

Germany observed these things with scorn on her lips. She said we were not truly neutral, since we did not make Great Britain keep to the old rules of international law. Her scorn would **The Use of** have been better justified if she herself had not broken **Submarines**. the same law more glaringly than her opponents. She had developed submarines further than any other nation and began to use them against her enemies soon after the war opened. At once rose the question of how far the submarine should conform to the ordinary rules of international law governing naval warfare, by which it was firmly established that a prize taken by a belligerent warship was to be sent into port if possible. If not possible she might be sunk, provided crew and passengers were placed in safety. The first part of

this rule could not be observed by a submarine; for it did not carry enough men to man a prize. Over the second part arose a violent controversy. The Germans began to sink ships at sight without thought of the safety of the persons on board; and they paid no attention to the protests of their opponents. This practice aroused the apprehensions of neutral nations, whose citizens were legally traveling on the non-combatant merchantmen of belligerents. The Germans claimed that the submarine was a new instrument of warfare and was not bound by old rules. The *Entente* allies contended that the rules were supreme, and that a new instrument of warfare should not be used at all if it could not be used in conformity with them. The neutral nations took sides with the *Entente*. February 10, 1915, the United States warned Germany that she would be held in "strict accountability" if in carrying out her submarine policy American lives were lost or American ships were sunk.

The Germans treated the warning with contempt. March 23 they sank a British ship, the *Falaba*, in St. George's Channel, and among The the slain was Leon Thrasher, a citizen of the United *Lusitania*. States. Protest was made promptly, whereupon the German government began to argue the case. May 7 came the startling news that the *Lusitania*, one of the largest, finest, and swiftest of the ocean liners, had been sunk by a submarine off the Irish coast with the loss of 1153 persons, men, women, and children, of whom 114 were citizens of the United States. Up to this time few persons in the United States had favored taking part in the war. But the destruction of the *Lusitania* brought many to demand that a stern ultimatum be sent to Germany, calling for reparation and apology in default of which we should declare war. President Wilson took a less defiant course. He called on Germany for explanations. They were not given in a frank manner, and he sent a second note, only to receive another dilatory reply. Convinced that Germany was flouting him, President he then sent a sharp note in which he said that the repeti-
Wilson's tion of such acts would be regarded "as deliberately
Course. unfriendly." On the same day he directed the secretary of the navy to prepare a comprehensive plan for developing the navy and similar steps were taken to enlarge the army. November 4, in an address before the Manhattan Club, New York, he said the time had come to strengthen the national defense and adopt a wider system of military training. The country had long felt itself safe from the danger of war with a great power; but the *Lusitania* incident showed it that it would be necessary to take a stronger stand than had been taken if we commanded the respect of foreign powers.

The response of the people to this new issue was so clear that it could not be mistaken by the German ambassador in Washington. Through his efforts the submarine commanders took a milder attitude. For a month they gave warning before firing and allowed

time for persons on the victim ships to take to the boats. While the public were beginning to believe that the worst was past came news that the *Arabic* was destroyed August 18, two Americans *Arabic* and being killed. Now Germany showed real concern. Her *Sussex*. ambassador asked the president to suspend judgment and a few days later gave assurances that no liners would be sunk in the future without placing the non-combatants in safety, provided the vessels did not resist or try to escape. To this assurance he was able to get his government to add an apology for the attack on the *Arabic* and an offer of indemnity for the American lives lost. For nearly six months the Germans kept these promises. Then, March 24, 1916, the *Sussex* was sunk in the British Channel with the loss of several citizens of the United States. Again the German government showed alarm, making it evident that it did not wish to offend the United States. It repeated in a more specific form its promise to place non-combatants in safety, provided the ships on which they traveled did not resist or try to escape.

In the negotiations that followed the loss of these four vessels, the *Falaba*, the *Lusitania*, the *Arabic*, and the *Sussex*, are embraced the main features of our submarine controversy with Ger- Opinion in many. In regard to it German opinion was divided into Germany. two sections, one believing that the United States should not be brought into the war by any unnecessary harshness and the other holding that we were so weak we could be ignored as a war-making power. The first faction had its way during the months of this controversy, largely through the influence of Ambassador Bernstorff. The time came when Germany was so uncertain of her final success that she went over to the second opinion. She thus dared the resistance of the United States at a time when her long series of affronts had put us in a mood to accept her challenge the moment it was given.

In Germany's promise of May 4, 1916, after the attack on the *Sussex*, was the statement that in return for her compliance she would expect the United States to demand that Great Britain A Condition relax her restrictions on neutral trade, and if the demand Ignored. was not made the German government might take the failure as a ground for a new course of action. To this statement Secretary Lansing said that his government could not agree that the rights of American citizens were held contingent upon the action of any other government. On the ground that her promise was conditional and that we had ignored the condition Germany finally tried to justify her adoption of unrestricted submarine warfare February 1, 1917.

THE AWAKENING OF THE PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES

The restrictions of the *Entente* allies on our trade caused much irritation, but it was eclipsed by the resentment felt against Germany's use of her submarines. One involved the loss of property and was a thing for future negotiations; the other involved the loss of life, something no future settlement could restore. Beneath this fundamental difference in the conduct of the two sides was the general view that Germany was aggressively ambitious in beginning the war, that she was not friendly to the United States, and that she would turn against them if she conquered in Europe. It was especially distasteful to them that Germany was ruled by a military class. Slowly the opinion was formed that the world would never have peace until this class was overthrown and democratic government set up in its place. This growth of conviction went on from 1914 to 1917, aided by Germany's fatal submarine policy, and her many interferences in our domestic affairs.

One form in which it was manifested was in the decision to increase the army and navy, which for generations had been maintained on a slender basis. Early in 1914 the regular army contained 85,965 officers and men, not including 5733 Philippine scouts, and the National Guard contained 128,043 officers and men. It then cost our government \$1049 to maintain a soldier a year against \$522 in Great Britain, \$330 in France, \$294 in Russia, and \$210 in Germany. The army had 634 pieces of artillery, the largest being of six-inch caliber; and it was estimated that the public arsenals could turn out only 500 guns a year, working three shifts. In the arsenals were 915 rounds of ammunition for each gun, which was then considered adequate; but in the war about to begin the amount would be used up in two days. There were about 1000 machine guns, but they were of the obsolete Colt and Gatling types. There were 119 flyers with 21 machine-guns of an early model. This state of unreadiness for war need not astonish us. Opposition to militarism of the European kind was inbred with the people. The burden of armament was five times as heavy a man in the United States as in Germany. We were employing the voluntary system of service, which is always a disadvantage where wages are high. Universal military service was too unpopular to engage the serious attention of the lawmakers. In the face of the great and general indifference to large defensive measures no influential political leaders had been willing to champion the creation of an army adequate to the defense of the country.

The progress of events served to awaken interest in the subject, and in his annual message, 1915, the president recommended the increase of the regular army to 142,000 and the creation of a "continental army" of 400,000 to be called into training at the rate of 34,000

a year for two months each year and then to pass into a reserve class for three years. This plan was unacceptable to the state militia, and through their support the so-called Hay Bill was passed, in lieu of the president's suggested bill. It authorized a regular army of 186,000 and a federalized national guard of 424,800, with an officers' reserve corps and a reserve training corps of officers at colleges and universities. The president accepted this bill when he saw that his own measure would not pass congress. Secretary of War Garrison, urging the "continental army," felt that he had been deserted by his chieftain and retired from office. **The Army.**

The navy was in a better state of preparation than the army. It was ranked as the third in the world, standing below the navies of Great Britain and Germany. In battleships it was nearly as strong as the second of these, but it was far below it in modern cruisers and destroyers. The personnel of the navy was excellent, but there was some criticism of the head, the secretary of the navy. The submarine, airplane, and rapid-fire gun were claimed as American inventions; but it illustrates our indifference to militarism that they got their best development in Europe. **The Navy.**

While President Wilson was deeply engaged in the problem of preserving neutrality the country came to the elections of 1916, and he received the indorsement of his party in a renomination. He had managed the neutrality question so that **Elections of 1916.**

Germany for the time seemed to have given up her pretension to attack neutral ships or destroy neutral lives at will. The republicans nominated Charles E. Hughes, of New York, who resigned from the supreme court to make the run. He had made a high reputation as a foe of machine politics and it was believed that in him the republican party, which was not yet entirely recovered from the division of 1912, would find a leader whom both wings could support.

The campaign was noted for the prominence given to the German-American vote, whose leaders were taking an active part in behalf of Germany. The leaders tried to get the candidates committed to a policy of sympathy for Germany. President Wilson openly repudiated them. Mr. Hughes was less clear in his announcements and the impression went out that he was vacillating. In the election itself the German-Americans were perhaps not as united as their leaders had said they would be. When the war came shortly afterwards the vast mass of them proved loyal Americans and many of them sealed loyalty with blood. As the campaign neared its close interest centered around the president's policy of neutrality. The democrats took for their slogan "He kept us out of war" and used it so effectively that they carried their candidate through with 277 electoral votes against 254 for Hughes. During this campaign ex-President Roosevelt, former candidate of the progressives, worked hard for Hughes. But he was not able to bring **Wilson Re-elected.**

all of his former followers back into the republican fold. To heal the breach of 1912 completely was work reserved until 1920.

When the election occurred the war in Europe had been going on two years and three months. Germany and Austria had lost the advantage they had at the beginning through their superior preparation. Their opponents were armed to the teeth, had well-trained armies, and it seemed that they would have a decided advantage in the spring campaign. Friends of the kaiser were anxious about the result, and urged him to get peace if possible. Accordingly, on December 12, 1916, the central allies issued an identic note proposing that conferences be held looking to peace. The tone of the note was that of a conqueror, and the proposal was rejected by the *Entente* allies. No terms had been suggested in the note, but it was thought that the Germans would accept none that their enemies would have. At this time it was evident to most people that the world would not be safe if Germany was not made to feel she had lost the war.

Before this identic note was sent out President Wilson had decided to issue an address to the belligerent nations in behalf of peace; and despite the failure of the identic note he made his appeal, December 18, 1916. He requested each side to specify the terms on which it would put an end to the war. He disclaimed any intention of offering mediation but expressed the hope that once the objects of the two sides were declared it would be possible to select those on which agreement could be made. He also suggested that it might be possible to take steps toward the formation of a league to preserve perpetual peace. Germany and her allies replied with an offer to appoint delegates to a peace conference, but they did not reveal their terms. Their opponents replied in a joint note, January 10, 1917, in which they refused to name specific terms beyond saying that territory occupied by the central allies must be evacuated with indemnities and reparation for damages done. The two sides were so far apart that it was evident that the war would have to continue awhile longer.

Germany was disappointed at the failure of these efforts, and her internal situation was becoming serious. Food and other supplies were running low, her munitions of war were depleted, her armies were being reduced, and her people were beginning to question the leadership of the men who had taken them into the war. Her ruling group felt that it was necessary to win at once or lose the confidence of the people. In this desperate situation they decided to use the one instrument of war they had not used, ruthless submarine warfare. In employing it they had to violate the promise made to the United States May 4, 1916. Balancing the gain against the loss they decided to run the risk of making another enemy. They thought they would destroy allied merchant ships so fast that

the *Entente* would be starved into submission before the United States could get ready to fight. Their purpose was announced to the world in a decree of January 31, 1917, to go into operation February 1. It created a war zone along the western coast of Europe and in the Mediterranean Sea in which all merchant ships, belligerent or neutral, would be sunk at sight, without regard to the safety of persons on board. To avoid closing neutral Spanish ports a narrow open area was left on the northern and eastern coasts of Spain and a narrow lane through the Mediterranean to the coast of neutral Greece. To accommodate Americans who wished to visit England one ship a week was to be permitted to pass through the war zone to Falmouth, in Cornwall, provided she arrived on Sunday and departed on Wednesday and had white and red stripes on her sides and flew a flag of red and white checks. She must also have a certificate from the United States government that she carried no contraband.

The publication of the German decree angered as much as it astonished the people of the United States. April 18, 1916, in protesting against the destruction of the *Sussex*, the president had said he would suspend diplomatic intercourse if unrestricted submarine warfare was continued; and in reply the Germans had promised not to follow that barbarous course. By the note of January 31, 1917, their promise was withdrawn, and the course before President Wilson was plain. February 3 he recalled Ambassador Gerard from Berlin and handed passports to Ambassador Bernstorff in Washington. Addressing congress on the same day he said that if the German threat was carried out he would lay the situation before congress for appropriate action. The senate indorsed his action by a vote of 78 to 5. The country in general approved, and the German-Americans in many cities passed resolutions protesting their loyalty to the United States.

February 26 President Wilson asked congress to authorize him to arm merchant ships for self-protection, and a bill for that purpose was introduced at once. Before it could be debated came the news that the liner *Laconia* was torpedoed on the night of the 25th with the loss of two American lives. The overt act had occurred which the country had expected since the announcement of January 31. Congress met the emergency by taking up a bill introduced by Mr. Flood to allow the president to establish armed neutrality. It passed the house by a vote of 403 to 13. Many members wished to except munition ships, and an amendment to that effect received 124 to 295 votes in the house. In the senate the bill encountered a filibuster conducted by Senator La Follette and for that reason it failed to pass. In disgust the president denounced the filibusters as "a little group of willful men," and the outburst of feeling in the country supported the charge. In asking

for power to arm the merchantmen he had said that he believed he had the power under laws already passed but acted for the sake of greater certainty. He now proceeded under the former assumption, and guns were ordered to be placed on American ships for defense against the submarines.

Would Germany provoke war by sinking one of these ships? The answer came on March 18 when she sent three of them to the bottom.

War Three days later Congress was called to meet in extra session on April 2, 1917. When it met President Wilson addressed it in an eloquent speech. He declared that the course of the German government against the United States was nothing less than a state of war, and he urged congress to accept the challenge and return it with all the energy the resources of the country made possible. A joint resolution declaring that a state of war existed by act of Germany was introduced at once. It passed the senate on April 4 with five votes against it and the house on April 6 with fifty votes in the negative. The opponents of the resolution were mostly pacifists, or representatives of constituencies in which were many German voters. Austria-Hungary had not taken active part in the submarine controversy against the United States and she was not included in the declaration of war. Late in the year she was pressing hard on the Italians and we declared war against her on December 7, 1917, in order to hearten that distressed people. No declarations of war were made by the United States on Turkey and Bulgaria.

AT WAR WITH GERMANY: A YEAR OF PREPARATION

When war was declared it seemed certain that the United States would not be called upon to give large military aid to the *Entente* allies. March 17 began the Russian revolution which set up a republican form of government. By this act it seemed that the great Russian people had clinched their opposition to German autocracy, and there was general confidence that the victory over Germany was now doubly assured. The part the United States would play, according to popular opinion, was to lend money to the struggling nations of Europe, and to bend all efforts to manufacture supplies and use the navy to check the ravages of the submarines. The view that we would not have to send troops abroad was soon known to be erroneous. France and Great Britain had suffered greatly in the war and their people were discouraged. It was believed that they needed to see the soldiers of the United States fighting by their sides in the trenches of France. Under this conviction the old opinion changed and a great army was organized to be sent across the Atlantic.

When congress took up the matter the country was accustomed

through long practice to a volunteer army. It was on this principle that the act of June 3, 1916, the so-called Hay Act, was based. Many members of congress wished to hold to it still. But **A National Army.** through the efforts of the president it was decided to proceed on the basis of universal service. A new law, May 18, 1917, provided that all the men in the country between the ages of 21 and 31 should be enrolled for military service, and out of them should be drafted the men whom the president desired to call into the army under the law. He was authorized to call 500,000 at once and an equal number at a later date. He was also permitted to increase the regular army by volunteering until it numbered 287,000. By this act the United States would have a total armed force of more than 1,700,000, the National Guard with its 424,800 men included.

To obtain the equipment for the new army was a gigantic task. The demand was for great quantities of rifles, heavy guns, machine-guns, and army supplies at a time when the manufacturing **Problem of Supplies.** capacity of the country was already taxed to capacity by the demands of Europe. To take over the new business it was necessary to enlarge plants, train operatives, and manufacture new machinery, all of which required time. The obstacles became especially apparent in regard to airplane construction. So important was the warfare in the air that it was common to hear it said that the victory would ultimately come to the side that could fill the air full of planes flying in such numbers as to wipe out whole armies. And since the United States were accustomed to do things on a large scale, the opinion was held in Europe and America that it was for them to furnish the planes necessary for such operations. When it was realized that such a thing was impossible, the disappointed public, forgetting that it had expected too much, put the blame on those who had charge of aircraft production.

Another difficulty of which sufficient account was not taken lay in the necessity of issuing commissions to untrained men, some of whom proved unequal to their duties while others did not **Emergency Officials.** learn to perform them until they had been some time in office. April 1, 1917, there were 13,524 commissioned officers in the army, including 7733 militia and reserve officers. December 31, 1917, the number had increased to 110,856. All these new officers came from civilian employment; and at a time when there was the most urgent demand that the machine should function smoothly it had to go through the process of eliminating those who proved unable to do what was expected of them. These facts ought to be remembered in passing on the merits of the men who had to plan and carry on the duties of the war department.

Despite the difficulties here mentioned, and others of less conspicuous nature, the year of organization proceeded in a way that satisfied our national pride. Rifles were obtained in sufficient

quantity from a large American firm which had just made a great number of Enfield rifles for the British government. By changing the **Rifles and Artillery.** Enfield bore so that the cartridges of the Springfield rifle could be used the firm was able to go on with rapid production of a large scale. The lack of artillery was remedied by purchasing guns from the French and British, whose factories, built for the most part since war began, had reached such a stage of production that they could serve our purposes without interfering with the needs of their own armies. When the elaborate airplane program undertaken under the enthusiasm of the moment broke down it was possible to purchase airplanes from France and Great Britain. Before the war ended we had obtained 3800 service airplanes from foreign sources.

Under the idea that we should have a vast number of planes in France the war department set out to make a distinctive American **Airplane Production.** machine which could be made in quantity production. To drive it was to be a new engine to which the name "Liberty" was given. The first attempts to develop this motor were not entirely successful. It was not until the spring of 1918 that it was perfected and somewhat later put into quantity production. By autumn the monthly output was 3878 motors. It proved an excellent engine for the bombing and observation planes but was not suitable for the pursuit planes. The government shipped 4435 of them to the American army in France and 1025 to the other nations fighting against the central allies. It also shipped to France 1885 De Haviland Four observation and bombing planes of American manufacture. When the armistice occurred the airplane situation had just assumed satisfactory form. Congress had appropriated \$691,851,866 for this purpose, and when it became known that results were not obtained as expected there was much disappointment. President Wilson appointed former Justice Charles E. Hughes to investigate the matter, and the report submitted showed that a large sum had been wasted through the attempt of men without practical experience in a highly technical work to carry it through on a grand scale in a short while. The report did not show that any part of the sum had been misappropriated; but it was evident that much had been wasted through not understanding the nature of airplane construction.

The experience of the army in getting a supply of machine-guns was also disappointing. When war came orders had been given to **The Browning Machine-Gun.** manufacturers to prepare models for a better type of gun than then existed. The result was the Browning gun, which is admittedly unexcelled by other guns. It was accepted in May, 1917, and orders given for the earliest possible execution. In the state of the industries existing at that time it was impossible to build factories and obtain machinery to make the gun for delivery in large quantities before April, 1918. Foreign-made

guns had to be obtained for the training camps and for the first divisions that arrived in France.

To support the war the great industries of the country were brought under a system of coöperative control so that waste effort might be avoided. A Council of National Defense was organized **Organizing Industries.** to assemble and direct the scientific energies of the country. Congress established control over the marketing of food and fuel, and acting under its authority President Wilson appointed Herbert Hoover national food administrator, and Harry A. Garfield fuel administrator. To get the best results out of the railroads was another serious problem. For several months the railroads tried to get along under the direction of a Railroads' War Board, with a competent railroad president at its head. But by the end of 1917 the railroads themselves were forced to confess that they could not meet the heavy demands placed upon them. They had tried to serve the country faithfully in the crisis, but they were still operating as distinct lines, and the thing that was needed was to make them work as a single system. The president obtained this object when he took the railroads into government hands on December 27, 1917, and appointed William G. McAdoo, the secretary of the treasury, their director-general. Under this régime the transportation system of the country was improved by obtaining various economies on the principle of large-scale operation. The government ran the railroads until March 1, 1920, when they were handed back to the companies.

Another large undertaking of the government in a line of business that had formerly been left to private hands was the operation of shipping. Before the war foreign-owned ships carried **Shipping.** nearly all of our deep-sea commerce, and these ships were not available when war began. It was necessary for the government to go into the shipbuilding and ship-operating business. Accordingly in 1916 congress created the Emergency Fleet Corporation with a capital of \$50,000,000, furnished by the government. After we entered the war the capital of this corporation was increased until in October, 1917, it was as much as \$1,934,000,000. At that time its program called for the construction of 1200 vessels with dead-weight tonnage of 7,500,000; and later on this capacity was largely increased. December 13, 1920, the secretary of commerce reported that the American tonnage engaged in distant foreign commerce at that time was "tenfold what it was in 1914." Before the war the merchants of the United States paid a freight bill of \$200,000,000 a year to foreign ship-owners. In 1920 over half of our foreign commerce went in American bottoms, and the immense sum paid in freight on that half was kept at home.

THE AMERICAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCES IN FRANCE

Soon after the United States entered the war commissioners arrived in Washington from Great Britain, France, Italy, and other countries at war with Germany. Exhausted in their long struggle **Foreign** these countries asked for loans. The request was complied **Loans.** with at once and in generous terms. Our loans to these states aggregated \$9,711,739,636 on August 15, 1920, handed over in bonds which the taxpayers of the United States have agreed to pay with interest, if the creditor nations do not pay them.

The visiting commissions were unanimous in the opinion that American troops were needed in France to hearten the discouraged **Our Soldiers** allies. At that time much was being said in the papers **in France.** about ex-President Roosevelt's request that he be allowed to raise a division of volunteer soldiers for immediate service in France. Congress finally authorized the division, provided the president saw fit to accept it. Since it was contrary to the policy of the war department to send untrained troops to Europe, or to raise civilians to high military rank without the military training requisite for such commanders, President Wilson announced that the Roosevelt division would not be accepted. But to meet the demand for the immediate presence of our troops in France he ordered the troops that had been in Mexico to be dispatched at once across the Atlantic. They were known as the First Division and were troops from the regular army. The division began to embark on June 13 and in due time arrived safely at "a port in France." It was followed quickly by the Second Division, and by the end of the year 187,916 troops and 7579 marines had been embarked for France.

By this time the Russian revolution had run into the Bolshevik régime and peace was being arranged between Bolshevik Russia and **The** Germany and her allies. It was evident that with the coming of the spring of 1918 immense forces would be thrown **Triumph of** against the allied lines in France, and insistent requests **the Ships.** came for the early transportation of all possible forces from the United States. To meet the demand ships were required in large numbers. Each regiment sent over meant the employment of more cargo ships to carry over the supplies for its maintenance. By repairing the German merchant ships in our harbors when the war began, by borrowing ships from Great Britain, by taking over for the war 300,000 tons of Dutch shipping in our harbors waiting for freight, by chartering some Scandinavian and Japanese ships, and by using the growing output of our shipyards under the operation of the Shipping Board we were able to meet the emergency. By November 1, 1918, the army had in service 431 ships, of which 39 carried troops; and of the latter class 16 were loaned to us by the allied nations. As the result of these efforts in the seven months from April 1 to November 1, 1918,

the government embarked 1,634,929 troops for the scene of conflict; and when the armistice was signed, November 11, we had dispatched more than 2,000,000 men to the battle area. At that time nearly an equal number was in training in the United States to follow after them for the great drive which was expected to end the war in the spring of 1919.

To support this vast army in France intricate and well-organized Services of Supply were created. This organization comprised a large transportation system behind that part of the battle line that was assigned to the American troops, with rail-roads and long lines of motor transports, as well as great depots of supplies, bakeries, repair stations, training areas, and many other similar kinds of activities. The smooth conduct of these operations also demanded the improvement of harbors, the construction of railroad sidings, the repairs of railroads, and other such works. Taken all together the work behind the lines was as great, if not as important, as the labors in the actual fighting areas.

To command the American Expeditionary Forces the president selected General John J. Pershing, who with his staff arrived in Paris on June 13, 1917. One of the first things he did was to come to an agreement with the allied commanders upon the part of the great battle line his troops were eventually to occupy. That done the lines of supply were projected for the support of the assigned sector. At that time Great Britain was defending the channel ports and Flanders, the portion nearest to her own shores. France was holding the part south and east of the British sector. The portion assigned to the United States was that which lay to the east of the Meuse as far as the eastern banks of the Moselle, commanding the approaches to the strong positions of Metz and Sedan. Later on this sector was widened on the western end to include the Argonne Forest.

Before the American troops could take over their own sector they had to go through a period of training in the new methods of fighting developed during the war, and this was necessary to the trained soldiers of the regular army as well as to the newly recruited men. The first divisions that arrived obtained this training in association with French and British troops, being broken up into small units and interspersed with similar British and French units. The willingness of the Americans to sacrifice their own organization for the time had a happy effect on our allies. As soon as the fundamental lessons had been learned the process was abandoned and the divisions that came later went through their overseas training solely in American hands. A short experience in France convinced General Pershing that the spirit and method of the training should have more of the offensive in it than was practised in the Allied armies in France. The British and French had been so long in the trenches

that they had forgotten the rules for offensive action. Insisting that the American troops should not fall into similar habits General Pershing took the first opportunity to place his own divisions in the battle line. The First took over a sector north of Toul on January 18, 1918, the Twenty-Sixth went to the front near Soissons early in February, the Forty-Second took over a sector near Lunéville on February 21, and the Second went into the trenches near Verdun on March 18. Since a division contained 28,000 men, we thus had in battle line when the great German offensive of 1918 broke on the allied lines on March 21 a total force of more than 100,000 men.

In designating the divisions it was decided that those that were formed out of the regular army should have numbers below twenty-six, those made up of soldiers from the National Guard should have numbers from twenty-six to seventy-five, and those from the drafted men were numbered from seventy-five upwards. This decision was followed when the divisions were organized; but as they lost men they received their replacements from the drafted men without regard to the territory from which they came. In the first engagements in which our troops took part the divisions employed were naturally of the first and second of these three groups. These divisions, it should be remembered, were formed promptly after we entered the war; and it was possible to bring them quickly into the field because of the Hay Act, of June 3, 1916.

AMERICAN TROOPS TO THE RESCUE

The actual fighting of Americans in France may be considered in two phases, the first of which includes the sporadic fighting in aid of the hard-pressed French and British forces in the terrible first months of the campaign of 1918. The second phase includes the fighting along our own sector. In the earlier of these phases they were called in by the sudden crisis that overwhelmed the allied lines, fighting before they were supposed to be prepared, and going in by divisions to stay the tide of German victory. In the later phase the war had settled down for them, and the men from the United States were ready in sufficient numbers to take over the sector that had been assigned them. They now appeared as a great army, with a wide and systematically planned offensive of their own. The earlier of these series of operations created great enthusiasm in the country because it showed our soldiers in the rôle of victors at a most critical time. The second brought the great satisfaction of peace.

When our troops were thrown into the fighting the Germans had just made three thrusts at their opponents, inflicting vast losses in each. The first began March 21 in the Cambrai sector and pushed the British back to a front that barely protected the important railroad center of Amiens, but it failed after desperate

fighting when French reinforcements at last arrived. The second was to the northward and looked to the capture of the channel ports of Dunkirk, Calais, and Boulogne. It began on April 8 with terrific hammering, which the British resisted doggedly until at last French divisions arrived and the attack failed. In the interval between the initiation of these two attacks the British were induced to withdraw their opposition to a unified command, and General Foch became generalissimo of all the forces operating on the allied side. In offering him the aid of the American troops General Pershing used the following memorable words: "I come to say to you that the American people would hold it a great honor for our troops were they engaged in the present battle. I ask it of you in my name **Foch in** and in that of the American people. There is at this mo- **Command.** ment no other question than that of fighting. Infantry, artillery, aviation — all that we have are yours to dispose of as you will. Others are coming which are as numerous as will be necessary. I have come to say to you that the American people would be proud to be engaged in the greatest battle in history." Two days later the First Division was ordered to the front and went into the trenches April 25 three miles from Montdidier. In front of them was the village of Cantigny, which they attacked and took on May 28 in good style. This first actual encounter was delivered with so much spirit that it created satisfaction in the men of the other armies, who had been waiting anxiously to see how our troops would fight.

The third drive began May 27 on the Aisne line between Soissons and Rheims. In one day the French were pushed back five miles on a line twenty miles long. Next day they were forced back **The Marne** to the Vesle and then across it. On the 31st they were **Salient.** forced across the Marne, where they were able to make a stand. The Germans had thus driven a wedge into the part of the great line that ran east and west. At the same time the western leg of the wedge began to move still further west. June 1 it crossed the north and south road from Soissons to Château-Thierry, the French falling back six miles, and next day it again moved forward three miles. But by this time reserve divisions had been brought up and the German progress was stayed. The Marne salient, which resulted from these operations, was a blunt wedge with Château-Thierry at the southwestern point. It was thirty-five miles wide at the base and twenty-five miles deep. At Bouresches, seven miles west of Château-Thierry, the line was but thirty-nine miles from Paris, to which ran an excellent road.

In the critical days of this drive the Second and Third Divisions, nearing the completion of their training, were ordered forward to the danger point. In the Second served the fifth and sixth **Americans** regiments of marines, with the ninth and twenty-third **Sent** regiments of regulars. This division went into the line **Forward.** on June 1 at Bouresches. The Third took position from Château-

Thierry eastward to Jaulgonne, on the south bank of the Marne. Its machine-gun battalion had just been mounted on motor vehicles and outran any of the other troops in the two divisions, reaching Château-Thierry on May 31, where it did good service in holding back the Germans while the French crossed the river. Its men were thus the first Americans to fight in the actions that made Château-Thierry a household word in the United States in the summer of 1918.

June 1 the Second Division was going into the line to replace the tired French when news came that a break had occurred in the French line to the left. The ninth regiment, regulars, was sent at once to restore the line, which it did, repulsing two sharp attacks as it lay before Veuilly de Poterie and delivering an effective counter-blow on June 2. Meanwhile the marines had been drawn up behind the exhausted French troops as a supporting line. Late on June 2 the Germans forced back the French and marched on the marines. At 300 yards they were received with a deadly fire which sent them back to the rear in surprise and dismay. The advance had stopped. Just before the marines was Belleau Woods, strongly held by Germans. To take it with infantry alone was very difficult, but the artillery had not arrived, the marines were impatient, and it was decided to attack on June 6. For three days the fighting was severe, the Americans advancing slowly, inflicting and sustaining heavy losses. At last they were withdrawn on the 9th in order that the woods might be thoroughly shelled by the artillery, now in position. The result was that the position was stripped bare of forest, and the marines found it an easy matter to mop up what were left of the defenses. After that came several local battles in which the Americans generally advanced their lines. These small engagements were reported in the United States in detail and created much enthusiasm for the war.

July 14, late at night, began a fourth great German drive. This time it was an attempt to bend back the line east and west of Rheims, so as to isolate that strong place. It extended on the west as far as the outskirts of Château-Thierry and thus involved the Third Division, holding the south bank of the Marne. After a terrific bombardment the Germans crossed the river in canvass boats, formed a line on the south bank, and charged against the Third Division, which gave way for a while, and then returned to the charge and drove back their adversaries, forcing many of them to try to swim the Marne under fire. In the fighting the 38th regiment found itself faced by Germans on three sides. It stood its ground until reinforced, holding off two German divisions and taking 600 prisoners. General Pershing described its action as "one of the most brilliant pages in our military annals." While this fighting was going on a portion of the Forty-Second Division saw actual fighting with the French in the severe battles with which General Gouraud

beat off the German attacks east of Rheims. This July drive was Germany's last offensive in the war.

While the Germans were spending all their strength to surround Rheims, General Foch prepared and delivered the blow that put an end to their successes and turned the tide of battle to the **July 18,** side of the *Entente* allies and the United States. He massed **1918.** troops on the western side of the Marne salient, where the German line was thinly held, and here, on July 18, he delivered a furious onslaught that sent the invaders reeling backward from four to eight miles. Next day the attack was renewed and it was continued until on July 21 Foch held at all points the road from Soissons to Château-Thierry, the main line of supply for the Germans in the salient. This disaster warned them that they were in a trap, and they began to withdraw as rapidly as possible. Great quantities of supplies were abandoned, but they managed to escape by hard fighting with most of their artillery. Here was observed the great value of machine-gun organizations in covering a retreat. Filling the roadsides and hills with these instruments of death the retreating armies held back the pursuit day after day until the artillery was safe beyond the intervening rivers. The pursuers had the slow task of taking these machine-gun positions. But they delivered hard battle at all points until on August 4 the Marne salient was cleared of Germans.

In these operations the soldiers of the United States took prominent part. The First and Second Divisions, with the First French Moroccan Division placed between them, constituted the spear-head of Foch's attack on the 18th. The First went forward more than seven miles on that day, and took 3500 prisoners, the Second advanced five miles and took 3000 prisoners. A little south served the Fourth Division with the French. Just northwest of Château-Thierry was the Twenty-Sixth, which carried the line across the Soissons road on the 21st. Opposite Château-Thierry itself was the Third which crossed the river and occupied the town as the Germans withdrew and delivered hard battle against the enemy. In the region south of the town were other divisions in reserve. In the operations of pursuit of the retreating foe all these divisions took a leading part, and they were joined by the Forty-Second, known as the "Rainbow Division," the Thirty-Second, the Twenty-Eighth, and Seventy-Seventh.

**Our Troops
in the
Marne
Salient.**


OPERATIONS IN THE AMERICAN SECTOR

Bringing the divisions of United States troops into army units was a gradual process. The ideal set before the military authorities in the beginning was to unite six divisions into a corps, and to combine corps into an army. During the fighting in the **Army Or-** Marne salient a third corps was organized. The First and Third **ganization.**

took part in the engagement in that region. The Second, consisting of the Twenty-Seventh and Thirtieth Divisions, served with the British, and distinguished itself in the attack on the tunnel sector near St. Quentin and in the battles that followed. August 9 an agreement was made between Generals Foch and Pershing that the United States forces should be organized into an army and take over the sector long promised to it, from a point north of St. Mihiel to Nomeny, east of the Moselle, in all about forty-five miles. August 10 the army was constituted and orders secretly given for its concentration in the new sector. At this time the fourth corps was organized and the fifth was in process of formation.

The first task assumed by the First Army was the reduction of the St. Mihiel salient, into which the Germans had thrown themselves September 12, 1914, and the attack was made on the fourth anniversary of that event. At the angle itself was the Second French Corps, which General Foch had placed under General Pershing's command. East of the angle Pershing placed seven divisions, extending from Apremont to Port-sur-Seille, a few miles east of the Moselle. They were, in order, the First, its left on Apremont, Forty-Second, Eighty-Ninth — these three divisions constituting the Fourth Corps, under Major-General Dickman — and the Second, Fifth, Ninetieth, and Eighty-Second Divisions — constituting the First Corps under Major-General Liggett. North of the angle at St. Mihiel was the Fifth Corps, under Major-General Cameron, containing the Twenty-Sixth and Fourth Divisions with the Fifteenth French Colonial Division. The plan of attack was for the seven eastern divisions to deliver a smashing blow along their entire front, while the Twenty-Sixth and the Fifteenth French Divisions cut through the line in the north, both wings converging on Vigneulles, ten miles within the angle, whose position was important because the good roads to St. Mihiel led through it. If it could be seized before the Germans could escape, the spoils of war would be great and many prisoners would be taken.

The attack began at 5 A.M. on September 12, after heavy artillery fire. The infantry charged in good order, taking many prisoners in the demolished trenches, and advancing against a moderate fire. At nightfall it was learned that the enemy were withdrawing through Vigneulles, and a regiment from the Twenty-Sixth and another from the First Division set out to intercept them. They united at dawn of the 13th near Vigneulles and closed the net around a large number of Germans. The total number of prisoners was nearly 16,000 and the captured guns were 443, with large stores of supplies. This first achievement of the First Army removed the last doubt of the ability of this newly formed force to hold its own in any perils. It contained 500,000 men, of whom 70,000 were French. Its casualties in the St. Mihiel operations were 7000 all told.



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THE CAPTURE OF THE ST. MIHIEL ANGLE, SEPTEMBER 12, 1918

The Broken Line Shows the American Position at the Commencement and the Solid Line at the Conclusion of the Operation

From Bassett's "Our War with Germany" (Knopf)

Before these operations were begun plans had been made for a drive by the United States troops against German lines from the Meuse westward through the Argonne Forest, to be under-
 taken in coopération with the Fourth French Army under
 General Gouraud west of the Argonne. Military authori-
 ties considered this part of the line very "sensitive." Thirty miles
 behind it lay the main railroad for taking supplies to the southern
 side of the angle made by the great German battle line. It ran from
 Metz to Sedan, thence to Mézières, and on through Hirson to Le-
 Cateau. It was the aim of Pershing to reach this road at Sedan while
 the French would move on it at Mézières. If these points were taken
 the enemy would have to withdraw a large portion of his line from
 France, perhaps leave the country altogether. Sedan was, therefore,
 a prize worth striving for. In carrying out this design the American
 sector was extended westward through the Argonne and had a total
 length of about ninety miles.

The Meuse-Argonne line was twenty-three miles long, eight miles
 of it extending through the forest. The Germans held it in force,
 although they had concentrated on the east side of the
 Meuse, because they expected the St. Mihiel attack to be
 continued toward Metz and Briey. Back of their first line of defense
 was another, known as the Kriemhilde Stellung, a very strong posi-
 tion in itself. Against the first Pershing placed nine divisions in
 his front line, besides reserves, putting them into position secretly
 on the night of September 25. He had 2700 guns, 189 small tanks,
 of which 142 were manned by Americans, and 821 airplanes, 604
 manned by Americans. In all respects his forces were superior to
 his opponents. Striking out at dawn on the 26th they carried for-
 ward the whole line that was in open country. In three days' fighting
 it was advanced from four to seven miles, and then it stopped until
 roads could be laid down through the newly conquered area. In the
 forest, however, the progress was slower. The Germans had long con-
 sidered the Argonne impregnable, and they had used it as a place for
 refreshing worn-out divisions. It was filled with machine-gun nests
 and the ranges of all of its many roads and paths were accurately
 plotted. The United States troops working forward against its
 strong defenses suffered severely, but they kept advancing.

By the night of October 3 the engineers had finished passable
 roads across what had been No Man's Land, the artillery had been
 carried forward, and next morning the advance was re-
 sumed with heavy fighting. Again it was hard work
 inside and outside the forest, but everywhere there was
 some advance. At the same time General Gouraud, west of the
 Argonne, resumed his advance, making a material gain. Thus as the
 lines went forward more rapidly on each side of the forest than in it,
 there was a tendency to flank the defenders of that strong position,

Meuse-
Argonne
Plans.

The First
Blow.

Second
Phase,
Oct. 4-10.

and they fell back cautiously, inflicting heavy losses as they went. This advance brought the troops against the Kriemhilde Stellung, or Line, on which the Germans had worked steadily since they realized that the sector was threatened. While they made preparations to break through, the divisions in the Argonne were fighting with redoubled efforts. On the 10th they completely cleared the forest on the north and joined hands with Gouraud's men, who had worked their way up the western edge of the Argonne until both armies stood at its northern edge before the town of Grand Pré.

The next thing to do was to carry the Kriemhilde Line, now a formidable position more than two miles deep and well supplied with every feature of engineering skill that the war had developed. **Third Phase,** After a brief breathing spell the attacks were resumed **Oct. 14-** on October 14. Now followed several days of bitter con- **Nov. 1.** test. October 24 the Kriemhilde Line was pierced on a three-mile front at Landres-et-St.-Georges. November 1 came a general attack along the whole line, the object being to break through and seize Buzancy, the railhead through which the German lines were supplied. The barrage that preceded the attack was the acme of dense and furious destruction. When the infantry went forward light artillery went with them. The result was a complete sweeping away of the German defenses and an advance of four miles on the road to Sedan, the enemy falling back in great haste. At this time the preliminary negotiations that led to the armistice were well advanced and it was reported that the enemy was not fighting with accustomed spirit. While the Americans won these advantages in their own sector, General Gouraud advanced steadily toward Mézières.

The objects of the campaign were now within reach of the soldiers from the United States. November 6 the First and the Forty-Second **Fourth Phase,** Divisions were within eight miles of Sedan and learned **Nov. 6-11.** that no hostile troops stood between them and that place. Each division set out at once to occupy the position. At the same time a French division set out on the same mission, but a little behind the other two divisions. They all arrived on the opposite bank of the river from Sedan, but the French division was allowed to occupy the town, so closely associated with the war of 1871, for which the events of 1918 were the retribution. Six days later the armistice was signed and the war was over.

Other United States soldiers than those already mentioned served in the campaigns in France. Among them was the Second Corps, **The Tunnel Sector.** under Major-General Read, consisting of the Twenty-Seventh and Thirtieth Divisions, and serving with the British near St. Quentin. September 29 the two divisions were thrown against the Hindenburg Line at a point where it was constructed above the tunneled Scheldt Canal. By filling the canal with barges and cutting exits it was possible to keep a division of reserves below ground.



From Bassett's "Our War with Germany" (Knopf)

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MAP OF THE MEUSE-ARGONNE REGION

The line indicated on the map is the old position, popularly called the Hindenburg Line. North of it was the Freya Line, running through Brioules, Romagne, Exermont, to the Argonne Forest. The Kriemhilde Line was still farther north, with Grand Pré for the western and Dun-sur-Meuse for the eastern pivot. It passed through St. George and Landres and was broken by the Americans at a point between them.

As the Americans charged across the lines they were surprised to see Germans swarm up behind them. The Twenty-Seventh spent the day and the next mopping up the captured lines and were then withdrawn to a rest area, having suffered severely. The Thirtieth managed to hold the position and moved on and took Bellicourt and Nauroy. October 1 they were withdrawn, but they were back in the line in time to take part in the operations of October 8-9. They fought in the right-center of the British line and took Brancourt and Prémont, for which they received special mention in General Haig's report. After a brief period of rest the advance was resumed at the Selle River on the 12th. The Thirtieth had been withdrawn to recuperate, but it was called back to take part in the advance, and by its side now stood the Twenty-Seventh, both divisions fighting brilliantly. They carried the line across the Selle in the face of stout resistance and then the advance paused. Before it was resumed the Second Corps was taken out of the line to rest and receive replacements; and the armistice was signed ere it could return. The Twenty-Seventh Division was from New York, the Thirtieth was from North Carolina, South Carolina, and Tennessee, and was known as the "Old Hickory Division."

Outside of France United States troops served in Italy, whither the 332d regiment of infantry was sent. It arrived in July, 1918, and took part in the action at the crossing of the Piave River. Another body went to Russia, where it made part of a force that helped the Russians against the Bolsheviks. It was too small to accomplish important results and was withdrawn in September, 1919. A third special force, composed of 9000 men, served with Japanese, British, and French troops in a joint expedition to protect the Siberian railroads from the Bolsheviks. They landed at Vladivostok August 4, 1918, and conducted a campaign that reached more than 400 miles into the interior. The unsettled state of Siberia made it necessary to maintain this force in the country after the armistice was signed in France; but orders were given that it should be used only to guard the railroads and the large quantity of supplies that had been landed at Vladivostok for the old Russian government. The force was withdrawn April 1, 1920.

The part taken by the United States in the world war was highly important and creditable to our national spirit. Despite the many difficulties in converting the most pacific nation in the world into an efficient fighting state, the work of preparation was performed with great ability. In the business of actual fighting the soldiers of the United States took a vigorous part. They did not win the war alone. They came into it when the other powers engaged were nearly exhausted by long and valiant battling. With their fresh spirits and their earnestness they made a profound impression on the situation. Their hard and repeated blows were decisive.

Gratified
through
between the

factors in the encounters that occurred from July 18, 1918, to the end in November. It was our good fortune that we were in a position to render this deciding service to liberal government. We have a right to look upon our efforts as the last blows that put the suffering and far-spent German autocracy out of the contest.

THE UNITED STATES NAVY IN THE WAR

During the war the ships of the navy were divided into five fleets: The Atlantic Fleet, a home fleet then composed of some of the older type battleships and cruisers, to take the place of the **Five Fleets.** newest ships, which had been ordered to service in European waters. It was under the command of Admiral H. T. Mayo and was expected to meet any emergency that might arise in home waters. The Coast Patrol, under Captain H. B. Wilson, consisting of small vessels, was assigned to duty along the Atlantic coast from Brazil to Newfoundland. The Pacific Fleet, under Admiral W. B. Caperton, and the Asiatic Fleet, under Admiral A. M. Knight, both of which had been deprived of some of their best ships for service elsewhere. The European Fleet, under Admiral W. S. Sims, consisting of the battleships that served with the Allied Grand Fleet in the North Sea, as well as of the destroyers and other ships that guarded the ocean lanes against submarines and protected the ports to which the American transports and supply ships were sent. Of these fleets the last took the most prominent part in the war.

The first work of the navy in European waters was undertaken in response to a call for destroyers immediately after we entered the **Destroyers' war.** A small squadron of these vessels was dispatched **off Queens-** and reported for duty at Queenstown, Ireland, on May 4. **town.** They were assigned to service on the lanes of traffic to protect shipping against submarines. In 1916 a three years' program of construction had been authorized for the navy. It embraced the construction of battleships, heavy cruisers, and various other kinds of vessels. As soon as we entered the war the work on the heavier ships was suspended and all possible energy was given to the construction of destroyers, and other small boats that could be used against submarines. By the end of 1917 new destroyers were being finished, and as fast as ready for the sea they were added to the squadron serving in Europe. It is impossible to determine the precise effect of our coöperation in this phase of the struggle; but it is known that the destruction of allied shipping was at the most dangerous rate early in May, 1917, and that it fell steadily from that time. By the end of the year it began to be under control and the authorities recovered their confidence in the situation. Had it continued at the April rate the British Isles would have been starved into surrender.

Convoying troops and supplies was another work in which the

navy took most efficient part. When the United States troops began to be sent across the ocean no one was bold enough to say that the crossing could be made without great loss of life from the submarines. To the surprise of all no transport was sunk going over to France, and of the three that were destroyed all were returning to the United States when they went down. It was through the advice of Admiral Sims that the British finally consented to organize their merchantmen into fleets sailing at specified times and escorted by warships, a precaution that reduced the losses materially. The cruising service of the United States navy in American waters released ships of the British and French navies for service against the submarines nearer home. It also made it possible to utilize in the Grand Fleet in the North Sea British destroyers that had been in the convoy service. The navy of the United States has the reputation of being ready for service whenever called upon. In the World War it fully met the expectation of the public.

In December, 1917, a squadron of the newest battleships of the navy went to Europe under Rear Admiral Hugh Rodman, to serve as the sixth battle squadron of the Grand Fleet of the allies. It was assigned to one of the two "fast wings" of the Fleet, so that in action it would either lead the van or protect the rear. The strategy of Admiral Beatty, commanding the Grand Fleet, was to get the German fleet out of its harbor and fight it to a finish. But he was not able to carry out such a design. The Germans were too cautious to risk their one naval hope on the issue of a battle.

One of the lessons of the war that is not discussed as frequently as its importance warrants is the efficiency displayed by the submarine mines as instruments of protection in waters adjacent to land. By this means the Germans held their opponents at safe distances from the Kiel Canal and Heligoland, and thus demonstrated the value of mines for coast defense. Mines were also strewn in channels and other waters frequented by shipping with disastrous results. The most striking use of mines was in planting a mine barrage across the North Sea, between Scotland and Norway, a distance of 230 miles. The project was suggested by an American officer, and it was carried out with British and American coöperation. It involved the development of a special type of mine. The United States shipped 85,000 mines abroad during the period of their participation in the war, of which more than 50,000 were laid. It is believed that at least ten submarines were destroyed at the North Sea mine-barrage.

THE TREATY OF VERSAILLES

December 15, 1917, the Bolshevik government at Brest-Litovsk signed an armistice with Germany. Seeking to justify Russia for

deserting her former allies it called on them to state the terms on which they would make peace. Lloyd George, fearing the action of the
Peace Bolsheviks would affect the loyalty of British labor,
Terms, Dec. 15, 1917. announced on January 5, 1918, some of the terms for which Great Britain would stand, as the evacuation and restoration of Belgium, the surrender of Alsace-Lorraine, and the disposition of the German colonies in accordance with the wishes of the inhabitants.

Continuing in the same spirit President Wilson, in addressing congress January 8, 1918, set forth his celebrated fourteen points, on which he said that peace could be made with the central
The "Fourteen Points" allies. They included open diplomacy, freedom of the seas, removal of economic barriers, disarmament, equitable disposition of the colonies, the restoration of Belgium, the restoration of devastated France, the surrender of Alsace-Lorraine, the readjustment of Italian boundaries along the lines of nationality, an independent Poland, and the organization of "a general association of nations" to afford "mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity to great and small States alike." In later speeches the president amplified his Fourteen Points to some extent, but that series of demands remained the most comprehensive expression of war demands made by any of the belligerents opposed to Germany.

In September, 1918, the Germans were meeting daily reverses in France, and Turkey was rapidly losing her hold on Syria. September 15 the allied troops broke the Saloniki front and
Breaking the Eastern Front. began a rapid advance which had the effect of forcing Bulgaria to sign an armistice on the 29th. With Constantinople exposed on the north it was to be expected that Turkey would surrender as soon as her opponents had time to attack her. She did, in fact, sign a humiliating armistice on October 31. Austria-Hungary read her fate in these occurrences. Her Czecho-Slovakian subjects broke into rebellion late in October, and her Poles were on the point of joining the revived Poland that Germany had set up against Russia. At this juncture the Italian and British forces in Italy
Austria Surrenders. delivered a hard attack on the Austrian lines there and swept them back with immense losses. Under the circumstances the government at Vienna signed an armistice on November 3 by which it gave up its last vestige of military power.

Meanwhile Germany was moving steadily toward a catastrophe. Seeing their allies falling into sheer distress the German people at last lost confidence in their ruling class. They would have
Political Changes in Germany. felt otherwise if the war had ended favorably; but with defeat staring them in the face they could but reflect that faith in the group had cost them dearly. Finally, on September 30 they forced their chancellor, von Hertling, to resign while Prince Maximilian of Baden, a known liberal, took his place, with respon-

sibility to the *Reichstag*. The day he took office, October 4, he caused the Swiss government to propose to President Wilson and the *Entente* allies an armistice to be followed by a conference to consider the terms of peace.

At this moment Germany seemed to face complete defeat. An armistice would give her time to extricate her armies from the threatened disaster. Many people thought Prince Maximilian's **Armistice** note was but a ruse to gain time for such an end. But **Requested.** President Wilson did not mean to reject an opportunity to have peace at the earliest moment, if assured that the offer was genuine. He inquired if Germany accepted the "Fourteen Points," and did the chancellor speak for the constituted authorities of the empire? Senator Lodge, speaking in the senate, expressed his keen disappointment "that the President should at this stage enter into a discussion" with Germany. He would have had him demand unconditional surrender.

In his reply Prince Maximilian accepted the "Fourteen Points" and asserted that he held office by virtue of the wish of the *Reichstag* and thus spoke for the German people. Other notes confirmed these declarations, and President Wilson submitted the correspondence to the governments of the allied powers, who, in turn, announced their willingness to enter into peace negotiation on the basis of the "Fourteen Points," with certain conditions. Thus was called the meeting of military officers at Senlis, November 8, at which the Germans accepted the severe terms of the armistice dictated by the visitors. It was agreed that firing should cease at eleven o'clock on the morning of November 11.

It is probable that the mass of the German people did not then know to what extent they were beaten. They made a brave attempt to welcome their soldiers home as victors, but the terms of the **Terms of Armistice.** gave up vast quantities of munitions, including 5000 guns, 25,000 machine-guns, and 1700 airplanes of the best classes. She evacuated the country west of the Rhine and allowed her opponents to hold temporarily the cities of Cologne, Mayence, and Coblenz, the last mentioned being occupied by United States troops. In addition she gave up all her submarines, 6 battle cruisers, 10 battleships, 5 modern light cruisers, and 50 modern destroyers. Measures like these completely destroyed her power of resistance, and left her at the mercy of her opponents in the future course of the peace negotiations.

This humiliation broke the spell through which the privileged classes had ruled the people. Stripped of successes they were menaced with repudiation, and November 9 the kaiser abdicated and fled to Holland, followed by the Crown Prince **Hohen-zollerns Overthrown.** and other members of the Hohenzollern family. The king of Württemberg also abdicated, and the kings of Bavaria and

Saxony were deposed. Within a week most of the princes, grand dukes, and dukes who had ruled in Germany yielded up their power. The kaiser held on to his kingship of Prussia until November 28, when he gave that up also in a letter of abdication. The result was that Germany became "an imperial republic."

The Peace Conference met at Versailles January 18, 1919. The representatives of the United States were President Wilson, Secretary of State Lansing, Colonel E. M. House, Henry White, and General Tasker H. Bliss. The president believed it his duty to go to the Conference in order to obtain the adoption of a League of Nations. Leading the delegation it was natural for him to dominate it. He arrived at Brest, the point of debarkation for most of the American soldiers who had gone to France, on December 13, 1918. Arriving in Paris next day he was received with the most enthusiastic demonstrations. In visits he made to England and Italy he was received with the same delirious joy, as the bringer of a new era of "peace on earth and good will to men." In the relaxation from the horrors of war the people hailed with delight one who stood for permanent peace. How they were to get permanent peace they did not stop to ask.

In the United States public opinion was shifting. Early in his first administration President Wilson gave much time to the management of his party. When the World War began he concentrated his energies on problems of neutrality and began to let party leadership slip out of his hands. When we got into the war he gave intense attention to its direction and to his plan for a League of Nations. Most of the democrats followed him loyally; but a few, notably some democratic senators, resented his preoccupied manner and began to find fault with the conduct of the war. They had energetic support from the opposition party. Enough was said and done to create the opinion that the administration was most inefficient. To most of the malcontent democrats the League of Nations was a sacrifice of national interests.

This undercurrent of dissatisfaction found expression in the elections of 1918. It was aided by the fact that the republicans had now completely healed the breach of 1912. As the elections approached the democrats came to realize the peril in which they stood, and some of them appealed to the president to issue a statement in their behalf. Yielding to their requests he called on the country to elect a senate and house that would support him in carrying through his policy in the peace negotiations. His opponents pronounced this an unwarranted interference in the elections. The counting of ballots showed that they had carried both houses of congress. Thus it happened that when President Wilson went into the Peace Conference determined to wring some kind of League of Nations from the European diplomats he was hampered by the fact

that if he obtained what he wanted he would have to go through another contest to get an adverse senate to ratify it.

The work of the Peace Conference was assigned to committees, as the Committee on the League of Nations, on which President Wilson and Colonel House were the American representatives. But there was a central Council of Ten, composed of two members of each of the five large nations, Great Britain, France, Italy, Japan, and the United States. This committee soon became the important part of the Conference, and eventually its work was taken over by what came to be called the Big Four, the chief representatives of the leading states, Lloyd George for Great Britain, Clemenceau for France, Orlando for Italy, and Wilson for the United States.

February 14 the Committee on the League of Nations reported a draft of a Covenant of a League, announcing that it had the approval of all the allied belligerents. The report was published, and the next day President Wilson sailed for the United States, where his presence was demanded in connection with the closing business of congress. While in this country he made speeches in behalf of the Covenant and received suggestions of amendments from men like ex-President Taft, Elihu Root, and Charles E. Hughes. Returning to Paris immediately after the adjournment of congress he was able to incorporate most of these suggestions in the amended Covenant, which was finally adopted by the Peace Conference on April 28.

The Covenant outlined a league of sovereign states for the specific purpose of reducing or eliminating the likelihood of war. In Article X it pledged the constituent states to respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and political independence of the signatory states. If a war threatened, provision was made for taking the dispute to a court of arbitration before the parties were to go to war. A third important point was that plans should be made by the council of the League for the reduction of armaments. To carry out the purposes of the League there were to be a Permanent Court of Justice, a Council, and an Assembly. In the last were to sit representatives of each signatory state, in the Council were to sit representatives of the five large states, with four members to be selected from the other states by the Assembly. The plan for the court was to be formulated by the council and approved by the assembly. There was to be, also, a permanent secretary, whose chief duties were clerical. A mandatory system was created to take over and administer the conquered German colonies for the benefit of the colonists themselves and for the equal privileges of all the signatory states. In order to satisfy the United States special guarantees were given that the League should not interfere with the Monroe Doctrine. A special pledge was given that fair conditions of labor should be guaranteed by the states in the League.

In the general work of the Conference the delegates of the United States took active part. They sat on the committee on reparation and discussed boundaries and economic conditions. When the Big Four, late in the sessions, became the center of action for the Conference, President Wilson showed himself a vigorous and persistent leader. As the author of the "Fourteen Points," which had been accepted as a basis of negotiation, he was concerned with all that was done. He was not able to get all of these "Points" into the treaty, but he got in all he thought possible. The final document was handed to the Germans on May 7, 1919, the fourth anniversary of the destruction of the *Lusitania*. It was a hard treaty, but the conduct of Germans in the war made it a just one. There was some protest, slight alterations were made, and on June 28 the treaty was signed in the Hall of Mirrors in the palace of Versailles. July 10 President Wilson presented it to the senate in Washington.

The debate that followed was influenced to a considerable extent by party feeling. Many people had hoped that the debate would be on a non-partisan plane, and some of the senators had at first shown that they would throw aside party lines. But as the debate progressed they veered around to the position of the party leaders. President Wilson then appealed to the people. Starting out on a long tour that took him to the Pacific Coast he discussed the League to large audiences and with good effect. When he had gone as far on his return as Wichita his health gave way, and he came back to Washington an invalid, part of the time in serious fear for his life. In this situation he could not influence the League contest, which drifted for weeks and months. It was not decided finally until March 19, 1920, when by a vote of 34 republicans and 23 democrats against 15 republicans and 24 democrats the treaty, as amended by the republican majority, failed to have the necessary two-thirds of the senate and was not ratified. The minority included those who would have no league at all and those who supported the covenant without change. The majority included a number of democrats who favored the Covenant as written but were willing to take the Covenant with reservations of the republicans as the best that could be done in the existing situation.

In the debates two points encountered more opposition than any others. The Covenant allowed the British Empire one vote and one each to Australia, Canada, India, New Zealand, and South Africa. This arrangement was pronounced unfair on the ground that it gave the British six votes in the Assembly of the League. In the reservations of the republicans, popularly called the Lodge Reservations, this arrangement was repudiated absolutely: it was declared that no state should have more votes than the United States. In the democratic, or Hitchcock, Reservations, which had the approval of President Wilson, it was provided that a British col-

any should not vote when a purely British question was under consideration.

A second point related to Article X of the Covenant, which read: "The members of the League undertake to respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all members of the League. In case of any such aggression, or in case of any threat or danger of such aggression the Council shall advise upon the means by which this obligation shall be fulfilled." Opponents of the Covenant in general objected that this clause was likely to draw us into foreign wars. The republican reservations gave notice that in signing the League the United States assumed no obligation to defend the territorial integrity or political independence of any state unless the congress of the United States specifically authorized the said action. The democratic resolutions provided that when the Council "advised" on the means of fulfilling the obligations of the states, as provided in Article X, it was understood that they "advised" subject to the well-recognized principle of the Constitution that the congress alone could declare war.

President Wilson, in the light of later events, was blamed by many people for not accepting the Lodge Reservations. His position was that these reservations did, in fact, amend the Covenant in such a way that it took out the heart of it. He opposed especially the proposition to make the consent of congress necessary for each specific act by which we guaranteed political integrity. He thought that to try to lessen the representation of the self-governing British dominions would produce utter confusion. Two consequences followed from the long debate, whether intended or not: The attention of the congress and the country was taken up with the treaty and turned away from the consideration of matters connected with the restoration of domestic affairs to peace-time conditions; and the League of Nations controversy was thrown forward so that it became an issue in the elections of 1920.

The republican convention met in Chicago on June 8. It adopted its platform after a severe fight had taken place between those who favored accepting the League with moderate reservations and those who wished to reject it entirely. In the end the League plank was supposed to favor the latter. The candidates nominated were Senator Warren G. Harding, of Ohio, for president, and Governor Calvin Coolidge, of Massachusetts, for vice-president. The democratic convention met in San Francisco on June 28. Its platform indorsed President Wilson's administration. The candidates selected were Governor James M. Cox, of Ohio, for president, and Franklin D. Roosevelt, of New York, for vice-president.

In the beginning of the campaign it was thought that the execution of the eighteenth amendment of the Constitution, prohibiting the

manufacture and sale of intoxicating liquors, in effect in 1919, would have much to do with the results. At the same time another amendment was hanging in the balance, lacking the ratification of only one state. It at last received that when ratified by Tennessee in July, 1920, and thus the nineteenth amendment was placed in the Constitution, providing that suffrage shall not be denied on the ground of sex. It was believed that the woman's vote would play a significant part in support of the League of Nations.

Persons who knew the progress of previous campaigns were astonished at the general apathy which characterized the first weeks of the campaign of 1920. Later on much interest seemed to exist in the League of Nations. But everywhere was seen dissatisfaction with the democratic party's conduct of the government. The war was vastly expensive, the cost-plus system, which had been adopted to avoid the evils of the contract system, produced some glaring abuses, and there was a general popular demand that the government should be placed in other hands. When the votes were counted in November it was seen that Harding and Coolidge had received 404 of the 531 electoral votes and were elected. They had immense majorities in most of the states they carried, broke the "Solid South," and in the country at large their popular vote was more than seven millions larger than their opponents'. Making due allowance for the woman's vote, which would tend to make majorities larger than formerly, the successful candidates had the largest popular majority in our history.

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
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